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**A Discourse Analysis of the International
Relations between Russia and the United
States of America**

Diplomová práce

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Rok obhajoby: 2015

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Abstrakt

Táto diplomová práca analyzuje americko-ruské bilaterálne vzťahy prostredníctvom interpretácie diskurzov, rozhovorov a prejavov amerických a ruských prezidentov od septembra 2001 do decembra 2013. Ako teoretický a metodologický rámec práca používa kritickú diskurzívnu analýzu, presnejšie členskú kategorizačnú analýzu, na základe ktorej kategorizuje jednotlivé obdobia americko-ruských bilaterálnych vzťahov do troch kategórií – pozitívnej, neutrálnej a negatívnej. Každá kategória je definovaná dvoma základnými konceptmi členskej kategorizačnej analýzy - kolekciami pozitívnych, neutrálnych a negatívnych kategórií, ktorými sa prezidenti označovali navzájom, a predikátmi použitými v spojení s jednotlivými kategóriami. Výsledná kategorizácia americko-ruských bilaterálnych vzťahov je prepojená s konvenčnými politickými udalosťami s cieľom poukázať na paralely medzi zmenami v kategorizácii založenej na diskurzoch a zmenami v konvenčnom politickom kontexte. Diplomová práca tak ponúka alternatívny pohľad na vývoj americko-ruských bilaterálnych vzťahov.

Abstract

The diploma thesis analyses U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship based on the interpretation of discourses, interviews and speeches of the American and Russian presidents since September 2001 till December 2013. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, and more specifically Membership Categorization Analysis, as a theoretical and methodological basis of the analysis, the thesis categorizes specific periods of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship into three categories – positive, neutral and negative. Each category is defined by two basic concepts of the Membership Categorization

Analysis – by the collections of positive, neutral and negative categories, which were addressed by the presidents to their counterparts, and by the category-tied predicates related to the particular categories. The final categorization of the U.S.-Russian relations is contrasted with conventional political affairs aiming to highlight the parallels between the categorization changes based on the discourses and the changes in the conventional political context. The diploma thesis offers an alternative view on the U.S.-Russian relations.

Kľúčové slová

Kritická diskurzívna analýza, členská kategorizačná analýza, Spojené štáty americké, Rusko, bilaterálne vzťahy

Keywords

Critical Discourse Analysis, Membership Categorization Analysis, United States of America, Russia, bilateral relations

Rozsah práce: 177 523 vrátane medzier

Prehlásenie

1. Prehlasujem, že som predkladanú prácu spracovala samostatne a použila som len uvedené pramene a literatúru.
2. Prehlasujem, že práca nebola využitá k získaniu iného titulu.
3. Súhlasím s tým, aby bola práca sprístupnená pre študijné a výskumné účely.

V Prahe dňa 2. januára 2015

Bc. Andrea Pitoňáková

Pod'akovanie

Na tomto mieste by som rada pod'akovala PhDr. Vítovi Stříteckému, M.Phil., Ph.D. za jeho neoceniteľný prínos pre vznik tejto diplomovej práce.

The delimitation of a researched topic of international security

Topic: A Discourse Analysis of the International Relations between Russia and the United States of America since 2001 Based on Official Speeches Given by High State Representatives

Russia-U.S. international relations experienced a tough period during the Cold War when a conflict between these two countries could have led to lethal consequences not only for the two of them, but also for the whole world. Since the end of the Cold War and the origin of the Russian Federation as a democratic country, the Russia-U.S. relations warmed rapidly, what meant that Russia and the United States of America were no longer enemies. Despite that, their relationship in the 1990's and in the period after 2000 cannot be defined as a pure friendship.¹ Although the countries tried to collaborate, in 2001 "President Putin seemingly decided that Russia should "go for it alone" and subsequently, adopted independent approach to foreign and security policy.²

However, with the arrival of President Medvedev in 2008 and President Obama in 2009, the U.S.-Russian relations improved significantly, mainly due to the new policy of reset implemented by President Obama and his administration. The cooperation and talks between the two nations improved significantly and actually reached very important agreements in the questions regarding nuclear weapons and they even established Bilateral Presidential Commission in 2009.³ However, as President Putin was re-elected to the office in 2012, a deterioration of the mutual relations can be noted already although according to the speech of White House spokesman Jay Carney, their

¹ Allison, G.; Blackwill, R. D.; et al. (2011): *Russia and U.S. National Interests. Why Should Americans Care?* Harvard: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, p. 3.

² Kanet, R. E. (2009): *From Cooperation to Confrontation: Russia and the United States since 9/11*. Miami: Department of International Studies, p. 2-3.

³ Bilateral Presidential Commission (2012): *U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission. 2012 Joint Report*, p. 2.

cooperation was “based on (their) interest and not on personalities”⁴ and no change in the cooperation was expected, but reality of the last year proves otherwise.

The topic is very up-to-date analysing the relations of two extremely important nations that have been actively forming world’s history for a long time. In the world full of security threats that can be seen today it is inevitable to define the security allies that states can count on. Therefore the topic of U.S.-Russian relations seems so crucial, as the states need to know what attitude the others are in favour of. In my research, I will try to illustrate the relations not according to the outer actions, but according to discourses of high state representatives. A different approach can contribute positively not only to the research that has already been done, but also it is important for the future. Understanding their relations today may help us understand their future development as these two actors will surely remain in the international arena for many years to come.

An outline of a research methodology

The research methodology that will be used in my research will be a discourse analysis. Basically, the discourse analysis is used to examine the common use of language in a social context, which means that language is in the limelight of the discourse analysis, both in spoken and written form. However, the scope of the method can be greater and include even non-verbal communication. That part of the methodology will not be needed in my research though. The traditional methods consider the language only to be the mediator of the information about the real world “behind” the text. On the contrary, the discourse analysis does not treat the language as a sole means of passing the information on. The text and language themselves represent an instrumental part of the social context. The discourse analysis attempts to find out how people construct the reality by studying text produced and emitted to the society.⁵

⁴Carney, J (2012), (04-13-2013). Available from: <http://en.rian.ru/world/20120309/172012174.html>

⁵ Beneš, V. (2008): *Diskurzivní analýza*. In: Drulák, P.: *Jak zkoumat politiku*. Praha: Portál, s. 100-102.

A discourse analysis treats the reality as socially constructed and one of its main aims is to understand the specific ways of its creation. In my research, I will use the critical discourse analysis that has arisen only recently due to the contribution of Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk. According to the basic principles of the method, the language and discourse are not autonomous parts of reality, but that they are interconnected with its other parts.

Apart from the linguistic analysis of a text, the critical discourse analysis examines also the “rules of the discourse” in broader societal and historical context. It attempts to analyse the text as a discursive activity realized in a context created by the social praxis. This part of the analysis includes also other texts that are related to the main discourse and also contribute to the formation of the social context. Moreover, the third part of the method is the analysis of the real praxis in the society and deals mainly with ideology and power. The power relations influence the discourses while they are also influenced by the discourses. The critical discourse analysis does not claim that there is only one objective knowledge that would explain the reality.⁶

Moreover, in the group of discourse analysis, several different approaches can be identified. I will be using the Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) that was originally formulated by Sacks in the 1960s. It is important to point out that the categorization is not done just in order to create a classification, but to accomplish other goals. Sacks’s basic suggestion was that “*everyday knowledge is organized in membership categorization devices which consist of membership categories.*”⁷ The categories are determined by category-bound activities, which are determining for the character of the group, and category-bound predicates, i.e. aims, beliefs or values.⁸ The categories, however, can be altered in three specific ways – by altering the predicates, by changing the incumbency of the category and by modifying a collection into which the category belongs. These three factors are interdependent which means that changing

⁶ Beneš, V. (2008): *Diskurzivní analýza*. In: Drulák, P.: *Jak zkoumat politiku*. Praha: Portál, s. 93-95.

⁷ Leudar, I.; Marsland, V.; Nekvapil, J. (2004): *On membership categorization: ‘us’, ‘them’ and ‘doing violence’ in political discourse*. In: *Discourse & Society*, Vol 15, p. 244.

⁸ Collet, T. (2009): *Civilization and civilized in post-9/11 US presidential speeches*. In: *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, p. 459.

one aspect could lead to the change in another. Besides, categories are related to actions and can be used to justify events from the past or to prepare the grounds for the future. The creation of categories depends not only on the situation, but also on cultural resources provided by language.⁹

Research questions

The research questions that my research will try to find answers to are connected mainly with the membership categorization analysis that I will use. For my illustration of the U.S.-Russian relations, the vocabulary and language used in discourses of high state representatives will be the crucial ones. These will determine the basic categories characterizing the U.S-Russian relations.

Which expressions are used in speeches given by high state representatives to describe their counterparts and their mutual relationship? Is Russia marked as a friend, an ally or a simply just as a state in the speeches of the American representatives? What are the expressions that, on the other hand, define the U.S. in the Russian discourses? How have these expressions been changing since 2001?

The research question for the second part of my discourse analysis is related to the context in which the discourses were created and presented.

Which events are regarded as the most important ones in the U.S.-Russian relations since 2001? How are the changes in the discourses linked to the context? What happened when the rhetoric of the discourses underwent an alternation?

Levels of analysis

The analysis will use a new approach in the research of the U.S.-Russian relations. Most of the current studies concentrate on the political events and based on that information

⁹ Leudar, I.; Marsland, V.; Nekvapil, J. (2004): *On membership categorization: 'us', 'them' and 'doing violence' in political discourse*. In: *Discourse & Society*, Vol 15, p. 262-3.

they try to analyse the relations between the two countries. However, the political context will form only one part of my research that will be complementary to the main membership categorization analysis. Till now, speeches of high state representatives have not been fully used in the analysis of the topic and therefore I consider the research to be very original.

The main scope of the research will focus on the international relations of the United States of America and Russia. However, the scope will be mostly political as I will deal mainly with speeches of high state representatives, such as presidents, ministers or spokesmen. The research will also tackle security issues of the world politics as the countries sometimes present very different attitudes towards international issues, such as missiles in the Central Europe, the war in Iraq and Georgia, the situation in Syria or Russian cooperation with Venezuela.

The research will start with the analysis in the year 2001 when George W. Bush became the president of the United States of America, it will include the years of changing the presidency both in Russia and the U.S. (2008 and 2009) as these years present an crucial change in the mutual relations. The arrival of President Medvedev and President Obama to the office meant intensified cooperation and even a “restart” in their mutual politics. The analysis will finish with the year 2013. Inclusion of the year 2013 is important for drawing a detailed image of the present relations and for a plausible prediction of their future, given that in the year 2012 the old President Putin came back to power in Russia.

Research material

The research material will consist mainly of the transcripts of the speeches of high states representatives that will be used in the discourse analysis. The data-set will include not only the speeches given by the presidents of Russia and the United States of America, but also it will count with the discourses of ministers responsible for international affairs and security policy. Specifically, I will focus on the State Secretary of the Department of State as well as on the U.S. Secretary of Defence. In Russia, I will deal with the speeches given by ministers of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации*) and Russian Ministry of

Defence (*Министерство обороны Российской Федерации*). In the first part of my research, I will use the official speeches performed by the secretaries. The second part of my research called “reality check” will be based on the historical context of the years 2001-2013. For this part of my analysis I will focus on the news and articles presenting the events from the determined period of time.

The very basic unit of the data that I will collect from the speeches and documents will be in the form of words that will classify the relations of Russia and the United States of America. I will concentrate on different names and expressions that are used in the U.S. to describe Russia and vice versa. I expect to come across a change in the expressions used in the documents in the period after President Obama was inaugurated and started to exercise his own foreign politics. A similar alternation is anticipated in the Russian speeches of the administration of President Medvedev. The expressions will determine three basic groups of U.S.-Russian relations – positive (e.g. friend, ally, partner), negative (e. g. enemy, opponent, rival) and neutral (e. g. state, nation, people). The classification will be useful in the final assessment of the discourse analysis of the mutual relations between Russia and the United States. I assume that the classification of their relation will change over time and due to the membership categorization analysis I will be able to find out new characteristics of the U.S.-Russian relation.

Data collection

The data will be collected by a discourse analysis, precisely membership categorization analysis that will use the official speeches of the Presidents, Security and Foreign Affairs Ministers and Secretaries. These documents are available on the official websites of the institutions that is why the acquirement of the documents will not be complicated. In the analysis, I will include the speeches since 2001 given by Presidents Bush and Obama for the United States and Presidents Putin and Medvedev for Russia. Moreover, the speeches given by the State Secretaries Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, William Joseph Burns, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry will be taken into consideration. The same applies for Defence Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld, Robert. M. Gates, Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel. On the other hand, the speeches of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov and Sergei Lavror and of Ministers of Defence Sergei Ivanov,

Anatoly Seryukov and Sergei Shoigu will be analysed. In case that I will find it unsatisfactory, the database will be widened and enriched by other state representatives whose speeches will deal with Russia or the United States of America.

For the speeches and documents of the U.S. Presidents and the Secretaries of Defence and State:

<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/bushpresidency.html>

<http://obamaspeeches.com/>

<http://www.defense.gov/>

<http://www.state.gov/>

For the speeches and documents of the Russian Presidents and the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs:

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/speeches.shtml?month=03&day=6&year=2001&Submit.x=4&Submit.y=8&prefix=&value_from=&value_to=&date=&stype=&dayRequired=no&day_enable=true#

<http://kremlin.ru/>

<http://mil.ru/>

<http://mid.ru/bdomp/sitemap.nsf>

Data Analysis

The analysis will be realized according to the principles of critical discourse analysis. It means that the analysis will not attempt to find an objective truth about the society, rather it will try to draw an image of the international relations of the United States of America and Russia based on speeches given by high state representatives. The basic concept that will determine also the methodological part of my research will be membership categorization analysis. Via the basic principles I will try to analyse the relationship of the U.S. and Russia, identifying the main predicates and activities that determine the character of their relationship category. Based on the analysis of the discourses and the expressions mostly used in the speeches, the relationship of the U.S. and Russia at a certain moment of time will be allocated into one of the three basic categories – positive, neutral, and negative. The very basic determinant of the groups

will be the expressions that will be mentioned in the American or Russian speeches related to Russia or the U.S. respectively. Moreover, common actions and activities, such as meetings, establishing new institution or organizing a summit, or a refusal to do so, will be taken into consideration as well. The membership categorization will determine how the states see each other according to the speeches of high state representatives. The categorization will represent the basis of my research I will try to identify changes in the discourses and to link them with the changes in the historical context. Once the membership category changes, I will attempt to see how it determined the historical context or to find the reasons that led to such a change.

The analysis will consist of two main parts that will be interconnected. Firstly, I will focus on the genuine texts of the speeches which take into consideration both Russia and the United States. According to the language used in the speeches, I will do my best at defining the mutual relation category of the two states at the given time.

The second step of my analysis will examine historic context in the period from 2001 till 2013 in case that a change in the categorization will occur in the first part of the analysis. I will try to determine similarities or even interconnections between the discourse of high state representatives of Russia and the US and the actual historic context. The existence of a parallel between the discourse and the reality is plausible according to the critical discourse analysis.


Displaying the findings

The result of the discourse analysis will be my master's thesis in which I will draw a unique image of the international relations of Russia and the United States of America in two steps – the membership categorization analysis of the speeches given by high state representatives and the reality check in the form of the historical context that supplement the relations since 2001 till 2013. The primary outcome will be a text in which the findings will be presented. However, a possibility of graphical presentation that would illustrate the ratio of the different expressions belonging to different categories seems reasonable. Therefore, apart from the textual outcome, I will create a classification of the membership categories of the expressions used for determining

Russia and the U.S. that will be afterwards transformed into a graph. The three categories (positive, neutral, negative) will represent the axis y, while the time period since 2001 till 2013 will correspond with the axis x. The graphical representation will simplify the analysis of the changes that are expected to be spotted with the personal changes in the administration of the presidents. Moreover, the graphs will contribute to easier understanding of the results as visual presentations are believed to attract more attention and to be simpler to perceive than a written text. A combination of these two means of analysis will be nothing, but positive for my future thesis.

In the table below, an example of the graphical representation of the analysis is stated. In the first column the three categories (positive, negative, neutral) are stated, whereas in the first row the time axis is determined. Consequently, the numbers correspond to the frequency with which the specific expressions were found in the speeches from a specific year. The following graph illustrates the findings even more transparently.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
positive	10	12	11	12	10	8	12	18	22	24	23	12	10
negative	2	3	2	4	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1
neutral	16	12	15	14	13	14	10	5	6	4	6	15	12



Literature expected to be used

Apart from the speeches and official documents, scientific literature on the international relations between Russia and the U.S. will be used.

Monographs:

Allison, G.; Blackwill, R. D.; et al. (2011): *Russia and U.S. National Interests. Why Should Americans Care?* Harvard: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, p1-45.

Kanet, R. E. (2009): *From Cooperation to Confrontation: Russia and the United States since 9/11*. Miami: Department of International Studies, p1-20.

Periodic literature:

Borozna, A. (2008): *Russia's Friend- United State's Enemy: Russian Foreign Policy toward Iran*. In: *The International Studies Association*, p. 1-33.

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Troitskiy, M. (2010): *US-Russian Relations in Russia's Neighborhood through the Prism of Strategic Cultures*. In: *International Studies Association*, p. 1-8.

Tsygankov, A. P. (2013): *The Russia-NATO Mistrust: Ethnophobia and the double expansion to contain „the Russian Bear“*. In: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, No.46, p179-188.

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Introduction

The bilateral relations between the United States and Russia have been significantly influencing the international arena since the end of World War II. The former enemies from the time of the Cold War attempted to establish a new bilateral relationship in the 21st century. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Russian President Putin was the very first high state representative who called American President Bush to express his condolences and support. Since that very moment, the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship started to evolve attempting to overcome the legacy of the Cold War and to establish a new cooperative relationship. Despite the effort, the bilateral relationship of the two countries experienced several drawbacks only to get restarted during the presidency of Russian President Medvedev and American President Obama in 2009. Nevertheless, after President Putin returned to the office, the relationship deteriorated significantly and the consequences can be observed in the international situation nowadays.

The thesis will study the U.S.-Russia relationship since September 2001 till December 2013. It will offer two very different views on the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, as it will distinguish between the conventional political context and the analysis of the discourses presented by high state representatives of the United States and Russia. The first chapter of the thesis will provide an introduction of the basic principles of discourse analysis that will be used as methodology. Taking into consideration that Discourse Analysis encompasses a wide range of analytical approaches; critical discourse analysis and membership categorization analysis will be introduced in greater detail, as these two specifically will be used in the thesis serving different aims. While Membership Categorization Analysis will be used for categorizing the relationship between the United States and Russia and for observing the changes of the relationship, Critical Discourse Analysis will be useful in the analytical conclusion that will intend to draw parallels between the analyzed categories and the conventional political affairs.

