CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Political Science

Master's Thesis

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Religion Overt and Covert in Post-secular International Relations

Master's Thesis

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on

26th April 2024   Matěj Pur

References

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Abstract

Inspired by the idea of the return of religion, this thesis explores the impact of religion on international relations. The theoretical basis was post-secular theory, first outlined by Jürgen Habermas. This theory suggests that spirituality grows outside traditional institutions even as organized religion loses members.

The major turning point that led to the resurgence of religion in international politics was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent process of globalization. This shift opened the door for the analysis of the influence of religion in international relations, especially after 9/11 and during the Arab Spring.

This thesis focused on three main areas: the use of religious language in the UN General Assembly, voting patterns in the UN, and the survival of international alliances. An innovative methodology was used for the content analysis of the General Assembly speeches, which expanded the lexical set of religious terms. The results showed that despite the theory of secularism, representatives of states use religious language.

Analysis of voting patterns revealed a statistically significant influence of religion, particularly in the context of the Palestinian conflict and human rights resolutions. Finally, analysis of alliance survival revealed that religious diversity may lead to shorter alliances, supporting the hypothesis that religion influences international coalitions.

The results suggest that religion still plays a role in international politics and can influence decision-making at the global level. Thus, despite secularization, religion remains an important factor in IR.

Keywords

Abstrakt

Tato práce zkoumá vliv náboženství na mezinárodní vztahy, inspirovaný myšlenkou návratu náboženství. Teoretickým základem byla postsekulární teorie, kterou poprvé nastínil Jürgen Habermas. Tato teorie naznačuje, že i když organizované náboženství ztrácí své členy, spiritualita roste mimo tradiční instituce.

Hlavním bodem zvratu, který vedl k návratu náboženství do mezinárodní politiky, byl konec studené války a následný proces globalizace. Tento posun otevřel dveře pro analýzu vlivu náboženství v mezinárodních vztazích, zejména po 11. září a během Arabského jara.

Práce se zaměřila na tři hlavní oblasti: používání náboženského jazyka ve Valném shromáždění OSN, vzorce hlasování v OSN a přežití mezinárodních aliancí. Pro obsahovou analýzu projevů ve Valném shromáždění byla použita inovativní metodologie, která rozšířila lexikální sadu náboženských pojmů. Výsledky ukázaly, že navzdory teorii sekularismu zástupci států náboženský jazyk používají.

Analýza vzorů hlasování odhalila statisticky významný vliv náboženství, zejména v souvislosti s palestinským konfliktem a rezolucemi týkajícími se lidských práv. Analýza přežití aliancí nakonec ukázala, že náboženská diverzita může vést k jejich kratšímu trvání, což potvrzuje hypotézu, že náboženství ovlivňuje mezinárodní koalice.

Výsledky naznačují, že náboženství stále hraje roli v mezinárodní politice a může ovlivňovat rozhodování na globální úrovni. Navzdory sekularizaci tak náboženství zůstává důležitým faktorem v mezinárodních vztazích.

Klíčová slova

Náboženství, OSN, Valné shromáždění, obsahová analýza, analýza přežití, aliance, hlasování

Název práce

Náboženství skryté a odkryté v postsekulárních mezinárodních vztazích

Acknowledgment

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Introduction

God is not dead, as Nietzsche thought, but is coming back. And with revenge (Kepel, 1994). This statement by French political scientist Gilles Kepel thirty years ago summarizes the background context of my thesis. Religion is often overlooked by grand theories of IR, and generally, in most accounts, *"religion is thus essentially peripheral, and reflection on international politics is pursued as if it concerned an autonomous space that is not fundamentally disturbed by its presence"* (Ozdalga 2013, p. 17)

With secularization, there was an assumption that religion as an archaic phenomenon would die over time (Wilson 2016, p. vii). However, according to research by the Pew Research Center, there were 84 percent of believers in the world in 2010. (Center 2015) And thanks to the high birth rate among Christians and Muslims, there will be, according to the same research, 87 percent of believers; in absolute numbers, 8.1 billion people affiliated with some religion.

This grounds the importance of studying religion also in International relations and base the topic of my thesis. The omittance was in the long-term logical, as the international order, subject of International relations, was based on the Treaty of Westphalia, and resulting in what Elizabeth Hurd calls a "Westphalian presumption" *"that religion had to be marginalized, privatized, or overcome by a cosmopolitan ethic to secure international order"* (Hurd 2008, p. 3)

But in the same book Hurd states that "it is now unsustainable to claim that religion plays no significant role in international relations; it has become a critical consideration in international security, global politics, and U.S. foreign policy" (p. 134). What made this huge change? One of the reasons and possible breaking point, according to Hurd, Habermas (2006), and other scholars, was mainly the 9/11 attacks by Islamist terrorists (Sheikh 2019, p. 161), which also started, according to Habermas post-secular era.

In this, there were some mainly theoretical works about IR and religion, Vendula Kubálková proposed even year before International Political Theology as the alternative to International Political Economy (Kubálková 2000) with constructivism as a framework. *"Religion has been dubbed the 'missing dimension' and depicted as 'returning from exile,' lurking behind almost all of the new or old features of the post-Cold-War, post-9/11 world."* (Kubálková, 2009).

However, I want to complement these theories and focus on quantitative data of how religion effects international relations in two spheres: the United Nations General Assembly and bilateral and multilateral military alliances. My research questions about the first platform are:

- R1: Do representatives of states in the UNGA use religious language?

- R2: Is this religious language used more after 2001?

- R3: Is religion a factor in voting patterns in the UNGA?

In military alliance, the desicive factor is a heterogenity of states' dominant religions in the alliance, and this corresponds with the last research questions:

- R4: Does the religious diversity of members affect the duration of the alliance?

The first research question directs to the first hypothesis:

- H1: The religious language is used even by secularized states

The theoretical background for this hypothesis is that studies showed that politicians use religious terms in their domestic policy. Crines and Theakson quoted, for example, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech: *"Faith in politics isn't only about the relationship between faith and politics. It is also about having faith in the political process itself and its capacity to achieve a better society" (2015, p. 165)*. Professor of Bible, Society and Politics James Crossley concludes that after his presentation he is *"used to the surprise at the discovery of the amount of religious rhetoric in English political discourse."*

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Similar works exist for American presidents, such as The God Card by Ceri Hughes. (2019)

The second hypothesis corresponds with post-secular theory and the observation that "an academic debate on the Enlightenment, on modernity and post-modernity, was taken out of the university and floated in the marketplace." (Habermas 2008, p. 25) This is why I postulate it as positive:

- H2: Religious language is more present after 9/11.

The reason for studying religion by religious language is also methodological, as it is an unhidden phenomenon. Hobbs defines it as: *"Religious language is a visible and significant means by which we construct and reconstruct our beliefs about the world and our place in it."* (Hobbs 2021, p. 2)

For the voting pattern, the support is that, again, on a national level, there the effect of religion on voting proven. To name a few: presidential election in the U.S. (Olson, Green 2006), in the British parliamentary election (Bochel, Denver 1970) or from the different part of the world in the 2004 presidential election in Ghana (Takyi, Opoku-Agyeman, Kutin-Mensah 2010). My hypothesis is then affirmative:

- H3: The state-dominant religion has a significant effect on how the state votes in the UNGA.

For military disputes, there is not completely unanimous literature about the existence of religious conflicts after the end of the Cold War. From famous Samuel Huntington and his *The Clash of Civilizations* (Samuel 1993) to Brenda Shaffer, who claims contemporary religious conflicts are more ethnonationalistic. (Shaffer 2006) But when we take religion as a parallel to the culture of a nation, there could be a similar effect on alliance duration when sharing same culture is not surprisingly helpful for alliance. (Clemmesen 1999) Thus my last hypothesis is:

- H4: Higher diversity of member states' dominant religion implies a shorter alliance duration.

However, these hypotheses go against the dominant theory of secularization, as secularism is, according to Hurd: *"one of the most important organizing principles of modern politics"* (Hurd 2008, p. 23), and José Casanova believes that *"the theory of secularization may be the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences."* (Casanova 1994, p. 17) But still, when religion did not disappear with modernization as predicted, even one of the founders of secularization theory, American sociologist Peter Berger, believes this theory is false: *"The difficult-to-understand phenomenon is not Iranian mullahs but American university professors—it might be worth a multi-million-dollar project to try to explain that! My point is that the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false."* (Sacks, Weiming 1999, p. 2).

To highlight the importance why of studying religion in International relations now, I would untypically refer to Czechoslovakian philosopher and the first president Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who engaged with religious questions 100 years ago: *"Our time, our century, appears to be a time of transition: the old folk religion is falling, and modern man seeks to replace this loss with something new - a new, or at least renewed, religion."*(Kohák 1989) And my work should, by little contribution, help answer the question of what the new role of religion is in international affairs.

Except the quantitative contribution, another examined relatively underresearched area is the role of religion on diplomacy on the state level. Faith-based diplomacy is an already existing concept, but usually, it is used only on "track two" diplomacy, that is, *"diplomacy practiced by non-state actors, officials of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious leaders and private citizens"* (Montville 1991, p. 162).

In these cases, religious non-governmental organizations and their members, who are typically also believers, play an important role. *"Practitioners of faith-*

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based diplomacy will, to be sure, draw upon secular expertise in conflict resolution and analysis, political science and philosophy, experience in national security, diplomacy, community development, and the like. But their central, orienting compass is their faith." (Cox, Philpott 2003, p. 32)

However, my approach is not about the personal beliefs of IR actors – their influence is individual and, because of it, too hard to describe and generalize. Religion affects state norms and opinions of politicians and other actors, and that is a reason for my hypothesis that diplomats would not be dealing only secularly, as is often supposed.

For each part of this thesis, I use the following methods. Content analysis of speeches in the UNGA uses a dictionary technique (Watanabe, Zhou 2022), enhanced with words from GloVe vector embedding (Pennington, Socher, Christopher Manning 2014). The voting pattern analysis follows multinomial logistic regression, which was previously used to determine religious effect in British parliamentary elections. (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001) For finding effects on the duration of alliances, I chose the Cox proportional model for survival analysis, similar to (Bennett 1997).

After a review of existing literature about the history of the relationship between politics and religion, the recent resurgence of religion, post-secular theory, and the position of religion in current International relations, I follow each of three parts methodology and results, put all together in the final conclusion.

