Pluralism, Eliminativism, and the Definition of Art
dc.contributor.author | Bartel, Christopher | |
dc.contributor.author | Kwong, Jack M. C. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-25T14:09:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-09-25T14:09:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-09-16 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183913 | |
dc.description.abstract | Traditional monist theories of art fail to account for the diversity of objects that intuitively strike many as belonging to the category art. Some today argue that the solution to this problem requires the adoption of some version of pluralism to account for the diversity of art. We examine one recent attempt, which holds that the correct account of art must recognize the plurality of concepts of art. However, we criticize this account of concept pluralism as being unable to offer an explanation of why some concept is an art concept. Instead, many of the disagreements over the definition of art could be reconciled by recognizing that works of art can be valued in a plurality of ways. By recognizing a plurality of values for art, we claim further that the definition of art becomes a non-issue. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | cs |
dc.publisher | Helsinki University Press | en |
dc.publisher | Univerzita Karlova, Filozofická fakulta | cs |
dc.rights | This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. | en |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source.uri | https://estetikajournal.org | |
dc.subject | artistic value | en |
dc.subject | concepts | en |
dc.subject | definition of art | en |
dc.subject | eliminativism | en |
dc.subject | pluralism | en |
dc.title | Pluralism, Eliminativism, and the Definition of Art | en |
dc.type | Vědecký článek | cs |
uk.abstract.en | Traditional monist theories of art fail to account for the diversity of objects that intuitively strike many as belonging to the category art. Some today argue that the solution to this problem requires the adoption of some version of pluralism to account for the diversity of art. We examine one recent attempt, which holds that the correct account of art must recognize the plurality of concepts of art. However, we criticize this account of concept pluralism as being unable to offer an explanation of why some concept is an art concept. Instead, many of the disagreements over the definition of art could be reconciled by recognizing that works of art can be valued in a plurality of ways. By recognizing a plurality of values for art, we claim further that the definition of art becomes a non-issue. | en |
dc.publisher.publicationPlace | Praha | cs |
dc.publisher.publicationPlace | Helsinki | en |
uk.internal-type | uk_publication | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.33134/eeja.213 | |
dc.description.startPage | 100 | cs |
dc.description.endPage | 113 | cs |
dcterms.isPartOf.name | Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics | en |
dcterms.isPartOf.journalYear | 2021 | |
dcterms.isPartOf.journalVolume | 2021 | |
dcterms.isPartOf.journalIssue | 2 | |
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn | 2571-0915 |
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Kromě případů, kde je uvedeno jinak, licence tohoto záznamu je This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.