The second chapter of the thesis will offer a brief overview of the most important political events presenting a conventional context of the U.S.-Russia relations in the period between September 2001 and December 2013. The analysis will start with the terrorist attacks on the United States, the subsequent American-Russian cooperation

in the war in Afghanistan and the ratification of the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Further, it will address the dispute between the United States and Russia over the war in Iraq, over the American plan to deploy national missile defence system in Europe as well as over the war in Georgia. In the context of the reset of the U.S.-Russian relations, the analysis will include the foundation of the Bilateral Presidential Commission and ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Despite that, the analysis will finish leaving the U.S.-Russian relations strained because of the disagreement over Syria and other diplomatic issues between the two countries.

After that, the thesis will continue with Membership Categorization Analysis that represents the methodological basis of the thesis. The discourses presented by the presidents of the United States and Russia will be analyzed using the chosen key concepts of Stokoe that will be introduced in the first chapter. Using the concepts of Membership Categorization Device and category-tied predicates, the U.S.-Russian relationship will be categorized into three main categories – positive, negative, and neutral. Abiding by the economy rule and the consistency rule, the speeches, statements and interviews given by the presidents of the United States and Russia will be searched for the categories that the presidents addressed to each other and the category-tied predicates that will be related to the categories. Based on the nature of the collections of categories and the category-tied predicates, it will be possible to categorize the U.S.-Russian relationship as positive, negative or neutral.

In the last part of the analysis, the thesis will draw analytical conclusions from the findings of the Membership Categorization Analysis that will be interconnected with the most significant political events from the second chapter that introduced the conventional political context. The parallels between the changes in the categorization and the tangible events will be determined and concluded in the very last chapter. Moreover, the most significant differences between the specific categories of the U.S.-Russian relationship will be discussed.

The main aim of the whole analysis is to reconstruct the relationship between the United States and Russia from the interviews, speeches and statements that were given by the presidents in office. It will follow the changes and differences in the categories that the particular presidents assign to each other in the delimited period of time. The analysis intends to show how the relationship can be recreated through the discourses that arose in the past and how the discourses are interrelated with the political affairs. It will try to find out whether the changes in the political affairs did

have an impact on the U.S.-Russian relationship and whether the discourse responded to the tangible events.

The thesis will put into practice a new approach towards studying the U.S.-Russian relationship. While the vast majority of the studies focus on the political context, the conventional historical affairs will represent only a complementary part of the thesis. Discourse analysis will play the main role in the thesis because of its possible contribution to the political analysis. It argues that no objective truth really exists, because the reality is socially constructed. Discourse analysis focuses on language, on its role and usage in the discourses and on the ways that it influences the reality. In conclusion, discourse analysis offers various interpretations of the conventional political context based on the specific features of the analyzed discourses.

As my analysis will be based on discourse analysis, and specifically on two particular approaches, the thesis will provide an alternative perspective on the development of the relationship between the United States and Russia. Using Membership Categorization Analysis, it will focus on the way that the highest state representatives addressed each other and how the categories they used to assign their counterparts changed during the studied period of time. The thesis will offer a new point of view on the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship that will reconstruct the development using only discourses, speeches and interviews.

In contrast to the majority of scientific works, it will not consider the political context as a core of the research. The most important feature of the analysis will be the interconnection of the results of Membership Categorization Analysis and the conventional political events. It will attempt to discover correlations between the discursive analysis and the political context. It will be interesting to study whether the alternations in the Membership Categorization Analysis that will be based on the analysis of the discourses and the tangible events depend on each other in any way. Finding such interdependence between the discursive and political level will be the main purpose of the thesis.

1. Discourse Analysis as Methodology

Discourse analysis belongs to a wide group of approaches characterized by *textual analysis*. Their main feature is defined by stressing language functions, or by analyzing language outside the traditional categories of grammar, phonetics or phonemics.¹ Discourse analysis itself is typically defined as a collection of methods and theories intended for analyzing a commonly used language in a social context. However, the discourse that is analyzed does not necessarily have to be only textual or verbal. Discourse analysis can also deal with non-verbal communication represented by visual media (e.g. movies, posters, advertisement billboards) (Beneš 2008: 92 - 94). It is based on the presumption that language not only represents one of the vital aspects of personal life, but that it is dialectically interconnected with the elements of social life, and therefore social science and research must always take language into consideration (Fairclough 2003: 2). The most important characteristic of discourse analysis is its emphasis on the social context in which discourse arises, not simply the textual features of a particular discourse.

Traditional methodologies consider spoken and written words to be the sole mediators between the use of language and the world “behind” the text. The text or speech itself is perceived as a mere phenomenon, lacking its own value (Silverman 2001: 119). However, discourse analysis does not treat language as a medium, but as an individual phenomenon that forms a vital part of a particular political-social reality. It does not inquire how a text corresponds to an “external” reality, but examines in what ways the meaning and sense of objects and activities is constructed by people via their use of texts. Moreover, discourse analysis does not claim that just one correct interpretation of the textual material exists, as texts are not representations of a single reality capable of objective assessment (Beneš 2008: 93).

The analysis of discourse and text is distinguished by two basic approaches: the first focuses on the internal relations within a text, whereas the second concentrates on how a specific text is incorporated within a wider context. The first approach is mostly linguistic, while the second encompasses approaches that aim to analyze not only the use of language, but also what that use brings about in a social context (Nekvapil 2006:

¹ Apart from discourse analysis, textual analysis include also theories of speech acts and conversation analysis, analysis of narrative structures, content analysis, ethnography and ethnomethodology (Beneš 2008: 94).

264). As discourse analysis represents a wide range of various theoretical and methodological tools, it has proven extremely abstract to be used in my thesis. This is why I chose two additional and more specific approaches to employ in my thesis: namely, critical discourse analysis (henceforth CDA) and membership categorization analysis (henceforth MCA). Both of these are equally important, yet they will serve different purposes. While CDA will provide a greater theoretical background for my thesis, MCA will be used as the methodological basics. CDA will be particularly advantageous for analyzing the parallels between texts and the realities they represent, whereas MCA will be useful for another part of my research – specifically, for categorizing the relationship between the United States and Russia, as well as for observing the development of those relations. I will explain the basic principles of these approaches in the following chapters.

1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

The origins of Critical Discourse Analysis can be detected in the late 1980s when it emerged as a programmatic development in European discourse studies. Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk have been its main representatives who, further on, developed various different approaches towards analyzing discourses (Blommaert, Bulcaen 2000: 447). CDA should be not treated as a single method with clear rules, but rather as an approach constituting different permutations (Meyer 2001: 14). According to Fairclough, CDA can also be characterized as a theory “*which is in a dialogical relationship with other social theories and methods, which should engage with them in a “transdisciplinary” rather than just an interdisciplinary way*” (Fairclough 2001: 121). In essence, it is a matter of general agreement that CDA does not present a single method, but rather a more complex corpus of approaches that combine knowledge from more than just one field of expertise.

The main aim of CDA, as defined by Ruth Wodak, is to analyze “*opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language.*” (Wodak 1995: 204) CDA sees language as an integral

element of the material social practice² (Fairclough 2001: 122). If it is claimed that discourse forms a part of social processes, logically a dialogical relationship between the discourse and the social practice is implied. The nature of the dialogical relationship is a “two-way” relationship: not only is the discourse influenced by the social content, but the social reality is likewise shaped by the discourse (Fairclough, Wodak 1997: 258). „*It is an important characteristic of the economic, social and cultural changes of late modernity that they exist as discourses as well as processes that are taking place outside discourse, and that the processes that are taking place outside discourse are substantively shaped by these discourses*“ (Chouliaraki, Fairclough 1999:4). At the first glance, it may seem that the impact of social reality on discourse is much stronger than that of discourse on social reality. And yet the effects of discourse on society can be enormous. Apart from helping to sustain the social status quo, discourse also contributes to transforming the status quo and the spreading of various ideologies (Fairclough, Wodak 1997: 258). One of the main topics which CDA deals with is power. It is, in the modern world, concerned with analyzing the cognitive effects of particular discursive strategies intended to influence the opinions of others in a specific way. And that is exactly what text, speech and discourse are able to do (van Dijk 1993: 254). CDA focuses on the mutual relationship of discourse and society, but stresses its dialogical nature.

For a better understanding of CDA, here are eight basic principles which the majority of the approaches in the group of CDA have in common, as determined by Fairclough and Wodak (Fairclough, Wodak 1997: 271).

1. CDA Addresses Social Problems. By means of dealing with the linguistic and semiotic characteristics of discourse, CDA concentrates on social and cultural processes and structures. This implies that CDA is interdisciplinary and not only combines, but also complements, other fields of social and cultural studies.
2. Power Relations are Discursive. CDA deals with two important dimensions of power relations in society – “power in discourse” and “power over discourse”. It is important to point out that power can be

² “*Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people*” (Fairclough, Wodak 1997: 258).

exercised over an extended period of time and that discourse can support the position it promotes.

3. Discourse Constitutes Society and Culture. The relationship between discourse and society is a dialectical one. Society influences the nature of discourse, but society is also constituted by discourse.
4. Discourse Does Ideological Work. Ideology represents a specific construction of society and is often expressed by means of discourse. To find out whether a particular discourse aims to do an ideological work, it is vital to have a look at the conditions and background out of which that discourse was created, and at the way that discourse is received by an audience and the effects it may have. Only by examining those factors can an ideology within a discourse be revealed.
5. Discourse is Historical. The context in which a discourse is produced is crucial for understanding its main characteristics. Every discourse was created in a specific context and therefore, it is also related to other discourses that had already existed before the discourse itself and that had been constructing the society before the discourse itself.
6. The Link between Text and Society is Mediated. CDA attempts to reveal the correlations between society and culture on the one hand, and textual characteristics on the other. However, the relationship is complex and indirect.
7. Discourse Analysis is Interpretative and Explanatory. There is no objectively correct interpretation of any single discourse, first because of differences in the nature of every audience, and second because of the amount of context that had existed before.³ CDA therefore includes a systematic methodology and a detailed investigation of the every context. Only then may revealing hidden correlations and consequences be plausible. It is crucial to point out that the interpretations and explanations are never complete, because they are dynamic and open to new contexts and information.

³ Lutz and Wodak examined various interpretations of the same text. They tried to find out whether emotional, formal and cognitive schemata on the part of the reader or listener determined the perception of the text. Their research showed that interpretations of text do not take place through a *tabula rasa*, but that such interpretations depend on background emotions, attitudes and knowledge (Lutz, Wodak 1987). This proves the point characteristic of CDA that no *objective* interpretation of any text is possible.

8. Discourse is a Form of Social Action. CDA not only intends to clarify the opacity of power relationships in society, it also aims to express its opinions and apply the findings in the real world. CDA, for example, has been used for expert opinions in court⁴ and it has also contributed to changing discourse and power patterns in institutions.

CDA in my thesis will be used as the main theoretical approach towards examining the relationship between Russia and the United States. It will provide the basic attitude with which I will consider the speeches of high state representatives in an attempt to abide by the eight principles mentioned above. The main significance of CDA in my thesis lies in the interconnection between discourse and social reality, as I will attempt to uncover the dialectical relationship between speeches and tangible international affairs.

1.2. Membership Categorization Analysis

As I have already mentioned, the number of approaches that can be included under discourse analysis is very high. CDA is not the only approach that I will use to analyze my topic. To complement the more theoretical approach of CDA, I will use Membership Categorization Analysis (henceforth MCA) as my basic methodological framework.

MCA was originally formulated by Sacks in the 1960s⁵ and during the 1990s, the interest in Sacks' analytic framework intensified, mainly because of the debates about its possible contribution to both sociology and conversation analysis (Fitzgerald 2012: 306). MCA could be simply characterized as "*a formal analysis of the procedures people employ to make sense of other people and their activities*" (Leudar, Marsland, Nekvapil 2004: 244). The basic assumption of MCA is that membership categories are the very storage of all the information that we gain while talking or interacting with other people. Membership categories are defined by two basic conditions – category-

⁴ Gruber and Wodak were asked by the Jewish community for an expert opinion on a column in the biggest Austrian tabloid. The tabloid openly denied the Holocaust, which is considered a crime in Austria (Gruber, Wodak 1992).

⁵ The lectures given by Sacks in the 1960's are considered representative of the beginning of MCA. The lectures were later published as a book (see Sacks 1972a and 1995).

bound activities and category-tied predicates, while a category can belong to a “membership categorization device” (Collet 2009: 459). Any social role or activity can be characterized by several membership categories (such as a woman, a mother, a scientist) and therefore the main aim of the MCA is to find out how particular members choose which categories in specific cases (Beneš 2008: 108). In the following section I will explain the basic concepts of MCA in more detail.

Stokoe (Stokoe 2012) identified 10 key concepts of MCA that offer insights into data:

1. Membership categorization device (henceforth MCD) – the most important apparatus through which categories are assigned into collective categories (Stokoe 2012: 281). The mechanism of MCD consists of two parts – collection(s) of categories and rules of application. Collections of categories represent “*sets of categories that “go together” – e.g. [male/female]; [Buddhist/Catholic/Jew/Muslim/Protestant...], [freshmen/sophomore/juniors/seniors/graduate students ...]*”⁶ (Schlegloff 2007: 467). The rules of application are discussed further on.
2. Category-bound activities – activities, actions, forms of conduct that are characteristic and linked to a category’s members (Schlegloff 2007: 470).
3. Category-tied predicates – these predicates represent a category’s characteristics (e.g. mother [category] cares [predicate] for her child) (Stokoe 2012:281).
4. Standardized relational pairs – categories can be joined into pairs based on the duties and moral obligations they carry in relation to each other (e.g. parent-child) (Stokoe 2012:281).
5. Duplicative organization – some categories have particular obligations to each other and their relationship is “teamlke” (e.g. mother, father, son in the same family) (Stokoe 2012: 281).
6. Positioned categories – some collections of categories can be organized in a hierarchical way (e.g. baby, teenager, adult) (Stokoe 2012: 281).

⁶ It is crucial to point out that the categories are culturally determined, meaning that the collections are prone to variations depending on the cultural background. Moreover, one category will belong to several collections, again based on the background of the analysts. Although some of the categories may be treated as “objective”, the majority require further definition (Schelgoff 2007: 467).

7. Category-activity “puzzles” – specific actions are conducted in the way that unexpected combinations of categories are put together (e.g. jokes – women drivers) (Stokoe 2012: 281).
8. The economy rule – the first rule of application states that “*a single category term from any MCD can in principle do adequate reference*” (Schegloff 2007: 471).
9. The consistency rule – the second rule of application holds that “*if several persons are being categorized (that is, referred to by category terms), and if the first to be categorized is referred to by some category from some MCD’s collection, then that category or other categories from the same collection can be used to categorize subsequent persons*” (Schegloff 2007: 471). A simple example explains the rule: if a person talks about father and daughter and both categories belong to a standard collection or MCD, then the hearer assumes that both categories belong to the same family (Stokoe 2012: 281).
10. Categorization “maxims” – Because of the rules of application, Sacks defined two maxims – the hearer’s maxim and the viewer’s maxim. The first one states that “*if a category-bound activity is asserted to have been done by a member of some category...then: hear it that way*” (Sacks 1972b: 337), while the second holds that “*if a member sees a category-bound activity being done, then, if one sees it being done by a member of a category to which the activity is bound, then: see it that way*” (Sacks 1972b: 338). The hearer’s maxim provided the instructions for hearing a category term used by another, whereas the viewer’s maxim should help in perceiving the behavior of the categories itself (Schegloff 2007: 471-472).

Although the methodological framework mentioned above may seem complicated, the main strength of MCA is its analytic flexibility. As MCA is not tied to any single approach⁷, it possesses great potential for any discipline that deals with

⁷ Stokoe, apart from defining the 10 key concepts of MCA, also stated five guiding principles for MCA. The first step is represented by collecting data from different sources, then building collections of explicit mentions of categories. MCD and category-resonant descriptions should follow. Locating the position of categorial examples and analyzing the text where the category appears are the third and fourth steps. MCA should conclude by looking for evidence of how the category is received (Stokoe 212: 280).

identity and social knowledge (Fitzgerald 2012: 307). Using MCA in the field of international relations is, therefore, relevant and proper. Moreover, categorizing is usually not done just for its own sake, but it intends to reach other goals as well. “*In the political arena, categorization can, given the right circumstances, be used to accomplish among other things the rejection of an opponent or the recruitment of allies, and it can moreover prepare the ground for future political actions and interventions*” (Collet 2009: 459). In my thesis, MCA will be used for the purpose of demonstrating how the United States past categorization of Russia, and vice versa, may have influenced not only contemporary circumstances, but also their future relationship. Based on the speeches of high state representatives, I will follow the changes in the categories that the U.S. assigns to Russia, and those which Russia has assigned to the U.S., in an effort to interconnect these categorizations with tangible events.

The categories that I chose to form the base of my thesis are *positive*, *neutral* and *negative* category. From the 10 key concepts of Stokoe for the purpose of my analysis, I have chosen to put into practice the concepts of MCD and category-tied predicates. Except for these two concepts, I will be abiding by the economy rule and the consistency rule. The economy rule will be used in identifying all three categories, as detecting positive, neutral or negative expressions will be the first sign of the relevancy of the discourse. The consistency rule will be used when person who holds the presidency office changes. Once a person is called the president, he is assumed to be the representative of the United States or Russia and his discourses can be used to analyze the U.S. – Russian relations.

In case of the positive category, MCD will involve collections of positively perceived categories that the presidents assign to each other. They will include expression such as a partner, an ally or even a friend. When such a category is detected in the discourse, the analysis will further search for category-tied predicates expressed in the discourse, such as allies help each other or friends can come to an agreement.

Negative collection of categories will be determined by hostile expressions by which the presidents will refer to each other or to the other state. The examples may involve references such as a rival, an enemy or even an evil. Category-tied predicates will support hostility, invoke a negative image of the other one. They will include for

Although the rules may seem relevant, according to Fitzgerald, setting guiding principles would be very limiting for MCA. If we accepted the rules, we would place MCA at risk of being treated as a specific process and its main strength of flexibility could be lost (Fitzgerald 2012: 5).

example statements such as they caused the problem, they are to be blamed or they complicated the situation for us.

The third category was chosen to be neutral. However, defining this category may seem rather tricky and that is why this category will rely even more on the whole discourse than just on the expressions assigned to each other by the presidents. Collection of categories could involve references such as a nation, a state or just the president, meaning that the less positive or less negative expressions are used, the more plausible it is that the states categorize themselves in the neutral category. Category-tied predicates will most likely only comment on the behavior of the other one, without any emotional charge, e.g. the nation decided, the state is dealing with or the president has said.

1.3. Data Set

The data used in the analysis were collected from discourses involving speeches, statements and interviews with American and Russian presidents since September 2001 till December 2013. The presidents are perceived as the highest state representatives and therefore, the analysis depended on how they categorized each other in their discourses – positively, neutrally or negatively. The specific day of September 11, 2001 was chosen as the starting point for the analysis because of its importance in the development of world politics and specifically in the U.S. – Russian relations. The analysis finishes with the speeches and interviews conducted during December 2013. The documents were found online in official archives of American and Russian Presidents.

