

**Charles University in Prague**  
**Faculty of Social Sciences**  
Institute of Political Studies

Bc. Kenneth C. Stein

**Viktor Orbán's National Hungarian Identity Construct:  
Securitization of the 2015/2016 European Migrant Crisis as  
Existential Threat?**

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Autor práce: **Bc. Kenneth C. Stein**  
Vedoucí práce: **PhDr. Vít Střítecký M. Phil., PhD.**  
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**Abstract:**

The current paper examines Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech acts based on the preface that his language communicates political will, power, and serves as an outline for potential future political avenues. Orbán has been one of the most outspoken critics of the European Union's failure to adequately address the ongoing migrant crisis, as well as Europe's immigration issues. The aim of the thesis is to examine the language tools utilized by Orbán according to securitization theory. Utilizing elements of Wodak's Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with Tajfel and Turner's Social Identity Theory, the thesis provides analysis of the texts through the lens of Orbán's creation of a national Hungarian social identity construct as referent object being securitized against the migrant threat. Moreover, the thesis provides an overall analysis of Orbán's brand of Hungarian social identity politics, and the consequences for that right-wing populist social identity politics has for Hungary.

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

Kenneth C. Stein

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## Introduction

A July 2016 Pew Research Center reports highlights sharp ideological divides across the European Union on minorities, diversity, and national identity. “The recent surge of refugees into Europe has featured prominently in the anti-immigrant rhetoric of right-wing parties across the Continent and in the heated debate over the UK’s decision to exit the European Union. At the same time, attacks in Paris and Brussels have fueled public fears about terrorism...the refugee crisis and the threat of terrorism are very much related to one another in the minds of many Europeans. In eight of the 10 European nations surveyed, half or more believe incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country.



In addition to terrorism fears regarding refugees, The Pew Research reports also suggests many are also worried that they will be an economic burden. Half or more in five nations say refugees will take away jobs and social benefits. Hungarians, Poles, Greeks, Italians and French identify this as their greatest concern. Along with worries about refugees and minorities, the survey finds mixed views regarding the overall value of cultural diversity. When asked whether having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in their country makes their society a better place to live, a worse place or does not make much difference either way, over half of Greeks and Italians and about four-in-ten Hungarians and Poles say growing diversity makes things worse (Wike, et al, 4).

Additionally, it showed “a strong cultural component to national identity. A median of 86% believe sharing national customs and traditions is important, with 48% saying this is very important. Fully 68% in Hungary say sharing national customs and traditions is very important for being truly Hungarian, and 66% express similar sentiments in Greece. In contrast, fewer than four-in-ten consider sharing these traditions and customs very important in the Netherlands (37%), Germany (29%) and Sweden (26%) (ibid, 10).

Few European politicians in 2015 were set to politically capitalize on the daunting humanitarian and political turmoil resulting from the migrant crisis, with the notable exception of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Orbán has certainly capitalized upon the fears of terrorism among the general public, since the Islamic State has claimed that it had infiltrated the refugee and migrant populations which have resulted in some of the Islamic terror attacks that have occurred in France (2015 and 2016), Belgium (2015), and Germany (2016). Orbán’s use of populist rhetoric characterizes migrants as security threat. While his rhetoric continues to claim that the migrants pose a security threat to Hungary (and Europe as well), including references to terrorism, unlike Dutch politician Geert Wilders’ openly anti-Islam surprisingly his rhetoric avoids directly defaming the Islamic faith.

The 2015/2016 European migrant crisis (including both refugees and economic migrants) has been described as the largest mass immigration movement within Europe since World War II. While refugees and economic migrants (illegal immigrant) moving to Europe from the Middle East and Africa isn’t new, the migrant crisis (especially at its peak in mid-2015) is clearly the largest humanitarian and immigration event that Europe has had to deal with. The large scale is mostly a result of conflict and unrest in the Middle East and North Africa that has displaced millions. Described as both a massive humanitarian and political crisis, genuine refugees from war-torn countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya as well as illegal immigrants (economic migrants) have migrated, mostly by sea, to Europe.

Even Germany’s security officials expressed concerns of potential terrorism and radicalization of the migrants entering Europe, even though many refugees and migrants were attempting to flee areas where Islamists and terror groups such as ISIS were operating (Melvin, 2). According to one September 2015 CNN report “the historic migration has fueled fears that the population of Europe – and the culture of the continent – will be changed beyond recognition. It is a prospect some in Europe fear” (Melvin, 2). Hans-Georg Maassen, head of the Federal Office of Protection of the Constitution, was quoted in a Rheinische Post interview as

saying “We are watching Salafists appear as benefactors and helpers to contact refugees directly with the aim of inviting them into mosques” he continued “they want to recruit refugees for their affairs” (Melvin, 3).

Orbán does, however characterize the migrants as a legitimate security threat defined in cultural (and partly religious terms) to the Hungarian nation based on his assessment of a potential cultural and identity threat they pose to Hungarian national social identity. The effects of his populist rhetoric have been widespread in Hungary as well as the EU. In some respects, the migrant issue (at least until late 2016) has been politically beneficial for Orbán. This social identity construct, in combination with securitization of the migrant crisis, has promoted, if not allowed for, an increasingly anti-migrant and anti-immigrant fear among the Hungarian population and reignited once taboo and politically incorrect European-wide discourse on immigration, multi-culturalism, demographics, nation-state sovereignty, and ethno-centric politics. He has intertwined his political standing has become deeply intertwined in his discursive Hungarian national identity reconstruction to securitize identity, and “internationalized” the issue of migration by framing the greater debate in Hungarian, regional, and EU-wide contexts.

In some ways Orbán pulled a rabbit out of the hat, in that he was willing and able to manipulate his discursive position domestically and internationally to turn tragic events into political currency. Not only did his rhetoric garner support domestically by widening his and Fidesz’ support (temporarily at least), it de facto ostracized his domestic political opposition, undermined the far right-wing Jobbik Party base by gaining support from some of their constituency, and strengthened his image internationally as a “strongman.” The migrant crisis had the added benefit of helping him redirect attention away from Hungarian Government and Fidesz officials’ corruption scandals as well as gain international political support (at the very least among the Visegrad countries). Although his securitization of the migration issue remains popular domestically (and has given him international notoriety) and in 2015 he was able to gain popular political support, initiate a national survey and government-sponsored anti-immigrant billboard campaign, and implement border fences along a portion of southern Hungary, his recent battles have proven more difficult. He lost the initial battle at the EU over migrant quotas and despite a larger turnout than previous Hungarian elections at his 2 October 2016 national referendum.



## **Theoretical Foundation**

### **Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)**

Jahedi, et al (2014, cited Fairclough & Graham, 2002, p.188) describe critical discourse analysis as “a method that analyzes language as discourse, which means that ‘language is conceived as one element of the social process dialectically interconnected with others’” (1). Jahedi, et al (2014, cited Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001, p. i) designate CDA as: “the study of talk and texts. It is a set of methods and theories for investigating language in use and language in social contexts. Discourse research offers routes into the study of meaning, a way of investigating the back-and-forth dialogues which constitute social action, along with the patterns of signification and representation which constitute culture.”

Jahedi, et al (2014, cited Fairclough and Wodak (1997) summarize that, according to Fairclough and Wodak, the key principles of CDA are outlined as follows:

First, CDA addresses social problems. CDA not only concentrates on language and the use of language, but also focuses on the “linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, P. 271).

Second, power relations are discursive. CDA draws attention to “the substantively linguistic and discursive nature of social relations of power in contemporary societies” (ibid., p. 272). This shows that power relations are performed and constructed in and through discourse.

Third, discourse constitutes society and culture. It emphasizes a dialectical relationship between them i.e., discourse shapes society and culture, as well as being shaped by them (ibid.).

Fourth, discourse does ideological work. It shows that discourse is not neutral; there are some ideologies behind it. Ideologies refer to as “particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 275).

Fifth, discourse is historical. It means that “discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking the context into consideration” (ibid., p. 276).

Sixth, the link between text and society is mediated. CDA is “about making connections between social and cultural structures and processes on the one hand, and properties of text on the other” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 277). Fairclough (1993) highlighted that the link between text and society is mediated through Foucault’s notion of “orders of discourse”. For example, “the order of discourse that organizes, say a university will be characterized by a host of interrelated textual practices such as the discourses of essays, meetings, lectures, seminars, administrative texts and so on” (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, p. 53).

According to Wodak, CDA has roots in various disciplinary backgrounds in the humanities and social sciences that emerged in the mid-1960s to 1970s and like other discourse studies has the following dimensions in common:

- an interest in the properties of ‘*naturally occurring*’ language use by real language users (instead of a study of abstract language systems and invented examples)
- a focus on *larger units than isolated word and sentences*, and hence, new basic units of analysis: texts, discourses, conversations, speech acts, or communicative events
- the extension of linguistics *beyond sentence grammar* towards a study of action and interaction
- the extension to *non-verbal (semiotic, multimodal, visual)* aspects of interaction and communication: gestures, images, film, the internet, and multimedia
- a focus on dynamic (socio)-cognitive or interactional moves and strategies
- the study of the functions of (social, cultural, situative and cognitive) *contexts of language use*
- an analysis of a vast number of *phenomena of text grammar and language use*: coherence, anaphora, topics, macrostructures, speech acts, interactions, turn-taking, signs, politeness, argumentation, rhetoric, mental models, and many other aspects of text and discourse.

Therefore, (and perhaps most significantly) CDA is “not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach” (Wodak, 2008, ch. 1, 2). Wodak (2008, cited Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, 258) highlights that CDA extends beyond linguistic analysis, as “CDA sees ‘language as social practice’, and considers the ‘context of language use’ to be crucial. We quote one definition which has become ‘very popular’ among CDA researchers:

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.

Thus, CDA combines discourse analysis and the focus on language as “social practice.” Wodak clearly defines Critical Discourse Analysis as useful framework to aid the analysis of “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language...CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized etc. by language use (or in discourse)” (Wodak, 2005, 2). Because language is reasoned to be considered social practice, language itself becomes a force for the transmission of power, social practices and forces, and even serves as a method of

domination. Wodak (2005, cited Habermas 1967, 259) quotes Habermas' claim that "language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations, ..., are not articulated, ..., language is also ideological."

Understanding the relationships observed in language requires three core concepts for CDA: "the concept of power; the concept of history; and the concept of ideology" (Wodak, 2005, 3). Power relations become a struggle "over interests, which are exercised, reflected, maintained and resisted through a variety of modalities, extents and degrees of explicitness." Wodak (2005, cited Fairclough & Wodak 1997) states ideologies as "[cognitive] representations of practices formed from particular perspectives in the interest of maintaining unequal power relations and dominance." She summarizes the concept of ideology and its relationship with power. For the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) ideology is seen as:

an (often) one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group. Ideologies serve as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse: for example, by establishing hegemonic identity narratives, or by controlling the access to specific discourses or public spheres ('gate-keeping'). In addition, ideologies also function as a means of transforming power relations more or less radically. Thus, we take a particular interest in the ways in which linguistic and other semiotic practices mediate and reproduce ideology in a variety of social institutions. One of the aims of the DHA is to 'demystify' the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance. For the DHA, language is not powerful on its own – it is a means to gain and maintain power by the use powerful people make of it. This explains why the DHA critically analyses the language use of those in power..." (Reisigl, et al, 2008, 88).

### **Discourse-Historical Approach**

Wodak (2005, cited Reisigl and Wodak 2001) summarizes procedures of analysis:

The specific discourse-analytical approach is three-dimensional: after (1) having established the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) the discursive strategies (including argumentation strategies) are investigated. Then (3), the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) are examined (4).

There are several discursive elements and strategies which, in our discourse analytical view, deserve to receive special attention. We orientate ourselves to five constitutive questions:

How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?
By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the inclusion or exclusion of some?
From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed?
Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified or are they mitigated?

From the questions above, the analytical approach focuses on five types of discursive strategies, which are all involved in the positive self- and negative other-presentation. The discursive construction of “US” and “THEM” is the basic fundament of discourses of identity and difference. Wodak defines “strategy” as: more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim (Wodak, 2005, 3).

As far as the discursive strategies are concerned, that is to say, systematic ways of using language, we locate them at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity:

<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Objectives</b>	<b>Devices</b>
referential / nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	Membership categorization Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing Metaphors and metonymies Synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro pars)
Predication	Labeling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatory or appreciatively	Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits Implicit and explicit predicates
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	Topoi used to justify political inclusion Or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
perspectivation, framing or discourse representation	Expressing involvement Positioning speaker's point of view	Reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force or (discriminatory) utterances

Table 1: Discursive strategies for positive self- and negative other representation (Wodak, 2005).

### **Social Identity Theory**

Henri Tajfel and John Turner proposed Social Identity Theory in 1979, integrating the three processes of “social categorization, self-evaluation through social identity, and intergroup social comparison, into a coherent and testable framework for contributing to the explanation of various forms of intergroup behavior, social conflict, and social change” (Tajfel, et al, 1979, 40). The theory, based upon experimental investigations of intergroup behavior demonstrate that “not only are incompatible group interests not always sufficient to generate conflict...but there is a good deal of experimental evidence that these conditions are not always necessary for the development of competition and discrimination between groups” (Tajfel, et al, 38). Accordingly, Tajfel and Turner formulate their hypothesis and produce three variables influencing “intergroup differentiation in concrete social situations” (ibid, 38).

Hypothesis: pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other (ibid, 40-41).

Variables:

- First, individuals must have internalized their group membership as an aspect of their self-concept: they must be subjectively identified with the relevant in-group. It is not enough that the others define them as a group, although consensual definitions by others can become, in the long run, one of the powerful causal factors for a group's self-definition.
- Second, the social situation must be such as to allow for intergroup comparisons that enable the selection and evaluation of the relevant relational attributes.
- Third, in-groups do not compare themselves with every cognitively available out-group: the out-group must be perceived as a relevant comparison group. Similarity, proximity, and situational salience are among the variables that determine out-group comparability, and pressures toward in-group distinctiveness (ibid, 41).

Tajfel and Turner undoubtedly recognize that in-group bias is also influenced by goal relations between groups. However, their theory suggests evidence that in-group bias extends beyond treating bias between groups as simply a result of competition between groups based on competing goals or scarce resources, implying that:

in-group bias is a remarkable omnipresent feature of intergroup relations. The phenomenon in its extreme form has been investigated by Tajfel and his associates. There have been a number of studies...all showing that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, social categorization per se – is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group. In other words, the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group (ibid, 38).

The theory expands, or rather broadens “orthodox” definitions of “social groups”, past accepted national or ethnic categories towards a simpler definition of social groups. “The ‘groups’ to which the interactants belong need not depend upon the frequency of intermember interaction, systems of role relationships, or interdependent goals. From the social-psychological perspective, the essential criteria for group membership, as they apply to large-scale social categories, are that the individuals concerned define themselves as are defined by others as members of a group. We can conceptualize a group, in this sense, as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership of it. Tajfel, et al (1979 citing Sherif, 1966, p. 62) state: following from this, our definition of intergroup behavior is basically identical to that of Sherif: any behavior displayed by one or more actors toward one or more others that is based on the actors’ identification of themselves and the others as belonging to different social categories (ibid, 40).

Essentially, social identity theory proposes that individuals who define themselves as part of a group and perceive themselves to be members within a group can share an emotional attachment to their common self-definition. This is noteworthy because “real-world ethnocentrism is in-group bias – that is, the tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in

evaluations and behavior” because it means that in-group favoritism doesn’t necessarily rely upon an actual conflict of interests between groups (Tajfel, et al, 38).

According to the theory, social categorizations are considered to be “cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action” (ibid, 40). Consequentially, they “do not merely systematize the social world; they also provide a system of orientation for self-reference: they create and define the individual’s place in society...provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms...identifications are to a very large extent relational and comparative: they define the individual as similar to or different from, as ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than, members of other groups” (ibid, 40). Thus, “social identity” is presented as “aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (ibid, 40). Thus, the goal behind group differentiation is: to maintain or achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimensions. Any such act, therefore, is essentially competitive. This competition requires a situation of mutual comparison and differentiation on a shared value dimension. In these conditions, intergroup competition, which may be unrelated to the ‘objective’ goal relations between the groups, can be predicted to occur. Turner (1975) has distinguished between social and instrumental, or ‘realistic,’ competition. The former is motivated by self-evaluation and takes place through social comparison, whereas the latter is based on ‘realistic’ self-interest and represents embryonic conflict (ibid, 41).

Tajfel, et al argue for the following general assumptions based on this “limited concept of social identity”:

- Individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem: they strive for a positive self-concept.
- Social groups or categories and the membership of them are associated with positive or negative connotations. Hence, social identity may be positive or negative according to the evaluations (which tend to be consensual, either within or across groups) of those groups that contribute to an individual’s social identity.
- The evaluation of one’s own group is determined with reference to specific other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics. Positively discrepant comparisons between in-group and out-group produce high prestige; negatively discrepant comparisons between in-group and out-group result in low prestige (ibid, 40).

Based on those assumptions, the theory forms the following theoretical principles:

- Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity.
- Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups.
- When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct (ibid, 40).

Although they acknowledge that they do not imply that “social-psychological or ‘subjective’ type of conflict...as having priority or a more important causal function in social reality than ‘objective’ determinants of social conflict of which the basis analysis must be sought in the social, economic, political, and historical structures of a society...” rather their aim was to determine “social-psychological variables” (Tajfel, et al, 46).

In summation, the theory holds three cognitive processes as relevant to individuals belonging to part of an “in-group” or an “out-group.”

- Social Identification – processes by which you or ‘another person or persons’ identify with an in-group more overtly. The norms and attitudes of other members within that group being seen as compatible with your own or worthy of emulation by yourself, or as compatible with those of ‘another person or persons’ or seen as being by open to emulation by ‘another person or persons.’
- Social Categorisation – process of deciding which group you or ‘another person or persons’ belongs to. At its most basic and non-involved level ‘any group will do’ and no necessity is seen for conflict between groups.
- Social Comparison - Your own self-concept or the social concept of ‘another person or persons’ becomes closely meshed in with perceptions of group membership. Self-esteem, or the estimate of ‘another person or persons’ is enhanced or detracted from by perceptions of how in-groups and out-groups are held to behave or are held to be able to perform or to rate in society (Age of the Sage, 1).

In sum, “Social identity theory integrates a consideration of the categorization process, social comparison processes, and self-enhancement motivation, and people’s beliefs about relations between groups, in order to explain intergroup behavior and the collective self/social identity” (Hogg, 57).

## **The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory**

This paper utilizes securitization concepts from the Copenhagen School that maintain that elevation of certain hyper-political events and topics to the level of a security or existential threat must be framed and constructed as threats. This paper utilizes securitization theory, which includes: the definition of securitization, the identification of several security “sectors” as areas and levels of analysis, securitizing moves (through discourse that presents something as an existential threat), and the securitization process (labeling and constructing threats against a referent object in need of securing), and persuasion of an audience (i.e. arguing one’s case) (Buzan, et al, 23-26).

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, in their 1997 book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, attempt to balance the post-Cold War security study field’s debate between those advocating for a broader agenda who claimed “security status for issues and referent objects in the economic, environmental and societal sectors” rather than merely the traditional “military-political ones that define traditional security studies (known in some places as strategic studies (1). Within their analysis of the security studies field, the book compared the

two views to assess their “costs and benefits”, and therefore required them to define “what is and what is not a security issue, to explain how issues become securitized, and to local the relevant security dynamics of the different types of security on levels ranging from local through regional to global” (1). What makes something an international security issue is posed and the answer is “found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival.” (Buzan, et al, 21).

Buzan, et al (1997 cited Weaver 1988, 1995b) further describe what constitutes a security issue:

It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying ‘security,’ a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (21).

Buzan, et al categorize various security threats according to sectors, which include:

military, political, economic, social, and environmental sectors (22-23). “In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of constituting principle – sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology – of the state. Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority...In the societal sector...referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions. Given the peculiar nature of this type of referent object, it is extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential from lesser threats. Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes may be seen as invasive or heretical and their sources pointed to as existential threats, or they may be accepted as part of the evolution of identity. Given the conservative nature of ‘identity,’ it is always possible to paint challenges and changes as threats to identity, because ‘we will no longer be us,’ no longer the way we were or the way we ought to be to be true to our ‘identity.’ Thus, whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon whether the holder of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained. The ability to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioral customs, or a conception of ethnic purity can all be cast in terms of survival” (22-23).

### **Securitization as Speech Act**

Buzan, et al (1997 cited Weaver 1988, Austin 1975:98ff.) suggest that the analysis of securitization is not focused on an objective threat assessment that endangers that which the securitizing agent is attempting to protect, but rather assessment focuses on “the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act.



