

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut mezinárodních studií, Katedra západoevropských studií

Dominika Dražilová

**Turkish membership in the EU: French,
German and British Perspectives**

Diplomová práce

Praha 2012

Autor práce: **Dominika Dražilová**

Vedoucí práce: **Doc. JUDr. PhDr. Ivo Šlosarčík, LL.M., Ph.D.**

Rok obhajoby: 2012

Bibliografický záznam

DRAŽILOVÁ, Dominika. *Turkish membership in the EU: French, German and British Perspectives*. Praha, 2012. 92 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut mezinárodních studií. Katedra západoevropských studií. Vedoucí diplomové práce Doc. JUDr. PhDr. Ivo Šlosarčík, LL.M., Ph.D.

Abstrakt

Vstup Turecka do EU se stal jednou z hlavních nevyřešených otázek evropské integrace a je také předmětem rozsáhlých debat o samotné podstatě a účelu EU. Mělo by Turecko být členským státem EU s plnými právy nebo by mělo být s Unií spojeno na základě dosud nedefinovaných zvláštních vazeb? Tuto otázku si v dnešní době kladou mnozí. Každý členský stát Evropské unie má jinou představu o Evropě, existují různé názory, jak by Unie měla být definována a na jakých základech by měla být postavena. Diplomová práce zkoumá vztah mezi pojetím Evropy, udávaným diskursem politické elity dané země a postojem zemí k otázce členství Turecka v EU. Analyzovány jsou tyto tři země: Francie, Německo a Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska.

Abstract

The accession of Turkey to the EU has become one of the major unresolved issues of European integration and leads directly into bigger debates about the underpinnings and purpose of the EU. Should Turkey be a Member State with full rights or be connected to the through a yet undefined special relationship? That is the kind of question many are asking nowadays. Every Member State of the European Union has a different vision of Europe, with different views of how the Union should be defined and on what foundations it should be based. This work explores the relationship between the concept of Europe held by a country's political elite, through analysing its discourse, and the

country's position towards Turkish EU membership. Three cases are presented: France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Klíčová slova

Turecko, členství v EU, koncepty Evropy, sociálně-politické hodnoty, geografie, historie, ekonomický potenciál, Francie, Německo, Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Keywords

Turkey, membership in the EU, concepts of Europe, social-political values, geography, history, religion, economic potential, France, Germany, the UK

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval/a samostatně a použil/a jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Prohlašuji, že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného titulu.
3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne 18.5.2012

Dominika Dražilová

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors who led and supported me through my research and writing for their advice, patience and time. I would also like to say a big thank you to my family and friends, who have supported and encouraged me along the way.

TEZE DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE

Jméno:

Dominika Dražilová

E-mail:

dominika.drazilova@seznam.cz

Semestr:

LS

Akademický rok:

2011/2012

Název práce:

Turkish membership in the EU: French, German and British Perspectives

Předpokládaný termín dokončení (semestr, školní rok):

LS 2011/2012

Vedoucí bakalářského semináře:

Doc. JUDr. PhDr. Ivo Šlosarčík, LL.M., Ph.D.

Vedoucí práce (není povinné):

Doc. JUDr. PhDr. Ivo Šlosarčík, LL.M., Ph.D.

Zdůvodnění výběru tématu práce:

Rozšíření EU o Turecko představuje jednu z klíčových otázek evropské integrace, na kterou mezi členskými státy neexistuje jednotný názor. Ve své práci bych ráda srovnala postoj vybraných evropských zemí - Francie, Německa a Spojeného království - k této problematice.

Předpokládaný cíl:

Každý členský stát má jinou vizi Evropy, jinou představu o tom, na čem by měla být založena. Lze předpokládat, že tyto koncepty by měly ovlivnit postoj jednotlivých států ke členství Turecka v EU. Mým cílem je zhodnotit vztah mezi nimi.

Základní charakteristika tématu:

Předmětem mého zájmu bude zda a jak koncepty Evropy členských států, definované na základě diskurzu politických elit, ovlivňují jejich pozice ke členství Turecka v EU. Tento přístup přináší jinou perspektivu než pouze tradiční studii argumentů podporujících nebo odporujících tureckému členství v EU a poskytne pohled na danou otázku v širším kontextu. Koncepty Evropy budou definovány na základě několika proměnných: společensko-politických hodnot, geografie, náboženství, historie a ekonomického potenciálu. Práce se zaměří na období od roku 2004, kdy bylo rozhodnuto o zahájení přístupových rozhovorů s Tureckem do konce roku 2011, eventuálně do roku 2012.

Předpokládaná struktura práce:

1. Úvod (metodologie)
2. Definice konceptů Evropy
3. Koncepty Evropy členských států (Francie, Německa a Spojeného království) a jejich pozice ke členství Turecka v EU
4. Srovnání a analýza
5. Závěr

Základní literatura:

H. Sjursen (ed.), Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). S. Berglund, K. Duvold, J. Ekman, C. Schymik, Where Does Europe End? Borders, Limits and directions of the EU, 2009. F. Descheemaekere, Les Enjeux De L'adhesion De La Turquie A L'europe, Paris, 2008. J. Rupnik, Les banlieuses de l'Europe, Paris, 2007. B. Cautres - N. Monceau, La Turquie en Europe. L'opinion des Européens et les Turcs, Paris, 2011. M. Malmborg - B. Stråth, The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations. Oxford: Berg, 2002.
J.T. Checkel - P. J. Katzenstein, European Identity, Cambridge, 2009.
B. Geremek - R. Picht, Visions de l'Europe, Paris, 2007.
Marcou, J. - Vardar, D. La Turquie aux portes de l'Europe, Policy Paper 10, Notre Europe, Paris, 2004.
Ch. Lequesne, La France dans la Nouvelle Europe, Paris 2008.

Podpis studenta a datum

Schváleno	Datum	Podpis
Vedoucí diplomového semináře		
Garant oboru		

Obsah

INTRODUCTION.....	2
DEFINITION OF TERMS.....	4
METHODOLOGY.....	6
1. HOW TO DEFINE A CONCEPT OF EUROPE?.....	8
1.1. LITERATURE OVERVIEW	8
1.1.1. <i>General overview</i>	8
1.1.2. <i>Europe and further enlargement</i>	9
1.1.3. <i>Turkey as a Mirror</i>	10
1.2. CONCEPTS OF EUROPE	11
1.2.1. <i>Social and political values</i>	12
1.2.2. <i>Geography</i>	13
1.2.3. <i>Religion</i>	15
1.2.4. <i>History</i>	16
1.2.5. <i>Economic potential</i>	17
2. THE EU AND TURKEY	18
3. CONCEPTS OF EUROPE IN THE SELECTED MEMBER STATES	19
3.1. FRANCE	20
3.1.1. <i>France and the European Integration</i>	20
3.1.2. <i>France and the concept of Europe</i>	21
3.1.3. <i>France and previous enlargements</i>	29
3.1.4. <i>France and Turkish membership in the EU</i>	29
3.2. GERMANY	34
3.2.1. <i>Germany and the European integration</i>	34
3.2.2. <i>Germany and the concept of Europe</i>	35
3.2.3. <i>Germany and previous enlargements</i>	44
3.2.4. <i>Germany and Turkish Membership in the EU</i>	44
3.3. THE UNITED KINGDOM.....	47
3.3.1. <i>The UK and the European Integration</i>	48
3.3.2. <i>The UK and the concept of Europe</i>	48
3.3.3. <i>The UK and previous enlargements</i>	53
3.3.4. <i>The UK and Turkish membership in the EU</i>	53
4. CONCEPTS OF EUROPE AND SUPPORT FOR TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EU....	56
4.1. EUROPE BASED ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES.....	59
4.2. EUROPE BASED ON GEOGRAPHY	61
4.3. EUROPE BASED ON HISTORY	62
4.4. EUROPE BASED ON RELIGION	63
4.5. EUROPE BASED ON ECONOMIC POTENTIAL.....	64
CONCLUSION	67
SUMMARY	69
REFERENCES.....	70
ANNEX.....	81

« *Le jour où il n'y aurait plus de nations pour vouloir l'Europe, il n'y aurait plus d'Europe.* »¹

Introduction

Ankara officially applied to the EEC in 1987 and twenty-five years later it is still waiting at the gates of Europe. The question of Turkish membership has been and is a topic of vivid debate, with the status of Turkey within the EU being at the centre of the discussion. Should Turkey be a Member State with full rights or connected only by a “privileged partnership” of some kind? As Descheemaekere states, divergences on this question exist between Member States, political elites and public opinion and even within governments.² Thus, the accession of Turkey has become one of the major unresolved issues of European integration.

In previous EU enlargements the debate was not so tough. Even if France twice blocked the accession of the UK in 1963 and 1967 as well as opposing other candidates in the 1960s and even if Italy, France and Spain were not particularly favourable towards the negotiations with the new post-communist countries in the 1990s, the intensity of these debates cannot be compared with the one surrounding Turkey.³ The prior enlargements might have brought up certain polemics; however they never reached such intensity in debating the future of the EU, its borders and identity.

In general the debate about Turkish membership often focuses on the arguments on why Turkey should or should not join, on what the main concerns are and what is at stake. The demographic situation of Turkey, its geostrategic position, its religion and its impact on the European institutions and integration itself are being brought up and discussed repeatedly. The situation was also influenced by the European Council

¹ Marcel Gauchet, cited from Geremek, B., Picht, R. (eds.), *Visions de l'Europe* (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 19.

² Descheemaekere, F., *Les enjeux de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Europe* (Tours-Poitiers, Cachan/Paris, Hermes-science publications/Lavoisier, 2008), 134.

statement from June 2006, saying that the rhythm of enlargements has to take into account the absorption capacity of the Union.⁴ Nevertheless, as B. Cautres and N. Monceau explain, the Turkish candidacy is forcing the Europeans for the first time to inquire about issues which have been considered as of a “second level”: European identity and values, debate about the “europeanness” of a candidate country, the “borders of Europe” and the alleged democratic deficit in European integration.⁵

According to Rumelili debates about Turkish membership “suggest that elite opinion remains deeply divided on the issue of Turkish accession, not because of a disagreement on the associated costs and benefits, but because of its implications for the identity and norms of European society,”⁶ more broadly said, a debate which invokes different concepts and definitions of Europe.

This is my starting point. As every Member State of the European Union has a different vision of Europe, with different views how it should be defined and on what it should be based, my aim is to explore the relationship between national concepts of Europe and the eventual membership of Turkey in the EU. I will analyse if and how the position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on a concept of Europe as it is seen by its political elite on the bases of three case studies which look at France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The question is how a membership of Turkey, a largely Muslim democratic country, would coincide with particular national ideas and concepts of what Europe is or should be.

This approach offers a slightly different perspective than the usual general debate over advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership. Arguments used in favour of or against Turkey can then be placed in the context of differing perspectives on the whole project of EU integration.

³ Berglund, S., *Where Does Europe End? Borders, Limits and directions of the EU* (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub, 2009), 84.

⁴ Rupnik, J., *L'Europe et ses périphéries*, in *Les banlieues de l'Europe. Les politiques du voisinage de l'Union européenne*, Rupnik, J. (ed.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2007), 11.

⁵ Cautres, B., Monceau, N., *La Turquie en Europe. L'opinion des Européens et les Turcs* (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2011), 13.

⁶ Rumelili, B., Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in post-Enlargement Europe, *Journal of European Integration*, 33: 2 (2011), 237.

As B. Rumelili stresses:

“The ongoing debates on EU–Turkey relations are not simply debates over the inclusion of another member of ERIS into its core organization⁷ based on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Historically, and at present, relations with the Turk constitute a primary site for the representation, validation, and performance of European identity.”⁸

Shortly after the opening of negotiations in 2005 then enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn said that “Europe needs a stable, democratic and prosperous Turkey which adopts and implements our values, our rule of law, our policies, our standards”⁹. Yet the question remains, if those values and standards are the same in all Member States and how Turkey fits in the individual national concepts of Europe. Therefore, one thing is certain, as the International Herald Tribune expressed it following the unveiling of new draft rules for EU-Turkey negotiations in 2005: “Turkey will not become a member of the union today or tomorrow... It will be a long, difficult, and torturous journey”.¹⁰

Definition of terms

There are several terms which are used in the context of definition of Europe, the EU and associated concepts. Firstly, already the terms Europe and the EU are often interchanged and not used in distinguishable way. Therefore, in this work Europe will be used as a synonym of the EU, as political elite often don't distinguish between them and interchange them. The same can be said about academic literature, where in the context of concepts, definition and identity both terms are used alongside each other¹¹, as ideas of European civilization or a European geopolitical and civilizational identity emerge.¹² Even in the field of the European administration the two terms are used: the European Convention was unofficially called “The Convention on the Future of Europe” and produced a Draft Treaty establishing a “Constitution for Europe”.

⁷ The EU

⁸ Rumelili, Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization, 238-239.

⁹ Speech by EU Commissioner Rehn - Accession negotiations with Turkey: fulfilling the criteria, Brussels, 28 November 2005, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5364_en.htm, retrieved 4.4.2012

¹⁰ Bowley, G., EU unveils draft rules for talks on Turkey, *International Herald Tribune*, 30 June 2005.

¹¹ Geremek and Picht, *Visions de l'Europe*; Checkel, J.T., Katzenstein, P. J., *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹² Casanova, J., The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization, *Constellations*, Volume 13:2 (2006), 234-247.

Secondly, the concept of “European identity” has been often discussed since the 1970s, the idea being based on the principle of unity of EU Member States, of a common responsibility towards the rest of the world and of the dynamic evolution of the European construction.¹³ Nowadays, the term is often used in the context of the identification of European citizens with the European project and the EU (e.g. Eurobarometers). However, as it represents “collective beliefs about the definition of the group and its membership that are shared by most group members”¹⁴, the notion can be also understood in a broader context of describing the EU and its concepts. Therefore, in this work I will include in my research also references to the European identity.¹⁵

As J.T. Checkel and P. J. Katzenstein point out, the endeavour of defining European identity and Europe is in general complicated:

“The ship of European identity has entered uncharted waters. Its sails are flapping in a stiff breeze. Beyond the harbour, white caps are signalling stormy weather ahead. The crew is fully assembled, but some members are grumbling – loudly. While food and drink are plentiful, maps and binoculars are missing. Officers are vying for rank and position as no captain is in sight. Sensing a lack of direction and brooding bad weather, some passengers are resting in the fading sun on easy chairs thinking of past accomplishments; others are huddling in an openly defiant mood close to the lifeboats, anticipating bad times ahead. With the journey’s destination unknown, the trip ahead seems excruciatingly difficult to some, positively dangerous to others. Anxiety and uncertainty, not hope and self-confidence, define the moment.”¹⁶

¹³ Malmborg, M., Stråth, B., Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe, in *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations*, eds. Malmborg, M., Stråth, B. (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 11.

¹⁴ Checkel and Katzenstein, *European Identity*, 4.

¹⁵ There are two main approaches in the academic literature on European identity. The first approach aims to describe it as a psycho-sociological process or socio-political attachment of citizens towards the European space or a political community created by the integration process. The second one relies on a historical or philosophical debate about values and models of a life « à l’Europe », which is understood as a continent grouping several countries, as a civilization differing from the rest of the World which legitimizes the project of economic and political integration. The second approach can help us to better understand the concept of Europe (Duchesne, S., L’identité européenne, entre science politique et science fiction, Introduction, *Politique européenne*, Volume 30:1 (2010), 7.)

¹⁶ Checkel and Katzenstein, *European Identity*, 4.

Methodology

In this series of case studies I will focus on the definition of Europe in France, the United Kingdom and Germany through the discourse of the political elite in each. It is reasonable to anticipate that these visions of Europe should influence the stance of the respective countries towards the Turkish accession process.

My hypothesis is that the position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on the concepts of Europe which are commonly held by its political elite.

I argue that if a concept of Europe is commonly defined on a basis of **social-political values** (democracy, respect for human rights), a member state should be supportive towards Turkish membership once it fulfils all its obligations streaming from the Copenhagen criteria. If it is based on **geography**, then Turkey can join the EU, as part of its territory lies within the European continent. If Europe is defined on the basis of **religion**, the stance of the country towards Turkey's membership will be negative, as it clearly can't fulfil the particular criterion. In the case of Europe being defined by **history**, Turkey would be probably able to become a member of the EU. If Europe is seen on the basis of the **economic potential of integration**, then the country should also support Turkish membership which would bring a large and dynamic market into the Union. I was hesitating for a long time to include another concept based on culture. However, I decided to exclude it as it would have been problematic especially for the reason that culture in the context of European identity is often connected with history and religion, which are already included as categories in their own right.

In the first part of my work, various ways to define Europe will be discussed, with a special focus on five areas, which will serve as variables to identify prevailing concepts of Europe in individual Member States: social-political values, religion, history, geography and economic potential. In the second part, the relations between Turkey and the EU will be briefly reminded. In the third part, concepts of Europe in France, UK and Germany will be addressed. I will concentrate on the opinion of political elites, which in theory are the main factor shaping national politics. I shall focus on their discourses and also on the secondary academic literature. However, as to gain a general view, the results from various opinion pools shall be also briefly presented. In this part, the

French, German and British stances towards Turkey's membership in the EU will be analysed on the bases of discourses of their political elite, academic literature and also three interviews made with the representatives of the respective countries to the Council of the EU, dealing with the issue of enlargement. In the fourth part these positions will be compared with the concepts of Europe in the respective countries and conclusions will be drawn about the validity of the hypothesis that elite concepts of Europe are the main factor shaping positions on Turkey's accession to the EU.

The concepts of Europe of the three Member States were chosen as independent variables, the dependent variable is the stance of the country towards Turkish membership (positive or negative). As control variables were defined two factors: a) all three countries are big Member States belonging to the "Old Europe" and b) all of them agreed to the opening of negotiations with Turkey in 2005.

This work will cover the period from the decision to open opening the accessions negotiations with Turkey in 2004 until 2012. As to the scope of the material which shall be analysed as to define different concepts of Europe I will focus on the views held by the governing elite, which, as it has been said above, rules the country position towards Turkey. Therefore, among the analysed material will be governments' and elections' programs (presidential elections), as well as speeches of presidents and prime ministers and also academic literature.

1. How to define a concept of Europe?

1.1. Literature overview

1.1.1. General overview

Before focusing on concepts of Europe, as introduced in the previous chapters, based on history, religion, geography and social-political values, I will briefly address in general the academic literature concerning the topic of my work, which was influenced by H. Sjursen, who by analysing the enlargement process identifies three ideal types of Europe: economic, cultural and political. The first type defines the EU as a problem-solving entity; the second one suggests that the EU is moving towards a value-based community; the last type defines the EU as a “rights-based post-national union”.¹⁷

The academic literature devoted to the accession of Turkey to the EU has grown especially since the beginning of the 21st century when the accession process gained momentum. In addition to the academic literature, there is a large body of more immediate policy-papers and analytical publication by think-tanks such as GMF and Notre Europe¹⁸. The academic literature most often focuses on the history of EU-Turkey relations, economics and politics, and the institutional impact of Turkish membership. Given the breadth of the literature written on the topic I will limit my references to the works which are most relevant to the questions explored here. An interesting argument is put forward in the work of S. Vaner¹⁹ and D. Akagül – S. Vaner²⁰, which addresses the question of Turkish membership in general and from an economic perspective. G. Dorronsoro²¹ focuses on the geopolitical aspect of EU-Turkish relations. Democratization reforms are addressed by Özbudun²² and Rumford²³, amongst others.