Firstly, all speeches, statements and interviews of the presidents since September 2001 till December 2013 were searched for any mention of the United States, Russia and their relations. After the first step, the data set consisted of 580 documents that contained mentions of the U.S. or Russia. Then the documents were studied and 137 were considered to be relevant enough to be included in the final data set that the whole analysis worked further on with.

2. Political Context of the U.S.-Russian Relations

Before the actual discourse analysis of the U.S.-Russian relations, a conventional look at the most important events that constituted the U.S.-Russian relations since September 2001 till December 2013 will be introduced. In the next chapter, the political context will be analyzed from the conventional point of view offering a brief overview of the U.S.-Russian relations based on the tangible events only. The analysis will focus not only on the points of cooperation, but also on the political clashes between the United States and Russia in the delimited period of time.

2.1. *The Aftermath of September 11, 2001*

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represent the beginning of the analyzed period of time. On this day, terrorist attacks completely destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City, severely damaged the Pentagon and left about three thousand people dead (BBC History 2014a). Regarding the U.S.-Russian relations, it is necessary to point out that Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first of all presidents who called American President George W. Bush to express his condolences and support (Saltzman 2012: 547). President Putin also declared a minute's silence as a token of mourning over the terrorist attacks in the U.S. (Putin 2001a). The immediate American reaction to the terrorist attacks was that the United States put their troops on alert, however, Russia did not respond in the same way, but did the exact opposite, meaning it stood down⁸. The steps taken by both presidents in September 2001 indicate a warming tendency in the U.S.-Russian relations.

Later on in autumn 2001, President Putin openly supported anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and promised to help the United States and international community by providing Intel, air space, military bases and even further assistance if

⁸ The events after the terrorist attack were described by President Bush in October: *"After all, in the old days, had an American President put their troops on alert, Russia would have responded. And then America would have upped the ante, and then Russia would have upped the ante, and we would have had two issues on our hands: one, a terrorist attack on America, plus a military standoff. Instead, his first reaction was to stand down so as not to create any confusion, any doubt, so that the United States could stay focused on the terrorist attack"* (Bush 2001b).

needed⁹ (Tsygankov 2013: 30). The war in Afghanistan was initiated by U.S.-led coalition's air strikes on October 7, 2001 (BBC History 2014b). The reason why Russia joined the United States in the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan, apart from the Putin's wish to further incorporate Russia into the Western world, can be found in Russian interests in Afghanistan. Taliban had contributed to destabilization of the Central Asia region and, moreover, was supporting the insurgents in Chechnya against which Russia was already fighting a war (Perry 2007: 12). On the other hand, Russia's support for the operations in Afghanistan was essential for the United States of America, as its knowledge about the region was far more detailed than the knowledge of the United States. Apart from that, Russia was also able to provide the U.S. with military base and access to Afghanistan (Bremmer, Zaslavsky 2001: 12-13). In autumn 2001, Russia and the United States became significant allies in the war in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, in December 2001, the United States decided to withdraw from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty that was signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in 1972¹⁰ (Munková 2008: 30). Yet, American President George Bush did not consider the treaty to be much of importance anymore for the U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century and therefore, he opted for abandoning the 30-year old treaty. The main logic beyond the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was the intention of President Bush to deploy national missile defense (NMD) system in Europe, what was delayed by several years due to the 9/11 and the subsequent events (Saltzman 2012: 556). Although President Putin did not agree with the decision of his American counterpart, he could not do anything to prevent it from happening (Munková 2008: 30). The withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could be regarded as the first sign of disagreement between the presidents in the analyzed period of time.

On the other hand, the months after September 11, 2001 resulted in the creation and subsequent ratification of a new SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), also known as the Moscow Treaty. The treaty, which was signed by President Putin and Bush on May 24, 2002 in Moscow, committed Russia and the United States to reduce the number of active nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 till December 31,

⁹The whole statement of President Vladimir Putin can be found online on http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/5e2870b37fe461dc43256ad20031b7f8!OpenDocument.

¹⁰ Its main aim was to limit the number, type, and placement of missiles that Russia or the United States could deploy to eliminate potential incoming missiles. The basic logic was that the limited missile defense would act as a discouraging factor for both countries to develop more offensive weapons. Russia and the United States were allowed to deploy only one ABM system with 100 interceptors in order to protect a single target. (Munková 2008: 30)

2012 (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 2002). The number of warheads given by the treaty constituted approximately one third of the number of active warheads in 2002 (Watt 2004: 2-3). Although the Moscow Treaty was subjected to a lot of criticism, it represented the first major arms-control treaty of the twenty-first century and, more importantly, proved the willingness of Russia and the United States to work together (Pogorely 2004: 80-91). The events in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the improving U.S.-Russia relations that were characterized mainly by cooperation and partnership.

2.2. War in Iraq and U.S.-Russian relations

While President Putin actively engaged in the U.S. led war in Afghanistan, the same cannot be claimed about the U.S. war in Iraq. Since September 2002 when President Bush in the speech to the U.N. General Assembly declared that the war on terror could not be limited to al Qaeda and the Taliban or to Afghanistan, that Iraq had breached several UN resolutions and that he would no longer put up with the provocative Iraqi behavior in order to obtain weapons of mass destruction (henceforth WMD), President Putin did not express support for his counterpart's intentions to widen the war on terror on Iraq (Saltzman 2012: 553).

On the contrary, Russia pressed the United States to bring the question of worsening Iraqi crisis to the United Nations to prevent the United States from taking a unilateral action, as Putin considered the intention to carry out an invasion to Iraq to be a detour from the agreed upon war on terror (Wagnsson 2005: 56-57). Moreover, Russia had economic and geo-political interests in Iraq and was reluctant to allow the occupation of the oil-rich country by the US companies (Kasymov 2011: 550-551). Although the American attempt was to pass a single U.N. Security Council resolution that would eventually authorize the use of force against Iraq, Russia, Germany and France preferred a two-phase resolution. In the first phase, the resolution would demand that Iraq allowed the inspectors to renew their investigation of dismantling of Iraqi WMD. Secondly, in case that the inspectors reported Iraqi non-compliance, another resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq would be adopted by the U.N.

Security Council. Security Council unanimously adopted the first UNSC Resolution 1441 in November 2002 (Katz 2003: 44-45).

However, by February 2003, the joint stance of France, Germany and Russia towards supporting the second resolution became negative and they openly expressed their unwillingness to adopt a resolution authorizing any use of force in Iraq (Golan 2004: 437). Therefore, the United States started to search for states that would be willing to join the American forces in Iraq without evidence that Iraq obtained WMD. Moreover, the United States continued to promote the argument that no second resolution was needed to authorize use of force in Iraq (Gordon, Shapiro 2004: 146-147). The United States launched the invasion to Iraq on March 20, 2003 with the argument that Iraq did not fulfill the requirements of the UN Security Resolution 1441¹¹ (Lang 2008: 257).

Taking into consideration that Russia was one of the most profound opponents of the invasion to Iraq, the U.S.-Russian bilateral relations did not seem to have deteriorated as much as one would have expected (Wagnsson 2005: 59). Already in June 2003, President Bush and President Putin after a meeting issued a joint statement on the new strategic relationship in which both presidents express their will to “*work together to advance stability, security, and prosperity for our peoples, and to work jointly to counter global challenges and help resolve regional conflicts. We also declared that where we had differences, we would work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect*” (Bush 2003a). Although the United States and Russia did not cooperate in the war in Iraq and experienced serious disagreements on how the Iraqi crisis was supposed to be solved, they did not interrupt their bilateral relations and demonstrated a wish to continue cooperating in other areas.

¹¹ The UN agency UNMOVIC whose inspectors were responsible for monitoring Iraq’s compliance with the Resolution concluded that Iraq’s compliance was better at the time, however, full access to its programs and weapons sites would require more time. That report was then interpreted by the United States as Iraq’s refusal to cooperate immediately, actively and fully with the UN. Therefore the United States acquired a justified reason to invade Iraq. Apart from that, Iraq was connected with the war on terror despite a lack of evidence (Lang 2007: 257).

2.3. The Second Presidential Term of Bush and Putin

In 2004, in both the United States and Russia, presidential elections were held, but they did not bring any change to the office, as President Bush and President Putin were both re-elected for their second consecutive presidential term. President Bush won with a close majority of 51.2 % of the votes. One of the main factors that made the vote so tight was the division of the American population over the war in Iraq (Campbell 2005: 238). On the other hand, President Putin defeated other candidates with a majority of 71.31 % of the votes; however, no international issues were in the limelight of the presidential election campaign (Sakwa 2005: 388-391). As both presidents achieved to be re-elected, the U.S.-Russian bilateral relations could have continued to evolve continuously.

Nevertheless, in the years 2004 – 2006, no major development in the U.S.-Russian relations was seen. They did not sign any significant treaties that would elaborate, for example, on the SORT, neither did they launch any joint projects or become allies in a military operation. On the other hand, the presidents maintained close ties and kept meeting each other on a regular basis to discuss the important international issues and the relations of the United States and Russia. Although in 2004, President Bush and President Putin met only once in June in Georgia (Bush 2004a), both in 2005 and 2006, they managed to organize two meetings a year¹².

At the beginning of 2007, American White House officially announced the plans to place ten American-operated missile-defence interceptors in Poland and an advanced missile-tracking radar station in the Czech Republic (Weitz 2010: 104). The plans to deploy the national missile defence (henceforth NMD) systems in Europe were reintroduced by President Bush in mid-2005 (Saltzman 2012: 556) and the negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic were pursued after that. The installations were known also as the “third site”, as they would have been part of the ground-based mid-course defense element of the American global missile defense network¹³ (Weitz 2010: 104). The main reason that Bush administration offered to advocate the plan was that

¹² In 2005, Bush and Putin met in Bratislava, Slovakia (Bush 2005b) and Washington D.C., the U.S. (Bush 2005d), whereas in 2006, they encountered in Strelna, Russia (Bush 2006b) and in Hanoi, Vietnam (Bush 2006c).

¹³ The first two sites were located in Alaska and California, but the whole network also includes BMD (ballistic missile defense) radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom, and space-based sensors as well (Weitz 2010: 104).

the European interceptors would be closer to the possible launch sites from the rogue states in the Middle East. Apart from that, the NMD in Europe would serve as a common project that would strengthen the cooperation between the United States and Europe (Mankoff 2012: 335).

The announcement provoked a very negative reaction in Moscow not only because of the “third site” proximity to Russia (Weitz 2010: 104). Russia also claimed that the NMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic would be able to intercept Russian ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) and that the whole system could be converted into an offensive ballistic missile for nuclear delivery. That possibility posed a direct threat to Moscow (Wilkening 2012: 32). On the other hand, the United States argued that the Russian missiles could easily overwhelm the defense system and that the radars and interceptors were not positioned to be able to intercept Russian ICBMs (Slocombe 2008: 20). However, Russia introduced its own alternative sites where the missile defense system could have been placed in order to cooperate with the United States and NATO to defend also Russian territory from third county missile launches (Mankoff 2012: 336). Still, no agreement was reached till the end of Putin’s or even Bush’s second presidential term in 2008 and the deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relations throughout the year 2007 was undisputable.

2.4. *The War in Georgia*

In May 2008, President Medvedev was elected with over 70% of the Russian voters and took over the presidential office after President Putin (Franch, Nesterov 2010: 2). While President Bush was still occupying the American presidential office till January 2009, the 8-month long bilateral relationship of President Bush and President Medvedev was far from ideal. In August 2008, both countries got involved in the conflict in Georgia and even faced a military confrontation. The immediate source of disagreement between Russia and Georgia was the control over South Ossetia; a disputed territory that officially forms part of Georgia, but the majority of South Ossetians possess Russian passports (BBC 2014).

Although Georgia belonged to the former Soviet Union, the United States openly supported Georgia’s NATO membership and even in April 2008, President Bush

reaffirmed the American attitude towards the issue (Harding 2008). Georgian President Shaakashvili, feeling strong American support, launched military force on August 7, 2008 in South Ossetia in order to reoccupy the area that was, as he allegedly believed, being targeted by Russian military forces.¹⁴ Moreover, he directly targeted a Russian peacekeeping base that had been placed in South Ossetia since 1994 as part of the cease-fire agreement following the first Georgian-South Ossetian war in the early 1990's (Antonenko 2008: 23-24). The war broke out on August 8, 2008, as Russia responded to the Georgian attack on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, because they wanted to prevent Georgia from taking over full control over South Ossetia (Bowker 2011: 200). Russian and Ossetian joined armed forces succeeded in expelling the Georgian military from the territory of South Ossetia in only 4 days. They were even able to invade Georgia in a counterattack (Saltzman 2012: 558-559). However, by the time French President Sarkozy came to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire, Georgia lost control over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Antonenko 2008: 24-25). Although President Sarkozy managed to broker a cease-fire agreement, Russia unilaterally recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, consequently, justified its military presence in these two territories by bilateral agreements with them (Nodia 2012: 728). Russia did not fully comply with the six point cease-fire plan and withdrew from Georgia only in October 2008, while still allowed to remain militarily in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Bowker 2011: 198).

Despite the Russian military success, its international reputation as well as its bilateral relations with the United States suffered remarkably. Russia faced strong opposition not only from the United States, but also from Europe (Antonenko 2008: 26). The United States condemned Russian actions, while no criticism of Georgia's attack on the South Ossetian capital was detected. The US shipped back about 2000 Georgian troops that were deployed in peacekeeping in Iraq and promised to help Georgia with rebuilding their military after the war, to support Georgia in its plan to become a NATO member and to provide economic aid to Georgia. On the other hand, Russia partially considered the United States responsible for the Georgian self-consciousness and consequent attacks (Bowker 2011: 202-206). The U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship

¹⁴ President Shaakashvili claimed that after a meeting with Putin in February 2008, he was persuaded that Russia was getting ready for war. Russia, moreover, conducted major military maneuvers in the Caucasus in July and Shaakashvili also obtained intel that claimed that Russian forces were entering South Ossetia through Roki tunnel. All the information supported the belief that Russia intended to annex the republic and re-establish dominance over Georgia (Bowker 2011: 199).

worsened considerably during the first months of President Medvedev and the last months of President Bush in the presidential office.

2.5. *Reset of the U.S.-Russian relations*

In January 2009, the presidential office in the United States was taken by President Obama. The relationship between the U.S. and Russia in the months following the war in Georgia remained tense, as one day after President Obama was elected, President Medvedev announced the deployment of Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave (Charap 2010: 282). However, President Obama and his administration realized that without an improved relationship with Russia tackling other international issues would be very complicated (Lieven 2009: 29). Therefore, President Obama opted for the adoption of a new approach that was described by American Vice President Joe Biden in February 2009 as pressing the “reset” button on the bilateral relationship of the two countries. The main idea behind the reset was to cooperate with Russia on shared threats and issues that interested both countries, while still pushing back against Russian actions that undermined US interests in a way that would not ruin the relationship (Charap 2010: 282). President Obama’s call for reset was met with approval from President Medvedev and the joint statement¹⁵ issued by President Medvedev and President Obama in April 2009 supported their wish to improve the U.S.-Russian relations. Apart from that, Russia consented to allowing American supplies to cross its territory into Afghanistan (Goldgeier 2009: 24). With the new attitude introduced by President Obama, the bilateral relationship of the U.S. and Russia started to improve in 2009.

Another cooperative move conducted by the presidents was foundation of the United States and Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission in July 2009. Its main aim was to identify areas of cooperation and pursue joint projects of the U.S. and Russia to strengthen the ties between the two countries (DISAM 2010: 1). Further on, in September 2009, President Obama eventually cancelled the plans for the criticized third

¹⁵ The joint statement not only reaffirmed that the countries were no longer enemies, but also listed the areas in which the United States and Russia could cooperate, e.g. international security, global economic crisis, nuclear arms control and reduction, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. (Obama 2009d).

site of NMD system to be deployed in the Czech Republic and Poland. Instead he opted for the Phased Adaptive Approach for European missile defense (Wilkening 2012: 32-33). All the actions taken by the new presidents assumed their wish to extend the cooperation between Russia and the United States.

Moreover, President Obama and President Medvedev addressed also the issue of nuclear arms control and reduction. On December 5, 2009, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed on July 31, 1991 and entered into force on December 5, 1994, expired after the period of 15 years (Dekker 2010: 81). Although the presidents claimed that a follow-on treaty would be ready before START Treaty has expired, the negotiations were not concluded and the New START Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague (Schenck, Youmans 2012: 432). The New START Treaty includes the Treaty text, the Protocol that specifies additional rights and obligation, and three Technical Annexes. According to the New START Treaty, both countries are supposed to decrease the number of warheads on deployed launchers to 1,550, the number of deployed launchers to 700 and the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers for ICMBs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to 800 (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 2010). The significance of the New START Treaty lies in the fact that it brought to an end a period of a protracted break in the strategic dialogue between the United States and Russia, it demonstrated the improving relationship and it proved that the two nuclear superpowers were capable of a compromise in order to find a solution to complicated issues (Buzhinskiy 2013: 138-139). The New START Treaty clearly signaled that the two countries were willing to adjust their stances in order to meet their counterpart at least halfway.

Another area that was more than significant for the United States was the proliferation issue in Iran and North Korea. Russia not only offered the United States assistance in trying to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons¹⁶, but Russia also supported strengthened sanctions on North Korea in May 2009 and on Iran in June 2010 (Charap 2010: 283). On the other hand, the United States supported Russia in its effort to access the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although Russia started the negotiations in 1993 in order to access GATT and then, subsequently, the WTO, only in December 2011 it was granted the permission to join the WTO and since August 2012,

¹⁶ For example, in October 2009, Russia proposed that it would enrich uranium from Iran, so that Iran could use the uranium as fuel for the Teheran Research Reactor, but Iran would not possess the technology for the enrichment of low-enriched uranium itself (Charap 2010: 282 – 283).

Russia became a member of the organization (Zaytseva 2013: 2). The bilateral relations between the United States and Russia during the presidency of Obama and Medvedev significantly improved and gained cooperative tune.

2.6. Strained U.S.-Russian relations

In 2012, both countries underwent presidential elections. While in the United States, President Barack Obama managed to get reelected for his second presidential term¹⁷ (Cohen, Panagopoulos 2014: 384), in Russia, former President Vladimir Putin returned to the presidential office to serve his third term as a Russian president¹⁸ (Clark 2013: 374). President Obama and President Putin had only met personally once in 2009 before President Putin took over the office, even though the U.S. administration attempted to arrange their second subsequent meeting (Stent 2012: 128). They succeeded in meeting for the second time only in June 2012 in Mexico (Obama 2012d). Although the presidents did not have many chances to get to know each other, already in August 2013, President Obama canceled a scheduled meeting with President Putin that should have preceded the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg (Shuster 2013: 2).