Thus, the Copenhagen School scholars contend: “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization...securitized” means that the issue is “presented as an existential threat requiring emergence measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (23-24). The securitization theory claims to be an “intersubjective” process, and therefore it becomes important to highlight that evaluating or judging a security issue on objective merits or measurements proves difficult (ibid, 30). Buzan, et al (1997 cited Romero 1990) recognize that “states and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat” (ibid, 30). Consequently, a theory relies substantially upon the process of how a security issue becomes accepted through speech acts. Buzan et al propose a threshold: “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” In other words, the “existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity” (25). Lastly, they propose that a “measure of importance is the scale of the chain reactions on other securitizations: How big an impact does the securitizing move have on wider patterns of relations?” (Buzan, et al, 26).

Buzan, et al (1997 cited Weaver 1996b) argue that “in a securitized situation, a unit does not rely on the social resources of rules shared intersubjectively among units but relies instead on its own priorities” (26).

“A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules. The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action ‘because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure’)” (Buzan, et al, 26). Critical to this is the “staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (26).

### **Speech Act Defined**

Understanding what defines a speech act is critical to performing analysis of the texts. “A speech act is a minimal functional unit in human communication. Just as a word (refusal) is the smallest free form found in language and a morpheme is the smallest unit of language that carries information about meaning (-al in refuse-al makes it a noun), the basic unit of communication is a speech act (the speech act of refusal)” (Jaworowska, 1). Jaworowska (cited Austin 1962) refers to Austin’s theory and that what is said has three kinds of meanings: propositional (literal meaning of what is said), illocutionary (social function of what is said which could be: an indirect request, an indirect refusal, or a complaint), or a perlocutionary meaning (the effect of what is said).

## Methodology

This paper aims to examine Viktor Orbán's strategy of utilizing speech acts (speeches, interviews, and texts posted on the Hungarian Government website) as social identity constructs based on the understanding that his texts (referred to generically as speech acts) related to the ongoing 2015/2016 European migrant crisis demonstrate the discursive (linguistic) tools necessary to securitize the migration as an existential security threat to Europe (generally) and the Hungarian nation (specifically). The linguistic tools Orbán uses are assumed to have a discursive effect to successfully securitize the migrant issue as a threat to the Hungarian state.

This paper will focus primarily on Orbán's social identity construct (through language tools) as necessary pre-requisite to securitizing the referent object, i.e. Hungary from the existential threat of the migration. The author will examine the context of Orbán's speech acts and the nature of his categorization and characterization of the migrants as social actors in contrast to Orbán's socially-constructed actors (e.g. Hungarian national cultural identity and European social identity frameworks).

This case study will focus on Orbán's securitization of the migrant crisis as an existential security threat by examining the linguistic tools used to formulate the threat against Hungarian (and to some extent European) cultural and social identity. This author assumes Orbán's securitization of the migrant crisis to be based on the risk posed upon his Hungarian national social identity construct (i.e. Orbán's reconstruction of the Hungarian nation-state), social identity theory was selected to frame analysis within ethnic group identity politics.

The author intends to examine to what extent does Orbán's securitization of the migrant crisis rely upon his socially constructed Hungarian social and cultural identity as securitized referent object.

The thesis will address three main research questions in the order of precedence:

Q1: To what extent do Viktor Orbán's speech acts securitize the migrant crisis as an existential threat to Hungary based upon a socio-linguistically constructed national Hungarian social identity (as social category prototype) to effect maximization of his audience's group social identification processes through social identity, comparison, and categorization?

Q2: Which linguistic tools does Viktor Orbán utilize in his speech acts to elevate his national Hungarian social identity construction as group prototype to affect a Hungarian social identity group processes of social categorization, comparison, and identity in order to persuade his securitization argument of Hungarian identity as securitized referent object in need of security from the threat posed by the migration crisis?

### Q3: Has Orbán “over securitized” the migrant crisis as existential threat to Hungary?

This author will utilize elements of Wodak’s Critical Discourse Analysis (and specific elements of Discourse-Historical Approach) to analyze which of the five discursive strategies (referential/nominative, intensification/mitigation, predicative, argumentative, and perspectivization/framing discourse representation) and will highlight the language tools used to describe the Hungarian “in-group” versus the migrant “out-group” in order to determine the nature of Orbán’s discursive strategies.

This paper hypothesizes that Orbán’s speech acts securitize the migrant crisis as an existential threat to Hungary, to utilizing linguistic tools to socially-construct Hungarian national social identity model in order to maximize politicization and securitization of the migration as threat to the Hungarian nation based on its threat to a national social identity model. Orbán constructs this identity model as a linguistic strategy in order to maximize the persuasiveness of his speech acts to securitize the migrant crisis through the use of a language to influence his audience’s psychological group tendencies (social identity, categorization, and comparison). In effect, his speech acts and the language utilized are designed to influence social behavior in order to politically operationalize and capitalize on his audience’s self-conception (and perhaps self-esteem) in terms of “in-group” membership, actions, and feelings.

This author assumes that Orbán attempts to “politically operationalize” Hungarian “in-group” responses in order to influence audience psychological acceptance of his securitization efforts, and influence his audience’s social categorization processes in order to securitization as an attempt to influence his audience’s socio-psychological behavior processes of

Tajfel and Turner’s three main variables of Social Identity Theory: social identity, social comparison, and social categorization are utilized in his speech acts to support his Hungarian national social identity construct. Sections of this paper will be divided into three sections with examples of speech acts operationalizing social identity, social comparison, and social categorization processes in order to demonstrate the what degree socially-constructed identity is central to Orbán’s securitization of the migrant crisis. The analysis utilizes intertextuality to link themes between various speech acts.

Primary resources are primarily based on original Hungarian speech acts translated into English as well as two speech acts of originally in English. When available, translations from the Hungarian Government’s official website were utilized. Unless otherwise noted, the bolded sections of Orbán’s speech acts are my emphasis in order to highlight the discursive strategy and/or linguistic aspects of the text. Secondary sources were primarily utilized for constructing the theories, framework, and theoretical foundation of this paper.

The first section examines Orbán’s discursive (linguistic) strategies used to develop his Hungarian social identity prototype (social construction of the Hungarian nation-state as represented by his Hungarian social and national identity model) as a prerequisite to effectively generate Hungarian social identity “in-group” identification.

The second section examines the linguistic tools Orbán's utilizes in speech acts for evidence of social comparison - promoting positive values identified with his Hungarian national social identity prototype in order to persuade Hungarian audiences to socially identify with a Hungarian "in-group" in order to securitize against a migrant "out-group."

The third section, social categorization as persuasion, will examine Orbán's ultimate political goals and persuasion strategies in his securitization of the migrants as part of a larger political platform to "securitize" his national Hungarian social identity against migration and perhaps other "threats."

For the sake of brevity, this author attempts to answer Wodak's five constitutive questions (see DHA section above in methodology) by highlighting text throughout the paper demonstrating significant linguistic tools, words, phrases, and elements of Orbán's speeches. Unless otherwise noted, emphasis that is **highlighted** in the texts below is mine.

## **Speech Act as Social Identification: Reconstructing Hungarian National Identity**

According to Anthony D. Smith, there “In a purely conceptual sense, nations must have precedence, as the nationalism that seeks the autonomy, unity and identity of the territorialized historic culture— community presupposes the very idea of the nation. More important, many of the East European and Asian nations were created around pre-existing ethnies or ethnic networks, whether in Poland or Hungary, Slovakia or Finland, or on the basis of dominant ethnies in states such as Iran, Sri Lanka, Burma and Vietnam, and it was these ethnic ties that formed the basis of subsequent nations. The symbols, memories, traditions and myths of their dominant ethnies provided these new national states with their public cultures, their symbolic codes and repertoires, and many of their laws and customs. And these same ethnic heritages lend the discussion greater historical depth, for they suggest that, rather than being simply created by one or two generations of modern nationalists, nations were forged in stages over longer periods out of pre-existing cultural and political ties.” (Smith, 44).

As part of Orbán’s goal to securitize the migrant threat as threat to Hungary, as well as his broader aims to re-define the modern-day Hungarian state, identity politics plays a key role. As part of politicization and securitization, the concept of an ethnic nation-state serves to construct his national Hungarian cultural identity. This identity, not only serves as prototype for his national self-identification concept, as well as a focal point as an historical, cultural, and ethnic frame of reference, but also serves as a vessel for prototypical cultural beliefs, values, and customs that he wishes to resurrect and re-create. Orbán utilizes and politicizes this concept of social identity to produce, or perhaps persuade, self-categorization among his audience.

Hogg (citing (Tajfel, 1981) states:

Putting together the notions of prototype and of categorization based accentuation, we can see that social categorization perceptually assimilates people to the relevant ingroup or outgroup prototype. A social field comprising multifaceted and unique individuals is perceptually transformed into a social field containing people who to varying degrees match the relevant group prototype – a process called “depersonalization” because the basis of perception is group prototypicality rather than personal idiosyncrasy or interpersonal relationships. Since prototypes capture any and all features that define category membership (i.e., attitudes, feelings, and behaviors) depersonalization makes people in groups appear attitudinally, affectively, and behaviorally relatively homogenous – an effect which closely mirrors stereotyping. Because prototypes are generally widely shared, the stereotyping process is very much a group not an individual process (61).

Hogg essentially argues, that the “critical contribution of self-categorization and social identity theory to the study of group processes is that they link social categorization to self-conception and psychological group membership. The core idea is that we categorize ourselves just as we categorize others, and thus we depersonalize ourselves” (Hogg, 61).

Orbán’s securitization efforts attempt to use this link Hogg refers to, so that Orbán assists his audience with accepting his concept of a national level Hungarian social identity. The added

benefit of the social categorization of self is that, in addition to audiences accepting themselves as members of an “in-group”, their own depersonalization might also result in positive political behavior based on group allegiance.

Significantly, Orbán’s national Hungarian social identity construct as a prototype, in essence, becomes operationalized through his speech acts to an audience. This linguistic prototype as a discursive strategy has abilities to shape minds, but shape group behaviors. According to Hogg, “Prototype-based depersonalization of self is the process that makes group behavior possible. It transforms self-conception so that we conceive of ourselves prototypically (prototypes define and evaluate the attributes of group membership), and our behavior assimilates or conforms to the relevant ingroup prototype in terms of attitudes, feelings, and actions. Self-conception in terms of an ingroup prototype is a representation and evaluation of self in collective terms – a representation of self in terms of qualities shared with others. In this sense the collective self is best considered a textured repertoire of relatively distinct social identities tied to all the groups to which we feel we belong. The collective self, or rather collective selves, is tightly tied to group membership. Social categorization has profound effects on self-conception, social perception, and behavior – it generates characteristically “groupy” effects (ibid, 61).

Additionally, social identification may have other significant personal psychological impacts. Social identification manifests itself in numerous ways as an important factor in individual self-identity, self-esteem, and self-affirmation. Critcher, et al (cite Kunda, 1990) state that:

People wish to view themselves as competent, compassionate, and worthy individuals, but their attitudes, intentions, and behaviors do not always match this ideal. As such, people possess an eclectic toolkit of strategies for defending their positive self-views even when their thoughts, their behavior, or external events call those self-views into question. People might deal with a threat to self-esteem directly by minimizing or dismissing it, but people also address threats indirectly by bolstering some other aspect of their self-concept (ibid, 1).

Orbán introduces the language of identity into the speech acts that allow the speaker to discursively fashion a common Hungarian identity based on cultural norms, values, and beliefs. Orbán has maintained a remarkably consistent messaging in his speeches, interviews, and posted articles regarding his construction of Hungarian national identity and Hungarian values within his framework of a broader social identity. He manages to weave national identity and cultural values into a significant portion of his speeches, which serves as a baseline and a foundational block upon which he builds successive social identity arguments around. This method, though at times indirect in terms of supporting securitization of the migrant issue, significantly enhances Orbán’s ability to develop securitizing moves based on the threat of migrants to his construct of the Hungarian nation-state.

In developing this social construct, Orbán utilizes a referential and/or nominative strategy to create the Hungarian national identity (i.e. the in-group), which serves the political discursive strategy to construct Hungarian social identity as a national “in-group” becomes the referent object utilized in his securitization of the migrant issue as social identity threat. This linguistic

strategy of nomination is widely used among his speeches but primarily focuses on creating and maintaining “in-group” as positive identity and “out-group” member categories, where the “in-group” is associated with a positive identity” and the “out-group” is depersonalized.

Brookings Institution’s Senior Fellow Leon Wieseltier also perceives the migrant crisis as an identity crisis for Europe:

the refugees, what they pose to Europe, is a threat to the traditional European understanding of the nation-state. According to the traditional European understanding of the nation-state, every nation should be incarnated in a state, and every state should exemplify and personify a nation. That is to say, ideally, the political boundaries and the cultural boundaries should coincide. But, of course they never do, and so there develops this thing called the problem of minorities, which Europe was dealing with. Now, what this means is that what Europe has always lacked in its conception of its national identities is any conception of a naturally multi-ethnic society. And one of the things that has been happening in Europe, and now the refugee crisis will exacerbate this, is that pressure is being put on that old theory of the perfect fit of the nation and the state, and Europe is being pushed towards some sort of multi-ethnicity for which European culture, since time immemorial, is singularly ill-equipped...because we all know the history of Europe’s attitudes towards the “other”, and the “stranger”, and so on. The United States, by contrast, is, with the terrible example of the Native Americans aside, we are a naturally multi-ethnic society. We were multi-ethnic before we became multi-cultural, or rather we were multi-cultural empirically before we became multi-cultural ideologically (Wieseltier, *After Paris: The Refugee Crisis*).

Orbán’s primary speech act strategy creates and maintains positive references to Hungarian social identity (often without mention of an “out-group”). He produces numerous characteristics he ascribes to Hungary and Hungarian identity as part of a general referential/nominative discursive strategy, naturalizing the Hungarian “in-group.” Hungarians are “unique”, “special”, “innovative”, and by “nature” pursue “freedom” and are “politically incorrect”:

We Hungarians have a **natural capacity for freedom**. We have always known how to use it. We know that freedom is not a state that one achieves, but a way of life, like swimming: those who stop doing it drown. Freedom is always, everywhere, a simple question: Do we decide about our own lives, or does somebody else decide for us? (Orbán, 23 Oct 2016).

We have an interesting history and we speak a **unique** language...as for the future, our most important skill is our **innovative** way of thinking. Just to give you an idea: Hungarians have invented the computer, the ballpoint pen and the espresso (Orbán, 2013).

In capitals around the world, it is now seen **as natural that the Hungarians pursue their freedom** fights, one after another. They are not happy, but they understand that the Hungarians do everything differently. They are a **special species**, and this is what comes naturally to them (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

And as far as I see it, Hungarian people are **by nature** politically incorrect – in other words, they have not yet lost their common sense (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

He selectively traces the timeline of the Hungarian nation back 1,000 years, which roughly marks the time that the Hungarians (Magyars) arrived in Europe, and more importantly converted to Christianity.

Hungary is a state – **a one thousand-year-old state** – which must be capable of relying on its own resources in protecting its external borders and enforcing law and order on those sections of border (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

Of all European cultural elements and Hungarian characteristics mentioned in Orbán’s speech acts, the birth of the Hungarian nation-state through its Christian roots is perhaps the most prevalent. He seeks to define Hungary and the Hungarian nation within a broader European and Christian context. Not only does this serve to build Hungarian cultural and social identity as “European”, but it serves to validate his future political positions as “European”, as “Christian”, and therefore natural and acceptable parts of his broader ethnic and national identity construct. Thus, by expressing similarity between Hungary and Europe, it serves as a rhetorical convention (topos) to justify the identity position.

we perceive our own place and role in Europe in the light of the **past 1,100 years** – and, in particular, the last 100 years (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

**Europe is a community of Christian, free and independent nations**; it is the equality of men and women, fair competition and solidarity, pride and humility, justice and mercy (Orbán, 15 Mar 2016).

...Hungary joined the European Union; entering **the European Union and NATO** after referenda on these issues **was, in a modern context, reaffirmation of the decision taken by Saint Stephen one thousand years ago, to align with the West**. Once again, **Hungary chose the West. This is where we belong; we belong in the West...** (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

He ties Hungarian identity to an historical sense of yearning for a European identity, and joining “the desired West” - allowing the Hungarian national identity he constructs to be included as accepted as a part of a wider European social and cultural construct.

By the way Europe – in the old times, I saw Europe from a perspective from where it looked like an unreachable land...I had the chance to see **a European Union full of strength, optimism and self-confidence**. But what can I see now? **Totally the opposite**. An uncertain European Union without a clear vision about its future (Orbán, 2013).

**For us the European Union earlier was equal to ‘the West’, ‘the desired West’**. That is one of the main reasons why we attach positive feelings to the EU...regardless of some controversial developments of the history (Orbán, 2013).

He highlights the historical role that traditional values have played in Hungary, associating politics (democracy) with traditional beliefs (Christianity). The “proper answers...based on traditional values,” argues for their continued place in current and future Hungarian politics. He creates a simple division between those organizing their civilizations. “neglect” your cultural roots or be brave enough to express beliefs as “basic attributes or basic things of the world.”

We can surely say that Hungary serves nowadays as a real laboratory: **we try to find the proper answers to the challenges of a modern world based on traditional values** (Orbán, 2013).

...what is going on in Europe now, is an **absolutely open red and green attack** against traditional values: against the church, against family, against the nation. Of course, we accept that there is a room to debate issues about the



future of Christianity and the church, but allow me to cite a wise English man: 'we can have even basic doubts about the future of Christianity, I am sure it is not the task of politicians to kill it'. Especially because in our understanding, **democracy in Europe is democracy based on Christianity**. The anthropological root of our political institutions is *imago Dei*, which requires an absolute respect to the human being (Orbán, 2013).

Hungary is a different country in that sense. So, **there are two schools** at this moment how to organize the civilized way of living together. **One** is saying you should **neglect your cultural background**, don't speak about it, it's easier to live together. **The second** say **just courageously confess** what you think about the **basic attributes or basic things of the world**. I belong to the second school (Orbán, 2013).

Orbán stresses reaffirms the central role of Christianity as the foundation of Christian-democratic politics, using a predicative strategy to label the Hungarian nation as Christian in character, or at least attributing the positive characteristic of Christian principles to the construct of the Hungarian nation-state in his 2015 "State of the Nation Address":

For our flag is flying high; everyone can see that. Everyone can see that we are a people's party community, based on **Christian-democratic foundations** – the ideal, guiding star of which is a **civic Hungary**. I do not think that this would change in the next hundred years (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

The Honourable Chair also mentioned that national and **Christian-based governance** is...not a political issue but a personal affair...bears no relation to position, title, advantage or power...This is a key issue...of our governance...The work we do is far from perfect, even if that is what we should strive for. But notwithstanding our frailties and imperfections, there is one regard in which we cannot go wrong: **neither individual ambitions, nor individual or group values may take precedence over the interests and service of the nation**. This is more than mere respect for the law, stronger than the oath you take on the Fundamental Law. As the Honourable Chair said, this is a personal matter, a matter of integrity, and is, at the same time, **the very political foundation of Christian-democratic politics**. I should mention here a piece of political advice that should be important for all **Christian-democratic** politicians. '**Do not concern yourselves with whether God is on our side, but concern yourselves with whether you are on God's side**' (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

In Orbán's view of society, traditional values must be re-emphasized in a societal and political sense. Excerpts from his October 2013 speech in London, "The Role of Traditional Values in Europe's Future," provides a starting point for analysis of his cultural and social identity construct and later his political vision for Hungary through the lens of traditional values. His argument is organized around five main theses that support his conclusion that political power and solutions can be derived from powerful roots of social identity in Christianity and traditional values. In this speech, he provides a basic blueprint (though, as will be examined, it changes somewhat for the migration issue) for his recreation or resurrection of Hungarian identity as positive social actor and social roots to redesign or renew the Hungarian nation-state concept.

Thesis number one...The most important conclusion I have drawn from the [2008 financial] crisis is, that it is not something that ruins our competitiveness only temporarily, it is not a challenge that we can overcome by simple political measures. It is better to acknowledge we cannot live as we have lived so far. To put it very simply and very straight: **we cannot live beyond our means**.

My second thesis. We **should not neglect the difference between the member states** of the European Union. If we do so, it may have serious consequences...So, instead of ideology and dogmatism, wide-ranging diversity has to be acknowledged and respected.

Thesis number three. If we acknowledge diversity, it means that we **acknowledge the nation itself** as well. Even though being very open, free trade-oriented and investment-attracting, these economies are national economies. And this leads us to a conclusion of utmost importance: **the concept of nation still exists**, nation still remains relevant.

