

Abstract

The first aim of this thesis is to describe the steps from the perspective of the United Kingdom, which led to the passing of the resolution 1973 and the subsequent military intervention in Libya in 2011. The theoretical framework is securitization theory. The second aim of this thesis is grounded in the theory and tries to highlight the importance of the concept of audience in the securitization framework. In order to achieve this goal, securitization theory is introduced; its limitations described and subsequently reconceptualized to better suit the research question. The theory is then applied on a case study of the securitizing discourse, preceding the intervention from 15th of February until 21st of March 2011. These events are described from the perspective of the United Kingdom, which together with the general overview corresponds with the hypothesis that the Cameron administration was a securitizing actor towards both national and international audience. Consequently, the analysis shows that the securitizing discourses differed based on the relevant audience. Although human security and democratic aspirations were the main referent objects in both discourses, protection of national security as a referent object was specific only to the national audience. In addition, Gaddafi regime was the main threat presented towards both audiences. However, in the context of national security, the threats of Gaddafi supported terrorism and refugee crisis were present only on the national level. The no-fly zone represented extraordinary measures in both discourses. The differences in the securitizing discourses confirmed the insight that securitization should put more emphasis on the role of the audience in the process as the securitizing moves are often audience-specific.