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Poles and Poland as the Others as voiced
by the German media

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Introduction

Different theories on dependencies of media, public opinion and politics in democracies exist but it is clear that these fields are interconnected (e.g. Brand, 2013; Key, 1961; Weber, 2002; see also Wodak, 2001). Since media reporting contextualizes topics, evaluates them and reaches a high number of persons, it influences political decision making (Brand, 2013; Weber, 2002). This is connected to the impact media has on public opinion, as it was shown in the case of attitudes about the war in Iraq. In this study, the opinions of students from the Middle East, Asia and Europe were dependent on their consumed media (Willnat et al., 2006). In the mid of the 20th century specifically foreign policy was assumed to be independent from public opinion (“Almond-Lippmann consensus”), but this assumption changed as a result of massive protests against the Vietnam War and new researches in the 1970s (Holsti, 1992). Key (1961) argued that public opinion does shape policies and researchers found in general supporting evidences for this, but the conditions for it to occur remain debatable (Shapiro, 2011). Therefore, the causal effects between public opinion and policies are still an issue for academical research (Shapiro, 2011). Hence, because of the interdependencies of media, public opinion and politics, an analysis of media discourses informs also about social and political issues.

In the present work, the changing discourse in Germany about Poland is examined, with the aim to reveal reasons for political and societal conflicts between them. In order to do this, two periods of three weeks each in main German print media are examined. The discourse is analysed on the basis of the concepts Othering and Belonging, which are in the following considered to be opposite concepts (see Barkey, 2018). Othering is a concept stemming from the works of different philosophers, like Husserl (1960) who discusses how the other is perceived, or Hegel (2012) who argues that the self needs the other in order to define itself. The concept gained relevance as it was helpful to describe and analyse discrimination (de Beauvoir, 2011; Said, 1978). It is the social process of identifying an opposite as not belonging to the self, which is seen as the basis for racism or female oppression, and their partially dreadful consequences (see Brons, 2015; Hegel, 2012; Powell & Menendian, 2015). Examples for the terrible realisation of Othering can be found in the German-Polish history, such as the horrific crimes against Polish people based on the German belief of racial superiority during the Second World War. As these cases show, Othering occurs often in circumstances of power inequalities, when a more powerful group is shaping a discourse about a less powerful group. De Beauvoir

(2011) considers it to be a practice which only can be conducted by the side which possesses the greater power (see also Staszak, 2008). When the Other for the man is the woman it does not imply that the Other for the woman is the man (de Beauvoir, 2011). That is because the man can exist without being in a relation to the woman - in contrast to the woman which is defined by her relationship to the man - and the woman does not possess the power to define or impose categories on the man (de Beauvoir, 2011). Following these thoughts, the present analysis takes the perspective of one country only, of the country which traditionally has the hegemonial position in the relationship, Germany.

Othering is also seen as the basis for colonialism and its discursive mechanisms can frequently be found in colonial and postcolonial discourses (Hall, 1997; Said, 1978). The times of German occupations of Polish territories are discussed as colonial-like periods with colonial discourses (Kopp, 2012). Hence, the German-Polish relations were characterized by power inequalities, and, on a different level, also nowadays this inequality persists. Notwithstanding the negative implications of Othering, it is also regarded as an important process for self-identification and self-positioning in a society (Elmore, Smith, & Oyserman, 2018; Tajfel, 1981). It is seen as essential for the development of an understanding of the other, and as a necessary tool to produce meaning (Bakhtin, 1981; Brons, 2015). Othering is such a general social process relevant for the identity formation, that it occurs in different occasions and academic debates, its theoretical foundations can e.g. be found in social-psychology and philosophy. Many of the research projects in which Othering of a particular group was examined focussed on distinctive and prototypical cases, like Othering because of race (Hall, 1997) or of immigrant minorities (Haldrup, Koefoed, & Simonsen, 2006; Kamenova, 2014). These critical studies have been especially valuable to reveal the extent of discrimination in the time of their production, however, an exclusive focus on extreme cases leads to a distorted understanding of the phenomenon, which actually occurs also in everyday or minor conflict situation. Furthermore, the present case is a contribution to the understanding of Othering and Belonging. The strong collective identity the countries have as European states and as members of both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allows to observe different stages. Analysing Othering and Belonging in a comparative study can inform about the volatility of grouping somebody as belonging to the self or to the other (categorisation) as well as it informs us about the modifiability of judgements about other groups (characterisation). There are various countries which might represent more constitutive or significant others for Germany, however, this case is chosen because of its historical and current political significance.

This political significance is especially reasoned in the changes occurring in Poland in 2015, which were a result of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, short: PiS) gaining power in Poland. The change of government was followed by a deterioration of the German-Polish relation which represented a considerable turn, since the cooperation with the previous Polish government led by the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, short: PO) was characterized as a partnership (Lang, 2011). Several developments have caused this deterioration. At first, contrasting positions on the question of how to deal with the refugee crisis occurred. While the PiS-government was reluctant to accept any (Muslim) refugees¹ Angela Merkel's proclamation "Wir schaffen das!" ("We can do it!") was interpreted as a symbol for a welcoming refugee policy, underlining the will to integrate a large number of asylum seekers. Secondly, significant reforms of the Polish state, especially in relation to its constitutional court and, in 2016, to the public media, led to debates about a decline of democracy. Thirdly, anti-German statements by leading Polish politicians induced disgruntlement on the German side. Despite the immense changes, the current discourse regarding Poland has not been analysed in a comprehensive manner. For those reasons the following research questions are posed:

1. How have Poland and Polish people been discursively represented in German print media?
2. Has the political change in Poland from the Civic Platform liberal-democratic coalition into the Law and Justice anti-liberal and anti-democratic conservative coalition in 2015 influenced these discursive representations? And if so, how can this be explained?

The propositions following from these thoughts are firstly, that the representation is constructed within the axis of Othering and Belonging. This is reasoned in the complex German-Polish history in which Othering of the latter dominated, but also in their current commonalities and their shared memberships in different organizations. Secondly, the Polish change in government in 2015 has induced an Othering discourse in German print media. To take a look on these developments with the lens of Othering is especially important because of the far-reaching influences Othering has and specifically had in the relation of the two countries.

¹ The governing coalition of PO and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe was willing to accept around 7,000 refugees, but the succeeding government, consisting of PiS, Solidarna Polska and Polska Razem, rejected this, mainly justifying it with security concerns (Länder-Analysen, 2016).

Moreover, it can inform about the basis of political disputes and the importance of the political dimension of identity. It shows which conflicts and categorizations are used for a political Othering. Lastly, it opens up the questions which actors Other and which actors are Othered: In which newspaper can Othering be found? And, is it only conducted in relation to the responsible figures or is it generalized to the country and its people?

To address these questions and hypotheses, a comparative discourse analysis of a three weeks' time period in 2014 and a three weeks' time period in 2015/2016 is conducted. The first time frame covers the period from the 30th of April 2014 to the 22nd of May 2014, a time in which the 10th anniversary of the EU enlargement as well as the campaigning for the European parliamentary elections took place. This phase has been chosen since Othering and Belonging are often discussed in the EU context and these events put this context into focus (see Kuus, 2004; Tekin, 2010). The second period, from the 21st of December 2015 to the 14th of January 2016, refers to a time when the multifaceted conflict between the countries was intensifying. In this period, the media and judicial reforms have been implemented in Poland. These reforms led to critical responses from EU officials, inter alia, the idea of introducing the rule of law procedure against Poland was expressed. Meanwhile, the debate about the distribution of refugees in the EU was still on-going. Certainly, the analysed discourse does not always thematize the meta-issue of Poland's belonging to the EU and the West, but evaluates its membership or characterises its society as similar or distant. The research also includes the representation of people from a Polish descent living or staying for a short time in Germany, to analyse whether the political changes lead to a general changed perception and representation of persons associated with Poland.

The reason for the choice for a discourse analysis as the methodology lies in a constructivist perspective which acknowledges the relevance of discourses as social interactions (Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, 2018). Since social identities and images of others are mainly constructed through social exchange and languages, a discourse analysis is an adequate methodology to research these fields. This study incorporates several features from the discourse-historical approach which was developed by Wodak and Reisigl (2000; see also Wodak, 2001). Written (and spoken) language is understood as a form of social practice, and discourses are seen as influencing social and political structures as well as institutions but are likewise influenced by these structures (Reisigl & Wodak, 2000). Hence, Othering is not only conducted in discourses but also produced and reinforced by them. It is an abductive approach, meaning it aims neither at theory testing nor building, but aims at possible theoretical implications which can be derived

from observations (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). For the discourse-historical approach the various contextual information – the history, the (current) social-political situation and the textual information – is used, to produce a comprehensive picture on the discourse object, in the present case Poland's image in Germany (Wodak, 2018). The analysis is conducted with sensitivity to historical analogies. This is because intergroup conflict is significantly influenced by historical relations and the historical relation between the countries examined is difficult, especially regarding Othering and Belonging. The discourse-historical approach was specifically devised to research intergroup conflicts, as it was developed to analyse anti-Semitism in Austria (Wodak, 2001). The approach can be understood as a Critical Discourse approach, in its attempt to reveal social problems and power structures. As media have the power to shape discourses, and are a place where discourses can be easily observed, media analyses are a very relevant subject in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992). Furthermore, the analysis of the discourse about Poland drawing on media data is justified by the influence media has, specifically on the attitudes in Germany about Poland (Łada, 2016). Because many Germans have little direct contact to Poland and Poles, it is likely that their main information about the country stems from written texts in newspapers, various online sources as well as TV or radio reports (Łada, 2016; van Dijk, 2000).

The paper is structured as follows. In the first chapter Othering and Belonging are examined. Secondly, the concepts are operationalized, the selection of data is justified and preliminary findings are presented. Thirdly, the main findings of the media analysis are discussed, as there are: historical arguments as a form of Othering, the belonging of Poland to the West or the East and the representation of persons of a Polish descent in Germany. Lastly, the findings, and the differences between the newspapers over time, are discussed and the paper concludes by answering the research questions.

1. Othering as a key discursive mechanism of perception and representation

The theoretical basis of the concept Othering lies in philosophy, e.g. in Husserl's phenomenology or in the Hegelian dialectic. Husserl (1960) elaborated on intersubjective philosophical theory. He posed the question, how the ego can develop a conception of non-self entities, as the self perceives the outside world and the other not only as perceptions, but as parts of the real world (Arthur David Smith, 2005). Simultaneously, the other experiences the self, and both, the self and the other, are conscious about this mutuality (Husserl, 1998 as cited in Prole, 2018). Husserl sees Othering as an inner process, naming everything which is not the I, the self, as other; which may also refer to the inner consciousness (Crowell, 1996). Also Sartre (1993) studied the relationship between the other and the self, and focussed the influences of the existence of the Other for the self. He stated that the mere appearance of an opposite results in giving him or her the power to objectify the self, and this leads to the self realizing its own objectivity (Sartre, 1993).

Also for the Hegelian dialectic, the mere appearance of an opposite is essential: The self can only reach a form of self-awareness in distinction to other subjects (Hegel, 2012). This master-slave dialectic has also been understood in relation to ideas, underlining that ideas are contextual and need contradictions to receive meaning (Maybee, 2019). The view, that differentiations and oppositions are necessary in a language to produce meaning, was shared by Bakhtin (1981). He underlines the relevance of differentiations, and argues that differences are neither positive or negative as such (Bakhtin, 1981). They are needed to construct social and cultural identities as well as meanings in a general sense. This describes Bakhtin (1981) as dialogism: Words can acquire their definition and explication only in relation and differentiation to other words. Hall (1997) exemplifies it with social categories, such as nationalities. They are defined through characteristics one can possess, like a mother tongue, but likewise through negations. A nationality is defined as a non-nationality: To be German means not to be French or Polish (Hall, 1997). He argues that meaning refers to binary oppositions, like female and male. Also in Said's "Orientalism", the construction of meaning as a result of binaries becomes evident. Only through the distinction between Orient and Occident the terms receive a meaning (Said, 1978). The philosopher Derrida (1981, p. 41) states that binaries can never be neutral, as always one term is defined as more positive and more powerful than the other: "[o]ne of the two terms governs the other". This opposition of binaries can only be overcome by overcoming the hierarchies (Derrida, 1981).

Brons (2015) discusses the Hegelian dialectic in relation to the self. The self needs the other to reach self-awareness, a process Brons (2015) calls “sophisticated Othering”. In a meeting of two individuals or groups, the self always interprets and evaluates the other and its behaviour (Brons, 2015). In the attempt to understand the other, the self uses general assumptions, which stem from its personal views and experiences. The self expects that these assumptions which are true for the self are also true for the other (Brons, 2015). Accordingly, it assumes comprehensive similarities between itself and the other and thus interprets the behaviour of the other according to its own standards. This process of transferring your own standards and conclusions to somebody else often leads to false assumptions, because the arguments of the self might not be valid for the other, and the derived negative attributions are conclusively wrong (Brons, 2015). These assumptions and the connected attributions are a result of a lack of knowledge about the other and its background. Consequently, this process of seeing the self in the other and deriving assumptions about the others’ character and reasoning, can lead to the social separation of groups.

