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*From Failed States to Failed Cities? Slums and Stability in Urbanizing World*

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"Prohlašuji, že jsem diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně, s využitím uvedených pramenů."

Ivan Eckhardt

## **From Failed States to Failed Cities? Slums and Stability in Urbanizing World**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This text aims to examine the relation between booming urbanization in the developing world on the one hand and the issue of state stability and global security on the other hand. More concretely, it tests a hypothesis that overcrowded slums inhabited by millions of slum-dwellers deprived of basic needs constitute a serious destabilizing factor for states and regions they live in. To test this hypothesis, the failed state concept is used.

Both the hypotheses and the theoretical background used to test it necessitate that the whole problematic is simplified in two major ways. First, it might appear strange that the failed state concept is applied on cities. As written above, this text tests a hypothesis that slums in the developing world threaten state stability. This assumption is based on the fact that social factors typical for failed states, such as demographic pressure, unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, or poor public services are at the same time typical for social environment of slums. The text presupposes that factors proved to have destabilizing effects on a state-level should have similar effect on a city-level too.

Second, regional differences need to be omitted in order to enable comparison of megacities in different parts of the developing world. The main aim of this article is to study security impacts of urbanization process in the developing world. And since virtually all parts of the developing world are getting urbanized, nothing less than a global approach is possible in this case.

The first chapter of this text deals with the failed state concept and is aimed at compiling a set of factors that are generally destabilizing from the point of view of state security.

The second and the third chapter set broader historical context by comparing urbanization process that took place in Europe and North America with present urbanization of the Third World. The fourth chapter finds what risk factors commonly associated with failed states can be found in the developing world's cities/slums. Finally, the fifth chapter studies effects of slums on stability of their respective cities, states and regions.

Text finds that although slums really have some attributes that makes them potentially volatile, many of them don't threaten state or regional stability in any serious way. It is above all because of the informal economy that – if working correctly – provides slum-dwellers with basic livelihood in spite of poverty, unemployment, economic decline, and social exclusion. And although there is a number of instable violent slums/cities (above all in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa) and there are even cases of slum-driven state collapse (Lebanon in the 1970s or Kenya in 2008), these problems are linked to ethnic hostilities, segregation and exclusion much more than to mere unfavorable demographic and economic conditions slums are defined by.

## FAILING STATES

When using such overused and somehow vague term as the failed state, it is necessary to define how it will be understood in this text. There is in fact a whole set of terms concerning the state failure – failed state, collapsed state, weak state, shadow state, and quasi-state, to name but a few. At times, these labels are used interchangeably, another time they differ in their meaning, usually in order to describe phases of a gradual decline (at first a state is “weak”, then it becomes “failing”, then “collapsed”, etc.). At the same time, continuous verb “failing” used to describe a state might also serve to remind that the problem discussed is more a dynamic process or a tendency rather than a permanent unchangeable trait. The term “failed state” will be used in this text as it is probably the most prolific term, used for example in an annual Failed State Index (see below).

It needs to be reminded that the very concept is debatable: globalized economy and transnational corporations leave *all* states with much smaller power and control over their domains than some 50 years ago, and *all* states host criminal organizations, hence actors contesting the state monopoly on physical force. Nonetheless, there surely is a common-sense consensus about how to use the term – it is generally related to poverty, civil wars, overpopulation, group grievances, and other related issues. In his book of the same name, Paul Collier writes about “the bottom billion” (Collier 2007a) - a mass of people worldwide, but mostly in Africa, living in what he calls “trapped countries... clearly heading toward what might be described as a black hole” (Ferguson 2007). The majority of this “bottom billion” is living in states definable as “failing” or “failed”.

Following part provides a set of characteristics of such a state. It is based on a number of papers, articles, and books on the subject (Jackson 1990; Kaldor 1999; Leander 2001; Marten 2006/7; Wlaschütz 2004; Wulf 2004; Zartman 1995), but above all on annual Failed State Index presented by the US organization Fund for Peace that uses 12 indicators in order to test the degree of state failure.

This chapter will analyze the issue of state stability and security more profoundly, specifying what factors and traits are universally considered a menace to state stability. These risk factors are presented in five different sub-chapters as they are derived from five different social spheres: from state's history, from its demography, from its economical status, from its political system and, finally, from the character of its society.

## HISTORY: COLONIALISM, PREMATURE INDEPENDENCE, COLD WAR

One topic on which virtually all commentators on globalization agree is that the power of nation states has been substantially weakened. In most developing countries, this power has only been established relatively recently, in the post-colonial period from about 1965, and these countries have not had a great deal of time to build up a unified national pride and character, democratic institutions or a balanced national economy. (UN-Habitat 2003: 48)

The fate of current failing states is historically determined to a very high degree. In many parts of the world, native societies never have a chance to experience a significant time of peace and prosperity. To begin with, many of them were quite barbaric and inhumane, with war, slavery, torture, oppression of women, and other types of violence as a norm. The notion of human rights as a relevant political concept is no older than 200 hundred years, and for a very long time it was applied in an inconsistent manner and limited mostly only to what is now called the Western world.

Majority of present-day independent states (UN has 192 member states) have history of being subjected to a foreign domination (colonialism, annexation, etc.). By establishing their domains, colonial metropolises irreversibly disrupted traditional order, cohesion, and solidarity of native societies. Colonized people had to learn to live with a completely new reality of previously unknown races, new social, economic, and political systems, new technologies, not to mention deadly diseases, drugs, and similar maladies. Practices of

colonial regimes were inherently racist, based on exclusion of native population.

As is now widely acknowledged, even independence granted to colonies was a sort of cultural domination, since the notion of modern nation-state was a purely Western invention, alien to native non-Western societies. Instead of gradual evolution, the statehood was “allocated” to non-Western world in a flash, impetuously. Postcolonial elites with their Western education, ideas, methods, and modernizing plans soon found themselves in conflict with traditionalist masses opposing any profound changes in society. Generally, the societies weren’t “fit” (economically, politically, culturally) for the Western type of statehood and most of the vices of colonial era – violence, exclusion, inequality – prevailed even as states gained their independence.

Another burden for “young” non-Western states was brought by the Cold War, a global competition that left the Third World fragmented by a new, alien set of ideologies, cleavages, and conflicts. Both blocks were military engaged in all parts of the world, with the worst damage being inflicted upon states claimed by both superpowers. In addition, the end of the Cold War didn’t mean general advance, but rather brought new kind of problems. For example, with the support and attention of the superpowers waned, former military allies and proxies were left without perspective. Many of them they turned to ruthless political cronyism or criminal profit-making.

In addition, past 30 years have seen drastic acceleration of globalization which is yet another element that halves state authority. Unregulated financial flows, transnational corporations and other phenomena significantly reduce “living-space” of states: spheres and areas they can control and within which they act.



## DEMOGRAPHY: DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURE, POVERTY, REFUGEES

Some trends in demography may constitute a destabilization factor. Above all, it is rapid population growth. In early-modern European history, there were two major waves of population boom – the first in a period from 1500-1650, the second from 1730 to 1870. It is no coincidence that these two demographic waves were paralleled by two periods of violent political crises, while the intermezzo of demographic stagnation was an era of relative tranquility. Currently, it is the DW that is experiencing an unprecedented population boom whose consequences are virtually global. The higher the population growth rate, the higher the possibility of political instability, conflicts, or anarchy (Goldstone: 357).

Pressure of demographic boom can be further aggravated by high population density and poverty. In addition, raising population growth rate makes the proportion of the young people in the society growing. And it is the young, together with the women, who are affected the most by poverty, unemployment, and wars. At the same time, the young are more prone to violence (Vanderschueren 1996: 100) and to become supporters and members of radical political groups, street gangs, or sects. In fact, revolutions usually occur in states with exceptionally young populations (Goldstone: 365).

Poverty, high infant mortality, short life expectancy, and AIDS/HIV together with other diseases further deepen the misery of majority of people. In many parts of the world, vital resources such as food and water are very scarce. In such conditions, it is nearly impossible for the state to provide the people with adequate services such as health care and education. All these traits together create a societal powder box that consists of large group of poor and mainly young people with no jobs or life prospects. Poverty brings negative consequences that subsequently prevent any economic growth. Needless to say, most parts of sub-Saharan Africa serve as a sad example of this “vicious circle”.

Flows of refugees and displaced persons is another phenomenon that, if massive, is largely uncontrollable and have very destabilizing effect. A fast and massive wave of international migrants can paralyze even a quite stable state, especially when the migrants carry ethno-religious grievances or other socially explosive “material”. Another negative trend is “brain drain”, economic migration of middle-class educated people to more stable and perspective regions.

In the case of states in tropical regions, any possible development is hampered because of hot climate creating an environment that is very unfavorable for agriculture but at the same time extremely favorable for spreading of diseases such as malaria. It is no coincidence that most failed states are situated near the equator (Tortella 2007: 437-40).

#### ECONOMY: UNEMPLOYMENT, INFORMAL SECTOR, CRIME

Of course, stable and peaceful society is hardly imaginable in the context of deep economic decline and unemployment. Crisis in public sector, bankruptcy of private enterprises and decline of foreign investments leave the majority of people without jobs and salaries, while even the “ more fortunate” minority has only insecure and low-paid jobs. While *stable* economic growth strengthens the stability by making even poor people optimistic, crisis or a disappointing rate of growth does exactly the opposite (Keen 2001: 9). It is frequently observed that one of the groups most affected by economic hardships is the young – the same group that is usually most prone to violence.

When “normal” economy is justly perceived as unpromising, people turn to informal or illegal economy. This so-called shadow sector often functions as a virtual life-saver – though subsistence it provides is often rather miserable, it is better than nothing and it leaves people with hopes for improvement. The informal economy has, however, its dark side of violent criminal activities. Reign of organized crime attracts many, especially the young, by offering not only comparable high salaries but also a status and power.

## POLITICAL POWER: AUTHORITARIAN CLIENTELISM, ANARCHY, WAR

The key aspect of failing state is its inability to provide the people with the services they demand. In the first place, it is security – a failed state is not able to create order. The population does not turn to state authorities for protection, finding it not only hopeless but even counterproductive since the same state is often a source of violence. But even the other, less crucial services such as health care, education, infrastructure, or bureaucracy are non-existent as well. These factors that might be called bad governance are strongly related to state failure – they constitute its cause, symptom, and consequence at the same time (Collier 2007b; Ferguson 2007; Goldstone: 358).

The government of a failing state rules arbitrarily and non-transparent at best, with abuses of power being a norm. Fareed Zakaria notoriously coined the term illiberal democracies, describing formally democratic and lawful states that in reality routinely abuse their legislation, rig elections, and oppress citizens (Zakaria 1997). In these states, the rule of law exists only in theory, and the real power is exercised through corruption and clientelism. Such system of personal private connections and patron-client relationships is sometimes called neo-patrimonialism in a reference to Middle Age systems of vassalage and serfdom based on private links between rulers and their subordinates (Bøås 2005). In such system, rulers are profit-seeking privateers with connections to informal economy and criminal world, and the state becomes a privatized and criminalized informal entity.