1 Literature review

Literature about religion and International relations is not wide, and often, its position is on the periphery of research, but especially recently, it is more frequent. In this part, I want to briefly talk about the history of religion and politics with the subsequent rise of religion. These comments, especially post-secular theory, also hit IR scholarship.

1.1 History of religion and politics

The historical relationship between religion and politics has often been complicated, and both influenced each other. It is especially obvious in the history of Christian Europe, whereas Hannah Arendt postulates: *"I think it much more likely that authority, insofar as it is based on tradition, is of Roman political origin and was monopolized by the Church only when it became the political as well as spiritual heir of the Roman Empire."* (Arendt 1953, p. 111)

Christianity was in the Roman era very against politics, as it was shown, e.g., by the early Christian author Tertullian at the end of second century who wrote *"nobis nulla magis res aliena quam publica"*, i.e. nothing is more alien to us than public affairs. (Tertullian 1931, ch. 31) Arendt summarizes it similarly as *"the freedom which Christianity brought into the world was a freedom from politics, a freedom to be and remain outside the realm of secular society altogether, something unheard of in the ancient world."* (Arendt 1953, p. 111)

This transformative relationship continued through the medieval and early modern periods. Timothy Fitzgerald points out that during this time, the lines between the secular and religious were blurred and far away from the modern axiom that religion means church and non-religious means politics, state, or economics. *"However, in medieval Christendom and in early modern Religion, the distinction between priest and prince or church and governance was not*

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equivalent to religion and non-religious secular. The King was anointed explicitly following Old Testament precedent." (Fitzgerald, p. 84) This anointment, in the way of the biblical kings of Israel, is still present in the coronation of current kings, such as lately, the coronation of King Charles III.

The crucial element that Christianity gave to politics is, according to Arendt, maybe surprisingly, Hell. She believes that the vision of eternal suffering after death played a significant role in the authority at the beginning of the Middle Ages when it replaced the authority of Roman politics: *"Indeed, it required several centuries after Jesus' death to assert itself at all. It is interesting that this assertion coincided with the downfall of Rome, i.e., the disappearance of an assured secular order whose authority and responsibility only now became a charge of the Church.*" (Arendt 1953, p. 121)

Another breaking point I want to discuss in this brief excurse in history is the seventeenth century. The milestone of the Peace of Westphalia will be discussed in the next section, but significant new ideas have formed the modern era. In this century, there was a need for the first systematic definition of religion because of the meeting Native Americans during overseas discovery and also internal Christian sectarian wars, such as the Thirty Years' War. (Asad 1992)

John Locke in these times also produced an interesting definition of *politics "as something that is in its essential nature (and therefore ought to be) clearly distinct from 'religion'. He provides one of the earliest examples of a new Anglophone discourse on 'politics' as an essentially distinct domain from the separate domain of 'religion', a discourse that is today deeply embedded in the modern understanding of the world.*" (Fitzgerald 2011, p. 82) So religion is defined as distinguished from politics, and politics as distinguished from religion.

Locke's attribution was also a basis for secular politics and then the Enlightenment era, as Fizgerald continue: *"in modern discourse, secular politics*

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has been invented as something which is made possible by its separation from religion and is therefore itself non-religious. This imagining of the non-religious is as fundamental as imagining the religious, its reverse mirror image." (Fitzgerald 2011, p. 83)

However, this clear division between the religious and secular was limited to Christianity. In Islam many scholars have shown that there is a political element incorporated directly in Islam, very different from Tertullian's *nobis nulla magis res aliena quam publica*. *"Common touch points for this view include the fact that the Prophet Muhammad was a political and military leader who established Islam as a political entity, that Islam never historically developed the institutional separation between a corporate 'church' and a corporate 'state' out of which functional secularism could evolve, and that Islam is deeply associated with the public enforcement of a religious law (shari'a)."* (March 2015, p. 105)

Similarly, political Islam is also used as a modern phenomenon, which uses religion explicitly to shape political systems. *"the self-conscious concern with preserving, restoring, or fixing Islam's authoritative role in politics began before this, with such nineteenth-century figures as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and then, more forcefully, the intellectual responses to the 1918 abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate and the responses to the secularist manifesto of the al-Azhar scholar 'Abd al-Raziq (1925), Islam and the Foundations of Government, by such scholars as Muti'i (1926) and al-Khidr Husayn ('Imara 1989)."* (March 2015, p. 104)

Because these great thinkers of political Islam *"were rebelling against the political system that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, one that sought to copy the Western-inspired system of nation-states."* (Akbarzadeh 2021, p. 1), political Islam was inherently secular phenomenon as its antithesis when all state affairs are subordinate to Islam. *"The cry 'Islam is the solution' captures this mood."* (Akbarzadeh 2021, p. 1)

This antisecular Islam was not completely new as a key attribute of Sunnism *"is that it gave up hope for a perfectly just and pious ruler and relied instead on the*

force of the law and the community's knowledge of it. A treatise by the great thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), one of the most popular premodern figures for modern Islamists, separated political action from individual piety or virtue" (March 2015, p. 107)

Nevertheless, political Islam should not be viewed only as an element of Islamic and Islamic doctrine. Ernest Gellner tried to find a middle position when Islamic fundamentalism is inseparable from secularism, but there are historical classical elements of Islamic doctrine that still are valuable. (Gellner 1992) Similarly with this, that was an element in the pre-modern Ottoman empire (Peirce 2004) *"The Ottomans, well before colonialism, went as far as to promulgate formal codes (kanuns) in the realm of siyasa left to the rulers by the religious law itself. Ottoman legal theorists even declared that the Sultan's will was the source of the legitimacy of such codes"* (March 2015, p. 115)

The vision of the Westphalia that peace with religions completely failed in the 20th century. *"It cannot be denied that the great acts of human cruelty and destruction in the twentieth century have been carried out by secular governments, not religious ones – although it should be stressed that this fact does not entail the superior virtue of 'religious' states."* (Asad 1992, p. 9)

However, Arendt still believes that separating religion and politics is crucial for the modern era. *"This separation is a fact and, moreover, has its singular advantages for religious as well as irreligious people. Modern history has shown time and again that alliances between 'throne and altar' can only discredit both."* (Arendt 1953, p. 126)

In summary, this discourse around the separation of religion and politics in history and philosophy reveals important differences between Christianity and Islam, where Christian countries focus on strict separation of religion and politics, maybe with the exception of Mustafa Kemal's (Atatürk) reform in Turkey. (Bottoni 2007) But as we will see in the following sections, the debate

about the relation between politics and religion definitely did not end in the 19th century.

1.2 Rise of religion

The grand theories of IR typically do not consider religion a serious factor in international politics. (Sandal, Fox 2013) This is supposedly mainly because of the historical development of the international system when the rise of national states was the heritage of religious wars, especially the Thirty Years' War. *"This separation of religion and politics is usually traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), regarded as the starting point of the contemporary state system. The idea of a secular world of politics took hold in the minds of many in the West."* (Sandal, James 2011, p. 3)

According to Sandal and James (2011), this consequent character of secular IR theory does not mean that religion in the nature of IR itself is, in fact, marginal. *"Religion can indeed be employed as a variable in explanatory IR theory as a part of ostensibly objective accounts of what is going on 'out there"* (Sandal, James 2011, p. 4). They propose that this is just a result of the belief that religion was the leading cause of wars in this era, and getting rid of religion is the best way to prevent them. However, this has been disproven in the case of contemporary civil wars by Monica Toft: *"Surveying contemporary civil wars, it is striking how often religious cleavages and grievances become central to armed conflict. (…) As a result, religious civil wars today pose some of the biggest strategic challenges to the global order, from the intractable conflicts over Kashmir and Palestine, to the Sunni insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the sectarian Syrian bloodbath that has claimed an estimated 300 to 400,000 lives since 2011.* (Toft 2021, p. 1459)

Still, the secular character has been the most prevalent in IR and most of the sciences since then. "Secularism is the dominant language of religion and

politics in the West. Knowledge about religion and its relation to politics are dominated by secularist assumptions." (Hurd 2004, p. 236)

But in the 1990s, the subject of religion entered the more general discourse of world affairs back and with a bang, as probably as on the first, Gilles Keppel has observed in his book Revenche de Dieu (Kubálková 2000).

For example, Scott Thomas talks about the global resurgence of religion, which he defines as "the growing saliency and persuasiveness of religion, i.e. the increasing importance of religious beliefs, practices, and discourses in personal and public life, and the growing role of religious or religiously-related individuals, non-state groups, political parties, and communities, and organizations in domestic politics, and this is occurring in ways that have significant implications for international politics" (Thomas, Tutu, Tutu 2005, p. 26).

Even statistics prove that religion is not as globally declining as secularization theory has predicted. In fact, in 2010, according to the Pew Research Center, 16% of people were unaffiliated with any religion; in 2050, it will be 13%. It is primarily as most religions will rise thanks to the fertility rates. (Wormald 2015)

This has the potential to change the narrative that modernization also implies the secularization of societies, the so-called secularization theory. The secularization theory can be backtracked back to the Enlightenment (again, the post-Westphalian era) and became prominent in the 1960s, although *"sometimes the issue has seemed to be not so much whether secularization actually occurred, but whether or not 'secularization theory' itself exists."* (Tschannen 1991)

This prominence in what for example, Hugh Mcleod calls "the long 1960s" from 1958 to 1974 was thanks to the significant decline of religion in the West. *"Nearly every Western country saw a drop in church-going, and in some cases the drop was dramatic. In these years large numbers of people lost the habit of regular*

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church-going. In some countries there was a substantial drop in the proportion of couples marrying in church or having their children baptized. There was also a considerable decline in the number of clergy, both because of a fall in ordinations and, in the case of the Catholic Church, because of resignations. There was a modest increase in the numbers of those professing other religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or Islam, or stating that they had no religion. The main novelty here was that those who rejected Christianity were increasingly ready to say so loudly and openly." (McLeod 2007, p. 1)

But nowadays, even one of the leading figures of secularization theory, American sociologist Peter Berger, believes this theory is false. *"The world today, with some exceptions to which I will come presently, is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled "secularization theory" is essentially mistaken."* (Sacks, Weiming 1999, p. 2).

The reason for this is that although the central idea of secularization theory, that modernization must lead to the decline of religion everywhere "*has turned out to be wrong*" Sacks, Weiming (1999), p.2-3. According to Berger, one of the reasons for this is that religions have found a way to adapt to modern and secular society, such as the reform of the Second Vatican Council in the Catholic Church.