Since the very beginning of their bilateral relations, President Obama and President Putin had to face several clashes of opinions. The first one was related to the civil war in Syria that started in 2011. Whereas the United States were willing to abide by the principles of the responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention, Russia preferred the primacy of state sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states (Stent 2012: 128-129). Russia also criticized the events development in Libya and regarded the intervention as an illegitimate externally promoted regime change (Allison 2013: 796). Apart from that, Russia refused to support actions against Syria because of the pragmatic reasons, too, as Syria represents Russia's client state and a destination for Russian arms exports (Stent 2012: 128-129). Therefore, Russia and the United States were unable to reach an agreement concerning a possible intervention in the civil war in Syria, what caused a reasonable strain on the U.S.-Russian relations.

¹⁷ President Obama triumphed over Mitt Romney by 332-206 votes in the Electoral College and by 51% to 47% in the national popular vote (Cohen, Panagopoulos 2014: 384).

¹⁸ President Putin won the elections with 63,6% of the vote meaning that President Putin would stay in the office for the next six years thanks to a change in the constitution (Clark 2013: 374).

The bilateral relations of the U.S. and Russia suffered considerably also after President Obama signed Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act in December 2012 (International Debates 2013: 21). Although the document lifted the restrictions that tied normalized trade relations to Soviet laws on Jewish emigration, it introduced a list of Russian officials who would be denied visa for the United States and whose American assets would be frozen¹⁹ (Stent 2012: 133-134). Russia, on the other hand, reacted by adopting a new law that banned American citizens from adopting Russian orphans (Englund 2012) and by issuing a so-called Guantanamo list that prohibited approximately 60 American citizens from entering Russia (Bennetts 2013). Another cause of dispute between the United States and Russia was Russia's decision to grant asylum to Edward Snowden in August 2013, after the United States had sought his extradition to face espionage charges. However, Russia refused to fulfill the American requirement arguing that no extradition treaty with the United States had been closed and, therefore, no legal obligation for Russia to hand over Snowden existed (Sonne 2013). Based on the analysis of the tangible events, the U.S.-Russian relations at the end of the year 2013 considerably deteriorated, but only the analysis of the affairs of the following years would show whether the point the United States and Russia reached at the end of 2013 was the lowest point of their relations or whether the relations would go on worsening.

¹⁹ The Russian officials who were included in the list were the ones who were involved in the case of a 37-year-old Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. He accomplished to uncover large-scale corruption in Moscow's law-enforcement and tax-collection structures, but died in prison (Stent 2012: 133).

3. MCA of the U.S.-Russian Relations

The following part of the thesis is dedicated to the Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) of the U.S. - Russian relations since September 2001 till December 2013. Based on the speeches, statements and interviews given by the presidents of the United States of America and Russia, three main categories will be characterized using the key concepts of Stokoe, which were introduced in the previous chapter. As mentioned above, the rules of application, meaning the economy rule and the consistency rule, are applied in all three categories. The analysis concentrates on identifying the collections of positive, negative and neutral categories and, subsequently, the category-tied predicates for each category of the U.S.-Russian relations.

3.1. *Positive Category of the U.S.-Russian Relations*

First of all, the analysis dealt with the Membership Categorization Device (henceforth MCD) of positive U.S.-Russian relations. As mentioned earlier, the MCD consists of two parts – collections of categories and rules of application (Schegloff 2007: 467). As the rules of application are applied on all three categories, the analysis focuses on the collection of categories.

3.1.1. The Collection of Positive Categories

Concerning the collections of categories, positively charged expressions that could be included in the category were searched for in the data set. The Russian presidents throughout the studied period mostly referred to their counterparts in the US as a *partner*. However, the expression *partner* was not always used only in a positive manner and therefore, several factors had to be taken into consideration before concluding whether the occurrence of the expression *partner* could be considered an indication of the positive category. The adjective attached to the word *partner* was the

first significant factor in determining the positive charge of the expression in the documents.

President Putin used the following positive adjectives in connection with President Bush as his *partner* : “*solid*” (Putin 2001c), “*good, open, decent*” (Putin 2003h), “*consistent and predictable*” (Putin 2005b). When talking about the United States, he claimed that they are “*key*” (Putin 2002a), “*consistent and reliable*” (Putin 2003f), “*priority*” (Putin 2002b; Putin 2004b), “*strategic*” (Putin 2003e), “*major trade and economic*” (Putin 2003a; Putin 2004a), “*important*” (Putin 2005b; Putin 2006a), “*major*” (Putin 2006a), “*main, principal*” (Putin 2006b) *partners*. The adjectives categorized as positive when addressing either President Bush or the United States by President Putin were occurring since September 2001 till July 2006.

The positive adjectives associated with the United States during the term of President Medvedev were detected since July 2009 till October 2010. To address the U.S., President Medvedev used the expressions “*long-standing and promising*” (Medvedev 2009g), “*important*” (Medvedev 2010c), “*dialogue*” (Medvedev 2010e) *partner*. No denomination *partner* with a positive adjective of President Obama by President Medvedev was found. However, since October 2010 till December 2013, no positive adjectives in connection with the expression *partner* were detected in the documents presented by President Medvedev or, later on, by President Putin.

The next expression included in the positive collection of categories used by the Russian presidents was the category *friend*. President Putin called President Bush his *friend* for the very first time in February 2003 by saying: “*And I absolutely agree with the President of the United States when he says that Russia and the United States have ceased to be enemies and opponents, but have become partners. I fully subscribe to this and can name with satisfaction the President of the United States, who is a very serious politician and a very decent man, I can name him my friend*” (Putin 2003b). Since that moment, President Putin referred to President Bush as his *friend* on several occasions starting in February 2003 and finishing in February 2007²⁰. The category *friend* was later on used only twice by President Medvedev when talking about his American counterpart, President Obama. President Medvedev used the category both times at the

²⁰ The occasions when President Putin called President Bush a *friend* include a meeting with the French Regional Press and TV Channels in February 2003 (Putin 2003c), a toast for the dinner for St. Petersburg’s 300-Year Anniversary in 2003 (Putin 2003d), an interview with Radio Slovensko and the Slovakian Television Channel STV in 2005 (Putin 2005a), an interview with NBC Television Channel in 2006 (Putin 2006c), a press conference following talks with President Bush in 2006 (Putin 2006d) and a speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007 (Putin 2007a).

meeting with President Obama at the APEC Summits, first in November 2010 (Medvedev 2010f) and second in November 2011 (Medvedev 2011b). This particular category suggests very positive atmosphere of the relations between the nations and therefore the occurrence of the word itself is considered to be a satisfactory indicator for the positive categorization.

Moreover, after President Obama was elected the president of the United States, President Medvedev introduced a new category for addressing his counterpart. Since the very first speech in which President Medvedev congratulated President Obama on his election in November 2008, the most used denomination by President Medvedev was the category *colleague*²¹. The category cannot be included in the collection of positive categories since its first occurrence, as it does not undoubtedly indicate positive relations between the presidents. However, in the period of time since July 2009 till November 2011 when the positive categories *partner* and *friend* were occurring in the documents, it can serve as a supplement to the collection of positive categories. The category *colleague* was assigned to President Obama by President Medvedev in the specified period of time on eight occasions²². Considering that President Medvedev was using also other clearly positive categories, the denomination *colleague* can be considered a part of the positive collection of categories in the delimited period of time.

The last expression that clearly determines the positive nature of the relations of the U.S. and Russia is the category *ally*. Although this particular expression was mainly used in connection with the fight against terrorism, it was used by President Putin to describe the relations with the United States of America in October and December 2004 (Putin 2004a; Putin 2004b). The occurrence of the category *ally* also assumes very positive relations between the United States and Russia and that is why it is regarded as a part of the positive collection of categories without any other indicators.

The most frequent positive expression that American presidents used in their statements, speeches or interviews to address their Russian counterparts was the category *friend*. President Bush called President Putin *his friend* already in October 2001 at his News Conference (Bush 2001a) and continued to do so in the years to come. Only in 2001, President Bush used the category *friend* to address President Putin on

²¹ “Concerning our colleague who was yesterday elected President of the United States of America: Russia has sent him its heartfelt congratulations” (Medvedev 2008f).

²² The expression *colleague* was used by President Medvedev to call President Obama twice in July 2009 (Medvedev 2009e; Medvedev 2009f), once in November 2009 (Medvedev 2009h), four times during 2010 in April (Medvedev 2010a), June (Medvedev 2010b), September (Medvedev 2010d) and November (Medvedev 2010f) and in March 2011 (Medvedev 2011a).

three more occasions – firstly, again in October 2001 at his News Conference in Shanghai (Bush 2001b) and twice more in November 2001 at his News Conference in the White House (Bush 2001c) and his joint conference in Crawford High School (Bush 2001d). In 2002, President Bush assigned President Putin with the category *friend* on eight different occasions²³. It is vital to point out that on all the occasions when President Bush called President Putin his *friend*, he also named Russia the *friend* of the United States during 2001 and 2002. However, in the following years, President Bush used the expression *friend* only for President Putin just once at his News Conference in July 2003 (Bush 2003a) and in his speech after a discussion with President Putin in June 2004 (Bush 2004a). In 2005, the frequency of the category occurrence increased to four²⁴. The category was detected only twice in 2006²⁵, whereas in 2007, the number of occurrences again increased to the total of five occasions²⁶. In the period between October 2001 till September 2007, the category *friend* occurred twenty-seven times altogether. Since September 2007, President Bush did not use the expression till the end of his term in the President office.

Only in 2010, President Obama reinstated the usage of the category *friend* to address his counterpart, President Medvedev. In total since April 2010 till November 2011, he named President Medvedev his *friend* seven times – five times during 2010 and twice in 2011²⁷. It is crucial to point out that President Obama utilized the expression only at joint news conferences or speeches with President Medvedev.

The next category used by the American presidents was the category *partner*. When the individual occurrences of the expression *partner* were studied, the same procedure was applied to their categorization as it was applied earlier on in the Russian

²³ The list of occasions include two interviews with European journalists (Bush 2002a; Bush 2002g), his news conference in Berlin (Bush 2002b), four joint news conferences with President Putin (Bush 2002c; Bush 2002d; Bush 2002e; Bush 2002i), his speech at the Prague Atlantic Student Summit in Prague (Bush 2002h).

²⁴ The category *friend* was used by President Bush to denote both President Putin and Russia in an interview with Russian ITAR-TASS (Bush 2005a), at two news conferences in February and September (Bush 2005b; Bush 2005d) and in a speech prior to a meeting with congressional leaders (Bush 2005c).

²⁵ The two occasions included speeches given in July (Bush 2006a) and November 2006 (Bush 2006c). Both mentions of the category *friend* were related to President Putin himself without any remark about Russia.

²⁶ The occurrences consist of three interviews in May, June and October (Bush 2007a; Bush 2007b; Bush 2007f), a news conference with Prime Minister of Albania (Bush 2007c) and a speech after a meeting with President Putin (Bush 2007e). President Bush in these documents addressed the expression *friend* not only to President Putin, but also to the Russian Federation.

²⁷ President Obama addressed only President Medvedev as his *friend* in their joint speeches in April 2010 (Obama 2010a), June 2010 (Obama 2010b; Obama 2010c), November 2010 (Obama 2010d; Obama 2010e), May 2011 (Obama 2011a) and November 2011 (Obama 2011c).

documents. It means that the adjectives used in connection with the category *partner* were one of the factors that determined the occurrence of the category as positive. President Bush addressed Russia as a *partner* with the terms “*strong*” (Bush 2001d), “*crucial*” (Bush 2001e), “*equal*” (Bush 2002f), “*good, solid*” (Bush 2007d) since November 2001 till July 2007. The category *partner* reoccurred at the end of 2009 when President Obama called President Medvedev an “*effective*” *partner* (Obama 2009f). Since June 2010 till May 2011, President Medvedev was called also a “*solid and reliable*” (Obama 2010b), “*excellent*” (Obama 2010d) and “*important*” (Obama 2011b) *partner*. It is crucial to point out the difference in the usage of the category by the two presidents. While President Bush assigned the category to Russia as a state, President Obama used it to address President Medvedev as a person.

The last positive category identified in the data set was the category *ally*. It was used three times by President Bush in September 2003 (Bush 2003b), September 2004 (Bush 2004b) and September 2005 (Bush 2005d). President Bush mentioned Russia as the United States *ally* in the context of fighting the war on terror. On the other hand, President Obama called President Medvedev an *ally* when discussing the development of business relations between Russia and the United States of America at Russian-American Business Summit in July 2009²⁸ (Obama 2009e). The rather rare usage of the category *ally* indicates a very positive level of the U.S.-Russia relations.

3.1.2. Positive Category-tied predicates

The next step in the analysis consisted of studying the predicates that were used in connection with the positive categories *a partner*, *a friend* and *an ally* in the speeches, statements or interviews. Each occurrence of the positive category was studied in detail to determine the positive category-tied predicates that would help to characterize the U.S.-Russian relations. The predicates were divided into four group:

1. personal,
2. business,

²⁸ “*And the fact that he (President Medvedev) has experience in business, in the private sector, makes him an invaluable ally in our efforts to improve the commercial ties between our two countries*” (Obama 2009e).

3. security and military,
4. bilateral relationship.

Firstly, the predicates used in the Russian documents related to the topic of the personal relationship between the presidents were studied. The expressions used by the presidents connected to this topic area were the categories *partner* and *friend*, therefore, the predicates tied to these two words were studied in this particular section. When considering the predicates related to the category *friend*, it is crucial to stress that President Putin and President Medvedev both used the expression to name only their presidential counterparts, never the United States as a country.

When looking at the category *partner* and *friend* addressed to President Bush, President Putin used predicates that could not be perceived as entirely positive, but they suggested positive atmosphere of their personal relation. President Putin stressed that although he and President Bush did not always agree on certain issues, it was their right to have disagreements. It is obvious that President Putin attempted to persuade the world that his relationship with President Bush was friendly, open and personal. Although President Putin claimed that *“I have every ground for considering him to be a friend. ... It does not mean that our opinions coincide on all matters. As you see we differ on the question in point. When we discuss problems with him we exchange opinions, express our points of view and we try, as befits decent people, not to discuss third persons in their absence”* (Putin 2003c). He used the expressions *partner* and *friend* in connection with predicates that would express the fact that they were capable of handling the differences of their opinions in a friendly manner. The positive personal category-tied predicates that support the assumption include the collocations *to value highly*²⁹, *to be pleasant to work with*³⁰, *to have close or common positions*³¹, *to have*

²⁹ *“I am convinced that he is a solid partner. We can argue on certain problems, disagree on certain things, but I have already noticed, it caught my attention that if he agrees and says “yes” he always “follows the issue through,” he always sees to it that the accords reached are put into practice. Not only I, but the whole Russian leadership have paid attention to that trait of the President. It is an important trait and we value it highly”* (Putin 2001c).

³⁰ *“Generally, it is pleasant for me to work with the President of the United States. We have different points of view on many issues. I am sure that he does not always like what I say and do. But I can say for myself that I also look critically at the actions taken by our American partners. But President Bush is a good partner, he is an open, decent person, it is pleasant to work with him”* (Putin 2003g).

³¹ *“Having different views on how to settle this or that international issue does not mean that we do not have close or even common positions on other, no less important, issues on the agenda today, both in international and in bilateral relations”* (Putin 2005b).

*established good personal relations*³², *not to provoke a stormy reaction*³³, *to exchange opinions, to express points of view, to look to the future*³⁴, *to resolve a problem*³⁵, *to search for solutions to the problems*³⁶, *to stand up for national interests*³⁷, *to talk and reach agreements*³⁸. The personal predicates in connections with the categories *partner* and *friend* demonstrate a very positive personal relationship of President Putin towards President Bush that enabled them to cooperate in spite of the differences in their opinions or interests.

President Medvedev used only the categories *friend* and *colleague* in addressing the personal relationship with President Obama. The personal predicates aimed to support positive nature of their personal relationship without any secondary interests. He utilized the predicates *to have to listen to each other and to build up good relations*³⁹, *to spent the hour in the constructive and trusting atmosphere*⁴⁰, *to discuss*

³² “President Bush and I have established good personal relations. I think that he is a reliable person. He may take some decisions that I find debatable, but he is a consistent and predictable partner” (Putin 2005b).

³³ “Russia always had its own opinion on key issues in international relations. In recent years these relations have undergone substantial transformation, and although we do have our own opinion, it does not bear a confrontational character. It does not lead to any additional crises like the Caribbean one. I fully subscribe to this and can name with satisfaction the President of the United States, who is a very serious politician and a very decent man, I can name him my friend. But when we state our opinion, even though it may be quite different from others' views, this does not provoke such a stormy reaction as does the opinion of members of the Western community if they begin to state their own opinion” (Putin 2003b).

³⁴ “First of all, I would like to say that we are not going to a restaurant or the theatre, and we are not meeting for pleasurable reasons. Indeed, the President of the United States has often called me his friend, and I also consider him to be my friend, but we are still meeting in order to work – as I already said, to summarise the results of joint work over the previous period and to plan steps for the near future. Of course, various issues may arise in this dialogue. You mentioned the problem of Iraq: we have a different approach to this problem, but I think that this page must be turned over. Elections were held there – yes, with all their setbacks – but we need to look to the future. ... Of course, mutual issues and even disputes may arise. ... At the same time, our position is that a friendly view from the side, even a critical view, will not hinder us, but rather help us” (Putin 2005a).

³⁵ “Back then, during the Cold War, we always acted in such a way as to cause each other harm at any price, but today we share common goals and the differences between us regard only how to go about resolving this or that problem” (Putin 2006c).

³⁶ “Both parties confirmed that they are ready to search for solutions to all of these difficult problems by peaceful, political and diplomatic means” (Putin 2006d).

³⁷ “My guest and I, my friend, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, are often asked the question, whether our personal relationship helps in addressing certain issues or resolving various bilateral international problems. I always say so and I know that he also believes that this informal personal relationship is helping us in our work. I have to tell you that, at the same time, it does not prevent us from standing up for our national interests on a given issue” (Putin 2006d).

³⁸ “And I fully agree with my colleague and my friend about another thing. Do you know – and I will not be afraid of the word – that in spite of all our disagreements I consider the President of the United States my friend. He is a decent person. ... But I know that he is a decent person and it is possible to talk and reach agreements with him” (Putin 2007a).

³⁹ “I think the main thing is for us to be able simply to listen to each other and build up good relations. It is obvious that the reset in our relations with the United States has been successful in large part because President Obama and I have built up good personal relations” (Medvedev 2010e).

*issues in a friendly atmosphere*⁴¹, *to listen to arguments and reflect on them*⁴², *to thank for ongoing cooperation and for the reasonable compromises*⁴³, *to be grateful for active cooperation*⁴⁴, *not to steer clear from a discussion*⁴⁵, *to have very good relations and understand each other well*⁴⁶, *to trust each other and to solve problems*⁴⁷. It is reasonable to conclude that the predicates used by President Medvedev in connection with the category *friend* suggest positive nature of the personal relationship between the two presidents and, therefore, can be considered characteristics of the positive category of U.S.-Russian relations.