Territorial control is another concept that loses its sense in a failed state. Large parts of the state are under uncontested control of private armed groups, warlords, or other local actors. Also, cross-border movement is uncontrolled, which enable the crisis to be effectively exported abroad. However, the central and most important aspect of failed state is intensive and uncontrolled private (organized) violence. Three quarters of Collier's "bottom billion" has recently witnessed or are still witnessing a civil war. Internal wars are clearly related to poverty – the poorer the country, the higher the

probability it slips into a civil war. In addition, many countries suffer from such grave post-war instability and violence that it can be virtually equaled to a new war (Collier 2007b; Ferguson 2007).

## SOCIETY: GROUP GRIEVANCES, CULTURES OF VIOLENCE

In failed state, normal societal order is severely altered. Poor and powerless majority of the people perceive themselves excluded and lose confidence in their state. Disruption of traditional communal order and solidarity creates a widespread sense of alienation. At the same time, failing states very often host many group grievances based on ethnical, religious, racial, political, tribal or other cleavages. Violence, an ever-present malady of all failing states, only further undermines social cohesion. This frequently results in long, bitter, and violent conflicts fought with extreme brutality and no respect to human rights.

Deadly and vicious civil wars alter normal social order by producing a culture of violence that makes people perceive the use of physical force as normal and common social practice (Moser 2004: 6). Cultures of violence are usually accompanied by cultures of impunity - environments where chances of aggressors being prosecuted exists only in theory. In Guatemala, one of the most extreme cases, 98 percent of homicides remain unpunished (Relea 2007).

These are the main characteristics of a typical failing state. With the exception of historical determinants discussed in the first part of this chapter, it is hard to determine whether these traits are causes or consequences of state failure. Rather, they are to be viewed as both incentives and results at the same time – not only they trigger the state failure, but by doing so they create an environment where they truly can flourish. Even demographic pressure is not only cause, but a consequence of decline, since state failure prevents society from reaching economic development that could eventually lead to demographic stabilization (as in the Western world in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century).

## MODERN URBANIZATION IN EUROPE

Urban history shows that people come together in cities for wealth creation, and the creation of income has been considered to be the prime measure of urban success...

(UN-Habitat 2003: 96)

Before discussing the issue of slums in the developing world, the historic pattern of urbanization needs to be sufficiently clarified, because slums emerged as a product of this process. It is also crucial to know the course of modernization and urbanization of the Western world in the 19<sup>th</sup> and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, because this experience was eventually used as a model for planned development in the Third World countries. This chapter will explain the dynamic behind the urbanization of what we now call the developed world, with particular focus on urbanization in Europe.

Urbanization in Europe must be seen in the broader context of modernization, which can be understood as a complex inter-dependent set of overall social developments that include above all demographic boom, rapid scientific progress, transformation from primary (agriculture) to secondary (industrialization) economic sector, shift from traditional (feudal or colonial) establishment to modern independent nation states, democratization, and secularization. On behalf of clarity, though, the whole problematic needs to be, to some degree, simplified and schematized. The complex multi-level transformation will be thus analyzed on three basic layers: demography, economy, and political system.

Western pre-modern societies were rural, with majority of population living in villages and employed in primary sector. However, technological progresses such as mechanization and use of artificial fertilizers gradually enabled farmers to produce more food more easily, with less demand for human workforce. Also, political changes such as abolition of serfdom and redistribution of seized aristocratic/church lands led to even

higher agricultural productivity. More diversified and abundant diet, together with advances in medical health, resulted in raised quality and length of life with reduced infant mortality rates. Population boom, however, soon encountered one problem: the advanced agriculture's need for workforce was not sufficient to provide all rural population with a livelihood. In addition, entire European agricultural sector was shrinking due to competition with oversea imports (mainly from North America). To sum it up, the outcome of population growth and less demand for workforce was a growing number of "surplus" people in rural world (Tortella 2007).

Meanwhile, in cities, urban middle classes were growing in both numbers and assertiveness. It was this social group that eventually forced absolutist monarchies to summon representative bodies, abolish restrictive institutions, allow economic freedoms, and guarantee property rights. This urban class was interested above all in being able to carry business and multiply assets, so their main focus was at property rights and freedoms with voices calling for democratization rather marginal. Anyway, liberalization together with other developments (general state centralization and standardization, demands of growing population for various goods, and technological progress) brought higher economic growth and, ultimately, modern capitalist economies emerged (Ibid: 68). The process had spiritual character as well: new set of capitalist values emerged, especially previously unknown concepts of profit and (national or personal) interest that replaced duty, honor and other traditional motives. Max Weber's assertion of protestant reformation as a philosophical base of capitalism is notorious.

During their transition from traditional agricultural societies to modern industrialized countries, nearly all countries in the world experienced revolutions or other society-wide quakes. Probably the first was England's Glorious Revolution in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, one of the last was Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 (Ibid: 210).

Experiencing boom of capitalist entrepreneurial activities and economic growth, European cities soon found themselves in need for manpower to sustain it. And, with serfdom ties abolished and movement facilitated by new means of transport (namely railway), there was nothing to avert a massive migratory flow of above mentioned “surplus” masses from rural areas to cities in search for employment.

What resulted from these achievements was the 19<sup>th</sup> century as an era of economic growth and social progress never observed before, although it was enabled only by “sacrificing the life conditions of two generations [of workers]” (Ibid: 89, 91). Horrific living conditions of industrial employees were accompanied by other negative factors, namely rapid overcrowding of urban zones. Between 1800 and 1850, for example, the population of London nearly triplicated from one million to 2.7 million urbanites (Ibid: 30-1). This was when the first modern slums appeared, with all their negative attributes – poverty, diseases, violence. Friedrich Engels was the first to analyze the problematic of slums in capitalist societies (Devas 1993: 66).

Soon, however, various socialist movements and parties began to fight for better work conditions and share on political decision-making. Another factor that eased the negative aspects of modernization and urbanization was a possibility of oversea migration – North America’s fabulous abundance of land and need for manpower attracted significant number of “surplus” people. In this way, mostly rural people from Europe moved to growing American cities (Tortella 2007: 102-3; Davies 2006: 183).

In sum, what enabled Western societies to become urban was technological and medical progress that raised population growth, made agriculture less labor-intensive, and laid base to urban industrial growth conducted by new entrepreneurial middle class. Economically restrictive feudal order found itself under a severe pressure and eventually gave up. New political establishment gradually introduced liberal freedoms economic growth was conditioned on: free trade, private property rights, and freedom of movement.

At first, vast and profound demographical changes created major problems, above all poverty and misery among lowest urban strata. However, in spite of periodic crises, this system provided gradual economic growth that eventually enabled even factory workers to obtain some minimal material standards. But, because “people rebel not when in the worst misery, but rather when in a process of growth” (Tortella 2007: 42), the modernization era was far from peaceful. The most turbulent events of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, such as wars or revolutions, can be seen as products of these profound social changes.

After the WW2, industrial era reached its peak in the Western world. Birth rate growth was gradually slowing down up to the current point of population stagnation and (in some parts) even decline. Rising quality of life blurred class distinctions and led to individualist lifestyle. This was paralleled by shift from secondary sector of mass factory production to more decentralized tertiary sector based on services. This, together with automobilization and other advances in transport, laid base to partial de-urbanization, as people were moving from overcrowded (and often crime-ridden) industrial centers to cleaner and safer suburbs. In some states, immigration from less developed non-European countries was encouraged in order to have workforce for less attractive jobs. Women emancipation, crisis of nuclear family, sexual revolution, decline in interest in politics, or environmental damage were other important developments that took place in discussed period.

To sum this chapter up, what eased the demographic boom in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries was: 1) job-creating urban economic boom, 2) wide possibilities of migration, and 3) the whole process being rather gradual.



## URBANIZATION IN DEVELOPING WORLD

Urbanization is perhaps the only enduring trend in human history. The high rate of urbanization that is now occurring throughout the developing world parallels that which occurred in England and some other European countries during their industrial revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries. What is different now is that urbanization is not being accompanied by adequate economic growth in many developing countries. (UN-Habitat 2003: 25)

As UN-Habitat says, current urbanization of the developing world (DW) is nothing abnormal and Pacific “Tiger Economies” show that the process can be managed quite well. Globally, however, this handful of mostly East Asian economically successful countries serve only as a reminder of urban catastrophes in Africa, Latin America, and the rest of Asia. This chapter will describe the course of urbanization in the DW and explain why this process has been much more troubled than in the West.

### COLONIAL ERA

As already stated, most parts of the non-European world experienced colonial rule or some other type of oversea domination. Almost universally, the main purpose of colonies was to extract and export primary commodities, and their systems were designed to fulfill this task. Most importantly, colonial powers reshaped native societies in terms of forced agrarianization and de-urbanization. Existing urban cultures were destroyed, natives were not allowed to move to cities (urban-rural migration was usually prohibited in both directions) and native city-dwellers were moved to slums (Davies 2006: 51-3). Some of these colonial-era slums prevailed to the present day. Urbanization was avoided because cities had only marginal role in the colonial economic system, but also because they were viewed as potential centers of resistance. Apartheid regime was one of the last systems on the planet to use this old colonial tactic (Devas, Rakodi 1993: 28-9).

Colonial metropolises created their own urban infrastructures in order to export primary commodities. Cities such as Sao Paolo, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Caracas, Dakar, Lagos, Nairobi, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Calcutta, or Bombay are all cities of European origin, founded primarily for economic reasons. Only China and Arab world were able to maintain own ancient urban-system at whole.

Above all, European powers were interested in importing gold and silver, later also silk, spice, sugar, coffee, and other materials. In the first colonial period (1500-1800), this process was pioneered by private companies. Since the last third of the 19th century, however, industrialization and population boom in Europe created high demand for resources necessary to maintain economic growth. This resulted in a new wave of colonization, this time guided by modern national states that maintained robust oversea presence in colonies. It was this second period that had drastic impact on local societies: colonial elites used modern technologies to create complex cities with complicated infrastructure and new set of services such as police, transport, or administration. Western values were fiercely promoted (Pacione 2001: 435-439).

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a couple of European countries almost totally dominated the rest of the world. Colonies remained economically specialized in the same way as before – in raw material extraction and agricultural production. Industrialization was generally avoided (one of the few exceptions was Japanese Empire which opted for industrializing Manchuria and Korean Peninsula in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Colonies were exporting primary commodities and importing advanced, capital-intensive industrial goods. Some colonial regimes displaced large masses of native population to zones with plantations and mines (Mehmet 1995: 86).