¹⁷ Sjursen, H., Introduction, in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, ed. Sjursen, H. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 2-10.

¹⁸ E.g. Marcou, J., Vardar, D., *La Turquie aux portes de l'Europe*, *Notre Europe: Policy Paper 10* (2004), <http://www.notre-europe.eu/fileadmin/IMG/pdf/Polycypaper10.pdf> (retrieved 10.4.2012)

¹⁹ Vaner, S., *La Turquie* (Paris : Fayard /CERI, 2005).

²⁰ Akagül, D., Vaner, S., *L'Europe avec ou sans la Turquie* (Paris, 2005).

²¹ Dorronsoro, G., *Que veut la Turquie ? - Ambitions et stratégies internationales* (Paris : CERI, 2009).

²² Özbudun, E., Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004, *Turkish Studies*, Volume 8: 2 (2007), 179-196.

²³ Rumford, Ch., Human Rights and Democratization in Turkey in the Context of EU Candidature, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Volume 9: 1 (2001), 93-105.

A group of authors focus on the public opinion towards Turkish accession.²⁴ Public debates on the Turkish candidacy have been analysed by Wimmel²⁵, Negrine et al.²⁶, and Tekin²⁷. Le Gloannec²⁸ tries to identify factors influencing the Turkish accession process beyond the formal Copenhagen Criteria.

1.1.2. Europe and further enlargement

There are different ways how individual Member States can perceive Europe as a concept. It is possible to base the definition on many approaches. According to Malmborg-Stråth the reason is that there has never been Europe in an essentialist sense, but only its imaginations.²⁹ M. Foucher reminds us the EU not being a state or a nation, and being an open organization, Europe can in theory have indefinite borders: “We know the limits of the EU, when we have reached them”.³⁰

There is no doubt that the concepts of Europe and its identity have gone through profound changes through time. J. Rupnik says that Europe is undertaking the third important redefinition of its project, the first one being the development of the common market, the second one in the form of single market and the Maastricht Treaty. The Eastern enlargement opened a way to the “third Europe”, characterized by explicit relation between the questions of borders and the forming of the European project.³¹ This idea is supported by M. Foucher, who argues that identity of the EU is not fixed as it is still being redefined; it was remodelled during the last two decades in the context of

²⁴ Ruiz-Jiménez, A., Torreblanca J. I., European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession. Making Sense of Arguments For and Against, *European Policy Institutes Network: Working Paper 10* (2007), <http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1494.pdf> (retrieved 15.3.2012).

Cautres, B., Monceau, N., *La Turquie en Europe. L’opinion des Européens et les Turcs*.

²⁵ Wimmel, A., Beyond the Bosphorus? Comparing German, French, and British Discourses on Turkey’s Application to Join the European Union. *IHS Political Science Series Paper*, Volume 111 (2006), <http://aei.pitt.edu/7423/> (retrieved 15.3.2012).

²⁶ Negrine, R. et al, eds., Turkey and the European Union. An Analysis of How the Press in Four Countries Covered Turkey’s Bid for Accession in 2004, *European Journal of Communication*, Volume 23:1 (2008), 47-68.

²⁷ Tekin, B. Ç., The Construction of Turkey’s Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse, *Discourse and Society*, Volume 19:6 (2008), 727-763.

²⁸ Le Gloannec, A.M., Is Turkey Euro-Compatible, *Constellations*, Volume 13:2 (2006), 263-274.

²⁹ Malmborg and Stråth, Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe, 3.

³⁰ Foucher, M., *L’Europe et l’avenir du monde* (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2009), 61.

³¹ Rupnik, J., La nouvelle frontière de l’Europe : quels conflits pour une Europe élargie ?, in *Visions de l’Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 299.

greater diversity bringing into play new peoples and with their own pasts and historical memories.³²

It is also without doubt that the European identity and the borders of Europe are two essential elements of further enlargement of the EU.³³ J. Casanova says that Europe cannot decide whether to accept or reject Turkey before it resolves its “crises of civilizational identity”. As his main approach he defines the particular historical legacy of “Western civilization” based on a secularized form of cultural Christianity, and a “cosmopolitan civilisation of secular modernity”. Casanova argues that if Europe is based on the former, there is no space for Turkey unless it undertakes profound “Westernisation”, if Europe is based on the latter, then Turkey should be allowed to join the EU if it fulfils the economic, legal and political conditions required of all candidate countries.³⁴

Similar vision is shared by M. Müftüleri-Baç who argues:

“It has proposed that the question of how to define ‘Europe’ has emerged as a critical point of scientific inquiry in an analysis of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, playing an equal role to Turkey’s ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria. Because Turkish accession to the EU goes beyond a relatively simple analysis of Turkey’s ability to meet the accession criteria, the EU’s uniqueness and the emerging European identity need to be taken into account when assessing this process.”³⁵

1.1.3. Turkey as a Mirror

According to many authors Turkey plays a key role in the self-definition of the EU and is a crucial element of concepts of Europe.³⁶ Turkey’s membership bid is often compared to a “mirror” for Europe, for its identity and essence. As R. Kastoryano

³²Foucher, M., *L'Europe et l'avenir du monde*, 45-46.

³³ Geremek, B., *L'Europe en crise ?*, in *Visions de l'Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 19-20.

³⁴ Casanova, *The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe*, 236.

³⁵ Müftüleri-Baç, M., *The European Union and Turkey Democracy, Multiculturalism and European Identity*, *RECON Online Working Paper* (2011): 1, <http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/AbstractRECONwp1120.html> (retrieved 16.4.2012).

³⁶E.g. Morozov, V., Rumelili, B., *The external constitution of European identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers*, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Volume 47:1 (2012), 28-48.; Kastoryano, R., *Turkey/Europe: Space-Border-Identity*, *Constellations*, Volume 13:2 (2006), 275-287.

argues, Turkish candidacy to the EU “brought out the ambiguities of its definition: a market, a political space, a civilization” and “underscored the paradoxes of its expectations and values: universality formulated in the terms of human rights and a – religious – European particularism which is now added to national particularisms.” In other words, Turkey has brought a tension between the heritage of Europe and its future as an exceptional political construction.³⁷ Müftüler-Baç identifies two major processes of European integration impacting the European identity: the pace of integration and the process of enlargement and claims that in both Turkey’s accession would play a key role in forming the EU and its multicultural identity.³⁸ V. Morozov and B. Rumelili claim that Turkey has contributed to forming a European identity by challenging the self-perception of Europe as a multicultural space.³⁹

Turkey has been often used as example of “Other” in the context of self-defining of the EU.⁴⁰ In an identity formation is often given a positive value to the “Selves” and negative to the “Others”. A construction of a common European identity is not an exception.⁴¹ It is clear that frontiers can take different forms. Several frontiers allows growing, they are also protecting against the “Others”. In this respect they can take a geographic form as well as be based on shared religion, history, values or common interests. Rumelili argues that “as a liminal other, Turkey will remain constitutive of European identity”.⁴²

1.2. Concepts of Europe

The Treaty on European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty stresses that the EU is “drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights

³⁷ Kastoryano, R., Turkey/Europe: Space-Border-Identity, 275.

³⁸ Müftüler-Baç, M., The European Union and Turkey Democracy, Multiculturalism and European Identity, 5.

³⁹ Morozov and Rumelili, The external constitution of European identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers, 28-48.

⁴⁰ For general overview of the literature, see: Neumann, I.B., Welsh, J.M., The other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society. *Review of International Studies*, Volume 17:4 (1991), 327–348.

⁴¹ Tekin, B. Ç., The Construction of Turkey’s Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse, 738.

⁴² Rumelili, Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization, 236-237.

of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”⁴³ and is founded “on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity... prevail.”⁴⁴ Therefore, following the given reasoning, and as it was stressed above, I will focus on the definition of Europe in the meaning of **concept of social-political values** (freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, human dignity, tolerance, justice, solidarity), **historical concept** (based on common history), **religious concept** to which I add a **geographical concept** and **concept of economic potential**.

1.2.1. Social and political values

The concept of Europe can be based on social and political values. In his famous work, *Penser l'Europe* E. Morin stresses that Europe is characterised by spirituality, humanism, rationality, democracy...⁴⁵ M. Foucher reminds us, that European values as defined by Tzvetan Todorov are rationality, justice, democracy, liberty of individuals, secularism and tolerance, to this listing he adds critical thinking and doubts as philosophical virtues.⁴⁶ Olli Rehn in 2005 said that even if geography sets the frame, but that “fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe”. To the values listed above, he added solidarity, human rights and rule of law.⁴⁷

J. L. Quermonne adds economic and social rights and protection of the environment and claims that the values of Europe are its “identity card”.⁴⁸ The importance of the social aspect is shared by Geremek, who also argues that Europe is not defined on the basis of ethnicity, but by its “culture, education, history and the vision of the common future”.

⁴³ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty), Preamble, Europa, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm (retrieved 14.4.2012).

⁴⁴ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty), Article 2, Europa, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm (retrieved 14.4.2012).

⁴⁵ Morin, E., *Penser l'Europe, Les espaces économiques* - Fiche 37, p.2, http://00h00.giantchair.com/html/ExtraitsPDF/27454100935990_1.PDF (retrieved 16.4.2012).

⁴⁶ Foucher, M., *L'Europe et l'avenir du monde*, 45-46.

⁴⁷ Olli Rehn, Values define Europe, not borders, *The Financial Times*, 4.1.2005, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26bde788-5df5-11d9-ac01-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1v86UWU4D> (retrieved 16.4.2012).

⁴⁸ Quermonne, J.L., *L'Union européenne dans le temps long* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2008), 113.

However, as the most important of the European values on which the European identity is based, he considers “reference to Human beings”. According to Geremek, the Copenhagen Criteria, which together with the integration capacity of the EU and the economic readiness of the candidate state are essential prerequisites for admission, refer to this European identity.⁴⁹ He stresses that the Copenhagen Criteria are therefore constructing European borders on the bases of its values.⁵⁰

J. Weiler calls human rights an “icon” of Europe and claims that the notion of human rights is in Europe considered to be one of the biggest successes. He considers human rights together with democracy as founding values of our political system and that the best way to give content to a community of values, such as Europe, is through a commitment to the notion of the human rights.⁵¹

Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that if a country shares a concept of Europe based on social and political values and Turkey manages to fulfil and respect them, then it should fit into the particular vision and the stance of the Member State towards Turkish membership should be positive.

1.2.2. Geography

In general, defining Europe on the basis of geography is probably the most used and the easiest definition. The borders of Europe are clearly established in the West, the North and the South, however in the East they remain unclear. The Bosphorus in Turkey and the Ural Mountains divide Europe from Asia, but do not represent any state border.⁵² J. L. Quermonne argues that Ural as an eastern border of Europe is insufficient.⁵³ It can be said that from a geological point of view, Europe is not a continent and that it is established rather from a geopolitical perspective than from physical geographer’s approach.⁵⁴ Even if geographic Eastern borders can be defined as running along the Ural

⁴⁹ Geremek, L’Europe en crise ?, 19-20.

⁵⁰ Geremek, L’Europe en crise ?, 23.

⁵¹ Weiler, Droits de l’homme, Droits de l’homme, constitutionnalisme et intégration : iconographie et fétichisme, in *Quelle identité pour l’Europe ?*, ed. Kastoryano, R. (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2005), 155-156, 159.

⁵² Berglund, *Where Does Europe End? Borders, Limits and directions of the EU*, 70.

⁵³ Quermonne, J.L., *L’Union européenne dans le temps long*, 104.

⁵⁴ De Montbrial, T., Debating the borders of Europe, *The New York Times*, 21. 5. 2004.

Mountains⁵⁵, their mental definition varies. For the new Member States, belonging to Europe was defined by opposition to the “Other”, for the Central Europe the “Other” was Russia, for the Balkan countries, it was Turkey.⁵⁶ If Turkey joins the EU, the latter would border with Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Syria, an idea which is hard to imagine or unacceptable for many.

It has been already stressed that any country which is considered to be European can apply for EU membership. It is not without interest that Morocco’s application was turned down in 1987, because the country is not situated in Europe. In geographical terms Turkey is facing a similar situation with only 5% of its surface being located on the European continent. However, in general question of geography defining Europe’s borders is problematic, e.g. the closest capitals to Nicosia are Beirut and Tel Aviv and if Iceland joins the EU, it will be 800 km from anywhere in the EU.⁵⁷ C. Grataloup stress that Cyprus or Malta are from a geographical point of view only classified as European with some difficulty, as the first can be considered as part of Asia and the later of Africa.⁵⁸

J. Rupnik stresses that the frontiers of the EU are defined by the frontiers of individual Member States. However, if the frontiers of the states are results of history, those of the EU, which are doubted nowadays, are a result of political will. The last enlargements were made in the spirit of “reunifying of Europe” and an effort to link the borders of the EU and Europe can be observed especially among the new Member States. This is according to J. Rupnik the reason why the new Member States are trying to avoid the debate about the territorial limits of the EU. In general, the debate about the borders of the EU and Europe brings two major visions of the European project: firstly, Europe of “forty” including to the East everything except Russia and to the South nothing with the exception of Turkey. Secondly, Europe with the “centre” spreading the stability into the peripheries and using instruments such as “privileged partnerships”, ENP etc. to deal with the neighbouring countries.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Encyklopedia Britannica, Europe, Encyklopedia Britannica, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/195686/Europe> (retrieved 15.4.2012).

⁵⁶ Rupnik, J., Conclusion Quelles frontières pour l'Europe ?, in *Les banlieues de l'Europe. Les politiques du voisinage de l'Union européenne*, Rupnik, J. (ed.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2007), 197-198.

⁵⁷ Berglund, *Where Does Europe End? Borders, Limits and directions of the EU*, 70.

⁵⁸ Grataloup, C., *L'invention des continents* (Larousse, 2009), 14.

⁵⁹ Rupnik, J., Conclusion Quelles frontières pour l'Europe ?, 198-199.

Concept based on geography is problematic as it does not bring a clear definition. However, in general it is argued that Turkey is a European state as only with such the accession negotiations can be started. Therefore, it can be assumed that if the country's vision of Europe is based on geography, it should be supportive towards Turkish membership.

1.2.3. Religion

When the concept of Europe is based on a religious approach, it stresses the European origins emerging from a Judeo-Christian heritage. P. Cabanel argues that neither the former, nor the latter should be omitted, and furthermore that Europe should not be considered only as what has descended from the Enlightenment and secularization. P. Cabanel claims that Christianity is not only a tradition or an origin, because Europe today is Christian, with its catholic, orthodox and protestant branches having a strong base through their spiritual, architectural and artistic works.⁶⁰

The issue of religion as one of the defining concepts was brought into the debate about the European Constitution, where the question turned on whether Christian origins of Europe should be acknowledged or not. Among the arguments put forward was that Europe unquestionably was born from Christian culture with roots going back to even before the fall of the Roman Empire. Or as U. Ecco puts it that:

“As it is not possible to design the Oriental World without Buddhism, it is not possible to design Europe without acknowledging the role of the Church, different Christian kings, Scholastic theology or the deeds and example of its greatest Saints.”⁶¹

J. Weiler is famous for its supportive stance towards Christian origins in Europe, the fact that he argued that the Preamble of the European Constitution should contain references to Christian values as an important part of European integration and that he considers Christianity to be an essential part of the European identity is reminded by A.

⁶⁰ Cabanel, P., Religion, in *Dictionnaire critique de l'Union européenne*, eds. Anne Dulphy et al. (Paris : Armand Colin, 2008), 376.

⁶¹Ecco, U., L'Europe du métissage, in *Les banlieues de l'Europe. Les politiques du voisinage de l'Union européenne*, Rupnik, J. (ed.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2007), 214.

J. Menéndez.⁶² A notion of certain “mythical past” is proposed by K. Nicolaidis who bases his notion on a broad concept encompassing a common religion and culture. Europe is imagined as “ancestral reality” corresponding to Christian or Judeo-Christian Europe.⁶³

Even if the notion of secularism is considered as one of the key values of Europe, and even if the role of Judaism and partly even Islam in forming today’s Europe cannot be omitted, the idea of defining Europe on the basis of Christianity is an argument and an idea with a strong tradition. It can be assumed that if a Member State shares this vision of Europe, it will not be supportive towards a membership of a big Muslim country as Turkey.

1.2.4. History

Europe can be also defined on the basis of its history. As says J. Le Goff “Europe was not fatally conceived of all eternity; it is a product of history”, he also stresses that “Europe is not a geographic expression” and never it was reduced to such in the works of the Ancient authors.⁶⁴ Europe is not and has not been a term with easily definable proportions, but has been since Antiquity shaped through constant negotiations of whom to exclude and whom to include.⁶⁵

In general, there are two periods stressed as important in European history in the context of defining Europe: the Middle Ages⁶⁶ and the Enlightenment period, when the notion of Europe as a community with a vocation for concord emerged among philosophers. Europe was seen as a universal civilization project replacing Christianity and a “counter-image” facing the despotic East.⁶⁷

⁶² Menéndez, A.J., A Christian or a Laïc Europe? Christian Values and European Identity, *Ratio Juris*. Volume 18:2 (2005), 179.

⁶³ Nicolaidis, K., Les Fins de l’Europe, in *Visions de l’Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 214.

⁶⁴ Le Goff, J., L’Europe et l’histoire, in *Visions de l’Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 393-394.

⁶⁵ Malmberg and Stråth, Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe, 1.

⁶⁶ Le Goff, J., L’Europe et l’histoire, 402.

⁶⁷ Malmberg and Stråth, *The Meaning of Europe*, 2.

However, the question is whose history should be used to shape Europe's future. J.L. Quermonne argues that it is risky to reduce Europe only to the "West" at the risk of forgetting that the Empire of Constantine was uniting the West and East, and that Byzantium safeguarded the common heritage of Antiquity longer than Rome.⁶⁸ In addition, the history of the 20th century, which saw European states descend into total war before beginning the work for a common Europe, is a chapter of history which may well have wrought more consequential changes than in any period preceding it.

In general, it is argued that Turkey has a common history with the rest of Europe: starting with the admission of the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe in 1856, and continuing with Turkish membership in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe and NATO.⁶⁹ Hence a concept of Europe based on its history might be ambiguous. However, I will assume that concept of a common history should mean that at least Turkish EU membership is a possibility. As the question of religion is discussed in a different part, it will not be treated as such under the concept of the common history.

1.2.5. Economic potential

Economic development plays an important role in European integration and the internal market is one of its key elements. The EU started as an economic community, only to add powers in other areas later. It can be inferred from this sequence that some Member States may have seen in integration above all a possibility to advance material interests through economic cooperation⁷⁰ and that these states would base their concept of Europe on it. The rationale behind this concept is to see the European Project through the optic of a trade area allowing for increased economic exchange.⁷¹ The reasoning entails that some Member States may be primarily interested by the economic potential that the EU represents.

Turkey is already an important trading partner of the EU, connected e.g. through the Custom Union and considered as fast-growing enterprising economy. However, if it

⁶⁸ Quermonne, *L'Union européenne dans le temps long*, 102-103.