Precisely this separation of groups and its excluding implications is what is nowadays often understood by the term Othering (e.g. Powell & Menendian, 2015; Staszak, 2008; Thomas-Olalde & Velho, 2012). Powell and Menendian (2015, p. 17) emphasize the negative consequences Othering often has and define Othering “a set of dynamics, processes, and structures that engender marginality and persistent inequality across any of the full range of human differences based on group identities.” However, taking the philosophical reflections about the self and the other into account, the present work defines it more neutrally: *Othering is a social process of identifying the self and the other, by which an opposite is identified as not belonging to the self, which can lead to the devaluation of the other person or group.* In order to not deny the negative consequences of the process, also the devaluation is included in the definition. Moreover, because an ambiguous case is researched in the present work, not only is Othering taken into account, but its opposite as well, which is Belonging. Following Powell’s and Menendian’s definition of Othering, Barkey (2018, p. 32) defines Belonging as its opposite, as the “set of dynamics, processes, and structures that make it possible for comprehensive membership in the community of citizens”. Barkey’s juxtaposition of the concepts is adopted in this thesis, which leads to the definition of Belonging as *the process of self- and other-identification by which a counterpart is identified as belonging to the self and being part of the own group, which can lead to the revaluation of the other person or group.*

Social psychology scholars view Othering in the context of intergroup-conflicts, which stem from categorizations and the development of social identities. These processes serve the purposes of self-affirmation and social cohesiveness. Tajfel (1981) focussed on cognitive processes to explain intergroup behaviour. As a way to understand the environment, people need categorizations (Powell & Menendian, 2015). To process the continuous influx of numerous stimuli and information, humans try to connect incoming information with already present knowledge, they categorize them. Categorizations of people according to their personal characteristics into social groups can lead to stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981). Personal characteristics are usually present in infinite forms, meaning they are continuous variables (e.g. height of a person) (Tajfel, 1981). In contrast, categorizations are discontinuous and simplifying, because the number of categories is limited. This necessarily leads to misjudgements; since through the process of grouping persons, differences within a group are underestimated while divergences between groups are overestimated (Tajfel, 1981). Moreover, the categorization of the world is not only relevant to process external stimuli but also to place yourself in the system, into a group, to show where you belong (Tajfel, 1981). According to a social-constructivist approach, this positioning of yourself inside a group and hence the production of your social identity is mainly constructed through social interactions and discourses (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Bucholtz and Hall (2005) exemplified this discursive construction: In languages, which gender verbs, the shifting of the own gender identities can be conducted through re-adjusting the gendered verb-form used for the self; as well as the usage of specific vocabulary indicates the belonging to a social group.

A group can be defined either through external ascriptions, like being the staff of a company, or through internal identifications (Tajfel, 1982). These internal identifications are related to group values, recognition of belonging to the group and an emotional connection with the group (Tajfel, 1981). A positive social identity comes from a positive evaluation of your social group. Since the own social group can only be evaluated in comparison with other groups, the relation with and the assessment of the other are important characteristics of a positive social self-concept (Tajfel, 1981). A negative image of another group (the out-group) can help to construct a feeling of superiority for the own group (the in-group), and thus for the self (Tajfel, 1981). Therefore groups are interested in the presence of others which is inferior (Tajfel, 1981). Because people are profiting psychologically of the felt superiority, they are interested in keeping this status alive. Furthermore, when a prejudice is articulated in a group with like-minded people, the speaker often receives social recognition (Tajfel, 1981). In addition, an intergroup conflict is serving the purpose of increasing the cohesiveness in the in-group; less

academically spoken: to have a common enemy, is a situation which bonds people together (Tajfel, 1981). Since social support from the in-group, an increased group cohesiveness and high self-esteem are psychologically so valuable, prejudices have the tendency to remain for a long time - even when they have proven to be false.

Tajfel (1981) argues that attributions of groups are learned through the same processes as children learn other adjectives (e.g. light and heavy), through copying and social rewarding. That children internalise social grouping and characterizing was proven by many experiments, especially in the USA (Bloom, 2005; Clark & Clark, 1947). Clark and Clark (1947) showed that dark-skinned children, three to seven years old, preferred and played more with white dolls than with black ones. Even though they had no experiences in mixed-racial school contexts, they preferred the white-skinned over the dark-skinned dolls, hence, they devaluated themselves. Also in cases where the categorization and the ascribed characteristics for the categories were new and minimal, children were willing to believe it – and to adapt their behaviour accordingly. The primary school teacher Jane Elliott differentiated her pupils according to their eye-colour and informed them, that persons with brown-eyes had larger brains than the blue-eyed and therefore, the later would never reach the same level of intelligence (Bloom, 2005). In addition, the blue-eyed were supposedly not only lacking intelligence, but also other relevant characteristics necessary for learning. In the beginning, the children were reluctant to believe it; but the brown-eyed perceived a sense of belonging, enjoyed their new felt superiority and made fun about the blue-eyed. Subsequently, the blue-eyed children adapted to the low expectations and performed worse in tests than before (Bloom, 2005). How impressive these experiments might be, the doll experiment of Clark and Clark (1947) could not be replicated at a later point in time (Burnett & Sisson, 1995). Nevertheless, this lack of replication might be reasoned in social developments through the civil right movement and anti-racism efforts, and is not as such a counter-argument against children's fast learning of social groups.

Another consequence of the differentiation between an in- and an out-group is that the in-group is not only perceived more favourably, but also more human (Leyens et al., 2000). Leyens et al. (2000) showed this effect with experiments in which different emotions were attributed to groups; emotions, which are more or less ascribed to humans. The more complex secondary emotions connected to morality, guilt or sorrow, are only ascribed to humans. The simpler primary emotions, on the contrary, are widely assumed to exist also for animals, like rage or surprise (Leyens et al., 2000). Participants of the study ascribed more of these secondary

emotions to the in-group than to the out-group, thus they considered the out-group as *infrahumans* (Leyens et al., 2000). Moreover, persons define (negative) features associated with their own group as “human” (Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012). Hence, people *infrahumanise* the out-group while *suprahumanising* the group where they feel to belong (Vaes et al., 2012). Importantly, the process of *infrahumanization*, which is also known as *dehumanisation*, is a phenomenon not only occurring in extreme situations like war or severe conflict, but also in everyday-perceptions of out-groups (Vaes et al., 2012).

However, it remains to be explained how the choice of the relevant other in those processes take place. Who is opportune and advantageous for a comparison? Firstly, there are more benefits of comparing oneself with a group that is lower in social status as oneself, because this makes proving the superiority of the own group easier (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In order to achieve that, a group marked as inferior in one comparison is likely to change the partner for the next comparison, to minimize the harm for the ingroup esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Secondly, the other is chosen according to its proximity and its resemblance with the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thirdly and evidently, the context of comparison is relevant – while in a history class gender does not play a relevant role, in a sport competition it usually does (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

1.1 The far-reaching consequences of Othering

Othering is seen as the basis for discrimination and the subsequent violence committed against people perceived as other. The categorization to the outgroup has multiple effects specifically when this categorization is not individual but predominant in the society (Powell & Menendian, 2015). This is especially true, when power inequalities between groups exist, as it often occurs in societies with a share of migrants. In these societies, commonly the native inhabitants represent the in-group, while migrants represent one or multiple out-groups. Here the out-group can be disadvantaged in interlinked spheres of life, e.g. discrimination on the housing market can lead to a spatial segregation (Powell & Menendian, 2015). This segregation results in different work and education places, and can therefore create or reinforce inequality (Powell & Menendian, 2015). Another discrimination connected to Othering, is the oppression of women, as it was elaborated by Simone de Beauvoir (2011). One feature of this gender-related Othering is, that men are seen as the norm, while women are not (de Beauvoir, 2011; Jensen, 2011). This Othering also occurred in the legislation, as women in numerous countries

gained voting rights later than men.² In addition to this reduced access of power, women had and have a reduced access to education or good salaries (Equal Measures 2030, 2019).

Othering also represents the reason for a number of violent deeds committed in the last centuries.³ As the categorization into nations or races is a form of Othering, the committed acts reasoned in racism are product and realisation of Othering. Hence, Othering was the basis for colonialism, for slavery of Africans and their descendants, and for the horrors by the Nazis. The perception and belief, that the own race is more worthy than (all) the others, led to oppression of persons who are ascribed to other races, to the imposition of religions and beliefs on others, as well as to the exploitation of persons and their natural environment. Moreover, by assigning lesser value to black people, they could be deprived of their freedom and enslaved. In colonial times as well as in times of slavery the premature death of non-white people was accepted, as a result of overwork, as a punishment or for reasons of cost (Jobs, 2016). That this forms of inhumane behaviour goes hand-in-hand with a colonial discourse can, inter alia, be seen in works of Hall (1997) or Said (1978).

Hall (1997) analysed the representation of black people in Western Europe, from the beginning of the 19th to the end of the 20th century. He finds that the ascription of differences between people of colour and white people as natural, instead of cultural, implies that the boundary between both groups cannot be shifted, they cannot and never could belong to the same group. This setting of boundaries is a “strategy of splitting”, and thus the basis of Othering (Hall, 1997, p. 259). He argues that stereotypes lead to this separation, a separation between normal and abnormal, between civilized and primitive, between culturally accepted and rejected. Subsequently, Hall (1997, p. 249) sees stereotypes as “reduc[ing] [persons] to a few essentials, fixed in Nature by a few simplified characteristics” and describes them as most frequently occurring in unequal power relations. Whereas in his examples and definition, stereotypes only appear in negative forms, other scholars see stereotypes as neutral (Colman, 2015; Lippmann, 1991). Prejudices are academically defined as the negative affects or feelings towards another group, they are negative stereotypes (Anderson, 2010). Consequently, Hall’s notion of stereotypes can be understood as a combination of stereotype and prejudice and is closer connected to the effects negative stereotypes can have. Besides, Hall (1997) finds that

² The legal status of women is still in several countries not equal to the status of men (Equal Measures 2030, 2019).

³ A more recent example is the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar (Shani & Saeed, n.d.).

ranking societies according to their status of being civilised or developed is a tool to prove the own superiority, and is based in the thought-system of the Enlightenment. In this hierarchical system, countries on the African continent are mostly ranked at the lower end of the scale (Hall, 1997).

Said (1978) analyses the image of the Orient in Western Europe and the USA and looks at the function it serves, as it was not only a means to get to know the region, but also to define it and, simultaneously, to define the Occident as its antithesis. The colonial discourses about the so-called Orientals are dominated by motives of Othering with similarities to Halls examples. The superiority of the Westerner (here the Brit) is emphasized as well as the need of Orientals to be ruled and disciplined by Brits (Said, 1978). The Orientals can all be governed in a similar way, since they are perceived as more or less uniform. Furthermore, the British are here also described as being normal and rational, while the Orientals, in the contrary, as being not normal and irrational (Said, 1978). This ascription of the other to be irrational is relevant, as it denies the need of taking the others' perspective in order to understand them.

Also directly connected to the German-Polish historical relations, Othering and its realisation can be found. It occurred in colonial discourses in Germany about Poland, in the realisation of the discourse during the First World War and in the multiple horrific crimes committed by Nazi-Germany. The colonial discourse was connected with the Prussian occupation of mainly Polish inhabited lands (Kopp, 2012). As the occupation needed a justification, a picture of Polish inferiority was created. Frederick the Great, the King of Prussia during the first Polish partition, complained about the lack of order, a situation which he calls different from all the other European regions, and he intended to bring a law system to the "barbarians" (Liulevicius, 2009). During this time, a discourse about Polish people was shaped, which characterized them as being "unable to develop or achieve civilizational progress on their own" and denying their potential to govern themselves (Kopp, 2012, p. 34). Moreover, an image of an uncivilized region, dependent on the influence from the outside, has been drawn (Kopp, 2012). Germans, on the contrary, were ascribed to be called for governing Poles and bringing them culture and education. Those ascriptions of dependency and inferiority lead Kopp (2012) to call this discourse "colonial diffusionist". Also this discourse occurred during the Enlightenment, as it was a period when debates about hierarchies and civilizational status of countries were popular.

One example for this discourse was the novel “Soll und Haben” (Debit and Credit) by Gustav Freytag which was published in the middle of the 19th century and has been classified by Kopp (2012) as a classical colonial story. The main character, Anton, is trading with Poles, who are described as only being able to produce raw materials (Kopp, 2012). Anton calls himself a colonizer, with the task to establish order in this primitive region. Poland⁴ is portrayed as an empty and lawless but adventurous space, a “Wild East” as Kopp (2012) phrases it, referring to similar descriptions of the Wild West in the US-American context. Accordingly, it was considered a region where Germans can and should emigrate to. Additionally, Slavs were seen as a different and “weaker race”, which have been representing an adversary of Germans for a long time, “an old struggle” (Freytag, 1902 as cited in Kopp, 2012, p. 43). Anton explains the assumed superiority of Germans with a higher work ethic, a more advanced economical system, the superior German “Bildung” (meaning education/culture) as well as the Polish inability to found a state (Kopp, 2012). The extent of the novel’s influence can be seen by its inclusion in high school curricula from 1892 onwards, even becoming mandatory literature in secondary schools during the interwar period (Fenske & Groth, 2016).