...my fourth thesis...what is going on in Europe now, is an **absolutely open red and green attack against traditional values: against the church, against family, against the nation**. Of course, we accept that there is a room to debate issues about the **future of Christianity and the church**, but allow me to cite a wise English man: 'we can have even basic doubts about the future of Christianity, I am sure it is not the task of politicians to kill it'. Especially because in our understanding, democracy in Europe is **democracy based on Christianity**. The anthropological **root of our political institutions is imago Dei**, which requires an absolute respect to the human being. As for families, here we should say a straightforward sentence. **A community that is unable to sustain itself biologically will not survive and does not deserve it either. Immigration is not an answer**. It is a trick, a bluff. Most European countries, including my homeland, are suffering from demographic decline. We have to acknowledge demographically motivated family policies are essential and legitimate.

Thesis number five...**the concept of welfare state is over**. Instead of that, we should try to build up workfare states and **replace entitlements with a merit-based society**. In Hungary, thanks to the policies of the former governments, the inactive outnumbered the active. So, what we are doing now is a true European attempt: **we have renewed the country by restructuring the major systems**.

...my last thesis. Instead of simply managing issues...we need...**leadership**...motivated by **vision**. Hungary has great luck in this sense. Our leadership is rooted in a democratic legitimacy, resulting in an overwhelming two-third parliamentary majority. We can surely say that Hungary serves nowadays as a real laboratory: we try to find the proper **answers to the challenges of a modern world based on traditional values**.

### **Predicative Strategy: Hungary (Nation-State) as Positive Social Actor Nation-State Under Threat**

In addition to advocating Christian and traditional values as central aspects of Hungarian social identity, Orbán resurrects portions of Hungarian history that are congruent with his narrative. His March 2016 speech in Budapest, serves to demonstrate this selectivity as part of his cultural construction (Hungarian identity and by extension the Hungarian nation-state as securitized referent object to be protected from migrants). His reconstruction and simplification of Hungarian history assists in buttressing his definition of Hungarian social identity and the historical roots he uses to redesign the Hungarian nation-state. This particular speech outlines many of Orbán's approaches to identify potential current and future security threats from the migrants. The texts make use of numerous rhetorical conventions such as: expressing similarity, contrast, repetition, emphasis, and addressing the audience. He overemphasizes (exaggeration as rhetorical convention) the importance Hungarian revolutions of 1848 and the 1956 anti-communist revolt, which he uses to rhetorically to express similarity (to his modern-day revolution (especially the 2011 Hungarian Constitutional revolution) and contrasts this tradition against the revolutionary tradition of communism. Additionally, he personifies the Hungarian nation-state and personifies the concept of freedom.

Arguably, this is Orbán's most patriotic speech which serves not only to create nationalistic appeal, but more importantly to his political aims it serves to legitimate his power by reaching into the past to justify present and future actions. It builds up the Hungarian nation as a positive social actor (i.e. representation of Hungarian nationhood as "in-group") by evaluating its heroic traditions of the past revolutions of 1848 and 1956 and explicitly comparing historic heroic displays to past ones and contrasting the "group" against the historic "out-group" in negatively associated metaphors (e.g. communism as needing a "host animal", implying it is a parasite) and then links against the current European migrant crisis situation and the EU's position as negative social actors and explicit threats to this, explicit yearning for freedom and

maintaining freedom, and contrasting the and a positive “in-group” identity of Hungary, uses a predication strategy of labeling it a positive social actor ( and then ultimately contrasts the “group” with the current European migrant situation as a threat to positive Hungarian culture and social identity.

### “Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March”, 2016, Budapest

“Salutations to you, Hungarian freedom, on this the day you are born!”

**Ladies and Gentlemen, Compatriots, Hungarians around the World,**

With a cockade sewn by Júlia Szendrey pinned to his chest, a volume of poems in his pocket, and the still thrilling experience of the Revolution in his head, these are the words with which the poet Sándor Petőfi welcomed the fifteenth of March in his journal. Salutations to you, Hungarian freedom, on this the day you are born! And today also, one hundred and sixty-eight years later, it is with unfettered joy, the optimism of early spring, high hopes and an elevated **spirit that across the Carpathian Basin** we celebrate – from Beregszász to Szabadka, from Rimaszombat to Kézdivásárhely: every Hungarian with **one heart, one soul and one will**.

Just as then in the decisive battles of the Freedom Fight, now also Hungarian hearts are cheered by the fact that we have with us a Polish legion. I welcome the spirited successors of General Bem: we welcome the sons of the Polish nation. As always throughout our shared **thousand-year history**, now, too, we are standing by you in the battle you are fighting for your country’s freedom and independence. We are with you, and we send this message to Brussels: more respect to the Polish people, more respect to Poland! Greetings to you. It is a sign of the shared fate of Poland and Hungary that another glorious revolution of ours – that of 1956 – was born between the Bem Statue and Kossuth tér in Budapest. It rose up with the unstoppable force of our glorious ancestors, and by the evening it had dragged the Soviet generalissimo out of his boots.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

**By nature, Hungarians stand up for what is right when the need arises.** What is more, they fight for it if needs be, but do not seek out trouble for its own sake. They know that they can often achieve more through patience than through saber-rattling. This is why **those like us are rarely given to revolutions. We have only gone down that path twice in one hundred and seventy years.** When we did follow that path, **we had reason to do so:** we felt that our lungs would burst if we could not breathe in freedom. We threw ourselves into it, and once we had started a revolution, we did so in style. Modern European history has preserved both Hungarian revolutions among the glorious memories of the world: two blazing stars, **two national uprisings bursting forth in 1848 and 1956 from Hungarian aspirations and Hungarian interests.**

Glory to the heroes, honour to the brave. **Chroniclers have also recorded the revolution of 1918–19,** but the **memories of that period are not preserved on the pages of glory;** indeed, not only are those memories written on different pages, but they appear in a different volume altogether. The 1918–19 revolution can be found in the volume devoted to **Bolshevik anti-Hungarian subversions launched in the service of foreign interests and foreign ambitions;** it features under the heading “appalling examples of intellectual and political degeneracy” (Orbán, 15 Mar 2016). Yes, **we Hungarians have two revolutionary traditions:** one leads from **1848,** through **1956 and the fall of communism,** all the way to the **Fundamental Law and the current constitutional order;** the bloodline of the other tradition leads from Jacobin European ancestors, through 1919, to communism after World War II and the Soviet era in Hungary. Life in **Hungary today is a creation of the spiritual heirs and offspring of the ’48 and ’56 revolutions.** Today, as then, the heartbeat of this revolutionary tradition moves and guides the nation’s political, economic and spiritual life: equality before the law, responsible government, a national bank, the sharing of burdens, respect for human dignity and the unification of the nation. Today, as then, the ideals of ’48 and ’56 are the pulse driving **the life force of the nation,** and the **intellectual and spiritual blood flow of the Hungarian people.** Let us give thanks that this may be so, let us give thanks that finally the Lord of History has led us onto this path. Soli Deo gloria!

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Not even the uplifting mood of a celebration day can let us forget that **the tradition of 1919, too, is still with us** – though fortunately **its pulse is just a faint flicker**. Yet at times it can make quite a noise. **But without a host animal, its days are numbered**. It is **in need of another delivery of aid from abroad** in the form of a major intellectual and political infusion; unless it receives this, then after its leaves and branches have withered, **its roots will also dry up in the Hungarian motherland's soil, which is hostile to internationalism. And this is all well and good**.

A decent person who raises their children and works hard to build the course of their life does not usually end up as a revolutionary. The right-thinking person who stands on their own two feet and has control over their future knows that upheavals and the sudden upending of the ordinary course of life rarely ends well. The person of goodwill who seeks a life of serene and peaceful progress knows that trying to take two steps at once leads to you tripping over your own legs, and instead of moving forward, you will land flat on your face. And yet these right-thinking people of goodwill, these upstanding citizens of Pest instantly rallied to the call of our revolutions, marching at the front, right behind the university students. They formed the backbone of the revolutions and freedom fights, and they were to pay with their own blood for the honour of the Hungarian people. Every revolution is like the people who make it. On the committee, which oversaw order during the 15 March revolution, in the shadow of the colossal figures of Petőfi and Vasvári, we find the furrier Máté Gyurkovics, and the button-maker György Molnár. **Our revolutions were led by respectable citizens, military officers, lawyers, writers, doctors, engineers, honest tradespeople, farmers and workers with a sense of national duty**: Hungarians who embodied the nation's best aspects, our homeland's very best. **Hungarian revolutionaries are not warriors for hare-brained ideologies, deranged utopias or demented, unsolicited plans for world happiness**; in Pest, you find no traces of the illusory visions of quack philosophers or the raging resentment of failed intellectuals. The revolutionaries of 1848 did not want to salvage stones from the ruins of absolutist oppression in order to build a temple to yet another tyranny; therefore, the Hungarian revolution's songs were not written in honour of the steel blade of the guillotine or the rope of the gallows. Our songs are not sung by lynch mobs or execution-thirsty crowds; the Pest revolution is not a hymn to chaos, revenge, or butchery. **The 1848 Revolution is a solemn and dignified moment in our history, when the wounds of the glorious Hungarian nation opened once again. Springing from constitutional roots, it demanded the granting and return of the rights seized from and denied to the nation. It is exhilarating, but sober; ecstatic but practical; glorious, but temperate. It is Hungarian to the core.**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Three weeks before his death in battle, in his last letter to János Arany, Sándor Petőfi asked the following question: **“So what are you going to do?” When we, his modern descendants, read this, it is as if he is asking us the same question**. So, what are you going to do? How will you make use of your inheritance? Are the Hungarian people still worthy of their ancestors' reputation? Do you know the law of the Hungarians of old – that whatever you do should not only be measured by its utility, but also by universal standards? This is because your deeds must pass the test not only here, but also in eternity.

**Ladies and Gentlemen,**

We have our inheritance, the Hungarian people still exist, Buda still stands, **we are who we were, and we shall be who we are**. Our reputation travels far and wide; clever people and intelligent peoples acknowledge the Hungarians. We adhere to the ancient law, and also measure our deeds by universal standards. We teach our children that their horizon should be eternity. Whether we shall succeed, whether finally we see the building of a homeland which is free, independent, worthy and respected the world over – one which was raised high by our forebears from 1848, and for which they sacrificed their lives – we cannot yet know. **We do know, however, that the current European constellation is an unstable one, and so we have some testing times ahead**. The times in which we live press us with this question, which is like a hussar's sabre held to our chest: **“Shall we live in slavery or in freedom?”** The **destiny of the Hungarians has become intertwined with that of Europe's nations, and has grown to be so much a part of the union that today not a single people – including the Hungarian people – can be free if Europe is not free**. And today Europe is as fragile, weak and sickly as a flower being eaten away by a hidden

worm. Today, one hundred and sixty-eight years after the great freedom fights of its peoples, Europe – our common home – is not free.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

**Europe is not free, because freedom begins with speaking the truth. In Europe, today it is forbidden to speak the truth.** A muzzle is a muzzle – even if it is made of silk. It is forbidden to say that today we are **not witnessing the arrival of refugees, but a Europe being threatened by mass migration.** It is forbidden to say that **tens of millions are ready to set out in our direction.** It is forbidden to say that **immigration brings crime and terrorism** to our countries. It is forbidden to say that the **masses of people** coming from **different civilisations pose a threat** to our way of **life, our culture, our customs, and our Christian traditions.** It is forbidden to say that, **instead of integrating,** those who arrived here earlier **have built a world of their own,** with their own laws and ideals, which is **forcing apart the thousand-year-old structure of Europe.** It is forbidden to say that **this is not accidental and not a chain of unintentional consequences, but a planned, orchestrated campaign, a mass of people directed towards us.** It is forbidden to say that in **Brussels** they are **constructing schemes to transport foreigners** here as quickly as possible and **to settle them here among us.** It is forbidden to say that the purpose of settling these people here is **to redraw the religious and cultural map of Europe** and to **reconfigure its ethnic foundations,** thereby **eliminating nation states,** which are **the last obstacle to the international movement.** It is forbidden to say that Brussels is **stealthily devouring** ever more slices of **our national sovereignty,** and that in Brussels today many are working on a plan **for a United States of Europe,** for which no one has ever given authorisation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

**Today's enemies of freedom are cut from a different cloth than the royal and imperial rulers of old, or those who ran the Soviet system; they use a different set of tools to force us into submission.** Today they do not imprison us, they do not transport us to camps, and they do not send in tanks to occupy countries loyal to freedom. **Today the international media's artillery bombardments, denunciations, threats and blackmail are enough –** or rather have been enough so far. **The peoples of Europe are slowly awakening, they are regrouping, and will soon regain ground.** Europe's beams laid on the suppression of truth are **creaking and cracking.** **The peoples of Europe may have finally understood that their future is at stake: not only are their prosperity, their comfort and their jobs at stake, but their very security and the peaceful order of their lives are in danger.** **The peoples of Europe, who have been slumbering in abundance and prosperity, have finally understood that the principles of life upon which we built Europe are in mortal danger...**

**This danger is not now threatening us as wars and natural disasters do, which take the ground from under our feet in an instant. Mass migration is like a slow and steady current of water which washes away the shore. It appears in the guise of humanitarian action, but its true nature is the occupation of territory; and their gain in territory is our loss of territory.** Hordes of implacable human rights warriors feel an unquenchable desire to lecture and accuse us. It is claimed that we are xenophobic and hostile, but the truth is that the history of our nation is also one of inclusion and the intertwining of cultures. Those who have sought to come here as new family members, as allies or as displaced persons fearing for their lives have been let in to make a new home for themselves. **But those who have come here with the intention of changing our country and shaping our nation in their own image, those who have come with violence and against our will, have always been met with resistance.**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

**At first, they are only talking about a few hundred, a thousand or two thousand relocated people. But not a single responsible European leader would dare to swear under oath that this couple of thousand will not eventually increase to tens or hundreds of thousands. If we want to stop this mass migration, we must first of all curb Brussels. The main danger to Europe's future does not come from those who want to come here, but from Brussels' fanatics of internationalism.** We cannot allow Brussels to place itself above the law. We shall not allow it to **force upon us the bitter fruit of its cosmopolitan immigration policy.** We shall not **import to Hungary crime, terrorism, homophobia and synagogue-burning anti-Semitism.** **There shall be no urban**

**districts beyond the reach of the law, there shall be no mass disorder or immigrant riots here, and there shall be no gangs hunting down our women and daughters. We shall not allow others to tell us whom we can let into our home and country, whom we will live alongside, and whom we will share our country with.** We know how these things go. First, we allow them to tell us whom we must take in, then they force us to serve foreigners in our country. In the end, we find ourselves being told to pack up and leave our own land. Therefore, **we reject the forced resettlement scheme**, and we shall tolerate neither blackmail, nor threats (Orbán, 15 Mar 2016).

The time has come to ring the warning bell. The time has come for opposition and resistance. The time has come to gather allies to us. The time has come to raise the flag of proud nations. **The time has come to prevent the destruction of Europe, and to save the future of Europe.** To this end, regardless of party affiliation, we call on every citizen of Hungary to unite, and we call on every European nation to unite. The leaders and citizens of Europe must no longer live in two separate worlds. We must restore the unity of Europe. We the peoples of Europe cannot be free individually if we are not free together. If we unite our forces, we shall succeed; if we pull in different directions, we shall fail. Together we are strength, disunited we are weakness. Either together, or not at all – today this is the law.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In **1848** it was written in the book of fate that nothing could be done against the Habsburg Empire. If then we had resigned ourselves to that outcome, our fate would have been sealed and the German sea would have swallowed up the Hungarians. In **1956** it was written in the book of fate that we were to remain an occupied and Sovietized country until patriotism was extinguished in the very last Hungarian. If then we had resigned ourselves to that outcome, our fate would have been sealed, and the Soviet sea would have swallowed up the Hungarians. **Today** it is written in the book of fate that **hidden, faceless world powers will eliminate everything that is unique, autonomous, age-old and national. They will blend cultures, religions and populations, until our many-faceted and proud Europe will finally become bloodless and docile.** And if we resign ourselves to this outcome, our fate will be sealed, and **we will be swallowed up in the enormous belly of the United States of Europe.** The task which awaits the **Hungarian people, the nations of Central Europe** and the other **European nations** which have not yet lost all common sense is to **defeat, rewrite and transform the fate intended for us.** We Hungarians and Poles know how to do this. We have been taught that **only if you are brave enough do you look danger in the face.** We must therefore **drag the ancient virtue of courage out** from under the silt of oblivion. First of all, we must **put steel in our spines**, and we must clearly answer the foremost, the single most important question determining our fate with a voice so loud so that it can be heard far and wide. The question upon which **the future of Europe stands or falls is this: “Shall we live in slavery or in freedom?” That is the question – give your answer!** (Orbán, 15 Mar 2016).

**Go for it Hungary, go for it Hungarians!**

## **Hungarian Constitutional Reform as Social Identity Renewal: The Fundamental Law as Political DNA**

One of Orbán’s primary goals following his 2010 election was the creation of a new Hungarian Constitution. His discursive strategy of nomination and Hungarian national identity was essential in Orbán’s justification for the new constitution (the Fundamental Law). He personifies the constitution itself as organic and living, the national “identity card.” He utilizes nominative and argumentative strategies to define the nation through the constitution, to justify the preferred values as political inclusion, and frames the argument for the new constitution as necessary in order to protect Hungarian social and cultural identity by inserting and enshrining Hungarian traditional values into the “DNA” of the new constitution:

First of all, similar to the Holy Crown, the constitution – **in its essence as well as in its text – symbolises the continuity of the history of the Hungarian nation, of its political and cultural life.**

Secondly, as the constitution **evolves from the life of the nation**, it must follow the changes that have occurred in the fate of the country. We could not therefore attempt to draft a text which gave the slightest suggestion that the Hungarians had only just entered through Europe's doors the previous day, and that nothing of note had ever happened to us before that time (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

Thirdly, given that the **tradition** bequeathed to us by Deák refers to the constitution as a document which serves to create an identity and which is passed down as **a living tradition from one generation to the next**, we looked upon the constitution as **"the nation's identity card"**. In consequence, we could not possibly attempt to create a text which disregards all that we have: **our land, our language, and the natural and intellectual assets** which we have both inherited from our ancestors and borrowed from our descendants. Measuring the **former constitution** (which was **the communist constitution** re-worded after the fall of communism) against these three triangulation points shows us that the creation of Hungary's Fundamental Law was an historic task and a **necessity**...the Fundamental Law fulfils one of its most important functions when, as **an interpretative background**, it declares the achievements of the historical constitution. An example of this is the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, which may be regarded as a contemporary manifestation of the separation of powers, the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people.