⁶⁹ Rumelili, *Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization*, 236-237.

⁷⁰ Sjursen, *Introduction*, 2.

joins the EU, it would become part of the single market, meaning bigger interconnection and possibilities of profit. In such a scenario that a Member State defines its concept of Europe on the basis of the economic potential, it should be supportive towards the Turkish membership bid as it would create a bigger single market.

2. The EU and Turkey

Turkey applied for the membership in the EEC in 1987. However, its candidacy as an applicant country was only accepted twelve years later and in a drastically changed geopolitical situation.⁷² J. Rupnik (2007) stresses that since the disappearance of the Iron Curtain which divided Europe for more than a half a century; a new political and mental geography emerged, accompanying the changes in identities and territories. Central Europe has integrated with the “West”, the Balkans have become South-East Europe, Russia has been struggling with post-imperial identity, Turkey has been rediscovering the former Ottoman region and the Mediterranean has remained “the old crossroad of civilisations” but also a migration border.⁷³ Those changes deeply influenced Europe and the EU and therefore the circumstances for Turkish accession to the EU profoundly changed.

The prospect of Turkish accession began in July 1959 when Turkey applied for association with the EEC. In September 1963 an Association Agreement was signed. After a period of problematic relations from 1974-1983, Turkey officially presented its candidacy in 1987. In 1990, the European Commission did not recommend opening negotiations. In 1995, the Customs Union was established between the EU and Turkey. The decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey was finally taken in December 2004; this decision was also supported by the European Parliament which gave its approval by 407 votes against 262.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Cautres, B., Monceau, N., *La Turquie en Europe. L'opinion des Européens et les Turcs*, 100.

⁷² Berglund, *Where Does Europe End? Borders, Limits and directions of the EU*, 69.

⁷³ Rupnik, Conclusion Quelles frontières pour l'Europe ?, 197-198.

⁷⁴ Commission Indépendante sur la Turquie, *La Turquie dans l'Europe: Briser le cercle vicieux* (Septembre 2009), 9, http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009_french.pdf (retrieved 15.4.2012).

It is interesting to note that although the position of different political parties on the question of Turkish accession to the EU has been different, no Turkish party ever really reversed the orientation of Turkey towards Europe. However, the ultra-nationalist MHP and the Islamist movements have traditionally been opposed to Turkey's EU aspirations. The pro-European approach of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was a great surprise to the European leaders.⁷⁵

Relations with the EU have had a major influence on the internal development and foreign policy of Turkey, not only because the security policy of the EU integrates Turkey to a large extent, but also because of the fact that since 1995, the EU is Turkey's biggest economic partner. However, EU-Turkish relations are not without problems: the refusal of Turkey's candidacy in 1997 caused Turkey to turn temporarily to the United States.⁷⁶ In 2006 the refusal of Turkey to allow Greek Cypriot ships and planes to enter into its ports and airports led to the partial freezing of the accession process by suspending eight of 33 negotiation chapters.⁷⁷ In total, 13 chapters have been opened and one chapter has been provisionally closed.

3. Concepts of Europe in the selected Member States

The scope of the research material

The material analysed in this chapter was chosen on the basis of its relevance to the research question. I focused on the political elite as represented by the highest political representatives, which are the main factor shaping the politics and thus influencing the Member State's approach towards Turkish accession. The political opposition is for now not considered, as its influence on the country's approach will be secondary to the views of the ruling parties. Another reason for this approach is the limited scope of my work. As for the methodology of my analysis, after considering several approaches I finally decided to analyse the discourse of actors from the elites and monitor if certain elements are present or not.

⁷⁵ Marcou and Vardar, D., *La Turquie aux portes de l'Europe*, 13, 14.

⁷⁶ Dorronsoro, G., *Que veut la Turquie ?*, 71.

3.1. FRANCE

The analysed material

In the case of France I decided to concentrate on the concept of Europe as seen by the President of the Republic, who is the main political actor, supporting his view where appropriate by a statement of a Member of the Government. The material consists of the Programme of Nicolas Sarkozy for Presidential elections (2007), speeches of Jacques Chirac (2004-2007) and of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012). The presidential campaign in 2012 will be omitted as the results will be known too short before the submission of my work and also as Turkey does not represent a major issue.

3.1.1. France and the European Integration

Based on its history, culture and national identity France constructed a certain idea of Europe. The European project was presented by President De Gaulle as an extension of France's power serving French interests, by Mitterand as an engine of economic growth. However, more recently the EU has been connected with austere reforms, which are being imposed from the outside on the French government.⁷⁸

As Knapp and Wright state, for more than 50 years "France has been both an ardent promoter of European integration and the fiercest of defenders, within European institutions, of national interest narrowly construed."⁷⁹ The French approach can be most easily explained in the terms of a rather consistent national view and as an approach based on an evolving cost-benefit analysis. It is also important to stress that France through the EU's history has achieved a lot of its goals thanks to a 'special relationship' with Germany. The key elements of the French EU approach are: (1)

⁷⁷ Billion, D., Muslu, Z., Une Turquie en recherche de repères, *Confluences Méditerranée*, Volume 61 (2007), 64.

⁷⁸ Palier et al., Introduction : La France sans boussole au milieu des marchés, in *La France en mutation 1980-2005*, Culpepper, P.D., Hall, P.A. and Palier, B. (eds.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2006), 33.

⁷⁹ Knapp, A., Wright, V., France and European Integration, *The Government and Politics of France* (Routledge, 2007), 2, <http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/0415357322/pdfs/chapter14.pdf> (retrieved 16.11.2011).

relations with Germany (2) use of Europe as a diplomatic lever (3) the Common Agricultural Policy (4) free trade.⁸⁰

A famous example of the French approach towards integration is found in the events surrounding the Referendum of 2005. It is not without an interest that in the campaign leading up to the referendum, the issue of Turkish membership was frequently raised by right-wing parties such as the UMP, UDF, MPF, FN and MNR. The referendum also illustrated to what extent the debate about Turkish accession became a part of a domestic political debate. However, as C. Lequesne argues, the importance of the question of Turkish membership of the referendum result should not be overestimated. According to a survey conducted shortly after the referendum, only 6% of French claimed to vote “no” in order to oppose the accession of Turkey.⁸¹

In general **public opinion** on the EU has been stable during recent years; in 2011 around 39% of French citizens had confidence in the EU.⁸² French public opinion is most favourable towards the idea of “Europe des Etats”, where every Member State can determine cooperation on the case by case basis. Further deepening of EU integration, while respecting the role of states, is supported by 33%.⁸³

3.1.2. France and the concept of Europe

Social and political values

Jacques Chirac had a strong vision of Europe based on social and political values:

“Europe is firstly a community of values and principles, before being a community of interests. It is Europe of men, before Europe of the market. It is Europe of liberty and law.”⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Knapp, A., Wright, V., France and European Integration, 3-25.

⁸¹ Lequesne, C., *La France dans la Nouvelle Europe*, (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2008), 90-91.

⁸² Eurobaromètre Standard 75, Printemps 2011, Commission Européenne, 46, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_publ_fr.pdf (retrieved 28.5.2011).

⁸³ Eurobaromètre Flash 230, Quelle Europe? Les Français et la construction européenne, Commission Européenne, mai 2009, 16-17, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_230_first.pdf (retrieved 28.5.2011).

⁸⁴ TOUTEUROPE, Presentation-Jacques Chirac, *Toutleurope (no date)* <http://www.toutleurope.eu/fr/histoire/personnages/1992-2010/presentation/jacques-chirac-1932.html>. (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Chirac also stressed that Europe is a space of social cohesion, “which gives its place to solidarity and justice”.⁸⁵ The vision of Chirac was supported by Renaud Dutreil, the Civil Service Minister, who stated that “Europe is a political project founded on its values”.⁸⁶

In his speech from 2000, which was quoted also in the later years of his presidency, Chirac claimed that the founding values of Europe are “liberty, dignity, tolerance and democracy” and said that the “diversity of their political, cultural and linguistic traditions is one of the strengths of the Union”.⁸⁷ The same vision was repeated in 2001, when Chirac added “peace” as a core value:

“Because Europe is being built first a vast area of freedom, tolerance and democracy. Europe, it is also a social model that we want to defend and promote. ... Among the European values, there is a respect for identities and cultures. In the Union, everyone has its place, with its traditions, its language, and this diversity is one of the treasures of the European project. Finally, Europe is based on a cardinal value: peace. This is the condition of freedom and development. There cannot be a solid and living democracy, real economic and social prosperity, we cannot fully invest in growth, when there remains a perception of a threat.”⁸⁸

In 2005, Chirac also stressed that “Europe originates in a certain idea of man and his dignity”⁸⁹ and the importance of the liberty of man, “which expresses the European identity”.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Jacques Chirac, Conférence de presse du président de la République Jacques Chirac sur l'Europe, Elysee, 27 April 2004, http://www.melchior.fr/Conference-de-presse-du-presid.5151.0.html?&no_cache=1&print=1 (retrieved 15.5.2012).

⁸⁶ Vie Publique, Interview de M. Renaud Dutreil, ministre de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'État, Vie Publique, 5 November, 2004, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/043002832.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

⁸⁷ Jacques Chirac, Discours prononcé par Monsieur Jacques Chirac devant le Bundestag Allemand, Deutscher Bundestag, 27 juin 2000, <http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/gastredner/chirac/chirac2.html> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

⁸⁸ Jacques Chirac. Propos introductifs de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur les valeurs de l'Europe, l'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux pays baltes, l'idéologie de la construction européenne, l'avenir de l'Europe, les relations entre la France et la Lettonie, l'entrée des pays baltes à l'OTAN, les relations entre l'Union européenne, l'OTAN et la Russie, l'Europe sociale et l'action militaire de la France pour défendre la sécurité internationale, Riga, Lettonie, Vie Publique, 27 July 2001. <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/017000189.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

⁸⁹ Jacques Chirac, Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la construction européenne et l'Europe de la culture, à Paris, Vie publique, 2 May 2005. <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/057000096.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

⁹⁰ Ibid

Nicolas Sarkozy also spoke on the topic of the social and political values underpinning Europe. In his Presidential Programme of 2007 he stated that Europe has to defend:

“human rights, democracy, the protection of the weakest, solidarity and the protection of nature”⁹¹.

Sarkozy stressed the importance of values, such as human rights, during an interview in Brussels⁹². The entry on Europe on the official website of President Sarkozy stated that the President wanted to defend Europe, which “promote its values, defends its interests, protect its citizens”⁹³ and in a 2007 speech Sarkozy spoke of “Europe of peace” as another important value.⁹⁴

There is no doubt that even if the concepts of Europe held and propagated by Chirac and Sarkozy are based on social and political values, their approach differed insofar as Chirac continuously stressed the importance of respecting different cultures and traditions while Sarkozy was devoting less space to these values in his discourse.

Geography

The French notion of the borders of Europe has been influenced by the famous quote of Charles De Gaulle: “Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, it is Europe, it is the whole of Europe that will decide the fate of the world” (Strasbourg, 1959), which reiterated the traditional geographical definition of Europe.

During Jacques Chirac’s presidency Geography was not presented as a defining aspect in the concept of Europe. Borders were used mostly in the context of stability and security, as illustrated by a statement by Michel Barnier (Minister of Foreign Affairs,

⁹¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Mon Projet – Ensemble tout devient possible, Programme for the Presidential Campaign in 2007.

⁹² Gros-Verheyde, N., Mon rêve européen, par Nicolas Sarkozy. *Bruxelles* 2. 3 March 2012. <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/europe-pouvoir-traite-de-lisbonne/mon-reve-europeen-par-nicolas-sarkozy.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

⁹³ Nicolas Sarkozy, La vision du président de la république pour l’Europe, Elysee (no date), <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/europe/la-vision-du-president-de-la-republique-pour.9580.html> (retrieved 3.4.2012).

⁹⁴ Nicolas Sarkozy, La politique européenne du président de la république, Elysee (no date), <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/europe/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la-republique/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la.5285.html> (retrieved 3.4.2012).

2004), who stressed that it is in the interest of the EU that “the definitive border of our Union is a stable border.”⁹⁵ The concept of Chirac was probably best expressed by the Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who said that: “Europe, for France, is primarily a state of mind, a community of souls, rather than a matter of geography.”⁹⁶

The position of Nicolas Sarkozy on the question of geography, as a determinant for the concept of Europe, represents a change. He calls for:

“Europe which has borders, Europe, I want to say, which does not dilute itself through never-ending enlargement. I say it as I believe it to be. True Europeans are those who believe in an integrated Europe, which means a Europe with borders, which is not becoming a sub-region of the UN, because of successive enlargements. True Europeans want to stay faithful to the founding Treaty.” (Strasbourg, 2nd July 2007)⁹⁷

Sarkozy used the same argument already in his speech to the delegates of the Annual Congress of European People’s Parties in Rome in March 2006, where he warned against Europe becoming “a subset of the United Nations”.⁹⁸

Sarkozy considers the borders of Europe to be crucial and he also bases European identity on them: “Because without borders, there will be no European identity” and he adds that while speaking about borders, he keeps in mind the neighbouring countries of Europe, with which Europe has to construct particular bonds, but which “don’t have a vocation to become full members of the Union”.⁹⁹

In 2009 Sarkozy continued in the same line and one of the point of *The Priorities of the President for the Future of the Union*, presenting Sarkozy’s vision for Europe after the

⁹⁵ Michel Barnier, Entretien de M. Michel Barnier, ministre des affaires étrangères, avec France 2 dans l’émission “Les Quatre vérités” le 14 décembre 2004, sur l’interdiction de diffusion de la chaîne de télévision Al-Manar, l’ouverture de négociations d’adhésion avec la Turquie et la demande de reconnaissance du génocide arménien, l’opposition de l’UMP et de l’opinion publique à l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE, le troisième tour de l’élection présidentielle en Ukraine, Vie publique, 14 December 2004, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/053000151.html> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

⁹⁶ Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Tribune de M. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Premier ministre, dans des quotidiens européens, notamment, Financial Times, Süddeutsche Zeitung, El País... le 15 janvier 2004, sur l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, l’approfondissement institutionnel et la préparation d’une constitution et sur la part prise par la France à la construction européenne, intitulée “La France pour l’Europe”, 15 January 2004 <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/043000269.html> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

⁹⁷ Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours de M. le Président de la République, Elysee, 2 July 2007. <http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/pdf/president-8255.pdf> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

⁹⁸ Kubosova, L., Sarkozy calls for definition of ‘borders of Europe’, *EUobserver*, 31 March 2006, <http://euobserver.com/15/21278> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

⁹⁹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours de M. le Président de la République. Elysee, 2 July 2007.

French Presidency, read: “Give clear borders to Europe”. It contained the usual arguments about the danger of the enlargement without an end, calling for borders and limits for Europe.¹⁰⁰ The concept of Europe based on geography is presented also in the *Vision of the President of the Republic for Europe*, which clearly stresses that “Europe must have clear borders”.¹⁰¹

From a different point of view, the importance of borders for Nicolas Sarkozy can be illustrated by the spat between France and Italy in the summer of 2011, when France reintroduced its border controls following a flow of immigrants on North-African origin from Italy or later in 2012 when he argued that the external borders should be strengthened against illegal immigration¹⁰² and called for a revision of the Schengen agreement.¹⁰³

An observation can be made about the Mediterranean Sea, which Sarkozy calls “European sea”, laying in the middle of the “European civilization”.¹⁰⁴ This is interesting especially in the context of the Mediterranean Union, which Sarkozy designed, and his stance towards the situation in Syria and Libya.

In sum, it can be argued that while geography played no role in the approach of Chirac, Sarkozy considers it as one of the defining elements of the concept of Europe.

Religion

The stance of Sarkozy on religion is completely different to the one of Jacques Chirac, who followed the tradition of François Mitterrand, who took the position that religion is a private belief. Sarkozy differs not only with Jacques Chirac, but also with Lionel Jospin and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the President of the European Convention, who

¹⁰⁰ Nicolas Sarkozy, *Les priorités du Président la République pour l'avenir de l'Union* (no date), <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/europe/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la-republique/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la-5285.html> (retrieved 3.4.2012).

¹⁰¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, *La vision du président de la république pour l'Europe*, Elysee.

¹⁰² Lerougetel, A, Laurent, O., French President Sarkozy makes anti-immigrant appeal to neo-fascist vote, *World Socialist Web Site*, 16 March 2012, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/mar2012/sark-m16.shtml> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

¹⁰³ Gros-Verheyde, N., *Mon rêve européen, par Nicolas Sarkozy*.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

was refusing to mention the Christian origins in the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, on the grounds of defending *laïcité*.¹⁰⁵

In 2004, Sarkozy stated that: “It is certain that the Christian values were civilizing Europe and their influence was dominant.”¹⁰⁶ Later, Sarkozy said that:

“It would be a mistake to turn our backs on our past and to deny, in a sense, the roots that are obvious. ... To say that in Europe, there are Christian roots, it's just to state a fact of common sense; refusing to say it is to turn our backs on historic reality. If we reject our history, we are not ready for our future.” (Sarkozy, 31st January 2008)¹⁰⁷

Sarkozy referred to the Christian origins of France and Europe already in his speech in the Vatican in 2007, which brought him criticism from François Hollande and François Bayrou, the former criticising especially the fact that the President should be the “guardian” of *laïcité*¹⁰⁸. Bayrou criticised the fact that while referring to “essentially Christian” origins, Sarkozy was omitting the Enlightenment period.¹⁰⁹ In 2011, Sarkozy affirmed that “Christianity left us a magnificent heritage”.¹¹⁰

History

The notion of a common European history is partly represented in French political discourse. In his speech in 2005 Jacques Chirac recalled the Greek and Celtic heritage, followed by the Roman past, before Europe was covered by a “white coat of churches”. However, while speaking about the Romanesque and Gothic periods, Chirac stressed the enrichment which was brought by the Arab influence in Andalusia and Byzantine

¹⁰⁵ Tincq, H., Nicolas Sarkozy veut remettre la religion au cœur de la vie de la cité, *Le Monde*, 21 December 2007. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2007/12/21/nicolas-sarkozy-veut-remettre-la-religion-au-c-ur-de-la-vie-de-la-cite_992142_823448.html (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁰⁶ Sarkozy, N., *La République, les religions, l'espérance* (Éditions du Cerf, 2004), 180.

¹⁰⁷ Reuters, Nicolas Sarkozy souligne les racines chrétiennes de l'Europe, *LePoint.fr*, 30 January 2008, <http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites/2008-01-30/nicolas-sarkozy-souligne-les-racines-chretiennes-de-l-europe/1037/0/221231>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁰⁸ Le Figaro, Hollande fustige le «narcissisme» de Sarkozy, *Le Figaro*, 30 December 2007, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2007/12/30/01002-20071230ARTFIG00009-hollande-fustige-le-narcissisme-de-sarkozy.php>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁰⁹ Waintraub, J., Bayrou : «Sarkozy remet en cause la laïcité républicaine», *Le Figaro*, 26 December 2007, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2007/12/26/01002-20071226ARTFIG00005-bayrou-sarkozy-remet-en-cause-la-laicite-republicaine.php>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹¹⁰ Jaigu, C., Sarkozy célèbre l'héritage chrétien. *Le Figar*, 3 March 2011, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2011/03/03/01002-20110303ARTFIG00729-sarkozy-celebre-l-heritage-chretien.php>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

culture in Venice and the fact that a “Republic of Letters” was uniting the “ancient and modern, pagan and Christian, in the same community across nations and periods.”¹¹¹

“Europe of the Age of Enlightenment let coexist religions and cultures, assembled around the beautiful and powerful idea that nothing is more admirable than the human being.”¹¹²

The common history is represented also in the discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy, who claims that the EU is not based on “expiation of a tragic history” but on the willingness of Europeans to draw a lesson from it. As he further explains: “

“It is based on the shared desire to preserve the rich heritage of civilization that the centuries have left us, to preserve this priceless treasure, which I call the European humanism, to keep alive the European man, this human ideal that we wanted to share, universally with all the people around the world.” (Nicolas Sarkozy, 2007)¹¹³

The common history as a notion defining Europe is presented in the discourse of Chirac, it is used in a way to create an image of tolerant Europe, which respects other cultures and religions. The notion used in the discourse of Sarkozy differs as he is quicker in referring to the European civilization.