And still, at first glance, it would seem that one of the exceptions from this return of religion is the West, especially Europe. But Kratochvíl points out that it is not necessary to have a majoritarian religious society for the importance of religious discourse there because *"even the most secularized Western societies can find religious or religion-related arguments convincing.*" (Kratochvíl 2019, p. 78)

That is also the motivation and tool of the religious lobby in some major secular states – in the EU, there is a role of Christian COMECE (The Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Union) and CEC (The Conference of

European Churches), which professionalized in 1990s but *"they have been supplemented with several other Christian Churches (several Orthodox Churches, German Evangelical Church, Anglican Church amongst others), with representatives from other religions (Jewish, Muslim, Pentacostal, Mormons) and even with representatives from sects (Scientology as the most outspoken) that opened an office in Brussels"* (de Vlieger, Tanasescu 2012, p. 456). This resulted in a consultative role even for the treaties of the EU.

In the United States, Allen Hertzke claims that there is a role of religious lobby also in foreign policy: *"if domestic social policy constitutes the major priority and the principal success of the fundamentalist groups, foreign policy is a major focus of the liberal groups and represents their greatest effectiveness in galvanizing constituents into action"* (Hertzke 1988, p. 129) There is also strong pro-Israel lobby, but it has more nationalism/Zionist character than religious when the biggest supporters of alliance with Israel are evangelicals (Aleskerova 2021, p. 118). Muslim lobby has also organized mainly in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. (Ross 2013)

Very often, these formerly religious arguments are framed in cultural terms and part of the cultural heritage of the country, which was once a religious (in Europe, usually Christian) country. Kratochvíl warns that this strategy even makes religious terms more significant because suddenly it is the fight for the *"very survival of the national culture"* (Kratochvíl 2019, p. 79)

Mavelli and Wilson even argue that something which is at first glance, an absolutely secular neoliberal market is an example of transcendence. *"It blurs the divides between science and faith, facts and beliefs, the secular and the religious, as well as the practical and moral divide between knowledge and ignorance. In an almost mystical and transcendent turn, it gestures towards the unknowability and inscrutability of the market, thus asking for an act of faith in its inherent goodness. Yet, this act of faith is justified in purely secular and*

rational terms concerning the epistemological limits of scientific knowledge." (Mavelli, Wilson 2023, p. 312)

Sacks and Weiming (1999) point out that not all religious movements are rising. In fact, typically, the most significant religious movements nowadays are, according to them, the conservative and traditionalist ones, which reject compromise with modernity. *"Conversely, religious movements and institutions that have made great efforts to conform to a perceived modernity are almost everywhere on the decline"* (Sacks, Weiming 1999, p. 6)

1.3   Post-secular religion and society

"To say we should now bring an end to the secular is to say that we should reverse the dreadful consequences of the liberal erasure of God and take myth back from out of the hands of the fascists where it has all too often fallen." (Blond 1998, p. 27)

The most important turning point in researching the role of religion in IR was probably the 9/11 attacks. (there were important anti-secular events, such as Islamic Revolution in Iran, but which did not get such strong response in IR literature (Sandal, Fox 2013)). In an attempt to explain the return of God on the international scene, Jürgen Habermas used and popularized the term "post-secular society".

He argues, in accordance with José Casanova, that *"the loss of function and the trend toward individualization do not necessarily imply that religion loses influence and relevance either in the political arena and the culture of a society or in the personal conduct of life. Quite apart from their numerical weight, religious communities can obviously still claim a 'seat' in the life of societies that are largely secularized"* (Habermas 2008, p. 16). Shortly, the fact that people consider themselves as a member of religion less does not mean that religion is not significant.

Mavelli and Wilson define post-secularism as an *"attempt to move beyond the secular and thus the secular/religious divide, which can be considered one of the foundational dimensions of Western secular modernity. The question raised by the post-secular, then, is not just one of incorporation of the presence of religion into existing theoretical frameworks, but one of conceptual innovation to account for a transformation which affects the very structures of consciousness and power, and existing understandings of political community"* (Mavelli, Wilson 2023, p. 299)

They believe that when society is secularized, religion is still in the role of a source of morality. Habermas (2008) wrote that the term post-secular society can be used only for the countries of Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but Barbato (2012) widened this use even for Arab countries. The role of religion in these countries is, according to Barbato, to foster democratization and civil rights discourses. *"Religious discourses in exchange with secular discourses are not only rich enough to prepare cognitive notions and imaginations of a better world but also possess the motivational impact to world."* (Barbato 2012, p. 1081)

That is the reason Barbato calls Arab Spring a post-secular revolution, which he defines as *"their aim to end a secular, religious, or mixed regime which legitimises its rule by the cleavage of secular vs. sacred or the exclusion of some religious communities and to build a society in which citizens with different world views are prepared to accept religious traditions as a guideline without seeking to establish a dominant religious creed"* (Barbato 2012, p. 1082)

Habermas and Barbato believe that a post-secular society is the way to connect secularism and religion so they can benefit from each other. Secularism offers tolerance (especially religious) so religion is not reduced to fundamentalism, and religion offers *"the reservoir of moral resources for the secular domain"* (Mavelli, Wilson 2023, p. 300) and something Habermas calls the *"role of*

"communities of interpretation" in the public arena of secular societies" (Habermas 2008, p. 20) where the debate about society can be performed.

The dialogue is complicated by the fact that religious language often is not understandable by secular citizens and vice versa. But Habermas argues that *"it is unfair, to expect religious citizens to translate the reasoning for their arguments into secular language, when we do not place the same translation requirement on secular citizens."* (Habermas 2006, pp. 8–9.) Especially, as Wilson (2014) adds, *"the language of science does not speak to everyone"* (Wilson 2014, p. 352)

Using religious language in secularized society is also often controversial because of the history of its misuse. Wilson also highlights the fact that it is not only the case of religions because what we understand as 'secular language' can and has been manipulated in order to achieve political ends (Wilson 2014, p. 355)

1.4 Religion and International Relations

"Little do they know that they meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed." (Morgenthau, 1956, 234)

Hurd (2008) points out that the difference between religion and secularism is not so significant for International relations because secularism has risen from similar to Christian concepts. *"The idea of a secular state system evolved out of and was conceived in opposition to the practices of three specific religious groups — Lutherans, Calvinists and Catholics."* (Hurd 2008, p. 241). She also thinks that *"secularism is located on the spectrum of theological politics"* (Hurd 2008, p. 237), meaning that there are not only two distinct positions – secular and religious, but secularism is closer to religions than it is usually presumed.

So, when George W. Bush called for secular democracy in Iraq during the War on Terrorism, he, in fact, wanted an ideology with Christian roots and not

something more compatible with Islamic heritage. Hurd, therefore, opposes that *"rather than blindly supporting secularist political solutions at any cost, then, the international community should consider supporting pluralistic democracy, even if this means support for religious parties"* (Hurd 2008, p. 239).

Especially when secularism is usually another crucial element of Eurocentrism and hence it is problematic in the Third World countries. Another example is, that the Christian democracy in Europe, or in the case of American presidents, is usually not as scary case as the idea of Islamic religious parties. This is problematic for the relations with Muslim countries because *"secularization, in other words, remained situated within a broader Christian context."* (Hurd 2004, p. 241)

And from this non-neutrality rose three errors described by Rubin (1990), when religion was underestimated: seeing religion just as a theological set of issues rather than as a profoundly political factor, the tendency to Marxism's concept of religion as the opiate of the masses and mainly prediction of decline of religion because of modernization.

From this position of secularism as a point on the spectrum of political theologies, it should not be difficult to find a way to incorporate religion into the grand theories of International relations. According to Thomas et al. (2005), the moment when religion disappeared from International relations discourse was the second great debate over traditional versus behavioral methods in the 1950s and 1960s; although unintendedly. *"The second great debate is often seen—at least in the United States—as a triumph of positivism and behavioralism, the scientific study of international relations, over the stodgy traditional methods of diplomatic history, jurisprudence, and political philosophy"* (2005, p. 59).

The exception was the English School as part of Neorealism. "It was pointed out in the introduction that the role of religion in international relations was also a key part of some of the early thinkers in the English School of international

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relations—Martin Wight, Donald MacKinnon, and Herbert Butterfield. These scholars were responsible for one of the most distinctive features of the English School: the historical sociology of different state-systems showing the importance of religion and world history for the study of international relations." (Thomas, Tutu 2005, p. 57) Unfortunately, this research almost did not continue after these thinkers, although Thomas states that "the situation is now changing because of the global resurgence of religion, and religion has been returning from exile in international relations. What this means is that positivist approaches to the study of international relations are now doubly outflanked, with postmodernism on one side, and a religious resurgence on the other side". (2005, p. 59)

Sandal and James's work from 2011 *Religion and International Relations theory - Towards a mutual understanding* aims to work out the gap between religion and individual International relations theories. As mentioned, in the Realist strand, these attempts already exist in English School. But also, even in Classical Realism, Sandal thinks that there is a space for religion – *"Since classical realists started with human nature and ended up at the system level, any inter-level explanation (i.e. that links aspects of human nature to society level phenomena) also is possible — a considerable advantage if one wants to work with religion in this framework"* (Sandal, James 2011, p. 8).

Thanks to the transnational character of neoliberalism, the existence of religious organizations and groups is natural in the neoliberalist world. Helpful for their explaining is according to Sandal and James political theology, defined as *"the set of ideas that a religious body holds about legitimate political authority"*. (Philpott, 2007)

As constructivism is more a general approach to understanding international relations rather than a specific theory, Sandal and Fox (2013) believes that *"if one handled Constructivism as a theoretical strand, it would no doubt be the most conducive to accommodation of religious phenomena. Regardless of its*

epistemic status, Constructivism offers a rich terminology and a critique of discourses and interactions in our daily lives." (Sandal, Fox 2013, p. 167).

That is also why it is often used as an approach which, e.g., Kubálková (2000) used for her proposal of whole International Political Theory. (Kubálková 2000) An important advantage of Constructivism is also easy to transfer to other social sciences, which is especially beneficial for research in the intersection of religion and International relations, as this work is. (Sandal, Fox 2013)

Sandal and Fox (2013) also proposed the best way to research religion and International relations is to examine how religion is potentially influencing International relations, and only after this examination can we try to integrate the results into an existing IR paradigm. *"Beginning with an examination of religion's role in international relations and then examining how religion fits into the theory at hand results in a more comprehensive and comparable approach without preconceptions regarding the ability of each theory to accommodate religion."* (Sandal, James 2011, p. 5) This allows, according to them, to examine theories without limitation of their preconceptions.

