

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies
Department of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

2023

Bc. Jakob Kindl

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies
Department of Security Studies

**Conditions of Peace in the Context of the Colombian
and Northern Irish Peace Process**

Master's thesis

Author: Bc. Jakob Kindl

Study programme: Security Studies

Supervisor: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2023

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Šumperk on 01.08.2023

Bc. Jakob Kindl

References

KINDL, Jakob. *Conditions of Peace in the Context of the Colombian and Northern Irish Peace Process*. Praha, 2023. 78 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of Security Studies. Supervisor PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.

Length of the thesis: 148 869 characters

Abstract

This diploma thesis examines the relationship between the content and language of peace agreements and their acceptance by the population. It investigates the content based on Johan Galtung's theoretical concept of positive peace and the language based on structuralist linguistic theory. It is therefore an interdisciplinary research that combines the theoretical concept of the field of international relations with language theory. This thesis defends this approach by analyzing the concept of peace in international relations theories in which it identifies its shortcomings.

A comparative case analysis of two peace agreements is conducted, the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the Peace Agreement in Colombia. While the two conflicts and peace processes show many similarities, the outcome differed and while the agreement was accepted in Northern Ireland, the agreement was rejected in Colombia. This thesis is concerned with the search for the causes that may have led to the different outcomes of the referenda and their adoption, and it seeks these causes in the content and language of the two agreements, rather than in the rejection of the referendum per se.

The main contribution of the thesis is the analysis of the content and language of the two peace agreements, which examines not only whether the different parts of the peace treaties are consistent with achieving a positive peace, but also the extent to which the agreements use inclusive language involving women and minority groups. Another contribution is the definition of the relationship between negative and positive peace in the context of peace agreement negotiations. The analysis of both peace processes concludes that negative peace is a prerequisite to achieving positive peace, meaning that failure to achieve negative peace prevents the establishment of a peace agreement, regardless of whether the content of the agreement is inclusive and one of positive peace.

Keywords

positive peace, negative peace, Galtung, peace agreement, language, referendum, Colombia, Northern Ireland

Abstrakt

Tato diplomová práce se zabývá vztahem mezi obsahem a jazykem mírových dohod s jejich akceptací obyvatelstvem. Obsah zkoumá na základě teoretického konceptu pozitivního míru Johana Galtunga a jazyk na základě strukturalistické jazykové teorie. Jedná se proto o interdisciplinární výzkum, který spojuje teoretický koncept oboru mezinárodních vztahů s jazykovou teorií. Tato práce obhajuje tento přístup na základě analýzy konceptu míru v teoriích mezinárodních vztahů ve kterých pojmenovává její nedostatky.

Subjektem výzkumu je komparativní případová analýza dvou mírových dohod, Velkopáteční dohody v Severním Irsku a Mírové dohody v Kolumbii. Zatímco oba konflikty i mírové procesy vykazují řadu podobností, výsledek se lišil a zatímco v Severním Irsku byla dohoda přijata, v Kolumbii byla dohoda odmítnuta. Tato práce se zabývá hledáním příčin, které mohly vést k rozdílnému výsledku referenda o přijetí dohody. Tyto příčiny hledá v obsahu a jazyku těchto dvou smluv, spíše než v odmítnutí referenda jako takového.

Hlavním přínosem práce je jednak analýza obsahu a jazyka obou mírových dohod, která zkoumá nejen to, zda jednotlivé části mírových smluv odpovídají dosažení pozitivního míru, ale také to, do jaké míry je v dohodách užíván inkluzivní jazyk zahrnující ženy a menšinové skupiny. Dalším přínosem je definování vztahu mezi negativním a pozitivním mírem v souvislosti s jednáními o mírových dohodách. Analýza obou mírových procesů dochází ke zjištění, že negativní mír je prerekvizitou k dosažení pozitivního míru, tedy že nedosažení negativního míru znemožňuje nastolení mírové dohody, bez ohledu na to, zda obsah dohody je inkluzivní a pozitivně-mírový.

Klíčová slova

pozitivní mír, negativní mír, Galtung, mírová dohoda, jazyk, referendum, Kolumbie, Severní Irsko

Title

Conditions of Peace in the Context of the Colombian and Northern Irish Peace Process

Název práce

Mírové podmínky v kontextu kolumbijského a severoirského mírového procesu

Acknowledgement

In the aftermath of a global pandemic that has resulted in me not meeting face-to-face with a single professor or classmate, I would like to express my profound gratitude to those who have been a part of my life during this time, those who have supported, motivated, and complemented me. I thank my mum for constantly maintaining a sufficient unspoken level of pressure that not making it was never an option.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	2
1. THEORETICAL APPROACH TOWARDS PEACE.....	3
1.1. Realism.....	4
1.2. Liberalism.....	6
1.3. Constructivism.....	8
1.4. Marxism and neomarxism.....	9
1.5. Positive and negative peace.....	11
2. LANGUAGE IN THEORY.....	15
2.1. Structuralism.....	17
2.2. Peace and language.....	19
3. PEACE AGREEMENTS IN THEORY.....	21
3.1. Peace agreements and referenda.....	25
4. METHODOLOGY.....	30
5. CASE STUDIES.....	32
5.1. Colombia.....	32
5.1.1. Introduction to the conflict.....	32
5.1.2. Form of the agreement.....	34
5.1.3. Content of the agreement.....	34
5.1.3.1. Core of the agreement.....	34
5.1.3.2. Power-sharing.....	41
5.1.3.3. Justice.....	45
5.1.4. Ceasefire and negative peace.....	48
5.2. Northern Ireland.....	49
5.2.1. Introduction to the conflict.....	49
5.2.2. Form of the agreement.....	51
5.2.3. Content of the agreement.....	51
5.2.3.1. Core of the agreement.....	51
5.2.3.2. Power-sharing.....	54
5.2.3.3. Justice.....	56
5.2.3.4. Security.....	57
5.2.4. Ceasefire and negative peace.....	58
6. COMPARISON.....	60
7. CONCLUSION.....	62
List of References.....	66

INTRODUCTION

"Peace". This word began appearing without further context in 2022 on advertising banners on the sidelines of football grounds, on match balls, and on projection screens in stadiums where UEFA-sponsored matches were played, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¹ This one word, as an unambiguous expression of a universal natural human desire, needed no context.

Peace is a concept that can seem like a light, straightforward and universal concept, one of the few things humanity agrees on, like a unifying motif on a banner on the edge of a sports field. Peace is merely a word describing something that is not visible and that will evoke different associations and needs in each recipient. While some will understand peace as a state in which nations are not at war with each other, others will understand it as a peaceful state between people and the natural environment. The environment in which people live affects whether they think the world is more or less at peace compared to the past, just as the country of origin will affect what people indicate as what is lacking for peace. (*Youth Survey on Peace Awareness, 2022*).

Colombia, 2016. After more than fifty years of bloody conflict, Colombians are being allowed to vote in a referendum to accept a peace agreement that would end this long-running conflict. 50.2 % voted against and rejected peace. (Brodzinsky, 2016) Northern Ireland, 1998. After decades of bloody conflict, the Northern Irish are allowed to vote in a referendum to accept a peace agreement to end this long-running conflict. 71.1% voted to accept peace. (Hayes, 2007) Two states, plagued by violence, sought to reach a peace agreement, which they both also worked out. In both cases, however, the agreement had to be submitted to the population in a referendum for approval. The results differed.

Peace is a fascinating concept both linguistically and in terms of international relations, where it has long been overlooked. This thesis has therefore taken it upon itself to examine and critically evaluate both the concept of peace in international relations theories and the concept of language in the formation of peace agreements. Based on a comparative

¹ UEFA Champions League final sends global message of peace. (2022, May 28). UEFA. <https://www.uefa.com/returntoplay/news/0275-15405e648b3d-8ac8e1f7ec0f-1000--uefa-champions-league-final-sends-global-message-of-peace/>

analysis of two peace agreements in Colombia and Northern Ireland, it will link the issue of language and Johan Galtung's theoretical concept of positive peace. It will formulate the causes of the successful and failed peace referendums in those countries based on both the *content* and the *language* of the peace agreements. The thesis aims to contribute to the still new and unexplored academic field of peace studies with its innovative incorporation of Galtung's concept of peace and linguistic theory in the context of peace negotiations.

This thesis consists of two main parts. The first is devoted to situating peace within the theoretical framework of international relations, whether it be the shortcomings of explaining peace using established theories or the use of international relations concepts. In this theoretical section, I will also address the foundations of linguistic structuralist theory.

In the second main part, I will examine the case studies from Colombia and Northern Ireland in which I will analyze the content and language of specific parts of peace agreements. In the final part, I will compare and evaluate these findings.

1. Theoretical approach towards peace

The concept of peace in international relationships (IR) got overlooked for a long time. Whereas the academic field of international relations emerged already after the first world war, the concept of peace was not conceptualized and dealt with within the main two streams of thought until the late 20th century.

Physicists who study light or heat examine the laws of those physical phenomena and they come up with units they assign to those phenomena, so they are measurable and understandable. Nevertheless, they wouldn't study darkness or cold nor would they assign units to those situations as those phenomena would be understood to be the lack of light or the lack of heat. Within IR, peace was for a long time considered similarly as a pure lack of conflict or lack of war. The first IR stream of thought that would examine peace as a category of its own were constructivists, namely Johan Galtung in the 1960s.

In this theoretical part I will first make an overview of the concept of peace within the main IR theories including realism, liberalism, Marxism, and constructivism. I will analyze how each of the theories explains peace and where it fails to provide answers. In the second part, I will outline which theories will provide a base for my further research while acknowledging the strengths, the weaknesses, and possible blind spots of the given theories.

1.1. Realism

The first theoretical camp is realism. Realism, as the traditional theoretical school of thought, sees the world in terms of states. The basic component is a world in which anarchy reigns due to which states do not feel bound to rules, nor can they be compelled to act or constrained to act by any higher power since it does not exist.

In the context of thinking about peace, this is highly unoptimistic. One of the earliest exponents of the realist current, Thomas Hobbes, formulated the world as a space where the laws of nature rule, in which there is constant competition with each other without any arbiter. (Hobbes, 1985) War and conflict — or the absence of peace — is in this perspective only natural, as it is merely the result of constant natural competition. Realists also argue that all states have the same goal of achieving maximal security, they are considered power seekers (Schmidt, 2005) since they are a part of the anarchic world. Nevertheless, they have different means of achieving that.

The two core default positions of classical realism lead also to two core implications for peace. Firstly, if states are in a state of constant power-seeking, peace can only be a temporary situation of non-war and non-conflict. It is a phase in which states securitize and try to maximize their means to wage the inevitable war later. The peace phase is therefore dependent on the interstate power constellation, on the understanding and interpretation of the current situation by each state - what states recognize as a threat and what not, and on the determination of the states to use force as a means of seizing power in that particular situation. Secondly, if there is no global above-the-states authority that would have the power to enforce action on states then the state of non-war is always only temporary. A concept of sustainable peace is impossible because no institution could

enforce peace and because states will always act according to their nature. Any attempt of longing for permanent peace is set to fail. (Richmond, 2008)

A stream of neorealists later separated. While acknowledging the states as primary players and the system is anarchical, neorealists emphasize the structure of the international system rather than human factors that influence state behavior. Neorealists also move on from the notion of states seeking power to states seeking influence. (Zakaria, 1998) Influence is not a zero-sum game. Therefore, states can be either supplementary to one state's influence seeking which would lead to peace, or they can be contradictory in which case it leads to conflict.

Neorealism, therefore, offers new possibilities for thinking about peace. Neorealists came up with several theoretical peace concepts: power balancing, threat balancing (Walt, 1987), theory of the security dilemma, and theory of hegemonic stability (Herz, 1950, Jervis, 1970) in which the terms “balance” and “stability” can be defined as peaceful realities. Since the anarchic system does not provide a defense mechanism against a rise of a hegemon, according to neorealists, states use power balancing and they ally together against a potential hegemon or they choose to bandwagon and they join the hegemonic side in the hope of securing their survival (Walt, 1987, Mersheimer, 2001). It doesn't have to be a balanced power, also balancing of threats can lead to a non-conflict environment (Walt, 1987). The theory of the security dilemma proposes another explanation for why states wage war: that the perception of outside danger is sufficient to lead states into a spiral of securitization. This makes a balanced situation almost impossible because it could only be achieved by a situation of full mutual trust. Hence, the theory implies that sustainable balance is unreachable due to the natural distrust of states.

In the realist view, there are further situations in which peace and stability are achieved despite the anarchical environment and endless search for survival. Hegemonic peace can be achieved by the structural superiority of a hegemonic state which is not challenged due to its power. Imperial peace takes place when a hegemonic state goes even further and restricts the sovereignty of other states. Ideological peace takes place between states with the same ideologies or establishments, such as between democratic states. Structural peace

would exist if there was a global structural reform. That is so far unthinkable, but it exists in more narrow contexts such as within the EU.

1.2. Liberalism

Liberals, contrary to realists, shifted from the focus on states as drivers of international politics towards individuals who influence state behavior and preferences. The basic principles contain individualism, freedom, and the same rights and protection.

Liberalism is therefore per se more inclined towards giving a comprehensive explanation of peace since peace can be considered as an integral component of one's freedom. In 1795, one of the founders of the liberal idea, Emanuel Kant, provided a book called "Perpetual Peace". Kant concluded that perpetual peace is not only possible and that it is not only happening as a circumstantial condition when there is no war. Kant argued that peace is a state that can be actively achieved and maintained by international cooperation, exchange, and communication. (Kant, 1795)

One of the first promoters of liberalism in politics can be considered the President of the United States Woodrow Wilson who stood behind the foundation of the United Nations, an institution that reflected the liberal vision of a supranational oversight organization that would be able to promote and maintain peace. Wilson proposed a 14-Point Program for World Peace to the Congress which reflected his ideas of necessary conditions for peace, one of the first points being "the removal [...] of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." (Wilson, 1918)

Liberalism doesn't accept war as something inevitable for states seeking to maximize their power and security. On the contrary, war is something that can be prevented with the right approach. Peace is not a filler between two conflicts or the outcome of a power distribution situation between states, but peace is something that can be created and prolonged, something that can be pursued by peace-constituting actions such as collaboration set on common values and principles.

One of the core outcomes of liberal consideration of peace is the democratic peace theory which claims that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other. That implies that the more democracies exist in the world the fewer wars will occur. Whereas a correlation between democracies and peace is observable, the question of causality remains unclear. Criticism can be found such as by authors who argue that instead of democracies leading to peace, peace leads to democracies. (Giber & Owsiak, 2017) Others would argue that the attempts of exporting democracies in the name of promoting peace led to even more war and violence. (Mearsheimer, 2011)

According to liberalism, international peace can be achieved by two essential methods, collective security, and arms control and disarmament. (Mingst, 1998) The method of collective security would require all states to not only not wage war, but it would require them to not even collect means to wage war whether by its production or by military spending. In the ideal case, states would opt not to start a war because they would know the consequences of the international community which would commit itself to defending every member of the community. It is worth noting that these principles of collective security were applied in the case of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Both theories, realism, and liberalism, fail to provide a coherent explanation for the concept of peace. Both theories provide partial explanations but are not sufficient for further exploration of peace in international relations. The realist view of peace can be characterized as rather pessimistic; a clear path to peace is indefinable. Liberalism's view of peace and its claims of democratic peace and peace through economic interdependence has not been fully realized. Pessimism clashes with idealism.