Therefore, the constitution declares...that **for a thousand years Christianity has been a force preserving Hungary's nationhood**. The constitution declares – because it had to declare – that with the German occupation of Hungary on 19 March 1944 we lost our sovereignty, which we were only able to restore on 2 May 1990. The constitution declares – because it had to declare – that we condemn the crimes committed in Hungary under National Socialism and international socialism (i.e. communism), and that we reject any statute of limitations for those crimes... (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

Orbán's argumentation strategy and constructs allow him to justify not only his constitutional reform efforts but his placement of Hungarian values and Hungarian national identity into the constitution. Even the name "Fundamental Law" suggests its purpose as "state philosophy." This identity becomes immortalized, passed down "from generation to generation" and defines the "Hungarian world nation":

The most important change, however, is that, compared with the old "value-neutral" text (and in common with the constitutions of other countries), **Hungary's Fundamental Law** also presents our **constitutional identity**. As defined in the constitution, **this cultural identity** in some respects connects us to other nations, and in other respects sets us apart; it thereby establishes our place in Europe and in the world. Hungary's Fundamental Law is akin to those constitutions which create an opportunity for a citizen of the country to enter the text as if it were a building: the main body of the Fundamental Law is like a church nave, off which the cardinal Acts open like side aisles. The National Avowal itself is not a mere ornament or appendage at the beginning of the text, but is an integral part of it: it is the gateway through which we enter the building that is the constitution (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

**the Fundamental Law** adopted the following **state philosophy**: The National Avowal speaks on behalf of a **cultural community and a body of tradition which is passed down from generation to generation** and which sees a Hungarian people torn apart and driven to different parts of the world and **defines it as a united nation**. In the language of politics, we call this the **Hungarian world nation** (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

When we Hungarians talk about things like this, we usually do so by going back to the body of work produced by Ferenc Deák, the Justice Minister in the first accountable Hungarian government...made three points. First of all, in Deák's view, our constitution is a historical constitution. Allow me to quote him: "It was not produced at a stroke, but it developed from **the life of the nation**". He goes on to assert that "it therefore continues to emerge according to the development of the life of the nation". His third point, referring to the development of the life of the nation, is that "as it has solidified over the course of centuries, **we took over from our ancestors the work of centuries**, and it is **our duty to pass it down to our successors** as long as we can." The "we" he refers to are the Hungarian people of his day (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

...according to Ferenc Deák...a constitution means much more than a neutral catalogue of legal provisions which is devoid of values. In the traditional sense, it means...establishing a **direct link between law and morals**; its foundations were provided by documents such as King Stephen's Admonitions, the Golden Bull of 1222, the Tripartitum or the Pragmatica Sanctio...We are convinced that, for **as long as the Hungarian State exists, there is and will always be a historical constitution**. This is why we decided to call the document we are focusing on today "**The Fundamental Law**"; it is a document which **may be integrated into the fabric and attainments of the historical constitution**. Deák, too, looked upon this tradition as something which **developed organically** together with the life of the nation, and which the nation always adjusted to the most important questions of each era. As the constitution became intertwined with the history of the nation, the need also emerged for **the history of the nation to become integrated into the text of the Fundamental Law** (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

Noticeably shifting his argumentation strategy, he argues to legitimate the constitutional changes based on a historical and current political mandate, demonstrating the underlying political motivations behind the Hungarian social identity construct:

In 2010 the civic government (Fidesz-KDNP) did not shy away from its responsibility. As we say in the language of politics, the government majority at that time understood the will of the electorate. Even during the election campaign, we did not conceal our intentions, and **made it perfectly clear** before the second round of the **election** that if we were **granted a two-thirds mandate we would create a new constitution for Hungary**. In our evaluation, **Hungarian voters understood** that finally we had to end the protracted and chaotic period of transition, and open a new page in the country's history (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

...we were left out of the post-communist wave of European constitutional reform. There are perhaps some who may still remember that in the mid-1990s, **all former communist countries created new constitutions** of their own: the Romanians, the Poles – everyone. **Everyone, with one exception, and that exception was Hungary**. In Hungary, either the necessary political consensus was never arrived at, or neither political grouping had the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to pass a new constitution. **Hungary therefore missed this wave of constitutional change**; the whole of Europe saw it as the most natural thing that the countries concerned should create new constitutions when communism came to an end, that they should adjust to democracy and freedom, that they should make a move towards the European Union...We were left out of this. And no one at the time seemed to notice...In fact, **the ultimate consequence was that in 2010 we succeeded in forging a two-thirds parliamentary majority which for the first time was able to make up for the earlier lack of constitutional reform** (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

Orbán masterfully weaves his overt goals of reconstructing the Hungarian nation-state and cultural identity (through the Fundamental Law) by associating his ethnic and cultural identity goals with a slightly subtler socio-political "communal" and "work-based society" goals, while downplaying international "suspicion" of his reconstruction and renewal of Hungarian national "constitutional identity" with a mitigation strategy of a European Commission audit to dampen criticism:

We were treated with suspicion because of our new constitution, which also mentioned ideals which a number of European political schools of thought see as no longer relevant: **patriotism, Christianity, family, unity**. **Some such European attitudes regard these as antiquated, but the Hungarian Constitution declares that it takes its roots from the past, which will stay with us and will continue to remain important for us in the future**. After the Hungarian Constitution was subjected to widespread attack, the **European Union audited us comprehensively**. We can now say that **there is only one nation in Europe – a single country – which has been fully audited with regard to democratic values by a body authorised to do so** (namely, the European Commission, which officially bears the title of Guardian of the Treaties). That country is Hungary (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

The first element is...the **protection of language and culture**...Secondly, the constitution declares that "**individual freedom can only be complete in cooperation with others**"; in other words, the Hungarian constitution is based on **the communal principle**. One of the chapters is entitled "Freedom and Responsibility". This is a **community-centred constitution**, which finds individual freedom meaningful only in cooperation with others. In my view, this is **an element of constitutional identity**. Thirdly, this constitution defines the concept of the **work-based society**;



to be precise, it may declare that concept rather than define it. It says – and perhaps this is not a verbatim quotation – that we hold that the strength of a community and the honour of every person are based on work and the achievement of the human mind. And finally, the fourth element of the identity of our constitution is the **historical dimension**: it is open towards the historical constitution and also integrates legal documents unique to Hungarian history (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

I believe that Hungary's Fundamental Law is **a coherent system of values** and was conceived on the basis of a well-considered concept. In its construction, we also used elements which former builders rejected, such as the achievements of our historical constitution, while we integrated provisions derived from earlier rulings by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Based on all this, we clearly expressed the **set of values** which Hungary claims as its own, as a democratic European country... (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

## **Social Comparison: Hungarian Social Identity, the EU, and Migrants as Social Actors**

After social identity, social comparison is a significant tool utilized by Orbán in operationalizing his national Hungarian social identity construct and adding evaluating it as an “in-group” in comparison to other “out-groups.” This section aims to demonstrate Orbán’s use of language to influence the cognitive processes of his audience’s acceptance of his securitization theme of comparing his Hungarian construct to European and EU identity “groups” and, more importantly, comparing it against the migrants as an “out-group.”

In the *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes*, Michael Hogg summarizes the significance of categorization:

Categorization operates on non-social and social stimuli alike. However, there are some critical differences. These stem from the fact that social categorization implicates self and thus, revolves around comparisons among people, including self. Early research by Tajfel (e.g., Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; also see Doise, 1978; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972) identified an accentuation effect of social categorization: categorization accentuates perceived differences between categories and similarities within categories on dimensions believed to be associated with the categorization (i.e., stereotypical dimensions), and the effect is amplified when either or both the categorization and the associated dimension are subjectively important. The process of categorizing people exaggerates perceived similarities among people in the same group (rendering them less easily identifiable – e.g., Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) and differences between people in different groups, and the effect is stronger if it is important to distinguish between the groups (e.g., you belong to one of the groups) and if the perceptual dimension is important (e.g., a strongly evaluative dimension like “nice–nasty” or “honest–dishonest”)(59).

### **Hungary Past, Present, Future Actions: Revolutionary Roots to Justify Comparison**

On October 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016, thousands gathered in Budapest’s main square at the official ceremony to commemorate the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Hungary’s 1956 Revolution. Prime Minister Viktor Oban used the opportunity to address the Polish President Andrzej Duda and “Hungarians around the world.” Undoubtedly, the anniversary is significant to the modern history of Hungary, as it was the start of rebellion in Budapest against communist rule in Hungary. The anniversary allowed Orbán an opportunity to celebrate Hungarian nationalism and anti-communist heroes and allowed him to tie current events to those of the past.

The pretext for the speech was to commemorate the memory of brave Hungarians standing against Communism on the occasion of Hungarian Revolution of 1956, however it served as politically useful in several ways. Orbán’s very first sentence references Poland. This reference not only recognizes the attendance of the Polish President, but also serves to solidify supposed historical (or perhaps merely current) political solidarity with Poland, as well as to use a national anthem as an example to signify the importance of ethnicity. It highlights in very few words (and in a benign as opposed to overtly racial way) that the survival of ethnic Poles equates

to the survival of the Polish state. Thus, he emphasizes the importance of Poland surviving long as the Polish people survive. He continues to align Poland and Hungary as examples of “freedom-loving, courageous nations”, which effectively and succinctly has a dual meaning of Poland and Hungary as nation-states as well as Poland and Hungary as nations (peoples).

Undeniably, Orbán’s use of emphasis as rhetorical convention oversignifies and oversimplifies the importance of the 1956 Hungarian revolt. Orbán’s use of this historical event allows for a bold and patriotic display under the legitimate pretext of marking the anniversary as one of the most important modern Hungarian historical moments. While certainly a very significant in Hungarian history (as well as the history of the Cold War as it is correctly described as the first significant revolt against the Soviet Union in post-World War Europe), Orbán fails to mention the outcome of the revolt. The revolution was quickly suppressed, and it did not result in political victory over communism. In doing so, he attempts to bend popular respect for past Hungarian heroism in 1956 against Soviet oppression and the historical distaste against communist oppression in his audience in order the shape social comparison to current political events. Therefore, the Hungarian tradition of “freedom” not only justifies but requires strong political resolve and political action, as later described in the speech. He personifies and spiritualizes Hungarian “freedom” against oppressive rule and compares and legitimizes current political actions in his current day fight against the “Sovietization” of the EU over the migrant crisis. Christian identity and the European identity and strength are also elements. Christian identity references compare to the devil in reference communism, and David and his sling, a direct hint of the biblical story of David slaying Goliath.

Orbán’s use of historical references politicize Hungarian national and historical pride and help to justify his current political goals by framing his political viewpoints on securitization of the migrant crisis as a continuation of Hungarian principles of freedom, morality, and resistance against oppression. The references to courage, heroism, and glory are not just mere adjectives to evoke emotion, but rather a means to personalize his message to the audience. As will be examined, Orbán’s use of language creates a moral dichotomy – a moral and justifiable position for his political philosophy and action, and a contrasting indefensible moral position of events, political bodies, and those defined as combatants against his moral political position.

[Excerpts below]

In their national anthem, the Polish sing: “Poland has not yet perished, As long as we still live”. The Hungarians reply thus in their “Nemzeti Dal” (“National Song”): **“By the God of Hungary We swear, We swear that we the yoke of slavery No more shall bear!”** The slogan on the flag of the Polish legion is “For our freedom and yours”. This was true in 1848, it was true in 1956 and **it is also true today**. This is **a thousand-year-old friendship between two freedom-loving, courageous nations**. I hereby welcome President of Poland Andrzej Duda to Budapest, here in the main square **of the nation**. We salute him and all the people of Poland. God save Poland! At our ceremony, I welcome with gratitude **the revolutionaries of 1956**...I welcome with respect the friends of Hungary, who have arrived from twenty-six countries. They have stood by us and stood up for us, even in the most difficult times; and today they are here celebrating with us. Welcome!

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen, Hungarians around the world,

From here we send our greetings and heartfelt good wishes to all Hungarians – wherever in the world they may live. Hungary is their homeland, and Budapest is their capital also – just as the shining memory of October 1956 belongs to us all. For us, **23 October is the day of pride**. Even after sixty years, it uplifts and purifies. It is a shared heritage,

which was bequeathed to us by students, the workers of Újpest and Csepel, the citizens of Pest and Buda, locksmiths, apprentices, engineers, doctors, miners, soldiers and our executed prime minister. We owe them our eternal thanks...

... Hungarians joining us in commemoration,

In Budapest in October 1956 the course of history was reversed. Instead of the prophesised global communist revolution, a revolution broke out against the communist world. We sent a message to the West that the Soviet Union is vulnerable, and that in this world **the only permanent stars are those atop church spires. Communism, which until then was thought to be immovable, received a wound from which it was unable to recover.** After 1956 it fossilised alongside its ageing leaders, and finally together with them it entered in to a deal **with the devil.** Yet sometimes it still comes back to jeer and whistle at us! Nobody knows the origins of the Hungarians' strength and ability to attack from nowhere, and once every hundred years to be capable of miracles – **like a David with his sling.** Perhaps we possess the same ancient knowledge as that of the Greeks two and a half thousand years ago, who believed that the secret to a happy life is freedom, and the secret of freedom is courage...

**All of you gathered here in commemoration,**

The **Hungarians never relinquish their freedom,** they never accept its loss and are capable of conjuring it up – even in the most hopeless of situations. **In the autumn of 1956 everyone had the chance to see freedom** – to see it in its own perfect, flawless beauty. **It walked the streets and squares** of Budapest. **It stood in line** at the shops. It sat down at family dinner tables, appeared in offices, in smoky railway stations, and at the sad metal counters of bars. And **when it arrived, the Hungarians back then stood up and sang our National Anthem. If it is Hungarian, freedom is wonderful, even when it is dying.** And in death, too, it was a thing of wonder: although buried in an unmarked grave, face down, wrapped in roofing felt, its feet bound with barbed wire, it still rose up to live again. **It is here with us today, and it brings us together.**

All of you joining us in commemoration,

If our homeland is not free, neither can we be free...If a nation surrenders its freedom, then it can at any time slide back to simply being a minority. Only our own national independence can save us from the all-consuming, destructive appetites of empires. The reason we stuck in the throat of the Soviet empire and the reason it broke a tooth when it tried to bite on us was that we asserted our national ideals, that we stood together and did not surrender the love of our homeland. **This is also why we shall not accept the EU's transformation into a modern-day empire. We do not want them to replace the alliance of free European states with a United States of Europe. Today the task of Europe's freedom-loving peoples is to save Brussels from sovietisation, and from their aim to decide instead of us whom we should live within our own homeland. We Hungarians want to remain a European nation, not a minority in Europe.** As the heirs of 1956, we cannot accept that Europe wants to sever the roots which once made us great and which also helped us survive communist oppression. **There can be no free, strong, authoritative and respected Europe without the life-force of its nations and the two thousand-year-old wisdom of Christianity.** And we also cannot simply look on and do nothing while others work openly and systematically to replace the subsoil from which the shoots of European civilisation sprang forth. And although our size and weight does not enable us to shape the fate of Europe, we must take responsibility for our own fate. Even if the majority of Europe does restructure the foundations of its own civilisation and blend its own ideals and population, we must remain capable of protecting this piece of Europe the size of Hungary, which has always put fire in our hearts and inspired the Hungarian people.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

**The secret to freedom is courage...**people are either brave, or they are cowardly. When the time comes to face a test, it becomes apparent who we really are. In Hungarians, courage and common sense co-exist well, side by side...Nevertheless, **perhaps our geographical position every thirty years causes history to suddenly thrust us into the main current of debate on the future of Europe.** In 1956, after the Soviets pulled out of Austria, we sought to push the Iron Curtain back beyond our eastern border. We were brave and attacked the Soviet tanks with

mere Molotov cocktails. In 1989 it was we who had to open our border, to let Germans find their way to other Germans. We were courageous and did this, despite the fact that Soviet forces were stationed here. **And now, in 2015–2016, it is we who have had to close our border to stop the flood of migration from the South. Not once did we request the task – it was the work of history, and was brought on us by fate.** All we have done is not run away and not back down – we have simply done our duty. **We have continued to do our duty, even while being attacked from behind by those who we have in fact been protecting.** We have the courage to face up to injustice, because on Hungarian soil injustice does excuse one from fulfilling one's obligations; and therefore, **Europe can always count on us.**

Poles and Hungarians joining us in commemoration,

...**A cowardly nation has no homeland.** There will always be dramatic situations, strong adversaries and high stakes. But **this is no reason to surrender ourselves to fear. It is no reason to yield to the pathfinders for fear: to terrorists who declare war on the Western world; to profit-seekers, who send towards Europe hundreds of thousands of people who yearn for a better life; to do-gooders and naive souls who have no idea of the extreme danger towards which they are pushing Europe – and with it themselves.** If you can choose between two paths, choose the more difficult one: this is the first rule of bravery. The modern world is suffering because it has forgotten all this. Today Europe prefers to choose what is cheaper, watered-down and less demanding: bringing in immigrants instead of building their own families; speculation instead of work; debt instead of discipline. We Hungarians have set off on the more difficult path: our own children instead of immigrants; creating work instead of speculation and welfare benefits; achieving self-sufficiency instead of debt slavery; and border protection instead of the white flag of surrender.

Honoured veterans of 1956, Ladies and Gentlemen,

**There can be no victory without the uplifting of hearts.** Without this 1956 would not have happened either: it made the cowards brave, brought the suspicious together and replaced semi-paralysis with the will to act. It created unity, a national unity, where previously there had been only strife, incitement to class struggle, intellectual well-poisoning and a disintegrating nation.

My friends,

**Political strength, a parliamentary majority and even a new constitution are not enough:** though all are necessary conditions, they are not sufficient. Once again, victory cannot be achieved without the uplifting of hearts and without the spiritual awakening of Hungary and the Hungarian people. The towering example of 1956 is a beacon before us. Those who have eyes to see and ears to hear can see and hear this thousand-year-old truth: there must be unity in the most important things, freedom in other things and love in all things.

Glory to the brave. Go for it Hungary! Go for it Hungarians!

Orbán builds upon his Hungarian national social identity construct by through the use of his speech acts as narrative tool, raising a predicative and argumentative strategy to evaluate the modern Hungary concept with positive value. This discursive strategy later enables the Hungarian construct to be successfully compared as a social actor with the EU, and later the migrants.

First, he explains Hungarian failures:

Let me now briefly describe how, for Hungary, this new world naturally created a great many new opportunities, along with a great many new dilemmas. The first circumstance that we must face to this very day is that **we started out at a disadvantage. Germany only needed to liberate one half or one third of its territory from communism. We had no equivalent of West Germany: our entire country was under communism.** Unlike Austria, which the Russians left in 1955, in Hungary they only withdrew in 1990. The grave consequence of this is

that to this very day we feel the loss of almost forty years of our history and forty years of opportunity for economic development; and to this very day our state of development still trails countries which were not subjected to this ordeal. Therefore, when today in 2014 we speak of Hungary – or of any Central European country – it is always worth bearing in mind that we are speaking of countries **which are still working hard day after day to make up for historical disadvantages** in an environment within the European Union where we must live together and compete with countries which have an enormous competitive advantage over us. This has been and will be a challenge and a formidable intellectual problem for Hungarian policymakers of all political persuasions (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

One of the basic flaws of our transitional constitution before the enactment of the Fundamental Law was that it failed to declare historical continuity and **failed to give an adequate response** to the changes which have taken place throughout the nation's history. We cannot ignore, with a mere shrug of the shoulders, the fact that **Hungary's history in the 20th century included a series of events which disrupted the country's historical continuity: humiliating peace treaties following defeat in war, military occupations, dictatorships and radically opposing political systems.** Going beyond the demands of sheer logic and history, we cannot ignore this, because the events of the 20th century and decades of silence regarding these events led to the past being subjected to contradictory interpretations in our present-day lives... (Orbán, 24 Apr 2015).

the problem of Hungary...we don't have rich enough number of persons, the problem is not the richness but the lack of the rich families, that's the problem, **because we had a communist system in Hungary for 40 years. All family property was confiscated, major companies, smaller companies, middle-sized were confiscated and nationalized, so therefore we don't have an accumulation of the capital...** (Orbán, 2013).

However, when you think about it, it is natural that the rewards of those who work – work more, are more talented or are ready to take more risks – should grow faster than those who do not. I am therefore convinced that we must change from a culture of jealousy, a culture of aversion to people who are financially successful, to a culture that acknowledges performance. This will not be easy, particularly for those of us who come from backgrounds in the egalitarian system which was communism; but I am sure that we should see the existing differences in wealth more as a motivating force, rather than some sort of injustice that we seek to eliminate through artificial regulation. I could also express this by saying that for us democracy does not mean a continuation of the class struggle by peaceful means. We do not wish to accept this mentality under any circumstances, as it will result in a declining society with declining performance (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

I saw that in the past we were either afraid of foreign countries or looked down on them. We must abandon this mentality as no longer being worthy of a country seeking to become Central Europe's front runner once again in the near future – a country in which others may increasingly see the unfolding success of brave and independent economic policy. It is time for us to learn to look upon other countries as our equals, and to look upon ourselves as their equals (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

Orbán also utilizes negative labels of EU performance, to decrease the threat to Hungarian self-esteem:

“If we look at the facts we can deduce from the figures, we can see that **Europe accounts for an ever-declining percentage of the world economy, global industrial production and world trade.** This has **shaken our self-image – the self-image of the European people.** We believed that we were joining a community which is one of the world's fastest growing, most dynamic and most prosperous economic zones: one able to offer the highest level of economic prosperity. And **here we are now; we can see that we are not growing,** while others are growing at an enormous rate, and therefore our share of the world economy is continuously shrinking. Today, **25 years after reunification, the European community finds it a problem to face this fact.** At present, the European political elite refuses to recognise it, or if they do, it is only behind closed doors, and never in public... (Orbán, 6 Nov. 2014)

Orbán positions past negative Hungarian national labels with present labels, serving to consolidate and expand political support but also to inspire, and attempt to restore positive social identity:

In 2010 we were **fighting for our economic survival**, and it took all our strength just to stand on our own feet. Therefore, in 2010 we could only pursue a foreign policy of adaptation. We could only expect our foreign policy to defend from external threats our efforts for our economic sovereignty, and the country's renewal and reorganization. We accomplished this under János Martonyi's guidance, to whom we are grateful (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

It is perhaps right for me to use this opportunity to name just a few major problems that the entire European community is facing and tell you what solutions Hungary has found to them, because we are convinced that Hungary is not part of the problem but part of the solution. **We have achieved remarkable results** in some areas and have tested new means and methods which are not yet known elsewhere in Europe (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

### **The Migrant Issue as Security Threat: Comparing Civilizations, Values**

Orbán's interview below demonstrates numerous themes in line with his social identity construct of the national Hungarian social identity, but this text particularly highlights his attempt to demonstrate the cultural differences between Hungarians (and Europeans) and the migrants allowing for comparison between the "in-group" and "out-group" on various levels.