As they were incorporated into international market, non-Western native regions had to accept different, previously unknown economic system. Egalitarian rural societies' systems based on subsistence production with land in public tenure were quickly replaced

by economic competition, profit-making, privatization of land, export rural production, and waged work (Pacione 2001: 461-2). Davies argues that these changes created a catastrophe of apocalyptic proportions as native rural communities were uprooted and millions of landless peasants suffered from famine and poverty. "As a result, the twentieth century became an age not of urban revolutions, as classical Marxism had imagined, but of epochal rural uprisings and peasant-based wars of national liberation" (Davies 2006: 174).

The Great Depression spilled to the DW through fading demand for primary products, namely food. Small agricultural producers were driven to cities that were suffering at that time from scarcity of industrial jobs. This was one of the first booms of squatting (Pacione 2001: 439). There was growing frustration and anti-colonial sentiment among native populations as colonial metropolises, struggling with more pressing issues, left their domains behind, uncared-for. It was for the first time when economic interests of colonies and metropolises founded themselves in a direct opposition.

In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, real possibilities of economic growth and modernization were denied to the DW . It was mainly because of the era, with its World Wars and the Great Depression, was dominated not only by general political instability, but also by isolationism, protectionism, and decrease of international exchange (UN-Habitat 2003: 34). Non-Western regions, regardless on whether already independent (Latin America) or not (Africa, Asia), were economically subordinated to more developed countries which, at that time, were preoccupied with own problems.

It needs to be reminded that although Latin American states enjoyed their independence quite early, in the first third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, new Creole rulers left political and economic systems basically intact. Economies thus remained oriented on primary sector. Possibilities of economic growth and industrialization were, in addition, set back by internal turmoils, volatility of international economy, and world crisis in the first half of

the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Tortella 2007: 62, 66-7). That's why achievements reached in the continent were rather modest and by the end of the WW2, level of economic development in Latin American countries didn't differ much from that of the rest of the DW.

## GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE 20<sup>th</sup> CENTURY

Until the half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, European and North American population was the fastest growing in the world, with high birth rate paralleled by low infant mortality rate. In 1900, Europeans constituted one third of the world's population, in contrast to 20 percent in 1750 (Hobsbawm 1998: 355). Also, the West was the only truly urbanized region, with the rest of the world remaining deeply rural. At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, less than 3 percent of the world's population was living in towns and cities. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the DW's cities experienced only slow growth and Africa and Asia remained almost totally rural yet in 1950 (Pacione 2001: 67; Davies, 2006: 50-51).

In the DW, the *real* population growth and urbanization is taking place since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In approximately the same period, the West has been experiencing a slow-down in population growth and urbanization up to the point of current demographic stagnation and de-urbanization. In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the world's population grew from 2.5 billion up to 6 billion, with the major part of this addition originating in the DW. As for urbanization, the proportion of the urban population in the DW grew from 18 percent in 1950 to 40 percent in 2000 (UN-Habitat 2003: xxxi).

Significant drop in mortality rate in the DW, based on progresses in medicine and pharmacology, began roughly in the 1940s and was four to five times more rapid than in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Hobsbawm 1998: 356). Some states even tried to manage the population boom with birth control programs – the most notorious example is Chinese “one child policy”.

## GUIDED MODERNIZATION

Opening phase of the population boom in the DW coincided with the early post-WW2 era of bipolar confrontation and, more importantly, anti-colonialism. There was general agreement among winners of the WW2 that colonies are to be granted independence and subsequently assisted in their effort to modernize and industrialize as early as possible.

The developed world led by the UN decided to apply to the rest of the world its own “Western way” towards development: non-European regions were supposed to use modern innovations and start heavy industrialization with cities as motors of economic progress. This process was to take place within the framework of national state, which was nothing but another European invention. Local specifics were ignored at best or repressed as obstructions to modernization at worst. Most leaders of newly independent states were “westernized” in their ideas and lifestyles, so they were generally in accord with this approach (Mehmet 1995: 1-2, 59, 61).

Based on Keynesian theories and taking inspiration from the Marshall Plan's success, the whole project was designed in paternalist and technocratic fashion as linear, unproblematic, universal, scientifically planned process. It was not a laissez faire free market economy that was to be introduced in the DW, but rather sort of state capitalism with heavy reliance on protectionism, state interventions, and in some places even Five-Year Plans. Western advisors and local elites rigidly projected newly emerging urban industrial sector as based on big businesses, mass production, and heavy industry - at the expense of smaller enterprises. Infamous pharaonic construction projects such as Aswan Dam in Egypt are the most extreme and visible effect of this approach (Ibid: 65, 92). Mehmet assures that “period from 1950-1970 can be labeled as the Golden Age of Eurocentric modeling to shape Third World economic development” (Ibid: 60).

The Western scheme had heavy anti-rural and pro-urban bias: „the large agricultural

sectors dominated by low-productivity traditional farming which relies on unpaid family labour for subsistence production... [were] identified as the source of under-development“ (Ibid: 72-3). Mehmet claims that Western donors were deliberately supplying cheap food in order to make the DW’s agricultural sectors stagnating (Ibid: 61-2). Anti-rural policies found their most extreme form in massacres of rural people in some states of sub-Saharan Africa. All these measures were aimed at one goal: to make rural population move to cities and become waged labor for emerging industrial production. In some places, these anti-rural economic incentives were in addition reinforced by civil wars or natural catastrophes that devastated rural regions (Davies 2006: 16, 58). What resulted from this was nothing more than mass exodus of demographically booming rural population to cities.

In two decades, the West and local elites radically reshaped the DW’s agricultural sector in three major ways. First, modern capital-intensive mechanized technologies increased productivity and lowered demand for labor. Second, production was re-oriented from subsistence to export (this was partially done in the colonial era) which in many places brought radical decrease of local consumption – there were numerous famines and food riots in the 1970s and 1980s. Third, public land was enclosed, privatized, and consolidated into large estates. This unequal land distribution made it extremely difficult for the poor and landless to access it. (UN-Habitat 2003: 24-6; Pacione 2001: 443, 465-6; Mehmet 1995: 61-2, 93-4; Davies 2006: 16-17, 161; Devas, Rakodi 1993: 23; Devas 1993: 83-4).

The outcome was nothing else than a complete failure. The West and local leaders succeeded in destroying the agricultural sphere, but absolutely failed to create new urban industrial sectors. Only few cities in the DW experienced such economic growth that allowed them to accommodate masses coming from villages. And even if they did, it was frequently only temporal economic phenomenon, usually oil exports-driven boom such as in Nigeria. People were drastically “pushed” out of rural regions because of agricultural

decline instead of being “pulled” in by economically prospering cities. The whole attitude was flawed – abstract macroeconomic planning had totally ignored cultural issues and specific economic dynamics (Pacione 2001: 433). If the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century teaches something, it is that all such robust social engineering projects are doomed in advance.

Transnational corporations (TNCs) and their investments to the DW (a phenomenon totally unknown before) were not of much help either. Soon after the WW2, the developed world was experiencing remarkable prosperity that however soon met with shortage of labor and rising demands of workers. At first, the problem was temporarily solved by attracting immigrant workforce which was “abundant, non-unionized, cheap, docile and willing to take on menial tasks” (Ibid: 441), hence ideal for European employers. Immigration had obvious positive effect not only to host countries but to immigrants’ homelands as well, since it eased the pressure of urban growth and helped economy with remittances. However, immigrant workforce was gradually getting more organized, assertive, and thus expensive.

Western companies reacted by moving their activities to the DW where urban workforce was abundant, unemployed, and unorganized (Ibid: 439-42). In this way, economic development in cities of the DW was soon controlled by TNCs, with profits ending in offshore banks instead of starting local development and growth. In addition, new capital-intensive technologies had only modest demand for workforce, hence the number of jobs created was more than insufficient to accommodate millions of rural migrants (Mehmet 1995: 79-80, 89; Devas 1993: 78). In fact, more often it was the service sector that succeeded in providing jobs, rather than industry (Devas, Rakodi 1993: 25-6) – this issue will be further discussed in chapter about “East Asian Tigers”.

In addition to draining profits away from the DW, foreign investments further enforced regional differences, with large cities and ports as main recipients of investments and economic aid. Subsequently, native labor was attracted to these core cities, creating

highly asymmetric urban systems. In many developing countries, one city absolutely dominates, such as Montevideo, Bangkok, or Cairo (Pacione 2001: 442-3). There were other flaws: urban development was poorly managed and planned, if not left totally uncontrolled and chaotic (Davies 2006: 51, 128-9).

In the 1970s, it was already clear that the modernization project ship-wrecked. Its most visible effects were unprecedented and unexpected rural exodus with its secondary consequences: overcrowded cities, large slum populations, poverty, social injustice, unemployment, and failure of formal economy with subsequent emergence of massive informal economic structures (Mehmet 1995: 86).

## NEOLIBERALISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

[Structural Adjustment Programs] tended to weaken the economic role of cities throughout most of the developing world and placed emphasis on agricultural exports, thus [were] working against the primary demographic direction moving all of the new workers to towns and cities. (UN-Habitat 2003: 6)

Instead of being a focus for growth and prosperity, the cities have become a dumping ground for a surplus population working in unskilled, unprotected and low-wage informal service industries and trade. The slums of the developing world swell. (UN-Habitat 2003: 46)

After the oil shocks in the 1970s, OPEC countries saved their huge profits in Western banks. Mehmet explains that this credit expansion led to “lending mania” directed especially at the DW countries. Eventually, many such states founded themselves unable to pay their loans off, which resulted in the 1980s debt crisis (Mehmet 1995: 108-9).

Meanwhile, economic crisis of the 1970s forced the West to abandon old Keynesian



dogmas and begin to search for a new economic paradigm. What followed was an emergence of neoliberalism, a neoclassical economic approach strongly influenced by anti-statist libertarianism. Coming to the conclusion that the DW's problems were of poor governance, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (WB/IMF) initiated the so-called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), "prescribed" to poorer and heavily indebted developing countries. Originating in the 1980s, their aim was to loan money on condition of debtors implementing economic reforms – they were asked to lift protectionist trade barriers, deregulate all economic spheres (labor, trade, finances), reduce statist policies in favor of privatization, and exercise anti-poverty programs.

SAPs brought real improvement only in minority of countries it was applied on. Dollar and Svenson (1998) argue that a SAP can be successful only when the donor shows certain political and economic virtues. However, WB/IMF rather targeted these programs on the contrary on states affected by overall crises characterized by uncompetitive public enterprises, corruption, ineffective restriction of economic processes, fixed prices on basic commodities, and unattractiveness for foreign investments. In these countries, SAPs only intensified foreign control and ownership over local assets (UN-Habitat 2003: 45; Mehmet 1995: 123).