While realism provides a clear name for the causes of conflict and war, it does not provide a clear name for the causes of peace. When realism speaks of phases of balance or stability, these phases are underpinned by states' beliefs of sufficient strength and security, which can only be achieved through sufficient armaments, which inherently leads to an imbalance in other states' sense of security or perception of danger. The least strength or militarization states can achieve in their pursuit of peace is through bandwagoning or submission to hegemonic power.

While liberalism envisions peace as an aspirational state that can be achieved, it can be seen as too idealistic. According to liberal theory, lasting peace can be achieved through international cooperation and supranational institutions, but in the real world these visions work only on a small scale and the overlap of theory into the real world is absent. Liberalism can also be criticized because its vision can lead to the opposite of peace: when states try to export their values and impose them on other states, this can lead to their justification for their war efforts, but ultimately leads again to conflict.

1.3. Constructivism

Constructivist theory is based on the assumption that international order does not follow given regularities, but that all international order is a social construct. The creators of this construct are the people who, through their language and actions, create and keep this construct alive.

While constructivists accept the existence of an anarchic international environment and states as the basic unit of international relations, in which they agree with the realist current, they differ from them in the view that their actions are determined by laws of a mechanical nature. According to constructivists, both neorealists and neoliberalists failed to account for the role of identity and culture in national security policies and decision-making while being too focused on mechanical power dynamics and material factors. One of the leading representatives of this theoretical stream, Alexander Wendt, articulated that "human association is determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature." (Wendt, 1999)

This constructivist stream of thought carries with it its own implications for the explanation of peace. If states are not compelled to act by immutable laws, but if their actions are driven by the people who create social constructs through their actions, then the actions and decisions of states are influenced solely by the people who create them. Thus, states are not in a position in which they must act aggressively, in which they must legitimately act as units seeking to maximize their power. States can, in accordance with their own social structures, decide to act non-aggressively, even peacefully. If reality is merely a social construct created by individuals, then threat perception is also a construct

created by humans. Thus, the perception of safety or danger is not an objective regularity, but an influential and variable phenomenon acting on people, or decision makers, creating social reality.

Constructivists argue that there are three factors contributing to the construction of states and individual behavior: norms, identity, and culture. Norms refer to collective expectations of a community, identity is being defined by nation, and culture is seen as something carried by standards or by law. (Katzenstein, 1996) When accepting the idea of culture being what shapes states and their policies, then the situation that most closely resembles a state of peace, according to constructivists, occurs in the policy of applying a *culture of security*. There are several key elements for a functioning culture of security which comes back to the factors of which state policies are constructed. If there is to be a less conflict-prone world, the culture has to shift into a culture of non-violence. The way of thinking about security, insecurity, war, and peace has to take a shift in the first place. (Katzenstein, 1996)

Realists and liberal attempts and explanations of peace are rather characterized by a top-bottom approach. States operate within an anarchic environment, driven by the almost predetermined and unchangeable laws of international relations where any peace initiative has to come from them. Constructivism on the other hand, can be seen as a bottom-up approach. States policies and behavior is directly affected by cultures, identities, and norms of the people. Peace for the first time may not be the result of an accidental favorable state of affairs in the international environment, but it is a condition that can be consciously pursued. Structures within the international environment are not a constant, they are changeable according to the behavior of individuals or states.

1.4. Marxism and neomarxism

The fundamental problem of the international environment and the cause of oppression and unfreedom, Karl Marx identified as capitalist private ownership of resources, which ultimately leads to some states abounding in wealth at the expense of others. This inequality divides the world into classes, the working class, the non-owning proletariat, and the exploiting bourgeoisie, and leads to permanent class struggle. According to Marx, the cause of all conflicts and wars is the competition for economic resources. Marx saw the

solution to this situation solely in the violent suppression of capitalism and the creation of a "dictatorship of the proletariat".

Marxist literature defined peace, for example, as follows:

A state in relations between people, nations, and states characterized by peaceful and friendly coexistence and by the settlement of outstanding issues by negotiations and agreement. Lasting peace is one of the goals of the international working-class movement and the foreign policies of the socialist countries. (Příruční Slovník Naučný, 1966)

It is worth noting that here one can find mention of "lasting peace," an idealistic term not found in other theories. This, according to Marxist theory, is to be achieved by focusing on the core of the conflict, which is the inequality created by economic means.

The weakness of Marxist theory, however, is the fact that despite its proclaimed vision of a classless and conflict-free world, the theory itself is contradictory and violent. The achievement of the desired equitable state of affairs, even if it tends to target the causes of conflict, is only possible through violent revolution. The Marxist way of achieving peace is per se violent.

Any armed intervention from the outside in the socio-economic life of another country, to impose a 'higher social system', for which the conditions have not as yet matured, may, in the final analysis, have the opposite effect and not act as a stimulus to progress, but frustrate social development. (Kára, 1968)

After categorizing revolutions into violent and peaceful ones, even Marxist authors admitted that "even the peaceful form contains elements of violence". (Kára, 1968)

Marxist theory was adopted and modified over time by Neomarxists, the most prominent of whom was Immanuel Wallerstein. He came up with the theory of dependence and the concepts of core and periphery. According to this theory, it is possible to identify states in the world that are classified as peripheral states, which are those known as 'third world states'. On the other hand, the core states are those that have accumulated the most resources and the most wealth and are, in a figurative sense, exploitative states. Their wealth and well-being function only based on the exploitation of the periphery states on which they depend. (Wallerstein, 2004)

The state of peace in Neomarxist theory is made impossible by the present state of the world. The prospects of a conflict-free world are very limited; on the contrary, Neomarxism offers several types of conflicts to be played out in the future. Wallerstein presents three types of conflicts: the Khomeini type, in which the states of the periphery turn completely away from the states of the core and create an environment defined by their norms; the Saddam Hussein type, in which the states of the periphery attempt to militaristically threaten the North's dominance in the international environment; and a third type, in which the source of instability will be an unstoppable flow of people from the global South to the North, threatening Northern values and welfare. (Wallerstein, 1993)

Both Marxism and Neomarxism quite aptly name the causes of conflict and succeed in plausibly defining the real roots of the state of non-peace. However, the greatest shortcoming of both schools of thought is their inability to offer any solution that does not involve violent revolution, which, moreover, over time and failed attempts at realization in the real world, contains huge cracks and is a cause for doubt.

While classical theories of international relations are indispensable and useful for explaining the causes of wars, their explanations for the causes of peace fall short. In the following section, therefore, I will focus on theoretical concepts that can serve to better understand the concept of peace. The central theoretical concept for this thesis will be Johan Galtung's concept of positive and negative peace.

1.5. Positive and negative peace

In both theoretical and everyday terms, peace is thought of as opposed to war. Peace and war always operate in a dichotomous relationship: if there is war, there is no peace, and if there is no peace, there is war. In 1969 the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung came up with a concept that breaks this apparent dichotomy because “the word ‘peace’ gives an unrealistic image of the world”. (Galtung, 1969) Considering how many different descriptions of violence there are, and how many linguistic terms exist to describe the various degrees of violence, from argument and dispute to conflict and war, it is strange that there are only one means of expression to contrast all those degrees of violence, which is peace.

At the beginning of his argument, Galtung focuses on the distinction between different types of violence. According to him, violence can be categorized into two parts, personal (direct) and structural (indirect) violence, which differ based on several factors. Personal violence includes physical violence, the injured object can be identified, there is a subject from which the violence originates, and the act of violence is intentional and visible. Structural violence, on the other hand, involves psychological violence, the injured object cannot be identified, there is no identifiable subject from which the violence originates, and the act of violence is unintentional and not visible. (Galtung, 1969)

Later, Galtung added a third category of violence, which he called cultural violence. Cultural violence provides a cover for both direct and indirect violence as it legitimizes and facilitates both types of violence. Cultural violence can come from several sources, Galtung lists six: religion, ideology, language, art, empirical and formal sciences, and cosmology. According to Galtung, the relationship between the three types of violence can be described as triangular, in which each type influences and enables the others. (Galtung, 1990)

Violence can start at any corner in the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners. With the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic, like a vendetta. (Galtung, 1990)

The change in thinking about violence, which involved shifting the perception of the source of violence from the individual to the system, makes it possible to see peace as a category worthy of investigation. The academic field of peace studies, which was also born in the wake of Galtung's theory, has taken it upon itself not only to examine the various causes and consequences of violence but also to explore the different types of peace and the conditions for their implementation.

Galtung's first division of violence into two categories was a step that preceded further progress in thought, since in finding the opposite of the two categories of violence, two corresponding opposite categories must also be found.

With the distinction between personal and structural violence as basic, violence becomes two-sided, and so does peace conceive of as the absence of violence. An extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace. Just as a coin has two sides, one side alone being only one aspect of the coin, not the complete coin, peace also has two sides: the absence of personal violence, and

the absence of structural violence. We shall refer to them as negative peace and positive peace respectively. (Galtung, 1969)

Thus, the two counterpoints to direct and structural violence are defined as negative and positive peace. Negative peace entails the mere absence of direct physical violence and war and is curative. Negative peace need not be achieved peacefully. Positive peace implies an environment in which each individual can live in freedom, which is made possible by non-violent peace structures and is preventive. Positive peace is achieved through non-violent means. (Grewal, 2003) Positive peace also requires the absence of structures of cultural violence.

The relationship between positive and negative rates is complementary and interconnected. Since negative peace is easier to achieve, it can be identified as the first step towards a potential positive peace. Negative peace can exist in the absence of positive peace. Positive peace can exist solely on the assumption of a functional negative peace; the absence of a negative peace eliminates a positive peace. Negative peace can be achieved relatively easily and quickly compared to positive peace, which can often be achieved solely through deep structural changes. A positive peace is a long-term peace whereas a negative peace is a short-term peace.

Galtung's peaceful division is the closest of the theoretical variants to the neo-Marxist stream of thought, since, like the latter, it sees violence as the result of structural defects. In my view, Galtung's concept has a similar weakness to that of Marxism and neo-Marxism. While the critical part is very strongly argued and supported by evidence, the conceptual part falls short of offering convincing solutions.

Positive peace, involving the eradication of the structural sources of violence, has the appearance of a utopian positivist solution that is almost inapplicable to the realities of the real world. While identifying the category of cultural violence accurately names what enables structural and direct violence, it is almost impossible to find a satisfactory and realistic solution for cultural enablers of violence such as churches or ideologies. Positive peace implies that peace has been achieved through non-violent means, but adequate alternatives to promote positive peace are often hard to find.

One of the most fundamental criticisms I would like to raise is Galtung's understanding of the interrelationship between direct, structural, and cultural violence. Galtung understands these three types of violence in a triangular relationship, arguing that "violence can start at any corner in the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners." (Galtung, 1990). As a counterpoint, the three types of peace again stand in a triangular relationship as well:

This triangular syndrome of violence should then be contrasted in the mind with a triangular syndrome of peace in which cultural peace engenders structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and direct peace with acts of corporations, friendliness, and love. (Galtung, 1990)

Defying the correct model of the relationship between the three types of violence is essential to the proper choice of a peace strategy. There is no doubt that all three types of violence interact and do not exist in a vacuum. However, the triangular relationship implies equal importance between all three types. When accepting the triangular relationship, achieving the desired outcome is only possible by focusing on all three fronts with equal emphasis, as each type of violence can be a deterrent to the others. Focusing on only one type of violence cannot lead to a successful outcome. Therefore, according to Galtung's understanding of the relationship between the types of violence, the simultaneous pursuit of peace on all three fronts is a prerequisite for lasting peace.

I would like to argue, however, while maintaining the three categories of violence, that these categories operate in a different relation than that proposed by Galtung, namely the relation of hierarchy. I argue that there is a clear hierarchical relationship in which cultural violence is the very foundation that enables the other types of violence. Galtung himself distinguishes the three types of violence in terms of their temporal relationships as follows:

Despite the symmetries, there is a basic difference in the time relation of the three concepts of violence. Direct violence is an event, structural violence is a process with ups and downs, cultural violence is an invariant, a permanence remaining essentially the same for long periods. (Galtung, 1977)

The "permanence" of cultural violence can be seen as an argument for considering this violence as the core. I want to argue that this is why cultural violence should be targeted primarily in efforts to achieve lasting, positive peace. Moreover, a definition of cultural

violence that includes specific definable elements allows for a very focused approach to looking at peace efforts rather than setting unreachable targets.

I want to present the difference between the two interpretations of the relationship between types of violence using the example of the violence perpetrated in the form of child abuse by a priest. There was direct violence (event), and the facts of the crime were fulfilled by the specific act committed by the priest against the child. The structural violence (process) had already been going on for a long time before the priest committed the physical act of violence, for example, in verbal form or through the environment which made the act possible by its isolation and secrecy. Cultural violence (permanence) is found at the level of the church, on whose foundation everything took place and whose rules and practices create a suitable environment in which violence in the form of child abuse has become the rule rather than the exception.

If the triangular relationship between these three levels of violence is accepted, it is necessary to intervene at all three levels equally, as each level can be a trigger for the others. If a hierarchical relationship is accepted, it is necessary to target the source and enablers of the other two levels of violence - the cultural level. If the structural violence underlying direct violence disappears, it can lead to sustainable peace more effectively.

2. Language in theory

The question arises whether, in dealing with the naming of different types of peace, this is academic wordsmithing that has no overlap with politics and the resolution of real conflicts. In the next section, I, therefore, briefly address the importance of language, which is central to my comparative study. The essential role of language was already understood and emphasized by Galtung in his early essay on the topic of positive peace. On the one hand, he appreciated the connective function of the word, since "peace is on everyone's agenda". The word peace can provide a self-explanatory common harmonious basis for any kind of negotiation between two parties.

This approach presupposes that we somehow are attracted by the term 'peace' and would like to let that word express our goal rather than some other word. [...] The generally widespread use of the term 'peace' - so widespread and so generally acknowledged that it possibly presents some kind of substitute in this secular age for feelings of devotion and community that in former ages were invoked by reference to religious concepts. In fact, 'peace' has indeed religious overtones to

many, and this probably contributes to the use of the word 'peace' as a carrier of feelings of universal love and brotherhood in our days. (Galtung, 1969)

However, given the different types of violence that can only be countered by different types of peace, it is appropriate to both choose and use words that reflect reality as closely as possible. Consciously choosing the terms "negative peace" and "positive peace" could not only lead to a broader awareness that there is no one universal peace that is the opposite of one universal type of violence, but in addition, it would facilitate the communication of expectations and could lead to more clearly defined goals in peace and conflict politics.