Economic potential

Even though there is no doubt that economic integration and the single market are important for the French approach towards Europe, economic interests are not all that matter. As stated above, for Jacques Chirac Europe is: “firstly a community of values and principles, before being a community of interests. It is Europe of men, before Europe of the market.”¹¹⁴ Or, as Chirac puts it “Economic prosperity has to oblige to the demands of ethics. We benefit from the potential and the law of markets, but without forgetting that its fruits serve and give profit to all.”¹¹⁵ On a different occasion, Chirac

¹¹¹ Jacques Chirac, Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la construction européenne et l'Europe de la culture.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Nicolas Sarkozy, La politique européenne du président de la république.

¹¹⁴ Toutleurope, Presentation - Jacques Chirac.

¹¹⁵ Jacques Chirac, Propos introductifs de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur les valeurs de l'Europe, l'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux pays baltes.

stated that “Europe was cultural long before it was economic”.¹¹⁶ Sarkozy’s discourse offers a similar vision; his statement “values of the civilisation don’t yield under the pressure of the commercial and financial interests” clearly proves it.¹¹⁷

Therefore, even if the economic interests play a role in the French concept of Europe; they are not considered as a defining force in establishing it.

Conclusion: French concept of Europe in time

France, as one of the founding nations of the ECSC, has a strong vision of Europe and of what it should look like. However, in the previous part it was demonstrated that its concepts of Europe are evolving through time. In the analysed period, we can observe two different approaches which differ according to the occupant of the post of President of the Republic.

The concept of Europe under the Presidency of Jacques Chirac is based on social and political values such as liberty, dignity, democracy and peace. He never ceased to stress the importance of tolerance and respect for other cultures and traditions. Therefore, his concept can be identified as based on social and political values.

The vision of Nicolas Sarkozy is different. He also based his approach on social and political values. Next to the human rights, democracy and protection of the weakest he put solidarity and the protection of nature. However, in Sarkozy’s discourse an important space is devoted to the borders of Europe, the definition of which he never ceases to call for, and also to the Europe’s Christian roots. Therefore, his concept of Europe can be described as a mixture of three approaches and means Europe based on social and political values, geography and religion.

Both Chirac and Sarkozy use the notion of common history mainly to set the context for their concepts of Europe, not as a defining notion.

¹¹⁶ Jacques Chirac, Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la construction européenne et l’Europe de la culture.

¹¹⁷ Nicolas Sarkozy, Mon Projet – Ensemble tout devient possible.

3.1.3. France and previous enlargements

It is worth to briefly mention the French approach in the context of previous EU enlargements. A comparison of the 2004 enlargement and the Turkish case shows some interesting differences. B. C. Tekin identifies several distinctions between French scepticism towards the Eastern enlargement (public support being far below the EU average) and the negative approach towards Turkey. Firstly, the enlargement of 2004 did not spark deep-rooted debate and secondly, it did not start a discussion about the “raison d’être” of the EU. Thirdly, the debate remained within the realm of eurosceptic versus pro-European attitudes. However, in the Turkish case, a strong opposition is expressed by even those national political parties, that have traditionally followed a pro-Europe stance. Fourthly, in contrast to the Turkish accession, the French associated the question of immigration with the 2004 enlargement to a lesser degree.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the context of the post-communist countries, France originally proposed a “Confédération” as a framework for the association of the newly democratic countries with the EEC. In 1990 President Mitterrand proposed to President Havel the idea of the confederate construction. The French wanted to create an intergovernmental organisation to coordinate concrete policies.¹¹⁹ Even though the geopolitical situation in the last decades is different, it is impossible not to compare this French proposal with their approach towards Turkey, where France promoted a “Privileged partnership” and a Mediterranean Union.

3.1.4. France and Turkish membership in the EU

In France, disagreements concerning Turkish membership transcend the cleavage between right and left political parties. According to Nicolas Monceau Turkey’s European bid has resulted into a coming apart within the French political elite and has gone beyond ordinary political division by bringing opposition from both the right and

¹¹⁸ Tekin, *The Construction of Turkey’s Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse*, 730.

¹¹⁹ Lequesne, *La France dans la Nouvelle Europe*, 51.

left of the political spectrum.¹²⁰ Even inside the two main parties, the UMP and the PS, there are conflicts in regard to this question. However, as Jean Marcou argues, within the UMP the issue is probably more significant, as it was connected with the internal upheaval. The change in approach towards Turkey is marked by the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy as leader of the UMP and with Jacques Chirac, favourable to Turkish accession, losing control at the same time.¹²¹ Even though the UMP is far from having a single position on the issue, as even several former ministers (e.g. Jean-Pierre Jouyet), were favourable towards Turkey, it can still be claimed that the negative approach of UMP is rather coherent. On the contrary, the PS is much more divided on this issue. In the long term, the PS is cautiously supportive of Ankara's bid, but the cleavage between its members is more visible.¹²²

Christian Lequesne identifies three main reasons for the French political elite's negative attitude towards Turkish membership: cultural arguments, insufficient level of democracy in Turkey, and risk of dilution of the EU into a free-trade zone. Especially the third argument is not new, as it has been raised repeatedly in the context of the accession of the UK and of subsequent enlargements.¹²³ The arguments used by the French elite, such as the cohesion of Europe, dilution of the initial European project and European identity, are similar to other founding countries of the European Community.¹²⁴

In 2002 Giscard d'Estaing, at that time the President of the European Convention, sparked a polemic by saying that Turkey's capital was not in Europe, 95% of its population lived outside Europe, and that it was "not a European country". He stated that: "In my opinion, it would be the end of Europe", if Turkey was admitted into the EU, and that "The day after you open negotiations with Turkey, you would have a Moroccan demand (for membership of the Union,)".¹²⁵ He completely opposed the

¹²⁰ Monceau, N. French Perceptions, in *Turkey Watch EU Member States' Perceptions on Turkey's Accession to the EU*, eds. Aksit, S. et al. (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2009), 32-45, http://sinan.ces.metu.edu.tr/dosya/turkey_watch_en.pdf (retrieved 12.12.2011), 23.

¹²¹ Marcou, J., Les deux Europe Bruxelles à l'épreuve de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE : opinions et stratégies, *Politique européenne*, Volume 29 :3 (2009), 29, 30.

¹²² Monceau, French Perceptions, 23-29.

¹²³ Lequesne, *La France dans la Nouvelle Europe*, 92-95.

¹²⁴ Marcou, J., Les deux Europe Bruxelles à l'épreuve de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE , 31.

¹²⁵ Le Monde, Pour ou contre adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne, *Le Monde*, 8 November 2002, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2002/11/08/pour-ou-contre-l-adhesion-de-la-turquie-a-l-union-europeenne_297386_3210.html, (retrieved 17.11.2011).

Commission's supportive approach to Turkish membership and went so far as to qualify it as destruction planned by Member States hostile to the Europe of Jean Monnet.¹²⁶

Unlike d'Estaing, **Jacques Chirac** played a key role in supporting the Turkish appeal. His support was instrumental during the Helsinki European Summit of 1999, which granted Turkey the status of a candidate country.¹²⁷ He continued to approve of Turkish entry for several years thereafter. However, in attempting to disconnect the question of Turkish membership from the debate over the Constitutional Treaty, he decided to subject any EU enlargement posterior to 2007 to a referendum.¹²⁸ His promise was confirmed by an amendment to the French Constitution (revision of 28th February 2005).

In 2004, Chirac said that: "the destiny of Turkey was always connected with Europe. And this country was always connected" to Europe. Moreover, Turkey is today an important and loyal member of the Atlantic Alliance, it is a member of the Council of Europe, it is a member of the OECD and a lot of other organisations, particularly European". He further stressed that Turkey can serve as a role-model in its region and that it should not be denied entry on the basis of ethnic or religious arguments.¹²⁹

He also recalled the risk of Turkey swinging towards fundamentalism, should it be denied a European future and held that if a country can adhere to European values, it can become a member state of the EU.¹³⁰

Chirac's view was supported by Renaud Dutreil, the Civil Service Minister, who stated that "Turkey is bound to Europe by the whole of its history" and stressed that there was a strong alliance between France and the Sublime Porte.¹³¹

On the contrary, **Nicolas Sarkozy's** negative position towards Turkish membership is well known and unapologetic. In an interview with a French representative to the

¹²⁶ Marcou, *Les deux Europe Bruxelles à l'épreuve de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE*, 26.

¹²⁷ Monceau, *French Perceptions*, 25.

¹²⁸ Descheemaekere, *Les enjeux de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Europe*, 78.

¹²⁹ Jacques Chirac, *Conférence de presse de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur l'entrée de dix nouveaux membres dans l'UE, l'élection européenne du 13 juin, la réforme institutionnelle de l'UE...*, Vie Publique, (no date), <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/047000068.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹³⁰ Goulliaud, P., Jacques Chirac, the diehard defender of the Turkish cause.

¹³¹ Vie Publique, Interview de M. Renaud Dutreil, ministre de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'État.

Council of the EU¹³², working on the enlargement issue, it was noted, that Sarkozy repeatedly stressed that the whole process was based on the Negotiating Framework, according to which Turkey has to be “fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”.

In a famous debate with Segolene Royal in 2007, Sarkozy claimed that “those who are opponents of political Europe are supporting the enlargement of Europe without the end, because the enlargement without the end is preventing realisation of political Europe”. In this context Sarkozy stressed that it is necessary to tell Turkey: “You will be associated to Europe, we will establish a common market with you, but you will not be a member of the EU, because of a simple reason, that you are in Asia Minor.”¹³³ Thus, he claimed that the problem with Turkish accession is not that Turkey is a Muslim country, it is simply the fact that it does not lie in Europe.¹³⁴

Sarkozy returned to the issue of Turkish accession again in 2009, during his speech in Nimes. He started the electorate campaign for the European Parliament by saying that “Europe should not be constantly watered down by endless enlargements”, and repeated that Turkey “is not intended to become an EU member”. Yet, he stressed that Ankara should nevertheless be associated to the EU for economic and security considerations.¹³⁵

In 2007 France blocked opening the negotiating chapters concerning Economic and Monetary policy.¹³⁶ France vetoed talks in five areas, which it considered restricted only to countries that could attain full-membership. President Sarkozy argued that Ankara should have been offered a privileged partnership and therefore need not negotiate Economic and Monetary policy. Nicolas Sarkozy ceased calling for a privileged partnership in 2009, but the French veto has not been lifted.¹³⁷

¹³² Interview with a French Representative to the Council of the EU, It was conducted during my traineeship in the Council of the EU in April 2011.

¹³³ Marcou, Les deux Europe Bruxelles à l'épreuve de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE , 32.

¹³⁴ Stenotypie, L., La transcription exhaustive du débat, *Libération*, 2 mai 2007, <http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/010118726-la-transcription-exhaustive-du-debat> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹³⁵ Euroactiv, Sarkozy kicks off French EU elections campaign, *Euroactiv*, 8 mai 2009, <http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections/sarkozy-kicks-french-eu-elections-campaign/article-182104> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹³⁶ Marcou, Les deux Europe Bruxelles à l'épreuve de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE , 27

¹³⁷ Barysch, K., Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership? *Centre for European reform – Policy Paper*, January 2010, 3, <http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2010/can-turkey-combine-eu-accession-and-regional-leadership>, (retrieved 3.4.2012).

In an interview in December 2011, given just a few days after the Brussels Summit, referred to by the media as the “Do or Die Summit”, Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated his opposition to Turkish accession. He stated that Turkish membership would not ease the economic crisis and that the EU was designed for the European continent, while Turkey was in Asia Minor.¹³⁸

Another argument brought forth by French diplomacy focuses on the issue that Turkey would damage the EU and the value of its membership would not compensate for the costs. A “big and difficult country”, Turkey would only weaken the Union. According to the French representative to the Council of the EU¹³⁹ the EU cannot be even sure if Turkey is serious about its bid and if it really wants to be a member, especially because of the issue of sovereignty sharing. Generally, arguments against Turkish membership stress its size, its lagging economy, and the EU’s integration capacity..

In general, French **public opinion** demonstrates strong and stable opposition to Turkish membership in the EU. According to the latest data of the GMF’s Transatlantic Trends 2011 survey, opposition to Turkish membership reached 45 %, while 18% considered the country’s potential entry as positive (16% in 2010). Furthermore, 43% of citizens are persuaded that Turkey will eventually join the EU (38% in 2010).¹⁴⁰ (*Annex 1*) As far as issues French citizens consider central in the context of the enlargement process, the most important are freedom and democratic values, followed by economic issues, immigration and cultural and religious issues.¹⁴¹ (*Annex 2*)

¹³⁸ Le Monde, Nicolas Sarkozy – c’est une autre Europe qui est en train de naître, *Le Monde*, 12 December 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2011/12/12/nicolas-sarkozy-c-est-une-autre-europe-qui-est-en-train-de-naître_1617315_1471069.html (retrieved 3.4.2012).

¹³⁹ Interview with a French Representative to the Council of the EU.

¹⁴⁰ The German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends 2011 Topline Data July 2011*, The GMF (2011), http://www.gmfus.org/publications_/TT/TTS2011Toplines.pdf, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁴¹ Flash Eurobarometer 257 - Views on European Union Enlargement, European Commission, February 2009, 99, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_257_en.pdf, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

3.2. GERMANY

The analysed material

In the case of Germany, the concepts of Europe of three successive governments will be analysed, namely the coalition government of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Greens led by Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) and that of Angela Merkel (2005-2009 and 2009 until present), bearing in mind that Merkel represents two governments: the coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD and the coalition between CDU/CSU and Free Democratic Party (FDP).

Due to limited space, I will once again concentrate only on the top of the political elite; this time represented by the person of the Chancellor, assuming that he/she represents the position of the government and determines the direction of the German vision of Europe. However, as all governments were coalitions, I will also mention, if the position of a coalition partner differs from the main stream as expressed by the Chancellor. The material consists of the, speeches of the Chancellors, as well as Coalitions contracts.

3.2.1. Germany and the European integration

A. Knapp and Vincent Wright stress that “for Germany, the integration process has coincided with the progressive recovery of much of the sovereign status lost in 1945.”¹⁴² Often it is argued that as France searches in the European project for “reincarnation”, Germany finds “redemption”. This vision can be confirmed by the words of Angela Merkel, who claimed that “Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has a particular responsibility for our continent.”¹⁴³

The European policy of Germany has developed thought decades marked by consensus of the principal political parties, with the one exception of the first half of the 1950ies, as the principal political formations considered anchoring of the RFG in the community

¹⁴²Knapp and Wright, France and European Integration, 25.

¹⁴³Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe, Bruges, 2 November 2010, The Federal Chancellor,

of Western Europe as a gage of stability and prosperity. The policy of Germany within Europe is stable, as even the fall of the Berlin Wall and the national unification did not have to change its foundations.¹⁴⁴

In general, Germany advocates transporting on the European level parts of its institutional characteristics, such as the sharing of legislative power between the Council and the European Parliament, the development of political life in the European Parliament¹⁴⁵ or the notion of “Federal Europe”.

Public opinion shows, that in 2011, 42% of German respondents was persuaded that the things were going wrong in the EU (an increase of 9%) and the country was one of the ten Member States, where the distrust towards the EU exceeded the confidence, 55% against 35%.¹⁴⁶

3.2.2. Germany and the concept of Europe

Social and political values

Gerhard Schröder identifies Europe as a social, economic, cultural and political community. In his speech to the Bundestag in 2005 he described Europe as based on true respect for the basic principles of democracy and said that Europe is united on the grounds of peace, liberty, solidarity and prosperity.¹⁴⁷

“This is a Europe that, as a community of values, based on universal values and the inalienable human rights. It is a Europe that combines democracy, economic productivity and social solidarity to build a social model of its own.”¹⁴⁸

Schröder also stated that: “Europe is our raison d'être, the guarantee of a life in freedom and dignity”¹⁴⁹ and among European values and standards named also the

<http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2010/2010-11-02-merkel-bruegge.htm> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁴⁴ Wilkens, A., Allemagne, in *Dictionnaire critique de l'Union européenne*, eds. Anne Dulphy et al. (Paris : Armand Colin, 2008), 9-13.

¹⁴⁵ Lefebvre, M., L'Allemagne et l'Europe, *Revue internationale et stratégique*, Volume 74:2 (2009), 89.

¹⁴⁶ Eurobaromètre Standard 75, Printemps 2011, 46.

¹⁴⁷ Gerhard Schröder, Déclaration gouvernementale prononcée le 12 mai par Gerhard Schröder, devant le Bundestag au sujet de la Constitution européenne, AIDH <http://www.aidh.org/Europe/all-ce01.htm> (retrieved 2.5.2012).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

protection of minorities.¹⁵⁰ He identified peace and liberty as core values for Europe already in his previous statement when he defined as the priorities: “maintenance of peace, freedom, prosperity and our national and European identity”.¹⁵¹ Szymanski (2007) points out that Schröder and “the officials of the federal foreign ministry liked to invoke the concept of a “community of values” (*Wertegemeinschaft*) to describe Europe.¹⁵²

Merkel shares a similar vision cornering values defining Europe as Schröder, as she puts it:

“Today we are in a European Union that shares values, which has 500million citizens, and faces the new emerging powers.”¹⁵³

Merkel in the Bundestag in May 2006 posed the following question: “How can we defend our values if we cannot define them first?”¹⁵⁴ At the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 2007, Merkel stated that the essence of the European identity is its values:

“In such a world we must ask ever anew what holds Europe together also in this century, what the essence of its identity is. For me the answer is clear. The sources of Europe’s identity are our shared, fundamental values. They are what hold Europe together. Let us not forget: For centuries Europe had been an idea, no more than a hope of peace and understanding. Today we, the citizens of Europe, know that hope has been fulfilled.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Gerhard Schröder, Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2 December 2005, <http://www.druckversion.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Speech%20Ch%20Schroeder%2041th%20Munich%20Conference.pdf> (retrieved 4.5.2012).

¹⁵¹ Gerhard Schröder, Discours de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder, Chancelier de la République fédérale d’Allemagne, devant l’Assemblée Nationale, France-Allemagne, 30 November 1999, <http://www.france-allemande.fr/Discours-de-Monsieur-Gerhard,027.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁵² Szymanski, A., Germany and the question of Turkey’s membership in the European Union, *PISM Research Papers*, Volume 4 (2007), 33, Central and Eastern European Online Library, www.ceeol.col (retrieved 4.4.2012).