SAPs brought a complete reversal of previously dominant economic policies: protectionism and pro-industry approach were replaced by free-market liberalism and focus on export-oriented agriculture. Rural production was stimulated by increases of food prices, which had negative impacts on living standards (Rakodi 1993: 209-10). These efforts were largely fruitless, mostly due to elimination of agricultural subsidies in the DW that pushed the sector into difficult competition with heavily subsidized agribusinesses of Europe and USA (Davies 2006: 153). Profits from agriculture were to be used to pay off debts instead of being invested (UN-Habitat 2003: 46).

Decline of investments in industry together with economic re-orientation towards primary

sector led to industrial decline. “Since the mid-1980s, the great industrial cities of the South – Bombay, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Belo Horizonte and Sao Paulo – have all suffered massive plant closures and deindustrialization” (Davies 2006: 13). The absence of jobs is often also due to short-time speculative character of foreign investments. Even former East Bloc countries experienced some similar trends with cities originally specialized on heavy industry left forlorn after neo-liberal reconstruction of the 1990s (Ibid: 13-4, 24).

Current urban crisis of the DW needs to be seen from the point of view of these developments that resulted in „the emergence of a huge sub-sector of the urban population unable to find waged employment and whose poverty excluded them from obtaining adequate housing, education and health care. They usually found livelihood in informal economy“ (Pacione 2001: 441). Hence the gravest problem of the DW’s urbanization: it is “hollow”. Urbanization has been isolated from job-creating economic growth. “The size of a city’s economy, as a result, often bears surprisingly little relationship to its population size, and vice versa.” This “perverse urban boom” takes place in spite of falling wages, rising prices, and unemployment. “The global forces ‘pushing’ people from the countryside (...) seem to sustain urbanization even when the ‘pull’ of the city is drastically weakened by debt and economic depression” (Davies 2006: 16-17).

## NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

However, some developing countries did manage to reach a considerable economic success. They are to be found mainly in Pacific Asia. This is not only the case of Japan and China, but also of South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Since the 1990s, even South East Asia joined the club of East Asian Tigers. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong now constitute a group of post-industrial urbanized states that specialize in tertiary and quaternary economic sectors (Pacione 2001: 105). These

countries, together with China, are the only non-Western states that succeeded at least partially in providing the poor with public low-cost housing (Davies 2006: 31, 63).

This success of Asian Tigers is based on number of reasons, but above all because these states retained their autonomy in economic management. This Far Eastern approach was pioneered by Japan in the 19<sup>th</sup> century's (liberal reform period known as the Meiji era) and is relevant ever after. The East Asian states combined foreign ideas with their own traditions. Unlike in the rest of the DW, Pacific economies were dominated by local enterprises, so the profits remained home. Specific "Asian way" to capitalism avoided Western individualism in favor of communal and family values. Asian Tigers succeeded in creating labor-intensive export-oriented industries and at the same time preserved their rural sectors by performing egalitarian land reforms oriented on subsistence production. Also, the Tigers mostly avoided the mistake of underestimating the importance of education and human capital development (Mehmet 1995: 79-80, 106-13, 127-8).

There are of course other notable cases of economically more successful countries: Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, or India. Economic success of these countries that are given various names, such as "emerging economies" (Stevenson 1997) or "semi-peripheries" (Wallerstein 2004), enabled them to solve, to some degree, the problems of cities. Even India, a host of a gigantic number of slum-dwellers, in recent years succeeded in improving the situations in some cities (UN-Habitat 2003: 15). Major cities of these countries are fully integrated into global economy, having "strong presence of international enterprise with a multicultural (national and foreign) population, a high concentration of artistic and scientific life and a large volume of international tourism" (Canclini 2005: 253).

Especially the case of China is unique, since it is „possibly the only large country that has managed, so far, to urbanize rapidly without the creation of large slum areas or informal settlements" (UN-Habitat 2003: 126). During the era of Mao, the urban and the

rural were two separate realms, with migration outlawed. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, as a part of its overall pro-market reforms that made the country the world's second largest economy, the Communist regime eased the control measures and eventually enabled internal migration. Since then, about 200 million peasants have moved to growing East-Coast cities (Davies 2006: 7, 11, 53, 54; Pacione 2001: 105). Despite this rapidness and grandiose scope, Beijing was able to keep the whole process from becoming a mass disaster. This was mainly because Chinese economic boom enabled to provide significant part of the migrants with livelihood, cheap housing, and other services. In addition, Chinese demographic pressure is eased by overseas economic expansion – there are approximately 750,000 Chinese workers employed by Chinese enterprises in African continent only (Rusiñol 2007).

UN-Habitat claims that the most spectacular case of successful urban management is Shanghai. This demographically stabilized city is experiencing negative natural population growth since 1993. From the 1990s on, the economic growth is stable, based on foreign investments. The municipality initiated numerous successful infrastructure projects including forestation and environmental upgrades (Linchu, Zhi 2003). Nonetheless, this is not to say that Chinese urbanization is without adverse effects. Although the regime hesitates to call them slums, it has already admitted publicly that poor urbanized areas are a pressing problem that needs to be addressed (People's Daily Online 2005).

## PROSPECTS

Processes described in the previous chapter drastically change the global demography. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the world population has grown from 1.6 to 6 billion, with the majority of this addition originating in or absorbed by cities. The century witnessed the global urban population increasing from less than 5 to as much as 50 percent. While some of the cities that emerged in the DW are now successfully integrated into the global economy,

majority of them continue to be excluded from its benefits (UN-Habitat 2003: 135).

Many regional instabilities and conflicts the DW suffers from are caused by this trend. Rural protests in China, Mexico, and other states are reaction against negative consequences of rural decline, uncontrolled urbanization, and environmental damage. Immigrant communities inside many Western states, now frequently viewed as internal security threats, are the obvious children of this problematic. Recently, the Mediterranean Sea and Mexican-US border became restless with massive human flows, since Africa and Latin America are unable to handle the population boom. And the general rise of global inequality in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was caused above all by the failure of the modernization project in the DW.

And, there is no sign of global urbanization slowing down or even reversing itself. The majority of future population growth will be absorbed by cities of small or medium size, with number of inhabitants ranging from 500,000 to five million inhabitants (UN-Habitat 2003: 25). Such cities are generally lacking public services more than larger hubs (Montgomery 2003: 5). It is likely that the largest metropolises will experience decline in rate of growth (not decline in population) in favor of neighboring urban areas. This will create incredibly large urban regions.

The urbanization will be most sharp in East, South-East and South Asia. China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh – countries whose total population equals about 3 billion inhabitants - are still rural from at least 50 percent (Pacione 2001: 101). By 2025, this region is estimated to have 10-12 cities of more than 20 million – among them Shanghai (estimated 25 million), Jakarta (27), Dhaka (25), Mumbai (33), and Karachi (26). There will be gigantic urbanized area stretching from Korea and Japan to Indonesia's Jakarta, encompassing East Coast of China, Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia.

Africa, above all the sub-Saharan region, will be another scene of intense urbanization. Urban strip spreading from Abidjan, Ivory Coast to Lagos, Nigeria already constitute a transnational urbanized region with tens of millions of inhabitants. In following decades, the sharp growth is going to continue (UN-Habitat 2003: 50). Latin America is, in contrast to the rest of the DW, already a significantly urbanized region, so the urban growth there is slowing. But still, Rio de Janeiro/Sao Paulo region or Mexico City will both become agglomerations of tens of millions (Davies 2006: 5-7).

## SLUMS

The urban poor are trapped in an informal and ‘illegal’ world – in slums that are not reflected on maps, where waste is not collected, where taxes are not paid and where public services are not provided. Officially, they do not exist. Although they may reside within the administrative boundary of a town or city, their local authority may well be a slumlord or mafia leader, rather than city council staff, who often no longer attempt to assert their jurisdiction or even enter the slums.

(UN-Habitat 2003: 6)

This is the first thing we should know about slums: they are economically useful, sometimes extremely useful, because they offer low-cost housing options to the poor. (UN-Habitat 2007: 1)

According to the UN global report on slums (UN-Habitat 2003), there was nearly one billion slum dwellers on the planet in 2003, which is more than 30 percent of the global urban population. Majority of them were located in the DW.

The report defines slum as a heavily populated urban area characterized by substandard housing and squalor. Slum dwellers have inadequate access to safe water, sanitation as well as other infrastructure and services, their residual status is insecure and the place is overcrowded. UN-Habitat explained the emergence of slums in a quite simple formula: income inequality, lack of economic development, and population growth through immigration lead to poverty; and, subsequently, poverty with lack of affordable housing lead to slums (Ibid: 1, 8, 12, 17).

However, if compared to rural zones, many slums are believed to be places of opportunity and better living standard. Such zones are “slums of hope” that provide shelters from worse conditions and opportunities for improvement. These slums are slowly progressing

and developing. On the opposite, there are many “slums of despair” which are degenerating into real social black holes (Ibid: 9). In this chapter, I will describe that characteristics traditionally attributed to failing states can be found in slums, too.

## DEMOGRAPHY: OVERPOPULATION, POVERTY, REFUGEES

In general, the locus of poverty is moving to cities, a process now recognized as the ‘urbanization of poverty’. (UN-Habitat 2003: xxvi)

Historic, demographic, and economic factors that caused rapid urbanization of the DW were caused already discussed above. However, for the purpose of this text it is necessary to explain certain political circumstances that, too, strongly influenced the urbanization process. To begin with, colonial powers were struggling to prevent local populations from entering the cities, creating demographic overpressure. When independence (or fall of the Apartheid regime in South Africa) finally did away with these restrictions, urban populations skyrocketed.

Wars and mass violence in general are among extremely important causes of rapid exodus of rural population to cities. Many slums/cities emerged from excessive refugee crises caused by wars. Palestinian Gaza, Congolese Goma, or Sudanese Khartoum originated as refugee camps. Civil wars in Guatemala, Colombia, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, and many other countries, or interstate wars such as that in Vietnam had all strong urbanizing effects. In Vietnam, US military viewed rural areas as the base of resistance, hence they based their counterinsurgency tactic on anti-rural attacks and forced urbanization (Davies 2006: 48-9, 55-57).

A perfect example of war-driven urbanization is the case of Karachi, a wrong-place wrong-time city that bore effects of several refugee crises. Partition of India in 1947 drove about 600,000 refugees to the city. Wars over Kashmir, independence of



Bangladesh, and prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan had similar, only not that drastic impacts. This series of events created ethnically and religiously (Shiite minorities) heterogeneous, impoverished population (Hasan, Mohib 2003).