But another answer would be to give up the word 'peace' and simply state our interest in one or both of the two values and then try to do our best along both dimensions, so to speak. [...] We may then slant the definition of 'peace' in the direction of absence of personal violence, or absence of structural violence, depending on where our priorities are. (Galtung, 1969)

Before turning to the main theoretical proponents of language, I would like to argue for the importance of language directly based on Galtung's theory of cultural violence. My position is to some extent a modification of this theory.

As I mentioned above, Galtung cites religion, ideology, language, art, and the empirical and formal sciences as essential components of cultural violence, and thus enablers of both direct and structural violence. Language is thus already one of the elements that are included in the consideration of the actual underpinning of violence, but it is listed only as one among many others.

The explanation of the link between language and cultural violence, however, remains superficial and has not received much attention. In the essay, Galtung delves peripherally into gender-imbalanced language, which in some languages privileges men through the common use of the masculine, thereby rendering women invisible, enabling everyday structural violence against women. Galtung's second point is the different language families, which through their completely different language structures lead to different understandings of reality.

At this point, I believe it is necessary to reevaluate the relevance of language, both in the context of cultural violence and in the context of the entire discipline of peace studies. Language is not just one item of cultural violence, language is its foundation. Language is the red thread that runs through all the other components of cultural violence. Religion, science, and ideology cannot do without language and use language as a mediator and carrier of their impulses.

Galtung's whole theory of positive and negative measures attempts to create new linguistic categories that clearly describe reality. The categorization of peace is first and foremost a linguistic device and is the first step in allowing for the possibility of changing reasoning and subsequently policy based on that. This brings me to the second pivotal point of my theoretical section, which is structuralism.

2.1. Structuralism

Structuralism, being an interdisciplinary movement, perceives structures as the basis for the functioning of systems and therefore focuses on their identification and the exploration of their interrelationships. The basic paradigm of structuralism is language, which shapes reality; at the same time, no reality is not expressed by language.

The way of using language has become one of the uniqueness of humans compared to animals, humans use language not only to describe reality but also can express non-existent or invisible things. For example, it is hard to imagine how hope could exist independently of its exclusive existence within language. One of the representatives of structuralism, Michel Foucault, described language as an incredibly complex object of analysis that also serves as a tool for analyzing complex objects that are not linguistic in nature. (Foucault, 1978) Despite the symbols that people associate with the word peace, such as the white dove, the white flag, or the circular peace symbol, the word peace may not describe a clear physical state or visible phenomenon.

One of the basic structuralist principles, first proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure, is the division of each word sign into two components: signifiers and signifieds. In this case, the signifier is understood as the expressive component (what the object is called) and the signified is the content component (the object itself). (Saussure, 1986) Every word

contains both components at the same time. For example, in the case of the word "animal", the signifier is the word itself and the order of the letters of the a, n, i, m, a, and l, which, when spoken, produces a universally perceived sound and which can be understood, in the basic definition, as any vertebrate except man. However, what this set of letters evokes in the listener, whether he/she recalls as an association a paradise bird or a chevreton, is the signified. The relationship between signifier and signified is a matter of interpretation, context, and interaction between speaker and listener. De Saussure held that the signifier and the signified are of equal weight and that there is a coexistence between the two components without a hierarchical relationship.

Another of de Saussure's concepts is that some signs acquire meaning only through their relationship or their contrasts with other signs. (Saussure, 2001) An example of this is the word "evil", which functions only in a binary relationship with the word "good". If it were not for goodness, the concept of evil would be difficult to grasp, so the word evil functions only because of its binary.

De Saussure was followed by the psychoanalyst Lacan, who held that signifiers and signifieds do not stand in equilibrium, but that people are exclusively in the world of signifiers, that is, in the world of language. (Lacan, 1987) Lacan concluded that the dominance of signifiers prevents a full understanding of signifieds, in other words, reality is ungraspable since we think exclusively within the confines of language (Hewitson, 2010).

Another inherent philosopher concerned with language is Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose quote "The limits of language are the limits of my world" has become widely known. (Appelqvist, 2021) For Wittgenstein, language criticism consisted of pointing out where language crosses the boundaries of the world and therefore spreads nonsense. Later he explored what he called "language games", by which he meant the way language is used as a means to an end. (Wittgenstein, 1953)

Constructivism is followed by deconstructivism or the method of identifying and removing established traditional formations by critically analyzing them to understand the relationships and forces at work within social constructs. A key exponent of this

thinking is Jacques Derrida, who described deconstruction as a method "which examines the texts, the special situations, the totality of the history of philosophy in which the notion of method is constituted." (Derrida, 2020) The method of deconstruction can break down and critically dismantle established principles and structures, including the established structures of language. Deconstruction can break down traditional dichotomies, thereby creating new possibilities for perceiving reality.

2.2. Peace and language

In the given interdisciplinary context of the structuralist perception of language, the creation of two categories of peace takes on a new meaning that extends beyond the boundaries of peace studies.

In the context of Ferdinand de Saussure's two components constituting the signifier, peace can be divided into the signifier, which is the word peace, and its most basic common denominator, which may be the absence of war, and the signified meaning that the audience recognizes in the word. Different audiences will have different understandings of the same signifier.

For example, in the case of war, the different national identities of the opposing warring parties or the factor of whether one side is losing or winning, despite the common signifier, will suffice the different signified. For the invaded state, peace will mean a return to the pre-war state while for the victorious state, peace will mean the end of warfare while maintaining the status quo. Both sides will call for peace without meaning peace. Peace will lead to different signified meanings if the audience is male or female, young or old, ruling elites or rebels, participants or non-participants, victims or observers, rich or poor.

I suggest that distinguishing between positive and negative peace - that is, creating a broader range of signifiers while narrowing the meaning of each - can lead to a better understanding and reduce the gap between different signified understandings of the word peace. Narrowing down and concretizing the huge concept of peace can lead to clearer perceptions and reduce misunderstandings. If the proclaimed goal of peace negotiations is negative peace instead of peace as such, this will lead to a narrowing of the perceived signified meanings by the audience, who will be able to have a clearer idea and can

respond accordingly. Knowing that peace is further subdivided into positive peace, which represents more than the mere absence of violence, may lead to an increase in the demands of the audience, due to a more tangible selection of signifiers.

Another of de Saussure's concepts is demonstrated by the example of peace - a sign that takes on meaning exclusively through the context of its opposite. How the word peace is used in political, media, and interpersonal contexts demonstrates the principle of contradiction as a conveyor of meaning. Britannica dictionary defines peace as "a state in which there is no war or fighting" or "an agreement to end war" (Peace Definition & Meaning, n.d.) and Cambridge dictionary as "freedom from war and violence" (PEACE | English Meaning, n.d.).

The binary structure of the relationship between war and peace, two words used in complementary and contradictory ways, creates a reality in which peace is an automatic state when there is no war. It is a state that occurs spontaneously in the absence of war, not something that requires effort even in the absence of war. This duality offers a simplification of reality that is natural to the human mind, and which categorizes the world into opposites of good and evil, right and wrong options. Further, this binary implies the same material value; war, like peace, is two states describing the state of reality. This perception does not allow for an understanding of peace as a process that can only be achieved through active efforts and proactive steps.

The use of the categories of positive and negative peace breaks this duality. The opposite of war, a state without war, is expressed by negative peace. At the same time, a category emerges that operates outside the war-non-war relationship. The mere existence of the category of positive peace implies that the mere absence of war or violence will not be sufficient to achieve this other form of peace.

If one accepts Lacan's theory that the world operates exclusively at the level of signifiers, the importance of choosing the right language is crucial. Peace is not something tangible and visible, something that differs only in detail at the level of human understanding. Peace is a word that can encompass a whole range of conditions, associations, and perceptions that will vary for each individual involved.

The division of the verbal category of peace into positive peace and negative peace will not yield a definitive solution; the boundary of language is not overcome. Despite this, awareness of the importance and pitfalls of language use can lead to a search for solutions within the boundaries of language. The deconstruction of the word peace has allowed the emergence of new linguistic categories of peace that construct a new reality in which communication or the formulation of goals within peace studies or peace treaties can be clearer, easier, and eventually more successful.

3. Peace agreements in theory

Academic research and literature focusing on peace agreements mostly come from the field of peacebuilding or conflict studies. I would summarize the literature devoted to it into three categories: research on the importance of peace agreements, research on the successful creation of peace agreements, and conversely, research on the obstacles to successful peace agreements and the search for the components needed for achieving lasting peace.

Whether peace agreements serve their purpose and, if so, to what extent they are essential in peace processes is a matter of academic debate. For scholars of the traditional realist strand, peace agreements represent no more than a symbolic act, since in an anarchist environment state cannot be obliged to negotiate or to stop the acquisition of force through a mere agreement. (Mearsheimer, 1994) Even so, states and parties to conflict sit down at the negotiating tables with regularity to work out ceasefire and peace agreements. Different scholars, on the other hand, find a high correlation between peace agreements and the termination of violence. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000)

Among the proponents of functionality, one can identify the constitutive and instrumental views of peace agreements. (Arnault, 2006) These two different approaches to peace agreements can be likened to the fact that while one group sees the peace agreement as a precise car navigation, the other group sees it as a compass, which, although it does not show the exact route, can be used for directional guidance. The constitutive stream sees the content of peace agreements as crucial. Constitutionists, therefore, emphasize technicalities and precise language. For them, the functionality of peace depends

on the degree of fulfillment of the treaty obligations. According to this view, peace agreements can be divided into good and bad ones, where the bad ones can be the reason for a failed peace process. The instrumental view is characterized by seeing peace negotiations and agreements only as part of a comprehensive process. The negotiation and signing of such an agreement are not the focal point but merely a step towards a possible lasting peace.

Several key elements can be identified that are almost always found in peace treaties. (Harbom & Högbladh, 2006) The most commonly represented area of concern is the ceasefire and the subsequent disarmament process. This goes hand in hand with measures concerning ex-combatants, such as amnesty or reintegration into society. Another area is what can be called the political component of peace agreements, which includes political participation, power-sharing, or the right of one of the parties to political transition. The last major identifiable thematic group is what I would call the civic-territorial component. This includes issues of autonomy, regional development, power sharing, or land reform.

Several academics are trying to identify the criteria that are indispensable for a successfully crafted and mutually agreed peace agreement. Some authors see a guarantee of security, which must apply to all parties involved, as an essential component of a successful agreement. (Fortna, 2003) If, for example, a rebel group or a participating minority does not have a guarantee of security, it may jeopardize its cooperation in the disarmament process. Another essential component is the separation of political forces, which often goes hand in hand with the establishment of democratic institutions. The idea behind this is that a dispute can move from the violent plane to the political arena, provided that the distribution of political forces gives all parties involved a chance. If one party feels that it can gain more by using violence, or if it feels that its gains to date are not reflected in the distribution of political power, this may be an obstacle to reaching an agreement. (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003)

Another area of interest is the relationship between the preceding conflict and the coming peace. This consideration is based on the assumption that the form and duration of conflict have a direct impact on the success or longevity of peace. Some authors conclude that the

peacebuilding process is most successful after non-identical wars, after long wars without large costs, and in countries with high levels of development. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) Some scholars hold the view that long-term peace is more likely to come after repeated violent behavior and that negotiated settlements harm peace because their short-term horizon encourages both sides to try to achieve better outcomes for the next round of negotiations. (Derouen Jr & Bercovitch, 2009) In contrast, other scholars stand by the opposite result, namely that military victories do not lead to better peace chances than peace agreements. (Badran, 2014)

A large, and relatively new, body of academic research dealing with peace agreements is their human rights dimension. Academics working on this consider human rights to be one of the most important, if not the most important, elements of a peace agreement. However, the inclusion of human rights in the peace-building process has long been seen more as an obstacle. The emphasis on the human rights of all parties can lead to protracted negotiations that can end in stalemate. While a ceasefire can be agreed upon relatively quickly by all parties, negotiating issues relating to the rights of all groups involved may not lead to an agreement at all.

Some see the human rights component in peace agreements as a factor that can both complicate and reinforce the effectiveness of the agreement, particularly in the case of domestic conflict resolution, in which citizens are targeted for human rights abuses with particular frequency. (Manikkalingam, 2008) This has been linked in some studies to the understanding of liberal democracy as an environment in which human rights are best-taken care of through the institutions that liberal democracy entails. (Lacatus & Nash, 2020) The promotion of this particular political system is therefore, by this reasoning, a goal worthy of pursuing and enshrining in peace agreements. In this context, other authors emphasize the inclusion in the peace negotiation process of persons who are not involved in the conflict and who have experience moving within human rights structures, whose contribution lies in being able to neutrally include the perspectives of all parties involved. (Parlevliet, 2017)

What appears to be a shortcoming, however, in the case of the inclusion of human rights in peace negotiations, is the limitation to verbal commitments, which, of course, follows

from the nature of a peace agreement. At least three shortcomings can be defined in that regard. Firstly, the tendency to overly prioritize the inclusion of formal human rights provisions in the main texts of peace agreements, secondly, the expectation of holding individuals accountable for human rights violations in societies that lack basic investigative, adjudicative, and compensatory institutions and lastly, isolating human rights concerns by avoiding direct engagement with post-settlement governments and the failure to integrate human rights issues with other essential tasks of peace implementation. (Stedman, 2001) This is not meant to imply the irrelevance of human rights in peace negotiations; on the contrary, their importance may paradoxically be under-addressed by over-addressing them in peace agreements.

Academics in peace studies have also addressed the issue of third-party involvement in both the peace process and the implementation of the resulting peace agreement, and thus the maintenance of peace. It can be said that there is a consensus on the usefulness of third-party involvement when it comes to the emergence of a peace agreement. A non-aligned party may be the only way to bring all parties to the negotiating table. Some studies compare the two types of mediation, facilitation, and manipulation, and identify manipulation as a faster and more effective way of managing a crisis, while facilitation reduces the likelihood of re-conflict. (Wilkenfeld et al., 2003) However, there is no longer a consensus regarding the success and durability of peace. Some authors conclude that a mediated peace is less durable, especially when the third party is a superpower. (Gurses, 2008) This difference between the positive influence of the mediator on the creation of a peace agreement as opposed to the negative influence on its effectiveness may be due to the loss of interest that often wanes on the part of the mediator after the creation and signing of such an agreement. (Beardsley, 2008)

The last major thematic area falling under the research on the success of peace processes and treaties is the question of the durability of peace, i.e., what variables positively or negatively influence how long a negotiated peace will last. Whether a peace agreement can be judged successful or not can be based on several factors, the most common indicators being the number of casualties, the length of the peace, or economic recovery. (Rohner, 2018) It is clear that all three of these aspects are valid, do not operate in a vacuum, and are mostly interconnected. If the duration of peace is not long-lasting and

a new outbreak of conflict is not prevented, this will be reflected in the number of casualties. Likewise, if economic recovery stagnates, it may lead to discontent and renewed conflict, thus affecting the length of the peace.