The United States of America represent the second subject that was named a *partner* by President Putin and President Medvedev on a number of occasions. In the business area, the characteristic business category-tied predicates that were found in the same documents as the positive category *partner* include collocations *to discuss*⁴⁸, *to agree to continue cooperation*⁴⁹, *to implement joint projects*⁵⁰, *to have a broad range of*

⁴⁰ “I want to say that we spent this hour in the constructive and trusting atmosphere that characterises our relations with President Obama” (Medvedev 2009h).

⁴¹ „I want to thank my colleague, Barack Obama, for the fact that once again, as at our past meetings, we were able to discuss all of these different issues in such a friendly atmosphere and find good responses to the problems facing our countries and the entire world. Thank you, Barack, for today’s work” (Medvedev 2009h).

⁴² “It is very important when your dialogue partner, even if he heads as big an economy and powerful a country as the United States, listens to your arguments and reflects on them. I think this is extremely important. No matter who you are talking to, the leader of a big country or the leader of a tiny country, you have to make an effort to listen to what your dialogue partner is saying. If we do this we will forge a new foreign policy that will bring us success” (Medvedev 2010e).

⁴³ “First and foremost I would like to thank my colleague, the President of the United States, for his ongoing cooperation in this very complex matter and for the reasonable compromises that have been achieved thanks to the work of our two teams [of negotiators]” (Medvedev 2010a).

⁴⁴ „Thus, I am very grateful to my colleague for his active cooperation and for the truly warm welcome that our delegation experienced in the United States of America” (Medvedev 2010b).

⁴⁵ „My colleague, President Obama, does not steer clear from a discussion on this issue. He does not say it is a harmful idea, that it is not necessary; on the contrary, we periodically return to this subject” (Medvedev 2010d).

⁴⁶ “We do indeed have very good relations and understand each other well. This is important for reaching agreement on many different issues, and we are never short of topics to address” (Medvedev 2010f).

⁴⁷ “In turn, I would like to express my full satisfaction with both how my work with President Obama has proceeded and continues to proceed. The main thing that distinguishes and characterises our relationship is trust. Only if you trust each other can you solve complex problems; some problems have been resolved, but there are many more ahead of us” (Medvedev 2011b).

⁴⁸ “The US is our key partner. Among the topics that will be discussed during the visit by George W. Bush, economic relations will be the main focus” (Putin 2002a).

⁴⁹ “We also agreed to continue our bilateral cooperation in the area of economy” (Putin 2003e).

⁵⁰ “I am satisfied with the way our relations with the United States as a whole are developing. The United States is one of our priority partners. We have implemented a great deal of joint projects in the economic sphere” (Putin 2004b).

*economic ties*⁵¹, *to have many plans*⁵², *to work on joint projects*⁵³. All these business predicates support categorization of the U.S.-Russian relations as positive.

“The issues of disarmament, international stability and the building of an international security structure” (Putin 2002b) represent the second context in which President Putin addresses the U.S. or President Bush as a *partner* and even as an *ally*. When studying the documents with the positive category *partner*, the military predicates *to share the position*⁵⁴, *to agree to continue efforts*⁵⁵, *to continue with strategic partnership*⁵⁶, *to understand*⁵⁷, *to share very close positions*⁵⁸, *to be partners in addressing issues*⁵⁹, *to work together*⁶⁰, *to work further in the direction*⁶¹, *to be united by*⁶², *to manage to approve a joint document*⁶³. The predicates express the will of both nations not only to cooperate in the area of international security, but even to become

⁵¹ *“We also have a broad range of economic ties”* (Putin 2005b).

⁵² *“I would like to say that the United States of America is our nation’s long-standing and promising partner, a partner with whom we have many plans that have not yet been implemented”* (Medvedev 2009g).

⁵³ *“Even the difficulties that have existed between our states in the past and the affects of the crisis have not decreased the desire of our businesspeople to work on joint projects, which is wonderful”* (Medvedev 2009g).

⁵⁴ *“In this connection we share the position of our American partners”* (Putin 2003a).

⁵⁵ *“We agreed with the President to continue our efforts in terms of enhancing international stability, fight against terrorism, and ensuring better strategic stability”* (Putin 2003e).

⁵⁶ *“Today we reiterated, together with President Bush, our resolve to continue with our strategic partnership for the benefit of our nations and the entire world”* (Putin 2003e).

⁵⁷ *“Taking into account all these circumstances and also several areas that are sensitive for us, such as the war on terror, the US is a consistent and reliable partner. ... So I don’t agree with the formulation of the question that America stands apart. ... Today, if we want for the world to be balanced, it should develop along democratic lines. I assure you, everyone understands this. If you mean the difficulties that have arisen in connection with the events in Iraq, then there are a lot of explanations here. One of them, but not the only one, is of course the threat that the United States feels, its wounded pride after the terrorist acts of September 11, and the need to assert itself. I don’t think that this was done in the best way, but it is one of the motives for their actions. Of course, this needs to be understood, but you know our position, it was not only consistent on the events in Iraq, it was also quite harsh”* (Putin 2003f).

⁵⁸ *“We share very close positions regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”* (Putin 2004a).

⁵⁹ *“We are, undoubtedly, partners in addressing a series of pressing modern-day issues, above all in countering terrorism”* (Putin 2004b).

⁶⁰ *“We work together to fight international terrorism (we know that Egypt has also suffered from this scourge)”* (Putin 2005b).

⁶¹ *“And I think that in terms of geopolitical changes in the world, our cooperation in all of these directions is bound to remain natural and necessary. We are going to work further in this direction”* (Putin 2006b).

⁶² *„We are united by the realisation that the basis of national security is sustainable and progressive development. The general approach of the US is also fully in line with our integrated approach to security, emanating from an understanding that military power is limited”* (Medvedev 2010c).

⁶³ *“We have agreed also that the offensive and defensive systems of both countries should be considered together. We have adopted a joint statement on ABM. And this is also an important result of our work, even taking into account that we have differences on a number of items. Nevertheless, we managed to approve a joint document”* (Medvedev 2009f).

allies in the fight against terrorism⁶⁴. Therefore, all the military predicates are considered as features of the positive category of the U.S.-Russian relations.

The last, but not least topic that was mentioned in the documents was the issue of U.S.-Russian bilateral relations. In the speeches or interviews with the occurrence of the positive collocations, the predicates *to have ceased to be enemies and opponents*⁶⁵, *never to return to a state of confrontation*⁶⁶, *to be on a high level*⁶⁷, *to value deepening relations*⁶⁸, *not to interrupt the progress on the way to reaching common objectives*⁶⁹ were detected. All these bilateral predicates confirm warming of the U.S.-Russian international relations, but one more collocation that effectively can trace the improvement of the U.S.-Russian relations was identified in the course of the analysis. Both President Putin and President Medvedev utilized the statement that Cold War between the United States and Russia was over in autumn 2001⁷⁰ and then in summer 2010⁷¹. This particular collocation is considered to indicate a period of undoubtedly very high level of the U.S.-Russian relations.

The same four topic areas were determined in studying the predicates related to the positive expressions detected in the U.S. documents. The first area of personal

⁶⁴ The fact that the U.S. and Russia became actual partners was confirmed twice by President Putin by saying: *“With major countries such as the United States we have relations based on a partnership, and in some areas of our work together, for example, the fight against terrorism, we are even allies”* (Putin 2004a). *“We are, undoubtedly, partners in addressing a series of pressing modern-day issues, above all in countering terrorism. I would even say we are more than partners, we are allies in this sphere”* (Putin 2004b).

⁶⁵ *“And I absolutely agree with the President of the United States when he says that Russia and the United States have ceased to be enemies and opponents, but have become partners”* (Putin 2003b).

⁶⁶ *“Of course I assume that our own interests and our point of view will be taken into account. Otherwise joint work would be impossible. But one thing I can say for sure: Russia will never return to a state of confrontation with our partners in Europe and in North America”* (Putin 2003c).

⁶⁷ *“As for the fundamental relations between Russia and the United States, I agree with the assessment of my American colleagues: they have probably never been on such a high level as they are now. The level of trust is very high, as is the level of interaction on key problems of the modern world: trade turnover is growing – and all these are the realities of our bilateral relations.”* (Putin 2005a)

⁶⁸ *“As far as our relations with the United States go, they are one of our major partners and we value our deepening relations with this country”* (Putin 2006a).

⁶⁹ *“This paradigm shift is currently taking place in our relations with many states, including such important international partners as the United States. I hope the remnants of the Cold War are a thing of the past. But we must not interrupt the progress in establishing rapport on the way to reaching common objectives between two such strong powers as the United States and Russia”* (Medvedev 2010c).

⁷⁰ President Putin used the statement about the Cold War being over three times in total in the period between September 2001 and November 2003. He said: *“Today we must say once and for all: the Cold War is done with! We have entered a new stage of development”* (Putin 2001b). *“There can be no doubt about it. Not only has the Cold War ended, but conditions have been created in the world for Russia and the United States to go hand in hand in solving many problems of our time, both in the field of economics and security”* (Putin 2001c). *“We intend to dismantle conclusively the vestiges of the cold war and to develop new—entirely new partnership for long term”* (Putin 2001d).

⁷¹ President Medvedev declared his hope that the Cold War ended just once in July 2010 by stating: *“I hope the remnants of the Cold War are a thing of the past”* (Medvedev 2010c).

relationship between the presidents includes a wide range of category-tied predicates, as the category *friend* was the most frequently used expression to denominate President Putin. The personal category-tied predicates include the collocations *to call in a time of need*⁷², *to extend sympathy and support*⁷³, *to establish friendship*⁷⁴, *to invite to your house*⁷⁵, *to trust*⁷⁶, *to ask questions*⁷⁷, *to solve difficult issues*⁷⁸, *to discuss things in a frank way*⁷⁹, *to enjoy talking to and to thank for working together*⁸⁰, *to have good talks and to understand each other*⁸¹, *to have an important and constructive dialog and constructive relations*⁸², *to find a lot of agreement and common ground*⁸³, *to make the*

⁷² “Vladimir Putin was the first person to call. That's what a friend does, calls in a time of need, and he called. It's clear to me that he understands that we're developing a new relationship” (Bush 2001b).

⁷³ “Within hours after September the 11th attacks, President Putin called. He extended his sympathy, and he extended his support. He did something more. He knew that the American military was moving to high alert status. To simplify our situation, to show solidarity, he ordered Russia's military to stop a set of exercises that were getting underway. America, and I in particular, will remember this act of friendship in a time of need” (Bush 2001b).

⁷⁴ “It's my honor also to introduce President Putin to Crawford. I bet a lot of folks here, particularly the older folks, never dreamt that an American President would be bringing the Russian President to Crawford, Texas. [Laughter] A lot of people never really dreamt that an American President and a Russian President could have established the friendship that we have” (Bush 2001d).

⁷⁵ “I brought him to my ranch because, as the good people in this part of the world know, that you only usually invite your friends into your house. Oh, occasionally, you let a salesman in, or two, but—[laughter]. But I wanted the Putins to see how we live. And even though we changed addresses, our hearts are right here in our home State” (Bush 2001d).

⁷⁶ “I was able in Slovenia to realize that was possible when I visited with President Putin. And this head of his bureau there, or whatever you want to call the guy, asked me the question, first question: Do you trust Putin? Yes. I answered that several months ago. ... They said, “How do you know?” I said, “I looked into his eyes and was able to glimpse into his soul.” See, and I've been proven right. I do trust him because I believe he cares deeply about moving forward. There's so much that can be done in the spirit of friendship, together” (Bush 2002a).

⁷⁷ “I mean, we ask questions as friends would ask questions: “How are you doing this? Where are you doing that?” (Bush 2002a).

⁷⁸ “The good news is, we're—our relationship is a friendly relationship; that I view President Putin as a friend. I view Russia as a friend, not as an enemy. And therefore, it's much easier to solve these difficult issues, an issue like proliferation, amongst friends” (Bush 2002b).

⁷⁹ “I consider Vladimir Putin one of my good friends. Like other good friends I've had throughout my life, we don't agree 100 percent of the time. But we always agree to discuss things in a frank and—in a frank way” (Bush 2002i).

⁸⁰ “I always enjoy talking to my friend Vladimir Putin. He's a strong leader who cares deeply about the people of his country and understands the issues that we face. We just had a long discussion about a variety of issues. And I had the opportunity to thank him for working together on important issues such as the United Nations Security Council resolution” (Bush 2004a).

⁸¹ “You know, it's interesting. First of all, we don't need a fresh start in my personal relationship with Vladimir Putin. We're friends, and that's important. It's important so that we can—he and I can have good talks, and we can understand each other and understand the decision-making process” (Bush 2005a).

⁸² “I've just had a very important and constructive dialog with my friend. It's great to see—I know Laura was pleased to see Lyudmila Putin as well. We have had, over the past 4 years, very constructive relations, and that's the way I'm going to keep it for the next 4 years as well” (Bush 2005b).

⁸³ “We may not always agree with each other, and we haven't over the last 4 years, that's for certain. But we have found a lot agreement—a lot of common ground, and the world is better for it. Even though we didn't agree on certain issues, if you really think about what we have done the last 4 years, and

*relationship stronger*⁸⁴, *to have a cordial relationship and to discuss differences without hostility*⁸⁵, *to appreciate the friendship and the change to dialog*⁸⁶. Based on the analysis, President Bush considered President Putin his very good personal friend since the very beginning of the analysis nearly till the end of his office-term.

President Obama, similarly, developed very close relationship with his counterpart President Medvedev, which is obvious from the use of predicates tied to the positive categories *partner* and *friend*. The personal predicates *to develop a very effective working relationship*⁸⁷, *to have found a solid and reliable partner, to listen to one another and to speak candidly*⁸⁸, *to have built up an excellent relationship*⁸⁹, *to have built an outstanding relationship*⁹⁰ show close personal relationship of President Obama and President Medvedev and, consequently, confirm the positive nature of the U.S.-Russian relations.

The second area in which positive categories were assigned by the US Presidents to their Russian counterparts was business cooperation between the two countries. The business category-tied predicates detected in connection with the positive categories *partner* or *friend* consist of the collocations *to find ways to work together* and *to have a lot in common*⁹¹, *to develop the economic relationship quickly and to look for further*

what we want to do during the next 4 years, the common ground is a lot more than those areas where we disagree" (Bush 2005b).

⁸⁴ "I don't know how many visits we've had. I haven't been counting them because I've run out of fingers on my hands, but there's been a lot. And every time I visit and talk with President Putin, I—our relationship becomes stronger" (Bush 2005d).

⁸⁵ "But disagreement on issues doesn't mean that the relations aren't cordial. As a matter of fact, I have found that it's easier to disagree on issues when you have a cordial relationship. It means you can discuss your differences without hostility, which makes it easier that you can find common ground" (Bush 2007a).

⁸⁶ "We did discuss a variety of issues that are of importance to our respective countries, and I found the conversation to be cordial and constructive. We are results-oriented people. We want to help solve problems. And we recognize that we can do better solving problems when we work together. So I appreciate your time, appreciate your friendship, and appreciate the chance to dialog on important matters" (Bush 2007e).

⁸⁷ „I want to thank my friend and partner, Dmitry Medvedev. Without his personal efforts and strong leadership, we would not be here today. We've met and spoken by phone many times throughout the negotiations of this treaty, and as a consequence, we've developed a very effective working relationship built on candor, cooperation, and mutual respect" (Obama 2010a).

⁸⁸ "That's why I committed to resetting the relationship between our two nations, and in President Medvedev, I've found a solid and reliable partner. We listen to one another, and we speak candidly. So, Mr. President, I'm very grateful for your leadership and your partnership" (Obama 2010b).

⁸⁹ "Well, let me just say it is wonderful once again to meet with my friend Dmitry. I think we've built up an excellent relationship over the past 2 years, working on a whole range of issues. We had a very productive discussion here" (Obama 2010d).

⁹⁰ "Let me just make a brief statement. It is good once again to see my friend and partner Dmitry Medvedev. Over the past 2 years, I think that we have built an outstanding relationship" (Obama 2011a).

⁹¹ "Russia has got a lot of entrepreneurial talent. And I'm confident that the United States and our entrepreneurs and Russian entrepreneurs will find ways to work together. So we've got a lot in common" (Bush 2001b).

ways to expand it⁹², to have a good economic relationship and to resolve the differences in a wise way⁹³, to coordinate the efforts⁹⁴, to agree to expand trade and commerce⁹⁵. President Obama even used the expression *ally*⁹⁶ when referring to President Medvedev and the improvement of the commercial ties between the United States and America.

The most discusses topic in the documents with the occurrence of the positive categories was the topic of international security, military cooperation, non-proliferation and war on terror. The presidents used the military predicates *to work together to prevent proliferation and to reduce the threat*⁹⁷, *to share the same threat and the same resolve*⁹⁸, *to have vast discussions*⁹⁹, *to expand efforts*¹⁰⁰, *to share a common interest in the war on terror and to share information*¹⁰¹, *to fight together*¹⁰², *to have a friend in the fight against terrorism*¹⁰³, *to make progress and to solve the issue peacefully*¹⁰⁴, to

⁹² “Russia has set out to strengthen free market institutions and the rule of law. On this basis, our economic relationship is developing quickly, and we will look for further ways to expand it” (Bush 2001c).

⁹³ “We talked about our economic relationship. Russia has got a growing economy. We have products that they want, and they've got products that we want, like energy. And it's necessary for us to have a good economic relationship, one where we resolve our differences in a wise way” (Bush 2005d).

⁹⁴ “Together, we've coordinated our efforts to strengthen the global economic recovery through the G-20, work that we will continue in Toronto this weekend” (Obama 2010b).

⁹⁵ “So today President Medvedev and I agreed to expand trade and commerce even further. We agreed to deepen our collaboration on energy efficiency and clean energy technologies. We reached an agreement that will allow the United States to begin exporting our poultry products to Russia once again” (Obama 2010c).

⁹⁶ “From our first meeting at the G20 summit in London to our discussions here in Moscow, President Medvedev's leadership has been critical to new progress in U.S-Russian relations. And the fact that he has experience in business, in the private sector, makes him an invaluable ally in our efforts to improve the commercial ties between our two countries” (Obama 2009e).

⁹⁷ “It is clear there's a lot the United States and Russia can do together to defeat terrorism. ... Both our nations are working to prevent proliferation and to reduce the threat from cold war weapon stockpiles throughout the former Soviet Union. We also see progress in our efforts to build a new strategic framework” (Bush 2001b).

⁹⁸ “Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve. We will fight and defeat terrorist networks wherever they exist. Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” (Bush 2001c).

⁹⁹ “Russia and the United States have also had vast discussions about our defensive capabilities, the ability to defend ourselves as we head into the 21st century” (Bush 2001c).

¹⁰⁰ “A crucial partner in this effort is Russia, a nation we are helping to dismantle strategic weapons, reduce nuclear material, and increase security at nuclear sites. Our two countries will expand efforts to provide peaceful employment for scientists who formerly worked in Soviet weapons facilities” (Bush 2001e).