In summary, religion is not an omnipotent variable that can solve every problem of International relations. But still, *"religion needs to be brought back into the study of international politics"*. (Sandal, James 2011, p. 6) Because as Kubálková points out *"Religion can't 'return' to IR. It never left."* (Kubálková 2009, p. 31)

History of religious overlooked influence on modernity lists Rubin (1990): "religious-inspired revolution in Iran unexpectedly took power and followed an unpredictable course; U.S. military forces suffered their single largest loss since Vietnam from a fundamentalist car bomber in Beirut; and Christian-led movements brought democracy to the Philippines and South Korea—all posing quick and difficult decisions for U.S. policymakers. No stronger argument could be made for the centrality of religion in international affairs than this graphic experience" (Rubin 1990, p. 63). There is also a significant role of the Catholic Church in many countries, embodied in the position of the Holy See as an

international actor or in the role of the pope, who often deals with peace in countries in Latin America.

Religion, of course, is not only peaceful as there are still many mainly intra-state, religious conflicts (Toft 2021), even when there is religion more as a distinguishing factor than as the primary motivation, as summarized by this joke from Northern Ireland: *"As a man walks down a dark street in Belfast, a gunman jumps out of a doorway, holds a gun to his head, and asks, 'Are you Protestant or Catholic?' The man stutters, 'Well, actually, I'm an atheist.' 'Ah yes,' says the gunman, 'but are you a Protestant or a Catholic atheist?'"* (Sacks, Weiming 1999, p. 15)

2 Content analysis of speeches in the UNGA

As the first place to examine the religious effects on international affairs, I chose the presence of religious language in the speeches of state representatives in the United Nations General Assembly. With the accordance of the theory, especially post-secularism, there are two hypotheses:

- H1: The religious language is used even by secularized states

- H2: Religious language is more present after 9/11.

2.1 Methodology of content analysis

2.1.1 Religious language

"Religious language is a visible and significant means by which we construct and reconstruct our beliefs about the world and our place in it." (Hobbs 2021, p. 2). Obviously, it is only one way to behave religiously and hence also how to study religion. The reason why it belongs to the best way to study religious activities is that many of them require language. *"Prayer, religious songs, consecration, confession and preaching are just some of the examples we might think of straightaway"* (Hobbs 2021, p. 2)

We can divide religious language into an explicit and implicit one. Explicit religious language is *"language with recognizable religious connotations and explicit references to sacred texts and people"* (Hobbs 2021, p. 43). That is why it is one of the most apparent signs of religiosity in someone's discourse. Hobbs shows an example of US President Donald Trump claiming he was *"the chosen*

one" in August 2019 in a trade discussion in China, which most people immediately saw as a messianic claim. (Hobbs 2021, p. 43).

On the contrary, implicit religious language is *"not specifically associated with or derived from a world religion but which functions as a form of sacred making"* (Hobbs 2021, p. 44). Explicit religious language can become implicit in the case of majoritarian distribution of specific religions in a society. For the overt character of explicit religious language, this work will focus on verifying the hypothesis of the presence of overt religious behavior in speeches of representatives of states in the UNGA.

The speeches in UNGA were collected in the United Nations General Debate Corpus, which consists of all speeches from 1946 to 2022 and their official translation into English (for the ones that were not English in the first case) (Jankin Mikhaylov, Baturo, Dasandi 2022). Speeches of politicians and other representatives of UN member states have the advantage in that they describe the state's position to the public: *"In speeches, the leaders are presenting their public persona – how they would like to be perceived by the public. They are exhibiting what they believe will win votes, mobilize support for particular positions, and improve or maintain high approval ratings."* (Klotz, Prakash 2009, p. 153)

The return of God proposed by most post-secularists should be after the end of the Cold War (Kepel 1994) and especially connected with 9/11 (Habermas 2008). That is why this work will focus on this era and the comparison to previous years.

2.1.2 Content analysis methods

For examining this amount of text, the best and the most widespread method is content analysis, which *"allows researchers to analyse relatively unstructured data in view of the meanings, symbolic qualities, and expressive contents they have and of the communicative roles they play in the lives of the data's sources.*

The combination of these features is unique among research methods."
(Krippendorff 2019, p. 51). Because of the form of data open to interpretations,
the inductive approach for this study was used.

According to Kyngäs, *"this form of content analysis is suitable when the
phenomenon under study has not been covered in previous studies or when prior
knowledge is fragmented"* (Kyngäs, Mikkonen, Kääriäinen 2020, p. 13) which is
also true for studying the phenomenon of religious language in diplomatic
speeches as the religious language has not attracted big attention itself (Hobbs
2021) and the religions unintentionally disappeared from most of IR works with
the great debate over traditional versus behavioral methods. (Sandal, James
2011) This marginalization of religion happened, although *"religion can indeed
be employed as a variable in explanatory IR theory as a part of ostensibly
objective accounts of what is going on out there"* (Sandal, James 2011, p. 4).
Content analysis also *"lets us take advantage of the fact that communication is
an important part of what political leaders do."* (Klotz, Prakash 2009, p. 166)

Content analysis is predominantly descriptive, so it is ideal to determine what
was said and, with a combination with frequency analysis, how much it was said.
*"In other words, content analysis mainly focuses on 'what' questions, even if it
can address 'how' or 'why' questions as well."* (Pashakhanlou 2017, p. 449) This
depends *"whether the focus of attention is on the presence or absence of certain
characteristics or on the degree to which the speaker exhibits the
characteristics."* (Klotz, Prakash 2009, p. 156). The mentioned characteristics in
the case of this work would be if the speeches contain religious language.

In this work, standard lexicon methods determining word frequency are
enhanced by methods of natural language processing (NLP) and, more
specifically, word embeddings in accord with McDonald et al. to catch the
relations between combinations of terms. *"Vector representations of terms, such
as word embeddings, have been shown to be effective at encoding latent term*

features that preserve semantic relations between terms." (McDonald, Macdonald, Ounis 2017, p. 2).

This is possible by transforming each term into an n-dimensional real-valued vector. There are more methods of this transformation, e.g., the model GloVe by researchers from Stanford University uses a co-occurrence matrix to catch the word analogies according to their co-occurrence in the corpus. (Pennington, Socher, Christopher Manning 2014) This can describe the analogies when operating acquired vector like "a is to b as c is to ?". Based only on processed text, the model can correctly answer the question that *Athens is to Greece as Berlin is to ?* (as Germany).

McDonald et al. summarize this property of word embedding models as *"semantically similar terms are positioned close to each other within the vector space and, secondly, the directionality between multiple terms in the vector space can encode relations between the terms. Therefore, relations such as the previous example, who said what about whom, can have their relations preserved in specific dimensions of vector representations."* (McDonald, Macdonald, Ounis 2017, p. 3) This preservation of relations is also helpful for distinguishing religious and non-religious terms by their context.

The first step in finding a religious wordlist is finding the nearest terms for the chosen list from the existing wordlist. The existing wordlist was taken from *An introduction to religious language– exploring theolinguistics in contemporary contexts*, created by Paul Rayson from The USAS S9 'Religious and the Supernatural' Lexicon (Hobbs 2021) The selection was in the context of Abrahamic religions:

angel, baptism, belief, bible, bless, church, commandments, cross, divine, islam, god, gospel, heaven, holy, torah, jesus, mohammed, messiah, miracle, pilgrimage, pray, preacher, prophet, mosque, religion, sabbath, sacred, saint, salvation, sermon, soul, worship, shari, shiite, pagan, islamist, allah, holiness, eucharist

The closest terms were from pre-trained word vectors by GloVe (Pennington, Socher, Christopher D. Manning 2014) from Wikipedia + Gigaword 5 containing 6 billion of tokens with 300-dimensional vectors. The result was this:

miguel, jimenez, gabriel, baptized, sacraments, sacrament, beliefs, faith, contrary, scripture, testament, biblical, god, thank, pray, churches, episcopal, catholic, commandment, mitzvot, crossing, crossed, across, christ, heavenly, muslims, islamic, christianity, allah, gods, divine, gospels, hymns, preaching, hell, heavens, sacred, grail, talmud, judaism, talmudic, crucifixion, mohammad, ahmed, mohamed, savior, prophesied, resurrection, miracles, miraculous, cure, pilgrims, pilgrimages, hajj, prayed, praying, prayers, preachers, pastor, muhammad, caricatures, cartoons, mosques, masjid, imam, religions, religious, shabbat, sundown, passover, holy, ritual, ancient, st., st, cathedral, redemption, fundamentalist liberation, sermons, preached, homily, album, souls, r&b, worshipping, rituals, prayer, pulcini, villarosa, belafonte, sunni, shiites, sadr, pre-christian, paganism, pagans, islamists, militant, almighty, bless, pentecostal, prelate, teachings, communion

As we can see, among religious words, there are also some not appropriate for the research. The next step was to choose only the religious terms with caution to a strictly religious context. For example, "Mohammed" is often a name or an adjective "Islamic" can be part of the country's official name (the Islamic Republics of Iran, Pakistan, and Mauritania). The final word list is this 72 words: allah, almighty, baptized, beliefs, biblical, bless, cathedral, catholic, christ, christianity, churches, commandment, communion, crucifixion, divine, episcopal, god, gods, gospels, grail, hajj, heavenly, heavens, hell, holy, homily, hymns, imam, islamic, judaism, masjid, miraculous, mitzvot, mosques, muslims, paganism, pagans, passover, pastor, pentecostal, pray, prayed, prayer, prayers, praying, pre-christian, preached, preachers, preaching, prelate, prophesied, redemption, religions, religious, resurrection ritual, rituals, sacrament, sacraments, sacred, sadr, savior, scripture, sermons, shabbat, shiites, souls, sunni, talmud, talmudic, testament, worshipping

2.1.3 Corpus preparation

For finding the frequency of terms from the found word list, the R package quanteda was used. (Benoit, Watanabe, Wang, Nulty, Obeng, Müller, Matsuo 2018) This approach is also used in the existing research as a similar classification of UNGA speeches by Watanabe and Zhou. (Watanabe, Zhou 2022)

The following steps, according to quanteda manual (*Quick Start Guide* [no date]), are firstly to create a corpus. Each speech is one unit of the corpus, sorted by year and country of representative. Then, the corpus is tokenized into tokens of the length of one word and compared with the found word list, which is used as a dictionary inside the quanteda package. This could add potential errors, but in case of this dataset, I have never found one.