As I mentioned above, an often-discussed issue is the impact of third-party involvement on the durability of peace. While such involvement is usually beneficial to the formation of an agreement, it does not guarantee the longevity of the peace. This is, however, not due to the presence of the third party, but rather to its absence. Some authors, therefore, see the emergence and presence of so-called "peace custodians" as essential. (Stedman, 1997) For them, the work would not end with the signing of a peace treaty, but on the contrary would begin as it would include a thorough monitoring and evaluation of the development of the situation, focusing on the critical points on which the peace agreement is based.

Some authors focus on the impact of justice and reconciliation on the lastingness of peace. Reconciliation is seen by some as a necessary component of what they call a "culture of peace," a category that would function as a sustainable and deeply rooted rejection of violence that might otherwise stem from a sense of unfair treatment or a desire for retribution. (Bar-Tal, 2009) Other research focusing on the function of justice and the durability of peace, distinguishes between procedural and distributive justice, where the former focuses on procedural principles, transparency, and giving voice, while the latter focuses on equitability and equality. They conclude that a primary focus on procedural justice increases the chances of successful application of distributive justice and reconciliation. (Druckman & Wagner, 2019)

3.1. Peace agreements and referenda

Most academic research related to peacebuilding focuses on one of the above areas. The common denominator is a focus on the powerful actors or parties sitting at the negotiating table, on the conditions that make an agreement possible or impossible from the perspective of the decision-makers. I see a gap in the research on peace from the perspective of those affected, that is, the civilian population.

The interests of the majority of citizens affected by the outcomes of a peace agreement are often not present even in peace negotiations. As I mentioned above, focusing on, for example, the human rights side of a peace agreement, the side that directly affects the people affected by the outcome of peace negotiations, is often considered more of an obstacle, and its inclusion in the negotiations is, therefore, a relatively new development. Peace agreements are often quickly filled with proposals for a ceasefire, post-conflict political power-sharing, or disarmament, aspects that hasten the desired outcome while the perspective, demands, or needs of ordinary people are neglected or completely overlooked.

I suggest that academic research reflects this very dynamic. Academic work in the field of conflict management or peace studies is filled with research that examines the process of peace agreement formation from the traditional realist power-oriented perspective of the parties involved in the conflict, such as national, insurgent, or interventionist actors. In contrast, academic works that address the human-civilian aspect of peace agreements are rather rare.

While there are several factors by which academics measure the success of peace, the factor of the relationship between the peace agreement and the civilian population is completely absent. The civilians are the elephant in the room, at the heart of the matter, they may be the concern, but at the same time their demands, wishes, or opinions are often overlooked. The success and failure of peace agreements are measured based on the time until the next outbreak of violence, or based on economic growth, but not based on the population's acceptance of the agreement.

However, what could be considered a valid measure of whether or not a peace agreement is acceptable to ordinary people is a referendum. The referendum, as a subsidiary way of delegating responsibility for specific decisions, has already become a decisive moment in several peace processes in determining whether to accept or decline a peace agreement. There have been 31 peace referendums since 1948, 21 of them since the end of the Cold War, implying an increase in the popularity of this form of affirmation in recent years. (Collin, 2019) While only one peace agreement was rejected in a referendum before 2000,

the trend of voting against an agreement, or blocking it, has increased rapidly in the twenty-first century.

Several types of referendums can be identified. The basic division of referendums is into mandated and post-agreement referendums. Mandate referendums, or referenda on the initiation of a process, are referendums that are held to gain legitimacy for further peace negotiations. (Bjørklund, 2007) These referendums do not refer to the results or content of negotiations, only to the potential initiation of any future bargaining. It may seem that such a referendum is mere symbolism without much weight, but some authors conclude that it is the mandate referendum that has a decisive influence on future negotiations. (Loizides, 2012) The importance of this form of a plebiscite is seen in providing legitimacy to the whole process, which can push the actors involved in the negotiations to secure an outcome. The danger of this type of referendum lies in the possibility that peace negotiations may not even take place in the event of a negative vote.

The second type of referendum is the post-agreement or agreement-ratification type. In this case, a vote is taken to decide on an already negotiated compromise. In some cases, the submission of the outcome of the peace negotiations may even be a condition imposed by one of the parties involved to participate in the negotiations at all. There may also be situations during peace negotiations that require a type of agreement concluding a referendum. (Bjørklund, 2007) In situations in which the negotiating parties find themselves in a stalemate, they may let the population directly decide on specific issues. The result of the referendum then becomes part of the agreement. A distinction can also be made between comprehensive and constitutive referenda, in which a comprehensive referendum relates solely to the question of making peace and ending the conflict, at the heart of the matter a yes-no question, while a constitutive referendum may ask more complex questions, such as agreeing a range of reforms that may not relate solely to the question of peace. (Loizides, 2012)

The main divide in the hitherto rather marginal academic stream devoted to the role of referendums in peace processes is based on the view of the referendum as a phenomenon beneficial or detrimental to the peace process. The central argument for

seeing the referendum as positive for the development of the peace process is the impact that a referendum can have on mobilizing the population and thus gaining momentum. Getting the population to engage with the issue through the referendum leads to an increase in the awareness of the people and can lead to their greater involvement in the peacebuilding process, for example by bringing their demands to the negotiating table. (Tolbert & Bowen, 2009) This is particularly applicable in the case of mandate referendums, which lead to increased awareness of the peace process at its very inception. The population can be engaged throughout the process by consenting to the process taking place in the first place. Some authors see the early inclusion of the population in the decision-making process as directly related to their ultimate approval of the agreement. (Loizides, 2012)

Most authors, however, consider referenda in the context of peace negotiations to be rather disadvantageous and counterproductive. Much of this criticism coincides with the general criticism of referenda as an expression of direct democracy. A key factor in the fairness of a referendum is the best possible availability of objective information and awareness of the electorate. The main point of criticism of the calling of referendums to endorse peace agreements is therefore the fear of a lack of information for the electorate. This may be due to the malicious intentions of one of the parties, such as radicals (Mac Ginty, 2003), campaigners from both camps (Lee & Mac Ginty, 2012), or politicians (Hobolt, 2006). The less informed the population is, the more likely people are to be swayed by politicians' instructions, ideological ideas, or misleading false news. Politicians in such a situation may have disproportionate power and may apply it to win votes for one of two preferred outcomes. (Hobolt, 2006) Peace referendums are usually held in a very heated atmosphere, with a conflict still looming (or still ongoing) in the background. It is a zero-sum game, expressed by a simple question with two possible answers. This situation is very favorable to populists and radicals, whose simple answers and strong slogans usually give them an advantage over the factual, complicated, and complex answers that the other side can provide (Benjamin, 2008). Some authors also question the post-conflict possibility of reconciliation, which, according to them, is made more difficult, if not impossible, by the referendum for several reasons. One of the characteristics of a referendum is that the winner takes all, regardless of the closeness of the result. Also, turnout is often low, so accepting and applying the result of a referendum that only a minority

of the population voted for can lead to further resentment among the population. (Lee & Mac Ginty, 2012)

The limited literature on referendums in peace processes goes in further directions, with some authors addressing the interrelationship between the vision of a necessary referendum and the peace negotiation itself. Some scholars stress the importance of transparency in negotiations. If negotiations are tripartite and inclusive, referendums usually result in the adoption of an agreement; if negotiations are exclusionary, they do not mobilize the population sufficiently and often fail the agreement. (Amaral, 2018) This leads to a debate about the extent to which negotiations should be inclusive and whether access should be given to spoilers of peace negotiations. (Newman, 2006) Removing spoilers can lead to the facilitation of the whole process, but it also creates ideal conditions for later failures in the referendum. (Amaral, 2018)

This is where I see the biggest shortcoming of the research on referendums in peace processes so far. The academic camp arguing against referenda starts from the premise that referenda are not a good tool to deploy in a peace process, as they can derail the peace process for several reasons examined, with the result that peace will not be achieved. This assumption does not take into account the possibility that a negotiated peace would not be in the interest of the population.

Peace, perceived as a ubiquitously desired category, is seen as the ultimate goal. If, in a referendum, as the only possible direct questioning of the population about its agreement or disagreement with a negotiated situation, the population votes against peace, it is assumed that this is due to a lack of information or to succumbing to misinformation. What if the form of peace negotiated and proposed in the agreement does not correspond to what the population considers to be a peaceful situation? Disagreement with a negotiated peace agreement may not only be expressed by casting a vote in a referendum, but also by refusing to participate in the referendum.

Research on peace processes in the light of referendums voting to accept or reject the results of these processes tends to be overlooked in academia. Referendums are not seen as a relevant probe of the acceptance of the generated agreements by the people

affected by them, but as an easily exploitable and therefore dangerous instrument to undermine the outcome of peace negotiations and ultimately to undermine peace itself.

In the case of a rejection of a negotiated peace in a referendum, the anti-referendum camp feels confirmed in its view that referendums are an obstacle to peace, while the smaller camp, which sees referendums as an opportunity, will look for the causes of failed referendums in technical flaws, a lack of transparency in the negotiation process, or communication. Accepting that a population could consciously decide against peace is counterintuitive and difficult to grasp not only for non-participant observers of the situation but also in peace studies research.

Therefore, I will examine two peace agreements and I will try to analyze the weaknesses and strengths within them, considering the indicator of the result of the referendum. Focusing on the content of peace agreements in light of referendum voting makes sense even assuming that referendums are the wrong method of deciding on a peace agreement. The trend of using referenda to gain legitimacy for negotiated outcomes has increased dramatically in this century, and this upward trend can be expected to continue. Referenda will be used to provide legitimacy or to score political points. Exploring how to articulate peace agreements in a way that is acceptable to the population is in the interest of even opponents of referendums, as referendums as a means of deciding peace processes are likely to remain.

4. Methodology

Based on the above theoretical research on peace, language, and peace treaties, I would like to anchor my research in these theoretical and conceptual frameworks. Since I want to look at peace treaties that have been agreed upon in popular referenda, I believe that embedding is necessary within all three of these frameworks.

Under the first grounding, I want to examine the content of peace agreements in light of Galtung's theory of positive and negative peace. I will examine three strands of peace agreements that both countries have in common: the main content of the peace agreement, power-sharing, and justice. The main part differs in the two countries, with rural reform in the case of Colombia and human rights in the case of Northern Ireland. I will examine

each of the following categories based on whether the measures in that particular area seek to achieve positive peace. Thus, research question number one is:

Does targeting peace negotiation measures to achieve a positive peace lead to greater acceptability among the population?

H1: The more measures for achieving positive peace in a peace agreement, the more acceptable it is to the population.

H2: The more measures for achieving a negative peace in a peace agreement, the more acceptable it is to the population.

As part of my second theoretical grounding, in structuralist language theory, I will examine peace agreements in light of whether an inclusive form of language is applied in the agreements as a manifestation of positive peace. Since peace agreements are composed entirely of words, I assume that the language used in the agreements is a crucial factor in the population's resulting perception of the negotiated peace. I will examine whether language is positive peace based on two categories, gender, and groups. I will attempt to analyze the extent to which women and minority groups are included in the language of peace agreements. I also distinguish between the use of language either on a rhetorical or on a substantive level, which means whether in specific cases only unspecific vague language is used or if specific measures are involved. Thus, research question two is:

Does the use of positive-peace language in peace agreements contribute to greater acceptance of the agreement by the population?

H1: If the language used in a peace agreement carries elements of positive peace, it is more acceptable to the population.

H2: If the language used in a peace agreement carries elements of positive peace, it is not more acceptable to the population.

I will determine whether or not the peace resolution was acceptable to the population based on whether or not it was adopted in the subsequent referendum. I will therefore also contribute my work to the debate on referendums and peace agreements. I do not question the legitimacy of referendums despite understanding their shortcomings. On the contrary, I see the referendum as a reflection of how the population perceived the negotiated

compromise. When a referendum 'fails', I see the peace agreement as having failed, not the referendum as a democratic institution.

The comparative analysis I will be conducting will focus on the outcome of the peace negotiations in Colombia and Northern Ireland. I have chosen these two agreements for comparison because the two peace processes have several similarities. The most obvious similarity is in the process of approving the peace agreement through a referendum. I see the different results of the two referendums as an opportunity to compare the two peace agreements as one that was acceptable to the population and one that was not. Further, both conflicts were intrastate and were historically deeply rooted. Another important reason why I will be comparing these two peace processes is the content of the final agreements, in which there is overlap in several areas and therefore comparable in terms of content.

To analyze both peace agreements in terms of content and language, I used the University of Edinburgh's PA-X peace treaty database. I first introduce the conflicts and then analyze one of its main parts both in terms of content and language.

5. Case Studies

5.1. Colombia

5.1.1. Introduction to the conflict

Colombia has been plagued by intrastate conflict since the 1960s, making it one of the longest-lasting conflicts in the world. Throughout its existence, the conflict has caused countless casualties, with over 220,000 people estimated to have lost their lives in the conflict between 1985 and 2012. The casualties were only a minority composed of militants, with over 177,000 of the victims being civilians (Sanchez, 2013). The armed conflict has forced more than five million civilians to flee their homes, the second largest number of internally displaced people in the world. (Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, 2022)

Initially motivated by ideology, this framework, however, grew over time into a hard-to-understand and pervasive feud that involved many actors. In the 1960s, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) was formed, ideologically positioning itself as a left-wing guerrilla fighting against the central right-wing government. The right-wing government was also known for its violent suppression of peasants, traditionally found in the peripheral areas of Colombia, in whom it saw a threat of breeding and sheltering communists. The FARC saw itself as an advocate for the peasants. Similarly, at the same time, a second substantial guerrilla group, the ELN (National Liberation Army), emerged, which was communist, but drew more from the student and university population, and in this, it differed from the FARC.

The 1980s were then marked by an escalation of conflict. This includes the first attempt at a peaceful solution, the Uribe Agreement, which President Betancur sought to negotiate with the FARC. Although a ceasefire was negotiated, peace ultimately failed in part because of the absence of the ELN, which rejected the negotiations and continued fighting. This period is also marked by the increased role of the drug trade in the conflict.

The 1990s could be described as a period when the FARC was at its peak and was therefore one of the periods in which the drug trade flourished, as did the kidnappings associated with it. This provoked a response from the government, which had long been unable to bring the situation under control. A concomitant of the government's incompetence during this period is the emergence of the paramilitary far-right group AUC (United Self-Defenses of Colombia), which also became involved in the conflict and became known for its violent actions not only against guerrilla groups but also against civilians.

In the final analysis, the 2000s can be described as the bloodiest years of the Colombian conflict, in which the Colombian government operated not only a strengthened Colombian government backed by foreign support, but which supported right-wing paramilitaries in their fight against leftist guerrilla groups. It is a period that was shaped by the government of President Uribe, which was aimed at achieving a solution by military force. His security policy became known as the “Democratic Security Policy”, which labeled the use of force against insurgents as a war on terror and against drug trafficking.

(Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy, 2003) This harsh policy of force led to continued violence and casualties on both sides, but it also led to the gradual weakening of the FARC, which had to retreat to the periphery and operated more in the form of random assaults and kidnappings. According to some sources, the strength of the FARC was reduced from over 20,000 armed members to 8,000 between 2002 and 2010. (McDermott, 2010) Characteristic of this period was the loss of foreign support for the FARC, which until then had found its backers mainly on the Venezuelan side.