In their effort to flee a war, though, refugees often carry it with themselves, as their communities are frequently characterized by vast quantities of small arms, radical armed groups, ethnic grievances, poverty, and cultures of violence. As such, they remain a security problem even when conflict that produced them is over. Immigrant waves that emerged out of political violence may even directly cause a state failure and new war.

The history of Beirut, Lebanon is precisely an example of how refugee crises can create settlements that are inherently destabilizing. Founded by Armenian and Syrian refugees in the 1920s, Beirut slums experienced rapid enlargement as hundreds of thousands Palestinians were driven out of Israel. Initially, during the prosperous era of 1955-75, the state managed to provide impoverished masses with housing. However, another immigration wave of Palestinians expelled from Jordan created huge squatter settlements in south Beirut that eventually caused the state to collapse into a long civil war (UN-Habitat 2003: 203-4).

Globally, the combination of all these factors resulted in an unprecedented demographic shifts. In 1950, current megapolises such as Karachi (12 million), Jakarta (8 million), or Khartoum (8 million) were minor urban hubs of less than 500,000 inhabitants. As explained above, such pace of urbanization was too much to bear for newly independent fragile states and their economies. That's why large quantities of predominantly young migrants settled in slums, unemployed. Many of the world's slums are already "equivalent to cities in size" and have millions of inhabitants (Ibid: 90).

In the Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 72 percent of urban population live in slums. In South-central Asia, the number is 58 percent. In Ethiopia, Chad, and Afghanistan, we can safely

place an equalizer between slums and cities – 98 percent of urban population lives in slums there. In Nepal, it is 92 percent. Eastern and Western Asia and Latin America have between 30-40 percent of urban population living in slums. Northern Africa and Southeast Asia have 28 percent. In sum, Asia has 554 million slum dwellers, Africa 187 million, Latin America 128 million. In the developed world altogether, 54 million live in slums (Ibid: xxv).

Slums are hotbed of demographic problems such overcrowding, poverty, diseases, illiteracy, child mortality,- hence, low quality of life in general. In some places, these conditions are worse than in rural areas. In addition, slum dwellers suffer from health problems of both rural and urban character – malnutrition, parasites, trypanosomes, and high infant mortality meet with cancer, heart diseases, and other “diseases of civilization” (Davies 2006: 146-7). Population of cities in general and slums in particular tends to be very young – in most developing countries, at least half of urban migrants are under 24 (Devas, Rakodi 1993: 23).

On the other hand, many inhabitants of slums view their situation as better than is life in rural areas (UN-Habitat 2003: 23; Devas, Rakodi 1993: 27). Infant and child mortality is generally lower in cities than in villages (Montgomery 2003: 7). And, as stated above, many states are successfully improving living conditions of urban citizens. The truth is that there are significant differences between regions, states, cities, and even between slums in one city.

## ECONOMY: PROS AND CONS OF INFORMAL SECTOR

Slums, poverty and the informal sector are closely related. (UN-Habitat 2003: 57)

Politically, the informal sector, in the absence of enforced labor rights, is a semifeudal realm of kickbacks, bribes, tribal loyalties and ethnic exclusion.

(Davies 2006: 185)

The informal sector creates many of the jobs needed by the growing work force and compensates for much of the formal sector's failure to provide goods and services.

(UN-Habitat 2003: 102)

Demand for jobs, services, and housing in the DW's cities has been growing so rapidly that formal economic sector and state has not able to fulfill them. Especially lack of formal employment opportunities is a problem of many cities: most extremely, in many of the cities of sub-Saharan Africa, "formal job creation has virtually ceased to exist" (Davies 2006: 177). In Jakarta, unemployment skyrocketed from 10 to 50 percent as the country was struck with the major economic crisis in 1997. Or, in the 1990s, prolonged instability and violence made local industries flee from Karachi, leaving the city even more impoverished and struck by formal unemployment (UN-Habitat 2003: 212). Unemployment has the worst effect on the young (Rakodi 1993: 209), hence is potentially explosive in conditions of extremely young population of the DW's cities.

Impotency of both public and private economic spheres, however, has found its counterweight in an emergence of huge informal economies that filled the vacuum. Informal economy consists of productions, businesses, and other profit-making processes neither taxed nor regulated or observed by state. Although criminal activities fall into this category, they are only one part of it – and often a marginal part. Most of the informal economy is not connected with violence or illegal commodities, and the only way how

informal businesses differ from formal companies is that they exist outside the framework and formal boundaries defined by the state. Because of its informal nature, business in slums is made on basis of familiarity, family connections and daily contact. Absolute majority of the informal enterprises are small scale (this shows how the “big business” bias that dominated the modernization of the DW was generally flawed). Potential tax return is too low for the state offices to take trouble in registering them, so they remain outside its focus. The sector produces a colorful complex of goods and services ranging from the most basic necessities such as water, food, or electricity to more advanced services, shops, and even mass transport (UN-Habitat 2003: 47-8, 70).

Global informal workforce is “the fastest growing and most unprecedented social class on Earth” that consists of one billion human beings (Davies 2006: 178). This is 37 percent of the DW’s urban work force. Formal economy is the weakest in sub-Saharan Africa where 78 percent of urban employment and 42 percent of GDP is provided by informal economy. Globally, 90 percent of additional urban jobs in next decade will be created by informal economy (UN-Habitat 2003: 60). Common pattern is that smaller cities are more informalized than megapolises (Davies 2006: 177). But even many of the capital cities host gigantic informal sectors – in Karachi, for example, 75 percent of the workforce is informal.

The importance of informal sector for survival of hundreds of millions cannot be stressed enough: since the 1980s, “informal survivalism [has become] the new primary mode of livelihood in a majority of Third World cities” (Davies 2006: 178). Goods and services it produces are frequently consumed and utilized by the same slum dwellers, thus the sector is vital for slums not only as a job-creator but also as a supplier. In many cities, 60 percent of jobs and production came from the informal sector (UN-Habitat 2003: 29).

However, informal sector and “survivalism” has its dark side of crime, violence, and exploitation of the weakest – the children and women. Mafias, traffickers, gangs of thugs,

local strongmen, but also predatorial entrepreneurs or corrupt politicians – they all seek to use slums for their benefit. In Beijing, for example, marginalized urban areas serve as a source of cheap child workforce for local sweatshops (Davies 2006: 46). Predatorial entrepreneurs and criminal gangs derive their profits from slums in various ways – they sell or rent buildings or land regardless to whether it is private or public, organize pyramid schemes, do racketeering or many other types of illegal business. Negative aspects of survivalism will be discussed later.

As indicated above, commodities traded within the framework of informal economy include land, houses, and rents. Economically, habitation in slums can be divided into two subgroups. The first consists of squats that originated in mass land invasion or building occupation. In past decades, this sector has shrunk as it is increasingly getting privatized and commercialized by profit-seeking actors. Entry fees/bribes are to be paid to those who control the land – police, politicians, mafia, some traditional authorities, or local strongmen. Other profitable activity is to let squatters cultivate the land and thus increase its value, and then have them evicted. (UN-Habitat 2003: 82-3, 87, 101; Davies 2006: 57-8).

The second type is informal housing with habitants paying rent – this process is informal because it takes place outside the legal framework and ignores official regulations. Currently, it is this sector that is experiencing global boom (UN-Habitat 2003: 59). Common practice is that a private speculator legally buys undeveloped land, then illegally subdivides it and rents or sells it. Informal housing creates its own shadow-market sub-systems (Davies 2006: 40-3, 82-90). Even public land is frequently a subject of this informal market. This seemingly absurd thing – a speculator renting *public* land – usefully demonstrates the scope of corruption, informality, clientelism, and legal anarchy that reigns in the DW. This “slumlordism” is typical above all for Africa and Asia where “urban poor are increasingly the vassals of landlords and developers” (Ibid: 82).

## POLITICAL POWER: SEGREGATION AND VIOLENCE

In general, slums are the products of failed policies, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, dysfunctional land markets... and a fundamental lack of political will. (UN-Habitat 2003: xxxii)

The problem stems from a failure of national and city governments to recognize that their primary reality is one of rapid urbanization; that their primary task is to ensure that jobs, shelter and services are provided. (UN-Habitat 2003: 6)

One of the reasons that slums exist as places of poverty and inadequate services is the absence of political power among their residents. (UN-Habitat 2003: 68)

Economic and demographic changes in the DW proved to be too powerful and rapid for political elites to handle them. In addition, global drive for deregulation and liberalization that characterized the last third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century further hampered any political efforts to handle the issue (Ibid: 6). The sharpest increase in urban poverty and inequality in the DW took place mainly in the 1980s and 1990s, in an era of neo-liberal SAPs. Its “main single cause [was] the retreat of the state” (Ibid: 43). States were unable to provide new parts of cities with adequate services so they left them behind.

Initially, rulers of the newly independent states perceived (in many cases, misperceived) slums as dangerous places to be avoided at all costs. In this era, state policies were based almost exclusively on repression. Common practice was to have squatter settlements evicted and use the land for ambitious projects. Especially countries which were to host some high-profile event, such as the Olympics, frequently “cleaned” the cities of slums. Sometimes, this practice seems so frequent that slum-dwellers perceive themselves as in permanent move, as post-modern nomads. Davies claims that in Burma, about 1.5 million urban citizens (16 percent of the total urban population) were displaced in years 1989-

1994. There were many conflicts and evictions in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin American cities, as local authoritarian regimes viewed slums as political threats. Davies believes that in cases of Argentina ruled by military junta or Pinochet's Chile, there was "counterinsurgency-driven strategy of slum removal...targeted specifically at radicalized self-government in the shantytowns"(Davies 2006: 109). Similar examples could be found in virtually all the DW, but also in many Western states (Davies 2006: 98-114; Devas 1993: 80-2).

On the other hand, there are many states and municipalities which has had rather responsible attitude towards slums – especially in the last two decades (Davey 1993: 161). Cities such as Jakarta, Sao Paulo, or Cairo, not to mention East Asian Tigers, have performed at least partially successful programs of slum improvement. "Informal settlements, where most of the urban poor in developing countries live, are increasingly seen by public decision-makers as places of opportunity... While forced evictions and resettlement still occur in some cities, hardly any governments still openly advocate such repressive policies today" (UN-Habitat 2003: xxvi). However, sometimes these slum-development programs have such obvious clientelist character that it is difficult to view them as "good governance". In this way, for example, slums in Mexico City had been for a long time a power-base of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, deeply corrupt and authoritarian organization that was in power in Mexico for a good part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Connolly: 32).