To clear results, it is often necessary to remove so-called stopwords, which are the most frequent prepositions, articles and other words without any direct meaning, especially not religious ones, but in the frequency analysis, they do not have any impact on the result. I used a stopwords list by David Muhr (*Quanteda/stopwords* 2024).

Oppositely, for the following analysis, it is necessary to construct a document-feature matrix. This matrix describes the frequency of used terms in a collection of documents (in this case, in the collection of speeches). Document-feature matrix is defined as matrix which *"always refers to documents in rows and 'features' as columns. We fix this dimensional orientation because it is standard in data analysis to have a unit of analysis as a row, and features or variables pertaining to each unit as columns."*. (*Additional recommended packages:* [no date]) The use of the feature instead of the term is because of the wider options for this matrix, such as ngrams, syntactic dependencies, or a dictionary class.

2.1.4 Validation

For automated text analysis, it is necessary to validate the used method. *"What should be avoided, then, is the blind use of any method without a validation step."* (Grimmer, Stewart 2013, p. 271) The reason is that *"when applied to any one problem, however, the output of the models may be misleading or simply wrong"*. (Grimmer, Stewart 2013, p. 271)

The usually used "gold standard" for validation is manually annotating data. *"This procedure is based on the assumption that humans' understanding of texts (still) outperforms that of machines and that, if trained correctly, humans will make the most correct and valid classifications of texts."* (Song, Tolochko, Eberl, Eisele, Greussing, Heidenreich, Lind, Galyga, Boomgaarden 2020, p. 551)

These authors also propose that a manually analyzed sample should consist of at least 1,300 "documents" and 1% of all data. This is also why I made a sample composed of 1,300 randomly selected sentences from the whole corpus to find religious terms manually. A better variant to choose 1,300 random speeches was not chosen for too big a dataset, and difficult to go through it manually.

In this selection, I manually found 32 religious terms. My proposed automated script found 24 religious terms, according to my dictionary, with no false positives and eight false negatives, as summarized in Table 1.

2.1.4.1 Table 1

	Reference	
Prediction	0	1
0	1267	8
1	0	24

The resulting accuracy of the model was 99.38%, with 100% precision, 75% recall, and F1-value as their harmonic mean of 0.8571.

The missed religious terms were *Jews, blessings*, and *prophets* as plural forms of words from the dictionary, so I solved this problem by replacing them with regex forms (e.g., Jew* instead of only Jew). This approach was chosen because using these regex forms globally added many more false positives than using only a few words. The following missing word was *Shi'a*, a different spelling of Shi'ite, so I also added this word. The last term was "*faiths*", which is problematic because it is not usually used as a religious word (as the English phrase "in good faith" shows), so this false negative is probably inevitable. However, with these improvements, the recall of the model on this sample is 96.88%, and the F1-value is 0.9841.

2.1.5 Problematic terms

Manual validation also signified the problem when some terms are religious and when not, so I feel the need to comment on some of my choices here:

Jewish state: In the case of Israel and Judaism in general, there is a problem with the distinction of Jewish people as a nation and Jewish people as a religious group, and it is not very clear even in the Israeli constitution, which declares Israel as a Jewish state. (Beckford, Demerath 2007) *"Although there is no official religion in Israel, there is also no clear separation between religion and state. In Israeli public life, tensions frequently arise among different streams of Judaism: Ultra-Orthodox, National-Religious, Mesorati (Conservative), Reconstructionist Progressive (Reform), and varying combinations of traditionalism and non-observance. Despite this variety in religious observances in society, Orthodox Judaism prevails institutionally over the other streams."* (Jacoby 2005, p. 53). Because of the fact, that Jews as a religious group are only a part of Israeli society (6.8 million out of 9.2 million) (*Population - Statistical Abstract of Israel 2021 - No.72* [no date]), I kept the name of the Jewish state as a religious one because of the national character of Judaism, even though it is very disputable.

Holy city: The adjective *holy* can be considered a neutral description, usually connected with Jerusalem as the center of all Abrahamic religions. Nevertheless, I kept it as an example of a religious term because no important city has the phrase *holy city of* in its official name. In my opinion, using it is a choice of religious language (in the opposite of the case of *Islamic republic*).

Organization of Islamic Cooperation: This intergovernmental organization comprises all Muslim-majority countries worldwide and calls itself "the collective voice of the Muslim world". This makes it problematic for our case if it is a secular or religious organization. Still, I think that dealing with countries grouped only by their religion should also be an example of religious language, as it would be with the hypothetical organization of Christian countries.

2.2 Results of content analysis

Using the mentioned methodology, I obtained data describing the usage of religious terms in UNGA in dependence on the year and country of the speaker. Firstly, look at the most general level and how the usage has developed during the years since the beginning of the UN. According to fig. 1, the number of religious terms is significantly increasing:

Figure 1: Total usage of religious terms between 1949-2022

One peak is conspicuous and does not align with the slow trend – the year 1980 had the third-highest number of used religious terms. After looking at the source data, the explanation is not any political event but just an untypical speech by a representative of Pakistan about the start of the 15th century according to the Islamic calendar. He used 145 religious terms for comparison; the second was Israel, with 34.

In the spirit of this beginning the whole speech was: *"Another 40 days will usher in the beginning of a new Islamic century. Muslims all over the world will be celebrating the fourteen hundredth anniversary of a unique event, which was chosen by the Second Caliph of Islam, Hazrat Umar Ibn al-Khattab—may God be pleased with him—as the beginning of the Islamic Hegira calendar. The Hegira calendar commemorates neither the Prophet's birthday nor the time when the message of God was first revealed to him."*

The increase could also be because of the change in the number of UN member states (from 39 in 146 to 196 active speakers in 2017). This is described in fig. 2

where the number of religious terms is taken relatively to the number of speeches (i.e. speakers) in that year's UNGA session.

Figure 2: Relative frequency of usage of religious terms between 1946 and 2022

Suddenly, there is hardly any dominant trend, and the relative frequency oscillates around the same value. The mean of this frequency is 1.81 religious terms per speech, and the median is 1.68 terms.

When we continue to the perspective of the countries for Hypothesis 1, it is evident from fig. 3 that the relation between the secularity of the country measured by Secular Values Index from *Freedom Rising* by Christian Welzel (Welzel 2013) and the religiosity of their language in the UNGA is not significantly linear – the coefficient of determination of linear regression is only 0.156 and p-value of linear model is 0.0001848. This means that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.

Figure 3: Usage of religious terms in relation to their secular values index

However, the residual standard deviation is 1.011, as is evident in fig. 4. Though the index has an approximately normal distribution, the relative frequency of religious terms does not. Nor the removal of four outliers, found by Rosner's test, did not help much to approach linearity; in fact the coefficient of determination of linear regression was without states Iran, Jordan and Pakistan still the same, only 0.156.

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Normal Q-Q Plot of secular values index

Figure 4: Normal Q-Q plot of secular values index

In fig. 3, it is apparent that secular states also use religious language, and secularism measured by the Secular Values Index is not direct causality for the frequency of used religious terms.

It is also evident in fig. 2, that Hypothesis 2 has not been confirmed, as the religious language is not anyhow more frequent after the end of the Cold War nor 9/11, although it is apparent that neither secularism theory corresponds with this data, as religious language is not dominantly disappearing. Although, in absolute values, there is a greater presence of religious language on the UNGA scene, it is mainly because of the larger number of member states.

Geographically, in fig. 5, it is apparent that representatives from the MENA region used most religious terms in the history of the UN, with the primacy of Israel. Other prominent religious speakers were from the U.S. and Asia, especially from Malaysia. But there are also differences between Europe and Asia, including Russia, with South Africa on the other side.

Figure 5: Usage of religious terms in UNGA between years 1946-2022

Figure 6: Usage of religious terms in UNGA between years 1946-1989

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
Figure 7: Usage of religious terms in UNGA between years 1990-2022

As already mentioned, the milestone used in this thesis was chosen at the end of the Cold War. Comparing fig. 6 and fig. 7, the primacy moved from Saudi Arabia and Israel to Iran (very probably because of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979). The U.S. and Malaysia are other states that have been using more religious language after the Cold War. Especially the. The U.S. is a very exceptional example, in the opposite of Western trends. But the answer from its history could be because, in general, American presidents do not rarely use religious language to explain their foreign policy. E.g., George W. Bush's second inaugural speech *"was filled with references to the United States being"called" or given a "mission" by the "Maker of Heaven" and "Author of Liberty."* (Judis 2005, p. 65) Another reason is the delimitation against Islamic terrorism, as it is apparent in fig. 8 when after 1990, the terms related to Islam were much more frequent.

Figure 8: Wordclouds of used religious terms in the years 1946-1989 (left) and 1990-2022 (right)

The least religious continent is Europe, except for Spain before 1989 (because of the Catholic character of the Francoist regime (Payne 1984)), which also corresponds with the prediction, as Europe is considered the center of secularism with its *"sharply declining levels of church attendance in Europe are often regarded as evidence that this part of the world is being secularized."* (Halman, Draulans 2006, p. 1)

Wordcloud is a diagram showing the frequency of single terms weighted by the size of the word and, in this case, imagines the most used religious terms. (Jin 2017) fig. 9 shows that from Abrahamic religion, the most mentioned is Islam, with Judaism in second place (although the problem with distinguishing nationality and religiosity has already been mentioned). The most popular was, not surprisingly, the word "religious" and other general terms.

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Figure 9: Wordcloud of most used religious terms

3 Voting patterns in UNGA

One of the platforms where the effects on foreign policy could appear is the UN General Assembly and as it has univesal membership, it is useful place to examine religion's overt role there. UNGA passed approximately 18 thousand resolutions of varying importance. *"The same UNGA that passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 also approved, in 1975, resolution 3379 equating Zionism to racism, and, among the 276 resolutions adopted in 2018, one even proclaimed the "international day of the bicycle""* (Mesquita, Pires 2023)

Although the weight of resolutions is variable, there is a significance for international law. Also, it is important for international law, by their *"substantive, causative and modal effects".* (Öberg 2005)

Lande also claims the significance of the UNGA for the global politics: *"The decisions of the General Assembly can serve as a core of concentration because in a number of significant ways the Assembly has become both the political pivot and the institutional pith of the entire United Nations system."* (Lande 1966, p. 84)

3.1 Methodology of voting analysis

The research question of this part is clear: (R3) Is religion a factor in voting patterns in the UNGA? To verify my Hypothesis 3: *The state-dominant religion has a significant effect on how the state votes in the UNGA*, I used multinomial logistic regression as the most used nominal regression model for the cases when the outcome is nominal (Long, Freese 2014, p. 385), i.e., unordered, as in this case, the votes about resolutions are (with options Yes, No, Abstain, Absent and Not a member). As Long and Freese called them, these alternatives of the dependent variable fit in the model using regressors (independent variables).

