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<title>Ročník 2019</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/105685" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle>Volume 2019</subtitle>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/105685</id>
<updated>2026-04-05T08:33:07Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-05T08:33:07Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>What Is an Instance of an Artwork?</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111200" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Aliyev, Alexey</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111200</id>
<updated>2022-03-04T14:00:47Z</updated>
<published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">What Is an Instance of an Artwork?
Aliyev, Alexey
The expression ‘an instance of an artwork’ is often used in philosophical discourse about
art. Yet there is no clear account of what exactly this expression means. My goal in this
essay is to provide such an account. I begin by expounding and defending a particular
definition of the concept of ‘an instance of an artwork’. Next, I elaborate this definition –
by providing definitions of the main derivatives of the concept of ‘an instance of an
artwork’, namely the concepts of ‘a well-formed instance of an artwork’ and ‘a non-wellformed
instance of an artwork’. Finally, I examine the relation of the foregoing definitions
to the existence and identity conditions of artworks and make some additional remarks
concerning these definitions.
</summary>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Problem of Intentionality in the Contemporary Visual Arts</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111198" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Lorenzini, Gianluca</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111198</id>
<updated>2022-03-04T14:00:47Z</updated>
<published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Problem of Intentionality in the Contemporary Visual Arts
Lorenzini, Gianluca
The discourse regarding intentionality and interpretation in analytic philosophy of art,
although ample and lively, has concerned itself almost exclusively with the literary
medium. Starting from a paper published by Hans Maes, I discuss the complications that
may arise in straightforwardly applying current intentionalist strategies to the realm of
the contemporary visual arts. I first present a detailed account of the difference
between hypothetical intentionalism and moderate actual intentionalism which will help
to better understand the nature of Maes’s arguments in his paper. I then argue that
the characteristics which shape the approach of moderate actual intentionalism cannot
be accommodated by certain contemporary visual artworks. I will demonstrate how in
certain contemporary artworks, should a viewer be interested in accepting actual
intentions within her interpretation, she will have to do so with an extreme intentionalist
posture rather than a moderate actual one.
</summary>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Novels in the Everyday: An Aesthetic Investigation</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111196" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Puolakka, Kalle</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111196</id>
<updated>2022-03-04T14:00:47Z</updated>
<published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Novels in the Everyday: An Aesthetic Investigation
Puolakka, Kalle
Everyday aestheticians have had relatively little to say about literature. Inspired by Peter
Kivy’s philosophy of literature as laid out in his books The Performance of Reading and
Once-Told Tales, I examine reading literature as a part of everyday life. I argue that not only
do Kivy’s views help explain the value that avid readers place on their daily silent
engagement with a book, but that his philosophy of literature also shows how literary
works can have an aesthetic presence in our everyday lives even during periods
in-between reading a book. In light of the paper, literary reading turns out to be an
artistic routine that fills avid readers’ everyday lives in a very literal sense.
</summary>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Artistic Proofs: A Kantian Approach to Aesthetics in Mathematics</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111195" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Wang, Weijia</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/111195</id>
<updated>2022-03-04T14:00:47Z</updated>
<published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Artistic Proofs: A Kantian Approach to Aesthetics in Mathematics
Wang, Weijia
This paper explores the nature of mathematical beauty from a Kantian perspective.
According to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, satisfaction in beauty is subjective
and non-conceptual, yet a proof can be beautiful even though it relies on concepts.
I propose that, much like art creation, the formulation and study of a complex
demonstration involves multiple and progressive interactions between the freely original
imagination and taste (that is, the aesthetic power of judgement). Such a proof is artistic
insofar as it is guided by beauty, namely, the mere feeling about the imagination’s free
lawfulness. The beauty in a proof’s process and the perfection in its completion together
facilitate a transition from subjective to objective purposiveness, a transition that Kant
himself does not address in the third Critique.
</summary>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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