Provided there are Christians there will be a spiritual upturn, 30 Sep 2016.

"We have been taught that if two or three people are gathered together in the name of Christ, then he is in their midst. Therefore, it is almost inconceivable that Christianity could disappear, because there will always be at least two or three of us". Zsuzsa Fekete's interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for Reformed Church news portal reformatus.hu.

**Millions of people are leaving their homes in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia because of political tensions and civil wars, and in the hope of a better life. Many, including yourself, believe that the problem must be solved where it originates – meaning that people in distress should be given assistance in their own homelands. Why aren't the world's more affluent countries putting a lot more effort into this?**

The phenomenon which we call mass population movement began much earlier than the refugee crisis, and is a much longer process than that crisis. **If we look at the ethnic composition of large Western European cities we can see that radical changes have taken place. We see shocking figures for the proportions of native and non-native populations in Paris, Rome and other large cities.** The people who have already arrived in Hungary come from about 80 different countries, and the most difficult stage of the process will be when Africa sets out for Europe. We are part of a long process in world history. Some world leaders believe that the right to a better life is something everyone is entitled to, but, in order to achieve this better life, no efforts need to be made in the homelands of people living in poverty; instead, they say, people can freely go to wherever such a life is available. **If we allow space for this belief it will destroy Europe, its culture and its economic system – and it will not help those who come here.** People who stay at home in those countries will also lose out. So, what we must solve is not a refugee crisis, but a historic task related to how we Europeans, Hungarians and Christians relate to mass population movement. Of course, the question of taking assistance to those countries instead of bringing the problems here is still valid – and this is not just true of the crisis in the Middle East. Many disagree, but of course hypocrisy has been a part of world politics for a long time (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Prime Minister, two years ago, in Strasbourg and many times since you declared that you would like Hungary to stay Hungarian. Do you really believe that current developments are pointing to the elimination of nations in Europe?**

Yes, **this is a matter of life and death**: we are talking about fundamental issues related to our very existence. If we look at the **shifting ethnic balances and the difference in fertility rates** between the indigenous population and those who have newly arrived, **simple mathematics tell us how many years it will take before there are as many of them as of us, and when they will be in the majority. This is not the first time that this has happened in the course of human history** (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**But couldn't we integrate the new arrivals somehow?**

It takes a vivid imagination to believe that young Afghan men will marry into traditional German Christian families or Christians into Muslim families en masse. **The best we can hope for is not integration but peaceful coexistence, and this is what we call a parallel society. If cultures are not too far apart then they can live side-by-side on the same territory for centuries, but the harsh reality is that the greater the cultural divide, the greater the chance of conflict and clashes history** (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Since you mentioned marriage, what changes could be brought by the mass settlement of Muslims in Hungary – a country with Christian roots? Will we have to retaylor our legal system if, for instance, in the name of family reunification, a Muslim man brings four wives and ten children to Hungary? From a simple legal perspective, what will this situation bring?**

Parallel societies mean parallel legal systems. Having more than one wife is illegal in Hungary, because it is regarded as bigamy or polygamy. In states with traditional Christian-based legal systems there are Arab families who may comply with the law on the surface, but who in reality live their private lives according to the culture and legal system of their country of origin. Personally, I understand that they have greater trust in their own faith, ideals, customs and family arrangements than they do in ours. **I regard freedom as important and I accept that people who are different from us have the right to live in a different way, but that doesn't require them to come here. It is best for everyone to stay "under their own fig tree". But once we have admitted someone and they have established an ever-growing community here, while our community is declining, then it will be just a matter of time before they introduce their own rules,** according to which they live first as a minority legal system and then as a majority one, citing precisely their right to freedom and autonomy history (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**What about those Hungarians who have left for Germany or Great Britain in the hope of a better standard of living?**

This doesn't relate to them, because coexistence between our Central European citizens and their citizens is an essentially different problem. Brexit, of course, has shown that coexistence also causes difficulties there. One of the driving forces behind the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union was precisely the fact that many people from Central Europe went to the UK seeking work, and this angered local people. But Hungarians, Czechs and Poles come from essentially the same cultural background, so their coexistence does not lead to civilisational antagonism; although social and economic issues do arise, that is an entirely different dimension history (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**The various countries of Europe all follow different social and economic models, but despite this the European Union is striving to achieve unity on migration, which is causing tension. Where will this lead?**

If someone begins to view themselves as the centre of an empire, then they can easily fall into the trap of thinking that the more spheres of competence they have, the stronger they are. They think that the more capable they are of centrally controlling the life of countries, the stronger the community of countries will be. But this is a mistake, because the building blocks of European culture are provided by nations which each have their own separate cultures, but which are suddenly deprived of the opportunity to have a say in their own fate. This leads to a weakening of these communities, and the balance of the equation becoming negative, despite the strengthening of the centre. This is why I believe that we should aspire to a European Union that is a community of strong nations (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**The European Commission has already come to a decision: they want a mandatory quota, but why are they persisting with the distribution of migrants according to a quota when the majority of migrants have no desire to come to live in Hungary – or, for instance, Latvia, Romania or Slovakia?**

Unless we chain them to an immovable object, they will soon up sticks and go somewhere where they hope to enjoy a higher standard of living than they can have here (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**But what, then, is the point of the quota?**



There is a special perspective: the perspective of Germany, Austria and Sweden, and in general of the countries where trouble has already occurred. **Huge masses of people arrived in these countries without any controls or identification, and coexistence is proving difficult.** In such a situation, what can the politicians say? “There may be many of them now, but we will distribute them. **We may have a major problem now, but it will be smaller if we distribute it.**” **From their perspective, this is the logic behind the distribution of immigrants** (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Can you imagine a Hungary which bows to the will of the centre and admits the migrants?**

I don't want to imagine something like that. If I wanted to think about that I'd read “Eclipse of the Crescent Moon” (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**A Protestant American news website recently wrote that Europe is divided: there is an elite, and there is another part that is standing by Europe's Christian roots. They believe that the political battle on migration is a good opportunity for both sides, because the elite knows that the Muslims would never vote for a party with Christian roots – meaning that the more Muslims there are, the more that conservatives will be pushed out of power. But on the other hand, it is also a good opportunity for states with national roots to reinforce national consciousness. What do you think?**

It includes some part-truths. **The idea that people from Muslim communities find it extremely difficult to vote for a Christian political party is a logical one.** This means they will either vote for the left, or parties on the right must redefine themselves so that Christian values are downplayed. **This is the danger that is threatening the European right: if it wants to stay in the competition at all, it may be forced to take up a “central democratic” position, instead of a Christian democratic position. I regard this as a great loss, because we have had great leaders who entered the field of politics in the name of Christian values and did much good for the nations of Europe.** The effect of Christianity on political culture and everyday life is never stable: it fluctuates. Here in Europe we happen to be living through a period of a relatively low tide, but the high tide will follow, and then the spiritual upturn will begin, provided there are still Christians. The current low tide doesn't mean the end of Christian-inspired politics. **The calculations of the left which envisage Muslims becoming future left-wing voters will run aground, as Muslims will establish their own parties as soon as their populations are high enough. We are already seeing the first signs of this: there was a party of this kind in Holland, and there has also been a list of Turkish candidates for elections in Vienna. Muslims would primarily like to find politicians from among their own ranks, and they will also want to elect their own people – not the old social democrats – to the European Parliament.** Ultimately, the traditional left and right must both relinquish a significant portion of their political influence to a political force which is organised on the basis of a different culture. In the long term this will be a part of European democracy in countries which have allowed the existence of parallel societies. What we are fighting for now is to ensure that Hungary does not make the same mistake (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**You say that there is a low tide because there are fewer and fewer Christians...Not fewer worldwide.**

**Not worldwide, but certainly in Europe.** Christianity's centre of gravity has shifted away from Europe. On the world's other continents, we find lives based on stronger beliefs than here in Europe.

**And in such a situation how is it possible to build a country on Christian roots?**

We were taught that if two or three people gather together in the name of Christ, then he is there in their midst. Accordingly, it is almost inconceivable that Christianity could disappear, because there will always be at least two or three of us. As far as the state of our communities goes, I am not in good spirits either, but **this does not lead me towards hopelessness; instead I do my best to try to understand the vibrant movement of the Christian spirit – which sometimes gains ground, then withdraws** (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Why has the referendum become a party political issue? Will people vote according to their party affiliation or, as Reformed Church leaders have also urged, should everyone decide according to their own conscience?**

I don't think the referendum has become a party political issue; it's simply that many people would like to turn it into that. Hungarian society has an extremely clear-headed majority that can differentiate between questions of fate, national issues and party political issues. And the fact that people want to turn everything into a party political issue is nothing new in Hungary (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**We are approaching the 60th anniversary of the 1956 Revolution. On 14 October, the Hungarian Reformed**

**Church is holding a commemorative Synod in memory of 1956, to which you have also been invited. How do you view 1956 and, within it, the role of the churches?**

We have the freedom fighters of 1956 to thank for communism being at least to some extent more tolerable here than it was in East Germany, Poland, Romania or Czechoslovakia. In Hungary, the communists realised that there was a line which they could not cross, because if they did then they might not survive the attempt. Even the Russians needed a few days to spring into action, and during that time... The communists knew that they were exercising power in Hungary on the orders of a foreign power, but that they had to live with the people whom they were governing. They didn't want a repeat of what happened in 1956. We must be grateful to the revolutionaries of 1956 because, thanks to their sacrifice, our lives became easier. The churches of Central Europe reacted to the dictatorship in different ways. In Hungary, representatives of the militant church on both the Catholic and Protestant side soon disappeared. A totally different church strategy developed than, for instance, in Poland. The Revolution of 1956 was also about the fact that, if they are allowed to, the church and the people will soon find each other. The anniversary is also an opportunity to remember the Christian and Protestant faithful who have been unjustly forgotten (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Please allow me to share a personal experience: When you spoke at the funeral of Imre Nagy, my grandfather was watching the television wide-eyed and turned to my grandmother: "Mum, go to the shop and buy flour, sugar, salt and lard; there's going to be a war!" Looking back to 1989, how much of your dream of twenty-seven years ago, has been realised?**

If I may say so, the old gentleman wasn't too far from the truth, because war could easily have broken out, and then it would have been good to have lard and sugar in the pantry. There are those who regret and those who are glad that the changes here in Hungary took place without casualties and a civil war. It is difficult to say whether a more revolutionary change leading to a civil war would have created more achievements after a period of twenty-seven years than what was eventually realised by the negotiated transition. My view is that we should thank God that nobody died as a result of these political changes. What bothers me more is that between 1990 and 2010 there were twenty confused years, which could have been smoother, simpler and more successful (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Why weren't they more successful?**

The starting point for the change was not good enough. The Hungary which came after 2010 has been more successful because by then we no longer had to dance while tied hand and foot like József Antall had to in his time, and a constitutional revolution was successfully realised (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

**Sociologist Elemér Hankiss wrote that the world saw the true face of Hungary in 1956, and then again during the fall of communism. Can the world see us now, do you think?**

We are certainly the subject of attention – not like in 1956 or 1989, but in a way which involves much incomprehension. This is a result of Europe's divided fate following the Second World War. In 2004 we joined the European Union and sewed the "severed limb" back in place. But the scars are still there. **Under communism we didn't let them turn us into Homo Sovieticus and eradicate our culture.** When the Russians left, we found Europe again, but the scars are still here, and now **people in the Western half of the world look at us with incomprehension, because they cannot understand why we are clinging so hard to national independence, sovereignty and Christianity, and why we aren't more sympathetic towards the foreigners who are arriving in large numbers.** But in the meantime, we know that we have struggled for decades to prevent them from changing us and depriving us of our national and cultural identity. What is in our souls, I believe, is much stronger and more important than that which drives our opponents (Orbán, 30 Sep 2016).

Orbán's securitizes of the migrant issue in several layers, the first of which examines cultural dilemmas and cultural threats, and in 2014 calls for aid to genuine refugees and strong EU borders for illegal economic migrants, though also he seeks to reframe the migrant crisis discourse as other than a "refugee crisis", but movement of "economic migrants, refugees, and foreign fighters." Orbán's nominative and predicative discourse strategies aim to associate negative attributes to the migrants referring to them as a: "problem", a "danger", a "flood" threat that can "de-stabilize governments" and potentially the entire European continent. His comparisons are bleak and stark and have dramatic effect. This threat is labelled as an extremely negative social actor from which the EU must "seal" itself off from.

We have been forced to face a problem...immigration, or asylum policy. This is something that we must face up to. By way of background, and for those who are less familiar with Hungary...to the present day our country **does not have an immigrant community that leads its cultural life according to patterns which are different** from those of Hungarians...we have almost no Muslim immigrants whatsoever. Even though we can say that there are some, they form a small fraction of one per cent, and **that is how we would like to keep it**. Many find this a most uncivilised position, but I disagree. I dislike hypocrisy, and this is a time for straight talk: right now, Hungary would not be able to resolve the widespread problems that accompany immigration. At the same time, Hungary also holds the European view that in **immigration policy we must naturally help every individual who is in distress**. Therefore, **those whose lives are in danger and who are being persecuted on political grounds must be given help** – as follows naturally from European and Christian morality – and must even be given leave to stay if circumstances warrant. However, **no one can seriously think that all the refugees flooding Europe are political refugees**. No one could seriously entertain such an idea. We therefore need a highly sophisticated, intelligent and responsive refugee policy, or else Europe will become a magnet attracting everyone but not equipped to provide for them, and this will have negative implications for us all. We therefore support, and at a European level promote, the approach of **sealing our borders against immigration**, economic immigration; we must **also launch a policy which does not provide funds to refugees inside Europe, but channels them to those people's home countries: problems must be solved at root, where they emerge** (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

The danger we have been facing demands open and honest speech... what we have been facing **is not a refugee crisis. This is a migratory movement composed of economic migrants, refugees and also foreign fighters**. This is an **uncontrolled and unregulated process**. I would like to remind you that free choice of a host country is not included in the international law. I also want to underline that there is an **unlimited source of supply of people**, after **Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa is now also on the move. The dimension and the volume of the danger is well above our expectations** (Orbán, 22 Oct 2015).

This issue will determine the future of our political family. **We are in a deep trouble**. The migration crisis is able to **destabilize governments, countries and the whole European continent** (Orbán, 22 Oct 2015).

In simple terms, to call a spade a spade, the problem is mass migration. **Immigrants are now not just pounding on our doors, but are breaking them down on top of us. Not just a few hundred or thousand, but hundreds of thousands – indeed, millions – of migrants are besieging the borders of Hungary and Europe**. We cannot see an end to this. **There is plenty of supply: millions are setting out**. The following is not an exhaustive account. **Iraq** is a country of 33 million, where 8 million people are in need of humanitarian aid; in other words, 8 million people rely solely on humanitarian aid, and according to our projections this number will increase from 8 million to 10 million by the end of this year. Of these 8 million, we can say that as many as 4 million are internal refugees. **Syria**: four years of civil war; 12 million refugees receiving humanitarian aid; 7.6 million internal refugees, 4 million of whom have been forced to leave for neighbouring countries and are currently living in refugee camps. **Afghanistan**: 950,000 refugees in Iran, 1.5 million refugees in Pakistan. There is a **civil war in Libya**; continual internal insurrections in Eritrea; Mali is facing an internal war; and there is a semi-civil war situation in Somalia. If we add up the figures – the number of people and war situations – we can conclude that the number of internal refugees in the Sub-Saharan region is around 12.5 million. This is the summary report on the situation. **The North African line of defence has collapsed: the “Arab Spring” resulted in chaos, as the institutions of representative democracy – regarded by us, or rather by the West, as the only true form of state – remain inoperational in places where there is no will to operate them. Additionally, the European Union is weak**. Already at the beginning of the year, there were signs that this would not end well. Those with keen eyes could see that the migration pressure would escalate. **More and more people have set out, human traffickers have created their routes effectively with the help of the authorities, and Europe has not only left its doors and windows wide open, but has even sent out invitations to immigrants** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

Orbán's speech acts must persuade a comparison to be made between Hungarian and European cultural and social identity, making the case against economic migrants and a case for border security:

...the rules relating to refugees do not come into play...if we are talking about economic migrants; no one, no country in the world is obliged to accept them, unless they want to. There is no international law which compels anyone to receive economic migrants. As regards genuine refugees who are indeed fleeing degradation or a threat to their lives, the world does provide safe shelter for them. But **a refugee cannot say that they want to be a refugee in Germany, or in Macedonia – or in Hungary, for that matter. They have no choice!** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015)

This is the same procedure, Ladies and Gentlemen, as in 1956. Those who are refugees cooperate with the authorities of the given country – say Austria. There they go to a refugee camp where they receive the basic necessities of life and are safe, and there they await the announcement of the international quotas which decide where they can go...But that someone should just set out for the world, and say that Greece or Turkey is not good enough for them (okay, life in a refugee camp in Turkey is surely not the best, but it is safe), and then move on to Greece, and then Macedonia; but they are still not satisfied, and then they move to Serbia, (which is likewise not good enough), and then Hungary next. Hungary? That is out of the question: I want to move on from here! Austria? What were you thinking about? I want to go from Austria straight to Germany. No immediate benefits are available? Well then, I'll move to Sweden! This mechanism simply does not exist: it has nothing to do with any kind of international refugee convention... (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

Orbán justifies the “obligation of the nation state” as in “line with the common will”, proposing that more borders to “protect” demonstrate “competence in terms of governance” and are the solution, justifying his securitizing of the migrants as fulfilment of Hungary’s signature of the Schengen Agreement. Thus, this event allows Orbán to demonstrate power through securitizing the crisis in order to gain parliamentary powers to set up fencing (which he received and fencing of sections of Hungary’s southern border was initiated in June 2015) to “solve the problem”:

Several of you say that the construction of the Hungarian fence is not a solution, because if it were then everyone should build fences. **But of course, this is the solution!** To put it more modestly: **we signed an agreement which we call the Schengen Agreement.** Everyone signed this of their own free will and in line with the common will. It says that the **protection of borders is the obligation of each nation state** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

This may seem a little absurd, but if you think about it, it is not so absurd at all. Greece **must protect itself** by some means (with a fence, if there are no other options), and **Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, too, must protect themselves;** in this event the **entire system of southern external land borders of the free Schengen zone and the European Union would be protected.** A considerable proportion of European Union leaders state in their defence – something that we, in Hungary never use as a defence – that this is such a formidable task that it simply cannot be performed. **When we hear arguments of this type I think that it is in fact an admission of a lack of competence in terms of governance.** We believe that this task is manageable. At the very centre of international debates today is the question of whether we can accept what is still the majority view among politicians – I would not say among the people, but among politicians – that we are facing a problem which we cannot protect ourselves against, which cannot be physically blocked, and which we should therefore surrender to. There are views like this. And there is another view. **We are the only ones who take the view that it is possible to solve the problem,** but we must combine all our strengths – legal strength, financial resources, personnel and political courage – and we can then protect our borders. And **if everyone protects their own borders, Europe will be protected.** This is our position, and we seek to persevere in it (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

What have we come to? The Europe of which we were once proud – because this was the world of freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of opinion – is today in such an intellectual state, has manoeuvred itself into such a spiritual state, that certain words, questions and political concepts cannot even be uttered. The word “fence” is not a swear word (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

## **Immigration as Demographic Threat: Comparing Immigration with Cultural Suicide**

Orbán securitizes the migration issue not as an immediate threat, but a long-term one, openly describing the threat that immigration poses to displacing European and Hungarian identity. This securitization aims to address European biological decline and demographic

suicide and advocate for “family friendly” policies and children as the key to magnifying the strength of the nation. Here, he utilizes an intensification strategy on the speech act as illocutionary force by essentially warning of the danger, predicting outcomes, and explaining why change is needed:

The modern world sees economic facts as the ones that truly count. It may be right, but **I would attach higher priority to facts related to life. Above all, the facts which determine our biological survival and continuance** (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