The implementation of colonial discourse could well be observed during the First World War in the region Ober-Ost (located in territory of nowadays Latvia, Lithuania, North-Western Belarus and North-Eastern Poland). As it was under military rule, the Germans could carry out their missions in spreading (German) culture and (German) working culture (Liulevicius, 2009). Furthermore, not solely the colonial discourse of civilizational inferiority was implemented, but also the economic dimension of colonialism was realized: The exploitation of natural resources and local labour forces was in line with the situations in overseas colonies (Liulevicius, 2009). As it is characteristic for colonial relationships, the exploitation was based on a distinctive differentiation with a clear hierarchy between the colonizer and the colonised.

The natural separation, reasoned in ascribing people to different races, is especially influential in determining dehumanising behaviour. Hence, the ascription of Poles and Germans to different races and, especially with growing influence of the National Socialists, the conviction that racial affiliation determines the character and life path of a person, led to horrible deeds. During the Nazi-time the colonial idea of bringing culture and education to

⁴ Since Poland did not exist as a country in this time, the labelling here refers to the labelling in the book; where it refers to Polish inhabited regions. Similarly “Germany” for German inhabited regions is used, while a united German state did not exist.

(Slavic) people was not present anymore, since differences and rivalry between Germans and Slavs were seen as being so essential, that the mixing of culture or bloods should be prohibited and the development of Slavic people should not be supported (Liulevicius, 2009). This belief-system resulted in murdering millions of Polish civilians, targeting specifically its elite, sending many Poles to concentration camps and coercing them into forced labour (Deutsches Polen Institut, 2017). Also the extermination of Poles and Ukrainians, next to the extermination of Jews, was planned (Liulevicius, 2009). Moreover, the “Lebensraum” concept saw the territory in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as fruitful for a German settlement which was needed because an increase of ethnic Germans and the connected increased food supply was planned. Thereby, a rivalry for territories in CEE was induced and a justification for the expansionary policies of Nazi-Germany was presented.

This time clearly showed many evidences for the dehumanising aspects of Othering. However, these extreme cases should not create a one-sided picture of Othering, as it also occurs between states or regions in more moderate forms, where it is not an intentional degrading of an opposite but a means to define the self. As this paper studies Othering of one country and this people from the perspective of another, this subject is discussed in the following.

1.2 National and European Identity in the context of Othering and Belonging

One of the most influential criteria on which people are grouped and according to which the world is structured, is their nationality. As a nation is a felt community, based on “occupying a common homeland and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy, common rights and duties for all members” (Anthony D. Smith, 2001, p. 13), it informs us about several features of a person. Furthermore, it is seen as one of the most relevant collective identities people have nowadays (Triandafyllidou, 1998). The underlying ideology, as Smith (2001) expresses it, has as main premises that the world needs to be divided into nation-states, that the nation should be the community with highest loyalty and that every individual should belong to one nation. Therefore, according to the discussed theories of social psychology the own nation is the in-group, while other nations are out-groups (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Elements distinguishing two nations (typically referring to culture, language or history) are often stressed. Neumann (1998) exemplifies this with describing the emphasis on language differences between very similar languages like Croatian and Serbian or in one language, like in the case of Germany and Austria. If one term is more common in Austria while the other is in Germany, the EU is obligated to use two terms – to underline the fact that German is spoken

in two nations (Neumann, 1998). Triandafyllidou (1998) demonstrates that history and naming are other important boundaries separating nations. In the dispute between Greece and the then called Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)⁵, the internal name of the country (as Macedonia) and its references to history (e.g. to Alexander the Great) were highly criticized by Greece. Reasons were that the name Macedonia is also the name of a Greek region and that the Greeks see Alexander the Great as part of *their* history, as *their* hero (Triandafyllidou, 1998). The Greek dissatisfaction with the blurring distinctiveness was resulting in Greece effectively blocking FYROM's access to EU accession and NATO membership (Koukoudakis, 2018). This indicates that where the distinctiveness between groups seems to vanish, it results in the urge to stress differences.

Triandafyllidou (1998) argues in her analysis, that there is only one significant other for a country at a time; and that this one is chosen according to the threat it imposes on the own country. How applicable this observation might seem in her example (Greece and FYROM), it is neither well justified, nor is it coherent with the social-psychological findings on group-behaviour – which underline that it is not the threat itself that is mostly relevant for the choice of the other, but its assumed inferiority, proximity and situational features.

In the EU-context, questions of enlargement induce discussions about Belonging and Othering; as these process re-define the in-group they encourage considering its identity. Examples of such debates occurred in the realm of the Eastern enlargements and the Turkish accession. In Tekin's (2010) study, the discourses regarding Turkey's application for membership of the then existing European Community was analysed in regard to Othering processes. Through stressing cultural, religious or geographical non-Europeanness, as well as connecting the differences of historical conflict lines between the Ottoman Empire and the Western European world, Turkey was presented as not belonging to Europe, and consequently not being an appropriate candidate for a membership (Tekin, 2010). Using the name Ottoman was one important linguistic tool underlining the historic conflicts between Europe, particularly France, and Turkey (Tekin, 2010). In addition, references to the Enlightenment and civilizations occur as important dimensions of differentiation (Tekin, 2010).

⁵ The dispute has been settled, and since 2018 the country is named North Macedonia (Koukoudakis, 2018).

In the process of the EU Eastern enlargements the Otherness of Eastern Europe was underlined. Interestingly, this happened only a few years after the announcement, that Central and Eastern Europe will “return to Europe”. The notion, that Central and Eastern Europeans need to learn from their Western neighbours, was characterising the EU and NATO accession period, with its adaption of hundreds of legislations and regulations (Kuus, 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeyer, 2005). Hence, the process of re-belonging to Europe could only happen through the help and the guidelines from Western European (Kuus, 2004). The emphasis of the differences between the CEE and “full” (Western) European states often referred to the nationalism and authoritarianism of the former (Kuus, 2004). This was shown by a statement of the Foreign Minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer (2000), who declared that the enlargement is necessary, since otherwise “nationalist ideologies and confrontations” will remain present in the East. Hudabiunigg (2004) found that in German media discourses on the Eastern enlargement, Western and Eastern Europe were part of two different cognitive frames. Poles were, specifically, portrayed as not well organised, backward and having an irrational religious faith, in the contrary to Western Europeans, which are presented as civilised, economically well-off and rational (Hudabiunigg, 2004).

The origin of the concept Eastern Europe as the opposition to Western Europe originates in the time of the Enlightenment (Wolff, 1994). To develop a meaning for the concept of civilization, Western European Enlightenment thinkers needed an opponent which was not civilized, thus, they “invented” Eastern Europe (Wolff, 1994). Of course, this definition was not without grounds, as e.g. religious or language differences exist. Nevertheless, the perception that this is the most meaningful division line can be seen as constructed, especially taking into consideration that before, the North-South distinction was regarded the most relevant in Europe (Wolff, 1994). On the hierarchical order of civilizations Eastern Europe was ranked rather low; a backward region being “essentially in between”, in between European civilizations and Asian barbarisms (Wolff, 1994, p. 13). The differentiation of Eastern from Western Europe was mainly justified by cultural and economic disparities. Wolff (1994) sees these differentiations revived during and reinforced by the Cold War, when it was again said that a wall separates civilizations.

Kuus (2004) underlined, that Eastern Europe is an ambiguous and flexible concept. The inscription of Eastern European as inherently different from “Europe”, also stems from the process of defining Central Europe. Central European intellectuals, such as the Czech intellectual Milan Kundera (1984), framed Russia as the relevant Other for Europe and

underlined the cultural belonging of Central Europe to the West. As this was especially emphasized for a Western European audience, the purposeful usage of the concept to reach a political cooperation can be assumed (Kuus, 2004; Neumann, 1998). Hence, social (here: regional) identities can be flexible, functional and have political relevance. In addition, group identities are assessed differently depending on the actor's perspective.

2. Discursive representations of the Other – methodological premises

2.1 Operationalisation and data selection

For the analytical part of the thesis, an operationalisation of Othering and Belonging is needed. As it should function to analyse a discourse, the works of Critical Discourse scholars are taken into account. As many relevant scholars in the field are linguists, their works are particularly helpful to understand how discourses are relevant in producing social groups and how language is used to determine Othering (e.g. Reisigl & Wodak, 2000; van Dijk, 2000; Wodak, 2015). Therefore, indicators used by Wodak (2001) are summarized, as she points out linguistic features of exclusionary discourses. Categorizations are often conducted by using metaphors or personal pronouns (“us” and “them”). Additionally, in the discourse-historical approach *topoi* (sg. *topos*) are used for the analysis. *Topoi* are premises, connecting an argument with a conclusion, and are used for a justification of inclusion (Belonging) or exclusion (Othering) (Kienpointner, 1992 as cited in Wodak, 2001). Wodak (2001) refers to 15 different *topoi*. Those *topoi* which were found in the articles are explained in the analytical part of the paper. To exemplify their general logic, the *topoi* of threat and burden are described here. From the presentation of an action (or a person or a group) as a threat, it follows that the action should not be performed, or it should be done something against the persons or the group (Wodak, 2001). This argument is e.g. used for people, such as immigrants, characterized as threatening to native people. Thus implies that the threat, existing because of immigrants, should be diminished, which could either mean that the immigrants should not live in the country or they need to change in order to be less threatening in the eyes of the natives. The *topos* of burden is defined by Wodak (2001, p. 76) as: “If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens.” Hence, the representation of someone as a burden for the society can justify their exclusion .

In the following the relevant indicators for the further analysis are marked in italics. The derived indicators from Wodak, *topoi*, *personal pronouns* and *metaphors* are supplemented with the implications of the discussed theories and consequences of Othering. Studies from social psychology show that *comparisons* are important means to define and characterize the self and the other. Thereby *analogies* highlighting commonalities can be used to express perceived *equality* of two entities while contrasting often serves the purpose of presenting a counterpart as *inferior* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The representation of an opposite as *less human*

than the self (infrahumanization) is a frequently occurring process of Othering (Leyens et al., 2000). The ascription of differences to be *natural, instead of cultural*, can be evaluated as substantial Othering – something which does not occur always, but if it occurs, it is a definite criterion. Similarly can the opposite be assumed: A categorization which is justified on *natural instead of cultural or social grounds* is a strong indicator for Belonging. Furthermore, the felt superiority of the self (here: a country) towards the other(s) are sometimes linked to ideas of civilization: Countries are *ranked according to their proclaimed level of development* and following from this, a claim to govern and to dominate the others is derived (Hall, 1992). Since the West usually sees solely itself as having reached the highest level of development, Western states can only indicate equality by evaluating a counterpart as being *part of the West*.




Figure 1. Comparison between the two periods by number of coded segments which indicate Othering.




Figure 2. Comparison between the two periods by number of coded segments which indicate Belonging.

Figure 1 and 2 show the different codes used in the analysis indicating Othering or Belonging. The codes are partially stemming from the theory-based operationalization of Othering and Belonging, but also from the studied data. Thus it is a mixed approach using deductive and inductive coding. The codes are mainly referring to the employed arguments in the newspaper, linguistic indicators have been coded separately. A comprehensive overview of codes can be found in Appendix C. The figures indicate that Othering did increase, while Belonging did not.

The conducted methodology is a critical comparative discourse analysis of print newspaper which are chosen according to their relevance for the public discourse. Accordingly, the media were selected with regard to circulation and different political tendencies. The nation-wide daily newspapers with the highest number of circulations are included, the left-liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and the conservative *Die Welt* (Kleinstuber & Thomass, 2007). In addition, the most sold German newspaper, the controversial tabloid *Bild* is included, which is either classified as conservative or as right-wing and consists of shorter articles with many pictures (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d.; Kleinstuber & Thomass, 2007). Furthermore, the liberal weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* is

considered, which is characterised by a larger share of long and detailed analyses as compared to everyday news (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d.; Kleinstuber & Thomass, 2007). The newspapers *Bild* and *Die Welt* belong to the Axel Springer publishing company, whereas the other newspapers each belong to a different publisher.

A newspaper analysis is a feasible opportunity to grasp different opinions and dominant public attitudes on a topic. Even if the role of print newspapers is declining, the relevance of newspapers in the German public discourse is still high (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V., 2018; Hasebrink et al., 2017). Particularly older age groups are still predominantly dependent on print media, in 2016 more than half of people over 40, and more than two thirds over 50 were reached by a daily paper (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V., 2016). These groups are especially powerful; they represent a large and comparatively wealthy share of the German society, and consequently represent an important electoral group (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2018). Moreover, they often occupy key positions, e.g. the average age of members of the German parliament in the electoral period 2013 to 2017 was 49,7 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017). Hence, their influence on the discourse and the discourse written for this audience is of high relevance.