The period between 2010 and the peace negotiations and agreement are marked by the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, who as a leftist candidate defeated Uribe in the elections with a pro-peace agenda that distanced him from Uribe's democratic security policies. Santos began negotiating with the FARC as early as 2012, marking the beginning of a multi-year peace process that was divided into segments similar to the eventual division of the peace agreement itself. I will now analyze each of the main components.

5.1.2. Form of the agreement

The resulting agreement, entitled "Final Agreement on Ending the Armed Conflict and Establishing a Stable and Lasting Peace", is a document of more than 320 pages. Each part of the document was negotiated separately, over a different period. Between the conclusion of the first agreement in May 2013 on rural reform, more than three years passed until the signing of the final full agreement in June 2016. The main points of the agreement were rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs, and justice.

In a very ambitious way, the agreement proclaims its ambition to achieve peace, which is often associated with adjectives such as "lasting," "durable," and "stable," or uses terms such as "culture of peace." The word 'peace' appears 572 times in the document.

5.1.3. Content of the agreement

5.1.3.1. Core of the agreement

The first component that the Santos administration addressed with the FARC after coming to the negotiating table was agricultural reform. Imbalanced land ownership was the original motivation for the creation of the FARC in 1964. The previous period had

already been characterized by disputes over land ownership. The period known as "la violencia," lasting a decade between 1948 and 1958, was characterized by violence between conservative and liberal farmers in which at least 180,000 people died. (Azcarate, 1999) The return of the conservatives to power led to a turnover of local leaders who encouraged conservative farmers to violently seize the land of liberal owners. This is one of the main reasons why FARC's initial political goal after its creation was a revolutionary land reform. (Olave, 2019)

The land tenure situation remained unchanged throughout the conflict. An Oxfam report published a figure that 80% of Colombia's agricultural land, at the time of the first round of peace negotiations, belonged to 14% of the owners. (Oxfam Research Report, 2013) The Gini coefficient, measuring the level of inequality, showed the level of inequality in 200, when with 58.7% it ranked Colombia among the most unequal countries in the world. In 2012, the year of the first peace talks, the coefficient was still at a high level of 52.6%. (GINI Index: Colombia, n.d.)

The choice to prioritize agrarian reform was meant to highlight the progressiveness of peace talks, which wanted to address the root of the conflict in the first place, rather than dealing with its secondary symptoms. At the same time, this was a historic moment, as, despite several negotiating meetings up to that point, the FARC and the government agreed together for the first time in the history of the conflict, a tangible and visible signal showing the seriousness of these negotiations. (Voelkel, 2013)

The "radical transformation in the rural and agrarian reality of Colombia", as both sides called their goal in the joint statement, was to be achieved through several concrete steps. (Franks, 2013) One of the principal measures was the establishment of a Land Bank. This was to be used to redistribute land to landless or displaced farmers. The latter was to be able to claim from this fund land that had been illegally taken or that was not being used; legal landholders were to be guaranteed retention of their land. This institution was also to provide legal protection for farmers. However, the statement was largely vague, so no specific land was specified.

Agrarian reform in the form of land redistribution can be described as reformist not only because it was thematized first. This is because it was not primarily concerned with traditional modes of development, such as infrastructure, credit provision, or bequests for education, but was intended to specifically create a rural cadastre and legal mechanisms to provide new land for peasants deprived of land.

The position of the peace agreement on the laid foundation of agrarian reform also made sense from another point of view. After 50 years of conflict, neither the Colombian government nor the FARC was the victorious party, nor was either defeated. However, agrarian reform was a common interest for the FARC from the very beginning, while for the first government under a leftist president, agrarian reform was also a priority due to the appalling state of Colombia's agricultural sector characterized by low production and low salaries. While the concession of the central government was to consider agrarian reform at all, for the FARC it was a fundamental change in the way reform was to be achieved. The FARC's original plan was to achieve redistribution by forcibly confiscating landowners, effectively dispossessing them. However, nothing of the sort was included in the document; change was to be achieved through reform, not revolution.

This first arrangement between FARC and the government did not address the issue of the ceasefire and did not aim to end the violence. On the contrary, as I will point out later, the Colombian government continued the military process of suppressing the insurgents during the negotiation period. The purpose of the agrarian reform negotiations, however, by its very nature, sought what is required to achieve the criteria for a positive peace. Reform was aimed at the cause of the conflict rather than its manifestations. If the structural cause of the conflict was the unequal distribution of land from the very beginning of the conflict, this part of the peace settlement was intended to address that structural root in the first place.

However, weaknesses can be identified in this part of the agreement. The first of these I would identify as the lack of specification of how to provide security to peasants in the recovery and redistribution of land. In 2011, the Colombian government introduced the Victims and Land Restitution Law. The law was supposed to lead to the mediation of restitution in the form of millions of hectares of land for the victims of the conflict who

lost their land as a consequence. (Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law, 2012) This law, which had been in place for a year at the time of the first round of negotiations, had several cracks. These appeared in the very definition of who is a victim and who is entitled to restitution. Relatives of victims of the conflict, for example, were not entitled to restitution as long as it was not proven in court that the victim was not part of an illegal armed group. (Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law, 2012) Such definitive proof is very lengthy and often fails to reach a definite conclusion. Moreover, the very criterion of not being part of an illegal group made victim status de facto impossible, although there were of course victims on both sides of the conflict.

Another significant shortcoming of the law was the undefined method of recovering restituted land. Since restituted land in some regions was still under the control of illegal owners, restitution could be negotiated on paper, but without security support from the state, victims could not recover their regained land. This lack led to a boom in intimidation of victims who would have dared to apply for land. (Colombia: Victims Face Reprisals for Reclaiming Land, 2013) In some cases, there were even cases of people being killed who nevertheless decided to apply. (The Risk of Returning Home: Violence and Threats Against Displaced People Reclaiming Land in Colombia | HRW, 2013) However, the Land Bank, which is the cornerstone of agrarian reform, faces the same obstacle, because even it does not define how to protect victims in the enforcement of restitution.

Another shortcoming is the non-participation of some rebel parties in the negotiations, mainly the ELN. The ELN described the resulting content of these negotiations as a "Christmas gift that Colombians traditionally ask Baby Jesus with the only problem with these gifts in a virtual Christmas basket being the requirement of the touch of a magic wave to turn it into something real". (ELN Respalda Acuerdo Sobre Participación Política Entre Gobierno Y Farc, 2013) The ELN did not participate in the negotiations for several reasons. One of them was skepticism towards the Santos administration, which was, in ELN's view, promising things that were contrary to its neoliberal-oriented economic policy. For example, they were not convinced of the possibility of combining a good relationship with foreign corporations with the protection of small landowners against those very corporations. (Jiménez-Bautista, 2012) Another obstacle in their view was the lack of representation of ordinary people in the bargaining process. And finally, one

of the major hindrances they perceived was the failure to negotiate a ceasefire during the peace talks, which they saw as an attempt by the government to create a larger playing field for itself. (International Crisis Group, 2014) The absence of one of the major actors in the conflict did not give the peace talks the credibility to the outside public that the negotiations would have gained if all parties had participated.

The final point of deficiency is language. While focusing on the core of the problem as the first item on the joint negotiating agenda can be seen as progressive, some parts fall into the category of vague statements. This relates, for example, to the failure to identify the specific land to be redistributed. The proclaimed objectives also grew to the point where the content of the framework promised items from access and use of land, agricultural protection of reserve zones, programs of development with territorial focus, infrastructure, and land improvement, social development to development of a health system education and housing to the eradication of poverty and a food security system. (Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2016, p.118-127) This is a very ambitious economic package whose volume of verbal promises may strike the population as political rhetoric rather than the result of peace negotiations.

Language

Gender

In this part of the peace agreement, there is a very deliberate reference to women by name, as part of the peasant population as well as part of the victims, the needy, and the indigenous population. This is a very conscious highlighting and categorization of women, not as an automatic part of all the groups mentioned, but as a separate entity that, like men, is found in all groups affected by the conflict. The effect of conflict on women and children ('girls and boys') is recognized also at an unequal level to the effect of conflict on men. Emphasis is placed on the different needs of women, for example in terms of quality food provision for pregnant women.

Within the context of this Agreement to End the Armed Conflict, the Comprehensive Rural Reform (Reforma Rural Integral), [...] lays the foundation for the structural transformation of the countryside, creates conditions for the well-being of the rural population - men and women - thereby contributing to the building of a stable and long-lasting peace. (p.10)

This transformation must help to resolve the historical causes of the conflict, such as the unresolved issue of land ownership and, in particular, the concentration thereof, the exclusion of the rural population and the underdevelopment of rural communities, that especially affects women, girls, and boys. (p.10)

A genuine transformation of the countryside requires the adoption of measures to promote appropriate use of the land [...] by guaranteeing progressive access to rural property to those who live in the countryside, and, in particular, to rural women... (p.10)

This structural transformation also requires the promotion of equality between men and women through the adoption of specific measures to guarantee that men and women are involved in and benefit from the implementation of this Agreement on an equal basis. (p.11)

The CRR recognizes the productive and reproductive role of women and thus their fundamental contribution to rural development and the rural economy... (p.11)

In the area of food and nutrition, the CRR aims to ensure that the entire rural and urban population in Colombia has sufficient access to and availability of the foodstuffs they need for proper nutrition, in terms of opportunity quantity quality, and price, especially in the case of boys and girls, pregnant or breast-feeding women... (p.11)

Awareness of gender specificities and particular challenges is mentioned as one of the principles of CCR.

Acknowledgement of women as independent citizens with rights, who, irrespective of their marital status, or relationship to their family or community, have access, on an equal footing to men, to ownership of land and production project, funding options, infrastructure, technical services and training, inter alia; attention is to be given to the social and institutional conditions that have prevented women from gaining access to assets of production and to public and social benefits. (p.12)

In the practical part of the CRR, women are mentioned as a group that should be prioritized in some cases of land redistribution. In particular, women should have been covered by measures related to the provision of agricultural technology, and rural women should also have had easier access to credit. Also, in the area of secondary policies, women are specifically thought of, for example, in the area of judicial assistance or healthcare.

Special purchase credit: the National Government will arrange for the opening of a new long-term, subsidized, special credit line for the purchase of land by the beneficiary population, with special measures for rural women.(p.15)

Beneficiary persons: the beneficiaries of the plan of land distribution, the comprehensive subsidy, and the special credit, will be male and female farm workers without land or with insufficient land, with priority given to the victimized rural population, including associations of victims, rural women, female heads of households and displaced persons. (p.16)

Furthermore, the National Government will [...] set in motion a new rural land legal system that will enjoy appropriate coverage and capacity across Colombia, with emphasis on prioritized areas, and with mechanisms that guarantee access to justice that expedites and timely to the rural poor, with legal advice and special training for women regarding their rights and access to justice, together with specific measures for overcoming barriers that constitute obstacles to the recognition and protection of women's rights over land. The participation of women and women's organizations in the various spaces created for conciliation and resolution of conflicts concerning land use and possession will be promoted. (p. 18)

The adoption of an equity- and gender-based approach that takes account of the health requirements of women, per their life cycle, including measures to address sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial care and the special measures for pregnant women and children in the areas of prevention, health promotion, and treatment. (p.26)

Groups

The rural reform remembered the uniqueness of different population groups and thematized them on both a rhetorical and substantive level. One group that received special highlighting was the elderly. They were to be specifically thought of in the context of the introduction of social safety nets.

Implementation of the plan will take account of the following criteria: [...] The safeguarding of social protection through a regular economic benefit for workers in the countryside of retirement age, and an occupational risks subsidy proportional to individual savings. [...] The extension of programs for effective protection of the economic risk of old age to the elderly rural population in extreme **poverty**, which is not covered by the social security system, taking account of the special needs of [...] the elderly population. (p.31-23)

Racial and ethnic groups were also mentioned not only in the proclaimed principles but were also covered in some substantive measures, such as in the area of mechanisms to resolve land disputes.

The ultimate objective is the eradication of poverty and the total realization of the needs of citizens in rural areas, such that in the shortest possible time, the small-scale farmers and communities, including those of African descent and indigenous peoples, can fully exercise their rights and there can be a convergence between the quality of urban life and the quality of rural life, whilst at the same time complying with the territorial-based approach, the gender-based approach and having regard to the ethnic and cultural diversity of communities. (p.13)

Set up mechanisms for social dialogue between national, regional and local authorities, small-scale farmer communities and also indigenous, black, afro-descendent, Raizal and Palenquero communities, in addition to other communities where different ethnic and cultural groups coexist, and private-sector companies doing business in rural areas, to create formal spaces for discussion between actors with diverse interests, which allow the promotion of a common development agenda focusing on socio-environmental sustainability, the well-being of rural populations and economic growth with equity. (p.19)

The agrarian reform remembered the indigenous population but did not go into substantive reforms in the case of this group. The parties committed to respecting Peasant Enterprise Zones, but at the same time included traditional indigenous peoples in the grand rural reform plan; they too were to contribute to making agriculture more efficient.

To that end, it is necessary to recognize and to support the Peasant Enterprise Zones (Zonas de Reserva Campesina) and cooperative groups within society. (p.11)

The objective of the Development Programmes with Territorial-Based Focus (DPTF) is [...] the development of the small-scale farmer and family-run economy and particular production methods of the indigenous, black, Afro-descendent, Razial and Palenquero communities, through comprehensive access to land and to productive and social goods and services. The DPTFs will with equal emphasis play a part in inter-ethnic and inter-cultural spaces, with a view to the latter making effective progress towards development and harmonious coexistence. (p.22)

5.1.3.2. Power-sharing

The second priority that the parties addressed in the second part of the negotiations was the topic of political participation. This topic was particularly important for the FARC, which, as a paramilitary organization, controlled mainly the peripheral areas of the country, but which had no political version of itself, and therefore its only way was to forge alliances with the political candidates of these areas. (Gallego, 2018) The FARC's

interest in this part of the negotiation was to obtain the rights and guarantees to transform itself into a political entity.

This section, called "Political Participation: A democratic opportunity to build peace", is over a twenty-page section of the agreement that can be divided into two main themes: rights and security for the political opposition, democratic mechanisms for civic engagement, and the promotion of greater participation.

Negotiating the rights of the opposition was crucial for the FARC, as its goal was to transform itself into a political party, and thus the possibility of its appearance in the political opposition was prospective. A clue to this intention may be the deliberate choice of the title "exercise of political opposition in general and, in particular, for the new movements emerging in the wake of the signing of the Final Agreement." (p.36) The right of a political party to be in opposition to the government was to be enshrined in the Constitution. The security of the opposition was to be venerated by the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics. (CSS) This system was to ensure not only the protection of the opposition but also the prevention of restrictions on political rights through an early warning system. The form of this system was to be formulated by a Commission consisting of spokespersons of political parties and movements.