¹⁰¹ “He is a—he also is a man who worries about the threats that Russia faces. We share a common interest in this war on terror because Russia, herself, has been attacked; innocent people have lost life. And he's passionate on the subject, about protecting his homeland. And we share information about how best to do that” (Bush 2002a).

¹⁰² “We've got a new war to fight together. We're joined to fight against bloodthirsty killers. These people hate freedom. They hate multi-ethnic societies. They can't stand religion. And it's a threat to America, and this is a threat to Russia, as you all so well know” (Bush 2002e).

¹⁰³ “Terrorism—first of all, I've got a good friend in the fight against terrorism in Vladimir Putin. He understands the stakes, MDNM and so do I. He understands that as you embrace freedom and

*appreciate the understanding of the war on terror*¹⁰⁵, *to work together to stop proliferators*¹⁰⁶, *to work together on key issues*¹⁰⁷, *to agree to expand discussions*¹⁰⁸, *to have strengthened the global nonproliferation regime*¹⁰⁹, *to agree to deepen cooperation*¹¹⁰. In connection with this particular topic, the category *ally*¹¹¹ was used by President Bush to stress the importance of Russian cooperation in the war on terror. As all the predicates detected in the documents with occurrence of the positive categories imply the intention of the two countries to work together, they can be considered to be the characteristics of the positive category of U.S.-Russian relations.

The topic of bilateral relations of the United States and Russia represented a heavily discussed topic. The positive bilateral predicates found in the documents mostly express warming of the U.S.-Russian relations and the turn in perception of Russia by the United States. President Bush stated several times the difference between the “old times” and the “new era” of the U.S.-Russian relations by saying: “*When I was in high school, Russia was an enemy. Now, the high school students can know Russia as a friend*” (Bush 2001d). Other predicates that confirm the change of attitude towards

embrace change and—that there will be people who resent that and want to impose their will” (Bush 2002g).

¹⁰⁴ “*As you know—some of you have been on the trips with me to Russia, and you remember me talking with my friend Vladimir Putin about the need to be mindful of the Iranians' desire to have a nuclear weapon. We're making progress there. I really believe that we can solve this issue peacefully*” (Bush 2003a).

¹⁰⁵ “*And I appreciate you very much and your understanding of this war on terror. We also understand that we've got to work to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction*” (Bush 2005d).

¹⁰⁶ “*The issue of proliferation is one where there's good cooperation between the United States and Russia. It's in the world's interest that the United States and Russia and other nations work together to stop proliferators from being able to get a hold of materials that could end up harming innocent people*” (Bush 2007a).

¹⁰⁷ “*Well, we've been working very closely with Russia on Iran, and I don't think that this—first of all, my comments yesterday were very realistic in the sense that said, we're friends; we've got a complex relationship; we can work together, but we've had some disagreements. I just don't see how—why that, those kinds of statements are going to prevent the United States and Russia from working closely together on key issues like Iran or proliferation, areas where we can get along*” (Bush 2007b).

¹⁰⁸ “*President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles*” (Obama 2010a).

¹⁰⁹ “*Together, we've strengthened the global nonproliferation regime so that as we meet our obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, other nations meet theirs and are held accountable if they don't*” (Bush 2010b).

¹¹⁰ “*We see Russia as a partner, not an adversary. And we agreed to deepen our cooperation in several critical areas: on Afghanistan, counternarcotics, and a range of 21st-century security challenges. And perhaps most significantly, we agreed to cooperate on missile defense, which turns a source of past tension into a source of potential cooperation against a shared threat*” (Bush 2010e).

¹¹¹ President Bush stressed on three occasions that “*Russia and the United States are allies in the war on terror*” (Bush 2003b; Bush 2004b; Bush 2005d).

Russia include *not to view Russia as an enemy and not to be a threat to Russia*¹¹², to have a very frank and open relationship¹¹³, to transform the relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust¹¹⁴, to work together to break the old ties, to establish a new spirit of cooperation and trust¹¹⁵, to work with Russia as a friend¹¹⁶, to cast aside old doubts and suspicions and to welcome a new era of the relations¹¹⁷, to bring the U.S.-Russian relationship to a new level of partnership¹¹⁸, to sit beside a friend¹¹⁹, to solve problems and to have a frank exchange of ideas and philosophies and views¹²⁰, to view Russia as a friendly nation, not a hostile nation¹²¹, to have been able to reset relations between the United States and Russia¹²². The collocation *Cold War is over* that clearly supports the improvement of the U.S.-Russian relations was also detected in the American documents. It was found four times in the documents with the occurrence of the positive categories¹²³.

¹¹² “Well, I think the first sign of our new relationship is that he knows I don't view Russia as an enemy, that we're not a threat to Russia. And I know that he's not going to threaten the United States. That's a different attitude from the old days” (Bush 2001b).

¹¹³ “The old days, we used to distrust each other. The old days, the discussions were not very frank and candid. They were probably bureaucratic in nature. And we have a very frank and open relationship because we're not a threat” (Bush 2001b).

¹¹⁴ “The United States and Russia are in the midst of a transformation of a relationship that will yield peace and progress. We're transforming our relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust that will enhance opportunities for peace and progress for our citizens and for people all around the world” (Bush 2001c).

¹¹⁵ “We're working together to break the old ties, to establish a new spirit of cooperation and trust so that we can work together to make the world more peaceful” (Bush 2001d).

¹¹⁶ “And so my message to the Russian people, as well as to here at home, is that it is important that Russia be viewed as a friend, not as an enemy. I said that right off the bat; that was my stated goal as a President, is to work with Russia as a friend, not as an enemy” (Bush 2002a).

¹¹⁷ “It's a magnificent setting for our very important discussions and our signing of a treaty which says—it says that we're friends, that we're going to cast aside old doubts and suspicions and welcome a new era between the relations between your great country and our country” (Bush 2002c).

¹¹⁸ “Old suspicions are giving way to new understanding and respect. Our goal is to bring the U.S.-Russian relationship to a new level of partnership” (Bush 2003b).

¹¹⁹ “And I was sitting beside a friend. Russia is not an enemy. Russia is our friend. And it's important that we work together to achieve peace. Obviously, we have a difference of opinion on certain issues, but we don't have a difference of opinion on working together for peace” (Bush 2005c).

¹²⁰ “The foreign policy of my administration will be to work with Russia to solve common problems and, at the same time, be in a position where we can have a frank exchange of ideas and philosophies and views” (Bush 2006a).

¹²¹ “Russia is not hostile; Russia is a friend. We don't agree with Russia all the time, but nevertheless, I view them as a friendly nation, not a hostile nation” (Bush 2007a).

¹²² “We've been able to reset relations between the United States and Russia in a way that is good for the security and the prosperity of both of our countries” (Obama 2011a).

¹²³ President Bush confirmed the end of the Cold War in the following fragments of his speeches. “In terms of missile defense, I can't wait to visit with my friend Vladimir Putin, in Shanghai, to reiterate once again that the cold war is over, it's done with, and that there are new threats that we face, and no better example of that new threat than the attack on America on September 11th” (Bush 2001a). “When I got out of college in 1968, America and the Soviet Union were enemies—bitter enemies. Today, America and Russia are friends. It's important for you to know that that era is long gone as far as I'm concerned.” (Bush 2002e) “And thirdly, you know, we are going to work to end the—forever end the cold war. And that begins with the statement that Russia's our friend, not our enemy” (Bush 2002d). “In other words, he

3.2. Negative and Neutral Category of the U.S.-Russian Relations

The next categories to be studied are the negative and neutral categories of the U.S.-Russian relations. Prior to the research, it was expected that the analysis would firstly search for the categories used by the presidents and based on those findings, the category-tied predicates would be determined. The particular procedure turned out to be suitable for the category of positive relations between the United States and Russia. However, a different approach had to be adopted when dealing with the neutral and negative categories, because of the fact that none of the expected negative categories were detected in the documents. The analysis of neutral and negative U.S.-Russian relations is based on the assumption that the period of time when no positive collections of categories occurred can be classified as either neutral or negative. Consequently, the criterion for identifying the documents belonging to the neutral and negative categories was the absence of the positive categories.

Therefore, firstly, the documents from the period of time when none of the positive categories were detected in the discourses were studied and collections of categories assigned by the presidents to each other were specified. The categories were identical for both the negative and neutral categories of the U.S.-Russian relations. However, the crucial criterion that determined the nature of the category being positive or negative was the category-tied predicates. The documents that were studied by the different procedure come from the period since February 2007 till July 2009 (valid for Russian documents), since September 2007 till July 2009 (valid for the United States of America) and since November 2011 till December 2013 (valid for both the United States and Russia). In the periods of time, no positive categories were detected in the documents and that is why the negative and neutral collections of categories and category-tied predicates were searched for in these particular discourses.

recognized that there's an opportunity to work together. That's what friends do, by the way. Russia is not our enemy. As I said repeatedly, the cold war is over, and now we're dealing with threats in the 21st century" (Bush 2007c).

3.2.1. The Collection of Neutral and Negative Categories

As none of the expected negative categories were assigned by the presidents to each other, the collections of neutral and negative categories of the U.S.-Russian relations were identified together. In contrast to the positive collections of categories, it was not plausible to undoubtedly determine the negative or neutral classification of the categories, because the expressions used by the presidents in the defined periods of time did not bear traces of negative charge. That is why the stress when classifying the particular categories was put on the category-tied predicates that are discussed in the following chapter.

The first category that was used by Russian presidents in the specified period of time at the highest frequency was the category *partner*. Although the category belonged to the positive collection of categories when being connected with a positively perceived adjective, in the negative and neutral collection of categories, the category appeared alone and the main factor that determined its classification were the category-tied predicates. President Putin used the category *partner* when talking about the United States of America on five different occasions¹²⁴ since February 2007 till December 2007. President Medvedev also mentioned the category *partner* in connection with the United States in seven¹²⁵ speeches and interviews since September 2008 till May 2009. Since July 2009 till November 2011, the U.S.-Russian relations were categorized as positive in the previous chapter. However, already in February 2012 (Medvedev 2012a), President Medvedev utilized the category *partner* without any positive adjectives to address the United States of America and, therefore, this particular occurrence could not be included in the positive category itself. After President Putin had taken over the presidential office in May 2012, he used the category *partner* on four¹²⁶ occasions when expressing his points of view in connection with the United States. The category *partner* was not assigned at all to American presidents in the delimited period of time.

¹²⁴ President Putin addressed the United States as partners twice in February (Putin 2007a; Putin 2007b), in September (Putin 2007f), in November (Putin 2007h) and in December 2007 (Putin 2007i).

¹²⁵ President Medvedev named the United States *partner* twice in September 2008 (Medvedev 2008c; Medvedev 2008d), in November 2008 (Medvedev 2008e), in December 2008 (Medvedev 2008g), in March 2009 (Medvedev 2009a), in April 2009 (Medvedev 2009c) and in May 2009 (Medvedev 2009d).

¹²⁶ The occasions include two interviews in September 2012 (Putin 2012b) and April 2013 (Putin 2013a) and two news conferences in December 2012 (Putin 2012c) and in June 2013 (Putin 2013b).

The expression that Russian presidents used to denominate their American counterparts instead was the category *colleague*. In combination with the occurrence of other positive categories, the expression *colleague* can be included in the collection of positive categories. However, President Putin, who had very good personal relationship with President Bush, called his counterpart a *colleague* in July 2007 (Putin 2007d) and September 2007 (Putin 2007e). It is crucial to point out that President Medvedev addressed only President Obama as his colleague three times¹²⁷ before he started calling him a *partner* and a *friend*. Nevertheless, at the end of his term in presidential office in December 2011 (Medvedev 2011c) and March 2012 (Medvedev 2012b), he stopped using the categories *partner* and *friend* and returned to the category *colleague* when addressing President Obama. The absence of the positive categories clearly suggests a change in the U.S.-Russian relations that will be discussed in detail in connection with the neutral and negative category-tied predicates.

Apart from the categories *partner* and *colleague*, categories *president* and *the United States* were detected in the delimited period of time. The occurrence of these categories was common also for the positive collection of categories and therefore, the particular occurrences of the categories are not considered to be relevant for the analysis. However, the nature of the predicates tied to the categories will be taken into account in the next chapter as supplementary to determining the characteristics of the neutral and negative categories of the U.S.-Russian relations.

The same procedure will be applied to the categories *president* and *Russia* that were detected in the documents presented by American presidents in the specified period of time. The categories, in fact, were the ones used at the highest frequency by both presidents when addressing Russia or Russian presidents since September 2007 till July 2009 and since November 2011 till December 2013. Nevertheless, the categories were also widely used in the positive category of the U.S.-Russian relations and that is the reason why their occurrences on their own cannot be considered as indicators of neutral or negative categories. Once again, they will be taken into consideration in the analysis of category-tied predicates.

In contrast to the Russian documents, no relevant occurrences of the categories *partner* or *colleague* were identified in the American speeches, statements and

¹²⁷ President Medvedev called President Obama, but never President Bush, his *colleague* in November 2008 (Medvedev 2008f), in April 2009 (Medvedev 2009b) and in May 2009 (Medvedev 2009d).

interviews. In spite of that, two different categories were detected in the documents from the delimited period of time. The first category that was not employed in the positive collection of categories was the category *government* to address not only the Russian president, but whole Russian administration. It was used twice by President Bush in November 2007 (Bush 2007j) and in August 2008 (Bush 2008e) and twice by President Obama in June 2013 (Obama 2013c; Obama 2013d). Again, the exact nature of the category belonging to the neutral or negative collection of categories will be determined based on the category-tied predicates.

The second category could be characterized as a negation of the negative categories *an enemy* and *a threat*. The category consist of a claim that Russia as a state is *not an enemy* or *a threat*. Although the same negation of the category *enemy* occurred earlier, it was always connected to the positive category *friend*. For example, since May 2002 till May 2005, President Bush repeatedly stated: “*I view Russia as a friend, not as an enemy*” (Bush 2002b). “*And that begins with the statement that Russia's our friend, not our enemy*” (Bush 2002c). “*And so my message to the Russian people, as well as to here at home, is that it is important that Russia be viewed as a friend, not as an enemy*” (Bush 2002g). “*And I was sitting beside a friend. Russia is not an enemy. Russia is our friend*” (Bush 2005c). Despite the fact that since October 2007 till April 2008, President Bush named Russia *not an enemy* and *not a threat*¹²⁸, he did not add the positive category *friend* as he used to. The change in the discourse is noticeable and implies the change in the U.S.-Russian relations that will be further studied.

¹²⁸ Since October 2007 till April 2008, President Bush called Russia *not an enemy* or *threat* four times, but not once did he add the positive category *friend*. He said: “*Moreover, the missile defenses we will deploy are intended to deter countries who would threaten us with ballistic missile attacks. We do not consider Russia such a country. The cold war is over. Russia is not our enemy. We're building a new security relationship, whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation*” (Bush 2007h). “*I really don't view Russia as a threat, a military threat. I don't think— I'm pretty confident President Putin does not want to have any military conflict*” (Bush 2007i). “*I mean, look, I'm going to meet with President Putin to make it clear to him the cold war is over and Russia is not our enemy and that there's common ground. Obviously, I've had my disagreements with the President in the past, and-- but there's also areas where we need to work in common, such as proliferation and dealing with terror*” (Bush 2008b). “*The cold war is over. Russia is not our enemy. We're working toward a new security relationship with Russia, whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation*” (Bush 2008c).

3.2.2. Negative Category-tied Predicates

Firstly, the negative category-tied predicates were studied as it was more outright to determine their classification than the neutral category-tied predicates. The main criterion for identifying the relations as negative was the occurrence of predicates implicating hostility, disagreement and conflict between Russia and the United States of America.

In Russian documents, the occurrences of neutral or negative categories were studied in the determined period of time and it was concluded that the only period of time that could be considered the negative category of the U.S.-Russian relations began in February 2007 and finished in June 2007. President Putin used the predicates *to overstep the national boundaries in every way*¹²⁹, *hopefully to act in a transparent way*¹³⁰, *to certainly develop an offensive weapon and to actively develop and strengthen an anti-missile defense system*¹³¹, *to destroy the balance of power and to benefit from the feeling of complete security*¹³², *to pursue the sole purpose of furthering their own interests*¹³³, *not to understand and to turn up the pressure more and more*¹³⁴, *to be*

¹²⁹ “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?” (Putin 2007a).

¹³⁰ “We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration” (Putin 2007a).

¹³¹ “Yes, the United States is ostensibly not developing an offensive weapon. In any case, the public does not know about this. Even though they are certainly developing them. But we aren’t even going to ask about this now. We know that these developments are proceeding. But we pretend that we don’t know, so we say that they aren’t developing new weapons. But what do we know? That the United States is actively developing and already strengthening an anti-missile defence system. Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we recognise that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neutralised. Russia’s present nuclear capabilities, that is” (Putin 2007a).

¹³² “The balance of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security. This means that its hands will be free not only in local but eventually also in global conflicts” (Putin 2007a).

¹³³ “We have seen many positive developments in our relations with the United States, but we are becoming increasingly convinced that often the action taken by our partners in different areas, and the instruments they use with regard to Russia, pursue the sole purpose of furthering their own interests with regard to our country” (Putin 2007b).

¹³⁴ “We take a patient and tolerant approach to this kind of policy, but we have the impression that some of our partners do not understand us and are turning up the pressure more and more. Things have got to the stage where the non-existent Russian threat has started being used as a pretext for getting

*absolutely convinced that their opinion is the correct one*¹³⁵, *to be the principal violator of human rights and freedoms worldwide*¹³⁶. During the four months when President Putin was in power, the negative predicates connected to the category *partner* expressed clearly hostile attitude of Russia towards the United States and therefore, can be used to characterize the negative category of the U.S-Russian relations from Russian side.

On the other hand, the negative predicates in American documents were detected between August and October 2008. President Bush utilized the predicates *to have invaded a sovereign neighboring state and to threaten a democratic government*¹³⁷, *must respect Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty*¹³⁸, *to raise serious questions about the intentions in Georgia and the region*¹³⁹, *to have damaged the credibility and the relations with the nations of the free world*¹⁴⁰, *to need to honor the agreement and withdraw the forces and end military operations*¹⁴¹, *to invade the*

the U.S. Congress to increase defence spending – defence spending that will be used to carry out military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to build an expensive missile defence system” (Putin 2007b).