This method has already been used in literature for research on multiple variables behind voting behavior (Dyck, Gimpel 2005; Dow, Endersby 2004) and even for evaluating the impact of religious behavior in elections in Great Britain (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001), proving that *"religious belonging affects the likelihood of party support, dividing religious groups from each other in electoral politics"* (2001, p. 552)

For further use, I will show the mathematical formulation in the form of the calculation of probabilities of each outcome.

$$P_r(y = j | x) = \frac{exp(x\prime\beta_j)}{\sum_{j=0..k} exp(x\prime\beta_j)} \text{ (Hilbe 2009, p. 387)}$$

Where β are searched coefficients representing the measure of change based on the variable.

In the result, the share of the Christian or Muslim population is the variables testing hypothesis (Jews were not added because there is only one state with a dominating Jewish population, so it cannot be independently tested without comparison).

I chose my regressors similarly to previous research (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001), according to which what could be other factors affecting voting in the UNGA: as GNI per capita and population again from (Center 2015) and subregion, according to the United States Statistics Division (United Nations Statistical Office 1999). This subregion regressor aims to eliminate factors that neighboring countries could have similar religions as they historically spread, removing also often connected cultural values based on their common history. (Dodge 1971, p. 460)

For the calculation, I used packages for R nnet (using neural networks to fit multinomial log-linear models) (Venables, Ripley 2002), and to process predicted calculation, the package MNLpred (Tedmakessense 2021) based on

(Hanmer, Ozan Kalkan 2013), also helping with data preparation to plot into graphs.

The data from the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data (Voeten, Strezhnev, Bailey 2023) allowed for verification of the hypothesis and specifically an examination of some topics. For religious context, I chose the total set and the subsets about the Palestinian conflict (19% of all resolutions) and human rights (17%) as the most relevant for this thesis.

The created model needed to handle the imbalance, as 73% of all votes were Yes, and the model had a problem predicting any other options. After undersampling this variant (Cartus, Bodnar, Naimi 2020) and ignoring the option "Not a member" as irrelevant, this model had Pearson's χ^2 test results in over 40 thousand with a p-value of practically zero, so it also fits the predicted values well in comparison with the original data. R^2 value is problematic and has more variants as pseudo-R^2. For example, the one by Cox and Snell was, in this case, 0.14, although the maximum is 0.75 and depends on the data (Allison 2014).

3.2 Results of voting analysis

In fig. 10, we can see that even in the whole dataset of all voting on resolutions, there are significant differences in probabilities of results based on the religious composition of the country's population. Summarized, Christian countries vote more Yes than Islamic countries (which is the most common result), which proves my Hypothesis 3. The almost opposite effect is probably because these two variants are the most significant and have contrary effects in summary.

Figure 10: Influence of religious population on country's voting

To test the hypothesis, I chose the likelihood-ratio test as the preferred option. (Long, Freese 2014, p. 401) The χ^2 value for the Christian variant of the hypothesis is 5814.9, with a p-value lower than $2.2 \cdot 10^{-16}$, allowing us to show the significance of Christianity to the population on the UNGA voting on all levels, as the model with religious variable corresponds better.

According to the LR test of the Muslim hypothesis variant, the χ^2 value of this hypothesis is 6581.2 with a p-value again lower than $2.2 \cdot 10^{-16}$, and also proving this hypothesis on all levels.

The p-value of all thematic tests was also nearly zero, so our hypotheses are also valid in thematic areas. The biggest difference is, as predictable and as we can see in fig. 11, at resolutions about the Palestinian conflict, although preference for Yes does not have meaningful value, as any resolution can be proposed positively or negatively. At fig. 12, we can see a similar trend.

Figure 11: Influence of religious population on country's voting about Palestinian conflict

Figure 12: Influence of religious population on country's voting about human rights

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4 Survival analysis of alliances

The third and last part again examines the covert influence of religion in international relations, this time by examining the effect of religions on the persistence of alliances. The hypothesis, as stated before and similar to research on cultural factors in alliances, is that if states share the same religion, the alliance will last longer, as religious diversity could potentially have harmful effects.

4.1 Methodology of Survival Analysis

To analyze the effects of various variables on alliance duration, I used survival analysis. This method dates back to the founder of demography, James Graunt and the year 1662 (Glass, Ogborn, Sutherland 1963), but for this work is especially important David Cox and his Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, Oakes 2018).

According to Cox, in survival analysis, "interest centres on a group or groups of individuals for each of whom (or which) there is defined a point event, often called failure, occurring after a length of time called the failure time. Failure can occur at most once on any individual." (Cox, Oakes 2018, p. 1)

Usually, the failure is the death of a patient; in our case, it will be the dissolution of the alliance. Outside of clinical studies, survival analysis was also used in IR – e.g., for the research of postwar peace (Werner 1999), a study of determinants of civil wars (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline 2000), or, of course, alliance duration by(Bennett 1997) and (Gaubatz 1996). Bennett's work was especially my guide and inspiration regarding what covariates comprise, although he does not use the Cox model.

I chose the Cox model (or PH model) in accordance with Box-Steffenmeister, Reiter and Zorn (2003), who claim that the advantage of this model is that it

has fewer assumptions than parameter models. *"Parametric models are not as widely used outside the social sciences as is the Cox model. (…) In addition, because most political scientists are interested in the connection between the dependent variable and the covariates, we argue that duration dependency should generally be treated as a nuisance and that methods such as the Cox model or its variants with a flexible baseline hazard should be used."* (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, Zorn 2003, pp. 40, 42)

The Cox model is using this hazard function representing how the risk changes with time: $h(t|\mathrm{x}) = \exp\left(\sum_{j=1}^{p} b_j \cdot x_j\right) = h_0(t)\exp(\mathrm{bx})$ (Lee, Wang 2003, p. 299) Where **b** is a vector of coefficients and x is a vector of covariates, while parameter h_0 (baseline hazard function) is the only dependent on time. Coefficients **b** *"can be estimated from the data observed and indicate the magnitude of the effects of their corresponding covariates"* (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, Zorn 2003, p. 299).

The Cox model is semi-parametric, as the baseline hazard function and **b** are completely unknown. The problem of the independence of all coefficients over time can be solved by stratifying some covariate or defining a function of its dependency. By convention (Collett 2003), usually preferred function is multiplying the variable by the natural logarithm of time, but *"there is no mathematical or theoretical reason for this particular function of time to be preferred."* (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, Zorn 2003, p. 45)

Even the Cox model has this significant limitation; it is used for its simplicity and because it still usually works quite well. *"It is similar with application of linear regression models in classical regression analysis: the mean of dependent variable is rarely a linear function of independent variables but the linear approximation works reasonably well in some range of independent variable values."* (Balakrishnan, Rao 2004, p. 413)

For this purpose, I used the Schoenfeld test to examine if covariates are independent of time. This test has a null hypothesis that this assumption is

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violated, so if we choose classical p-value <0.05, the variables are not dependent of time if the p-value is bigger. Plotting Schoenfeld residuals also shows the dependency of time when the ideal is a horizontal line. (Collett 2003, p. 144)

Base variables, to which I added diversity of religion, I took from Bennett's article (Bennett 1997), which also used the dataset Formal Alliances from Correlates of War project (Gibler 2009). His work focuses on alliances from 1816 to 1984, so there is a little intersection with my work in an era of the UN and after the end of the Cold War, so the differences in results are probable. However, his dataset contained 207 alliances, and my dataset from 1946 to 2008 (end of current version) contained 333 alliances, so my limits are more generous and better for regressing a model.

Bennett chose eleven variables – change in security, alliance security improvement, mutual threat, capability change, symmetry, capability concentration, liberal, polity change, number of states, wartime, and war termination, which I will describe in more detail. (Bennett 1997, p. 871)

Security is defined in his dissertation (Bennett 1993) as:

$$Security(X) = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} = \frac{Capabilities(enemy_i)}{Capabilities(X) + Capabilities\left(supporters_{enemy_i}\right)}$$

Where capabilities are taken again from the Correlates of War project and its national capability index (Singer, Bremer, Stuckey 2012), and enemies are the states that were at war five years before measurement and supporters who joined state X in this war with the specific enemy. Change in security is then defined as *"the mean change in security across all alliance members across the five years of each aggregation period"* (1997, p. 865) and expected is a negative value, i.e., the bigger the change is, the less alliance persists.

I skipped alliance security improvement because it is based on the presumption that all neutral states to members of the alliance would be enemies if the alliance did not exist, which I find too harsh. Bennett also considers it "artificial"

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(Bennett 1997, p. 865). However, the most important reason to skip it was that Bennett's results did not find it significant.

The mutual threat variable contains the capabilities of states that were at war with all members of the alliance five years before the alliance's start. (Bennett 1997, p. 866) This time, the hypothesis is that it would have a positive value, i.e., the existence of mutual threat makes alliance relations stronger.

Change in capabilities is the absolute value of growth in capabilities of all member states, and the hypothesis is a negative coefficient as for stronger states, the alliance becomes more obsolete.

Alliance symmetry is based on Morrow's work (Morrow 1991), but there is no data for classifying which states are major powers and which ones are minor, so I again did not use this variable. Especially because the concentration of power is similar to symmetry, as it is defined as:

$$c = \sqrt{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}(S_i)^2 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \Big/ \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)}$$

Where S_i is the state's share of the alliance's capabilities. (Bennett 1997, p. 867) The effect is assumed to be positive, so a bigger share of capabilities by one state is beneficial.

Regime change is from the Polity V dataset (Marshall, Gurr 2020) when the changes are considered as *"either 1) externally imposed, 2) the result of internal revolution, or 3) related to an internal crisis"*. (Bennett 1993, p. 868) The hypothesis is that more changes of this kind will have a negative impact on the alliance.

Liberal index I took slightly different for simplification, and it is mean of the liberal democracy index for all states taken from the V-dem (Varieties of Democracy) dataset (Coppedge, Gerring et al. 2024) thanks to their R package vdemdata (Institute 2024).

For the institutionalization variable, there are no existing data in the current version (Bennett used v2.0, and the current is v4.1), so there is no way to consider if an alliance is institutionalized.