¹⁵³ Conférence De Presse Franco-Allemande Conference De Presse Conjointe De M. Le Président De La République Et De Mme Angela Merkel Chancelière De La République Fédérale D’allemagne, Elysee, 16 August 2011, <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/conferences-de-presse/2011/conference-de-presse-franco-allemande.11870.html> (retrieved 10.5.2012).

¹⁵⁴ Comelli, M., Greco E., Tocci, N., *From boundary to borderland: Transforming the meaning of borders in Europe through the European neighborhood policy* (Istituto Affari internazionali), 4, http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDFile/iai0606.PDF?Archive=191355791953&File=iai0606_PDF (retrieved 10.5.2012).

¹⁵⁵ Angela Merkel, Speech by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, Stajano, 25 March 2007, <http://stajano.deis.unibo.it/UP2006/2.FromTreaty/AngelaMerkel50th.pdf> (retrieved 10.5.2012).

As one of the greatest qualities defining Europe she names tolerance, and adds that “this dream could come true because we citizens of Europe have learned over the past 50 years to make the most of our identities and diverse traditions, the lively variety of our languages, cultures and regions.” Merkel also added that the greatest strength of Europe is “the power of freedom”.¹⁵⁶ She stressed the importance of freedom also in her speech to the US Congress in 2009, while saying that “freedom is the very essence of our economy and society”.¹⁵⁷

In general, Merkel says: “This European Union is founded on values: freedom, responsibility and the dignity of the individual” and stresses that it is the task of the EU to “advocate for these values in a world in which not everyone is beholden to them”.¹⁵⁸

On the meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 2008 Merkel said that European values include democracy, the rule of law, liberty, diversity, tolerance, justice and human dignity. She further stressed, that “it was only possible for Europe to emerge at all on the basis of these shared values”.¹⁵⁹ An interesting observation is that in this context Merkel does not distinguish between the values of the EU and Europe in a broader sense and identifies them similarly.

In Merkel’s concept of Europe, “values and interests belong together” and “anyone who regards them as incompatible is already on a slippery slope”.¹⁶⁰ The Coalition contract from 2009 states that: “Only with a unified Europe can we successfully represent our values and interests in the world.”

The importance of values is stressed also by the pledge in the Coalition contract from 2009 that the CFSC should consist of “close co-operation and joint action within the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel before the United States Congress, The Federal Chancellor, 3 November 2009, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2009/2009-11-03-merkel-usa-kongress.html?nn=77278> (retrieved 11.5.2012).

¹⁵⁸ Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe.

¹⁵⁹ Council of Europe is the custodian of our common values, The Federal Chancellor, 15 April 2008, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/be-merkel-europarat.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

¹⁶⁰ Angela Merkel, The secret of freedom is courage, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the M100 Sanssouci Colloquium in Potsdam, The Federal Chancellor, 8 September 2010,

western community of values, i.e., the enlightened, liberal democracies in this world.” In her speech in Bruges in 2010, Merkel repeatedly stressed the importance of freedom and democracy as the core values of Europe.¹⁶¹

To sum up, both Schröder and Merkel advocate that Europe is based on social and political values, such as democracy, peace, freedom, human rights, tolerance, responsibility and the dignity of the individual.

Geography

For Gerhard Schröder Europe was a “community, which wants, in full consciousness, to be more than a purely geographical entity.”¹⁶² Therefore, it is clear that Schröder’s concept of Europe is not based on geography and that he considered other things as determining Europe.

A different view can be observed in the approach of Angela Merkel who in 2006 claimed that:

“an entity that does not have borders cannot act coherently and with adequate structures. We must be aware of this and must therefore set out these borders (...). How can we defend our values if we cannot define them first?”¹⁶³

A statement, which goes much in line with M. Lefebvre’s assumption, that Europe is for Germany mainly geography.¹⁶⁴ In the context of the last Finish and German Presidencies of the EU, a rift could have been observed between the two states on EU enlargement, when Merkel called for clear borders for Europe,¹⁶⁵ a pledge she re-

<http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2010/2010-09-08-bkin-potsdam-en.html?nn=77278> (retrieved 4.5. 2012).

¹⁶¹ Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe.

¹⁶² Gerhard Schröder, Déclaration gouvernementale prononcée le 12 mai par Gerhard Schröder, devant le Bundestag au sujet de la Constitution européenne.

¹⁶³ Comelli, Greco, Tocci, *From boundary to borderland*, 6.

¹⁶⁴ Lefebvre, M., L'Allemagne et l'Europe, *Revue internationale et stratégique*, Volume 74 :2 (2009), 88.

¹⁶⁵ EU Observer: Merkel plays down hopes of EU constitution revival, *EU Observer*, 10 Mai 2006, <http://euobserver.com/18/21556> (retrieved 4.5.2012).

initiated in October 2006.¹⁶⁶ After all, already the Coalition contract from 2005 stated that the EU should agree on “limits of the enlarged European Union”.¹⁶⁷

In 2009, on a meeting before the European Parliamentary elections Merkel said that “We have to talk about the borders of this Europe”, a statement, which was immediately seconded by Nicolas Sarkozy.¹⁶⁸

The Coalition contract from 2009¹⁶⁹ stresses that the “West must move closer together to pursue its interests and preserve its common values”, which can be in a way also interpreted as stressing the importance of geography, though this time in a larger sense.

Therefore, it can be said that while geography played no or only limited role in the concept of Europe of Schröder, it is very important for Angela Merkel and her concept of Europe.

History

Schröder said that from a historical perspective, the Constitution is based on Europe drawing its “lessons from the painful history of the 20th century”.¹⁷⁰ In his speeches he often stresses the memories of the Second World War. Schröder also repeatedly stressed the importance of the French-German cooperation in the construction of Europe, while saying that: “Shared understanding of our history has made possible the reconciliation, peace and friendship.”¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ DW, Merkel: EU's Door Closing for Near Future, *DW*, 7 October 2006, <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,2197917,00.html> (retrieved 10.5.2012).

¹⁶⁷ Working together for Germany – With courage and compassion, Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD, 11 November 2005, http://archive.org/stream/WorkingTogetherForGermanyWithCourageAndCompassion/Koalitionsvertrag2005_engl#page/n0/mode/2up (retrieved 4.5.2012).

¹⁶⁸ Hurriyet Daily News, German, French leaders emphasize opposition to Turkey joining EU, *Hurriyet Daily News* (no date), <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/11621541.asp>, (retrieved 10.5.2012).

¹⁶⁹ Growth, Education, Unity – The Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP for the 17th legislative period, Berlin, 26 October 2009, <http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/091215-koalitionsvertrag-2009-2013-englisch.pdf> (retrieved 12.4.2012).

¹⁷⁰ Gerhard Schröder, Déclaration gouvernementale prononcée le 12 mai par Gerhard Schröder, devant le Bundestag au sujet de la Constitution européenne.

¹⁷¹ Gerhard Schröder, Gerhard Schröder, son partenaire. Français de cœur et d'esprit, c'est un partenaire sûr et fiable. Le chancelier social démocrate Gerhard Schröder rend hommage à son ami français, *Libération*, 21 April 2005, <http://www.liberation.fr/hors-serie/0101525661-gerhard-schroder-son-partenaire-francais-de-coeur-et-d-esprit-c-est-un-partenaire-sur-et-fiable-le-chancelier-social-democrate-gerhard-schroder-rend-hommage-a-son-ami-francais> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

He is not using the concept of common history as something excluding the others and his regular commemorating of the perils of the Second World War is not at all surprising and it might be even expected from a German Chancellor.

Schröder was not avoiding mentioning the ancient history, such as Carolingian Europe, but he used it in the context of current European project:

“Initially, there was the Carolingian Europe. Then, the European Community and later the European Union (...)”¹⁷²

With the change of government in 2005, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany came to power. Some representatives of the CDU share the opinion expressed by F. Pflüger that political values such as democracy, human rights are not enough to define the European identity and that the political union needs a “we-feeling”, connected with a centuries old-history: “Greek antiquity, Roman law, the conflict between the Pope and the German Kaiser in the Middle Ages, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, all these that give Europe its specific character”.¹⁷³ This approach is in line with M. Lefebvre, who argues that for Germany an important role in defining Europe is played by the common history, originating from the Kingdom of the Franks and more largely by the geographical spreading of the Gothic Art.¹⁷⁴

This culturalist vision might be shared by many. However, Merkel in her speeches rather concentrates on the common history in a similar way as Schröder. She often mentions European history, she recalls the division of Germany, the Berlin Wall and its fall, e.g. in her speech at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome¹⁷⁵, on the occasion of opening of the academic year at College of Europe in Bruges, or in the US Congress¹⁷⁶, but not in an excluding way.

¹⁷² Gerhard Schröder, Discours de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder, Chancelier de la République fédérale d’Allemagne, devant l’Assemblée Nationale.

¹⁷³ Yilmaz, H., Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Volume 9:3 (2007), 297.

¹⁷⁴ Lefebvre, L’Allemagne et l’Europe, 88.

¹⁷⁵ Angela Merkel, Speech by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome.

¹⁷⁶ Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel before the United States Congress.

“We persecuted and destroyed one another. We ravaged our homeland. We jeopardized the things we revered. Not even one generation has passed since the worst period of hate, devastation and destruction.”¹⁷⁷

To sum up, we can observe that neither Schröder nor Merkel use the common history as a crucial part of their concepts of Europe, even if both of them often mention a common past, they do so mainly in the context of common values, such as democracy, freedom and tolerance.

Religion

In Germany religion stays in the public life. It is significant that during the RFG the Chancellery was held by the CDU for 45 years out of 60.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, relations between Germany and the Holy See were probably influenced by the election of a German Pope.

Schröder did not use the notion of religion in his concept of Europe and his approach resembles the approach of Jacques Chirac. In a speech on 13 April 2000 Ludger Volmer, Minister of State in the Auswärtiges Amt said: “When we speak of a community of values we do not mean a religious community, which the Union has never been.”¹⁷⁹

On the contrary, Merkel’s position on religion as a defining concept of Europe is completely different. Merkel was not against the inclusion of the Christian origins to the Preamble of the European Constitution and was criticised by the German media for promising to the Pope that she would try to include a reference to them.¹⁸⁰ Merkel also said that Europe requires shared values and that: “the question of basic values in the European Union is an important issue for the Holy Father, just as it is for me” and

¹⁷⁷ Angela Merkel, Speech by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome.

¹⁷⁸ Lefebvre, *L’Allemagne et l’Europe*, 88.

¹⁷⁹ Szymanski, Germany and the question of Turkey’s membership in the European Union, 33.

¹⁸⁰ BBC News, European press review, *BBC News*, 12 September, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5337166.stm> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

stressed the need to express “our identity” as a Christian one in the dialogue of civilizations.¹⁸¹

At a press conference in 2007, Merkel noted that ‘the Judeo-Christian values . . . sustain the EU’ and that ‘we are marked by this Judeo-Christian past’ and in an interview with the news weekly *Focus*, she said that as to the Europe’s common Christian values ‘No one doubts that they significantly shape our life, our society. I wonder, can we maintain the formative aspects of Christianity for day-to-day politics if the political sphere does not stand by them?’¹⁸²

Therefore, we can conclude that while religion did not play a role in the concept of Europe for Schröder, it represent an important part of Merkel’s definition of Europe.

Economic potential

Schröder stated that Europe wants to be more than “an internal market or a free trade zone”.¹⁸³ He also stressed that the success of the EC and the EU is not measured only by the economic numbers.¹⁸⁴

Merkel advocates a similar vision:

“Let us not forget: For centuries Europe had been an idea, no more than a hope of peace and understanding. Today we, the citizens of Europe, know that hope has been fulfilled. It has been fulfilled because the founding fathers of Europe were thinking in terms well beyond their own generation. They were thinking in terms well beyond their own time. They were thinking in terms also well beyond purely economic freedoms.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹Chancellor Merkel met with Pope Benedict XVI, The Federal Chancellor 9 September 2006, <http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/it-merkel-beim-papst-deutschland-freut-sich-auf.html> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

¹⁸² Yilmaz, H., Turkish identity on the road to the EU, 298.

¹⁸³ Gerhard Schröder, Déclaration gouvernementale prononcée le 12 mai par Gerhard Schröder, devant le Bundestag au sujet de la Constitution européenne.

¹⁸⁴ Gerhard Schröder, Discours de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder, Chancelier de la République fédérale d’Allemagne, devant l’Assemblée Nationale.

¹⁸⁵ Angela Merkel, Speech by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome.

On another occasion, Merkel stressed that the importance of "A question of our values, whether we give commercial interests precedence over human rights", while adding that in economic relations too, fundamental rights must always be respected.¹⁸⁶

It can still be argued, that even if the economic potential is important for Germany, it is not the defining notion of the concept of Europe neither for Schröder nor for Merkel.

The German concept of Europe in time

To sum up this chapter, we can claim that the German concept of Europe has changed with the changes of the government. For Schröder the question of defining Europe lies primarily within shared social and political values and his government invoked Europe as a "community of values" (*Wertegemeinschaft*). He uses the notion of common history mainly in the context of values such as democracy and freedom. Religion and geography plays no role in his approach and even if he certainly attaches importance on economic interdependence, by no means does he consider it as the main variable of the concept of Europe. Therefore, it can be concluded that the approach of Schröder towards Europe is based on social and political values.

On the contrary, Angel Merkel stresses not only social and political values, but also the aspects of geography and religion. The latter might be put into the context of her statement that "multiculturalism has failed"¹⁸⁷.

Surprisingly, there is no difference in the concept of Europe of the first and second government led by Angela Merkel, which might have occurred, as they partly consist of different political parties. It is true that since the start of the European crises, Merkel speaks more about economic issues; however, she does not use economic interconnection as a defining element of her concept of Europe. Three explanations present themselves: firstly, Merkel defined the main elements of her concept of Europe already during her first Chancellery and there was no necessity to change it. Secondly, the concept of Europe and the question on what it should be based became less relevant as more urgent issues such as the European financial crises are at hand. Thirdly, even if

¹⁸⁶Council of Europe is the custodian of our common values, The Federal Chancellor.

¹⁸⁷ Müftüleri-Baç, M., The European Union and Turkey Democracy, Multiculturalism and European Identity, 1.

different concepts of Europe do exist within the coalitions, they are not echoed by the Chancellery.

Germany undertook a similar development in the definition of its concept of Europe as France, when concepts based on social and political values were completed with aspects of geography and religion.

3.2.3. Germany and previous enlargements

It is without doubt that Germany was the keenest and the most influential supporter of the Eastern enlargement. As M. Zaborowski says the support can be explained through several reasons varying from egoistic self-interest to a notion of “civilian power”. An important role was also played by the experience of Franco-West German reconciliation. It was Germany and the UK which supported a clause in the so-called “Europe Agreement” with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, recognizing the desire of these countries to join the EC. Germany also supported the establishing of the Copenhagen Criteria, “leading to the prospect of Eastern enlargement becoming official EU policy.”¹⁸⁸

3.2.4. Germany and Turkish Membership in the EU

Germany and Turkey have special historic, economic and cultural relations. They date back to the Ottoman Empire and there is also a large Turkish population living in Germany,¹⁸⁹ which is the reason why Turkey in Germany is not considered as a matter of foreign policy, but as an “issue of the domestic policy”. Currently there are 3.5 million Turkish citizens living in Germany and it is the biggest foreign community within the country.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, it is important to realize that talking about Turkey is talking about genuine domestic issues, such as migration and Islam.

¹⁸⁸ Zaborowski, M., More than simply expanding markets: Germany and EU enlargement, in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, ed. Sjursen, H. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 104, 105.

¹⁸⁹ Cautres, B., Monceau, N., *La Turquie en Europe. L'opinion des Européens et les Turcs*, 95

¹⁹⁰ Interview with a German Representative to the Council of the EU. It was conducted during my traineeship in the Council of the EU in April 2011.

Schröder's reasoning concerning Turkey went in the direction of the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria while emphasising rights and freedoms. Szymanski explains that "this was chiefly due to the ruling parties' left-wing convictions which entailed stressing the secular character of the Union and the primacy of the Enlightenment heritage in Europe". However, Schröder's government did not avoid referring to Turkey as to a Muslim country, simply it did not use it as an obstacle for the integration to the EU, but as an argument supporting it.¹⁹¹

Other factors marking Schröder's positive stance towards Turkish accession include the fact, that most Turks living in Germany vote for the SPD¹⁹² and also that the post of the Commissioner for Enlargement was held by an SPD politician, Günther Verheugen. Arguments used in support of Turkish membership bid stressed the strategic significance of Turkey, the consolidation of democracy in Turkey and its positive influence on the region and „economic benefits to Germany (on account of the extensiveness of German-Turkish business dealings) and to the Union as a whole (in the energy sector, for instance)“.¹⁹³ The Chancellor stated that: "As Europe's biggest economy and Turkey's largest trading partner, Germany stands to profit from Turkish accession."¹⁹⁴

The position of the government formed in 2005, led by **Angela Merkel** and composed of the CDU/CSU and the SPD concerning Turkish membership was expressed in the Coalition contract as follows:

“Germany has a particular interest in a deepening of mutual relations with Turkey and in binding the country to the European Union. The negotiations launched on 3 October 2005 with the aim of accession are open-ended processes which does not imply any automaticity and whose outcome cannot be guaranteed at the outset. This poses a particular economic, demographic and cultural challenge.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ Szymanski, Germany and the question of Turkey's membership in the European Union, 31.

¹⁹² Turkish Weekly, Turks in Germany, *Turkish Weekly* (no date), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/146/turks-in-germany.html> (retrieved 14.4.2012).

¹⁹³ Szymanski, Germany and the question of Turkey's membership in the European Union, 31-32.

¹⁹⁴ Turkish Weekly, Blair: A stable, democratic Turkey would be a huge benefit for Europe, *Turkish Weekly* (no date), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96/blair-a-stable-democratic-turkey-would-be-a-huge-benefit-for-europe.html> (retrieved 14.2.2012).

¹⁹⁵ Working together for Germany – With courage and compassion, Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD, 11 November 2005.

The Coalition contract also stressed the absorption capacity of the EU and adds that under the condition that “the EU has not the capacity to absorb Turkey” or if Turkey cannot meet completely the commitments of the membership, it has to be “linked to the European structures as closely as possible and in a way that further develop its privileged relations with the EU”. The Coalition contract includes two main institutional arguments against Turkish membership, “the question of the EU’s internal structures as well as that of the Turkish political system.”¹⁹⁶

In other words, it means a support for a “privileged partnership” and a complete change of position in comparison to Schroder’s government.

In 2006, Merkel reaffirmed the preference of the CDU for a privileged partnership. However, she added that “If a previous government and the EU decided to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey, then it is our duty to follow through on that.”¹⁹⁷ In 2009, before the elections to the European Parliament, Merkel stated that “It is right that we say to people in the European election campaign ... our common position is: a privileged partnership for Turkey, but no full membership”¹⁹⁸. Her approach was similar to Sarkozy’s, who also re-initiated the question of Turkish accession during the campaign before the election. The Coalition contract from 2009 basically restated the same position to Turkey as its predecessor in 2005.