¹³⁵ *“One of the major difficulties today is that certain members of the international community are absolutely convinced that their opinion is the correct one. And of course this is hardly conducive to creating the trusting atmosphere that I believe is crucial for finding more than simply mutually acceptable solutions, for finding optimal solutions“ (Putin 2007c).*

¹³⁶ *“Let us not be hypocritical about democratic freedoms and human rights. I already said that I have a copy of Amnesty International’s report including on the United States. There is probably no need to repeat this so as not to offend anyone. If you wish, I shall now report how the United States does in all this. We have an expression that is perhaps difficult to translate but it means that one can always have plenty to say about others. Amnesty International has concluded that the United States is now the principal violator of human rights and freedoms worldwide. I have the quote here, I can show you. And there is argumentation behind it“ (Putin 2007c).*

¹³⁷ *“Russia has invaded a sovereign neighboring state and threatens a democratic government elected by its people. Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century“ (Bush 2008e).*

¹³⁸ *“Russia's Government must respect Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Russian Government must reverse the course it appears to be on and accept this peace agreement as a first step toward resolving this conflict. Russia's actions this week have raised serious questions about its intentions in Georgia and the region. These actions have substantially damaged Russia's standing in the world, and these actions jeopardize Russians' relations - Russia's relations with the United States and Europe. It is time for Russia to be true to its word and to act to end this crisis“ (Bush 2008e).*

¹³⁹ *“As I have made clear, Russia's ongoing action raise serious questions about its intentions in Georgia and the region. In recent years, Russia has sought to integrate into the diplomatic, political, economic, and security structures of the 21st century. The United States has supported those efforts. Now Russia is putting its aspirations at risk by taking actions in Georgia that are inconsistent with the principles of those institutions. To begin to repair the damage to its relations with the United States, Europe, and other nations and to begin restoring its place in the world, Russia must keep its word and act to end this crisis” (Bush 2008f).*

¹⁴⁰ *“With its actions in recent days, Russia has damaged its credibility and its relations with the nations of the free world. Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century. Only Russia can decide whether it will now put itself back on the path of responsible nations or continue to pursue a policy that promises only confrontation and isolation. To begin to repair its relations with the United States and Europe and other nations and to begin restoring its place in the world, Russia must respect the freedom of its neighbors” (Bush 2008g).*

¹⁴¹ *“President Medvedev of Russia has now signed on to the terms of this agreement. And that's an important development; it's a hopeful step. Now, Russia needs to honor the agreement and withdraw its forces, and of course, end military operations” (Bush 2008h).*

country in a disproportionate response to a conflict¹⁴², to exacerbate tensions and complicate diplomatic negotiations¹⁴³, to invade a sovereign neighbor and violate Georgia's territorial integrity¹⁴⁴, must show respect for the sovereignty and territory of its neighbors¹⁴⁵. The categories that were tied to the negative predicates include the category *government* (Bush 2008e), but the general expression *Russia* was detected predominantly in American documents. Nevertheless, the negative predicates represent sufficient characteristics to categorize the relationship of the U.S. towards Russia as negative since August till October 2008.

It is vital to point out that when studying the predicates used by American presidents, no negatively charged predicates were found between February and June 2007. Similarly, no negative predicates were detected in Russian documents since August till October 2008. To conclude, based on the MCA, the negative categorization of the U.S.-Russian relations does not overlap and, consequently, a different periods of time are considered as negative for Russia and another period for the United States of America.

¹⁴² “For nearly 2 weeks, the world has watched Georgia's young democracy come under siege. Russian forces invaded the country in a disproportionate response to a long-simmering conflict in Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The world has come together to condemn this assault” (Bush 2008i).

¹⁴³ “The territorial integrity and borders of Georgia must be respected, just as those of Russia or any other country. Russia's action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations. In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions that remain in force, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, and they must remain so” (Bush 2008j).

¹⁴⁴ “Last month, Russia invaded a sovereign neighbor and violated Georgia's territorial integrity. The people of Georgia withstood the assault from the Russian military, and the international community rallied to stand with the people of Georgia and their democratically elected Government” (Bush 2008k).

¹⁴⁵ “The United States and the EU agree that the territory of Georgia includes the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We're working to meet the humanitarian needs of the Georgian people and help displaced families return to their homes. To earn the respect of the international community, Russia must show respect for the sovereignty and territory of its neighbors. Russia must accept the responsibilities and obligations of international leadership” (Bush 2008l).

3.2.3. Neutral Category-tied Predicates

The next step of the analysis consisted of studying the predicates that could be categorized as neutral. In Russian documents, the same procedure that was implemented to the analysis of positive category-tied predicates was applied, meaning that the predicates connected to the categories *partner* and *colleague* were primarily studied and then supplemented by predicates connected to the general categories *president* and *the United States of America*.

The majority of the predicates related to the above mentioned categories were commenting on the U.S.-Russian relations. Between June 2007, when the last negative category-tied predicate occurred, and July 2009, when the first positive category was put in use by President Medvedev, both President Putin and President Medvedev multiple times commented on the U.S.-Russian relations using predicates *to discuss a possibility of raising the relations to an entirely new level*¹⁴⁶, *to hope that the relations will continue to develop in the same positive mood*¹⁴⁷, *to have differing approaches and to have differences*¹⁴⁸, *to start looking for positive things in the relations with each other rather than concentrating only on problems*¹⁴⁹, *to need to take a positive view of each other and support each other*¹⁵⁰, *to have heard the concerns*¹⁵¹, *not to need friends, but to need vassals to command*¹⁵², *to have different points of view, but must continue to*

¹⁴⁶ „As for the future, as I already mentioned, we are now discussing a possibility of raising our relations to an entirely new level that would involve a very private and very, shall we say, sensitive dialog on all issues related to international security, including, of course, the missile defense issue” (Putin 2007d).

¹⁴⁷ “I would like to thank my colleague, the President of the United States, for a very constructive and open dialog, which we enjoyed today. This gives me every hope to believe that further on the relations between the countries will continue to develop in the same positive mood” (Putin 2007e).

¹⁴⁸ “As far as our differences go, differences have always existed, and with such substantial relations and ties in such a wide variety of areas there will always be differences somewhere. We have differing approaches regarding many issues on the international agenda, and we even have differences in our bilateral relations, including in the economy. This is only natural” (Putin 2007f).

¹⁴⁹ “But I do not think that this is some kind of tragedy and cannot be reversed. On the contrary, I think that we in Russia, in Europe and in the United States need to be patient and start looking for positive things in our relations with each other rather than concentrating only on problems. We need to do everything we can to help build up our trust in each other. There is no need for lectures” (Putin 2007g).

¹⁵⁰ “All we need is to take a positive view of each other and support each other. I think that if we become more interdependent our trust in each other will grow, and as we come to trust each other more, so our relations with each other will grow stronger” (Putin 2007g).

¹⁵¹ “Regarding missile defence, I can tell you that I discussed this issue on the telephone with President of the United States George Bush just a couple of days ago. As I said, we had the impression that our American partners have heard our concerns” (Putin 2007h).

¹⁵² “Russia has demonstrated on numerous occasions in word and in deed over the last 15 years that we want to be not just a partner but also a friend of America. But we sometimes have the impression

*work together*¹⁵³, *to need to strengthen the relations*¹⁵⁴, *to sort out the issue and to restore the best possible relations*¹⁵⁵, *to have much more ideology in the foreign policy and to try to remove the ideology from the foreign policy*¹⁵⁶, *to make a choice in favor of full-fledged relations with Russia*¹⁵⁷, *to build a foundation for strong relations*¹⁵⁸, *to want to intensify cooperation*¹⁵⁹, *to agree to try to reset the relations and open a new page in the ties*¹⁶⁰, *to show willingness and ability to listen*¹⁶¹. The predicates are considered to be the neutral as they express the need of the U.S. and Russia to work on improving their mutual relations, however, they do not imply hostility or disagreements. On the other hand, the predicates clearly show that after the negative period and before the positive period of the U.S.-Russian relations, Russian presidents concentrated on the topic of improvement of the relations with the United States, meaning that the relations

that America does not need friends. We sometimes have the impression that the United States needs vassals it can command” (Putin 2007i).

¹⁵³ *“Our relations are not going to disappear. It is clear that Russia and the United States are doomed to interact and have to collaborate on a wide range of international issues. ... But even despite the fact that we have different positions, we nevertheless must continue to work together, because of the number of global challenges and the number of global threats faced by Russia and the United States”* (Medvedev 2008a).

¹⁵⁴ *“I think the current American administration understands this. We shall wait and see, but in any case we have no choice: we need to strengthen our relations”* (Medvedev 2008b).

¹⁵⁵ *“The sooner our American partners sort out this issue the better it will be for Russian-American relations. We are ready to restore the best possible relations and develop our ties in full with the United States”* (Medvedev 2008c).

¹⁵⁶ *“Unfortunately, now our partners have much more ideology in their foreign policy than we do. And all of these concepts, which are taken up by the State Department and in other places - they are pure ideology, and with perfectly obvious properties. This does not help the citizens of that state at all. ... It seems to me that we should all try to remove the ideology from our foreign policy. The less schemes there are, the better. And we certainly need to get rid of Sovietology stereotypes. It seems to me that trouble with the current administration of the United States of America is that it contains too many Sovietologists”* (Medvedev 2008d).

¹⁵⁷ *“Yes, today these relations are not the best. And many questions are being raised in Russia, including moral ones. But I would stress that we have no issue with the American people, we do not have inherent anti-Americanism. And we hope that our partners, the new administration of the United States of America, will make a choice in favour of full-fledged relations with Russia”* (Medvedev 2008e).

¹⁵⁸ *“We hope that the new President of the United States of America Mr Barack Obama will be a successful president who can build the domestic and foreign policies of their country in the right way, build a foundation for strong relations between the Russian Federation and the United States. Russia is ready for this”* (Medvedev 2008f).

¹⁵⁹ *“In any event, what we have received so far is evidence that our American colleagues and the new President, Barack Obama, want to intensify cooperation and arrive at a number of decisions of importance not just for Russia and the United States”* (Medvedev 2009a).

¹⁶⁰ *“I cannot but agree that over these last years, unfortunately, our relations have encountered difficulties and, as the U.S. President just said, they were drifting in the wrong direction. Our relations were worsening, and this was not in the interests of the United States of America, nor the Russian Federation, nor indeed of the planet as a whole. We have agreed to try to reset our relations and open a new page in our ties. This is important given our joint responsibility for the processes taking place”* (Medvedev 2009b).

¹⁶¹ *“Probably the most important thing of all was that we showed our willingness and ability to listen to each other’s arguments. There was none of this trying simply to hand out recipes for how to behave in international relations, or, even worse, how to organise our own country’s internal affairs”* (Medvedev 2009d).

were not negative anymore, but they were just getting positive. However, the topic of personal relationship of the presidents did not play an important role in the documents. Therefore, the period between June 2007 and July 2009 can be regarded as neutral from the Russian point of view.

The second period of time that was categorized as neutral based on Russian documents lasted since November 2011 till the end of the analysis and encompassed both President Medvedev and President Putin. The predicates that were detected in connection with the categories *colleague*, *partner*, *president* or *the United States* included *to be entitled to view our (Russian) election any way they want*¹⁶², *to attempt to upset the balance*¹⁶³, *to have accomplished very useful work*¹⁶⁴, *to reiterate the desire to build on the progress and develop a constructive, predictable, and mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation model*¹⁶⁵, *to attempt to replace the anti-Soviet Jackson-Vanik amendment with an anti-Russian law or upset the strategic balance by building a missile defence system*¹⁶⁶, *to have the ambition to upset the strategic balance*¹⁶⁷, *to disturb the strategic balance, but to be patient and look for*

¹⁶² “I nonetheless had to make one point clear, namely, they in America are entitled to view our election any way they want – this is their choice, but it does not have any particular meaning for us. We are a strong sovereign country, a big country, and whatever views one holds, they should be expressed in proper fashion. It is one thing to say after the votes have been counted and the decisions announced that you are concerned or you do not understand the situation, but it is quite another thing when the very next day we hear old refrains in the best traditions of the Cold War era. This is certainly not what the reset was supposed to be about. I said all this to my colleague yesterday“ (Medvedev 2011c).

¹⁶³ “When President Obama and I signed the new START Treaty, it was assumed we would be in relative parity, with perhaps the need for a little adjustment on both sides. This is a relatively balanced situation that creates or supports the strategic balance model. We understand that in essence, missile defence is a continuation of the Strategic Missile Forces, only using other means. In other words, this is basically an attempt to upset that balance. We cannot be indifferent to it” (Medvedev 2012a).

¹⁶⁴ “I said that although there are varying assessments of the reset in relations that has been much spoken about over these last three years, I think that we have accomplished very useful work over this time” (Medvedev 2012b).

¹⁶⁵ “I had a substantive discussion with President of the United States Barack Obama in Los Cabos recently. We reiterated our desire to build on the progress we have made over recent years and develop a constructive, predictable, and mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation model. As the world’s biggest nuclear powers, Russia and the USA play a vital part in resolving many global and regional problems, and at a time when international relations are so complex, on-going and trusting dialogue between our two countries becomes even more important” (Putin 2012a).

¹⁶⁶ “We cannot but feel concerned when we see attempts to replace the anti-Soviet Jackson-Vanik amendment with an anti-Russian law, or upset the strategic balance by building a missile defence system. We have voiced these concerns on many occasions and at various forums” (Putin 2012a).

¹⁶⁷ “Nevertheless, the issue you mentioned – the US missile defence system – is surely one of the key issues on today’s agenda because it involves Russia’s vital interests. Experts understand that a unilateral solution will not benefit stability in the world. In essence, the ambition is to upset the strategic balance, which is a very dangerous thing to do, as any involved party will always strive to maintain its defence capability, and the entire thing could simply trigger off an arms race” (Putin 2012b).

*compromise*¹⁶⁸, *to have an imperialist approach to foreign policy*¹⁶⁹. The second neutral period differs from the first one in one very important aspect. It is obvious from the predicates used in Russian documents that the relations were rather worsening from the positive state to the neutral one and only analysis of the documents issued in 2014 would show whether the relations deteriorated to reach the negative category.

Based on the earlier categorization of the U.S.-Russian relations from the American point of view, the first neutral period lasted since September 2007 till July 2009, though it was interrupted by a three-month period of negative category since August till October 2008. Although President Bush was rather optimistic about the cooperation with Russia in some areas by saying *to continue to work with Russia*¹⁷⁰, *to build a new security relationship*¹⁷¹, *to agree with Russia and to strongly support (their proposal)*¹⁷², *to work toward a new security relationship*¹⁷³, *to think strategically and not get stuck in the past and be willing to advance agendas*¹⁷⁴, he also used predicates

¹⁶⁸ “The second problem that arose then and continues today relates to missile defence. We have said so many times. We feel threatened when our partners create such systems. This leads to (or can lead to, if we do not respond) the nullification of our nuclear and missile capabilities. It also significantly disturbs the strategic balance which has protected humanity from large-scale military conflict since World War Two. ... However, I would like to go back to the thesis formulated by the 42nd President: we are not enemies. I agree with that. We just need to be patient and look for compromises” (Putin 212e).

¹⁶⁹ “Russia is being accepted into the World Trade Organisation with the help of the United States, for which we are grateful to the Obama Administration. The accession process has begun. But the trick is that if they had kept the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the United States would have begun to lose money following Russia's accession to the WTO. They were forced to abolish it. It was an excellent opportunity to leave the Cold War behind and move on. But no, they had to think up another anti-Russian law, the Magnitsky Act. The investigation of those events has not even been completed. Why was this done? Just to show off who is the toughest here. What for? It is an imperialist approach to foreign policy. Who would be happy about it? We warned them that we would respond in kind. But apparently they didn't expect a strong answer” (Putin 2013a).

¹⁷⁰ “I am—will continue to work with Russia, as well as other nations, to keep a focused effort on sending Iran a message that—“You will remain isolated if you continue your nuclear weapons ambitions” (Bush 2007g).

¹⁷¹ “Moreover, the missile defenses we will deploy are intended to deter countries who would threaten us with ballistic missile attacks. We do not consider Russia such a country. The cold war is over. Russia is not our enemy. We're building a new security relationship, whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation” (Bush 2007h).

¹⁷² “And, you know, we did something really interesting with Russia on this Iranian issue. The Iranians said, it's our sovereign right to have nuclear power. And I said, yes, it is; it is your sovereign right. But we can't trust you to enrich because you've been hiding your program from international inspectors. And so therefore, we will join—we agree with Russia when they said, you can have a plant, and we, Russia, will provide you the fuel and collect the fuel, which I strongly support” (Bush 2007i).

¹⁷³ “This week President Putin is planning to attend his first NATO summit, and later this week I plan to travel to Sochi, Russia, for further talks on this and other matters. In our discussions, I will reiterate that the missile defense capabilities we are developing are not designed to defend against Russia, just as the new NATO we are building is not designed to defend against Russia. The cold war is over. Russia is not our enemy. We're working toward a new security relationship with Russia, whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation” (Bush 2008c).

¹⁷⁴ “We spent a lot of time in our relationship trying to get rid of the cold war. It's over; it ended. And the fundamental question in this relationship is, could we work together to put the cold war in the past? And I fully recognize there are people in America and Russia that think the cold war still exists. And

that indicate critical attitude towards the state of Russian democracy by stating to *recognize the checks and balances in government and certain freedoms that are inviolate*¹⁷⁵, *to honor the international obligations and to investigate allegations of abuses*¹⁷⁶, *to understand there needs to be checks and balances and free and fair elections and a vibrant press*¹⁷⁷. The categories *government* and *not an enemy* were detected in this period of time what categorizes them as neutral categories. The deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relations is obvious from the American documents since September 2007 till August 2008, as President Bush openly criticized the internal situation in Russia. Considering the personal relationship with President Putin, President Bush only assigned President Putin with the category *president* using predicates *not to agree on a lot of issues; to agree on some*¹⁷⁸, *to have a good personal relationship, but not to always agree eye to eye*¹⁷⁹, *sometimes to listen, sometimes not to*¹⁸⁰, *to have an interesting relationship*¹⁸¹. Even the change in the way President Bush addressed

sometimes that makes relations difficult. But it's very important for leaders to think strategically and not get stuck in the past and be willing to advance agendas. And so we've worked very hard over the past years to find areas where we can work together and find ways to be agreeable when we disagree. And I think we've done a pretty good job of it" (Bush 2008d).

¹⁷⁵ *"We've worked hard to make it appear in their interests—or we made it clear to them that it is in their interests to have good relations with the West. And the best way to have good long-term relations with the West is to recognize that checks and balances in government are important or to recognize there are certain freedoms that are inviolate. So Russia's a complex relationship, but it's an important relationship to maintain"* (Bush 2007g).

¹⁷⁶ *"I am deeply concerned about the detention of numerous human rights activists and political leaders who participated in peaceful rallies in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and Nazran this weekend. I am particularly troubled by the use of force by law enforcement authorities to stop these peaceful activities and to prevent some journalists and human rights activists from covering them. The freedoms of expression, assembly, and press, as well as due process, are fundamental to any democratic society. I am hopeful that the Government of Russia will honor its international obligations in these areas, investigate allegations of abuses, and free those who remain in detention"* (Bush 2007j).

¹⁷⁷ *"My hope, of course, is that Russia is a country which understands there needs to be checks and balances and free and fair elections and a vibrant press; that they understand Western values based upon human rights and human dignity are values that will lead to a better country. That's my hopes"* (Bush 2007k).