The data is translated by the author and for all quotations which are longer than a word group, the original wordings are given in Appendix A. The quotations are numbered according to their first appearance in the thesis. The linguistic analysis of the text data is conducted on the German original, and not on the translated English version. Since a discourse analysis is a language-focussed method which acknowledges the relevance of linguistics, slight modifications of the meaning need to be taken into account. In cases where the meaning is not directly translatable, different possible translations and explanations of the German understanding are added in the text or in the footnotes. Relevant terms which are discussed in detail are marked in bold by the researcher, this means that these words are not stressed in the original version in the newspaper.

For the purpose of standardization the two time frames both refer to a time period of 20 to 25 days, which refer to 19 copies of the dailies, as well as four copies of the weekly newspapers.⁶ The first one looks at the time from the 30th of April to the 22nd of May 2014, during which two relevant events took place, that shifted the focus to Poland: the 10th

⁶ An exception is, in the second period, the *SZ*, because the 6th of January is a regional holiday, one copy less was published.

anniversary of the EU enlargement (May) and the pre-election coverage of the European elections, which happened between the 22nd and the 25th of May. Both topics made an evaluation of European countries likely, and since Poland is the most populated country which entered in 2004 as well as the most populated country from the region, it is often chosen as an example. This time frame has been selected because the question of Othering or Belonging are often occurring in the context of EU enlargement. Furthermore, Donald Tusk, which had good relations to Angela Merkel, was still Prime Minister of Poland. Accordingly, it was before the changes in Poland began and the relationship started to worsen.

The second period covers the time from the 21st of December 2015 to the 14th of January 2016. This is justified by the developments happening during this time, but also happening during the months before. In May 2015, the former PiS member Andrzej Duda won the presidential election, which was followed in October 2015 by the victory of the PiS, winning an outright majority in the Sejm and making Beata Szydło the new Polish Prime Minister. Shortly after the PiS reached offices, in a controversial procedure, the government elected five new constitutional judges (Länder-Analysen, 2016). Moreover, on 22 December a new law passed the Sejm changing the functioning of the constitutional court, signed by Duda on 28 December (Länder-Analysen, 2016). The second reform was related to public media, which was reorganized mainly through exchanging leading figures (Länder-Analysen, 2016). Both reforms were criticized as helping conservative, PiS-friendly actors reaching relevant power positions and led to critical reactions from EU officials. In addition, the question of the distribution of refugees in the EU was still debated.

In the comparison of the two periods, it is apparent, that in the later time frame more articles about Poland were published, as more current events, evaluated as newsworthy, happened. Due to the selection of these periods, numerous articles in context with the European Union appear, which is not transferable or generalizable to other time frames. As this study should give a picture about press discourses, it does not focus exclusively on political articles. However, as it is one objective to show how the discourses changed according to political changes, there will be a focus on political articles. Advertisements, articles related to sports, weather or stock numbers are not included in the analysis. Interviews with or articles written by politicians or experts and reader's letters are included, as it is not an examination of a journalist's discourse only. Also foreign voices are examined, since the study subject is not a discourse of Germans about Poles, but a discourse in Germany about Poland and its people. Hence, the perspective of the study is the perspective of the audience (see McQuail, 1997). The analysis starts with an

exemplary illustration of German-Polish relations and Poland's position in the EU context, which should give an overview of the changes.

2.2 Preliminary finding for the discourse analysis: The European context of Othering and Belonging as represented in German print media

In the first period the relationship between Poland and Germany is solely presented as good. Whereas in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* Poland is named "our ally" (Bannas & Kohler, 2014), in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* Martin Schulz goes even further with his enthusiast statement, delivered in an election campaign speech in Warsaw:

75 years ago the most terrible time in German-Polish history was still ahead of us. The people here were afraid of war, and the government of my country wanted war. And now? **We are together, as equals, as friends in the European Union.**"

Appendix A (1) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16.05.2014 (Ulrich, 2014) ⁷

In this excerpt, the belonging of Poland to Germany and to the EU, is evident. Especially the term "friend" is clearly a positive characterization and indicates similarities and like-mindedness of the countries. Also being "together [...] in the European Union" underlines the belonging to a common category. Furthermore, the description of an opposite as being "equal", is an indicator for Belonging, likewise to characterizing an opposite as inferior is an indicator for Othering. With this "equality"-utterance Schulz distances himself from discourses of Polish inferiority that existed in German history to which he refers in the previous phrases.

Also in the second period statements viewing the German-Polish relations positively, do exist. But they are often presented in a context where these statements appear to have an appeasing purpose or seem implausible. In a report titled "Criticism and Aggression" this becomes apparent:

Government spokesman Seibert said **several** times that **Germans and Poles were partners and friends**, and that it was in Berlin's interest to enhance these close relations "wherever possible" in dialogue with the new government.

Appendix A (2) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12.01.2016 (Sattar & Schuller, 2016)

⁷ The original translations can be found in Appendix A, in an order numbered according to their appearance in the thesis.

The headline already indicates that this relation is not a friendship of partners, but that there are two sides opposing each other. Underlining that Seibert said something several times, as well as employing the conjunctive “were” (which is translated from the conjunctive of to be “*seien*” and not from the past “*waren*”), suggests that he tried and needed to convince someone – but without being successful. Since one of the moral imperatives for Germany stemming from the Second World War is a good relation with Poland and the economic relations between the two countries flourish, German politicians often stress the well-functioning partnership while other actors do not. This difference between the society or the media and the government could also be found in the 1990s. The German government served as an advocate for Poland’s membership in the EU and in the NATO, with the aim to enhance stability and peace in the region, but the German society was critical regarding these developments, and focused on the threatening numbers of potential Polish migrants and their negative influence on the German labour market as well as Polish criminality (Gatzke, 2010). By looking at the classifications of German and Polish journalists in the second period, the contrast to the government’s assessment become visible: Burghardt (2016) speaks about an “alienation” between the countries and Wieliński (2016) characterizes the relation as an “ice age”, both articles were published in the *SZ*.

These examples indicate a considerable change. Whereas in the first period the relationship is described very positively, in the second period positive and negative evaluations do exist but the positive ones are largely relativized and mostly conducted by politicians. The reasons for this change are in greater detail analysed in the following.

The question whether Poland fully belongs to the community of the European Union and whether it should be a member of the Union was discussed in both periods. In spring 2014, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine was highly discussed and Poland and Polish expertise were valued in Germany. Especially in articles of Polish authors, e.g. by the former Polish ambassador, Janusz Reiter, and the Polish President at this time, Bronisław Komorowski, the personal pronoun “we” is used. This usage indicates the feeling of belonging to the EU.

We [members of the EU/Europeans]⁸ can no longer afford weakness.

Appendix A (3) *Bild*, 30.04.2014 (Reiter, 2014)

I am glad that **we Europeans** have agreed on a way to condemn Russia's aggression and try to stop it, even if the sanctions against Moscow have had little effect so far.

Appendix A (4) *Bild*, 10.05.2014 (Diekmann & Vehlewald, 2014)

But the Polish belonging to the EU is not unquestioned in the first period. In the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*, the very pro-European Polish candidate for the European Parliament, Bogdan Wenta, is cited with the utterance:

“We want to show now, that **we** [Poles] **belong** [to the EU]”

In contrast, the article is referring to him differently:

But the Pole Bogdan Wenta **wants to belong**.

Appendix A (5) *Die Zeit*, 22.05.2014 (Krupa, 2014)

Both utterances show that Polish belonging to the EU was still a debatable question; if the belonging had been unambiguous, it would not have been thematised. Moreover, the statement “[he] wants to belong” signals that Wenta, and related Poland, is not considered to belong at this point in time.

Nevertheless, the evaluation of Poland as a EU member is predominantly positive. The EU Eastern Enlargement of 2004, and specifically the Polish membership, are described by several newspapers as a “success story” or even as a “miracle”, as Janusz Reiter phrases it (Reiter, 2014; Brill, 2014; Hein, 2014; Krupa, 2014). In the *FAZ*, this story of Central and Eastern Europe is also called an “economic miracle” (Schwarz, 2014), which creates an analogy to Germany, as the original term “Wirtschaftswunder” refers to the German economic development after the Second World War. Comparisons highlight the Polish superiority over other new EU member states, which constructs Poland as one of the leaders of this (economic) success story. It is noteworthy that the new EU members are predominantly not characterised as a burden, but it is emphasized that both, old and new, EU members profit from the

⁸ In many of the following examples “European Union” and “Europe” are taken as synonyms, thus references of Poland as being non-European or “beyond Europe” likely refers to the EU and the connected idea of democratic European civilizations, and less to geographic assessments.

enlargement. Nevertheless, mostly economic profits are thematised, while other possible profits are not. Poland's positive evaluation is moreover reasoned in the pro-European sentiments, which is a commonality of the Polish and the German society:

The **most convinced Europeans** live in Poland and Germany.

Appendix A (6) *Die Welt*, 14.05.2014 (Siems, 2014)

However, these assessments of Poland as a pro-European state and the EU-community as profiting from its membership changed drastically in the time between the selected periods.

When Germans look eastwards, they think they see **bastions of the Eurosceptics**.

Appendix A (7) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23.12.2015 (Brössler, 2015)

Hence, from May 2014 to December 2015 the "most convinced Europeans" turned into "bastions of the Eurosceptics". In the excerpt from the *SZ*, a metaphor employing a military object is used, as it creates an analogy with a battle, underlining the divergences between the Eurosceptics and the pro-Europeans and simultaneously between the states eastward from Germany and the unspecified other states located in the North, West or South from Germany. In the second period, military and fighting metaphors can be found multiple times, inter alia used to characterize Jarosław Kaczyński, the judicial reforms, but also the relationship between Poland and the EU (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2016; Schuller, 2016; Kafsack, 2016).

In winter 2015/2016, there were mainly two reasons why Poland was constructed as non-European, or as not rightfully belonging to the European Union. On the one hand, the Polish judicial and media reforms initiated a discussion on the Polish democracy, and on the other hand, the Polish unwillingness to receive refugees and whether this was in line with solidarity in the EU, was questioned.

The first discussion was well-reasoned, as Poland's reforms led to criticism from various well-known institutions, for example the Democracy Index ascertained a decline of the Polish democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). Nevertheless, the overall status of Poland did not change in the index, because it has been classified as a flawed democracy even before the developments started in 2015 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). Moreover, even in 2015 and 2016, Poland has been evaluated as being more democratic than other EU countries, such as Croatia, Hungary and Romania (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). Despite that, due to the very fast acting government in Poland as well as Poland's relevance as a populous EU country, the discourse on Poland's democracy intensified. Several articles in different

newspapers (*SZ, Zeit, Welt*) were criticizing the non-compliance of the reforms with European values (Siems, 2016; Mühlhauer, 2016; Bittner, 2016). The notion of “European values” is not as vague as it sounds, since the values, like democracy, rule of law, human dignity, freedom and solidarity, have been stated in the Treaty on the European Union, article two (European Union, 2016). A guest commentary by the former Vice President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, relates to these values. The title already indicates that several member states are not seen as valuable for the Union and should consider leaving.

Anyone who doesn't like it **can leave!**

Appendix A (8) *Die Welt*, 14.01.2016 (Reding, 2016)

In the article, Reding portrays particularly Poland and Hungary as not holding European values, such as human dignity, freedom, or equality, values which have been derived from the experiences of the Second World War, and are thus a burden to the functioning of the Union. Consequentially, she suggests them to leave the EU. Referring to the stated values contains the logic consequence that if a state does not comply with European values, the state should be penalised (with the aim of making the state comply with the values again) or excluded from the EU. From this argumentation, the topos of constitutionality is derived: *If a person or a state does not act in line with the constitution, the person or the state should be penalised or excluded from the community which has adopted this constitution.* Hence, developments which are considered to be a contradiction to EU values, and connected to the EU identity, should not occur and if they occur, they need to be counter-acted or lead to an exclusion from certain EU rights or even from the Union. Since it is not legally possible to exclude a member from the EU, Reding encourages the self-selected exclusion.

Through exaggerations and emotional language the discourse on Poland's position in the EU became heated. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* published a comment where even the headline “Beyond Europe” states that Poland is not considered to be “European” anymore. It further goes on with:

The PiS government replaced leading figures in politics, justice, administration and economy with followers and openly disregarded a decision of the constitutional court. Now the rulers have **finally crossed the Rubicon between liberal and authoritarian systems.** [...]

The aim of the coup is to turn the government into a **Leviathan beyond any control.** The new law brings Poland closer to this **frightening state of affairs.** [...]

The PiS people apparently expect that their taboo break will remain without consequences in Europe. They believe that the EU with all its problems does not want to face another major crisis. If they are right, this would be equivalent to a European **core meltdown. Europe would lose its identity** and should never again be a symbol of democracy and justice in the world.