## SOCIETY: EXCLUSION AND DESPAIR OR SOLIDARITY AND HOPE?

Under these conditions [of insecurity], the capacity to maintain recognizable and usable forms of collective solidarity and collaboration becomes difficult. This collective solidarity has been critical to the way in which traditional societies have been run, particularly those with tribal or strongly family-oriented leanings. (...) In extreme cases, this weakening of traditional norms of behavior can cause societies to become crime or graft ridden as social standards become increasingly threatened... (UN-Habitat 2003: 47)

[P]overty is not a direct cause of crime. Crime is more a consequence of exclusion from social services, education, health care, governance and politics... [T]he extent to which people feel valued, respected and recognized by society determines the extent to which they themselves value society in return. Social exclusion has eroded moral values and broken down social support structures such as the family and the community resulting in individuals and groups being at risk of falling into crime and violence. (Mitullah 2003)

Most slum dwellers are people struggling to make an honest living, within the context of extensive urban poverty and formal unemployment. Slums are also places in which the vibrant mixing of different cultures frequently results in new forms of artistic expression. Out of unhealthy, crowded and often dangerous environments can emerge cultural movements and levels of solidarity unknown in the suburbs of the rich. (UN-Habitat 2003: vi)

Crucially, all the conditions discussed above have negative effect on social cohesion in slum societies (UN-Habitat 2003: 52). In slums, social capital – defined as “long-standing reciprocal trust among neighbors and community members” (UNFPA 2007) – is under heavy pressure. Especially long-time unemployment can be devastating. “The



neighborhoods that suffer high unemployment rates are also likely to suffer from weak social structure, high rates of alcohol consumption, drug abuse, frustrations and violent youth crime” (UN-Habitat 2003: 75). In slums, an ever present feeling is insecurity: insecurity with respect to employment, health, and life, or with respect to the situation of relatives and friends. Feelings of powerlessness, alienation, and general despair are too frequent (Ibid: 76).

As stated above, general life attitude of slum-dwellers is survivalism, as their lives are oriented towards the most basic and urgent need: to stay alive. Davis describes this as a socially degraded dog-eat-dog world that destroys all communal ties, solidarity, and social capital. Survivalism of some and profit-seeking of others brings informal child labor, trade with human transplants, and other types of exploitations. Clientelism reigns as even the most marginal benefits require patronage or protection. The poor often turn to a semi-legal sphere of gambling, lotteries, and pyramid schemes. Broils and conflicts are interpreted in terms of ethnicity, race, or religion. As such, they may lead to sectarian violence (Davies 2006: 183-90).

The major problem of many cities in the DW is violence. In 1989, Montreal Conference of Mayors concluded that violence is caused by urban growth that takes place in the context of insufficient services, unemployment, isolation, and marginalization of the underprivileged and the young. High rates of violence create the atmosphere of insecurity, alienation, intolerance, and eventual degeneration of social coherence. General distrust to the state authority creates cultures of impunity as offenses are rarely reported (Vanderschueren 1996: 96-99).

Rich neighborhoods often separate themselves from slums by raising walls and other security measures: „the fear of crime has changed the nature of cities with a high level of violence, separating social groups, changing the open, interactive nature of the community and enforcing segregation through gated communities and walled enclaves”

(UN-Habitat 2003: 77). In cities where inequality between rich and poor quarters is great but these parts are at the same time geographically close, this trend can evolve into a real „architecture of fear“ (Davies 2006: 115-20).

In these instances, excluded and isolated slum societies feel rejected by “normal” world and react reciprocally by refusing mainstream standards of family, education, carrier, culture, and law. “As unemployment and segregation increases, the strength of the opposition increases”. “Oppositional culture” that emerges in this way leads to crime, violence, and drug use above all among the youth (UN-Habitat 2003: 75). Even when unfounded, rumors and assumptions about “violent slums” can become self-fulfilling prophecy as fear, exclusion, and segregation make anecdotic images of slums become a reality.

In her book *City of Walls*, Teresa Caldeira describes the urban space in Brazil as increasingly militarized. What emerge from this trend are fortified islands, isolated from local social landscape but integrated into global economic flows (Caldeira 2001). In addition to broadening geo-social gap, this trend globally doesn't contribute to urban security as criminals tend to divert their attention to less protected (i.e., poorer) areas of the same city (Vanderschueren 1996: 99). Many other Latin American cities show similar pattern, for example Guatemala City, Guatemala or Bogotá, Colombia.

Equally extreme forms of segregation and isolation can be found in China. Rural migrants found themselves in an unequal relation to urban citizens. Some call this a “caste-like discrimination” (Davies 2006: 169) and „system akin to South Africa’s apartheid“ (Wingfield-Hayes 2006). Often, migrants doesn’t have any legal permission to stay in cities, they don’t exist from the legal point of view which make them an easy “prey”. They often work in dangerous or insanitary conditions on construction sites or sweatshops (Davies 2006: 60). This situation brings a number of negative outcomes, including high number of broken families and high crime rates. The number of Chinese youth criminals

skyrocketed from 33,000 in 1998 to approximately 80,000 in 2007 (Chuanjiao 2007).

Segregation and isolation can be based not only on economic rich/poor distinction, but on racial and ethnic basis as well. From the 19<sup>th</sup> century till the 1990s, Durban had been a place of deep racial segregation with periodic waves of violence. In the period of 1986-92, as the South African Apartheid regime was experiencing a free fall, about 3,000 inhabitants of Durban were killed in politically motivated clashes and masses of people fled to other parts of the city. Currently, the legacy of segregation and culture of violence is still vivid – slums are plagued by crime, general insecurity, and social decay (Thompson 2003).

In their flow to Nairobi and other cities, millions of rural Kenyans carried their ethnic identities with themselves. As a result, the capital city (whose population boomed from 167,000 in 1971 to more than two million at the present) is divided along tribal lines. Poor zones are known for their high rates of violence and criminality. In addition, they already proved to be a strongly destabilizing factor – after the rigged elections in December 2007, rival ethnic gangs clashed in all major cities in Kenya, leaving hundreds of dead. The state authorities were mostly unable to stop it. Some other cities of sub-Saharan Africa have similar ethnically-mixed character: for example, only every fourth inhabitant of Abidjan is of Ivorian origin (Holsti 1999: 298).

In Karachi, Pakistan, traditional urban order based on clan, caste, and religious values was wiped out as the city was invaded by inflow of culturally diverse population expelled from India. Internal order of Karachi has been fragile or virtually inexistent ever since, with frequent outbreaks of ethnic, religious, or political conflicts (Rennie-Short 2004: 51). Recently, there have been riots caused by Benazir Bhutto assassination. Needless to say, high-income parts of the city are well isolated.

In many places, rapid social changes and disruption of traditional societal order gave birth

to completely new spiritual phenomena. Radical religious movements such as Islamism, Pentecostal Christianity, or extremist sects spread their roots in many cities/slums of the DW – from Latin America to Arab world, from India to China (UNFPA 2007). Probably the most destructive case of this “spiritual renewal” can be found in Kinshasa, where long-time overall (economic, political, societal) crisis caused the city’s formal social order to disintegrate into a picturesque mix of “magic”, prophetic cults, violent sects, Pentecostalism, and even Harry Potter-inspired witch-hunts (Davis 2006: 191-5).

Such a grim picture is far from universal, though, as social reality of many slums is quite acceptable. Even in places of general decline there are attempts to establish some grass-root self-help structures (Mehmet 1995: 139-40). All conflicts can be settled or at least soothed by “[s]ystems of patronage, justice and governance [that] discourage violence by producing stable expectations regarding different groups’ shares of land, power and income. As long as those expectations are met, societies tend to remain politically stable” (Goldstone: 354). This scheme works in many slums.

In Delhi, India, traditional communal order of Indian villages combined with modern new measures into a safety web based on solidarity of the poor. Some poor parts of Delhi have even autonomous judiciary systems (Jha 2005: 10-11). Autonomous colonies are to be found in all major urban hubs in the DW, such as in Mexico City (Pacione 2001: 567-8). In slums with grassroots social control, crime rates are usually low. Survivalism, although it can have merciless Hobbesian character, is often rather based on solidarity and kinship (Rakodi 1993: 214-5).

UN-Habitat reminds that “informal settlements carry much of the atmosphere of the rural communities from which they have stemmed. It is this rural imprint that gives them their unique, lively character, without the separations between home, work place and recreation that is the hallmark of ‘modern’ and middle-class society” (UN-Habitat 2003: 26). This is to say that in context of post-modern individualist urban societies, some slums can serve

as outdoor museums of solidarity and community. In fact, many slums really are former villages encroached by spreading industrial and urban zones. This trend is typical especially for East and South East Asia. “Kampong”, Indonesian word for slum, means “village” (McCarthy 2003: 1), Chinese name for slum means “village in a city” (The Economist 2007).

Jakarta and Cairo can serve as examples of two giant cities with relatively peaceful slums. Due to Indonesia’s ethnically, linguistically, and religiously (Christian minorities) diverse population, Jakarta has become a virtual melting pot of peoples. Somehow, slum populations managed to remain rather homogenous and peaceful, united by solidarity of the poor. In poor parts of Jakarta, ethnic cleavages seem to have lost their destabilizing and conflict-creating potential they proved to have in rural areas (McCarthy 2003). And even though the poor parts of Jakarta are witnessing general social degradation and collective depression since the economic crisis from 1997, slums have never become dangerous places of violent criminality as in Africa or Latin America.

Very much the same can be said of Cairo. The Egyptian capital has been growing in a rather unfavorable context – rapid and intense demographic changes were paralleled not only by economic problems and poverty but also by political instability, conflicts, and refugee crises spilling over from neighboring countries (Palestine, Sudan, Libya, or Algiers). In spite of this, slums in Cairo remained relatively “open” and generally peaceful. “Unlike many third world cities, violent crime in Cairo is extremely rare” (Sims 2003: 19). Until recently, the city had very homogenous population with no socially excluded minorities. Though in the last few years, state authorities stepped to the policy of segregation and deportation towards Sudanese refugees (Grabska 2006). At the same time, Sudanese youth gangs emerged.

## SUMMARIZATION

This text's aim is to specify the key characteristics of "failed state" and find out which of them can be found in slums as well. In its annual Failed State Index, the US think-tank Fund for Peace uses indicators that constitute "a wide range of elements of the risk of state failure".<sup>1</sup> When applied on the DW's slums, we get following picture (see Chart 1).

Chart 1: Indicators of instability and their presence in slums

<i>Indicators of instability applied on slums</i>	<i>Occurrence</i>
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures	<b>very high</b>
2. Massive Movement of Refugees, Complex Humanitarian Emergencies	average
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia	average
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight	<b>high</b>
5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines	<b>high</b>
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline	<b>very high</b>
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State	<b>high</b>
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services	<b>very high</b>
9. Arbitrary Application of Law, Violation of Human Rights	<b>high</b>
10. Security Apparatus as a "State Within a State"	N/A
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites	N/A
12. Intervention of Other States	N/A

<sup>1</sup> [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3865&page=8](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=8)

We can divide the indicators to groups according to their relevance for the problematic of slums. First, there are three indicators that are absolutely relevant for every slum on the planet without exception, because slums are defined by them. These are: demographic pressure, economic decline, and absence of public services. Slum, defined as “overcrowded and poor urban area without adequate access to public services”, cannot but score high on these three factors.