¹⁷⁸ *"You know, one of the interesting—well, my leadership style has been to try to be in a position where I actually can influence people. And one way to do that is to have personal relationships that enable me to sit down and tell people what's on my mind without fear of rupturing relations. And that's how I've tried to conduct my business with Vladimir Putin. We don't agree on a lot of issues; we do agree on some. Iran is one; nuclear proliferation is another. Reducing our nuclear warheads was an issue that we agreed on early"* (Bush 2007g).

¹⁷⁹ *"As I say, I try not to have antagonistic relations with President Putin. We've got a good personal relationship. We don't always agree eye to eye. Kosovo is an area where we don't agree eye to eye. But that doesn't—just because you don't have a—just because you have a disagreement doesn't mean that you can't work together"* (Bush 2007i).

¹⁸⁰ *"And I would hope that he would make decisions that enhanced institutional reform, enhanced the institutions necessary for a free society. As I say, sometimes he listens, sometimes he doesn't"* (Bush 2007i).

¹⁸¹ *"The other thing is, is that this will be my last chance to visit with him face-to-face as, you know--and I've worked with him for 8 years. We've had a very interesting relationship. I like him. He's a person that has been a strong leader for Russia"* (Bush 2008a).

President Putin implies a deteriorating tendency not only in personal, but also in bilateral relations of the U.S. and Russia. Moreover, since August till October 2008, the relations were categorized as negative from the American point of view.

The U.S.-Russian relations can be categorized as neutral again after October 2008. A slight improvement was detected in December 2008 when President Bush in one of his last speeches emphasized that *there is common ground between Russia and the United States; there is common interests, and there is going to be a lot of tensions*¹⁸². Nevertheless, after President Obama took over the presidential office, the predicates *to restart the conversations*¹⁸³, *to need to reset or reboot the relationship and to have areas of common concern*¹⁸⁴, *to begin a very constructive dialogue*¹⁸⁵ clearly suggest the improving tendency of the U.S.-Russian relations that fully unfolded in July 2009.

The second period of neutral relations could be dated since November 2011 till December 2013. The cooling of the U.S.-Russian relations was not so obvious, while President Medvedev was in office, as President Obama used predicates *to have made important progress*¹⁸⁶ and *to have been extremely productive*¹⁸⁷. And although at the

¹⁸² “First of all, there’s common ground between Russia and the United States. And one area of common concern is the issue of proliferation. And there’s a lot of cooperation taking place to work constructively with Russia to make sure that raw materials don’t get in the hands of rogue regimes or terrorist groups. ... I will tell you that - my only point is there’s common interests, and there’s going to be a lot of tensions. And the President has got to be in a position where he can deal with those tensions in a way that doesn’t send chilling signals with other allies” (Bush 2008m).

¹⁸³ “And, you know, I’ve mentioned this in conversations with the Russian President, Mr. Medvedev, to let him know that it is important for us to restart the conversations about how we can start reducing our nuclear arsenals in an effective way so that we then have the standing to go to other countries and start stitching back together the nonproliferation treaties that, frankly, have been weakened over the last several years” (Obama 2009a).

¹⁸⁴ “Well, we’ve had a good exchange between ourselves and the Russians. I’ve said that we need to reset or reboot the relationship there. Russia needs to understand our unflagging commitment to the independence and security of countries like a Poland or a Czech Republic. On the other hand, we have areas of common concern. And I cited two examples: the issue of nuclear nonproliferation and the issue of terrorism. And at this point, I think we probably have some potential common concerns on the world economic front as well. So my hope is, is that we can have a constructive relationship where, based on common respect and mutual interest, we can move forward” (Obama 2009b).

¹⁸⁵ “As I’ve said in the past, I think that over the last several years the relationship between our two countries has been allowed to drift. And what I believe we’ve begun today is a very constructive dialogue that will allow us to work on issues of mutual interest, like the reduction of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of our nonproliferation treaties; our mutual interest in dealing with terrorism and extremism that threatens both countries; our mutual interest in economic stability and restoring growth around the world; our mutual interest in promoting peace and stability in areas like the Middle East” (Obama 2009c).

¹⁸⁶ “Over the past 3 years, we’ve made important progress. With Russia, we’re now reducing our arsenal under the new START Treaty, the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly 20 years. And when we’re done, we will have cut American and Russian deployed nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s” (Obama 2012a).

first meeting with President Putin the predicate *to have a candid, thoughtful and thorough conversation on a whole range of bilateral and international issues*¹⁸⁸ could imply a positive start in the U.S.-Russian relations, the predicates utilized later on such as *not to recognize the grave dangers of all-out civil war*¹⁸⁹, *to have an interest as well as an obligation to try to resolve this issue*¹⁹⁰, *to have differing perspectives on the problem*¹⁹¹, *to recognize that they are part of an international community and that they should be abiding by international law*¹⁹², *to slip back into Cold War thinking and a Cold War mentality*¹⁹³, *to see anti-American rhetoric*¹⁹⁴, *to have some profound differences*¹⁹⁵, *to have rejected that logic*¹⁹⁶ show a deteriorating tendency in the U.S.-

¹⁸⁷ “Well, first of all, let me just say that the last three years of my work with President Medvedev has been extremely productive” (Obama 2012b).

¹⁸⁸ “We, in fact, did have a candid, thoughtful and thorough conversation on a whole range of bilateral and international issues. ... We agreed that we need to build on these successes, even as we recognise that there are going to be areas of disagreement, and that we can find constructive ways to manage through any bilateral tensions” (Obama 2012c).

¹⁸⁹ “I wouldn't suggest that at this point the United States and the rest of the international community are aligned with Russia and China in their positions, but I do think they recognize the grave dangers of all-out civil war. I do not think they condone the massacres that we've witnessed” (Obama 2012e).

¹⁹⁰ “I've spoken to President Putin several times on this topic. And our basic argument is that as a leader on the world stage, Russia has an interest, as well as an obligation, to try to resolve this issue in a way that can lead to the kind of outcome that we'd all like to see over the long term. And look, I don't think it's any secret that there remains lingering suspicions between Russia and other members of the G-8 or the West. It's been several decades now since Russia transformed itself and the Eastern Bloc transformed itself. But some of those suspicions still exist” (Obama 2013a).

¹⁹¹ “With respect to Syria, we do have differing perspectives on the problem, but we share an interest in reducing the violence, securing chemical weapons and ensuring that they're neither used nor are they subject to proliferation and that we want to try to resolve the issue through political means if possible, so we will instruct our teams to continue to work on the potential of a Geneva follow-up to the first meeting” (Obama 2013b).

¹⁹² “There have been some useful conversations that have taken place between the United States Government and the Russian Government. And my continued expectation is that Russia, or other countries that have talked about potentially providing Mr. Snowden asylum, recognize that they are part of an international community, and that they should be abiding by international law. And we'll continue to press them as hard as we can to make sure that they do so—” (Obama 2013c).

¹⁹³ “And so there's still a lot of business that we can do with them. But there have been times where they slip back into Cold War thinking and a Cold War mentality. And what I consistently say to them, and what I say to President Putin, is that's the past and we've got to think about the future, and there's no reason why we shouldn't be able to cooperate more effectively than we do” (Obama 2013e).

¹⁹⁴ “What's also true is, is that when President Putin—who was Prime Minister when Medvedev was President—came back into power, I think we saw more rhetoric on the Russian side that was anti-American, that played into some of the old stereotypes about the cold war contest between the United States and Russia. And I've encouraged Mr. Putin to think forward as opposed to backwards on those issues, with mixed success” (Obama 2013f).

¹⁹⁵ “But I have not written off the idea that the United States and Russia are going to continue to have common interests even as we have some very profound differences on some other issues. And where our interests overlap, we should pursue common action. Where we've got differences, we should be candid about them, try to manage those differences but not sugarcoat them” (Obama 2013g).

¹⁹⁶ “And I've said to Mr. Putin directly, and I continue to believe that even if you have great concerns about elements in the opposition—and we've got some concerns about certain elements of the opposition like al-Nusra—and even if you're concerned about the territorial integrity of Syria—and we're concerned about the territorial integrity of Syria—if you, in fact, want to end the violence and slaughter

Russian relations from the American point of view. Except for the general categories *president* and *Russia*, only category *government* was detected as relevant. Likewise, a further analysis of the following years would be needed to conclude whether the relations fell into the negative category. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Russian relations since November 2011 till December 2013 can be categorized as neutral.

inside of Syria, then you're going to have to have a political transition. Because it is not possible for Mr. Asad to regain legitimacy in a country where he's killed tens of thousands of his own people. That will not happen. So far, at least, Mr. Putin has rejected that logic" (Obama 2013g).

4. Analytical Conclusion


In the next chapter, the findings of the Membership Categorization Analysis and the overview of the conventional political context of the U.S.-Russian relations is interconnected in the analytical conclusion. The outcome of the whole analysis focuses not only on the changes that were identified throughout the analyzed discourses of the American and Russian presidents, but also uncovers the correlations between the discourse alternations and tangible events since September 2001 till December 2013.

First of all, it is vital to point out that based on the MCA it is plausible to divide the U.S.-Russian relations in the studied period of time into three categories – positive, negative and neutral. Every category of the U.S.-Russian relations was characterized by the occurrence of the positive, negative or neutral categories and category-tied predicates. However, certain differences in the categorization process existed. While the positive category of the U.S.-Russian relations was determined based on the occurrence of the clearly positive categories (e.g. *friend*, *ally*, *partner* with a positive adjective) and then the category-tied predicates were identified, it proved impossible to determine the neutral and negative categories in the same way. The reason why a different approach had to be adopted is that none of the expected negative categories were found in the data set.


Therefore, the further analysis of the neutral and negative category of the U.S.-Russian relations relied on the assumption that the period of time that could not have been categorized as positive, would have to be categorized as negative or neutral. The collection of neutral and negative categories, consequently, could not be separated into two distinct groups and therefore contains both neutral and negative categories that were assigned by the presidents to each other. Nevertheless, the categorization of the discourses was then determined by the category-tied predicates attached to the categories themselves. That is why the main criterion for categorizing a discourse as negative or neutral was not the category, but the category-tied predicate found in the discourse. To conclude, the most significant methodological alternation in the MCA of the categories was that whereas the discourses were categorized as positive if a positive category was found, the discourses were categorized as negative or neutral based on the category-tied predicates used in the discourses.

Another significant finding that needs to be addressed was the difference between the usage of the particular categories by the American and Russian presidents. In the positive category of the U.S.-Russian relations, the American presidents used mainly the expression *friend* to address their Russian counterparts. President Bush mentioned the category *friend* at least twenty-seven times in the official discourses since October 2001 till September 2007, while President Obama called President Medvedev his *friend* at least seven times since April 2010 till November 2011. Although the Russian presidents also applied the expression *friend* to call the American presidents, their most frequently used expression was the category *partner* with a positive adjective. On the other hand, concerning the occurrence of the neutral and negative categories, while the Russian presidents continued to use not only the very general categories as *a president* or *the United States*, but also categories such as *partner* or *colleague*, the American presidents stopped addressing their counterparts by any expressions, but general categories *president* or *Russia*. In fact, as the categories themselves nearly vanished from the U.S. discourses in the neutral and negative periods, they in fact lost the importance that was transferred to the predicates. However, in all the categories, the American presidents were the ones to stress that Russia was no longer an enemy, whereas the Russian presidents did not use the expression at all.

When considering the time periods that were categorized as positive, negative and neutral, it is vital to point out that the categorization does not coincide perfectly in Russian and American documents. The positive category lasted, according to Russian documents, since September 2001 till February 2007, then since February 2007 till June 2007, the relationship was categorized as negative followed by a period of neutral category since June 2007 till July 2009 and then by positive category till November 2011. The analysis left the relationship in the neutral category. On the other hand, based on American discourses, the relationship was positive since September 2001 till September 2007, then a period of neutral category followed since September 2007 till August 2008. The three months since August 2008 till October 2008 were clearly categorized as negative. After another short period of neutral relationship between October 2008 and July 2009, the relationship was classified as positive again till November 2011. Since then, the relationship belonged to the neutral category till the end of analysis. The graphical illustration of the classification can be found below.



Graph 1. The classification of the U.S.-Russian relationship based on the Russian discourses (green = positive, red = negative, blue = neutral).



Graph 2. The classification of the U.S.-Russian relationship based on the U.S. discourses (green = positive, red = negative, blue = neutral).

The main discrepancy in the classification of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship is found in the period since February 2007 till September 2007. While the Russian President Putin considered the relationship to be clearly negative and then neutral, the American President Bush still perceived Russia in a positive way. The explanation is rather simple – the Russian president responded negatively to the American intention to deploy the national missile defence system in the Central Europe, whereas the American president had no reason to alter his attitude towards Russia. After the initial months of hostility from the Russian perspective and negotiations between the two countries, the relationship got settled as neutral from both American and Russian point of view.

Further discrepancy was detected in the classification between August 2008 and October 2008 when the American President Bush perceived Russia very negatively, while the Russian President Medvedev still saw the United States rather neutrally. The reason was the war in Georgia and the dispute between Russian and the United States about the approach towards Georgia. The United States condemned Russian response to Georgian military actions, what worsened the relationship from the American point of

view. On the other hand, Russia's attitude towards the U.S. did not change, as Russia attempted not to ruin the relationship and defend its actions in the international arena.

Apart from the two discrepancies, the classifications of the U.S.-Russian relationship from both American and Russian perspective correspond. Since July 2009 till November 2011, based on both American and Russian discourses, the relationship was categorized as positive and then since November 2011 till the end of the analysis as neutral. The changes in the categorization can be interconnected with the conventional political affairs. In July 2009, the relationship improved considerably due to the reset of the U.S.-Russian relations that was carried out by President Obama and Medvedev. Moreover, in July 2009, the United States and Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission was founded indicating very warm bilateral relationship between the two countries that was confirmed by the discourses as well. On the other hand, the change from the positive to neutral category, which was based on the discourses, could have been influenced by the different attitude of the states towards the civil war in Syria, which started in 2011, and then by the change in the Russian presidential office from President Medvedev to President Putin.

As mentioned earlier, some of the most international affairs were also reflected in the bilateral relationship of the United States and Russia. However, in the long period of positive category since September 2001 and February or September 2007, the United States and Russia experienced a very serious disagreement regarding the war in Iraq. While the United States launched a military intervention in Iraq in March 2003, Russia vehemently opposed such an action. Nevertheless, the disagreement did not reflect in any remarkable way in the discourses. That is closely related to a very significant factor that has been influencing the U.S.-Russian relationship and that is the personal relationship of the presidents in office. Although President Putin did not agree with the military action in Iraq, his personal relationship with President Bush in that period of time was very positive. Consequently, thanks to their close personal relationship, the bilateral relationship of the United States and Russia did not deteriorate. Yet, it is disputable how much the personal relationship influenced the development of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the years to come, which is beyond the scope of this analysis.

To conclude the findings of the analysis, it was clearly shown that the tangible events do reflect in the discourses and do influence the relationship of the United States and Russia. However, the events may be perceived by the states in a different way causing the discrepancies in the classification. Thanks to the discourse analysis, it was

possible to reconstruct the U.S.-Russian relationship from the past and to link the changes in the discourses to the tangible international events. Nevertheless, the relationship of the two countries was influenced also by other factors, such as the personal relationship of the presidents, but the strength of this particular factor would have to be analysed in greater detail.

Conclusion

The main aim of the thesis was to reconstruct the bilateral relationship of the United States and Russia based on the discourses that were presented by the presidents of the two countries in the period between September 2001 and December 2013. The thesis consisted of four chapters that were focusing on different topics. The first chapter introduced the methodological basis of the thesis that was formed by Discourse Analysis. As it represents a wide set of different analytical frameworks, Critical Discourse Analysis was chosen as theoretical background of the thesis, while the Membership Categorization Analysis was meant to be used as the methodological basis of the analysis. In the first chapter, the basic principles of both the Critical Discourse Analysis as well as of the Membership Categorization Analysis were introduced. Consequently, the concepts of Membership Categorization Device, category-tied predicates, economy rule and consistency rule were chosen out of the ten most basic concepts of the Membership Categorization Analysis, which were elaborated by Stokoe. The four key concepts were then used in the further analysis.

The second chapter offered a brief overview of the most important affairs that had an impact on the U.S.-Russian relationship. The thesis started with the events that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and then it dealt with the U.S.-Russian military cooperation in Afghanistan and the ratification of a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. It did not omit the U.S.-Russian disagreement over a military intervention in Iraq in 2003 or over the American plan to place the Third Site of the national missile defence system in Europe. The most significant decline of the U.S.-Russian relationship was caused by the crisis in Georgia in 2008. The change in the president office in both the United States and Russia brought a considerable improvement in the mutual relationship of the two states that was characterized mainly by the reset of their relationship, by the foundation of the Bilateral Presidential Commission and by the ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Nevertheless, the dispute over the civil war in Syria, another change in Russian president office and other diplomatic issues cause the U.S.-Russian relationship to be strained at end of the analyzed period of time in December 2013.

Using the Membership Categorization Analysis in the third chapter, the thesis categorized the U.S.-Russian relations into three categories – positive, negative and neutral. Every category was characterized by the collection of categories that the presidents assigned to each other in the discourses and by the category-tied activities that were related to the categories. It is vital to point out that when analyzing the positive category of the U.S.-Russian relations, firstly the occurrence of the positive categories was detected in the discourses and further on, the category-tied predicates were searched for to confirm the positive nature of the relationship. On the other hand, when analyzing the negative and neutral category, firstly the discourses that were not categorized as positive were searched for the categories assigned by the presidents to each other. The collections of neutral and negative categories were the same, as no clearly negative categories appeared in the discourses. Therefore, the category-tied predicates related to the neutral and negative categories were the main factor that determined the nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Thanks to the analysis, the thesis succeeded in reconstructing the U.S.-Russia relationship in the delimited period of time based on the discourses presented by the presidents of the United States and Russia.

In the last chapter, the thesis achieved to interlink the changes in the categorization to the most significant historical affairs. It was proven that the political context clearly influenced the categorization of the U.S.-Russia relationship as positive, negative or neutral. In the majority of the cases, after a serious dispute was detected between the United States and Russia, the discourses altered and so did the categorization of the U.S.-Russia relationship. On the other hand, a cooperative tendency was reflected in the positive categorization of the relationship. It was clearly demonstrated that it was plausible to draw parallels between the political context and the changes in the discourses, showing the great value that the discourses have for the political analysis.

Summary

The diploma thesis aimed to analyze the bilateral relationship of the United States of America and Russia based on the interpretation of discourses, followed interviews and speeches presented by the presidents of the two countries since September 2001 till December 2013. The thesis used Critical Discourse Analysis and more specifically Membership Categorization Analysis as a theoretical/methodological basis of the analysis. The U.S.-Russian relationship was categorized as positive, negative or neutral based on the collections of categories and category-tied predicates that the presidents used to address their counterparts in the delimited period of time. The changes in the categorization over time were contrasted with tangible political affairs, providing alternative view on the U.S.-Russian relationship.

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