...we must also speak of the question of families. This also, I believe, qualifies as some sort of a **taboo issue** in the European Union. Families must be supported. **Families must be supported** so that they can have children, can raise more children, can feel that **their children are safe and secure**, and can see that their children have a positive future. We must seek to use our own resources – **with a new family policy and without immigration** – to slow down, halt and reverse our demographic decline. I know that today this seems to fall into the realm of science fiction, as if we look at the numbers and the trends and are familiar with the age that we live in, this seems to be a rather hopeless enterprise. Ferenc Deák articulated a guiding motto of Hungarian politics: “I can also go on fighting without hope.” This is just such a situation. **He fought without hope, and this led to the Compromise, and the advancement of Hungary.** This story, too, amply demonstrates that there are battles that may seem hopeless but, if we commit to them, in the end hope may emerge. I am therefore certain that we should not head towards the easier option, **we should not give up on family policy. We should not seek to compensate for lack of workers with immigration, but should instead take steps towards supporting families.** This, I must repeat, requires great effort on our part (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

The situation is **that in Europe today it is not PC to talk about demographic issues.** I am personally faced almost daily with the fact that there are certain topics which nowadays are not considered suitable subjects for discussion in the European public sphere. There are words which simply cannot be uttered...for political reasons (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

I sometimes feel as if the same thing has happened to **demographics and family policy. Neither the topic, nor the use of the words is PC,** and in order to prevent potential attacks a truly European politician would weed them out of their message, making sure that they are not even uttered, as it could be embarrassing, would call for explanation, and would result in negative media reports the next day. However, **Europe’s demographic situation could be a serious topic.** You are no doubt aware that I belong to the sphere of people’s parties: the community of parties with Christian democratic inclinations which are located on the centre-right of the political map. When we create, and adopt documents relating to the future, **we continually fail to agree that the term “family” should even feature in those documents. When we suggest incorporation of the word, there are some who oppose it, saying that even if we use the word, we can only use it in the plural, leaving open what the concept of family actually means, and what a European family comprises** (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

Europe is ageing. The figures show that **Europe’s population will decline.** In 2013 the number of deaths exceeded the number of births in one half of the 28 Member States of the European Union, and in some European countries a depressingly high percentage of young people cannot even find jobs. In addition, Europe’s demographic weight in the world will continue to decrease. In 1960 Europe’s population accounted for 13.4 per cent of the world’s population; in 2013 that figure is only 7.1 per cent, if we look at the 28 Member States of the European Union. This means that Europe is the continent and civilisation which is struggling with the gravest demographic problem and is the most rapidly ageing continent. But if the situation is this serious, why is this topic so under-represented in politics and in European discourse in general? Who will live here in Europe? This is the key question here. We should talk about this seriously, and **yet much more time, attention, energy and money are being devoted to other things and to debates which have much less to do with reality: gender debates, same-sex marriage,** and we could certainly mention quite a few others. These are all important things which may be dear to our hearts, but they are nonetheless only secondary. They will not shift Europe out of the economic and social quagmire which it is stuck in. It seems that today **there is antipathy towards those who are willing to point out that the emperor has no clothes,** those who warn, based on factual evidence, that there will be big problems if politics abandons **the basic unit of European culture: the family** (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

In Hungary, the majority believe that in the modern age a child is both a blessing and a reward in the life of a family and in the life of society alike. Everyone in Hungary – all right, maybe not everyone, but most people – are capable of doing more for their children than for themselves. We Hungarians believe that **children magnify the strength of their parents, they magnify the strength of the family, and a generation of children magnify the strength of a nation, of a whole country, and finally our entire civilisation**. Children magnify our capacity, and enable us to achieve more; this is the view we take. So, children are a motivating force: a positive motivating force in the life of society, like no other we know of. After all, when we are old, they will look after us, they will attend to our needs, they will be the guarantee for renewal of our communities, and they will take forward the heritage which is everything which has made our lives meaningful. Without children, there is no continuation, and there is no security for the elderly (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

Orbán securitizes the nation-state concept in the metaphor of societies, hinting that immigration will lead to conflict rather than peaceful communities stating imperatively and with strong intensification discursive strategies. He warns (illocutionary act, essentially speech act) that the “survival of our civilisation is at stake”, a “moral duty” to defend European borders from the “implant” of a different culture. This serves as one of his most important arguments within the social comparison construct of the “in-group” versus the “out-group”. His social comparison highlights stark contrasts, e.g. “outlook on life...a mentality and customs which are completely different than ours”:

It is not the topic of this meeting in the strictest sense, but we all know that **if there are insufficient numbers of children, the issue of immigration will emerge...**In terms of **the peaceful functioning of societies, it is important that our communities should be capable of regeneration**. It is important that communities should remain viable, and should be able to sustain themselves without resorting to external resources. I am convinced that Europe cannot build its future on immigration, rather than families. I would like to warn you, however, that there are already European documents in existence which seek the solution in that area (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

Those who expect help from elsewhere will sooner or later have to pay the price for it. This is an iron law, there is no alternative to it – even though **there are some in Brussels who think that the immigrants flooding into Europe should be seen as a blessing, because with them we shall be able to resolve our economic and demographic problems overnight**. Many of us – perhaps all of us – know that this is not true at all. And we also know that this way of thinking is **extremely dangerous**. It is dangerous because it **upsets the balance of the continent**. It **implants among us a culture and an outlook on life with a mentality and customs which are completely different from ours**. **This culture has a different approach to work, has different ideas about human relations and, last but not least, holds different views on the foundations of our social system: the family** (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

**The survival of our civilisation and culture is at stake**. In the history of the world, not a single culture which was unable to populate the land in which it lived was able to survive; writers from antiquity extensively documented this phenomenon (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

I sincerely hope that...more and more European leaders will have the courage to endorse **the need for family-friendly** European policy (Orbán, 5 Nov 2015).

We take the view that it is **the most natural thing in the world to want to protect one’s own family**. This is just what we are doing now. **Hungary has been a valued member of the larger European family for a thousand years. It is its historic and moral duty to protect Europe, as Hungary thereby also protects itself. The reverse is also true: when we protect the borders of Hungary, we also protect Europe** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

## Migration as Economic Threat

His argument here is more pragmatic, and his discursive strategy relies upon perspectivization and argumentation of the Hungarian state and Hungarian people having the “right” to choose whom they employ in their labor force.

We in Hungary **reject the notion that we need immigrants in order to have a labour** force that is prepared to do certain jobs. In our view, **a national community must organise its life so as to ensure that there are those who carry out even the least appreciated jobs. Importing people from abroad to do jobs that we are for some reason not prepared to do is not a solution. This is not a healthy mentality.** A country must be able to perform all the jobs which are, as we understand it, necessary for its existence and maintenance. If a situation arises in which there is insufficient labour, there are two things we may do. **One is to look around within our own borders, to see where our hidden reserves may lie. I would like to draw everyone’s attention to Roma affairs** – not only in Hungary, but across the whole of Europe. We are speaking about a European community of ten million – hundreds of thousands of people in Hungary alone – which represents major employment reserves, provided we have good policy for their training and integration into the labour market...the mobilisation of our own reserves (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

...Hungary alone is unable to resolve the situation – that is, to end **the flood of migrants** and eliminate the causes creating refugees. We can take part in an international operation which seeks to achieve this, but we cannot resolve the situation. What we can undertake is to manage the situation, because even if we are unable to resolve it, we are not prepared to live with a problem under just any circumstances. While we are fully aware that we are unable to resolve the situation, we are not prepared to assist migrants in just passing through or staying in Hungary and doing whatever they like in defiance of Hungarian law, without registration and identification...Therefore, when we build a fence and make our Penal Code more stringent, we are not seeking to resolve the problem (because we simply cannot undertake that), but we are indicating a specific method for coping with a global problem. This is how we are going to live with the problem until it is resolved by the international community...I do not support, cannot allow, and will always resist a scenario in which party leaders elected by the Hungarian people simply stand up, shrug their shoulders, and say: “You see, there is no Hungarian solution; the situation will improve when it is resolved by the international community.” One cannot have this. We must create an acceptable framework in our day-to-day lives for the management of the situation. This is what is happening now, this is what everyone can legitimately expect us to do, and we shall always rise to this challenge (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

We are unable to support all the economic migrants. A minimal understanding of economics and our experiences to date are enough to tell all of us that we are unable to give jobs to everyone. Furthermore, we cannot even be sure that they all want to work hard. I think it puts things into perspective when one sees that there are some who are not even satisfied with Austria, and who then move on to Germany; and it also puts things into perspective when one sees immigrants demonstrating in Germany because they want to go on to Sweden. The situation is made worse by a spate of serious crime. A Europe which requires its half a billion citizens to respect its laws is unable to persuade migrants to undergo a simple registration process. Brussels’ policies and the great powers made the situation even worse when they proved to be unable to grasp the root of the problem, and saw people who are clearly illegal economic migrants as being refugees. As a result, we find that our borders are in danger, our way of life based on respect for the law is in danger, and Hungary and the whole of Europe are in danger. What is happening now is an invasion; we are being invaded. It is, however, a daily experience in Europe now that those who have been invaded are unable to offer shelter (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

I am not going to name names, or even countries, but if someone keeps saying that we abide by the Dublin Convention, and it is now time to distribute migrants in Europe based on quotas, it sounds like a legally appropriate proposition. It is a positive proposition in its intentions, but despite these intentions it is a terrible idea, because the outcome of this will be that the people concerned will take this as a message that they can come to no harm, they are free to come as they have done up to now, they may cross borders illegally as they have done so far, and they will eventually find shelter and accommodation somewhere. From nations’ points of view, quotas mean a sharing of burdens: the burden which each nation agrees to share. But for a person who has walked two thousand kilometres, quotas are not about burdens, but about getting shelter somewhere and, regardless of the underlying intentions, the message is taken as an invitation. It is this outcome that we bear responsibility for. Our moral responsibility, too, is linked to the outcome, rather than to our intentions; and regardless of our intentions, our political decision has encouraged millions to set out, and for this we must accept our share of moral responsibility. This is why it is very

important to make it clear, and this is why I put it as plainly as I do, almost with the harshness of sandpaper, when I say: ‘Do not come’. I beseech those who wish to come to Europe through Hungary: ‘Do not come’. I say this for moral reasons, because we Hungarians cannot be responsible for what may happen to you on the way. We are not encouraging you to set out on this journey. And I, and we Hungarians, cannot accept responsibility if the sea claims your lives. Do not risk your lives and the lives of your children for the sake of an illusion. Do not come, you will not be able to cross the border. As you are not refugees (and I shall come back to this in a minute), but migrants, Hungary will act in accordance with the rules on migrants. Hungary will not let you in, or will send you back. Therefore, you should not risk your children’s lives (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

**These people** – and we are coming to a very important point here – **are no longer fleeing to safety**. Turkish refugee camps may not be the most comfortable places, very probably are not what you would dream about, and may not offer the life we would like for ourselves, but those who are already in a Turkish refugee camp are safe (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

If you wish to live in Hungary, whether as a migrant or as a refugee, an application can be submitted in Athens at the Embassy of Hungary – or I believe, at the Embassy of Germany there also. We will assess your application. We have our own rules, and at the end of the procedure we will tell you whether, if you are refugee, you should stay here or under international conventions you should move to another country. **If you are a migrant, we will tell you whether we want you to live here, whether we need you, and whether we can find a place for you. Because we are the ones who best know how many people we are able to provide jobs for and to care for at the same level as Hungarians; and we can only provide jobs and care for a number of people which does not upset our own system** (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

Buzan, et al (cf. Derrida 1977a, Waever 1995b) recognize the subjectivity of securitization:

Whether an issue is a security issue is not something individuals decide alone. Securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed: Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that should survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a threat, and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? This quality is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm. For individuals or groups to speak security does not guarantee success (31).

Securitization is subjective, and ultimately based upon a value judgement made by the securitizing actor and his audience. A critical element in securitization theory suggests that securitization must be viewed as subjective (or perhaps intersubjective), and that the securitization process (the “hyper-political” aspect) and its result largely hinges upon the successful usage of persuasion to validate the social construct.

## **The National Consultation**

Orbán’s national consultation proved a less than dramatic first attempt to gain political currency in Hungary. While Orbán claimed it successful, and it served him as a barometer to measure political winds in Hungary, it had little long term effect. The influx of migrants in mid-2015 had more. Orbán uses argumentative strategy to justify better governance through seeking “agreement” with the people:

whenever we see a problem – a difficult issue, or rather several difficult issues – on the horizon, we seek to reach areas of agreement between the people and the Government before it looms larger, before its weight starts to crush the entire spectrum of Hungarian politics and before it culminates in a crisis...the essence of the National



Consultation is to create an area of agreement on the most difficult issues in good time. It is not just about legitimacy, something that the Government can refer to – but that is not irrelevant. We must have a genuine area of agreement to directly explore people’s opinions with our questions (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

This is why we are able to stand by our migration policy. The Government’s position on migration is uncompromising – because one million out of eight million people responded, and 85–90 per cent of them told us clearly what they want. They also told us what they do not want. So, there is an area of agreement in Hungarian politics, and several areas of agreement on migration, which gives democratic stability (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015). t

The question is whether a country has the right to declare that it **does not wish to change its own ethnic-cultural composition** suddenly and dramatically as a result of external intervention. Does a country have the right to say it does not want this? Or do we have to subject ourselves to the international liberal doctrine (I apologise for introducing ideology), which says that everyone is free to choose where they wish to live in the world? (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

The National Consultation provides us with **firm support** in this respect also. Our position is a **sovereign position**, according to which every nation, every community, every state has the right to decide on its own development. This is why we do not have the right to influence or to even pass judgement on the attempts of other countries to live with large communities which are based on religious and cultural foundations which are different from those traditionally found there. I believe we should not in any way judge France for choosing to have – or at least accepting – a society in which eight to ten per cent of the population is from the Muslim community. And based on demographic calculations – and this is pure mathematics – indigenous French people have also decided that in the future they shall live in a society in which that community will form an increasingly large percentage. That is their decision. Obviously, the Germans also made their own decision with respect to Turkish people some time ago, and have been making decisions on this ever since. I believe that we must not pass judgement on these decisions, either from a political point of view, or based on reason, **because it is the right of every people – a given country’s indigenous people – to decide with whom they want to live** (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

Because if the Hungarian people decide that things are fine the way they are, thank you very much, no one has the right to tell us to change – to tell us to live with a substantial and ever-growing Muslim community. No one has the right to demand this of us, and at the end of the debate this is what we shall have to say in very clear terms (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

Orbán demonstrates his willingness to defend the Hungarian nation and European borders. Its served to increase his domestic support in 2015 and early 2016. His strategy of securitizing the migrant crisis was successful in terms of Hungarian Parliament authorizing use of the Hungarian Army (non-lethal force authorized) to patrol in conjunction with Hungarian Police along the Croatian part of the border (not covered by the initial Hungarian-Serbian border fence. The discursive strategies utilized were intensification, predication, and argumentation, and were more effective in 2015 when uncertainties of numbers and a large influx of migrants were arriving in Hungary:

Why does the Hungarian government support the fence? It supports the fence **because it works. It works!** Just take a look, the Hungarian-Serbian border section is 175 kilometres long – look, and you can see the figures. **Earlier we had hoped that, in line with international experience, the number of illegal migrants would fall to one-sixth or one-seventh.** This is not what happened; **there was a much more significant decrease.** So, we can tell you that the fence on the Serbian-Hungarian border – about which I shall supply further details – is a double line of defence: not single but double. This double line of defence, with police behind it – and military operations and a strict penal code behind that – has been, combined with the police, enough to prevent illegal entry into the territory of Hungary along a section of 175 kilometres. But it does not prevent all entry. **As while the term “border fence” is often mentioned in combination with the word “closure”, we are not closing the border, but merely the green border. The borders are open at the designated entry points** where people have been able – earlier also – to enter and exit under normal circumstances, in observance of existing international and Hungarian regulations. But we have closed the green border, and have created a physical structure which can be protected (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

...if we claim that the fence works (and it does work on the Serbian border), **what about Croatia? This is where we stand on the situation on the Croatian border. Ladies and Gentlemen, we cannot protect both borders – the Serbian and Croatian borders – without the defence forces.** The room for manoeuvre that you have given us has been enough to deploy the police. **You have not given us authorisation to use the military, and we are therefore able to protect the Serbian section; we shall also be able to protect the Croatian section, but for that we need the army to be allowed to patrol the borders together with the police. If we are given authorisation to deploy the army in addition to the police, we shall be able to protect both the Croatian and Slovenian border sections; but this needs to be sanctioned, and you have denied us this approval. Therefore, allow me to say that those who refused permission for our soldiers to patrol our borders together with the police, and who now take us to task because we are not effective enough, are hypocrites and Pharisees. That is not a fair political stance** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

Orbán successfully securitized the issue domestically in Hungary, but internationally was harshly criticized. His speech acts, therefore have also demonstrated mitigation strategies in attempts to lessen international criticism. This strategy utilizes an argumentation to defend his legal actions as well as the mitigation strategy to appear more humanitarian:

In the summer of 2015, with complete disregard for European rules, **more than ten thousand migrants a day were arriving at the Hungarian-Serbian border.** These people had already been in the territory of another Schengen Area Member State. **As it is the responsibility of a country on the Schengen Area's external border to ensure that the crossing of that external border is controlled, Hungary had no choice but to erect a physical barrier.** We would quietly note that at that point in time, **there were already four other such fences in the territory of the EU.** Germany, and a considerable section of German public opinion, were unable to comprehend – and some people are still unable to do so – how Hungary, the country that tore down the iron curtain, could resort to such a measure (Orbán, 13 July 2016).

**We did this as good, law-abiding Europeans.** The protection of the external border is not a thing of beauty, it is not a matter of aesthetics, and **it cannot be done with flowers and cuddly toys.** In Banz, when I told politicians from the Christian Social Union in Bavaria that I am the captain of your border fortress, I wanted to express the essence of Schengen. The external borders of Germany and the central Member States are in fact many hundreds of kilometres from their territories. **These countries have placed their faith in the Member States on the external borders, trusting that they will perform their duty. And Hungary has done this.** Hungary is protecting the Germans – along with the Swedes, the Dutch and all its other European partners (Orbán, 13 Jul 2016).

Orbán utilizes limited mitigative strategies to lessen discriminatory phrases against the migrants:

...We are Christian democrats so the issue of moral responsibility...We have a heartfelt compassion for the people who left their homes. They are victims of the bad governance of their own countries. They are victims of bad international political decisions. And they are victims of our bad European policy as well which raises expectations that are impossible to be fulfilled. They are obviously victims of the human traffickers. **But considering them victims must not turn ourselves into being victims. Just because we do not consider them enemies we must not act against ourselves.** Our moral responsibility is to give back these people their homes and their countries. **It can't be our objective to provide them with a new European life.** Right to human dignity and security are basic rights. But neither the German, Austrian nor the Hungarian way of life is a basic right of all people on the Earth. It is only a right of those ones who have contributed to it. Europe is not able to accept everyone who wants a better life. **We have to help them to get back their own lives with dignity and we have to send them back to their own countries** (Orbán, 22 Oct 2015).

Let me draw your kind attention to the fact that European Christian democratic approach doesn't tolerate any anti-Muslim policy. **Muslim faith which we honor and respect is not responsible for the root causes of this mass migratory movement** (Orbán, 22 Oct 2015).