Second, there are four indicators that are not included in the definition of slums, yet are extremely common. These are: human flight, delegitimization of the state, human rights abuses, and uneven economic development along group lines. As for human flight: many people leave slums because they want to find a better place to live or simply flee violence. As for state delegitimization and human rights abuses: slums are excluded and marginalized areas with rights of their inhabitants ignored or overlooked. As such they are often subjected to interests of powerful individuals or groups. In response, slum-dwellers see state as indifferent at best or oppressive at worst. And finally, as for uneven economic development along group lines: slum-dwellers are often perceived and perceive themselves as specific quasi-“ethnic” group differing from inhabitants of more developed areas. This is only reinforced when population of slum really is ethnically, racially, or religiously different. What results are socially constructed identities that experience radically different levels of prosperity and development.

Third, there are two indicators that are present only in some cities/slums and only to a varying degree: inflow of refugees and group grievances. Previous chapters provided several examples of slums that were forced to accommodate masses of refugees and displaced persons, or slums that are divided because of group grievances based on recent hostile events and/or historical legacies of alleged injustices, atrocities, and exclusion.

Fourth, there are three remaining factors: external intervention, security apparatus functioning as a state within a state, and fractionalization of ruling political elites. These

indicators are rather difficult to be applied on slums, so they are omitted.

This all is, however, quite obvious: slums have some aspects that are traditionally understood as risk-factors with destabilization potential. What is more interesting is to ask: do these aspects proved themselves so? And if so, which of them particularly?

What emerges from analysis presented in previous chapters is not only obvious and sad fact that slums worldwide are places of extreme poverty and despair; in addition, there are three interesting observations that can seem surprising from the point of view of this text's hypotheses. First, in spite of common sense presumptions, millions of impoverished people deprived from basic needs and infrastructure squeezed into small places don't necessarily have to threaten state and social stability in any significant way. Second, those cities that in fact do represent a relatively destabilizing factor are not necessarily the most economically underdeveloped and demographically troubled. Third, rather than by slums, state and international stability seems to be threatened more by rural unrest caused by issues such as warlordism or organized crime, but also by industrial expansion of urban zones into the country (so-called *desakotas* phenomenon). Now, I will examine each of these observations more deeply.

## SLUMS, NOT THE GREATESTS THREAT

We cannot quantify (in)security and (in)stability. However, when imagining an urban area overcrowded with poor, unemployed, and ethnically diverse population in a country that has long tradition of political violence, oppression, and internal conflicts, a commonsensical expectation would be that these urban areas must be undermining social and state stability. Yet, although Jakarta matches exactly this scenario, this city is far from unstable. Unlike many cities in Africa or Latin America, Jakarta didn't witness in recent years any major waves of political or criminal violence. There weren't any serious disturbances linked to Muhammad cartoon controversy in Jakarta, for example (the same



could be said of other Muslim megacities such as Cairo or even Karachi).

Of course, there is a world-wide report of political crises caused or significantly contributed to by frustration of the urban/slum poor. For example, impoverished masses in Teheran were one of the power bases of Ayatollah Khomeini and his Islamic revolution of 1979. Other case is anti-apartheid movement, which Davies calls “the most significant shantytown uprising in world history” (Davies 2006: 58-60). But these and other events were mere activist movements aimed at reaching political change and even though they usually brought short-time anarchy, they rarely caused state-wide and society-wide collapse.

On the other hand, there exists a phenomenon capable of fast and dramatic destabilization that is at the same time inseparably linked to urban zones – terrorism. But although it is doubtlessly reinforced by urban poverty and disillusion, it cannot be seen as originating solely from urban/slum problems. Causes of this complex problem are to be searched for in many different fields – psychology, sociology, politics, religion. Current global wave of terrorism is much more a result of post-9/11 events rather than flawed urbanization. A link between slums and terrorism is rather minor.

One of the very few cases of a state authority collapsing because of uncontrollable slums is Kenyan post-electoral crisis of December 2007 and January 2008. Background factors of this crisis were negative economic and demographic conditions, weak state, and, most importantly, ethnically fragmented population. Nonetheless, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa and given the overall conditions of the country, it can be argued that the crisis was a *relatively* minor one. Common sense tells us that in an overcrowded and poor sub-Saharan city of four millions bitterly divided along tribe lines, a little spark of ethnic dispute could easily cause general chaos and genocide. Yet, post-election chaos lasted only two months and ethnic clashes left no more than 1,000 dead – indisputably a tragedy, but a minor one if compared to massive and prolonged African catastrophes in Rwanda,

Congo, or, most recently, Sudan. It is characteristic that these bloodbaths took place predominantly in rural areas (Rwanda is urbanized from less than 10 percent).

Fall of Lebanon into the civil war in the 1970s is another example of slum-driven state collapse. But in this case, destabilization took place because Palestinian immigrants to Beirut were militarized radicals – their status of slum-dwellers was of lesser importance. The civil war in Lebanon was caused by politically-motivated antagonisms and while urban poverty was one of the factors that intensified the violence, it was not primary cause. This issue will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Another example of a country whose stability is threatened by restive cities/slums is Pakistan, as proved recently by violent urban riots related to Islamabad Red Mosque events or Benazir Bhutto assassination. However, it is uncontrollable rural areas, not slums that make this country a failed state. The same can be said about other urban agglomerations, such as Mexico City. The Mexican capital has some extremely violent slums, which are nonetheless of minor importance to the country's stability if compared to the northern border regions plagued with drug-traffickers' violence or restive populations in the south.

In sum, slum-driven state-failure or state-collapse (not a political coup or revolution) is quite rare phenomenon and rural areas still remain primary source of instability in the world of today. In spite of them scoring quite high on “indicators of instability”, slums and one billion of people living in them have been threatening state and societal stability in a surprisingly low degree – so far.

There are numerous ways to explain this. A realist would say that slums, in fact, do suffer from high rates violence and anarchy, but these vices remain hidden since their nature is for some reason rather implosive than explosive. Often, as UN-Habitat informs, “slum dwellers are not a threat to the larger city, but are themselves victims of urban crime and

related violence“ (Un-Habitat 2003: XXVIII). Instability remains inside as slums “gluttonize” on themselves. Slums can be easily isolated and controlled by state authorities and ignored by “normal” society – as they frequently are. Another explanation could be based on old wisdom that society is likely to rebel not in times of absolute material misery and absence of economic growth, but rather when growth doesn’t meet the expectations of the masses. That would mean that major urban unrest is still ahead in the DW.

However, in explaining relative peacefulness of most of the world’s slums, we cannot omit the positive impact of cities in general. After all, “social scientists have long recognized that cities provide exceptional opportunities for entrepreneurship, creativity and the generation of wealth” (Gizewski, Homer-Dixon 1995). Cities offer nothing less than a hope for better life - without it, urbanization would have never existed. Even slums are frequently places of hope rather than of despair. This is largely due to informal sector’s capability to provide even the poor with a very basic livelihood and fulfill their essential needs in this way. That’s why slums can retain some sort of social cohesion even when formal sector and state are unable to accommodate their needs. Informal sector has the most positive effect when combined with webs of autonomous systems of social order - an establishment already existing in many slums. Activities of NGOs and public state policies can contribute too, but only when carefully targeted, projected, and managed. Otherwise, they are likely to have no or negative effect. Also, criminal groups or armed political groups should be prevented from influencing informal sector and autonomous social structures.

## RISK FACTORS: SEGREGATION, EXCLUSION, GROUP GRIEVANCES

Those cities that are threatened by restive and violent slums are often relatively well-off. How come? Why, for example, favelas in a globalized prosperous city such as Sao Paulo suffer from violence, crime, and anarchy that much that federal army has been repeatedly sent in to restore order? And why a much poorer city such as Cairo has surprisingly peaceful slums?

Demographics of both cities aren't very different – they both have approximately 20 million inhabitants, their population is extremely young, and they both are currently growing through natural increase rather than immigration. According to UN-Habitat, “at least one quarter of the population is poor by any standards and another quarter is on the margins of poverty” in Cairo (Sims 2003). Sao Paulo, because of its higher economic development, is likely to have lower rates of poverty than Cairo. Both states acknowledge the problem of slums and try to solve it, yet Brazil with its advanced economy has more resources to do so.

Both states experienced periods of dictatorships and political turmoil. However, Egypt waged several wars and is surrounded by ethno-religious conflicts in Palestine, Sudan, and Algiers that naturally concern Arabic Muslim population of Egypt. Cairo even accommodated one million Arabs evacuated from Suez Canal in 1967-73 and two millions expelled from southern Sudan. Sao Paulo/Brazil hasn't experienced any similar events.

It is clear that on demographic level, the two cities don't differ too much, and Sao Paulo seems to be favored in economic, political, and other circumstances. To at least partially explain the different character of slums in the two cities, we need to analyze the layer of society.

Situation in Sao Paulo is determined by the continent's history. Spanish and Portuguese rule over Latin America was purely feudal, authoritarian, and rigid. Independence movements in the first two decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century were led by conservative and reactionary white Creole elites. While the USA was fighting for its independence under the revolutionary banner of antimonarchism, liberalism, and freedom, Latin American „emancipation“ was nothing more than a secession. The social order of inequality and exclusion based on racial and economical basis prevailed and decades that followed were marked by economic decline, anarchy, and dictatorships. The most stable Latin American country of that era was Brazil, which was – symptomatically – a monarchy. Finally, the Great Depression brought in a crisis that ultimately destroyed the medieval character of the continent (Wiarda, Harvey 2007: 17-32; Tortella 2007: 62, 66-7). Such a legacy cannot be easily dismissed, as „[m]ost Latin American countries are still struggling to overcome this feudal past“ (Wiarda, Harvey 2007: 20). For example, Paulo Vanucchi, Brazilian Human Rights Minister recently complained that violations of human rights in his country are „institutionalized“ because of military regime and 300 years of slavery (Barrionuevo 2007).

Insecurity that is rampant in many Latin American cities as well as rural areas is an outcome of this historical development. And Sao Paulo, with its strong segregation, exclusion, inequality, low degree of social mobility, and violent crime is no exception. In spite of aspiring to the status of the Latin America's most prosperous city, Sao Paulo experiences social problems mere economic growth and public policies cannot solve (Devas, Rakodi 1993: 14-6).