The approach of Merkel and the CDU can be probably best illustrated by her statement from 2004, when she claimed that Turkey constitutes an asset as a “bridge” between Europe and the East and added that “a bridge ... should never belong totally to one side. Turkey can fulfil its function as a bridge between Asia and Europe much better if it does

¹⁹⁶ Bottger, K., Maggi, E.M. German Perceptions, in *Turkey Watch EU Member States’ Perceptions on Turkey’s Accession to the EU*, eds. Aksit, S. et al. (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2009), 37, http://sinan.ces.metu.edu.tr/dosya/turkey_watch_en.pdf (retrieved 12.12.2011).

¹⁹⁷ Outcome of negotiations on Turkey’s accession to EU uncertain, The Federal Chancellor, 6 October 2006, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/tr-eu-beitrittsverhandlungen-mit-tuerkei-ergebnisoffen.html> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

¹⁹⁸ Hurriyet Daily News, German, French leaders emphasize opposition to Turkey joining EU, *Hurriyet Daily News* (no date), <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/11621541.asp> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

not become a member of the EU.”¹⁹⁹ In general, arguments used by the CDU against Turkish membership include especially “EU-internal and identity reasons”.²⁰⁰

Both coalitions led by Merkel included parties which were in favour of Turkish membership, first the coalition with the SPD and the second with the FDP,²⁰¹ The SPD has especially stressed the fact that membership in the EU can stabilize democracy in Turkey.²⁰²

In general, German **public opinion** is rather hostile towards Turkish membership in the EU. According to the latest data of the GMF survey Transatlantic Trends 2011, the idea that Turkish membership would be a bad thing reached 40 %, while 21% considered potential membership of Turkey as positive (16% in 2010).²⁰³ (*Annex 1*) In regard to issues, which German citizens in general consider as key in the context of the enlargement process, the most important are freedom and democratic values, followed by economic issues and immigration.²⁰⁴ (*Annex 2*)

3.3. THE UNITED KINGDOM

The analysed material

In the case of the UK, the concept of Europe of three successive governments will be analysed: the Labour governments of Tony Blair (2001-2004, 2005-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010), and the Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition led by David Cameron, on the basis of various speeches and government documents. Due to limited space, I will once again concentrate only on the chosen timeframe of this work (2004-2012) and on the political elite, this time represented by the person of the Prime Minister. The assumption is that he represents the position of the government and

¹⁹⁹Tocci, N. Elite Opinion Dimension: Behind the Scenes of Turkey’s Protracted Accession Process: European Elites Debates, in *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story*, Cakir, E. A. (London: Routledge, 2011), 87.

²⁰⁰ Bottger and Maggi, German Perceptions, 36.

²⁰¹ Cautres and Monceau, *La Turquie en Europe*, 97.

²⁰² Bottger and Maggi, German Perceptions, 36.

²⁰³ The German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends 2011 Topline Data July 2011*.

²⁰⁴ Flash Eurobarometer 257 - Views on European Union Enlargement, 99.

determines the UK's vision of and approach towards Europe. The analysed material consists of speeches of the Prime Ministers and several governments' documents.

3.3.1. The UK and the European Integration

The UK is often seen as a “difficult partner”, supporting integration in certain areas, but rejecting it in others.²⁰⁵ According to S. Kahn (2007), the British approach towards Europe is influenced by two specificities of its political culture: the priority given to individual rights on one hand, and the UK's special relationship with the United States of America, on the other. .²⁰⁶ It can be argued that for the UK the biggest cost of Europe is the “affront that it represents to a long-standing tradition of national sovereignty reinforced by great power status”.²⁰⁷

Public **opinion** in the UK is generally Euro-sceptic. In 2011 Eurobarometer, 49% of respondents were persuaded that things in the EU were heading in the wrong direction. The UK was among the ten countries with highest levels of distrust, with 63% of people sceptical of the EU (against 24% approving of it).²⁰⁸ In 2011, 35% of respondents believed that the accession of UK was beneficial, marking.²⁰⁹

3.3.2. The UK and the concept of Europe

Social and political values

The British approach towards Europe is often represented by current historiography as one of “calculating-pragmatism” and “half-hearted realism”, but by all accounts it is far from “value-free”.²¹⁰

In his statement to the European Parliament in 2005, Tony Blair said this of the EU:

²⁰⁵ Parr, H., Grande-Bretagne, in *Dictionnaire critique de l'Union européenne*, eds. Anne Dulphy et al. (Paris : Armand Colin, 2008), 204.

²⁰⁶ Kahn, S., *Géopolitique de l'Union européenne* (Paris : Armand Colin, 2007), 43.

²⁰⁷ Knapp and Wright, France and European Integration, 25.

²⁰⁸ Eurobaromètre Standard 75, Printemps 2011, 32, 46.

²⁰⁹ Eurobaromètre Standard 75, Printemps 2011 , 36.

²¹⁰ Ludlow, P., Europe in British Political Discourse, in *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations*, eds. Malmberg, M., Stråth, B. (Oxford: Berg, 2002),, 122

“This is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens. I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market.”²¹¹

His statement certainly reflects a pro-European stance and it can be argued that it does not differ from some statements by his French and German counterparts. He defines the EU as a union based on values and solidarity beyond just a common market. Blair’s words can be put into the context of his pamphlet “A Global Alliance for Global Values”²¹², published in 2006, which elaborates on the doctrine of value-based intervention.

Social and political values are also present in Gordon Brown’s speech to the European Parliament in March 2007; he based Europe on “peace and unity” and ranked it “among the finest of human achievements and which is today a beacon of hope for the whole world”.²¹³ Brown’s pamphlet “Global Europe - Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges” argued that peace, freedom and democracy are shared European values.²¹⁴

In turn, David Cameron’s approach is also evident a statement he made: “Europe is defined not by religion, but by values.”²¹⁵

Therefore, it can be argued that the notion of values as defining Europe is appears again and again in the discourses of all three Prime Ministers. However, social and political values are not mentioned as often as in the cases of France and Germany.

²¹¹ BBC News, Full text: Blair's European speech, *BBC News*, 23 June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4122288.stm (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²¹² Blair, T., *A Global Alliance for Global Values* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/798.pdf> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²¹³ Gordon Brown, EU must take the lead in reforming global financial institutions, European Parliament, 24 March 2009, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20090323IPR52329+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²¹⁴ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Global Europe: Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges* (Cabinet Office, October 2007), 3, 17, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf17/fco_beu_doc_globaleurope71022, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Geography

In the UK, geography and borders are not used in defining the concept of Europe. The approach is expressed in a report entitled *The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?* by the House of Lords, which claims that: “for the EU to try and define its external borders was neither feasible nor desirable.” The idea is that an attempt by the EU to “draw a final boundary around its territory which excluded European countries would not be consistent with the Treaty.”²¹⁶

Religion

Religion is not generally used as an idea shaping the concept of Europe by any of the three Prime Ministers. This notion that religion is not a determining factor can be illustrated through a statement by David Cameron from 2010, in which he claims that Islam shares values with other religions, such as Christianity and Judaism, and that all of them can peacefully coexist:

“the values of real Islam are not incompatible with the values of Europe, that Europe is defined not by religion, but by values. The EU is a secular organisation. And Europe welcomes people of all faiths, or none.”²¹⁷

History

Unlike geography and religion, European history has been used in Blair’s discourse, especially the end of the Second World War, as evident in his speech to the European Parliament in 2005: “When the war ended, Europe was in ruins. Today the EU stands as a monument to political achievement. Almost 50 years of peace, 50 years of prosperity, 50 years of progress. Think of it and be grateful.”²¹⁸ In his speech to the European Parliament, Gordon Brown also stressed the lessons Europe learnt from its history²¹⁹

²¹⁵ David Cameron, PM’s speech in Turkey, Number 10 Downing Street, 27 July 2010, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-in-turkey/>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²¹⁶ House of Lords - European Union Committee, *The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?*, House of Lords (London : The Stationery Office Limited, 2006), 71, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/273/273.pdf> (retrieved 17.3.2012).

²¹⁷ David Cameron, PM’s speech in Turkey.

²¹⁸ BBC News, Full text: Blair’s European speech.

²¹⁹ Watt, N., Gordon Brown urges EU not to retreat into protectionism, *The Guardian*, 24 March 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/24/gordon-brown-eu-strasbourg-protectionism>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

The notion of Europeans' common history can be also found in discourse of David Cameron:

“The experiences of the Second World War gave birth to the European Union we have today. But for me, 1989 is the key date – when Europe tore down the Iron Curtain and came together as democratic nations working together across our continent.”²²⁰

However, the theme of a shared European history does not appear to fundamentally define the concept of Europe for any of the three Prime Ministers.

Economic potential

The economy of the EU and its potential to generate economic growth have always played an important role in the way the Union is seen and defined in the UK. Yet, Tony Blair emphasized that:

“There is not some division between the Europe necessary to succeed economically and social Europe. Political Europe and economic Europe do not live in separate rooms. The purpose of social Europe and economic Europe should be to sustain each other.”²²¹

He does not question the importance of economic Europe. In one of his previous speeches, Blair said the number one reason why Britain must be at the centre of Europe is that by 2004, Europe will be “the largest economy in the world”.²²² Blair's approach towards Europe was the object of criticism by Schröder, who accused him of wanting a “big free-trade union” and a reversal from “the European Union back to the European Economic Community”.²²³ Even if this statement was exaggerated, it indirectly reflects the importance which the UK is according to the economic dimension of the EU.

The economic concept of Europe is important to Gordon Brown as well. He believes that Europe's unique position in the globalized economy is due to the fact that it has achieved “the greatest and biggest single market in the world.”²²⁴ According to Brown, the EU should be committed “to free trade and openness, with the EU leading by

²²⁰ Prime Minister's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, Number 10 Downing Street, 14 November 2011, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/lord-mayors-banquet/> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²²¹ BBC News, Full text: Blair's European speech.

²²² Geddes, A., *The European Union and the British Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 91.

²²³ Deutsche Welle, Blair Under Fire as EU Presidency Looms, *Deutsche Welle*, <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,1624076,00.html>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²²⁴ Deutsche Welle, Blair Under Fire as EU Presidency Looms.

example in breaking down barriers to create a free and fair multilateral trading system, and developing further its partnerships with the US and major emerging economies to foster economic cooperation and free trade. Brown's pamphlet "Global Europe - Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges" argued that the objectives of the EU are openness, fairness and the importance of cooperation between nations."²²⁵ In other words, Brown was proposing a union that would act on the "economic, security and environmental imperatives of globalisation."²²⁶

In a speech in 2010, David Cameron qualified the large trading block, and the large single market as the biggest benefit of the EU. He added that the UK is:

"full members of the European Union. There is one part of it where we have stayed out. That is the European single currency, the euro. I think that is absolutely right we are outside the euro, because it is very important for a large economy like ours to be able to set its own interest rates, to fix those interest rates for the conditions that suit us here in the UK."²²⁷

This statement clearly illustrates the preference given by the Prime Minister to the concept of the EU as a large trading area but stresses the importance the UK places on the necessity to manage its own economic affairs in certain domains.

On a different occasion, Cameron stated that "Every generation has to make the argument for free trade all over again and this generation will be no different".²²⁸ The importance the UK accords to their own economic issues can be illustrated also in their approach towards the City of London in the context of fiscal harmonisation.

To conclude, the concept of Europe in the UK stresses the importance of the European economy and its trade-generating potential. Europe is seen as the "greatest and biggest single market in the world" and its biggest added value is "having a large trading block, a large single market". Not even Blair, who supported a social Europe alongside an economic one, doubted the importance of the European economy and the benefits that it brings to the UK.

²²⁵ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Global Europe: Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges*, 3-4.

²²⁶ Korski, D., Two cheers for Gordon Brown's speech, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 13 November 2007, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/two_cheers_for_gordon_brown_speech, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²²⁷ David Cameron, PM Direct in Manchester, Number 10 Downing Street, 10 August 2010, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-direct-in-manchester-3/>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²²⁸ David Cameron, PM's speech in Turkey.

The concept of Europe in the UK over time

To sum up, it is surprising that perceptions of Europe of the analysed three governments are so similar, as they represented different political parties. The UK's approach is obviously not value-free, because values such as democracy and peace play a significant role in the UK's vision of Europe. However, the fact that the importance of the single market is stressed repeatedly leads us to conclude that the economic conception of the EU takes centre stage in the English perspective.

3.3.3. The UK and previous enlargements

The UK has always been supportive of European enlargements, so that a strong opposition from the governing elite or the public has traditionally not materialized.²²⁹ As David Lidington, Minister for Europe, recalled in 2011 in Vienna:

“British support for enlargement goes back a long way. Margaret Thatcher is not normally thought of as an enthusiastic European. But in her famous Bruges speech she declared at a time when it was is not fashionable, nor even believable, that it was important for all to remember that Prague, and Warsaw and Budapest were also great European cities”.²³⁰

3.3.4. The UK and Turkish membership in the EU

The UK's favourable position towards Turkish membership is well known; on the conditions that Turkey meets EU requirements and continues the necessary reforms. It is indicative that the EU started the negotiations on Turkish accession during the UK presidency. Within Britain, there exists cross-party consensus on this issue.

In 2005, **Tony Blair** said that he “sincerely believe that EU membership is Turkey's future” and that he would work hard to help Turkey meet its bid. He also added that “Europe will benefit from opening up, not from being introverted.”²³¹ The arguments for support consist of such issues as bringing stability and security to the region. Blair

²²⁹ Cautres and Monceau, *La Turquie en Europe*, 102.

²³⁰ David Lidington, EU enlargement – a UK perspective, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 15 February 2011, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=551925482>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²³¹ Oliver, M., Turkey's future lies in EU, says Blair, *The Guardian*, 30 September 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/30/eu.politics> (retrieved 17.3.2012).

also stressed that “there is no contradiction between Islam, democracy and prosperity” and dismissed concerns about the capacity of the EU to integrate Turkey as groundless.²³² Furthermore, in a report entitled *The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?*, the House of Lords affirmed the “strategic importance of Turkish accession for the long-term development of the wider Europe” and dismissed the debate about absorption capacity as “harmful”.²³³

The supportive stance on Turkey did not change when the Prime Minister was replaced. In fact, **Gordon Brown** repeatedly confirmed his support of Turkish membership. The importance given to Turkish accession by Brown’s government can be illustrated with a statement by J. Murphy, Minister for Europe, in 2008, that it represents an issue:”of the same importance for the EU and the Islam world as the accession of the countries of the central and Eastern Europe for closing of the page after the Cold War.”²³⁴

Current Prime Minister **David Cameron** is equally supportive of Turkey’s EU ambitions. During his visit to the country in 2010, Cameron stated that Turkey can become a "great European power" that can help build links with the Middle East.²³⁵ “He also stressed that Turkey is vital for the European economy, as well as for security concerns, politics and diplomacy, and that it is “Europe’s BRIC”²³⁶, offering a huge economic potential.

Overall, his reasoning is much like that of his predecessors and covers three areas. Firstly, he offers economic arguments: Cameron said that “it makes sense to include this fast-growing, very enterprising economy” into the single market. Turkish membership would lead to increase of trade flows, jobs, investment and wealth, and would bring economic benefits. Secondly, as Turkey is already a member of NATO, its entrance into the EU would mean further development of the security of Europe. Thirdly, Europe should make sure that Turkey stays on the right path towards democratisation and reform.²³⁷

²³² Turkish Weekly, Blair: A stable, democratic Turkey would be a huge benefit for Europe, *Turkish Weekly*, 16 October 2004, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96/blair-a-stable-democratic-turkey-would-be-a-huge-benefit-for-europe.html>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²³³ House of Lords - European Union Committee, *The Further Enlargement of the EU*, 71

²³⁴ Cautres and Monceau, *La Turquie en Europe*, 101

²³⁵ BBC News, Cameron 'anger' at slow pace of Turkish EU negotiations, *BBC News*, 27 July 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10767768>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

²³⁶ David Cameron, PM's speech in Turkey.

²³⁷ David Cameron, PM Direct in Manchester.

The position of the successive UK governments can best be illustrated by the following statements by David Cameron:

“Do you know who said this? ‘Here is a country which is not European, its history, its geography, its economy, its agriculture and the character of its people – admirable people though they are – all point in a different direction. This is a country which cannot, despite what it claims and perhaps even what it believes, be a full member.’”²³⁸

Now, that might sound like some Europeans describing Turkey. Actually it was General de Gaulle describing the United Kingdom, my country, before vetoing our accession to the European Union. So we know what it is like to be shut out of the club, but we also know that these things can change.”²³⁸

“A European Union without Turkey is not stronger but weaker, not more secure but less secure, not richer but poorer.”²³⁹

The Government’s firm support for Turkey’s EU accession was recently endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s report on UK-Turkey relations and Turkey’s regional role.²⁴⁰

In general, UK **public opinion** is not very approving of Turkish membership in the EU; however, the opposition is not as strong as in Germany or France. According to the latest data of the GMF’s Transatlantic Trends 2011 survey, belief that Turkish membership would be a bad thing reached 27 %, while 25% considered potential membership as positive (26% in 2010).²⁴¹ (*Annex 1*) In terms of key issues in the context of European enlargement, UK citizens list immigration first, followed by economic issues, and freedom and democratic values.²⁴² (*Annex 2*)

²³⁸ David Cameron, PM’s speech in Turkey.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ David Lidington, Turkey and the UK – prosperity, security and stability.

²⁴¹ The German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends 2011 Topline Data July 2011*.

²⁴² Flash Eurobarometer 257 - Views on European Union Enlargement, 99.

4. Concepts of Europe and support for Turkish accession to the EU

In this work I am trying to assess my hypothesis that a position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on the concept of Europe held by the respective country's political elite. I focused on cases of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In the previous chapters the positions of their political elite towards the concept of Europe were analysed and their position towards Turkish membership was described. Is it possible that for the political elite to define Europe primarily on the basis of religion and still be supportive towards Turkish membership? Or is it possible that it sees Europe as a concept of democratic values and rejects Turkish accession? In the following pages we will have a look at different configurations between the concepts of Europe and attitudes towards the Turkish bid.

This chapter will compare the results from the previous chapters and prove or disprove my hypothesis. I assumed that if a concept of Europe is defined on a basis of **socio-political values** (democracy, respect for human rights), a member state should be supportive towards Turkish membership on the condition that Turkey fulfils all its obligations stemming from the Copenhagen criteria. If it is based on **geography**, then Turkey can join the EU, as part of its territory lies within the European continent. I assume that if Europe is defined on a basis of **religion**, the stance of the country towards Turkey's membership will be negative, as it clearly can't fulfil the particular definition. In the case of Europe being defined by **history**, Turkey would be probably able to become a member of the EU. If Europe is seen on the basis of **economic potential**, then the country should also support Turkish membership. (Fig.1)

Concept of Europe based on	Assumed stance towards Turkish membership
social-political values	positive
geography	positive
religion	negative
history	positive
economic potential	positive

Fig.1 Concepts of Europe and assumed stance towards Turkish membership

For the use of my work, I will divide the three countries into several cases according to the various concepts of Europe their political elites were using. France under the presidency of Jacques Chirac will be referred to as France I. Its concept of Europe can be described as based on social and political values. France under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy will be named France II. Its concept is more complicated and will be described as based on social and political values, geography and religion. Germany I will be the Germany of Gerhard Schröder with its concept of Europe based on social and political values. Germany II will be represented by the two successive governments of Angela Merkel, as no big differences were found between the two governments in their concepts of Europe, which is based on social and political values, geography and religion. The UK will then represent the three successive governments of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron, which share the same concept of Europe based on economic potential. (Fig.2)

Case	Political elite represented by	Concept of Europe based on
France I	Jacques Chirac	Social and political values
France II	Nicolas Sarkozy	Social and political values, geography and religion
Germany I	Gerhard Schröder	Social and political values
Germany II	Angela Merkel	Social and political values, geography and religion
UK	Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron	Economic potential

Fig.2 Concepts of Europe in 3EU

From the results from the previous chapter, we can observe that four concepts of Europe are used in the analysed countries: twice independently (the concept of Europe is defined on basis of one dominant approach) and twice as complementary (the concept of Europe is defined by several approaches). The independent approaches towards Europe are the *concept based on social and political values* and the *concept based on the economic potential*. The complementary approaches are the *concept based on geography* and *the concept based on religion*. However, the concept based on social and political values can be also used as a complementary approach.

