Koaliční hlasování a koeficienty volební moci aktérů

Abstract

Bakal arska pr aca je uvodn ym textom te orie koali cn ych hlasovac ch hier pre form alne (logika, matematika, te oria hier) i humanitne (politol ogia, sociol ogia) zameran ych citate lov. S u uveden e z akladn e de n cie, charakteristiky koali cn ych volebn ych syst emov, diferenci acia na v a zen e a nev a zen e PP-hlasovacie syst emy. Dal sia cas t sa venuje t eme volebnej moci, s u de novan e najzn amej sie koe cienty volebnej moci pre jednotliv ych voli cov (Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan-Packel). Z avere cn a praktick a aplik acia koe- cientov porovn ava volebn u moc jednotliv ych kraj n EU pri prij man rozhodnut v Rade Eur opskej unie pod la zmluvy z Nice a Lisabonu.

This thesis is an introducion to the theory of coalition games intended for readers oriented on formal disciplines (logic, mathematic, game theory) as well as on humanities (political science and sociology). Basic de nitions, characterization of voting systems, definition of weighted and unweighted voting systems are introduced. The next part of the thesis focuses on indexes of power (Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan-Packel). The last part of thesis addresses the application indexes of power. Comparisons of indexes of the EU countries in decision-making proccesses of the Council of the European Union in accordance with the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon are presented.