Appendix A (9) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24.12.2015 (Ulrich, 2015)

In the first citation Poland is described as “hav[ing] crossed the Rubicon between liberal and authoritarian systems”, even though democracy indices never classified Poland as an authoritarian state, neither in 2015 nor up until this thesis was written, but as a flawed democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). An academic evaluation characterizes Poland as an illiberal or defect democracy (Garsztecki, 2020). Not only is this an incorrect evaluation but the change to the authoritarian system is characterized as “final” and, by using the metaphor “crossed the Rubicon” declared as irreversible. Thus it denies the possibility of Poland to restore the rule of law and certain democratic standards. In the second excerpt, the Polish government is named a “Leviathan beyond any control”, a metaphor which can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, in the Old Testament, a Leviathan describes a symbol of chaos, a monster and a global power hostile to God (Dudenredaktion, n.d.). In Thomas Hobbes “Leviathan”, the naming of the Leviathan refers to the biblical figure but it embodies the unrestricted power of a state and its government (Weinhandl, 2016). While the second interpretation of an unlimited power “beyond any control” is in the present case more closely related, the biblical picture of the monstrous Leviathan is also present and activated. In the following sentence, Poland is described as being in a “frightening state of affairs”, an expression which leaves open for whom this state of affairs could be frightening. Either it could be a threat for the EU as a democratic community or for the Polish people, as those directly affected by these reforms, or for both. The third paragraph supports the first interpretation, as it states that if the Polish taboo break remains without consequences, it poses a threat to the “European Identity”, and is even dramatizing it with the equation to a “core meltdown”.

Through amplifications (frightening state of affairs, authoritarian system) and emotional and visual language (Leviathan, Rubicon, core meltdown), Poland, and specifically the Polish government and its reforms, are constructed as fundamentally undemocratic, immoral and non-European, therefore, as not rightfully belonging to the EU (topos of constitutionality). Thereby a picture of Poland not able to govern itself is drawn, and of not having the ability to reconstruct democracy on its own. This connects to the image of dependency which frequently occurred during the colonial discourses, hence, a picture of inferiority is (re)produced. On the contrary, in a phrase at the end of the commentary, Poland is described as one of the most important

member states of the EU, an utterance which mitigates to a certain extent the strong statements earlier in the text.

The second debate referred to European solidarity, and whether the reception of refugees should be a part of this. In a reader's letter to the newspaper *Welt*, various topoi of exclusion are employed:

Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann is right when he says that **solidarity is not a one-way street**. If the governments in Warsaw, Budapest, Bratislava and Prague also refuse to accept refugees in the future, EU subsidies for these states must be cut. **Because it contradicts the European idea of collecting the net contributors' money while at the same time contributing nothing to overcoming the refugee crisis.**

Appendix A (10) *Die Welt*, 22.12.2015 (Schmitt, 2015)

This excerpt uses, as many other articles especially in the newspapers *Welt* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the notion of "solidarity". Solidarity is one of the core values which are stated in the Treaty on the EU, however, it is a highly context-dependent concept and often used when an opponent demands something from the other (Wallaschek, 2016). In this discourse on refugees, solidarity is frequently occurring in relation to EU subsidies which are transferred to CEE states. Hereby, three arguments are employed: Firstly, showing a lack of solidarity relates to argumentations of unfairness and immorality, which have similarities with the topoi of abuse. The topos of abuse, implies the following conclusion.

[I]f a right or an offer for help is abused, the right should be changed, or the help should be withdrawn, or measures against the abuse should be taken

(Wodak, 2001, p. 77).

As someone is acting unfair or immoral, this behaviour has to be reduced, either through changing the rights (here: the subsidies) or the entitlement for the rights (here: for the subsidies or the EU membership). Additionally, the denial of morality can often be found in discourses of Othering in order to classify an opposite as inferior. Secondly, the topos of burden is activated; with the phrase "collecting net contributors money", the author not least refers to German money and draws a division line between net contributors and net receivers. Thirdly, since solidarity is a core EU value and the CEE governments are ascribed to contradict "the European idea", the topos of constitutionality is applied.

In another article published in the *Welt*, differences in the EU are directly thematised:

The most difficult border in Europe to cross has no fences and no towers. It runs in people's heads. On the one side, those who want to stop the flow of refugees immediately. Like the left-nationalist Slovakian head of government Robert Fico, who regrets that migrants have become a "protected species". Or Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who does not want "a large number of Muslims in the country". Poland's head of government Beata Szydło accuses "some countries" of "exporting their problems". **On the other side** is Germany. [...] The tone has become sharper between **West and East**, especially since the national conservative PiS took over the government in Poland. **Here** those who want an open Europe. **There** those who want to close themselves off. **"Never before has the gap between them been so wide,"** says Ian Bremmer, founder of the Eurasia Group, one of the world's most important political analysis houses. 2016 will be the year of destiny. **Is Europe holding out - or is it collapsing under the tension?** Not Alexis Tsipras, not Greece, not the debts are the greatest risks. "It is the rise of populism and nationalism," says Bremmer.

Europe is splitting up. [...]

More than a few consider the **Eastern Enlargement a mistake.**

Appendix A (11) *Die Welt*, 14.01.2016 (Beutelsbacher, Sommerfeldt, & Zschäpitz, 2016)

With the first sentences of the excerpt, through employing the "border" metaphor, group affiliations are established and their division is emphasized. Precisely this division is underlined later by the usage of the "gap"-metaphor⁹, as both, wide gaps and borders, are often not easily overcome. The significance of the border image in the context of the EU and migration is interesting in two respects. First, because it is one of the main achievements of the EU, that borders between its members largely became invisible, irrelevant and – easy to cross. Secondly, the EU has strengthened its external borders against migrants, which coined among critics the notion of a "Fortress Europe", and many people tried unsuccessfully to cross these borders, to enter this fortress. Hence, the achievement of a border-free union is threatened by the CEE, the (mental) border in-between the EU member states is re-established and it is so high that it is more difficult to cross it than to enter a fortress. The division is furthermore linguistically underlined by the introductory contrasting expression "On the one side" (Slovakia, Hungary, Poland) and "On the other side" (Germany) and the juxtaposition of "here" and "there". Whereas the article refers only to four European countries all located in Central and/or Eastern Europe, the line of division is drawn between West and East, as it is the classic differentiation

⁹ Gap is translated here from the German "Kluft" which also describes a cleft, a deep crack in the rock.

in Europe since the times of the Enlightenment which was reinforced by the Cold War (see Wolff, 1994). Moreover, this clear division discounts different opinions on the acceptance of refugees in Western and Eastern Europe, thus the homogeneity in both regions is overestimated. By this presentation, Eastern European states are devalued, while Western European states are revalued. In the highlighted question, by speaking of a possible “collapse” of the Union with the responsibility lying among the CEE countries, the argument for Othering is constructed via the topos of threat as they are threatening the existence and functioning of the EU. Nevertheless, the most unambiguous and direct utterance on the belonging of Poland and other CEE states is the concluding sentence of the text excerpt, naming the Eastern Enlargement “a mistake”, indicating that the CEE countries should never have been part of the EU, which highlights their difference with the other EU members. In this article, as it is frequently occurring in the analysed media, the developments of Poland in 2015 are seen as crucial for the division.

Nonetheless, also in 2015/2016 the Belonging of Poland to the EU is thematised but it occurs less often than Othering. The family-metaphor creates a sense of natural cohesion, and in the present case, of natural belonging to the EU/Europe. In the second period, it was used two times, once by a German journalist, and once by the Polish journalist Wieliński:

Something very bad is going on in Poland. It is good that Europe is reacting. In difficult times help can be expected from the **family**.

Appendix A (12) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 09./10.01.2016 (Wieliński, 2016)

It is striking that some of the most clear linguistic indicators for categorizing Poland as belonging to the EU, are employed by Polish authors. This fact could be reasoned in the pro-European sentiments existing in Poland and in a different evaluation of the (Polish-European) relationship from a Polish or a German perspective. But it could also be a stylistic difference, which authors use when writing for a foreign instead of a national audience. In other texts it is stated that Poland is an “extremely important country“ and that Europe needs Poland (Schilitz, 2016; Ulrich, 2015). Thereby the topos of advantage is employed, which implies the conclusion rule:

[I]f an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it

(Wodak, 2001, p. 74).

Hence, the utterances suggests that Poland should remain a EU member. In the *FAZ*, which dedicated many articles on the issue, albeit not the most outstanding ones regarding Othering,

a meta-discourse on the issue developed. Marcus Felsner, chairman of the German Eastern Business Association, wrote a guest article, which begins with:

It is shameful: we are still backing the Oder and Neisse. From time to time, without even turning around, **we throw admonishing words or school records to the Poles.**

And Felsner writes in the last section:

It is time to recognise that the Iron Curtain actually fell in 1989 and for more than 25 years **it has not been appropriate to ask Poland to prove that it belongs to Europe.**

Appendix A (13) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 04.01.2016 (Felsner, 2016)

In this statement the Polish belonging is thematised, and presented as something which should not be questioned, implying that even if developments do not correspond to European values or standards, Poland is nevertheless a *European* state. Due to underlining the duration of Polish belonging to Europe, Felsner implies that before the Iron Curtain fell, Poland did not necessarily belong to Europe, but that it did belong to Europe before it became a EU member. The civilizational understanding of Europe, which is connected to democratic and/or capitalist states but not necessarily to a EU membership, can be derived from this.

By these excerpts it becomes evident that especially the *Welt* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* employ a discourse of Othering in the EU context. This has several reasons. The *SZ* has a very pro-European Union view, therefore EU matters are fairly important in the newspaper (Koopmans & Pfetsch, 2007). Furthermore, because the newspaper takes a particularly positive position on the issue of refugees and has a left-liberal orientation, it is not surprising, that the policies of a national conservative party, as the PiS is, are criticized in a more noticeable manner than in conservative newspapers (Conrad & Aoalsteinsdóttir, 2017). Also the *Welt* took, especially for a conservative medium, a refugee-positive position in the discourse of 2015, emphasizing the moral obligation of European countries to welcome refugees (Conrad & Aoalsteinsdóttir, 2017). Hence, the rejection of accepting refugees by the Polish government resulted in a PiS-critical position by the *Welt*. In the *FAZ*, which does not assess the EU and its values as positively as the other discussed daily newspapers, the topos of constitutionality in the EU context is less strong. Moreover, the newspaper dedicated the largest space for opinions on the discourse and presents Polish criticisms on Germany not predominantly and immediately as unjustified, e.g. Nord Stream 2 and Germany's position on the project are critically assessed. The *FAZ* discourse on Poland's belonging to the EU can be evaluated as balanced, both topoi for Belonging and for Othering are presented. As the *Bild* has less political and far shorter

articles, a discussion about different positions of EU states occurs seldomly and did not occur to a significant extent in the second period. Interestingly, in the first period, two very positive articles in which Polish voices (Janusz Reiter, Bronisław Komorowski) appeared in context with the EU and Poland's position in the Union were published in the tabloid.

To conclude, in 2014, the belonging of Poland to the EU was not unquestioned, but it was largely regarded as something the EU on the one hand (specifically the old EU members and Germany) and Poland on other hand, profited from. Moreover, in the statement questioning the belonging, it appears to be a matter of time until Poland will fully belong to the European community. In contrast, in the analysed period of 2015 and 2016, the earlier as positively praised well-functioning Polish economy, has largely not been thematised anymore, but a clear focus on more negatively evaluated and as non-European characterised aspects, like the democratic decline or the migration issue, can be observed. It follows from this, that in Germany democratic and human right standards such as the rule of law or the acceptance of refugees are seen as existential for the European Union, and as more relevant than economic indicators. According to the discussed theories of social psychology, common values are one main factors for the creation of a group identity. Thus it is not surprising that a period in which several events happened that questioned the EU values produces Othering discursively and produces a more intense discourse than economic factors did.

Another reason for this changed focus could be a shift as a reaction to the most apparent crisis: Due to the financial and eurozone crisis which began in 2008 respectively 2010, in 2014 economic problems were still prevalent and considered to be a main threat for the EU (European Commission, 2014). This led to the praise of the Polish economic growth in 2014. However, in 2015/2016, the nationalist and populist Eurosceptics were considered a higher risk for the EU, as the following excerpt shows:

Not Alexis Tsipras, not Greece, **not the debts are the greatest risks.** "It is the rise of populism and nationalism," says Bremmer.

Appendix A (11) *Die Welt*, 14.01.2016 (Beutelsbacher, Sommerfeldt, & Zschäpitz, 2016)

This means a shift from mainly understanding the EU as an economic organization to a conception of a value-based community. Hence, whereas in 2014 economic concerns still dominated, in 2015/16 the refugee crisis and the growing right-wing populist movements were prominent and regarded as a major concern for the European stability (see European Commission, 2016).

Lastly, for Germany, the acceptance of refugees was also reasoned in the responsibility for the Second World War, which led to normative arguments in the discourse (Conrad & Aoalsteinsdóttir, 2017). Due to this discourse in connection with the Second World War, and here specifically with the Holocaust, it was especially difficult to accept the wish for selection of refugees according to their religious beliefs, as it was discussed in Poland (Etzold & Goebel, 2015). In this context it is also argued, that for the founding countries of the European Community, the idea of a united Europe developed not least as a reaction and in contradiction to the First and the Second World War. ¹⁰ Consequently, the EU identity and the European identity were developed in opposition to its own past, as Wæver phrased this:

Europe's "Other", the enemy image, is today not to a very large extent "Islamic fundamentalism," "the Russians" or anything similar - rather Europe's Other is Europe's own past which should not be allowed to become its future.