4.1. Europe based on social and political values

I assumed that if the approach of the country towards Europe is based on social and political values, the country should be supportive towards Turkish membership under the condition that Turkey fulfils its obligations from the Copenhagen Criteria. The conclusions from the previous chapters show that this concept can be used as independent or a complementary way of defining Europe.

a. Independent approach

The concept based on social and political values is the dominant approach in the case of France I and Germany I.

France I

The concept of Europe of Jacques Chirac is characterised by an emphasis on common values such as liberty, dignity, democracy and peace. In his speeches he never ceases to stress the importance of tolerance and respect for other cultures and traditions.

Jacques Chirac was a great supporter of Turkish membership in the EU. His stance on Turkey is clear from this statement: “In the name of what, in the name of what humanist, European tradition could we tell people who are saying to us 'We want to have the same values as you,' that 'We do not want you'?”²⁴³ His arguments supporting Turkish membership also further include the risk of seeing Turkey “swing to fundamentalism”²⁴⁴, and that as an EU Member State Turkey might serve as a model in its region.

Germany I

The approach of Gerhard Schröder is also value-oriented and is based on social and political values while stressing the importance of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria and placing a strong emphasis on rights and freedoms. In his public utterances Europe is often referred to as a “community of values” (*Wertegemeinschaft*).

²⁴³ Goulliaud, P., Jacques Chirac, the diehard defender of the Turkish cause, *Le Figaro*, 16/10/2007, http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/2005/10/12/01005-20051012ARTFIG90290-jacques_chirac_the_diehard_defender_of_the_turkish_cause.php

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

As arguments for supporting Turkish membership Schröder stressed the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, the country's strategic significance and its positive influence on the region, as well as the economic benefits for Germany promised by the enlargement. He did not avoid referring to Turkey as to a Muslim country; this fact was used as an argument supporting its integration to the EU. In general, the government of Schröder took a view that "though Turkey had problems with observance of democratic principles, human rights and civil liberties this did not mean that it was not a part of that community of values since Turkey professed itself in favour of a democratic order."²⁴⁵

Matching the hypothesis

The assumption that a country with a concept of Europe based on social and political values would be supportive towards the Turkish membership bid therefore appears to be supported by the evidence.

b. Complementary approach

The concept is used as a complementary approach in France II and Germany II.

France II

Nicolas Sarkozy bases his vision of Europe on values such as human rights, democracy, protection of the weakest, solidarity and the protection of nature. However, this is not the only basis on which he builds his concept of Europe, in which geography and religion also play an important role. Sarkozy is famous for his negative stance towards Turkish membership.

Germany II

Angela Merkel stresses the importance of shared values: "The sources of Europe's identity are our shared, fundamental values"²⁴⁶, her approach being similar to Schröder's in this respect. For Angela Merkel Europe is based on democracy, peace, freedom,

²⁴⁵ Szymanski, Germany and the question of Turkey's membership in the European Union, 33.

²⁴⁶ Speech by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome.

human rights, tolerance, responsibility and the dignity of the individual. However, other elements, similarly to Nicolas Sarkozy, play an important role in her approach. The stance of Merkel towards Turkish membership is also negative; she proposes a privileged partnership or some other kind of special partnership rather than full accession to the EU.

Matching the hypothesis

In the cases when the concept of social and political values is used as complementary, the stance towards Turkish membership was negative. This basis is therefore necessary, but is not sufficient for a supportive stance towards Turkish accession.

4.2. Europe based on geography

The concept is used as a *complementary approach* in France II and Germany II.

France II

Nicolas Sarkozy considers geography as one of the defining elements of the concept of Europe. Concerning the accession of Turkey to the EU, he repeatedly classed Turkey as belonging to Asia Minor and not to Europe.

Germany II

Similarly to Sarkozy, Angela Merkel called several times for a clear definition of borders for Europe.

Matching the hypothesis

In the cases when the concept of geography was used, the stance towards Turkish membership was negative. Therefore, the hypothesis was not matched as it was assuming a supportive stance following the decision of the Member States to open the accession negotiations with Turkey.

In general, it can be observed that for those who define Europe through “culturalist lenses”, meaning that they see Europe on the basis on common religion and partly also

history, such as in cases France II and Germany II, “geographical borders represent an essential element separating ‘us’ from the ‘other’ ”²⁴⁷ and are therefore an important factor.

4.3. *Europe based on history*

This concept was not found as independent or complementary in any of the studied cases. However, it would be wrong to argue that history is not seen as important as it was mentioned on many occasions by the political actors examined above. Indeed, it is interesting to observe how the notion of a common history has been used in varying ways to strengthen arguments on both sides.

Therefore, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder with their approach based on values and respect towards other traditions and cultures were referring to the Enlightenment and its humanism. The notion of history can be used as supportive argument, such as when Jacques Chirac and his administration were stressing the fact that France and Turkey have always been connected and that Turkey is a member of many European organisations. On the contrary, the reference of Nicolas Sarkozy to “European civilization” match the importance he assigns to religion, as clearly his reference to civilization nods particularly in the direction Christian roots. Tony Blair, David Cameron and Angela Merkel mention often the history of 20th century in the context of the European integration.

However, in the cases analysed here, history was never used as defining notion, merely as a context for other arguments. Hence I have not classified it with the independent or complementary concepts.

²⁴⁷ Tocci, Elite opinion dimension, 88

4.4. Europe based on religion

The concept is used as a *complementary approach* in Germany II and surprisingly also in France II.

France II

There are two interesting paradoxes; firstly, France is famous for its *laïcité* and its devotion to it. Therefore, it is surprising that a notion of religion is even considered in the French environment.

Secondly, even though Sarkozy bases his vision of Europe partially on religion, he claimed that the problem with Turkish accession “is not the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country”. There might be two explanations for it: Either Sarkozy does not assign as much importance to religion as it might seem at first, or is deliberately shying away from the argument because of controversy such statement from the French President would cause.

In sum, the part of the hypothesis that states that a state which gives importance to religion in the concept of Europe would be against Turkish membership appears from the available evidence to be justified.

Germany II

Angela Merkel stressed on several occasions that “Judeo-Christian values . . . sustain the EU”, and her vision of Europe is definitely partially based on religion, which matches well with the general stance of CDU. However, in her arguments against Turkish membership, she avoids mentioning religious issues and rather prefers to recall arguments such as referring to the EU’s limited absorption capacity.

Matching the hypothesis

The hypothesis was proved to be justified, as both countries have a negative stance towards the Turkish membership bid. In the context of domestic debates about failure of the multiculturalism taking place in both France and Germany, the view might be that

Turkey as a Muslim country, cannot integrate to the EU the same way Muslim immigrants have failed to integrate in the Member States.²⁴⁸

4.5. Europe based on economic potential

This concept is an *independent approach* in the UK.

UK

There is no doubt that economic potential plays an important role in the concept of Europe as seen by successive British governments. The importance of the single market and a large trading area as observed in British political discourse clearly illustrates this. However, it would be wrong to argue that the UK bases its concept of Europe solely on a consideration of economic potential: there are other issues which fall outside the scope of this work. Therefore, it should be stressed that in the UK vision of Europe an important role is played also by geopolitics and by an attachment to national sovereignty and intergovernmentalism.²⁴⁹

UK political leaders tend to dismiss economic arguments for not admitting Turkey and highlight instead the economic advantages Turkish membership could bring to the Union. As David Cameron put it in 2010:

“As we build our economic relationship there are some who fear the growth of a country like Turkey, who want to retreat and cut themselves off from the rest of the world. They just don’t get it. They seem to think that trade is a sort of zero-sum game. They talk about it quite literally as if one country’s success is another country’s failure. That if our exports grow, then someone else’s must shrink. That somehow if we import low-cost goods – including from Turkey – that we are failing. As if all the benefits of Turkey’s exports go to Turkey alone when actually we benefit too from choice, from competition, from low prices in our shops. The whole point about trade is that everyone can benefit from it.”²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Tocci, Elite opinion dimension, 88

²⁴⁹ Cautres, B., Monceau, N., *La Turquie en Europe*, 100.

²⁵⁰ David Cameron, PM’s speech in Turkey.

Other arguments in favour of Turkish Membership include references to geostrategic balances and the fact that Europe should aim to ensure that Turkey stays on the right path of democratisation and reform.

Matching the hypothesis

The hypothesis was proved to be matched by the findings as the UK, following the concept based on economic potential, is supportive towards Turkish membership in the EU.

The results can be found in the following table:

Case	Concept of Europe based on	Stance towards Turkish membership	Hypothesis (<i>the stance towards TR membership depends on the concept of Europe of the political elite</i>)
France I	Social and political values	Positive	proved
France II	Social and political values	Negative	disproved
	Geography		disproved
	Religion		proved
Germany I	Social and political values	Positive	proved
Germany II	Social and political values	Negative	disproved
	Geography		disproved
	Religion		proved
UK	Economic potential	Positive	proved

Fig.3

Before summarising, several interesting observations can be made. Firstly, there is a striking similarity between the concepts of Europe of France I and Germany I, and also between France II and Germany II. The former two based their concepts supporting Europe standing on values and respect towards differences such as cultural or religious, the latter two on a concept which acknowledges social and political values, while adding geographical and religious limits to Europe. The change might be considered in the context of the declaration of Sarkozy and Merkel that multiculturalism has failed. Secondly, it is interesting that even if a concept of Europe is partly based on religion, neither Merkel nor Sarkozy argued against Turkish accession with explicit reference to Turkey's religion.

To sum up, the hypothesis was partly proved right and it can be justifiably claimed that the position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on a concept of Europe which is dominant among the country's political elite. I assumed that the concept of Europe based on religion would entail a negative stance towards Turkish membership, while in contrast concepts based on economic potential, geography, social and political values and history would generally entail a positive position towards Ankara's bid. This hypothesis was proven to be justified as concerns concepts of Europe based on religion and on economic potential. The hypothesis was not supported in the case of geography. It can be argued that in the cases selected for this analysis, history is used mainly as a "scene setter" or to support various arguments on either side and does not represent an individual or complementary approach. The concept of social and political values is more complicated, as the hypothesis was shown to be correct when this concept was used as an independent approach and wrong when it was used as a complementary approach. From the results, it can be assumed that the importance of this concept changed in time and that it switched between categories. Social and political values played an important role in France I and Germany I. However, we observed that when it was connected with other concepts (France II and Germany II) it lost its validity and acted only as a scene or context setter, similarly to the use of history.

Conclusion

The Turkish bid for membership of the EU has been and is provoking a vivid debate and there is no common position on the question among Member States. In the scope of my work I attempted to test the hypothesis that the position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends primarily on the concept of Europe held by the country's political elite. Three countries have been analysed, France, Germany and the UK, with varying results.

The hypothesis was partly proved right and it can be claimed that the position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on a concept of Europe as it is seen by its political elite. However, the results were different than what was initially expected. I assumed that the concept of Europe based on religion would bring a negative stance towards Turkish membership while concepts based on economic potential, geography, socio-political values and history would support a positive position towards Turkish membership. This was shown to be correct in regard to concepts of Europe based on religion and on economic potential. The analysis of concept of Europe based on geography, however, brought a different result than expected. Moreover, it can be argued that in the analysed cases, history played only limited role in the concepts of Europe among the political elite. The concept of social and political values is more complicated, as it was supporting a positive attitude towards Ankara's bid when used as an independent approach and proved ineffective when complementary to other variables. It can be argued that the importance of this concept changed in time and that it switched between categories. Social and political values played an important role in France I and Germany I (represented by Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder). However, their significance when they were connected with other concepts, as in France II and Germany II (Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel), rapidly deteriorated and they lost their validity, being limited only to a scene or context setter, similarly to the way the history was used, a development which can be probably put into the context of a changing political situation at the national and European level.

There are a large range of issues at play in influencing a state's position towards Turkey and its bid to join the EU and not all were covered by the variables chosen for this work. The previously mentioned geopolitical aspect plays a key role for some countries. This work does not claim to resolve the complex issue of the relation between the concepts of Europe held in member states and their position towards Turkish membership, but aimed to shed light on some causal relationships which form pieces of the puzzle presented by a very large topic. Further research in these areas will be necessary to test more detailed hypotheses and further extend our knowledge of the factors underlying EU Member States' positions on Turkish membership.

Summary

Turkey officially applied to the EEC in 1987 and twenty-five years later it is still waiting at the gates with the question of its accession giving rise to a vivid debate within the Union. Every Member State of the EU has a different vision of Europe, with different views of how it should be defined and on what it should be based. The aim of this work is to explore the relationship between national concepts of Europe and positions on the membership of Turkey in the EU. This work tries to assess the hypothesis that a position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on the concept of Europe held by the respective country's political elite. Concepts of Europe are analysed on the basis of social and political values, geography, religion, history and economic potential. Discourses of political elites in three countries - France, Germany and the UK in the period from 2004 to 2012 - have been evaluated, with varying results.

On the basis of the evidence examined, the hypothesis that the position of a country towards Turkish EU membership depends on a concept of Europe as it is seen by its political elite appears to be partly supported. A concept of the EU based on economic potential proved to be linked with a positive stance and a concept based on religion is associated with a negative stance towards Turkish membership. The analysis of a concept of Europe based on geography, however, brought a different result than initially expected and appears to be linked with a negative rather than a positive position towards Turkish membership. Moreover, it can be argued that in the cases selected, history appears to play only a limited role in the concepts of Europe among the political elite. Concept based on socio-political values appear to support a positive attitude towards Ankara's bid when used as an independent approach but are less influential when complementary to other concepts. This work does not claim to resolve the complex issue of the relation between the concepts of Europe held in member states and their position towards Turkish membership, but aimed to shed light on some causal relationships which form pieces of the puzzle presented by a very large topic.

References

Secondary sources

- Akagül, D., Vaner, S., *L'Europe avec ou sans la Turquie* (Paris, 2005).
- Barysch, K., Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership? *Centre for European reform – Policy Paper*, January 2010,
<http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2010/can-turkey-combine-eu-accession-and-regional-leadership> (retrieved 3.4.2012).
- Berglund, S., *Where Does Europe End? Borders, Limits and directions of the EU* (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub, 2009).
- Billion, D., Muslu, Z., *Une Turquie en recherche de repères, Confluences Méditerranée*, Volume 61 (2007), 63-79.
- Bottger, K., Maggi, E.M. German Perceptions, in *Turkey Watch EU Member States' Perceptions on Turkey's Accession to the EU*, eds. Aksit, S. et al. (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2009), 32-45,
http://sinan.ces.metu.edu.tr/dosya/turkey_watch_en.pdf (retrieved 12.12.2011).
- Bowley, G., EU unveils draft rules for talks on Turkey, *International Herald Tribune*, 30 June, 2005.
- Cabanel, P., Religion, in *Dictionnaire critique de l'Union européenne*, eds. Anne Duphy et al. (Paris : Armand Colin, 2008), 376-378.
- Casanova, J., The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization, *Constellations*, Volume 13:2 (2006), 234-247.
- Cautres, B., Monceau, N., *La Turquie en Europe. L'opinion des Européens et les Turcs* (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2011).
- Checkel, J.T., Katzenstein, P. J., *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Comelli, M., Greco E., Tocci, N., *From boundary to borderland: Transforming the meaning of borders in Europe through the European neighborhood policy* (Istituto Affari internazionali),
http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDEFile/iai0606.PDF?Archive=1913557191953&File=iai0606_PDF (retrieved 10.5.2012).
- Commission Indépendante sur *la Turquie, La Turquie dans l'Europe: Briser le cercle vicieux* (Septembre 2009), 9,
http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009_french.pdf (retrieved 15.4.2012).
- De Montbrial, T., Debating the borders of Europe, *The New York Times*, 21. 5. 2004.
- Descheemaekere, F., *Les enjeux de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Europe* (Tours-Poitiers, Cachan/Paris, Hermes-science publications/Lavoisier, 2008).

Dorronsoro, G., *Que veut la Turquie ? - Ambitions et stratégies internationales* (Paris : CERI, 2009).

Duchesne, S., L'identité européenne, entre science politique et science fiction, in *L'identité européenne, entre science politique et science fiction, Politique européenne*, Volume 30:1 (2010), 7-16.

Ecco, U., L'Europe du métissage, in *Visions de l'Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 211-217.

Encyklopedia Britannica, Europe, Encyklopedia Britannica, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/195686/Europe> (retrieved 15.4.2012).
Foucher, M., *L'Europe et l'avenir du monde* (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2009).

Geddes, A., *The European Union and the British Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
Geremek, B., L'Europe en crise ?, in *Visions de l'Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 9-26.

Geremek, B., Picht, R. (eds.), *Visions de l'Europe* (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007).
Grataloup, C., *L'invention des continents* (Larousse, 2009).

Kahn, S., *Géopolitique de l'Union européenne* (Paris : Armand Colin, 2007).
Kastoryano, R., Turkey/Europe: Space-Border-Identity, *Constellations*, Volume 13:2 (2006), 275-287.

Knapp, A., Wright, V., France and European Integration, *The Government and Politics of France* (Routledge, 2007),
<http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/0415357322/pdfs/chapter14.pdf> (retrieved 16.11.2011).

Le Gloannec, A.M., Is Turkey Euro-Compatible, Constellations, Volume 13:2 (2006), 263-274.

Le Goff, J., L'Europe et l'histoire, in *Visions de l'Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 393-406.

Le Monde, Pour ou contre adhésion de la Turquie a l'Union européenne, *Le Monde*, November 8 2002, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2002/11/08/pour-ou-contre-l-adhesion-de-la-turquie-a-l-union-europeenne_297386_3210.html, (retrieved 16.11.2011).

Lefebvre, M., L'Allemagne et l'Europe, *Revue internationale et stratégique*, Volume 74 :2 (2009), 86-97.

Lequesne, C., *La France dans la Nouvelle Europe*, (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2008).

Ludlow, P., Europe in British Political Discourse, in *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations*, eds. Malmberg, M., Stråth, B. (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 101-123.