The number of states is probably clear. More interesting is the two hypothesis that it would have a positive or negative effect, especially because of dealing with free-riding—small alliances could deal with it more accessible as it is easier to monitor it (Olson, Zeckhauser 1966), or it could be less problematic for bigger alliances (Morrow 1991). Bennett's results showed a slightly positive effect.

A wartime alliance is one signed after the war of all members. The warterm variable shows if an alliance ended some war during its existence. Both should have negative effects.

Finally, my variable for the diversity of religion is based on the World Religion Dataset (Maoz, Henderson 2013), assigning an index to states based on the most prominent religion. There are six options – Christian, Muslim, Jew, Buddhist, Hindu, and non-religious. Then, I calculate the diversity of these indexes using the Hill-Shannon diversity index. The reason for not using the more common Shannon index is that it does not measure diversity itself, but uncertainty about the sample and so it does not *"behave in ways that do not make sense for a metric of diversity"* (Roswell, Dushoff, Winfree 2021, p. 326)

Hill-Shannon index is then defined as:

$$I_{HS} = e^{-\sum_{i=1}^{S} p_i \ln(p_i)} = e^{H_S}$$ (Roswell, Dushoff, Winfree 2021, p. 328)

I hypothesize that it will have a negative effect. If states have different religions, dealing with each other should be more complicated, even if the states are secular, as mentioned earlier (based on post-secular theory).

4.2 Fitness of model

I used several methods to determine whether the model represents the data well. First, I will describe the statistical tests. The AIC (Akaike information criterion) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion) are primarily used to compare models and measure their simplicity. (Parzen, Lipsitz 1999). Another option is concordance index measuring, as the name suggests, the concordance between observed and predicted values. (Korn, Simon 1990) Last is the Wald test, which corresponds with the chi-square test because the square of the Wald statistic *"can be compared with percentage points of a chi-squared distribution on one degree of function"* (Collett 2003, p. 71).

Another method to assess the goodness of fit of models is graphical. For this purpose, I plotted deviance residuals and dfbeta residuals with the ggcoxdiagnostics() function in R. With this method; residuals are expected to be close to zero—positive deviance residuals signal that this alliance ended sooner than expected and vice versa. (Lee, Wang 2003, p. 331). They also help to examine outliers and influential observation.

4.3 Results of survival analysis

First, after combining the data, I fitted the Cox model to the data of 333 alliances. When comparing with Bennett's results, it can be confusing that the sign of the coefficient is opposite to that of the Cox model, where positive coefficients mean a harmful effect. With this in mind, it is apparent that the models correspond in most values, except concentration and change in security, which lost their significance.

Table 4.3.1

	(1)	Bennett (1993)
Diversity of religion	0.233	
	p.=0.155	
Change in capabilities	167.749***	-62.6***
	p.=<0.001	-
Liberal democracy index	2.732***	0.781***
	p.=<0.001	+
Number of members	-0.280*	0.078**
	p.=0.034	-/+
Concentration	-0.080	0.929***
	p.=0.851	+
Warterm	-0.915*	0.279*
	p.=0.034	-
Change in security	-257.247	0.101***
	p.=0.452	-
Polity changes	0.020	-0.052
	p.=0.221	-
Num.Obs.	333	207
AIC	700.1	
BIC	730.6	
Wald	35.99	

However, testing the assumption of time non-dependency shows that this model fails with a global Schoenfeld test value of only 0.0016, as shown fig. 13.

Figure 13: Schoenfeld test for the first model

Unfortunately, the lowest individual test value shows diversity of religion, so I used time stratification for a number of members. It did not help, so I used the following method, assigned a dependent function, multiplied by ln(time), and got a global Schoenfeld test value of 0.1052, sufficient to use the Cox model. After that, I excluded the least statistically significant variable – concentration (that is model 3 with a global Schoenfeld test value of 0.156, fig. 14):

Table 4.3.2

	(1)	Bennett (1993)	(2)	(3)
Diversity of religion	0.233		0.445***	0.441***
	p.=0.155		p.=<0.001	p.=<0.001
Change in capabilities	167.749***	-62.6***	185.176***	183.864***
	p.=<0.001	-	p.=<0.001	p.=<0.001
Liberal democracy index	2.732***	0.781***	2.987***	2.988***
	p.=<0.001	+	p.=<0.001	p.=<0.001
Number of members	-0.280*	0.078**	-0.079***	-0.078***
	p.=0.034	-/+	p.=<0.001	p.=<0.001
Concentration	-0.080	0.929***	0.074	
	p.=0.851	+	p.=0.864	
Warterm	-0.915*	0.279*	-0.907*	-0.925*
	p.=0.034	-	p.=0.042	p.=0.033
Change in security	-257.247	0.101***	-403.310	-403.577
	p.=0.452	-	p.=0.178	p.=0.181
Polity changes	0.020	-0.052	0.037**	0.037**
	p.=0.221	-	p.=0.006	p.=0.007
Num.Obs.	333	207	333	333
AIC	700.1		684.2	682.3
BIC	730.6		714.7	708.9
Wald	35.99		45.14	45.06
Concordance	0.652		0.706	0.705
Global Schoenfeld test	0.0016		0.1052	0.156

Figure 14: Schoenfeld test of model 3

In the table, we can see that the best results in test statistics have model 3. However, the second one has a slightly higher Wald test result and concordance (which makes sense as there is one variable less), but not significantly enough to compensate for the improvement of the Schoenfeld test and better fulfillment of assumptions of the Cox model.

In fig. 15, it is apparent that fit curves depart from zero only for the liberal democracy index variable, but the deviation is around -0.1, so the result is still valid. Deviance residuals shown in fig. 16 are plotted mostly around zero, and part of them goes to +3. This suggests that the model sometimes predicts longer durations for alliances than there are in fact, but still, in the mean, it is close to zero.

Figure 15: Plots of Dfbeta residuals for all variables

Figure 16: Plot of deviance residuals to linear predictions

In the previous table and fig. 17, we can see that there are some differences from Bennett's work – change in capabilities' coefficient has a three times bigger effect, and change in security lost significance and has a really different value.

The change for a liberal democracy index is obviously from the change in the method of calculation, including a change of sign. On the other hand, the effect of polity changes is significant in my model. Even with these differences in mind, my model is close to literature, so also the result for religions has relevance.

Figure 17: Coefficient estimates of selected variables

With a p-value less than 0.001, the diversity of religions is a statistically significant variable inside the test. The size of the coefficient is 0.441, corresponding with the hypothesis 4 that a higher diversity of religions brings a higher risk for the alliance.

More precisely, it is shown in fig. 18 by survival curves for minimal diversity (equal to zero) or maximal diversity (equal to 22). The difference in median survival times for these diversities and base values of other variables is 15 months, which is then the maximal impact of religions in the duration of alliances.

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
Figure 18: Survival curves with median survival times

In Aalen's plot in fig. 19, we can see the dependency of the cumulative effect of variables by time. There has been an interesting increase in the liberal democracy index for around 20 years. This plot *"gives information on whether the particular covariate has a constant or time-dependent effect. Positive slopes occur during periods when increasing the covariate increases the hazard, negative slopes occur when increasing the covariate decreases the hazard and the cumulative sums will have roughly zero slope during periods when the covariate has no effect on the hazard."* (Henderson, Milner 1991, p. 401)

Figure 19: Aalen's plot of cumulative effect of variables in time

Conclusion

The goal of this work was to respond to the idea of a resurgence of religion in global politics, which many sociologists and political scientists have described (Haynes 2014, p. 88). The theoretical background chosen for describing this phenomenon was post-secular theory, postulated first by Jürgen Habermas. The problem with the analysis of the term "post-secular" is that it has a vague definition, but the main phenomenon is that organized religion loses its members, but there is the rise of spirituality outside its borders.

The main turning point of this development and strikeback of religions is usually after the end of the Cold War and its connection with globalism proposed by Haynes: *"A focus on RTAs fits well with a separate argument often seen in the context of the post-Cold War impact of globalisation: states are said to be losing their pre-eminent position in international relations, challenged by an array of important non-state actors, with financial or diplomatic clout."* (Haynes 2014, p. 75)

Similarly, only after the Cold War, IR theorists did begin to study religion as a factor: *"Favoured by the 1990s post-positivist turn, which opened to scrutiny seemingly 'unobservable values and practices like religion', this literature has began to question some of the secularist presumptions which undergird the discipline. In particular, scholars have increasingly looked at the positive contribution that politicised religion could play in processes of modernisation, democratisation and peace-building, both in the so-called Western and non-Western world, as well as at the deeper theoretical implications that the global resurgence of religion raises for thinking about future world orders"* (Mavelli, Petito 2012, p. 934)

After it, the post-secular theory was used in IR, for example, to explain the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terrorism (Habermas 2006; Pabst 2012), or the Arab Spring revolutions (Mavelli, Petito 2012).

Unfortunately, this research on religion in IR is often only focused on the grand theories. This gap was then a motivation for this thesis – to find if there is a justification for the return of religion and the influence of its effect in three areas.

Main findings

My first area of research was on unhidden religious manifestation, specifically in speeches at the United Nations General Assembly. For content analysis, I needed a set of religious terms to find them in the corpus and to be able to compare them in different years. I took this set from *An Introduction to Religious Language* (Hobbs 2021) and widened it using embedding vectors from the GloVe set with other words with similar meanings. This novel approach is another – methodological – contribution of my work, as I do not know of any use of this method for widening a defined set for lexical methods. With this method, I got 72 words with dominantly religious significance from the original seed of 39 words.

My hypotheses were that, despite the theory of secularism, religious terms should be used by secularized and religious states without big differences, which was apparent in fig. 2, where there is no dependence on secular values index.

The second hypothesis is that according to post-secular theory, religious language should be more often used by state representatives lately, especially after the end of the Cold War and 9/11. This hypothesis is true only thanks to the rise of states in the United Nations; in relative numbers, there was no trend, and the hypothesis is denied.

Geographically, it is not surprising that states of the Middle East are at the top of the rankings in using religious terms. But after the end of the Cold War, the United States has also been significantly talking in religious terms, in contrast

with Europe, especially thanks to using terms related to Islam and, hence, probably, the War on Terror.

In the second part, I chose the analysis of voting patterns in the UNGA as the place where religion should not have an effect on secular states. I used multinomial logistic regression to focus on only religious effects. As a religious variable, I took the share of the Christian and Muslim population in states (the Jewish variable would have a focus only on Israel). The other independent variables were GNI per capita and the index of the subregion to eliminate the factors of neighboring countries with often similar cultural values.