(Wæver, 1998, p. 90)

In Germany, because of the weight of the remembrance of the Second World War, governments which contradict European values, are connected with and compared to National-Socialism, discussed emotionally, and opposed. A more detailed analysis of this connection as well as supporting evidences from newspapers can be found in the following.

¹⁰ Also Reding (2016) emphasized that European values were derived from the Second World War experiences.

3. Prevailing features of Poland's discursive representations in the German printed press

3.1 The topos of history – Poles and Poland as the Others in the context of Nazism

In the German-Polish relationship, history plays an important role. In the analysed discourse, history and learned lessons from the past mainly refer to the Second World War. Here, the logic from the topos of history can be found, which reads as follows:

[B]ecause history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation

(Wodak, 2001, p. 76).

Both, the German and the Polish side, used analogies with Nazis to criticize the behaviour of the other, which intensified the debate. The German analytical frame for a comparison is ideological, comparing and relating nationalist movements to the National Socialist era frequently occurs in Germany, e.g. the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, short AfD) is often compared with Nazism (Jesse, 2008; Steuwer, 2019). This kind of Othering can be explained by the idea that in order to understand an opposite, one's own standards and experiences are used, which due to a lack of understanding of the opposite and the difference of its situation can lead to Othering (see Brons, 2015). In Poland, at least in the analysed cases cited in German newspapers, the analytical frame for Nazi-comparisons is more connected to the country (Germany) and specifically its hegemonial role in Europe. As these cases mainly refer to politicians or journalists from the national-conservative or populist spectrum, they cannot be seen as characteristic for the discourse in Poland.

In the studied newspapers, the references of PiS and related actors towards the German-Polish history are predominantly framed as anti-German and (therefore) irrational. An example for this is a report in *Die Welt* about the Polish media reform where a caption says:

Anti-German conspiracy theories are very popular in Poland: the magazine "Wprost" portrays Angela Merkel and EU leaders as power-hungry invaders

And in relation to the corresponding picture:

Its cover shows the three German politicians [Angela Merkel, Martin Schulz und Günther Oettinger¹¹] and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker bent over a map. **The picture with the European flag in the background is reminiscent of shots taken at Hitler's headquarters during World War II.** **Title: "They want to control Poland again."** Under normal circumstances, one would not have to attach importance to this **idiosyncratic interpretation of reality.**

Appendix A (14) *Die Welt*, 12.01.2016 (Winterbauer, 2016)

The article discusses the representation of Germany in different Polish newspapers, in which the topos of history is applied by illustrating Germany as a threat to Poland and particularly to its sovereignty. Through this image Germany is constructed as the Other. In the report, this application of the topos of history and the learnt lesson, that Germany still is a threat for Poland, is framed as fundamentally irrational, as it is named a “conspiracy theory” and an “idiosyncratic interpretation of reality”. Because of the exaggeration which is inherent in the analogy with the Second World War, the German journalist can classify the argumentation as a “conspiracy” and therefore does not need to discuss the underlying criticism, that Germany possesses a hegemonial power in the EU and other countries, like Poland, do not. Hence, the Othering of Germany in Polish media leads to a defence reaction in German media (presenting the criticism as irrational), which results in the Othering of Poland in Germany. This picture of comparing current Germany with Nazi-Germany is so influential, because many German efforts aim specifically to distinguish itself from its past, e.g. Germany still is reluctant to take a leading political position in many foreign policy fields (Stark Urrestarazu, 2015).

The analogies in German press between developments in Poland and German National-Socialism are connected to the democracy decline in Poland, as well as to the nationalistic and partially xenophobic ideology. In the 2015 annual review in the feuilleton of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* an article about populist movements in Poland, Czechia, Hungary and France, was illustrated with a picture of a head having Hitler’s iconic moustache (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2015). The usage of Hitler’s moustache activates not only the person Adolf Hitler, but the Nazi politics and the Nazi-ideology more in general but is a rather humoristic form of a Nazi-comparison (Weinert, 2018). In addition, in the *SZ*, in the *Zeit* and in the *Bild*, analogies of

¹¹ The selection of the persons is reasoned in the criticism of the Polish reforms by Schulz and Oettinger, and in the key power-positions the other, Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker, obtain.

Jarosław Kaczyński, the media and judicial reforms with processes and ideologies in Germany in the 1930s were drawn (Wefing, 2016; Vehlewald, 2016; Fischer, 2015). A guest article in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* by Magdalena Marsovszky, a cultural scientist born in Hungary, draws the strongest analogy between the developments in Eastern Europe, specifically in Poland, Hungary and Croatia, and Nazi ideology. Moreover, she ascribes backwardness to Eastern European states, as well as characterizing the new member states as inferior and distinguishes them clearly from Western Europe.

The new EU countries are **societies of fear**. They are **belated nations**, because they were in the process of nation building at the time of the Enlightenment. The ideas of **human rights could therefore not be internalized by broad masses**, and what remained of the ideals of the Enlightenment was above all respect for the (just emerging) nation. **The nation was thought in terms of descent** and not in terms of republican freedom. In ethnically oriented societies, **tribal thinking through exclusion** is part of the strengthening of self-understanding, while individualism generates fear.

Appendix A (15) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30.12.2015 (Marsovszky, 2015)

Firstly, the new EU-states are in a very generalizing style described as “societies of fear” and “belated nations”. Both negative characteristics, the former clarifying that the following analysis does not only refer to governmental actions, but has to be understood more generally in relation to the societies, whereas the later implies the backwardness of the countries. Secondly, it is argued that all new (here: Eastern) EU countries understood their nations merely in ethnic terms, and could not internalize human rights. A development of Enlightenment in these countries and connected rational, modern and moral ways of thinking are thereby denied. Further, these societies are ascribed to have “tribal thinking”, tribal or the German “Stamm” is a typical colonial term, which underlines the primitivity of the social organization of colonized people (Speitkamp, 2016). Hence, tribal thinking is pejorative and implies a non-civilized mindset.

Later in the text, the countries are described to be anti-Semitic, mainly because the existence of anti-Israeli policies during socialism, which after the end of the Soviet Bloc have been redirected to the Jewish world conspiracy. With this argumentation, Marsovszky largely ignores Western European, not least German, anti-Semitism, which is striking in a German newspaper. While anti-Semitic attitudes indeed can be found more frequently in Eastern Europe, the amount of anti-Semitic attacks in Germany and Poland is largely comparable (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2019). She goes on with criticizing the region’s religiosity, labelling it as an ethno-religious belief-system leading to ethnic

nationalism, which implies the conviction of being superior to other cultures and nations. In addition, but only in direct reference to Hungary, Marsovszky speaks about the “Lebensraum” ideology, which is, according to the article, part of the Hungarian constitution.

Due to this combination of arguments, non-respect for human rights, backwardness, ethno-nationalism, anti-Semitism, felt superiority over other cultures and the “Lebensraum” ideology, an analogy to National-Socialism is constructed. Even though this notion of “Lebensraum” does not refer to all Eastern EU states, it is part of activating the image of National-Socialism in reference to the entire region, especially to the named countries, Poland, Hungary and Croatia. The term “Lebensraum” is, because the concept was used by the National-Socialists, nowadays overshadowed by its historical meaning. Hence, a former neutral term which was employed by the National-Socialists or was part of their ideology is not anymore used in the German language in its original meaning, but mainly for the purpose of suggesting a likeness with National-Socialism (Weinert, 2018). Through the constructed analogy with Nazism, the stressing of differences between Eastern and Western Europe and the ascribed inferiority to the East, this article is a clear example of an Othering discourse. To create analogies of Poland with Nazi-Germany can be considered a relativization of the Nazi-regime and Nazi-crimes especially against Poles; with similarities to draw analogies of Jews and Nazis, like in the comparison of the Holocaust with Israel’s politics towards Palestine (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2000). Since Marsovszky is an academic originating from Hungary, as it is indicated in a short author’s description, she possesses a form of authority which allows her to speak more critically or devaluating about the countries and their developments without being able to be accused of this to the same extent as other (native German) authors would be. Being similar to Nazi-Germany characterizes someone as a threat for the peaceful life in Europe and, since this time is understood as a collapse of civilization and morality, the analogy characterizes the reference subjects as not being civilized and not having moral standards.

In contrast to this usage of history, also because of the conflictual history a good German-Polish relation is considered as something extraordinary and valuable (see also quotation 1; Ulrich, 2014).

The German-Polish relationship is close, Germany and Poland are important partners for each other. **Considering their history, that is great.**

Appendix A (16) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12.01.2016 (Frankenberger, 2016)

Furthermore, notions of a “historical guilt” exist, implying the German obligation to assure a positive German-Polish relation (Felsner, 2016). The historical guilt argument employs a slightly different logic than the “learnt lesson” logic of the topos of history. The logic reads as follows: *Because someone (Germany) did something bad in the past to someone else (Jewish/Polish people), he/she/it must now act specifically sensible and supportive.*

Since the German remembrance on the Second World War includes the obligation of “Never Again”, meaning to prevent similar developments which led to the Second World War and specifically to the Holocaust, it is considered a societal task to recognize possible national-socialist, racist (especially antisemitic) and anti-democratic movements, to counteract them and to restrict their power of action (Stark Urrestarazu, 2015). Thus the Othering of the past leads to Othering of present movements which are perceived to be similar, in this case the national-conservative movement, the PiS and the political reforms in Poland. However, as the above presented examples show and as Stark Urrestarazu (2015) argues, the notion of “Never Again” and other consequences derived from being the principal offender of the Second World War and the Holocaust, can have different implications. “Never Again”, inter alia, refers to “Never Again Auschwitz” but also “Never Again War”, which can lead to conflicting recommendations for action, as in the case of the war in Kosovo (Stark Urrestarazu, 2015). In the above presented discourse, the remembrance of the Second World War simultaneously leads to Othering of the Polish government or more generally the Polish society as well as to a call to maintain a close partnership with Poland.

Also in this history-related discourse, which mainly occurred in the second period, especially the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Welt* were prominently using arguments for Othering. Although the article by Marsovszky was written by a guest author, the images and analogies created reached the audience of the *SZ*. However, the enthusiast statement of Martin Schulz which contrasts the German-Polish relation in 2014 with those in 1939, was also published in the *SZ*, but circa 19 months before. On the contrary, in the second period, the most striking examples in which a good German-Polish relation was seen as a necessity because of the Second World War can be found in the *FAZ*.

3.2 The categorization of Poland as Western – Poles and Poland as the Others in the context of Western Europe

Next to the categorisation of Poland as “European” or as rightfully belonging to the EU, another important categorization indicating Belonging is the construction of Poland as Western. Germany considers itself part of the West and sees the full belonging to this community as a goal it has achieved over time (Winkler, 2008)¹². Therefore, a categorization of Poland as Western indicates Belonging, whereas a categorization as Eastern signals Othering. Due to the historic significance of this classification, which indicates the West as being superior to the East, an analysis is meaningful. By contrasting the two periods, noticeable differences can be found: In 2015/2016 only two examples label Poland directly as “Western”, while this occurred four times in the analysed period in 2014. In relation to this, it should be noted that more articles are dedicated to Poland in 2015/2016.

In 2014, similar to the clear categorization of Poland belonging to the EU, in regard to the conflict in Ukraine, Poland and other CEE countries were constructed as being part of the West. The conflict with Russia provokes a discourse with similarities to the Cold War discourse, having the West and the NATO on the one side, and Russia on the other.

In practice, however, are such far-reaching financial and trade sanctions [against Russia] currently rather unlikely because they would also entail considerable **costs for the West**. An energy embargo, for example, would hit **the countries of Central and Eastern Europe** hard, which obtain a large part of their gas supplies from Russia.

Appendix A (17) *Die Zeit*, 15.05.2014 (Schieritz, 2014)

Also in relation to the EU Eastern Enlargement, the new EU members are characterized as Western:

The West of the East quickly turned into **the East of the West**.

Appendix A (18) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30.04.2014 (Schwarz, 2014)

Even though the second example underlines the belonging of CEE to the West, it simultaneously emphasizes the Eastern conception and draws the attention to the alterable categorization of the region. Hence, it is assessed as Western, but the difference to the *own*

¹² Also Habermas referred to Western values, and Western orientation of Germany, as a consequence of the Second World War (Klaus, 2008).

Western identity is highlighted. In 2014, also this belonging to the West was not unquestioned.

An article about the Polish song for the Eurovision Song Contest, argued that:

Hardly anyone at the ESC dares to say, that the Polish group Donatan & Cleo offers bourgeois whorehouse level with their folkloric pseudo-striptease and an unambiguous butter churn fumbling, because **Poland is closing ranks with the West** in the Ukrainian conflict.