On the contrary, Cairo is an open touristically attractive international city with a rather cosmopolitan character and history that contrasts with colonial cities such as Sao Paulo. As such, Cairo has much more homogenous population with few excluded minorities. Poverty in Cairo, even though grave, is not spatially concentrated as poor households mix with middle and upper class houses. Sunni Islam too is a factor that promotes solidarity

and unity in Cairo (the same may cover Jakarta, too).

It is in this remarkable solidarity and openness – rather than in economic or demographic factors – where lies the main reason why Cairo with its 13 million inhabitants living in poor informal urban areas classifiable as slums is doing surprisingly well. Although slums of Cairo were source of some unrest in years of the city’s dynamic boom and in the beginning of the 1990s there was a wave of Islamist incidents, Cairo has never in its history degenerated to hellish levels of Bogotá in the 1980s or many Brazilian or South African slums today. And only thanks to this apparent social cohesion, the city managed to withstand refugee crises and civil wars it has always been affected by.

What is important is that in modern Egypt there have been revolutions, political violence, but never a civil war. In spite of internal conflicts in neighboring states that inescapably spilled to Egypt, the very country has witnessed no eruption of *mass* hostilities among its citizens, nor drastic segregation along ethnic lines. The same cannot be said Brazil and other Latin American states with their authoritarian exclusions and “dirty wars”. The same cannot be said of South Africa with its decades of segregation and subsequent violent anti-Apartheid struggles. And the same cannot be said of Pakistan, Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan, and a score of other states.

There is, however, one exception confusing this argument: relatively peaceful Jakarta, the capital of a country that has suffered from many rural-based ethnic conflicts. The city – mainly thanks to the informal measures social control (UN-Habitat 2003: 76) – managed to function as a proverbial melting pot.

We can however find economic reasons too, especially the fact that even the poorer parts of population of Cairo benefited from tourism. Even more helpful were foreign remittances sent by Egyptians working in Persian Gulf countries. In 1974, oil boom in OPEC Gulf countries created a call for gastarbaiters, which many in Egypt answered.

Their remittances brought a boom of informal housing (Davies 2006: 58; UN-Habitat 2003: 206). This should be perceived as a generally positive trend, since this slum-creation was based on the poor people's opportunity, rather than necessity or desperation. Slums that had emerged in this way didn't degenerate as the boom concluded in the 1980s and remained generally "slums of hope". On contrast, Nigeria experienced similar oil exports-driven growth in 1970, and many – foreigners included – came to Ibadan, boosting unplanned urbanization. However, the boom didn't last and "slums of hope" deteriorated eventually (UN-Habitat 2003: 211).

Among more significant causes is also migration of Egyptians to Europe and Gulf: there are four million Egyptians (five percent of population) living abroad, while Brazilian and Pakistani diasporas equal only two million (less than one percent of population) and four million (2.5 percent) respectively.<sup>2</sup> Naturally, migration ease demographic pressure of the country the people move from. It needs to be remembered though that it may at the same time destabilize the host country, as proved by the case of immigration from Mexico to the USA. While in Mexico, the human flow eased demographic pressure and Mexicans working in the USA eventually supported domestic economy by their remittances, many states of the USA experienced rise of immigrants' criminality. Most extremely, Los Angeles had become "the third largest Mexican city" (Canclini 258) and Latin American immigrants contributed to interethnic tensions that eventually exploded in 1992.

Also, it was crucial that Egypt was reluctant to accept and accommodate refugees from Gaza. Were Egypt to ease demographic pressure in the region by accepting several hundred of thousands of impoverished Palestinians with their militant anti-Israeli grievance, the possibility of Lebanon-style destabilization would arise. Mubarak's *mano dura* approach contributes to stability too.

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<sup>2</sup> Egypt: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/839/eg1.htm>

Brazil: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=311>

Pakistan: <http://www.opf.org.pk/opd/yearbk/YEARBK.pdf>

What needs to be taken in account too is that the assertion provided by UN-Habitat's case study of Cairo from 2003 that "violent crime in Cairo is extremely rare" (Sims 2003: 19) was probably rather exaggerated; also, since 2003, the situation in Cairo has developed towards more instability, as the situation of Sudanese refugees deteriorated and slums are yet again viewed as breeding ground of Islamism. In spite of this, the city remains relatively peaceful, and it is mostly due to its social coherence.

To sum it up, in addition to quantifiable economic and demographic measures such as number of inhabitants, pace of immigration and emigration, poverty, the Human Development Index, GDP, or sums donated to infrastructure programs, there are also other factors that are necessary when analyzing slums. It is above all historical, social, and political context of urbanization and slum-creation. Frequently, people have been driven from rural areas to cities not only due to economic and demographic factors, but also by civil wars, authoritarian oppression, criminal violence, or general anarchy. Slums that emerged from this process tend to suffer from higher rates of violence, crime, and insecurity, not to mention segregation based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences.

That's the explanation why the most crime-ridden and uncontrollable slums are to be found not only in underdeveloped and demographically booming regions in Tropical Africa, but as well in globalized cities of economically more promising and demographically more stabilized states such as Brazil or South Africa. Bogotá, Guatemala City, Karachi, Central African cities, Durban, Gaza, and other places are so sinister and volatile not because of rapid urbanization or deep poverty, but rather because these cities grew within the context of long-time criminal, political, or ethnic violence, exclusion, and wars.



For example: Central America, Mexico, and some US cities are currently tormented by violence of youth gangs of Central American origin, which is the legacy of civil wars and expulsions that took place in the 1980s much more than a result of economic depression. Turmoil in slums in some relatively prosperous Arabic states, or ethnic riots in major Western cities such as LA (1992), Sydney (2004), and Paris (2005) are rooted in religious, political, and ethno-social problems much rather than in mere poverty or material degradation.

Chart 2: Indicators of instability and their effect on slums

<i>Indicators of instability applied on slums</i>	<i>Occurrence</i>	<i>Risk factor</i>
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures	<b>very high</b>	
2. Massive Movement of Refugees, Complex Humanitarian Emergencies	average	<b>high</b>
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia	average	<b>high</b>
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight	<b>high</b>	
5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines	<b>high</b>	<b>high</b>
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline	<b>very high</b>	
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State	<b>high</b>	
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services	<b>very high</b>	
9. Arbitrary Application of Law, Violation of Human Rights	<b>high</b>	
10. Security Apparatus as a "State Within a State"	N/A	N/A
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites	N/A	N/A
12. Intervention of Other States	N/A	N/A

For the same reason, even economically less favored cities such as Cairo or Jakarta can be relatively peaceful in spite of material misery – because their socio-political conditions are relatively promising. The example of French riots in 2005 usefully shows the importance of social layer: there was striking contrast between explosive Parisian suburbs and remarkable peacefulness of Arab minority in Marseilles. It emerged that ethnic minorities in Marseilles are segregated much less than in Paris. Interestingly, Arab rappers in Marseilles are known to use melancholic and non-aggressive lyrics, unlike their Parisian colleagues whose hostile texts poured oil into the riots. (Kimmelman 2007).

Currently, all major disturbances in the DW's cities originate from ethnic hostilities. Food riots that took place in almost all of the DW at the beginning of 2008 were often very wild and violent, but none of them resulted into a long-term state failure. It is no wonder that the only recent case of slum-riots powerful enough to shake with a state took place in Kenya, a country somewhat economically promising given the regional average but deeply and bitterly divided along tribal lines – a cleavage that has not ceased with flow to cities/slums.

Slums are inseparable from economic and demographic problems, but these are not the main causes of instability, because problems of poverty and unemployment can be addressed by informal economy and autonomous systems of social control. Instability in slums is likely to be rooted rather in segregation, group animosities, and other social maladies (See Chart 2).

## RURAL WORLD COLONIZED BY CITIES

In addition to the slum-creation, urbanization has other problematic side-effects. More advanced parts of the DW are now witnessing a new trend in urban growth. Pacione explains that “as metropolitan development accelerates, private capital begins to deconcentrate to areas within the metropolitan region but outside the main city in order to

avoid rising land prices, labor costs and negative externalities such as traffic congestion” (Pacione 2001: 444).

Fine example of this trend is Jabotabek, a giant region of more than 20 million inhabitants constituted by Jakarta and three of its neighbors - Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. More distant areas that surround the industrial core have mixed rural-urban character, because they are a place where agriculture meets offshore-funded industries and modern infrastructure. This new global phenomenon blurs traditional distinction between the rural and urban. In this case, urbanization is not made by rural population moving to cities, but rather by cities spreading to rural areas. Indonesian term *desakota* (desa = village, kota = town) is already recognized as a relevant concept of post-modern urbanism. Desakota is a zone of neither urban nor rural character, without definite cores and peripheries (Pacione 2001: 443; Davies 2006: 9-10). Desakotas are usually former villages encroached by cities that often have the same function as slums (The Economist 2007).

In China, this trend has already grown into something very grim. In last 20 years, urban economic boom has consumed 16 million acres in Chinese rural areas, used mainly as construction sites for houses or factories. Land is confiscated with a very questionable legality, usually with involvement of corrupt local officials. In addition to these injustices, rural population in China is enraged by police brutality, corruption, garbage dumped massively in their areas, pollution, and other environmental damage, poverty, and unemployment. Rural parts of China that are being “colonized” by cities in this way now resemble the DW’s worst slums (Wingfield-Hayes 2006; Davies, 2006: 91). Every year, the frustration of hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants erupts in thousands of incidents, ranging from interpersonal disputes with officials to massive and violent protests. The regime is able to suppress these protests only because they are isolated from each other. Recent rural protests in Mexico are inseparable from this problematic too, because they are linked to issues such as environmental damage or land expropriation.

## CONCLUSION

Gizewski and Homer-Dixon (1995) argue that “by itself, urban growth is quite benign. However, in interaction with other factors, such as economic crises and a weak state, urban growth appears much more likely to contribute to violence.” Although this is generally true, examples of Jakarta or Cairo show that even sharp urban growth accompanied by economic problems, poverty, and insufficient public services doesn’t have to lead to mass violence and instability. That’s the first and the most important finding of this text: in spite of material hardships, the majority of one billion inhabitants of the DW’s slums managed to establish some sort of informal order that prevents their societies from falling into anarchy. Core of this autonomous order is informal economy.

In spite of this, there are cases of mass urban/slum disorder and instability. However, they arise more from various social problems than from economic and demographic factors. Although material problems without question pour oil on their flame, these cases of mass violence are far from mere food riots or similar economic conditions-related disturbances. In slums that carry atmosphere of a group animosity, segregation, and exclusion, economic hardships are interpreted in ethnic, racial, or religious terms. In Kenya, tribal divisions inside slums recently exploded, paralyzing the state. On the other hand, in cities with better social coherence, effective informal social order, and functioning informal economy, material problems tend to be solved or at least reduced by communal work. That’s why, for example, slums of Jakarta avoided sliding into anarchy after the country was struck by the economic crisis in 1997.

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