Several democratic mechanisms were considered when the agreement was drafted. Greater control of the decision-makers by the population was to be ensured through increased transparency. The communities themselves were to nominate the overseers of this transparency. The right to demonstrate and protest peacefully was to be guaranteed. A new regional media should have been introduced, reflecting not only the needs of the communities in its composition and subject matter but also greater transparency for the population. To increase participation in the democratic process, namely in elections, a reform of electoral ID should have taken place, targeting remote localities. Other measures include ensuring a level playing field in the political contest and promoting political culture through education and social programs. It is worth noting that these points, although very comprehensive, lack concrete measures and remain at general resolutions.

One of the few concrete measures was the establishment of Special Transitory Electoral Districts for Peace. This was to be the establishment of 16 new electoral districts to better represent the interests of the people of these areas, who were considered to have been overlooked until then. (Bocanumenth & Cuartas, 2022) These districts were chosen where the conflict affected the population the most, i.e., areas with the highest number of victims and high levels of poverty. The creation of these new constituencies was intended to allow these affected people to apply their political voice for the first time.

This part of the agreement, which was concluded in 2013, has already paved the way for the future political transformation of the FARC, in the form of the enshrinement of opposition rights or the creation of Special Peace Constituencies. However, this was not the end of compliance with the FARC's demands. It was not until the final stage of the negotiations, namely in July 2016, that one of the most controversial parts of the peace agreement was added to the section on political participation. This included a guarantee for the newly formed political entity, the FARC, to be represented in both legislative chambers of Colombia, the Senate and the House of Representatives, for a period of 10 years, regardless of how many votes it received. In both chambers, it was to be guaranteed five seats during this period. Colombia's largest opposition party at the time, the Polo Democrático, had only 3 seats in the House and 5 seats in the Senate, which automatically made the FARC the strongest opposition party. (Alsema, 2016) The 3% vote threshold for entry into both the upper and lower houses was not to apply to it for 10 years.

While the elements of political participation negotiated in 2013 could be characterized as positive-peaceful, the concessions that were included in the agreement at the very end of the negotiations and thus just before the referendum cannot be so characterized. Several opinion polls have consistently found minimal levels of popular trust in the FARC during the years of peace negotiations. Approval of the transformation of the FARC into a political party was also very low, with 15.3% of the population approving the idea in 2016 while 71% disapproved. (García-Sánchez, 2020) This is a mere transformation into a political party, not guaranteed seats in both legislative branches. Thus, efforts to keep the FARC at the negotiating table prevailed in this case. Concessions on the political

participation front, however, may have been one factor in the unacceptability of the agreement to the population.

Language

Gender

Several parts of the political participation section specifically address women and their political rights. The problem of women's under-representation in politics is highlighted.

Taking account of the fact that women face greater social and institutional barriers in terms of political participation, as a result of deep-rooted discrimination and inequality, as well as structural conditions of exclusion and subordination, there will be significant challenges in guaranteeing their right to participation, and facing up to and transforming these historical conditions will involve developing affirmative measures that will safeguard women's participation in the various areas of political and social representation. (p.34)

In consolidating citizen participation on the part of women, their social agendas have to be appreciated and their contribution to public life as political subjects has to be recognized especially in the area of the promotion and defense of their rights. (p.35)

The promotion not only of political pluralism but also social movements and organizations, particularly of women [...] requires new forums for dissemination.... (p.35)

The commission that was to be appointed to redefine the constitutional right of political parties was to be composed not only of specific representatives of each political party but also of guaranteed female representation.

Care will be taken to ensure that the parties, movements, and other groups called to the Commission include female representation. (p.37)

Similarly, the newly established Comprehensive System, in addition to preventing threats to the security of political parties and ensuring their safety, was to explicitly ensure the inclusion of women in public life.

The new System will incorporate special measures for women, and these are to include positive evaluation of their involvement in public life. (p.37)

The government should ensure measures to increase women's political participation.

To promote a democratic, participatory culture, the National Government will implement the following measures: [...] A program to promote political participation and leadership by women. (p.54)

The National Government and the FARC-EP acknowledge the important role played by women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the consolidation of peace. (p.55)

The strengthening of women's political and citizen participation on an equal footing includes the adoption of measures that will guarantee balanced representation of men and women in shaping all the forums referred to herein. (p.55)

Groups

Marginalized groups are rarely thought of in the power-sharing section. Groups are mainly discussed in the political participation section, as the goal is set to increase even in the peripheries of the country. In this part of the agreement, only rhetorical references to groups can be found, substantive ones cannot be identified.

The community, institutional and regional media must contribute to citizen participation and especially promote civic values, the acknowledgment of different ethnic and cultural identities... (p.45)

Through legal and technical assistance [...] support will be given in the form of extraordinary measures to organizations of [...] young people and groups historically discriminated against. (p.42)

Support for the management arrangements offered by the electoral organization to stimulate and to facilitate electoral participation on the part of the most vulnerable and most isolated populations and in particular [...] adopting mechanisms to facilitate access to voting stations on the part of communities living in isolated and outlying zones. (p.52)

5.1.3.3. Justice

In December 2015, the negotiating parties published the outcome of the negotiations regarding justice. The result was a comprehensive package of interlinked institutions and measures that were intended to work together and balance the desire for justice on the part of victims with incentives for perpetrators to participate in the measures. The three newly

created institutions were the Truth Commission, the Search Unit for Missing Persons, and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.

The first two institutions were created for the victims of the conflict to meet their need for clarification and knowledge of the reality that affected them or their relatives, but also to provide a voice for the victims. The newly established Truth Commission, as an independent institution, was to collect testimonies from victims, listen to and record their stories. This was to lead to a better understanding, of the possibility of recording the story of the confluence through the eyes of those affected in the first place. It was to enable an understanding of the effects of the conflict that was not reflected in the statistics of deaths, which may have included gender-based violence, or the marks the conflict left on children and adolescents. The cohabitation of Colombians who have been on opposite sides of the conflict for so long and the non-repetition of events should have been made possible by this openness, it should have been the basis for a possible dialogue. By its very nature, it is an institution that falls into the category of positive peace, as the meaning of this institution does not involve thematizing material violence and instead allows for an understanding of the impact of structural violence that may not be visible.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace was an institution that was supposed to open the door for those who had committed crimes and to enable them to transition to a post-conflict reality, albeit conditionally. The idea was that in exchange for confession and transparency about one's crimes, as long as they did not fall into the category of serious crimes, one's sentence would be remitted; literally, the idea was to seek to guarantee the broadest possible amnesty. () Unpardonable crimes included crimes against humanity, genocide, kidnapping of civilians, and sexual violence, among others, while illegal possession of weapons or activities that were directed against the state as an entity were to be included in the amnesty.

Language

Gender

Women as a group were mentioned by name as victims who had been subjected to violence targeted based on their gender. An important aspect was that sexual violence

committed against women was not pardonable by amnesty. Women were also to be part of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.

“There have also been other, less visible but no less painful forms of victimization, such as sexual violence, psychological damage or simply living in fear.” (p.134)

“The consequences of such violations are most serious when they are committed against women.” (p.154)

“Reparations must be in line with the United Nations call for all peace agreements to adopt a gender focus, recognizing reparative and restorative measures, the special suffering of women, and the importance of their active and fair participation in the judicial component.” (p.154)

“Crimes against humanity [...] rape and other forms of sexual violence [...] will all be ineligible for an amnesty or pardon.” (p.161)

“The National Government will [...] improve quality of psychosocial care to ensure the emotional recovery of victims following the specific harm or injury they have suffered, including the particular impact of sexual violence.” (p.192)

Groups

The justice section specifically addresses and includes groups such as racial and ethnic peoples or indigenous populations in the measures. Within the subjects of the equity measures, groups of people who have experienced specific violence based on their membership in that particular group have been identified, whether that group was distinct based on age, religion, or ethnicity. Rhetorical assurances prevail over substantive measures, with a few exceptions. This exception is, for example, the imposition of an obligation on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to consult with indigenous communities on its actions.

Millions of Colombians have been victims [...] groups and communities have been affected throughout the length and breadth of the country, including rural communities, indigenous peoples, the Afro-Colombian, black, Palenquero, Raizal

and Roma communities, persons due to their religious beliefs, political parties, social and trade-union movements, the LGBTI population... (p.134)

Throughout its work, the Commission will take an appropriate approach to learn about the different ways in which the conflict-affected [...] children, adolescents, youths and the elderly, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, rural communities, persons on basis of their religion, their opinions or their beliefs, the Afro-Colombian, black, Palenquero and Raizal communities, the Roma community, the LGBTI community... (p.140)

In addition, the consequences of such violations are most serious when [...] victims belong to the most vulnerable groups, subjects of special protection, who deserve reparation and special protections, including indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombian communities and other ethnically distinct groups... (p.154)

The state will need to consult with the indigenous peoples regarding the form and opportunity in which the decisions adopted or to be adopted by their respective jurisdictions... (p.181)

5.1.4. Ceasefire and negative peace

The cessation of fighting was only the last point of several years of peace negotiations. There were several attempts at a ceasefire during this period of negotiations, but it was almost exclusively a unilateral ceasefire declared by the FARC. These attempts have failed several times. Although the number of casualties steadily declined from the start of negotiations in 2012 until the conclusion of the agreement in 2016, the conflict has not stopped costing lives. Between 2012 and 2016, at least 634 people died. (Battle-Related Deaths - Colombia, 2023)

The first declaration of a ceasefire followed the first peace negotiation on agrarian reform, declared by the FARC in November 2012. (FARC Rebels Announce Cease-Fire, 2012) However, just two months later, it was violated after several attacks on and deaths of police, which the FARC claimed were in response to ambushes and bombings by guerrilla fighters in the aftermath of their ceasefire declaration. (Acosta, 2013)

The FARC had declared five ceasefires by 2015. One moment of significant escalation was in March 2015, when, in response to the unilateral ceasefire observed, President Santos stopped bombing guerrilla positions, which many saw as the first step towards a bilateral ceasefire. However, just a month later, an ambush of soldiers resulted in 11 deaths.

(Colombia Lifts Bombing Truce After Farc Attack in Cauca, 2015) This resulted in an almost immediate spiral of retaliatory strikes and a resumption of bombing by the government.

There was no bilateral ceasefire in Colombia until the final signing of the peace agreement. Several attempts at a unilateral ceasefire failed and resulted in a resurgence of violence. The inability to maintain a state of ceasefire across the negotiations was a factor that was reflected in public acceptance of and confidence in the peace negotiations. Support for Santos, for whom the peace talks were a fundamental political theme, dropped rapidly to 29% approval. (Bouvier, 2015) While the number of people who favored the military defeat of the FARC rose from 25% to 42%, support for the peace process fell from 69% to 52%. (Bouvier, 2015)

5.2. Northern Ireland

5.2.1. Introduction to the conflict

The conflict in Northern Ireland, later known as the Troubles, has deep historical roots. One of the basic dividing lines between the two opposing sides was the historically conditioned dominant religion; while the Northern Irish were majority Protestant, the Irish were majority Catholic. However, tensions escalated into violence in the 1960s, between 1969 and 1998, more than 3,500 people were killed in the conflict, about half of whom were civilians.

The ignition of the conflict between the two groups can be accessed in the 1960s, in which two things developed in parallel. On the one hand, the poor living conditions for the Catholic minority living in Northern Ireland resulted in the formation of civil rights groups, such as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, which organized protests in Northern Ireland. In response, the characteristic suppression of these protests, either by banning or physical violence, by the Northern Irish authorities began during this period. The second distinctive element of the 1960s was the beginning of the activities of paramilitary organizations on both sides, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) on the Northern Ireland side and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) on the Irish side.

In the 1970s, the conflict began to increase in intensity and the first casualties began to occur. Casualties were claimed by the demonstrations in Derry (Londonderry), which have become widely remembered as the Battle of Bogside (1969) and as Bloody Sunday (1972), in which British soldiers were directly involved as the perpetrators. Tensions were exacerbated by political decisions in Northern Ireland, such as the Internment Policy, which increased the powers of the Northern Ireland Police to arrest suspects without charge. The IRA was engaged in terrorist attacks during this period, particularly targeting British security forces, but civilians were also being killed. The fact that the conflict was escalating also led to the first ceasefire efforts between the IRA and London to allow talks between the two sides. However, these failed as Britain did not accept the IRA's demands, such as the release of Republican prisoners or the withdrawal of British soldiers to barracks or away from the island of Ireland. Similarly, the ceasefire declared for the whole of 1975 did not lead to a cessation of violence; on the contrary, the number of civilian casualties increased on both sides. () Hunger strikes by IRA prisoners became a distinctive feature of the 1970s.

The 1980s and 1990s were marked by an unceasing conflict but with intensified efforts to resolve it on both sides. The first major product of these efforts was the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement agreed between the Irish and English governments. This recognized for the first time that the Irish government should play at least an advisory role in the Northern Ireland conflict, which until then had been seen as an exclusively British domestic matter. However, this agreement did not affect the conflict, which remained intense, with the death toll on both sides at the hands of the IRA and UDA continuing to rise. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, leaders of both sides began to meet secretly, namely John Hume as leader of the Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party and the leader of Sinn Féin, the nationalist Irish party. By the mid-1990s events gained momentum, leading to the IRA's openness to a ceasefire to negotiate a deal, provided that the nationalist Sinn Féin party was included in the negotiations. Once this demand was met, a peace document known as the Good Friday Agreement was negotiated.

The Good Friday Agreement consists of several main parts. The Agreement begins with a short section that establishes a treaty between two states, the UK and Ireland, which refers to the already concluded Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. A fundamental part

of the new British-Irish Agreement, based on which the rest of the peace agreement was subsequently based, were several key declarations. What these declarations had in common was that they expressed, for the first time, the legitimacy of both opposing sides' views on the subject of Northern Ireland. Whether the inhabitants of Northern Ireland felt themselves to be part of Britain or part of Ireland was to be left entirely to them, and understanding was expressed for both alternatives as an expression of respect for their right to self-determination.

The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will: [...] Recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland concerning its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland. (p.3)

5.2.2. Form of the agreement

The final form of the Good Friday Agreement is 32 pages long and divided into 11 chapters. There were six weeks between 10 April 1998 and George Mitchell's announcement about reaching an agreement and the referendums to be held in Ireland and Northern Ireland on 22 May 1998 for both the population to become familiar with the resulting agreement and for the launch and conduct of the two campaigns, for and against the referendum.

While it was clear that this was an agreement to mediate an end to the conflict between the two sides, there was little mention of peace. The agreement is called the Good Friday Agreement, after the fact that the agreement was reached on Good Friday and avoids the use of the word 'peace' in the title itself. The word "peace" occurs only once in the entire document.

5.2.3. Content of the agreement

5.2.3.1. Core of the agreement

A key part of the negotiated document dealt with "rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity", i.e., human rights for short. This part consisted of a general commitment by all parties to the principles of human rights, the institutionalization of these rights in all

affected countries, concrete steps in favor of the victims of the conflict, and economic, social, and cultural issues affecting the civilian population.