- Malmborg, M., Stråth, B., Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe, in *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations*, eds. Malmborg, M., Stråth, B. (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 1-25.
- Marcou, J., Les deux Europe Bruxelles à l'épreuve de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE : opinions et stratégies, *Politique européenne*, Volume 29 :3 (2009), 25-46.
- Marcou, J., Vardar, D., La Turquie aux portes de l'Europe, *Notre Europe: Policy Paper 10* (2004), <http://www.notre-europe.eu/fileadmin/IMG/pdf/Polycypaper10.pdf> (retrieved 10. 4. 2012).
- Menéndez, A.J., A Christian or a Laïc Europe? Christian Values and European Identity, *Ratio Juris*. Volume 18:2 (2005), 179-205.
- Monceau, N. French Perceptions, in *Turkey Watch EU Member States' Perceptions on Turkey's Accession to the EU*, eds. Aksit, S. et al. (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2009), 32-45, http://sinan.ces.metu.edu.tr/dosya/turkey_watch_en.pdf (retrieved 12.12.2011), 16-30.
- Morin, E., Penser l'Europe, *Les espaces économiques* - Fiche 37, http://00h00.giantchair.com/html/ExtraitsPDF/27454100935990_1.PDF (retrieved 16. 4. 2012).
- Morozov, V., Rumelili, B., The external constitution of European identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Volume 47:1 (2012), 28-48.
- Müftüler-Baç, M., The European Union and Turkey Democracy, Multiculturalism and European Identity, *RECON Online Working Paper* (2011): 1, <http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/AbstractRECONwp1120.html> (retrieved 16. 4. 2012).
- Negrine, R. et al, eds., Turkey and the European Union. An Analysis of How the Press in Four Countries Covered Turkey's Bid for Accession in 2004, *European Journal of Communication*, Volume 23:1 (2008), 47-68.
- Neumann, I.B., Welsh, J.M., The other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society. *Review of International Studies*, Volume 17: 4 (1991), 327-48.
- Nicolaidis, K., Les Fins de l'Europe, in *Visions de l'Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 275-297.
- Özbudun, E., Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004, *Turkish Studies*, Volume 8: 2 (2007), 179-196.
- Palier et al., Introduction : La France sans boussole au milieu des marchés, in *La France en mutation 1980-2005*, Culpepper, P.D., Hall, P.A. and Palier, B. (eds.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2006), 13-36.
- Parr, H., Grande-Bretagne, in *Dictionnaire critique de l'Union européenne*, eds. Anne Dulphy et al. (Paris : Armand Colin, 2008), 202-205.

Quermonne, J.L., *L'Union européenne dans le temps long* (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2008).

Rehn, O., Values define Europe, not borders, *The Financial Times*, 4 January 2005, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26bde788-5df5-11d9-ac01-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1v86UWU4D> (retrieved 16.4.2012).

Ruiz-Jiménez, A., Torreblanca J. I., European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession. Making Sense of Arguments For and Against, *European Policy Institutes Network: Working Paper 10* (2007), <http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1494.pdf> (retrieved 15. 3. 2012).

Rumelili, B., Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in post-Enlargement Europe, *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 33: 2 (2011), 235-249.

Rumford, Ch., Human Rights and Democratization in Turkey in the Context of EU Candidature, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Volume 9: 1 (2001), 93-105.
Rupnik, J., Conclusion Quelles frontières pour l'Europe ?, in *Les banlieues de l'Europe. Les politiques du voisinage de l'Union européenne*, Rupnik, J. (ed.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2007), 197-203.

Rupnik, J., La nouvelle frontière de l'Europe : quels conflits pour une Europe élargie ?, in *Visions de l'Europe*, eds. Geremek, B., Picht, R. (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007), 299-315.

Rupnik, J., L'Europe et ses périphéries, in *Les banlieues de l'Europe. Les politiques du voisinage de l'Union européenne*, Rupnik, J. (ed.), (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2007), 9-40.

Sjursen, H., Introduction, in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, ed. Sjursen, H. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 1-15.

Szymanski, A., Germany and the question of Turkey's membership in the European Union, *PISM Research Papers*, Volume 4 (2007), 3, Central and Eastern European Online Library, www.ceeol.col (retrieved 4.4.2012).

Tekin, B. Ç., The Construction of Turkey's Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse, *Discourse and Society*, Volume 19:6 (2008), 727-763.

Tocci, N. Elite Opinion Dimension: Behind the Scenes of Turkey's Protracted Accession Process: European Elites Debates, in *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story*, Cakir, E. A. (London: Routledge, 2011), 83-103.

Vaner, S., *La Turquie* (Paris : Fayard /CERI, 2005).

Weiler, Droits de l'homme, Droits de l'homme, constitutionnalisme et intégration : iconographie et fétichisme, in *Quelle identité pour l'Europe ?*, ed. Kastoryano, R. (Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2005).

Wilkens, A., Allemagne, in *Dictionnaire critique de l'Union européenne*, eds. Anne Dulphy et al. (Paris : Armand Colin, 2008), 9-13.

Wimmel, A., Beyond the Bosphorus? Comparing German, French, and British Discourses on Turkey's Application to Join the European Union. *IHS Political Science Series Paper*, Volume 111 (2006), <http://aei.pitt.edu/7423/> (retrieved 15. 3. 2012).
Yilmaz, H., Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Volume 9:3 (2007), 293-305.

Zaborowski, M., More than simply expanding markets: Germany and EU enlargement, in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, ed. Sjursen, H. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 104-121.

Primary sources

For the reason of clarity, this section also includes articles from newspapers, which were used in the analysis of the discourse of political elite, when the relevant speech was no longer available on the official website.

General

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty), Europa, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm (retrieved 14.4.2012).

Eurobaromètre Flash 230, Quelle Europe? Les Français et la construction européenne, Commission Européenne, mai 2009, 16-17, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_230_first.pdf (retrieved 28.5.2011).

Eurobaromètre Standard 75, Printemps 2011, Commission Européenne, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_publ_fr.pdf (retrieved 28.5.2011).

Flash Eurobarometer 257 - Views on European Union Enlargement, European Commission, February 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_257_en.pdf, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Speech by EU Commissioner Rehn - Accession negotiations with Turkey: fulfilling the criteria, Brussels, 28 November 2005, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5364_en.htm (retrieved 4.4.2012).

France

Euroactiv, Sarkozy kicks off French EU elections campaign, *Euroactiv*, 8 mai 2009, <http://www.euroactiv.com/eu-elections/sarkozy-kicks-french-eu-elections-campaign/article-182104> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Gros-Verheyde, N., Mon rêve européen, par Nicolas Sarkozy. *Bruxelles 2*. March 3 2012. <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/europe-pouvoir-traite-de-lisbonne/mon-reve-europeen-par-nicolas-sarkozy.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Interview with a French Representative to the Council of the EU. It was conducted during my traineeship in the Council of the EU in April 2011.

Jacques Chirac, Conférence de presse de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur l'entrée de dix nouveaux membres dans l'UE, l'élection européenne du 13 juin, la réforme institutionnelle de l'UE..., *Vie Publique*, (no date), <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/047000068.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Jacques Chirac, Conférence de presse du président de la République Jacques Chirac sur l'Europe, Elysee, 27 April 2004. http://www.melchior.fr/Conference-de-presse-du-presid.5151.0.html?&no_cache=1&print=1 (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Jacques Chirac, Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la construction européenne et l'Europe de la culture, à Paris, *Vie publique*, 2 May 2005. <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/057000096.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Jacques Chirac, Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la construction européenne et l'Europe de la culture, à Paris le 2 mai 2005. *Vie publique*, 2 May 2005, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/057000096.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Jacques Chirac, Discours prononcé par Monsieur Jacques Chirac devant le Bundestag Allemand, Deutscher Bundestag, 27 juin 2000, <http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/gastredner/chirac/chirac2.html> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Jacques Chirac, Propos introductifs de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur les valeurs de l'Europe, l'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux pays baltes, l'idéologie de la construction européenne, l'avenir de l'Europe, les relations entre la France et la Lettonie, l'entrée des pays baltes à l'OTAN, les relations entre l'Union européenne, l'OTAN et la Russie, l'Europe sociale et l'action militaire de la France pour défendre la sécurité internationale, Riga, Lettonie, *Vie Publique*, 27 July 2001, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/017000189.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Jaigu, C., Sarkozy célèbre l'héritage chrétien. *Le Figaro*, 3 March 2011, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2011/03/03/01002-20110303ARTFIG00729-sarkozy-celebre-l-heritage-chretien.php> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Tribune de M. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Premier ministre, dans des quotidiens européens, notamment, *Financial Times*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *El País*... le 15 janvier 2004, sur l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, l'approfondissement institutionnel et la préparation d'une constitution et sur la part prise par la France à la construction européenne, intitulée "La France pour l'Europe", 15 January 2004, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/043000269.html> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Kubosova, L., Sarkozy calls for definition of 'borders of Europe', *EUobserver*, 31 March 2006, <http://euobserver.com/15/21278> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Le Figaro, Hollande fustige le «narcissisme» de Sarkozy, *Le Figaro*, 30 December 2007, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2007/12/30/01002-20071230ARTFIG00009-hollande-fustige-le-narcissisme-de-sarkozy.php> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Le Figaro, Hollande fustige le «narcissisme» de Sarkozy, *Le Figaro*, 30 December 2007, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2007/12/30/01002-20071230ARTFIG00009-hollande-fustige-le-narcissisme-de-sarkozy.php> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Le Monde, Nicolas Sarkozy – c'est une autre Europe qui est en train de naître, *Le Monde*, 12 December 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2011/12/12/nicolas-sarkozy-c-est-une-autre-europe-qui-est-en-train-de-naître_1617315_1471069.html (retrieved 3.4.2012).

Lerougetel, A, Laurent, O., French President Sarkozy makes anti-immigrant appeal to neo-fascist vote. *World Socialist Web Site*. March 16 2012, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/mar2012/sark-m16.shtml> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Michel Barnier, Entretien de M. Michel Barnier, ministre des affaires étrangères, avec France 2 dans l'émission "Les Quatre vérités" le 14 décembre 2004, sur l'interdiction de diffusion de la chaîne de télévision Al-Manar, l'ouverture de négociations d'adhésion avec la Turquie et la demande de reconnaissance du génocide arménien, l'opposition de l'UMP et de l'opinion publique à l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'UE, le troisième tour de l'élection présidentielle en Ukraine, *Vie publique*, 14 December 2004, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/053000151.html> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours de M. le Président de la République, Elysee, 2 July 2007, <http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/pdf/president-8255.pdf> (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Nicolas Sarkozy, La politique européenne du président de la république, Elysee (no date), <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/europe/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la-republique/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la.5285.html> (retrieved 3.4.2012).

Nicolas Sarkozy, La vision du président de la république pour l'Europe, Elysee (no date), <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/europe/la-vision-du-president-de-la-republique-pour.9580.html> (retrieved 3.4.2012).

Nicolas Sarkozy, Les priorités du Président la République pour l'avenir de l'Union (no date), <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/europe/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la-republique/la-politique-europeenne-du-president-de-la.5285.html> (retrieved 3.4.2012).

Nicolas Sarkozy, Mon Projet – Ensemble tout devient possible, Programme for the Presidential Campaign in 2007.

Reuters, Nicolas Sarkozy souligne les racines chrétiennes de l'Europe, *LePoint.fr*, 30 January 2008, <http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites/2008-01-30/nicolas-sarkozy-souligne-les-racines-chretiennes-de-l-europe/1037/0/221231> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Sarkozy, N., *La République, les religions, l'espérance* (Éditions du Cerf, 2004).

Stenotypie, L., La transcription exhaustive du débat, *Libération*, 2 mai 2007, <http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/010118726-la-transcription-exhaustive-du-debat> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Tincq, H., Nicolas Sarkozy veut remettre la religion au cœur de la vie de la cité, *Le Monde*, 21 December 2007. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2007/12/21/nicolas-sarkozy-veut-remettre-la-religion-au-c-ur-de-la-vie-de-la-cite_992142_823448.html (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Touteleurope, Presentation-Jacques Chirac, *Touteleurope* (no date) <http://www.touteleurope.eu/fr/histoire/personnages/1992-2010/presentation/jacques-chirac-1932.html>. (retrieved 15.5.2012).

Vie Publique, Interview de M. Renaud Dutreil, ministre de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'État, *Vie Publique*, 5 November 2004, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/043002832.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Waintraub, J., Bayrou : «Sarkozy remet en cause la laïcité républicaine», *Le Figaro*, 26 December 2007. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2007/12/26/01002-20071226ARTFIG00005-bayrou-sarkozy-remet-en-cause-la-laicite-republicaine.php> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Germany

Angela Merkel, Speech by Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the European Council, at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, Stajano, 25 March 2007, <http://stajano.deis.unibo.it/UP2006/2.FromTreaty/AngelaMerkel50th.pdf> (retrieved 10.5.2012).

Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe, Bruges, 2 November 2010, The Federal Chancellor, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2010/2010-11-02-merkel-bruegge.htm> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Angela Merkel, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel before the United States Congress, The Federal Chancellor, 3 November 2009, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2009/2009-11-03-merkel-usa-kongress.html?nn=77278> (retrieved 11.5.2012).

Angela Merkel, The secret of freedom is courage, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the M100 Sanssouci Colloquium in Potsdam, The Federal Chancellor, 8 September 2010, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2010/2010-09-08-bkin-potsdam-en.html?nn=77278> (retrieved 4.5. 2012).

Chancellor Merkel met with Pope Benedict XVI, The Federal Chancellor, 9 September 2006, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/it-merkel-beim-papst-deutschland-freut-sich-auf.html> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

Conférence De Presse Franco-Allemande Conference De Presse Conjointe De M. Le Président De La République Et De Mme Angela Merkel Chancelière De La République Fédérale D'Allemagne, Elysée, 16 August 2011, <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/conferences-de-presse/2011/conference-de-presse-franco-allemande.11870.html> (retrieved 10.5.2012).

Council of Europe is the custodian of our common values, The Federal Chancellor, 15 April 2008, <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/be-merkel-europarat.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

DW, Merkel: EU's Door Closing for Near Future, *DW*, 7 October, 2006, <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,2197917,00.html> (retrieved 10.5.2012).

EU Observer, Merkel plays down hopes of EU constitution revival, *EU Observer*, 10 Mai 2006, <http://euobserver.com/18/21556> (retrieved 4.5.2012).

Gerhard Schröder, Déclaration gouvernementale prononcée le 12 mai par Gerhard Schröder, devant le Bundestag au sujet de la Constitution européenne, AIDH, <http://www.aidh.org/Europe/all-ce01.htm> (retrieved 2.5.2012).

Gerhard Schröder, Discours de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder, Chancelier de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, devant l'Assemblée Nationale, France-Allemagne, 30 November 1999, <http://www.france-allemande.fr/Discours-de-Monsieur-Gerhard,027.html> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Gerhard Schröder, Gerhard Schröder, son partenaire. Français de coeur et d'esprit, c'est un partenaire sûr et fiable. Le chancelier social démocrate Gerhard Schröder rend hommage à son ami français, *Libération*, 21 April 2005, <http://www.liberation.fr/hors-serie/0101525661-gerhard-schroder-son-partenaire-francais-de-coeur-et-d-esprit-c-est-un-partenaire-sur-et-fiable-le-chancelier-social-democrate-gerhard-schroder-rend-hommage-a-son-ami-francais> (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Gerhard Schröder, Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2 December 2005, <http://www.druckversion.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Speech%20Ch%20Schroeder%2041th%20Munich%20Conference.pdf> (retrieved 4.5.2012).

Growth, Education, Unity – The Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP for the 17th legislative period, Berlin, 26 October 2009, <http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/091215-koalitionsvertrag-2009-2013-englisch.pdf> (retrieved 12.4.2012).

Hurriyet Daily News, German, French leaders emphasize opposition to Turkey joining EU, *Hurriyet Daily News* (no date), <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/11621541.asp>, (retrieved 10.5.2012).

Hurriyet Daily News, German, French leaders emphasize opposition to Turkey joining EU, *Hurriyet Daily News* (no date), <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/11621541.asp> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

Interview with a German Representative to the Council of the EU. It was conducted during my traineeship in the Council of the EU in April 2011.

Outcome of negotiations on Turkey's accession to EU uncertain, The Federal Chancellor, 6 October 2006, <http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/tr-eu-beitrittsverhandlungen-mit-tuerkei-ergebnisoffen.html> (retrieved 6.5.2012).

Turkish Weekly, Blair: A stable, democratic Turkey would be a huge benefit for Europe, *Turkish Weekly* (no date), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96/blair-a-stable-democratic-turkey-would-be-a-huge-benefit-for-europe.html> (retrieved 14.2.2012).

Turkish Weekly, Turks in Germany, *Turkish Weekly* (no date), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/146/turks-in-germany.html> (retrieved 14.4.2012).

Working together for Germany – With courage and compassion, Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD, 11 November 2005, http://archive.org/stream/WorkingTogetherForGermanyWithCourageAndCompassion/Koalitionsvertrag2005_engl#page/n0/mode/2up (retrieved 4.5.2012).

The United Kingdom

BBC News, Cameron 'anger' at slow pace of Turkish EU negotiations, *BBC News*, 27 July 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10767768>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

David Cameron, PM Direct in Manchester, Number 10 Downing Street, 10 August 2010, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-direct-in-manchester-3/>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

David Cameron, PM's speech in Turkey, Number 10 Downing Street, 27 July 2010, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-in-turkey/>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

David Lidington, EU enlargement – a UK perspective, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 15 February 2011, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=551925482>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Deutsche Welle, Blair Under Fire as EU Presidency Looms, *Deutsche Welle*, <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,1624076,00.html>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Global Europe: Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges* (Cabinet Office October 2007), p.3-4, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf17/fco_beu_doc_globaleurope71022, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Gordon Brown: EU must take the lead in reforming global financial institutions, European Parliament, 24 March

2009, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20090323IPR52329+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Goulliaud , P., Jacques Chirac, the diehard defender of the Turkish cause, *Le Figaro*, 16/10/2007, http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/2005/10/12/01005-20051012ARTFIG90290-jacques_chirac_the_diehard_defender_of_the_turkish_cause.php (retrieved 1.3.2012).
House of Lords - European Union Committee, *The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?*, House of Lords (London : The Stationery Office Limited, 2006), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/273/273.pdf> (retrieved 17.3.2012).

Korski, D., Two cheers for Gordon Brown's speech, *European Concil on Foreign Relations*, 13 November, 2007, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/two_cheers_for_gordon_brown_speech, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Lidington, D., Turkey and the UK – prosperity, security and stability, *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Blogs*, 11 April 2012, <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/davidlidington/2012/04/11/turkey-and-the-uk-prosperity-security-and-stability/>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Oliver, M., Turkey's future lies in EU, says Blair, *The Guardian*, 30 September 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/30/eu.politics> (retrieved 17.3.2012).
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends 2011 Topline Data July 2011*, The GMF (2011), http://www.gmfus.org/publications_/TT/TTS2011Toplines.pdf, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Turkish Weekly, Blair: A stable, democratic Turkey would be a huge benefit for Europe, *Turkish Weekly*, 16 October 2004, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96/blair-a-stable-democratic-turkey-would-be-a-huge-benefit-for-europe.html>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Watt, N., Gordon Brown urges EU not to retreat into protectionism, *The Guardian*, 24 March, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/24/gordon-brown-eu-strasbourg-protectionism>, (retrieved 3.5.2012).

Annex

Annex 1: Public opinion about Turkish membership in the EU

Annex 2: Considerations for future enlargements