Appendix A (19) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10.05.2014 (Bartetzko, 2014)

As Poland is “closing the ranks with the West”, it is not seen as Western, nor is this cooperation seen as natural, but more as a wish of Poland to belong. In addition, the evaluation of the contribution to the ESC is highly pejorative.

Even though there was no uniform Western evaluation of Poland, the difference to the second period is significant, where the geographic location in Eastern Europe and the East are often emphasized. This localization refers to the intra-EU difference, as seen in the quotation 11 (Beutelsbacher, Sommerfeldt, & Zschäpitz, 2016), in Martin (2016)¹³ or in the following subheading on the front page of the *FAZ*:

Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw: A lot of new things in the **East**, but few good ones

Appendix A (20) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30.12.2015 (Veser, 2016)

This example employs a formal allusion, as the phrase originally refers to Western Europe, it activates the concepts of Western in contrast to Eastern Europe.¹⁴ The belonging to Eastern Europe is moreover underlined by drawing analogies with Orbán’s Hungary and Putin’s Russia, an article in the opinion section titles:

Poland: **Like** in Budapest or Moscow

Appendix A (21) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 07.01.2016 (Hassel, 2016)

By emphasizing the capitals, specifically similarities between their governments are emphasized. It employs the German word “wie”, here translated to “like”, which expresses equality between the different sides. The analogy of the Polish with the Hungarian government

¹³ Martin (2016) refers to Warsaw, Dresden and Budapest.

¹⁴ The original “Im Osten viel Neues” is modelled on „Im Westen nichts Neues“, literally translated to “Nothing New in the West”, which is the title of a book about the Western Front in the First World War, by E.M. Remarque.

is to a certain extent justified, because meetings between the leading PiS-politician Jarosław Kaczyński and Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán occurred, the formal alliance of the Visegrad countries exists and similarities between the countries' democracies prevail (Garsztecki, 2020). The later analogy with Russia is certainly less so, as they have little connection and their status of democracy according to the Democracy Index have been very different. While in 2016 Russia was considered to be an authoritarian regime and ranked 134th, Poland was considered to be a flawed democracy and ranked 52nd, hence, their level of democracy was largely not similar and other comparisons (e.g. between Poland and other flawed democracies) would have been more accurate. Moreover, because of the conflictual Russian-Polish history and the not easy relations nowadays, this analogy can be viewed as insensitive. Nevertheless, comparisons with the person Putin have been used, inter alia by citing Schulz's utterance, on the front page of *Die Welt*:

The President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, accused the [Polish] government of pursuing a policy based on the Russian model. "This is directed democracy in **Putin's style, a dangerous Putinisation of European politics.**"

Appendix A (22) *Die Welt*, 11.01.2016 (*Die Welt*, 2016b)

These comparisons with Russia, which is seen as one of the most significant Other to the West and the European civilizations, are a means to present Poland as an Other (Neumann, 1998). Besides, it clearly exaggerates the decline of democracy in Poland. In addition, it is used in order to underline the similarities in Eastern Europe and hence to give an argument for the categorisation of Eastern in contrast to Western Europe.

To analyse the categorization into West and East is particularly meaningful because the concepts of West and East are not fixed. Since the West and the East are not (anymore) directly connected to the membership of an organization, a state can, dependent on current values or politics, be characterized as belonging to either. Here, Othering can be easier detected than in the case of the EU, where the question is "Should a state belong?" and less so "Does a state belong?". Hence, for an analysis of Othering and Belonging, flexible categories are more profitable than fixed ones.

Interestingly, in both cases of characterizing Poland as Western or Eastern it was not only in connection to the EU or the NATO but also to Russia. In the first period, in the context of the war in the Ukraine, Poland was seen as the West, which allows the following conclusion from a German perspective: As a country is with us, on the other side of Russia, it is characterized as belonging to us, as part of the West. The "enemy of my enemy is my friend" argumentation

can also explain other moments in the German-Polish history, in which Poland was especially positively assessed, when it was opposing Russia or respectively the Soviet Union. The early “Polenbegeisterung” in the 1830s, where Germans praised the Polish braveness to stand against their occupiers, was a situation in which Poles fought, inter alia, against Russian occupation (Gatzke, 2010). Also the Solidarność movement in the 1980s was not least directed against Soviet influence and was largely positively evaluated in the German societies. In Western Germany the positive picture of Polish freedom and democracy fighters evolved and in Eastern Germany, the opposition saw an ally in Solidarność (Gatzke, 2010; Pietras, 2008). In addition, the praises of “return to the West” in the 1990s can be understood by the above explained logic: As the Soviet Bloc collapsed, Poland and other CEE countries applied for membership in organizations with main focus in Western Europe, they were seen as changing categories, from the Russian/Soviet/Eastern side, to the Western one. Hence, it is likely that this argumentation is not only valid for Poland, but also for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

This observation reveals the following: Firstly, Russia is a meaningful Other for Germany, so important that it is frequently used as an object of comparison. Neumann argues that the previous attribution of Russia as barbaric has changed into an attribution of authoritarianism, which explains the association of a democratic decline in Poland with Russia (Neumann, 1998). Secondly, CEE countries are evaluated on the basis of their relation with Russia, which reveals a Russian-centric view on the region. That this relation with Russia is so important is also based on the strong connection of Russia with the concept of Eastern Europe. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the affiliated states were seen as the East (Kundera, 1984). Because the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was the most populous and most powerful of the Soviet Republics and Russia represents the successor state of the Soviet Union, the East/Eastern Europe as a geographical and civilizational concept specifically refers to Russia. Thirdly, the Polish belonging to the West is vulnerable and dependent on current developments and political interests. It is, as Wolff (1994) phrased it, still seen as “essentially in between”.

3.3 The characterization and categorization in the German society – Poles and Poland as the Others in the context of Polish people living in Germany

Considering the different subjects to which the discourses refer, the following subchapter needs to be viewed somewhat separately from the former subchapters. However, as it is one aim of the research to look who is Othered and if the political changes in Poland lead to Othering of Polish people more in general, this discourse is analysed. This chapter looks at two themes, the discourse on Poles as criminals and the representation of Polish migrants in Germany.

In the 1990s, one of the most discussed topics in relation to Poland was car theft. It mostly occurred in jokes, like in the humoristic Harald-Schmidt-Show "How can you tell that the Poles have been in space too? The Big Dipper is missing its wheels!" (Stach, 2018), underlining criminality therefore employing the topos of threat. Stereotypes of Polish car thieves and Poland as a destination for German stolen cars have been formed. In 2014, this characterization was still prevalent, even though from 1994 to 2014 the numbers of stolen cars in Germany as well as the role of Poland as a sales market and transit country decreased in importance (Leyendecker, 2016). Although in 2014, most non-German car thieves were of Polish nationality and a large Polish minority existed in Germany, they accounted only for 10 percent of the total number of car thieves in Germany (Bundeskriminalamt, 2015). The route via Poland as a transit country was nevertheless important (Bundeskriminalamt, 2015). By contrast, the topic car theft was not any longer thematized in 2015/16. The tabloid *Bild* dedicated the most articles to this issue, not surprisingly, since tabloids thematize sensational criminality more often (Popović & Popović, 2014). Especially interesting was their experiment to park an empty decoy car at the German-Polish border and wait for it to arrive in Poland, titling:

That's how quickly a car disappears to Poland

Appendix A (23) *Bild*, 15.05.2014 (Bild, 2014b)

The headline refers to a German anti-Polish saying: "Just stolen, already in Poland"¹⁵, and clearly aims at reinforcing the stereotype about Poland as a destination or a transit country for stolen German goods. Because of the construction of the stereotype of Poles as car thieves in the 1990's, the stereotype of Polish car thieves, in contrast of Poland as transit country only, is also activated by this headline and the project. Since the numbers of stolen cars were decreasing, the purpose of applying these stereotypes seems to be intentional.

A connected topic which thematized Polish criminality was the introduction of a German-Polish police cooperation aimed at tackling border criminality by increasing the authorities of the police on the other side of the border. The conservative newspapers, the *Bild*, the *Welt* and the *FAZ*, discuss this cooperation with the focus on stolen German cars and, due to the existing stereotype of Polish car thieves, created the unwritten analogy that these car thefts are often committed by Poles. On the contrary, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* emphasizes the role of Poland as a transit country, and thus degrades the role of Poles as car thieves.

¹⁵ In German it reads as follows: "Kaum gestohlen, schon in Polen".

As Brandenburg's Minister President Dietmar Woidke (SPD) emphasised, these are not **primarily crimes committed by Poles**, but often "Europe-wide crime committed by multinational gangs from up to six countries".

Appendix A (24) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16.05.2014 (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2014)

In these examples, especially in the *Bild*, Poland and Polish people are viewed in connection with illegality which characterizes them as having a lack of morality and activates the topos of threat.

Although in 2015/16, car theft in connection with Poland or Poles was not thematized, another example of a Polish criminal was presented in the *Welt* which underlined the origin of the offender. This is constructed through the repetition of the (Polish) nationality as well as naming the regional origin (Eastern European) of the perpetrator, e.g. the word "Pole" already occurs in the sub-headline (*Die Welt*, 2016a). Because the suspect is accused of killing a person, the designation of the offender's origin is supported by the German press code (*Deutscher Presserat*, 2017). However, the code explicitly stresses, that a nationality should not be repeated and not occur in the headline, which it both does in the present case. It can therefore be concluded that Polish criminality is a topic which declining relevance in the German discourse, but in occurring cases, it is presented in a light which explicitly stresses the Polishness of the offender.

In Germany, the second largest group with an immigration background is from Polish descent but this group is comparatively silent and well-integrated (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge/Bundesministerium des Innern*, 2019; *Loew*, 2017). Since the migration movements occurred in different waves during the last 150 years from Poland to Germany, this group is distributed in various regions and subsequently rather heterogeneous. The movements nowadays are characterized by short-term and seasonal labour migration, with occupations predominantly in elderly care, agriculture, and in the cleaning or the construction sector (*Loew*, 2017).

The amount of articles discussing Polish migrants and their role in Germany declined between 2014 and 2015/16. Whereas in the first period, arguments for Othering and for Belonging can be found, in the second period, Polish migrants are less thematized and mainly represented neutral. The Othering discourse in 2014 refers to short-term Polish immigrants which are seen as a financial burden abusing the social security system in Germany, whereas Germany, on the contrary, is called the "social welfare agency" of Europe (*Bannas & Kohler*,

2014). In 2012, following a case where two Polish short-term labour migrants appealed against the German family insurance fund for the payment of child allowances, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that Germany has to pay child allowances for children who live abroad, when one of their parents is considered as unrestrictedly taxable in Germany (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2012).

Flood of child benefit applications from Eastern Europe

[...]

The Family Office **cannot keep up with the processing**: the number of unprocessed cases amounts to 30,000. Most of them come **from Poland**. This will **cost the German state hundreds of millions of euros**, as the Federal Ministry of Finance announced answering the request of this newspaper.

Appendix A (25) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30.04.2014 (Astheimer, 2014a)

The first phrase is the headline of an article, which criticizes the decision by the EU court and the migrants who are applying (unjustly) for these benefits. Through the use of the term “flood” the child benefit applications are constructed as a natural disaster, thus they are seen as a threat. In the second example, the load for the Family Office and for the German state becomes evident by means of two formulations: The administrative burden is stressed by the phrase “cannot keep up with processing”, and the financial burden by only giving the vague number of costs “hundreds of millions of euros” and not setting it in relation to comparable costs or tax payments. Hence, the topoi threat and burden are applied. Besides, the article stresses that these benefits are granted although the children live in Poland, implying the exploitation of the system and indicating that this child benefit is intended for children in Germany only. This interpretation is supported by a headline of a report written by the same author, Sven Astheimer, in the *FAZ* two weeks later:

1 billion child benefit for **foreigners**

Appendix A (26) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12.05.2014 (Astheimer, 2014b)

As well as with a headline on the front page of the *Bild*:

366 751 **EU foreigners** received **German** child allowances

Appendix A (27) *Bild*, 07.05.2014 (Bild, 2014a)

In the latter, the exploitation is even more emphasized by employing the word “German”, as it suggests a categorisation into two groups, Germans and foreigners, as well as it characterises the child benefit as German, stressing it is paid by and for Germans (topos of abuse). The term

“Ausländer”, here translated to “foreigner” is in German more devaluating than the English translation, since it is less used in connection with foreigners from Western Europe, but more refers to people who are seen as less equal, e.g. persons from the former Soviet Bloc, former Yugoslavia or Turkey (Reisigl & Wodak, 2000). Thus it often refers to migrants who live in Germany, but are visibly different from white Germans, or do not have a German citizenship.