Religion and related political and national categorizations were addressed at the outset in a joint resolution in which all parties committed to respecting freedom of political opinion and religion.

Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular: the right to free political thought; the right to freedom and expression of religion. (p.18)

The agreement anchored the establishment of an institution that was to be the guarantor and enforcer of human rights. This institution was established as the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC), which was to function in a similar way to the European Commission of Human Rights and was to be responsible for monitoring and protecting human rights in the specific context of Northern Ireland. The NIHRC was given both investigative and executive powers and was to liaise regularly with the Northern Ireland Assembly. (Munce, 2014)

I would like to point out a particular point of this section that I consider significant in the context of the means to achieve positive peace, which is language. Language is identified as a cultural issue, linked to the measures for the civilian population, which has an impact on social inclusion and community development in Northern Ireland. The Agreement provides for a range of measures that reflect the awareness of Northern Ireland as a territory characterized by the use of both Irish and Ulster Scots, as well as the existence of other linguistic minorities. The inclusion of measures for the use and protection of both languages is an element that targets the civilian population, which on the face of it may not be related to the direct violent conflict, but which is nevertheless included in the Agreement precisely to create the structural changes that may be the focus of renewed conflict.

All participants recognize the importance of respect, understanding, and tolerance to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots, and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. (p.21)

The British Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it: take resolute action to promote the language; facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand; seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language; make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints; place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education; explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of *Teilifis na Gaeilge* in Northern Ireland; seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production... (p.21)

Language

Gender

Women's rights were explicitly mentioned in the human rights section, but this was only a rhetorical inclusion of women's political rights; women's right to full political participation was mentioned.

Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular: The right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, or gender. [...] The right of women to full and equal political participation. (p.18)

Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life. (p.20)

Groups

As religion was identified as a structural problem, religious groups were also the most, in fact exclusively, thematized in this section. This targeting of religious groups is found in the human rights section of the document on both levels, rhetorical and substantive. The facilitation of the Irish language in education and the media can be classified as a major substantive measure.

The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights, and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. (p.18)

5.2.3.2. Power-sharing

An essential part of the joint agreement was the enrichment of the legislation with new institutions to ensure more cooperation and exchange on three levels that are called “three strands”: democratic institutions in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and a British-Irish Council between Ireland and Great Britain.

The creation of political and public institutions as the first point of the final peace agreement falls into the category of positive peace. It is not about stopping visible violence, but about addressing one of the possible root causes of the conflict, which was being seen in the lack of political representation of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and the inadequate means of exchange between decision-makers on all sides.

In Northern Ireland, the Treaty created two institutions under Strand 1: the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive. The Assembly, as a legislative institution, was not only to provide greater self-government over selected areas, it was primarily to provide safeguards and mechanisms to ensure that power-sharing within Northern Ireland was protected and maintained. These safeguards included proportional sharing not only of seats in Parliament but also of ministries, ensuring that each significant party had at least one ministry thus guaranteeing to be part of the decision-making process. The European Convention on Human Rights was invoked as the guiding principle, not to be challenged by any authority or ruling. A further guarantee was created through the decision on the necessity of cross-community support in the case of a significant decision. This meant that in some cases a minimum number of votes from both communities had to be cast in favor of a proposal.

The institutions created in Strand 2 to enable official political exchange between Northern Ireland and Ireland were the North/South Ministerial Council, the North/South Inter-Parliamentary Association, and the North/South Consultative Forum. In the case of the North/South Ministerial Council, this was a complete innovation in Northern Ireland-Irish relations, as it was an institution that was to acquire quite a lot of political powers. The NSMC was to serve as a joint Northern Ireland-Irish institution, jointly deciding on earmarked policy areas. Of these 12 areas, six involved joint decision-making

and subsequent implementation of decisions separately in the two countries, and six involved a cooperative approach to joint implementation of those decisions.

There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected including (a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers, and Committee membership in proportion to party strengths /b/ the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe... (p.7)

...(d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis; (i) either parallel consent, i.e., a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; (ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. (p.7)

The other two institutions established under Strand 2, NSIPA and NSCF, no longer possessed such policy decision-making rights, but still provided new platforms for exchange on the North-South axis. NSIPA provided this platform for members of both parliaments, while the NSCF was to be established as a civilian platform to provide a space for consultative exchange between civil society representatives.

The legislative part of the agreement, which forms the first part, in itself seeks to put in place mechanisms that target the deeper-rooted sources of conflict, namely the lack of political representation of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and the lack of possibilities for interaction between the two opposing camps. The creation of new institutions is not mere symbolism, as some of the institutions have also acquired substantial political decision-making rights through their incorporation, in areas such as education and the environment. (p.15) The creation of a platform not only for political exchange but also for civilian exchange is also significant.

Language

Gender

This part of the agreement does not mention women.

Groups

The newly created institutions were intended to better reflect Northern Ireland's religious minority of Catholics. No other groups were included.

5.2.3.3. Justice

Justice was de facto reflected in the Good Friday Agreement exclusively in the form of provisions for the release of prisoners. All parties committed to a timeframe within which the release of prisoners of all paramilitary organizations was to take place. However, this was to apply only to members of those organizations that had committed themselves to the ceasefire. The intention was that prisoners who had served at least two years were to be released after that time and were to be treated as having already served their sentence. All parties also committed to engaging in efforts to reintegrate released prisoners.

Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated program for the release of prisoners [...]. (p.28)

Prisoners affiliated to organizations which have not established or are not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit from the arrangements. (p.28)

The intention would be that should the circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody two years after the commencement of the scheme would be released at that point. (p.28)

The release of the prisoners was considered one of the most controversial points of the agreement. On the one hand, it was an indispensable point for the cooperation of paramilitary groups in the peace talks, especially the IRA, while on the other hand, it was a major source of irritation for the victims of the conflict. After only two years, the people who carried out terrorist attacks on civilians and who were responsible for several deaths were to be set free. (BBC) The survivors of the victims of the conflict do not feature in the negotiated document, their desire for justice has not been taken into account and therefore this part of the agreement cannot be seen as a contribution to positive peace.

The role of reconciliation concerning victims of violence is addressed in the document. While the negotiated agreement is very explicit in some areas, the Reconciliation and

Victims of Violence section is not only quite brief but also very vague. In three points, all parties acknowledge the role of victims and their suffering, as well as their right to contribute to a post-conflict society. The need for sufficient resources and funding for organizations and programs dedicated to these people is recognized, but no specific amount or financing mechanisms are named.

The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation. (p.20)

It is recognized that victims have a right to remember as well as to contribute to a changed society. The achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence. (p.20)

The participants recognize and value the work being done by many organizations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions, in Northern Ireland and between North and South, and they see such work as having a vital role in consolidating peace² and political agreement. (p.20)

Language

Gender

This part of the agreement does not mention women.

Groups

This part of the agreement does not mention groups.

5.2.3.4. Security

The negotiated agreement included a section on the issue of security in the post-conflict period. Policing was one of the multipliers of violence during the Troubles. The Northern Ireland police, which was closer to and composed entirely of Unionists, was not only unrepresentative of the population composition but was also often a direct cause of fuelling conflict, for example in the frequent banning and violent responses to non-violent protests by the Catholic population.

² This is the only occurrence of the word “peace” in the whole GFA.

The Good Friday Agreement envisioned addressing this structural deficiency through police reform. An independent Commission was to be set up to look into policing and name the structural deficiencies. The independence of the Commission was to be achieved by staffing it with experts and neutral international representatives. This Commission should have been given time not more than one year to work out a fair policing system that would be credible to all sections of the population.

It is worth noting that the parties negotiating the peace agreement did not intend to take policing reform into their own hands. On the contrary, having specified the need for reform, they left the formulation and application of this reform to non-participating experts.

The participants believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable, both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of the society its policies and operates within a coherent and cooperative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms. (p.23)

An independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland [...]. The Commission will be broadly representative with expert and international representation among its membership and will be asked to consult widely and to report no later than Summer 1999. (p.23)

5.2.4. Ceasefire and negative peace

There were several attempts to declare a ceasefire during the Troubles. Generally, a ceasefire was declared during periods in which attempts at negotiation were made. All attempts before the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement failed. In 1972, the ceasefire jumped after the collapse of secret IRA negotiations with British officials. The ceasefire induced in 1975 did not lead to a cessation of violence and casualties mounted.

The successful ceasefire declared in the context of the 1997 GFA negotiations was an important factor not only for the peace negotiations but also for the subsequent referendum. While the ceasefire was successfully observed in 1997, it was violated

in January 1998. There were the murders of three civilians, which were then claimed by the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), who were considered to be a de facto part of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) with only a code name, which had already committed itself to a ceasefire. The UDA described these incidents as only retaliatory to previous crimes against them, but they committed to a further no-first-strike policy. (McKenna, 1998) However, this incident aroused great political passions and in response, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) was removed from the peace talks. (Blair & Melaugh, n.d.)

The decision to remove them came not without risk because of the possibility that in response to the expulsion, the UDA might decide not to respect the ceasefire at all. At the same time, however, it was necessary to respond to the incident with a measure that would be sufficient to address possible doubts about the legitimacy of the peace talks among the civilian population.

Following the completion of the agreement on 10 April 1998, it was also essential that the peace of arms should last during the period between the signing of the agreement and the referendum on its adoption, which took place on 22 May 1998. Ceasefire was maintained during this period. (Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement - Peace Accords Matrix, n.d.) It was also important in achieving a successful ceasefire that even parties that were opposed to the adoption of the peace agreement sought to achieve their goal during this period by persuading people to vote no in the referendum, not by intimidating them through violence.

The result of using violence to intimidate the population could have a twofold and diametrically opposite effect: it could both embitter the population and strengthen its desire for justice, and it may also bring the population together and strengthen its desire for an end to the conflict. The parties that were not part of the peace negotiations would, therefore, via applying further violence strengthen the commitment to a peace agreement, which was not in their interest. If violence had been undertaken by one of the parties that had been part of the peace negotiations, it would probably have led to doubts about the possibility of a peace agreement and its possible effectiveness.

Since the parties involved in the peace negotiations maintained the ceasefire, or uncompromisingly excluded from the negotiations the party that was guilty of breaking the ceasefire in an isolated case, the absence of violence, and thus negative peace, was ensured during a crucial period of the decision-making process on the peace agreement.

6. Comparison

Table 6.1: Table of Content and Language Analysis of the two studied agreements.

Content	Colombia	Language		Northern Ireland	Language	
		<i>Gender</i>	<i>Groups</i>		<i>Gender</i>	<i>Groups</i>
Ceasefire	NO	—	—	YES	—	—
Priority	PP	R/S	R/S	PP	R	R/S
Power-sharing	NP	R/S	R	PP	—	R/S
Justice	PP	S	R	NP	—	—

PP – positive peace, NP – negative peace, R – rhetorical, S – substantive

Despite many similarities, the two peace documents differ in several details as presented in Table 6.1. The Colombian Peace Agreement is a broad and very complex document, which is described by many as one of the most transparent peace processes ever.

Compared to the Good Friday Agreement, it is a longer negotiated and much more extensive agreement. Despite the lengthier content of the Colombian document, the time for the population to have the opportunity to inform themselves about the negotiated agreement, between its publication and the referendum vote, was roughly a month in both cases. The over 300-page document was a big bite compared to the 30-page paper in Northern Ireland, even though every part of the Colombian document was published continuously. The fact that some of the controversial topics were inserted into the Colombian agreement only at the last minute, such as guaranteeing FARC political seats, may have undermined the trust that the transparently conducted negotiations had built up.

The use of the word "peace" is also on two completely different levels. While peace is not expressed as an objective in the Good Friday Agreement even in its name and can be found only once in the text, it is mentioned more than 280 times in the Colombian document that has the 'building of a stable and lasting peace' written in its very title. Both the scope

of the documents and their peace message vary greatly, in one case the narrative is more one of ending conflict while in the other the narrative is one of peace.

Peace negotiations also took place in different conflict contexts in both cases. In Colombia, the conflict was not only ongoing during the negotiations, but was the official policy of the Colombian government, which wanted to improve its negotiating position by making further gains in the conflict. Only the final signing of the agreement was supposed to lead to a bilateral ceasefire, which had never been achieved until then. In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, a ceasefire was a condition for negotiations, and its violation led to exclusion from the peace talks. While the people of Northern Ireland could trust the fragile but already somewhat workable ceasefire, for the Colombians it was a step into the unknown. In the case of Northern Ireland, negative peace was initially achieved, while negative peace was not achieved in Colombia.

In terms of content, elements can be found that are comparable between the two agreements. Both peace agreements attempt to address the structural causes of the conflict in the first place, whether it be the unjust ownership of land in Colombia or the oppression and absence of political representation of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. The other two points, power-sharing, and justice were central to the peace negotiations in both countries. While the new power-sharing system in Northern Ireland targeted one of the roots of the conflict and was intended to offer political representation that was more reflective of the population's poverty, in Colombia power-sharing was ultimately a source of tension. The FARC gained political advantages and guarantees that were too much for a section of the civilian population.

The justice component was one of the most controversial points in Northern Ireland; the pardoning of all paramilitaries from both sides was more of an injustice for many victims. The justice contained in the Colombia agreement, on the other hand, was a comprehensive one and one of the most elaborately designed parts of the agreement, which established several new institutions to serve both victims and ex-combatants, including innovative institutions such as the establishment of the Truth Commission.

In terms of language in the two selected categories, the peace agreement in Colombia works up to an example of how to shape inclusive realities through language. All of the areas of the peace agreement examined include both rhetorical and substantive elements targeting both women and minority groups such as indigenous peoples or other ethnicities. It was not just a matter of rhetorical symbolism; instead, there were concrete plans to adapt the peace agreement to the needs of women or other groups. In contrast, the Good Friday Agreement, in most of its key points, did not incorporate or address women or any other minority group in its language, with the sole exception of the religious minority, which was the central theme of the entire agreement.

7. Conclusion

Testing peace agreements on measures of positive and negative peace shows similar characteristics in selected areas. Major parts of both agreements, whether rural reform in Colombia or addressing the human rights situation in Northern Ireland, were focused on the identified source of conflict rather than its visible consequences. In both cases, the naming of the source of the conflict was followed by concrete action in the areas concerned. Newly established institutions such as the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission as well as new measures concerning, for example, the use of the Irish language in schools and the media were concrete steps that addressed the human rights of the Catholic minority. Similarly, comprehensive agrarian reform in Colombia addressed the root cause of the dispute in the form of unequal land ownership.

In the area of power-sharing, Colombia's solution to the situation was initially consistent with the requirements for a positive peace, which included measures to allow the FARC to transform into a political entity, a mechanism to protect the political opposition, and the establishment of new electoral districts. What ultimately torpedoed these steps, however, was the last-minute inclusion of FARC political guarantees in the agreement. The concession made by the Colombian government to the FARC to complete the agreement, and thus the gain of a negative peace at this point, jeopardized the possibility of a positive peace. In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, the power-sharing arrangements were consistent with the terms of positive peace, as the agreement

enshrined the possibility of political representation even for a previously overlooked minority.