My analysis showed that there is really an effect of religion on voting. Countries with a Christian population vote less often positively than countries with a Muslim population. The strongest effect is at resolutions about the Palestinian conflict, but also at resolutions focused on human rights and at all resolutions in general. This again contradicts the presumptions of secularism theory, but proves my third hypothesis.

The final part of my thesis was the survival analysis of alliances. Using the Cox proportional hazards model, I wanted to examine the effect of religion on the duration of alliances. The hypothesis was that a more diverse dominant religion of alliance members means a shorter time of alliance existence. Other variables were taken from the work of Scott D. Bennett (1997): change in security, mutual threat, capability change, liberal, polity change, number of states, and war termination.

The coefficient for the diversity of religion was 0.441 with a p-value smaller than one thousandth, meaning that this hypothesis was also verified. The difference in median survival times for zero and maximum diversity was 15 months.

Implication of Findings

- UN General Assembly speech analysis showed that state representatives use religious language in global diplomatic forums, such as the UNGA, challenging the secularization theory.

- Voting patterns analysis indicates a statistically significant religious influence on voting in the UNGA, especially in votes related to the Palestinian conflict. This suggests that religious affiliations can influence international policy decisions.

- Alliance survival analysis demonstrated that religious diversity within alliances can lead to shorter duration, and thus a quantitative measure of religion's impact on international coalitions.

Future research posibilities

Future research could widen my work on the analysis of non-Abrahamic religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, etc. These religions were omitted to narrow my work, and they are less present in the West, which is dominantly secularized, but they could still impact international diplomacy. Similarly, there could also be bigger distinctions in various Christian churches, even if there are sometimes problems with their classification.

Another possible way to continue my results is to find real examples of religious impact. It could be in the development and implementation of international law norms or describing using religion as soft power. I believe it could be interesting to survey the state representatives at the UNGA, if they realize that religion is in their work present factor and use it for qualitative research.

The research of religions in security studies could also go beyond my alliance analysis; one example is a comparative study of the behavior of secular versus religious states in conflict situations. One prominent example could be the Holy

See, as it is a recognized member of international society and also has jurisdiction over the whole Catholic Church.

In the end, I believe that it is obvious that even though religion is not as dominant as it was centuries ago, it still plays a role. As Vendula Kubálková stated: *"Religion can't 'return' to IR. It never left"* (Kubálková 2009, p. 32)

Závěr

Cílem této práce bylo odpovědět na ideu návratu náboženství do globální politiky, kterou mnoho sociologů a politologů popsalo (Haynes 2014, str. 88). Teoretickým základem zvoleným pro popsání tohoto fenoménu byla postsekulární teorie, poprvé postulovaná Jürgenem Habermasem. Problém s analýzou termínu „postsekulární" je jeho vágní definice, ale základní fenomén je, že organizované náboženství ztrácí své členy, ale za jeho hranicemi spiritualita opět narůstá.

Hlavním zlomem tohoto vývoje a návratu náboženství je obvykle konec studené války a její spojení s globalizací, jak Haynes navrhoval: *„Fokus na RTAs dobře odpovídá oddělenému argumentu často zmiňovanému v kontextu dopadu po studené válce na globalizaci: státy mají ztrácet své výsadní postavení v mezinárodních vztazích, napadané polem důležitých nestátních aktérů s finančním nebo diplomatickým vlivem."* (Haynes 2014, str. 75)

Obdobně až po studené válce teoretici mezinárodních vztahů začali studovat náboženství jako faktor: „Podporované post-pozitivistickým obratem v 90. letech, který otevřel podrobnému zkoumání zdánlivě ‚nepozorovatelné hodnoty a praktiky jako náboženství', tato literatura začala zpochybňovat některé sekularistické předpoklady, které zakládaly celý obor. Konkrétně, vědci se začali dívat na pozitivní přispění, které politizované náboženství může přinést v procesu modernizace, demokratizace a budování míru, a to v takzvaném západním i nezápadním světě, stejně jako na hlubší teoretické důsledky, které globální obrození náboženství přináší ke přemýšlení o budoucích světových řádech." (Mavelli, Petito 2012, str. 934)

Poté byla postsekulární teorie použita v mezinárodních vztazích například pro vysvětlení útoků z 11. září a globální války proti terorismu (Habermas 2006; Pabst 2012), nebo revolucí Arabského jara (Mavelli, Petito 2012).

Bohužel tento výzkum náboženství v MV je často zaměřen pouze na velké teorie. Tato mezera byla tak motivací pro tuto práci – najít, jestli je nějaké opodstatnění pro návrat náboženství a jeho dopadů ve třech oblastech.

Hlavní zjištění

Mojí první oblastí výzkumu byly neskrývané projevy náboženství, konkrétně v projevech na Valném shromáždění OSN. Pro obsahovou analýzu jsem potřeboval sadu náboženských pojmů na jejich vyhledání v korpusu a pro jejich porovnání v jednotlivých letech. Tuto sadu jsem vzal z *An Introduction to Religious Language* (Hobbs 2021) a rozšířil ji použitím vnořovacích vektorů ze sady GloVe dalšími slovy s podobným významem. Tento novátorský přístup je dalším – metodologickým – příspěvkem mé práce, jelikož nevím o jiném použití této metody pro rozšíření definované sady pro lexikální analýzu. Takto jsem získal 72 slov s převážně náboženským významem z původních 39 slov.

Moji hypotézou bylo, že navzdory teorii sekularismu, by náboženské pojmy měly být používané sekularizovanými i náboženskými státy bez velkých rozdílů, jak je také vidět na fig. 2, který neukazuje žádnou závislost na indexu sekulárních hodnot.

Druhá hypotéza je, že podle postsekulární teorie by náboženský jazyk měl být častěji používán zástupci států v poslední době, hlavně po konci studené války a 11. září. Tato hypotéza se ale potvrdila jen, když se nevezme v potaz nárůst počtů členských států OSN, v relativních číslech zde žádný trend nebyl.

Geograficky není překvapivé, že státy Blízkého východu vedou žebříček používání náboženských pojmů. Ale po konci studené války Spojené státy také začali mluvit v náboženských pojmech, a to na rozdíl od Evropy, a zvláště díky používání pojmů spojených s islámem, a tedy pravděpodobně války proti terorismu.

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V druhé části jsem si zvolil analýzu vzorů hlasování ve Valném shromáždění jako v místě, kde náboženství by nemělo mít žádný efekt. Použil jsem multinomiální logistickou regresi pro fokus pro pouze vliv náboženství. Jako proměnnou popisující náboženství jsem vzal podíl křesťanské a muslimské populace (proměnná pro židovství by zahrnovala pouze Izrael). Dalšími nezávislými proměnými byl hrubý národní produkt na počet obyvatel a index subregionů pro eliminování faktorů souvisejícími s tím, že sousedící země mají často podobné kulturní hodnoty.

Moje analýza ukázala, že je zde opravdu vliv náboženství na to, jak státy hlasují. Země s křesťanským obyvatelstvem hlasovali méně často kladně než státy s obyvatelstvem muslimským. Nejsilnější byl tento efekt u rezolucí k palestinskému konfliktu, ale značný byl také u rezolucí zaměřených na lidská práva a u všech rezolucí obecně. Toto opět odporuje předpokladům teorie sekularismu, ale dokazuje mou třetí hypotézu.

Finální částí mé práce byla analýza přežití aliancí. Díky Coxově modelu proporčních rizik jsem chtěl zkoumat efekt náboženství na délku trvání aliancí. Hypotézou bylo, že čím rozmanitější bude dominantní náboženství členů aliance, tím kratší bude existence tohoto spojenectví. Další proměnné byly převzaté z práce Scotta D. Bennetta (1997): změna v bezpečnosti, existence společné hrozby, změna schopností, index liberální demokracie, počet změn režimů, počet členů a ukončení války.

Koeficient pro diverzitu náboženství byl 0,441 s p-hodnotou menší než jedna tisícina, což znamená, že i tato hypotéza byla ověřena. Rozdíl v mediánu trvání aliance s nulovou a maximální diverzitou byl 15 měsíců.

Důsledky zjištění

- Analýza projevů na Valném shromáždění OSN ukázala, že zástupci států používají náboženský jazyk na globálních diplomatických fórech, jako je VS OSN, navzdory teorii sekularismu

- Analýza vzorů hlasování ukazuje statisticky významný vliv náboženství na hlasování ne VS OSN, obzvláště u hlasů ohledně palestinského konfliktu. Toto naznačuje, že příslušnost obyvatelstva k náboženství může ovlivnit mezinárodní politická rozhodnutí.

- Analýza přežití aliancí ukázala, že náboženská diverzita v rámci aliancí může vest k jejich kratšímu trvání neboli kvantitativní ukázku dopadu náboženství na mezinárodní koalice.

Možnosti budoucího výzkumu

Budoucí výzkum by mohl rozšířit mou práci analýzou ne-Abrahámských náboženství, jako je hinduismus, budhismu, šintoismus atd. Tato náboženství byla vynechána pro zúžení mé práce a také jsou méně přístupná na Západě, na kterém sekularizace převážně probíhala, ale i tak by mohla mít dopad na mezinárodní diplomacii. Podobně zde může být také větší rozlišování křesťanských církví, u kterých je ale zas problém s jejich klasifikací.

Další možnou cestou, jak navázat na mé výsledky je nalézt reálné příklady dopadu náboženství. Tím by mohl být vývoj a implementace mezinárodních právních norem nebo popis používání náboženství jako „soft power". Věřím, že by mohlo být zajímavé udělat průzkum mezi zástupci na VS OSN, pokud si uvědomují, že náboženství je v jejich práci přítomným faktorem a použít to pro kvalitativní výzkum.

Výzkum náboženství v bezpečnostních studiích by mohl jít za hranice mé analýzy aliancí; jedním příkladem je možná komparativní studie chování

sekulárních versus náboženských států v konfliktních situacích. Prominentním příkladem by mohl být Svatý stolec, který je uznávaným členem mezinárodního společenství a také má jurisdikci nad celou Katolickou církví.

Závěrem, věřím, že je očividné, že i když náboženství není na mezinárodní scéně tak dominantní jako před staletími, tak přesto stále hraje jistou roli. A jak uvedla Vendula Kubálková: *„Náboženství se nemůže ‚vrátit‘ do mezinárodních vztahů. Nikdy neodešlo."* (Kubálková 2009, str. 32)

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