They do not want to see their country thronging with people from different cultures, with different customs, who are unable to integrate; people who would pose a **threat to public order, their jobs and livelihoods** (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

...we have no problems either with the Muslim community living here in Hungary. Those who are here have found a good place to be. They are in Hungary in accordance with the law; they are not immigrants, but have come to Hungary over the last twenty to twenty-five years, have entered the country lawfully at designated border crossing-points, have asked permission to establish their businesses, and created a living in Hungary...They have their own living, they have settled here, and contribute with their work to the value which Hungary generates year after year. Therefore, we shall continue to appreciate the Muslim community which we have in Hungary, but **we do not at all wish to see a sudden and dramatic rise in their numbers as a result of external intervention**. I know that these are seemingly contradictory ideas... (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

We do not criticise Islam as a civilisation, and we wish to strengthen our relations with countries forming part of that faith. We look upon the Islamic cultural communities living in Hungary as a valuable asset, and we do not wish to put them in awkward situations even at a verbal level; but we insist on Hungary's current ethnic-cultural composition... (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

Thanks to the mass media and the internet, it is now clear to everyone that **Europe is rich, but weak**. This is the most dangerous combination possible. From their own viewpoint, it appears to be a perfectly reasonable decision for those who live in difficult circumstances to set out for a rich but weak region of the world in order to take their share of the good life there: in this instance, here. We understand this. We understand that many of them are forced to leave countries where some are committing atrocities against their own people, where the economy has collapsed, and where unemployment has broken all records. The migrants themselves are the victims of bad political decisions. In fact, the world has turned its back on these people: the world has turned its back on states in which human dignity is not respected, and where it is degraded on a daily basis. We understand all this. **But based on simple mathematical calculations, it is easy to see that Europe is unable to take on all the troubles of the world** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

Despite Orbán's continued politicization and securitization efforts on the migrants, his 2 October constitutional referendum was unsuccessful in achieving the required votes needed for approval. While his speech (below) has been structured positively, it masks a defeat:

### **Viktor Orbán's press conference after the announcement of referendum results**

Budapest, 2 October 2016

Good evening, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to welcome those who are here with us, as well as those who are following events on TV. I would like to make a brief summary here, in the light of the results. Thirteen years after we decided to join the European Union with a large majority in a referendum, tonight once again the Hungarian people made their voice heard on a European matter. We have achieved an excellent result today, because we have surpassed the result of the referendum on Hungary's accession. In the accession referendum, 3 million 56 thousand people voted to join, and we currently stand at 3 million 204 thousand – and we have yet to hear about the bulk of the votes of Hungarians from beyond the borders. And here I should perhaps also add that some 15% more people voted in this referendum than the last European parliamentary election, so our weapon will be strong enough in Brussels as well.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to congratulate everyone, and to express my gratitude to those who, having appreciated the significance of the matter in hand, took part in the referendum. They came and contributed to the emergence of this enormous understanding of more than three million people. As regards those who voted, today

nine out of ten people decided in favour of Hungary's right to make sovereign decisions. We may be proud, I believe we may be proud that as the first Member State of the European Union, and the only one so far, the Hungarian people had the opportunity to state their opinion on the issue of immigration. This is how it had to be; what's more, this has been the fair procedure. Given that this issue was not yet on the agenda at the last parliamentary election in 2014, citizens were unable to express a position, an opinion on this matter at that time. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is perhaps the most important issue for the years ahead, the future of Hungary, the future of our children and grandchildren: whom we should live together with; what will happen to our culture; what will happen to our way of life and our economic system, revived with great effort; and what will happen to our Christian roots.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is a modern-day population movement in progress around the world. The waves of this have reached Europe, spectacularly and painfully. The question now is what the response of the European Union will be. The EU's proposal is that we should let the migrants in, and that it should mandatorily distribute them among the Member States, and that Brussels should decide on this distribution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Hungarian people have considered this proposal today, and they have rejected it. The Hungarian people have decided that we Hungarians alone may decide on whom we wish to live together with. Brussels or Budapest, that was the question, and we decided that the right to make that decision lies exclusively with Budapest. We have set out on a path today. It will be a long path. We have taken the first and most important step. On this long path, hard battles and fierce conflicts await us. Now, after celebrating, we have to do two things in order to enforce the will of the people. First of all, we must lend constitutional force to the people's decision. Therefore, in the next few days I shall submit a proposal on constitutional amendment to the Hungarian parliament. I believe that we must represent the will that the people have declared today and lay it down in our Fundamental Law. The other urgent task we must accomplish is to enforce today's decision in Brussels as well.

Dear Friends,

Brussels, too, is on the verge of an important decision. It is now Brussels which is about to make an important decision. The European Union is a democratic community. Today 92% of those who voted in a referendum in a Member State have said that they do not agree with Brussels' intention. The question is simple: can Brussels, can the democratic community of European states impose its will upon a Member State in which it has been opposed by 92% of those who voted in a referendum? I promise you, I promise every citizen of Hungary, that I shall do everything in my power to stop this from happening. Once again, thank you for voting in the referendum, thank you for your attendance, your votes and your support. I shall continue to rely on you in the future also, and you, too, may rely on the Government, Fidesz, the Christian Democratic People's Party, and naturally, on myself as well.

Go Hungary, go Hungarians!

## Social Categorisation and Persuasion: Orbán's Greater Identity Aims

Orbán thus far has effectively utilized language tools as discursive strategies to influence his audience to accept his national Hungarian social identity construct as proto-type. Orbán's speech acts as persuasion tools thus far have produced the significant basic steps of self-identification of Hungarians as an "in-group" and comparison of Hungarians towards an "out-group." As this section examines, however, Orbán's difficulty in successfully operationalizing categorization aspects of social identity towards political action and shaping behaviors to achieve his larger political aims.

The significance of this is summarized by Hogg:

Social categorization affects intragroup behavior via self-categorization and prototype-based depersonalization...produces ingroup identification, a sense of belonging, self-definition in group terms, and ingroup loyalty and favoritism. It also causes conformity to group standards and normative behaviors among members, as well as mutual positive regard and cohesion. Prototypicality becomes the critical and highly salient yardstick of group life such that those who are prototypically deviant are heavily censured, while those who are prototypically central become highly influential...social categorization and depersonalization effects on processes within groups is wide ranging, covering conformity, normative behavior, crowd behavior, group polarization, the behavioral expression of attitudes, cohesion and liking, deviance, leadership and power, roles, status, diversity, subgroups, assimilation and pluralism...(ibid, 63).

Orbán's construction of a positive Hungarian social identity through social categorization of Hungarians against Europeans is a more delicate process. He threads a political and social needle carefully, with many nuances. Utilizing positive argumentation and predication strategies Orbán evaluates Hungarian attributes positively in a predication strategy designed to label Hungarian social identity (and economic vitality) as positive. He must carefully construct an identity within the EU, since Hungary relies upon the EU. At the same time, he attempts a negative argumentation and predication strategy (on certain select shortfalls of EU as an actor). This is narrowed to negative argumentation strategy focused on member states' leadership and EU political leadership regarding divergent political views on the refugee and humanitarian issues, illegal and economic migration issues, EU external border security, EU asylum policy reform, and the EU migrant quota issue.

Orbán illustrates the poor state of the European Union's current situation in order to bolster a stronger and more positive Hungarian social identity to aid audience self-categorization:

Recent events have shown that an **increasing number of people are beginning to have doubts about the European project, and are turning against it.** We must also acknowledge that there are **diverging views** about the challenges and proposed solutions – not only among politicians and political parties, but **also among the people themselves.** There are likewise **diverging views regarding the options for further action.** There are some who want more centralisation, and there are some who want less. **There are some who prefer a Europe of nations,** while others would even ban national flags from sports stadiums. There are **some who would systematically import labour to Europe from afar,** while **others would like to provide jobs for the masses of young unemployed people.** There are **some who would take in millions of people** in order to address their demographic problems, while **others place their faith in the promotion of families** (Orbán, 13 July 2016).

For many years, **Europe's construction project made progress** – not always smoothly, but with overall consistency. The waves of closer integration and enlargement interlocked like the teeth of a zip fastener. The most uplifting moments in this process were German reunification in 1990 and European unification in 2004...**And then in 2005 something went wrong.** The citizens of two founding states – France and the Netherlands – rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. In contrast to Danish and Irish referenda on other European treaties, there was no question of holding a second vote after minor adjustments. The momentum towards integration came to a halt. By the time changes were made, with the Treaty of Lisbon's entry into force, a global crisis was upon us. In 2008 the European elite, which had drawn its legitimacy from economic achievements, suffered a defeat. The aftermath of the economic and financial crisis spelled the end of the illusion that the EU could guarantee continuing prosperity – let alone increasing prosperity – for all of its citizens. **In certain Member States the crisis of the elite has escalated into a crisis of democracy** (Orbán, 13 July 2016).

This came to a head in the geopolitical crisis in Ukraine in 2014 and the migration crisis barely a year later. Fears and concerns have multiplied, while the number of solutions and effective answers has reduced. This is how we arrived at the British referendum; this is a turning point, because **for the first time since its foundation the EU is losing a Member State, which is a substantive move towards disintegration** (Orbán, 13 July 2016).

Twenty-five years after the miracle of 1990, we can hear the sound of gunfire in the eastern half of Europe. In its southern part, harsh economic bailout packages are leading to increasing anarchy and opposition to the European Union, with the emergence of a range of alarming extremist parties. **Terrorist organizations recruit fighters to join their ranks from among immigrants living in the continent's western part, while the southern borders of the EU – including our own state's borders – are besieged by waves of modern-day migration, in the face of which increasingly frustrated states and governments are at a loss.** And this is happening in an economic environment in which millions of Western European citizens feel that they have to work ever more for less money, just to keep their jobs. Europe is facing questions which can no longer be answered within the framework of liberal multiculturalism. **Can we shelter people, many of whom are unwilling to accept European culture, or who come here with the intent of destroying European culture?** (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015)

## **Social Categorisation and Persuasion: Advocating Hungarian Alternatives as Solutions**

Orbán attempts to social categorization as a means to persuade his Hungarian audience to adopt his political and social identity alternative, using primarily predicative and argumentative strategies against the EU positions, and intensification strategies seeking to categorize Hungary as innovative, progressive, and willing to break political taboos by making its own social and economic model:

**Every nation attempts to cut from the fabric of history a social and economic model adjusted to its own body** (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

Hungary gave its own answers to the most important European questions in 2010. Already since 2010, we have been living in the future which many other countries are only just setting out towards or will attempt to reach sooner or later. **Europe today continues to huddle behind the moats of political correctness, and has built a wall of taboos and dogmas around itself.** In contrast, we took the view that the old pre-crisis world will not return. There are things from past periods which are worth keeping, such as democracy – as far as possible in a form which needs no modifying adjectives; but we must let go of everything that has failed and has broken down. We must let go of these things before they bury us beneath them. **We have chosen the future.** Those who do not make choices find that instead circumstances will make the choices for them. Those who do not actively decide will find that their lives will be decided for them. We therefore let go of neo-liberal economic policy, and perhaps we did so as late as we possibly could have; we let go of the policy of austerity, just before we were about to share the fate of Greece; **we let go of the delusion of the multicultural society before it turned Hungary into a refugee camp, and we let go of liberal social policy which does not acknowledge the common good and denies Christian culture as the natural foundation – and perhaps the only natural foundation – for the organization of European societies.** We decided to face the barrage of unfair attacks and accusations, and also let go of the dogma of political correctness (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

I believe that merely relying on the creation of jobs on the open labour market **is no longer a valid approach in today's world** (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

When we entered office, there were 550,000 families in which the father or another member of the family lived off income supplements and benefits instead of active employment: 550,000! Today, there are 170,000 such families in Hungary, and if our plans are achieved, this figure will be zero by 2018. By 2018, we shall be able to provide work of some kind – even if only in public works – for every Hungarian, and to pay a wage instead of social benefits. Instead of the policy of “something for nothing”, we shall pursue the policy of “something for something” (Orbán, 6 Nov 2014).

## **Social Identity to Redefine Hungary: The Creation of an Illiberal State**

Orbán advocates for undercutting liberal democratic ideals and domestic institutions through open admission of his government's push toward subverting liberal democratic ideals and institutions within Hungary, but rather paints liberal democratic ideals as less important than national ideals. He maintains an awkward view of Hungary's role within the EU. While at times painting the EU as villain (in the specific case of the refugee quota scheme), his view of Hungary, and his take on the sovereignty of the nation-state concept, allows him to maintain his apparently paradoxical position on the EU. On the one hand, he supports a general sense of European solidarity (both within and without the EU), while on the other he is able to quickly vilify EU positions, policies, and politicians, or rebut criticisms against him (or his coalition government). This seemingly contradictory position on the EU allows him to gain European and international political notoriety, while at the same time bolstering his position domestically in drumming up nationalistic support from those in agreement over national sovereignty or simply euro-skeptic positions.

Orbán's worldview is that Europe and the West, who rely on liberal democratic ideals and institutions, have failed to protect European identity, heritage, and the roots of democratic ideals from subversion from within the liberal-democratic political and societal structure. Today's Western liberal-democracy societies have created a freedom inversion - by blindly supporting liberal institutions, secularism, and multi-culturalism they have actually undermined their own societies and the freedoms of their ethnic nations enjoyed before political correct politics and culture arose. He offers an alternative that is based on sovereignty of the nation state, the creation of an illiberal state. In his view, Europe has lost the values that have underpinned European civilization, has been bankrupted spiritually, and is losing its identity.

Orbán's ultimate identity aim is to move Hungary away from liberal-democracy as the “center” of Hungarian nation-state identity and replace it with a more “communal” concept. His argument selectively categorizes Hungary vs. the EU based on cultural values that are threatened (indirectly) by liberal-democracy's failures, and perhaps the EU's failure decision on the EU refugee quota.

However, Orbán views the threat to Hungary (and his political vision) more broadly than the even the migrant crisis. The migrant crisis (and Europe's inability to react to it) is his view a symptom of what he views as a greater problem with liberal-democracy's acceptance of multi-culturalism. Orbán intends to protect his Hungarian national social identity construct from liberal interferences that would threaten his ability to protect his Hungarian national social construction:

...liberal politics only ever recognizes two kinds of opinion: its own and the wrong one. You yourselves may clearly remember this; this is how these considerations led to Hungary taking a new direction in 2010, and **a new era of national politics** began (Orbán, 27 Feb 2015).

...what is happening today in Hungary can be interpreted as an attempt of the respective political leadership **to harmonize relationship between the interests and achievement of individuals – that needs to be acknowledged – with interests and achievements of the community, and the nation.** Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, **the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc. But it does not make this ideology a central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead** (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

If we put this idea in the dimension of the relationship of the individual and the community...then we will see that in the past twenty years the established Hungarian liberal democracy could not achieve a number of objectives...**Liberal democracy was not capable** of openly declaring, or even obliging, governments with constitutional **power to declare that they should serve national interests...**it even questioned the existence of national interests. I did not oblige subsequent governments to recognize that Hungarian diaspora around the world belongs to our nation and to try and make this sense of belonging stronger with their work. Liberal democracy, the **liberal Hungarian state did not protect public wealth...**So we can safely state that in Hungary liberal democracy was incapable of protecting public property that is **essential in sustaining a nation...**Then, the liberal Hungarian state did not protect the country from **indebtedness...**the system of **foreign exchange loans** – it failed to protect families from bonded labor. Consequently, the interpretation of 2010 election results, especially in the light of 2014 election success, can acceptably be that in **the great world race that is a race to come up with the most competitive way of organizing state and society,** Hungarian voters expect from their leaders to...forge and work out a new form of state-organization that will make...Hungarians competitive once again after the era of liberal state and liberal democracy, **one that will of course still respect values of Christianity, freedom and human rights.** Those duties and values that I enumerated should be fulfilled and be respected (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

...American “soft power” is deteriorating, because liberal values today incorporate corruption, sex and violence, and with this liberal values discredit America and American modernization. Also, the Open Society Foundation published a study not long ago analyzing Western Europe. In this, we could read a sentence which says that Western Europe was so preoccupied with solving the situation of immigrants that it forgot about the white working class. Or the British prime minister said that, as a **consequence of the changes happening in Europe, many became freeloaders on the back of the welfare systems.** One of the richest Americans, who was one of the first investors in the company Amazon, stated that we are living in a society that is less and less capitalist and more and more feudal, and if the economic system does not reform itself then the middle class will disappear, and, as he puts it, “the rich will be attacked by pitchforks”. Therefore, he thinks a middle-up economic model is needed instead of a top-down model (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

Orbán’s greater political goal is re-create Hungarian national social identity to shape Hungarian politics away from a liberal-democratic state towards an illiberal state, replacing the focus on individualism with community and nation, “welfare” to “workfare.” Thus, his nominative strategy focusing on the nation as an “in-group” and an argumentative strategy placing ethnic and cultural values as central culminates in his ultimate political goal to reorganize the Hungarian state:

...for our generation, the regime change is the generational experience to which we compare everything, against which we measure everything, whence we start to define everything that happens around us... (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

I would suggest we briefly remind ourselves that in the 20th Century there have been three major world-regime changes. At the end of World War I, at the end of World War II, and in 1990 (Orbán, 26 July 2014). The common points in these – I might have mentioned this here once – were that **when the changes took place it was clear for all** of us that we are going to live in a different world overnight... (Orbán, 26 July 2014).



...the **changes in the world nowadays have the similar value and weight**. We can identify its manifestation – that point when it became clear – as **the financial crisis of 2008, or rather the Western financial crisis** (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

...today this is not the principal question...**this as a race to invent a state that is most capable of making a nation successful**. As **the state is nothing else but a method of organizing a community**, a community which in our case sometimes coincides with our country's borders...the defining aspect of today's world can be articulated as a race to figure out a way of organizing communities, a state that is most capable of making a nation competitive. This is why, Honorable Ladies and Gentlemen, a trending topic in thinking is **understanding systems that are not Western**, not liberal, not liberal democracies, maybe not even democracies, and yet making nations successful. Today, the stars of international analyses are Singapore, China, India, Turkey, Russia (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

We are searching for (and we are doing our best to find, ways of **parting with Western European dogmas**, making ourselves independent from them) the form of organizing a community, that is capable of **making us competitive in this great world-race** (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

In order to be able to do this in 2010, and especially these days, we needed to courageously state a sentence, a sentence that, similar to the ones enumerated here, was considered to be a sacrilege in the liberal world order...**to state that a democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy**. Moreover, it could be and needed to be expressed, that probably **societies founded upon the principle of the liberal way to organize a state will not be able to sustain their world-competitiveness in the following years**, and more likely they will suffer a setback, unless they will be able to substantially reform themselves (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

The Hungarian answer is that the era of a **workfare state could be next**, we want to organize a workfare state...that in character it is not of a liberal nature. What all this exactly means, Honorable Ladies and Gentlemen, is that we have to **abandon liberal methods and principles of organizing a society**, as well as the liberal way to look at the world (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

When it comes to a relationship between two human beings, the fundamental view of the liberal way of organizing a society holds that we are free to do anything that does not violate another person's freedom...it took us twenty years...to articulate the problem...everyday life experience suggested to us that it was the stronger party who decided...the weaker were stepped upon...the continuous life experience of **vulnerable, weak families that had smaller economic protection than others during the last twenty years**. Our suggestion for that, and we will try to build the Hungarian state on this, is that it should **not** be the organizing principle of Hungarian society...Instead the principle **should be do not do to others what you would not do to yourself** (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

...NGOs and civil organizations will always appear on the fringe of political life. Now, the Hungarian NGO landscape shows a very particular image...If we look at civil organizations in Hungary, the ones in the public eye, debates concerning the Norwegian Fund have brought this to the surface, then what I will see is that we have to deal with paid political activists...moreover, political activists paid by foreigners. Activists paid by definite political circles of interest. It is hard to imagine that these circles have a social agenda...more likely that they would like to exercise influence through this system of instruments on Hungarian public life. It is vital, therefore, that if we would like to reorganize our nation state instead of the liberal state...these are not civilians coming against us, opposing us, but political activists attempting to promote foreign interests. Therefore, it is very apt that a committee was being formed in the Hungarian parliament that deals with constant monitoring, recording and publishing foreign attempts to gain influence, so that all of us...will know who the characters behind the masks are (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

Contrary to the liberal state organizational logic of the past twenty years, this is a state organization originating in national interests (Orbán, 26 July 2014).

## The Final Showdown: European Refugee Quota

Orbán's strong stance against the European Commission and Germany's advocacy of implementing EU migrant quotas is the latest battle for Orbán. Although the quota implementation would only (at least for now) be for a requirement for Hungary to admit a relatively small number of refugees, it challenges Orbán's stance and his advocacy of nation-sovereignty on this issue as a "right to choose" issue. Currently this issue will be decided in the European Court in 2017, but it poses interesting questions regarding the future of Orbán's stance and his domestic political support if forced to admit refugees. He frames it a pragmatic legal battle, though his strategy clearly demonstrates fear of the quota setting a precedent for other refugees (and perhaps migrants) to come to Europe, as well as a dangerous precedent against Orbán's Hungarian nation-state construct and he paints journalists "orchestrating" the obstruction of European political opinion as well as political opposition to his position as undermining his Hungarian nation-state construct. He later combines this with a populist position of Europe turning "against the will of the people":

The **Brussels** institutions believed (and **continue to believe**) that **there is a single means with which to manage and resolve the entire migration crisis: the mandatory relocation quota**. Hungary was the first to firmly express its opposition to this idea. We opposed it in political debate, we shall go to the European Court in Luxembourg, and we shall also consult the Hungarian people in a referendum. So why this firm, tough position?

On the one hand, **until we regain the ability to control the situation on our external borders, and until we decide who may enter our territory, any kind of distribution scheme is an invitation**. On the other hand, mandatory distribution **is not possible** if the smuggler or **the migrant in question is the one who decides on their ultimate destination**. **Thirdly, this message which encourages millions of economic migrants to set out**. A better life cannot be seen as a fundamental right – much though we would like to be able to grant it. Last but not least, in European law there is no consistent rule for mass immigration (Orbán, 13 July 2016).