Justice was a comprehensive block of measures in the Colombian peace agreement that was exemplary in meeting the demands of positive peace. The agreement established not only a mechanism of transitional justice for perpetrators of violence but also institutions providing a voice for victims. The crimes that could not be pardoned in the amnesty were clearly defined, making the agreement different from the Northern Ireland amnesty, which, with the intention of a restart, applied the amnesty to all, regardless of the degree of offenses. The judicial part of the Good Friday Agreement was heavily influenced by efforts to keep all parties at the negotiating table, at the expense of positive peace.

The selection of the categories to be compared was based on comparability and perceived importance. Both agreements, especially the Colombian one, have additional substantive components, such as a section dealing with drug trafficking, which greatly impacted the course of the conflict. However, the three categories compared also show similarities, are conscious of the sources of conflict, and show both positive and negative peace arrangements.

Nevertheless, a significant difference between the two agreements does emerge, namely in the achievement of negative peace already during the peace negotiations. In Northern Ireland, negative peace, or in other words a ceasefire, was de facto a condition for the maintenance and continuation of peace talks. As soon as a breach of the ceasefire occurred, it led to the immediate reaction of excluding the responsible party from the meeting. This was intended to lead to the legitimization of the peace process in front of the population; during the negotiations, it made apparent that the parties were capable of ensuring a negative peace and the absence of visible violence.

In comparison, in Colombia, such complete efforts of achieving a full ceasefire were missing. Over the course of several years of peace negotiations, conflict was still one of the levers that the government, as a member of the peace negotiations, used to improve its position at the negotiating table. Over the years of negotiations, the situation has alternately escalated and de-escalated, with the FARC declaring a unilateral ceasefire

several times that never lasted. The desired bilateral ceasefire, which would have been tantamount to achieving a negative peace in Colombia, was only set as the ultimate goal during the negotiations and could only be achieved when a final form of agreement was signed. The population was therefore never able to gain confidence in the ability of all parties to achieve and enforce a negative peace. This may have been one of the reasons for the failure of a comprehensively negotiated agreement that otherwise met the requirements of positive peace in many aspects.

This difference leads to the verification of hypothesis H2, namely that “the more measures for achieving a negative peace in a peace agreement, the more acceptable it is to the population”. Comparing these two cases leads to the conclusion that a negative measure must precede a positive measure. Despite the comprehensive and innovative approach to defining the requirements for peace in the case of Colombia, including a revolutionary way of using language, including specific groups such as women and minorities, this agreement was rejected by the population in a referendum. I argue that one of the reasons for this is the very failure to establish a negative peace during or before the peace negotiations themselves. Indeed, the implementation or non-implementation of a negative peace is the biggest difference between Northern Ireland and Colombian agreements, both of which otherwise largely fulfill the content of the focus on a positive peace.

A comparison of the two peace agreements at the language level showed a large difference in the categories tested. The Colombian peace agreement included both women and other groups in all sections, at least at the rhetorical level. The groups that the agreement specifically included by name were several, ranging from indigenous peoples to age-defined groups such as the elderly, children, or adolescents, to ethnic minorities and people with disabilities. Substantive provisions for women were found in all three areas of the agreement examined and were remembered in the newly created rural system, in political representation, and the justice section. The Colombian peace agreement is exemplary in its use of language to be as inclusive as possible.

In comparison, the Good Friday Agreement falls well short in the categories examined. Women are not included at all except for one rhetorical mention, and the groups are

represented solely by the constant preoccupation with the religious group of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. On a linguistic level, the Good Friday Agreement is the complete antithesis in inclusiveness to the Colombian Peace Agreement.

The referendum result, however, leads to the conclusion of hypothesis H2, namely that “if the language used in a peace agreement carries elements of positive peace, it is not more acceptable to the population”. As in the first case, I would argue that the crucial point was the non-establishment of a negative peace before and during the peace negotiations.

The academic field of peace negotiations in the context of peace negotiations, as well as research on the content of peace agreements in the light of positive and negative peace and research on the language of peace agreements, is still very much unexplored. The comparison of the two cases of peace negotiations and agreements has provided a counterpoint for understanding the importance of the interrelationship between negative and positive peace, namely that negative peace is a prerequisite for positive peace.

List of References

- Acosta, N. (2013, January 9). *Colombia's FARC rebels say ceasefire to end January 20*. Reuters. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-colombia-rebels-ceasefire-idUKBRE90904L20130110>
- Alsema, A. (2016, August 25). *FARC to take part in Colombia's 2018 elections, but with guaranteed seats*. Colombia Reports. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://colombiareports.com/amp/farc-take-part-colombias-2018-elections-guaranteed-seats/>
- Amaral, J. (2018). Do peace negotiations shape settlement referendums? The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement experiences compared. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 53(3), 356-374.
- Appelqvist, H. (Ed.). (2021). *Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language*. Taylor & Francis Group.
- Arnault, J. (2006). Good Agreement? Bad Agreement? An Implementation Perspective. *New Jersey: Center of International Studies*.
- Azcarate, C. (1999, 3). Psychosocial Dynamics of the Armed Conflict in Colombia. *Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*.
- Badran, R. (2014). Intrastate Peace Agreements and The Durability of Peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(2), 193-217.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2009). Reconciliation as a Foundation of Culture of Peace. In *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace* (pp. 363-377).
- Battle-related deaths - Colombia*. (2023, June 22). Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.BTL.DETH?end=2016&locations=CO&start=2012&view=chart>
- Beardsley, K. (2008). Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), 723-740.
- Benjamin, R. (2008). Democratic Validation. *Contemporary Peacemaking*, 230-241.
- Bjørklund, T. (2007). The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and when Does It Succeed? *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 5(3), 237-260.
- Blair, T., & Melaugh, M. (n.d.). *A Chronology of the Conflict: 1998*. CAIN Archive. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch98.htm>
- Bocanumenth, M., & Cuartas, F. P. (2022, March 11). *Victim Seats in Congress Could Help Advance Peace in Colombia*. Washington Office on Latin America. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://www.wola.org/analysis/victim-seats-in-congress-could-help-advance-peace-in-colombia/>
- Bouvier, V. (2015, May 7). *Peace in Colombia Falters in Critical Area: Public Opinion - Colombia*. ReliefWeb. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/peace-colombia-falters-critical-area-public-opinion>
- Brodzinsky, S. (2016, October 2). *Colombia referendum: voters reject peace deal with Farc guerrillas*. The Guardian. Retrieved August 1, 2023, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc>

- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2022, August 30). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.h>
- Collin, C. (2019). Peacemaking referendums: the use of direct democracy in peace processes. *Democratization*, 27(5), 717-736.
- Colombia lifts bombing truce after Farc attack in Cauca. (2015, April 16). BBC. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32318890>
- Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy. (2003, November 13). Crisis Group. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/colombia-president-uribes-democratic-security-policy>
- Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law. (2012). *Amnesty International*.
- Colombia: Victims Face Reprisals for Reclaiming Land. (2013, September 17). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/colombia-victims-face-reprisals-reclaiming-land>
- Derouen Jr, K., Bercovitch, J., & Wei, J. (2009). Duration of Peace and Recurring Civil Wars in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. *Civil Wars*, 11(2), 103-120.
- Derrida, J. (2020). *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, With a New Introduction* (J. D. Caputo, Ed.). Fordham University Press.
- Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. *The American Political Science Review*, 94(4), 779-801.
- Druckman, D., & Wagner, L. (2019). Justice Matters: Peace Negotiations, Stable Agreements, and Durable Peace. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(2), 287-316.
- ELN respalda acuerdo sobre participación política entre Gobierno y Farc. (2013, November 11). Caracol Radio. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from https://caracol.com.co/radio/2013/11/11/nacional/1384193940_013243.html
- FARC rebels announce cease-fire. (2012, November 19). DW. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from <https://www.dw.com/en/colombias-farc-rebels-announce-two-month-cess-fire/a-16390129>
- Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. (2016). 118-127.
- Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. (2016).
- Foucault, M. (1978). *Von der Subversion des Wissens* (W. Seitter, Ed.; W. Seitter, Trans.). Ullstein.
- Franks, J. (2013, May 26). *Colombia, FARC rebels reach agreement on agrarian reform*. Reuters. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rebels-talks/colombia-farc-rebels-reach-agreement-on-agrarian-reform-idUKBRE94P0CA20130527>
- Gallego, J. (2018). Civil conflict and voting behavior: Evidence from Colombia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 35(6), 601-621.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191.
- Galtung, J. (1977). *Essays in Methodology: Methodology and ideology*. Ejlers.
- Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 27(3), 291-305.

- García-Sánchez, M. (2020). The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 12(3), 239-251.
- Gibler, Douglas M.; Owsiak, Andrew (2017): "Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919–2001". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- GINI Index: Colombia*. (n.d.). UN data. http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3AS.I.POV.GINI
- Good Friday Agreement*. (1998).
- Grewal, B. S. (2003). Johan Galtung: Positive and Negative Peace.
- Gurses, M. (2008). Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace. *International Interactions*, 34(2), 129-155.
- Harbom, L., Högladh, S., & Walensteen, P. (2006). Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(5), 617-631.
- Hayes, B. (2007). Who voted for peace? Public support for the 1998 Northern Ireland agreement. *Irish Political Studies*, 16(1), 73-93.
- Herz, John (1950): Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*.
- Hewitson, O. (2010, June 20). *What Does Lacan Say About... The Signifier?* LACANONLINE.COM. Retrieved July 13, 2023, from <https://www.lacanonline.com/2010/06/what-does-lacan-say-about-the-signifier/>
- Hobbes, Thomas (1968): *Leviathan*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2006). How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Referendums. *Party Politics*, 12(5), 623-647.
- International Crisis Group. (2014). Left in the Cold? The ELN and Colombia's Peace Talks. *Latin America Report*, (51), 14-16.
- Jervis, Robert (1970): Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*.
- Jiménez-Bautista, F. (2012). To know the violence in order to understand it: origin, causes and reality. *Convergencia Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 19(58), 13-52.
- Kant, Immanuel (1795): *Zum ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwurf*.
- Kára, K. (1968). On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace. *Journal of Peace Research*, 5(1), 12-13.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.). (1996). *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Lacan, J. (1987). *Das Seminar, Buch.11, Die vier Grundbegriffe der Psychoanalyse*. Quadrige.
- Lacatus, C., & Nash, K. (2020). Peace Agreements and the Institutionalisation of Human Rights: A multi-level analysis. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 24(6), 889-912.
- Lee, S. Y., & Mac Ginty, R. (2012). Context and Postconflict Referendums. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 18(1), 43-64.
- Loizides, N. (2012). *Referendums and Peace Processes in South Africa and Cyprus*.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2003). Constitutional referendums and ethnonational conflict: the case of Northern Ireland. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 9(2), 1-22.
- Manikkalingam, R. (2008). Promoting Peace and Protecting Rights: How are Human Rights Good and Bad for Resolving Conflict? *Essex Human Rights Review*, 5(1).

McDermott, J. (2010, August 4). *How President Alvaro Uribe changed Colombia*. BBC. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10841425>

McKenna, F. (1998, January 23). *Ulster Freedom Fighters (Ulster Defence Association) Statement, 23 January 1998*. CAIN: Archive. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/uff23198.htm>

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49.

Mearsheimer, John (1990): *Correspondence: Back to the Future: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe*. International Security.

Mearsheimer, John (2001): *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton.

Mearsheimer, John (2011): *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics*. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Mingst, A Karen (1998): *Essentials of International Relations*. London: Norton.

Munce, P. (2014). Unionism and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 1999-2005: Hostility, Hubris and Hesitancy. *Irish Political Studies*, 29(2), 194-214.

Newman, E. (2006). *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution* (O. P. Richmond, Ed.). United Nations University Press.

Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement - Peace Accords Matrix. (n.d.). Peace Accords Matrix. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/northern-ireland-good-friday-agreement>

Olave, G. (2019). The eternal return of Marquetalia: on the founding myth of the FARC-EP. *Folios*, (37), 149-166.

Oxfam Research Report. (2013). *DIVIDE AND PURCHASE: How land ownership is being concentrated in Colombia*. 7.

Parlevliet, M. (2017). Human Rights and Peacebuilding: Complementary and Contradictory, Complex and Contingent. *Human Right Practice*, 9(3), 333-357.

Peace Definition & Meaning. (n.d.). Britannica Dictionary. Retrieved July 13, 2023, from <https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/peace>

PEACE | English meaning. (n.d.). Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved July 13, 2023, from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/peace>

Příruční slovník naučný. (1966). Československá akademie věd.

The Risk of Returning Home: Violence and Threats against Displaced People Reclaiming Land in Colombia | HRW. (2013, September 17). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/17/risk-returning-home/violence-and-threats-against-displaced-people-reclaiming-land>

Rohner, D., & University of Lausanne and CEPR. (2018). Success Factors for Peace Treaties: A Review of Theory and Evidence. *Political Science*.

Richmond, P Oliver (2008): *Peace in International Relations*. London and New York.

Sanchez, G. (2013, July 25). *Report says 220,000 died in Colombia conflict | News*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/7/25/report-says-220000-died-in-colombia-conflict>

Saussure, F. d. (1986). *Course in general linguistics* (C. Bally, A. Sechehaye, & A. Riedlinger, Eds.; A. Riedlinger, Trans.). Open Court.

- Saussure, F. d. (2001). *Grundfragen der allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft* (A. Riedlinger, A. Sechehaye, & C. Bally, Eds.; H. Lommel, Trans.). W. de Gruyter.
- Schmidt, Brian, Long, David (2005): *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*. New York: State University of New York.
- Stedman, S. J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *International Security*, 22(2), 5-53.
- Stedman, S. J. (2001). Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers. *IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation*. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ImplementingPeaceAgreementsinCivilWars_IPI2001.pdf
- Tolbert, C., & Bowen, D. (2009). Initiative Campaigns: Direct Democracy and Voter Mobilization. *American Politics Research*, 37(1), 155-192.
- Voelkel, C. (2013, May 28). *Three Reasons why Colombia's Land Reform Deal is Significant*. Crisis Group. Retrieved July 21, 2023, from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/three-reasons-why-colombias-land-reform-deal-significant>
- Wallerstein, I. (1993). The World-System after the Cold War. *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(1), 5.
- Wallerstein, I. M. (2004). *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Duke University Press.
- Walt, Stephen (1987): *The Origins of Alliances*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979): *Theory of International Politics*. New York: MacGraw-Hill.
- Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wilkenfeld, J., Young, K., Asal, V., & Quinn, D. (2003). Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47(3), 279-301.
- Wilson, Woodrow (1918): *President Wilson's Message to Congress, January 8, 1918*. Records of the United States Senate. National Archives.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Blackwell.
- Youth Survey on Peace Awareness – 2021*. (2022, March 18). Goi Peace Foundation. Retrieved August 1, 2023, from <https://www.goipeace.or.jp/en/news/peace-survey2021/>
- Zakaria, Frank (1998): *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press