I feel compelled to say that in most European countries – I could honestly say in **ninety per cent of European countries** – **there is a gap between the opinion of the people and the policy pursued by the elite**. (I am not going to mention which countries – not a single one – to spare our Foreign Minister the time-consuming task of having to receive ambassadors.) In a democracy, this is a serious problem. This difference may be covered up for a while with, say, **orchestrated journalism**. And if you look at the press of one country or another (I myself check it every day), no one could reasonably claim that there is no **orchestrated journalism**. **We stand accused of causing problems for press freedom; but if one surveys the entire Hungarian press for its depiction of the migrant crisis, if one examines the various voices and tones, if one looks to see how opinions diverge, one finds a much broader spectrum than in the press of the countries which believe themselves to be – entirely without foundation – more advanced than our own**. This is not a philosophical question, or a question of media law; this is a question of facts. Every morning more proof emerges that there are orchestrated opinions on these issues. I am not accusing anyone of personally controlling the press or public opinion; I am not even claiming that political leaders guide these opinions. I am merely pointing out that western societies are constructed in a way that makes it possible to pursue policies there over a longer period – I mean weeks, rather than years – with apparent public support, which the majority of the people do not actually support; but even there, this cannot go on indefinitely (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015). Those countries are more developed democracies than we are, and therefore their leaders are able to distance themselves more from the people. This is less possible in a less developed democracy such as Hungary; here, we must immediately integrate public opinion into our policies: there is less tolerance, and if we pursue a policy contrary to their view the public show tolerance for a much shorter period. There is a limit everywhere, however, and this is what is **creating internal tensions within European politics, because everyone feels that things cannot go on like this forever**. The public's voice will have to be heard sooner or later. **The people of Europe will regain their ability to influence politics sooner or later, as this is their constitutional right** – it is just a question of time. **I am certain that, sooner or later, there will be a different migration policy in Europe – one that will stand on different foundations**. Such a policy must be developed, as a democratic system cannot live with this internal contradiction for long, and Western Europe is unquestionably a democracy (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

Why are we quarrelling with Europe? You can see for yourselves: we need to **fight a battle on two fronts**. We must **protect the borders of Hungary and Europe**, and at the same time **we must also fight against Europe's short-sighted policy, which has turned against the will of the European people**. I get the impression that many people are not willing to see the full gravity of the threat. First of all, they do not see mass migration as a threat or as a problem, but as an opportunity which we should welcome. We can understand the European left. They indeed look upon migration as an opportunity enabling them to destabilise the nation state and accomplish their historic goal: the elimination of nations. There is a reason why political forces are taking turns in criticising Hungarians for standing up for our thousand-year-old statehood, the country's sovereignty and our national independence. We have got used to this since 2010. But it is not only the left which takes this stance: we can find people from across the entire political spectrum who through their conduct have even encouraged migrants to leave their countries and risk their lives en route for Europe in the hope of a better life. The consequences for us and for Europe are disastrous: as **Europe is unable to protect its external borders**, an increasing number of internal borders are being closed within Europe, one of the most important achievements of which has been the free movement of goods and people, commonly referred to as "Schengen". So, we are quarrelling with Brussels. We have diverging views on the problem, the means by which to resolve the problem, and the consequences of the problem. We have different ideas about what is going to happen if we take or do not take certain steps. One thing is certain, however: we must reconsider a number of European achievements, agreements and institutions. But in the meantime, we must not sit here doing nothing. **As long as Europe is unable to take united action, the individual nation states will be forced to defend themselves against this brutal threat in a fierce struggle, beyond their means, and by making extraordinary sacrifices** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

The Hungarian people have decided: the country must be protected. Every action the Hungarian government has taken to date, and every measure it will take derives from this overriding duty. In 2015 there are two political trends in Hungary: **one which seeks to protect Hungary and the Hungarian people, and seeks to preserve our national culture and European identity; and one which for some reason works to oppose all this** (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

**Proposals such as the quota system merely address the consequences, rather than the causes**. This is not a European action plan. **The underlying philosophy of the quota system is not aimed at ensuring that no more economic migrants come to Europe, or protecting Europe and the European way of life. It would instead spread the problem – based, I believe, on the silent recognition that migrants who have already entered Europe illegally will be reluctant to go back home**. In response to this, we Hungarians say: leaders in Brussels have put the cart before the horse. We suggest that we should first put an end to the mass migration, and once we have succeeded in protecting our borders, we should discuss what should happen to those who are already here or who want to come here. At all events, we must persuade them to respect our laws. We must make it clear to everyone that Europe is Europe because explicit rules govern our co-existence. In Europe, the rule of law does not mean oppression, but the provision of protection and security (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

Border protection. What I am going to say might at first appear to be medieval, but as the Americans say the same thing, this medieval approach is probably acceptable. **A country which has no borders or is unable to protect them, should the need arise, is no country at all**. Naturally, the European Union made the right decision, also from our point of view, when it determined upon reducing the importance of borders between the Member States to a minimum. I would like to stress that it did not eliminate them, as there is still a border between Austria and Hungary (Orbán, 7 Sep 2015).

as a penultimate issue, the introduction of the quota system. Naturally, Hungary is opposed to this system. There are two reasons for this. **First of all, we believe this is not an issue for today; now we should concentrate on the protection of our borders. We should not allocate quotas, but thousands of soldiers – if necessary, tens of thousands – should be sent to the south, to countries where there is a need for border protection and where the given nation state is unable to cope with this. There is no legal framework for this at present. This is what we should be working on, rather than wrangling over quotas**. But we have to face up to the following situation: in order to stop the quota system within the European Union's legislative framework – and this is a proposal, a legislative initiative – you need a qualified majority. This does not exist at present. Even all the Visegrád countries combined are unable to prevent the European Union from making a bad decision. This may well happen – I mean the adoption of a decision, a bad decision – as soon as this week, and this will then be law (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

We are now talking about fences, the police and the army, we are talking about resources, quotas, and so on. But deep down – at the heart of the matter, as far down as the human eye can see, down to the foundations of philosophy – **we must decide whether Europe wants to change or not.** Is what is happening to Europe today a good thing or a bad thing? The situation today is that the number of people who have arrived in the European Union is well over a million. I gave you the figures in a breakdown by countries (Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Sub-Saharan region), so it is obvious that millions more will set out. The real problem is that there are some in Europe – I do not know if they are in the majority, but it is certain that leaders who say things like this are in the majority, which is of course not the same as the people – **who believe that what is happening is a good thing, and that this is a great opportunity for their countries to change. I am not going to name names, but the leaders of large countries say that this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change, and they want this to happen.** I would like to make it clear that they have the right to desire this. **I believe that every European nation state has the right to change according to their own free will.** They are also within their rights to embrace large Muslim communities and to conclude that they are not worried by the experience that we – the European Christian cultural community – have so far been unable to integrate them, and that therefore parallel societies are coming into being in a number of European countries, with declining Christian and increasing Muslim ratios. There are some who believe that this is a welcome development. It may well be that this causes no surprise on the left, but it certainly surprises us here. There are some who believe this is good, this is desirable, and this is an opportunity (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

And at the end of the day the question is whether we in Hungary **have the right to say that we do not want to change our cultural pattern** at this speed, and based on this logic. Is it possible for us to not want this, do we have the right to not want this? The question is not whether we are right: that is something we can talk about, because there are some – I believe from the left – who claim that this is not the right position, while from the national and Christian side we claim that they are wrong. We believe that it is a good thing if Hungary preserves its cultural patterns. But the question is not what is good or bad, but whether Hungary has the right to insist on what we ourselves want to decide. This will then lead us on to the question of whether any European nation state – including Hungary – has the right to decide whom they will let into their countries, whom they wish to live together with, and whom they do not wish to be there (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

The Hungarian position is as firm as it is – if I may say so, I would not call it **stubborn, but a firm position** all the same – because it is very clear on this issue: against the background of known European experience, **we do not regard such a rapid and uncontrollable change of cultural patterns as beneficial for the Hungarian people.** No one has authorised us to accept this; the Hungarian people did not entrust us with the task of generating or tolerating change in Hungary on such a scale. **We were entrusted with the task of enforcing that which is laid down in the Hungarian Constitution and in the laws of Hungary. In the storm of migration, or the storm of the global refugee crisis, this gives us the right to insist that we shall not accept a European policy from those seeking to force us – explicitly or implicitly – to change, and to become like them.** We want to decide what we are like and whom we want to resemble. This is our own sovereign, national decision, and I am asking the Honourable House not to yield an inch on this. This is a Hungarian national duty, a constitutional duty. We Hungarians alone are able to decide on this. This cannot be dictated from the UN Headquarters in New York, and not even from the headquarters in Brussels. This can only be the decision of the Hungarian people. I am asking you to continue to insist on this position (Orbán, 21 Sep 2015).

## Conclusion

Orbán views the current migration issue as a national (and pan-European) threat in numerous ways including the risk of terrorism, migrants as economic threat to Hungarian jobs and a burden to the state. In a strict sense, Orbán has clearly over-securitized the issue in terms of an immediate danger to the Hungarian state (terrorism risks, foreign fighters, or even an enormous state economic burden as in Germany). However, it is clear from his rhetoric and speech act strategies that he views the migration crisis as especially dangerous to Hungarian ethnic, cultural, and social identity and a biological risk to ethnic Hungarians and families through a long-term demographic threat. Therefore, in the sense of his ultimate political aims and objectives of protecting Hungary against multi-culturalism, internal cultural and social conflicts, parallel societies, and demographic displacement, his level of securitization may be justified as commensurate with the threat, if larger migration to Europe continues.

Analysis of Orbán's speech acts finds that he consistently and extensively utilizes linguistic tools in support of a strong populist identity politics, sufficiently enough to demonstrate this as a politically successful securitization of national identity under existential threat from the migrants. His use of social comparison as an operationalized tool for securitization has also demonstrated effective, and both have enabled Orbán to win tactical "securitization" victories, namely: construction of a fence, parliamentary emergency actions allowing limited use of Hungarian Military forces, a successful declaration of national emergency, an increase in constituent popularity and consolidation of political support, and limited international support (Visegrad region). Orbán's securitization of the migrant issue as existential threat, however, has thus far only led to these tactical victories. While his near term aims (above) were achieved, his use of social categorization as a securitization process has been less successful. It By itself, it cannot be measured as a successful securitization effort, in large part due to his broader aims to categorize his national Hungarian social identity construct inside the EU but as an illiberal state. Orbán understands the power of ethnic and national self-identity, not only as a political tool to maximize his personal (and his political party's) power, but also as a powerful constructive force. This identity is essential to his greater politic goals of promoting the nationalism he views as needed to fuel the current and future Hungarian nation-state.

Examination of Orbán's discursive strategies successful demonstrate his ability to weave his national Hungarian social identity as his securitized a referent object (Hungary itself, or perhaps Hungarian and potentially by extension an embodiment of European cultural and social identity). Viktor Orbán's speech acts before and after the 2015 migrant crisis has demonstrated his adeptness at utilizing social identity for political gain, in a unique form of modern-day nationalism and national identity politics with the aim of re-structuring Hungarian governance and Hungarian society. However, beyond obvious political opportunism, Orbán's speech acts provide evidence of broader political aims to pivot Hungarian society (and perhaps serve as example for Europe as a whole) away from a societal focus on the individual and turn towards a more communal and societal focus.

The end political result of his operationalization of social categorization is focuses on re-balancing Hungarian spiritual, social, and economical factors at the individual level through a government political platform re-balance the excessive focus away individualism and towards

the nation-state as a community (the illiberal state). Subsequently, Orbán's social identity rhetoric thus far, has avoided operationalizing the more extreme elements of social categorization.

The speech acts can be viewed within a broader attempt to shape Hungarian society and the Hungarian nation-state. In addition to his speech acts, political actions such as Orbán's support for drafting and implementing a new Hungarian Constitution, new and more restrictive laws on media outlets and NGOs in Hungary, as well as the government anti-migrant billboard campaign also serve multiple functions and may require further research beyond the scope of this paper. As examined in his constitutional efforts, however, he seeks to infuse social identity of all forms (especially ethnically and culturally) into his social construct of the Hungarian social prototype, and ultimately in his aim of constructing an illiberal Hungarian nation-state, for power, the prevention of ethno-cultural suicide, or both.

Orbán has already managed to transform Hungarian politics. (and to some extent European he has re-opened dialogues in European political discourse once considered taboo, popularizing and attempting to legitimize non-politically correct concepts. While not advocating all aspects of the non "PC" discourse, Orbán has managed to open a divergent dialogue in Hungary. In the EU, he has cracked open Europe's political "Pandora's box." Traditional European political positions and concepts such as the nation-state, state sovereignty, Europe's Christian heritage and identity, are again being re-evaluated. The values of as state sovereignty, the concept of nation-state, and Europe's Christian heritage and identity long considered outdated by some European political elites, as well as more "extreme" politics such as ethnic nationalism national interests, have started to widen notions of an acceptable political spectrum.

In some respect, Orbán personifies perhaps the rise of European ethno-centric politics and the externalization of ethnic and nationalist politics in foreign policy and international arenas. His speech acts so far can be viewed as an attempt to "push the envelope" in order to make his political positions more acceptable to his Hungarian audience, and the very least, tolerable for other Europeans by avoiding overtly racial or discriminatory tones.

However, based upon this authors current analysis of his speech acts, it becomes evident that he, may in fact, not support white supremacism, or white nationalism at all. There are, however, certainly those within his party that hold the view of immigration as white genocide, and may in fact support white nationalism. While there is evidence to support that Orbán and Fidesz have encroached upon political positions of the far right-wing Jobbik Party over the past two years, there may in fact be limits to how far "right" Orbán himself is willing to move his political platform. Alternatively, this could be evidence of Orbán maintaining a "cleaner" and less extreme public image while allowing for at least tacit support from more extreme elements within Hungarian society.

Alternatively, his discourse could move to more extreme positions. While not openly promoting xenophobia, racism, or anti-Islamic sentiment, doesn't necessarily halt it either. It remains to be seen whether Orbán will advance farther right on the political spectrum in order to attain his ultimate objectives. The danger isn't Orbán's securitization based on promoting the referential securitized object (national identity), but rather what steps Orbán (or other populist

leaders) have the potential to take when identity politics based on politicizing the psychology of self-esteem and self-conception the “in-group” reach their limit, and therefore turn to increasingly negative characterizations and stereotyping of the “out-group” perhaps based on Jobbik’s platform of overt racial and genetic identities.

In the near term, Orbán hopes to move center-right political positions to a more mainstream position in Hungarian and European politics while focusing on his “civic Hungary”. While too early to judge, Orbán’s ethnically-centered politics could very well lead to a new nationalistic model aimed squarely at the political bankruptcy of Western liberal-democratic governance. His speech acts do appear to solidify his personal political power (as well as Fidesz), but also help with shaping and honing the national community, their attitudes, and (political) behavior.

Orbán demonstrates political talent in tailoring political messaging and anti-migration stance as a direct threat to Hungarian national identity, and utilizes fear and identity politics to generate political currency. Bold speech is a powerful strategy he uses which appears often to combine nominative, predicative, and argumentative linguistic strategies together in powerful effects as illocutionary force (speech act). Orbán has successfully built the foundation of his own political power and his political future upon appeals to populist notions of norms and values, a renewed concept of the Hungarian nation-state, and social identity politics attempting to revive national pride and self-esteem. The analysis of his national Hungarian social identity construct as referent security object was mostly successful due to social identity and social comparison aspects. These processes from Social Identity Theory were the easiest of the three for Orbán to successfully operationalize as well as the most benign. Further research on the current European (and American) populist political constructs of ethnic and cultural ties should be conducted in order to more fully understand the phenomenon, if aiming to avoid potential of more extreme political operationalization of social categorization based on “stereotypical” associations of an “out-group” as security threats.

So far, Orbán has not only been able to demonstrate a plain-spoken resoluteness and pragmatism in defense of Hungarian cultural and ethnic identity interests (and perhaps European interests as a whole), while breaching the taboo of discrimination against the “other.” This has been due, in large part, to his effective political utilization of the migrant crisis, and the securitization of the issue as a security threat (and particularly made it an immediate and readily perceptible threat to the Hungarian “nation” (in both senses of the word).

He has made ethnic social identity politics more politically acceptable, and liberal institutionalists and Western European politicians may very well see that attacking Orbán may actually play well for him in a “post-politically correct” world. It would bode well for Liberal-democratic leaning analysts and EU integrationists to more fully examine Orbán’s speech acts for discursive strategies and operationalized socio-psychological tools of securitization against threats to social identity “centers of gravity” and national “core interests”, rather than rejecting Orbán’s speech acts as political messages. European media and academic reporting on populism should must look beyond its own liberal-democratic bias, its own “categorization,” of Orbán and other populist movements and right-wing politics if it wishes to resolve the migrant crisis as well as address the greater shortcomings of the European Union’s integration. Orbán’s securitization

of the migrant threat is only a small part of his political strategies and aims, rather than merely a return to century-old “primordial” nationalism. At first glance it is easy to assess that Orbán’s politics are merely a return to the modern rise of nationalism at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, closer inspection of Orbán’s speeches reveal a new form of right-wing politics that is much more nuanced, and at times even seemingly contradictory, however in the speech acts examined above, Orbán’s broader political discourse demonstrates adept, cunning, nuance and pragmatism resulting in concrete political objectives and actions, and therefore deserves more attention rather than dismissal.

In at least one respect Orbán is correct. This crisis has demonstrated not only the EU’s inability to effectively manage the migrant crisis, but has demonstrated a weakness in the EU construct. A political fault line between East and West is emerging within the EU, and while Orbán perhaps didn’t create it, if the European liberal-democratic Western political elite and their governments fail to resolve critical issues of migration and multi-culturalism, Orbán’s illiberal state may grow in appeal.



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**Charles University**  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Institute of Political Studies

**Viktor Orbán's National Hungarian Identity Construct:  
Securitization of the 2015/2016 European Migrant Crisis as  
Existential Threat?**

**Řešitel: Bc. Kenneth C. Stein**

Vedoucí práce: PhDr. Vít Střítecký M.Phil., PhD.

Obor: Bezpečnostní studia

Předpokládaný termín obhajoby práce: Unor 2017

Jazyk práce: angličtina

## Thesis Focus and Methodology

In 2015 it was reported that over 1 million migrants entered the EU from Syria and many other countries, many of which are now in Germany. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has recently spoke out against migration from Syria and other Middle Eastern and North African countries. Speech acts will be analysed to determine their political context, and how the migration crisis may shape intra-EU relations and, to a lesser extent international relations outside the EU. The thesis will analyse Viktor Orbán's responses to the migration crisis through the use of CDA combined with Social Identity Theory. A special focus will be placed on Orbán's political leadership's responses to the migration crisis and the securitization of the issue in Hungary. The thesis will examine the securitization of the immigrant crisis by providing an overview of constructivist international relations scholars who have focused on the role of language in international relations and examine the relation between language, power, and security speech acts.

The thesis will analyse the process of securitization and therefore on the works of the Copenhagen school regarding security as a speech act. Recent political speeches (and actions) by Prime Minister Orbán demonstrate an excellent case to analyse the politics of securitization within each of the countries regarding their respective responses to 2015/2016 mass illegal immigration, refugee, and migrant crisis situation.

Moreover, the thesis will attempt to analyse Orbán's speech acts through the lens of social identity theory to examine methods of populist politics, ethnic and/or nationalist social identities, and the securitization of the migration crisis as existential cultural threat. The thesis may include analysis of Orbán's speeches before and during the migrant crisis for their securitization effects (whether reactionary or anti-immigration from the start). The thesis will examine Orbán's speech in regards to perceptions of the migration crisis as a security threat to Europe, especially the character of the politicization and securitization of the issue in Hungary.

The thesis will tackle four main research questions:

- Q1: What linguistic tools does Viktor Orbán utilize in order to shape the debate on the immigration crisis in Europe towards securitization as a threat to Hungary?
- Q2: What political consequences will Orbán's securitization of the migrant crisis have for Hungary?
- Q3: Does Orbán over securitize the issue of the migrant crisis, and if so, why?

The thesis may examine various speech acts through Critical Discourse Analysis of texts and speech acts as instruments of political power and framing of discourse, by examining political speeches from the V4 countries as well as other EU politicians regarding their responses to the migrant crisis.

The thesis will work with work to form several potential hypotheses:

- H1: Viktor Orbán uses special language in order to securitize the issue of the migrant crisis

H2: Right wing political parties/anti-EU parties form the majority basis for the securitization/politicization of migration crisis to further social identity politics

H3: Orbán assessment of the migration crisis as legitimate security concerns

### **Thesis outline**

1. Introduction
  1. Introduction to the topic
  2. Theoretical background – Copenhagen School and security as a speech act, Social Identity Theory
  3. Methodology and resources – Social Identity Theory combined with CDA
2. Historical context, Orbán speeches before migrant crisis
3. Orbán speeches securitizing migrant crisis
4. Context of the political speeches and political actions regarding migration events
5. Conclusion

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