This case shows the different stands of the newspapers according to their political orientation and their different stylistic traditions. While the conservative newspapers are all highly critical, the left-liberal and pro-European *Süddeutsche Zeitung* is thematizing the payments, but characterizing it more as a legitimate procedure, explaining and following the argumentation of the court (Bohsem, 2014). Moreover, the less sensational and more liberal oriented *Zeit* is not thematizing it at all. On the contrary, the *FAZ* dedicates two articles and a question in an interview with Angela Merkel to the topic. The newspaper traditionally takes on a rather neoliberal view, with general scepticism on social benefits and has been classified as the most critical major German newspaper on European integration (Karasek, 2009; Koopmans & Pfetsch, 2007). In the *Bild*, identity-forming language occurs more frequently and is here used to form a German identity, but also often used to assure an identity of *Bild*-readers (Brichta, 2010). For the tabloid it is typically to focus on one side of a problem only, which is also explained by the sheer brevity of the articles (Brichta, 2010). Notably, none of these articles is written in the form of a commentary, but in the form of reports, which leads to them being perceived as objective.

However, also in the first period, the dependence of the German labour market on Polish workers was emphasized. Particularly their relevance for the care sector is underlined as the following interview response by Annegret Kamp-Karrenbauer shows.

I would advise all those who express themselves in a bold and negative way to close their eyes for a moment and imagine the Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian care workers in Germany were not there. **We have to thank them** that we do not have to put our relatives in a nursing home.

Appendix A (28) *Die Welt*, 02.05.2015 (Crolly & Gaugele, 2014)

In the utterance, the benefit of Polish care workers becomes evident, as they support the care-work sector, from which the subtopos of benefit is derived: *If a community benefits from the presence of certain actors, they should be present*. The topos has similarities with the logic of the topos of advantage and is therefore considered to be a subtopos, but is connected to people instead of actions.

In the second period, the benefit of Polish migrants for the German society is less thematized. An article looking at the German-Polish cross-border cooperation at the Baltic Sea and the many Poles living on the German side, finds bilateral cooperation but does not evaluate the migrants as belonging or not and sets the subject in the context of the political conflict and presents the conflict as a threat for the cooperation (Burghardt, 2016). This example suggests that the political divergences are of such significance that also little related themes are viewed through this lens. Nevertheless, also the (financial) burden is not thematized and therefore, the overall evaluation of Polish migrants is rather neutral.

Discussion and Conclusion

To evaluate the conducted analysis, it is important that Othering refers to different actors, meaning it is imprecise to speak about an Othering of *Poland*. Whereas often the Polish government and its actions are othered, the society and the people are less often so. This can be seen by focusing on Othering of people from Polish descent in Germany, which did not increase from 2014 onwards. However, because in democratic systems the government is elected by its people, Othering of politics simultaneously others at least parts of the society, the voters of the governing party and the persons in power. That the Polish society is generally less opposed than the government is shown by the occasionally conducted differentiations between the government, its actions, and public opinions, as well as through underlining the Polish protests against the reforms in December 2015 (Veser, 2015; Wieliński, 2016; Winterbauer, 2015). These protesters were presented especially positively and a support of them is encouraged (Bittner, 2016; Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2016). Since the notion of Polish protesters fits well into the image of Polish freedom fighters, which was inter alia created by the *Solidarność* movement but can also be found in the early “*Polenbegeisterung*”, it was especially often recapitulated. In this case, Othering of the Polish government and the solidarization with the Polish protesters may also be caused by the polarization in the German society. This interpretation is on the one hand theoretically supported by the idea that one’s own standards and conclusions are used in order to understand the opposite. On the other hand, it is supported by evidence from the newspapers, in which analogies of the PiS-party with the Alternative for Germany or the far-right movement Pegida¹⁶ are drawn (Maak, 2016; Molinari, 2016; Martin, 2016).¹⁷ Analogously to the comparisons of the PiS-politics with National Socialism, Nazi-comparisons are also conducted with the AfD (Steuer, 2019). Nevertheless, this can also have the opposite effect: When a representation of Poland as an Other is established, drawing analogies between Poland and particular groups in Germany, can be a means to present these groups as not rightfully belonging to Germany. The polarization in Germany was mainly caused by different stands on migration, which led to a need for positioning the self (Hinger, Daphi, & Stern, 2013). This purpose seems plausible considering the predominant German audience of

¹⁶ Pegida is an abbreviation of “*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*”, which can literally be translated to “*Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident*.”

¹⁷ Similarly to the examples discussing Poland’s Belonging to Eastern Europe, Warsaw is named in line with Budapest and Dresden (Martin, 2016). The capital of Saxony lies in the East of Germany, is the place where Pegida was founded and serves as a symbol for right-wing movements.

the newspapers. The Othering discourse positions the newspaper politically and thereby reveals e.g. for the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* a largely EU-positive identity, characterized by a will to uphold democratic standards and a friendly attitude towards refugees. The cited utterances by politicians can also reflect the aim to signal a general rejection of nationalist or populist movements, which is not only an opinion related to Poland but can be translated into political action in domestic politics (e.g. Martin Schulz). This is additionally indicated by direct analogies between Germany and Poland occurring in the articles. They either describe the developments in Poland as a warning message for Germany or call for the moderation of the discourse (Molinari, 2016; Gauweiler, 2016).

The criticism of the Polish government and the solidarization with the opposition can also be understood as involvement, especially in cases in which both can be found: praise of the Polish opposition and criticism of the government (Ulrich, 2015). Hence, an Othering discourse which is not related to the entire society and not devaluates the society can be interpreted as a Belonging discourse with parts of the foreign society, here with the Polish opposition. Distinct positions towards Polish politicians from the PiS and the PO have been found earlier. For example, in the German discourse on the Polish presidential election in 2010, Jarosław Kaczyński was, in contrast to his competitor Bronisław Komorowski, uniformly presented negatively and unsympathetic (Czachur, 2011). Accordingly, in most cases, not Poland is othered, but its government as well as the people and media associated with them.




Figure 3. Comparison of newspapers according to the frequency of coded segments indicating Othering, period one and two.

As visualised in Figure 3, significant differences in numbers of segments which were evaluated as examples of Othering have been found. This has to be evaluated as supporting evidence only, as the content and therefore the level of Othering between the segments varies. Moreover, segments have been coded twice or multiple times. Nevertheless, it supports the finding, that in the second period examples for Othering have been found especially in the *Welt* and in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. It is striking that in the second period the left-liberal *SZ* occupies a leading position in the Othering discourse, whereas in the first period, a discourse of Belonging dominated. This Belonging discourse was especially related to the German-Polish relationship and Poland's position in the EU. But it also extends to the representation of people with a Polish migration background. In the second period, the Othering discourse found in the *SZ* is degrading and produces the picture of an inferior Polish Other. A finding of the analysis is that Othering is not solely present in populist or right-wing discourses, but can and is in a similar way used by left-liberals. By contrast, the *FAZ* which particularly employed an Othering discourse in the first period (Poland as non-Western, Polish migrants as a burden), had a very balanced position on the Polish government and the Polish society in the later time phase, by debating arguments for Othering and Belonging. Similarly to the *SZ*, the *Welt* employed an Othering discourse on Poland justified with the non-compliance of democratic standards, European values and the reluctance to accept refugees. However, in contrast to the *SZ*, an Othering discourse has been found also in relation to Poles in Germany, both in the first and in

the second period, as Figure 3 shows. Here, for a conservative newspaper the particularly positive position on refugees in the second period, as well as the generally less migrant-friendly opinion in the first period come together. Both in the *Bild* and in the *Zeit* the number of articles on Poland is lower, due to the scarce political content of the *Bild* and the relatively small number of analysed weekly editions by the *Zeit* (only four prints have been analysed in each time frame). This explains also the low numbers in Figure 3. In the tabloid, in the first period two somewhat conflicting discourses are conducted, which construct Poles as criminals, threatening and a financial burden on one side, and on the other side, Poland is clearly considered as belonging to the European Union. As a result, a distinct differentiation of the discourse subjects (Poland as a state, Polish people in Germany) appears. In the *Zeit*, as it is a liberal newspaper with articles of different political opinions, several examples for Othering and Belonging can be found in both periods, without giving a clear picture or position.

The analysis shows that the discourse is largely characterized by Othering and Belonging and the representation of Poland is never unambiguous. Poland is seen as equivocal: It is a EU member, but a new one. It is a part of the West, but of the East at the same time. It is a democratic country, but democracy is in decline. Moreover, Othering is reasoned in the historical power inequalities which partially persist. In both periods and for most subjects, utterances underlining Othering as well as utterances indicating Belonging could be found. However, the discursive shift is evident: Whereas in the first period Poland is mainly constructed as belonging to Germany, to the European Union and to the Western world, in the second period, Othering is clearly dominating. The main tools found indicating Belonging were pronouns, the categorization as Western, emphasizing the benefits for the EU by the Polish membership and presenting Poland as equal. The characterisation of the German-Polish relation changed from a well-functioning partnership to a multifaceted dispute. Poland's depiction as the Other was linguistically conducted through employing metaphors, using amplifications and comparisons. By placing Poland in the category Eastern as opposed to Western, the distance to Poland was underlined. In addition, in relation to Nazi-Germany, the topos of history and in reference to the EU topos of constitutionality, threat, abuse and burden were used. Thereby, Poland was constructed as an internal Other, which neither upholds EU values nor helps its progress and therefore unrightfully belongs to the Union or even to the European civilization.

The political change from the liberal-democratic PO-government to the anti-liberal and anti-democratic PiS-government was the main reason for this development. Specifically, the Polish judicial and media reforms were assessed as undemocratic. They induced the characterization

Poland as not rightfully belonging to the European Union, and for its categorisation as Eastern. In addition, the reluctance to receive refugees and Eurosceptic voices were a justification to evaluate Poland as “not European”. This implies the German reception of the EU and the West as democratic states with pro-European societies which should be open for migrants/refugees. Furthermore, because the Polish economic well-being was a less prominent argument in the second period, it can be assumed that economic developments were less considered to be a threat for the continuity of the EU in 2015/2016. The national-conservative or authoritarian orientation of parts of the Polish society and of the PiS-government in conjunction with its reforms led to comparisons with Nazi-Germany, which insinuates questioning the moral of the compared subjects. Because of the notion of “Never Again”, implying an Othering of movements with similarities to National-Socialism, this Othering is especially powerful. These different reasons for Othering are all connected to the national-conservative, right-wing spectrum of Polish politics and go hand-in-hand with the polarization of the German society. Therefore, when a new Polish government came to power, the Othering of Poland would probably stop. It makes the relations nevertheless vulnerable, when a certain part of the country is strongly regarded with scepticism by the public of the other. But considering that polarization is dynamic, also a decline of polarization or polarization occurring around a different topic could improve the relations. That the latter somewhat happened is supported by findings of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2020) in combination with findings of Łada (2019): In 2019, for the first time since 2014, Germans ranked the refugee and migration issue not as the most important political problem anymore (but the climate crisis). Simultaneously, Łada (2019) found a sharp increase in the share of Germans assessing the German-Polish relations as good.

The representation of Polish people in Germany seems to be, to a certain extent, independent of the representation of Poland. In 2014, Polish people in Germany were likewise constructed as an Other and as a part of the Self. The Othering was reasoned in the criminality of Polish persons and in the legal vacuum in Poland, hence the topos of threat was employed, and the old stereotype about Polish car thieves was activated. Moreover, Polish migrants working in Germany were displayed as burdening and abusing. However, by using the topos of benefit, the belonging of Polish migrants to the German society was constructed. Remarkably, in 2015/2016 Polish migrants were less thematized and therefore neither a clear Othering or a clear Belonging discourse was conducted. This might be explained by the focus on other migrant groups, such as refugees. The evident Othering discourse in relation to Poland and the Polish government was thus not generalized to all Poles, specifically not to the Poles living or staying shortly in Germany. To conclude, this study has identified the overall main arguments constructing

Poland as the Other were the topos of history (Nazi-comparisons), the categorization of Poland as Eastern and its construction as non-European. Moreover, Poles were defined as the Other by presenting them as a burden, as abusers, and as a threat for the German society.

Other criteria from the conceptualization of Othering have not been found in a significant way. The argument that Poland ranks lower on a “civilizational” scale as compared to Germany does only occur once in a reader’s letter in 2014 and is treated as an exception and consequential not analysed in detail (Neef, 2014). De-/infrahumanisation refers mainly to individuals or human groups, and since the analysed case often refers to political standards, it was not found as a reasoning in a comprehensive way. But neither was it used to characterise Polish migrants.

The analysis reveals that in Germany the categorisations and characterisations of Poland are easily changeable. This volatility of the relationship can be seen by taking a look at the German perspective on Poland in 2014: Also before the main political reforms happened, Poland was not considered to be fully part of the Western community or of the EU. Because this was the case, the Othering discourse could easily be initiated by the events happening in 2015/16, the changes of functioning of the constitutional tribunal and the new appointment to numerous positions in public media. Consequently, it can be assumed, that similar developments in countries that are seen as belonging more to the above mentioned groups would have caused a different reaction, and hence, a different discourse less focussed on Othering. Nevertheless, the economic relations between the two countries are strong and German government politicians were very reluctant to criticize the Polish reforms but rather stressed their partnership. This indicates a difference of the presentation in the press and of the reality of the political relations.

Precisely because of these utterances by government politicians which stand occasionally in contrast to the evaluations of journalists, an analysis including the discourse of politicians is considered to be fruitful. Thereby, their different evaluations could help to detect the intentions behind their statements and furthermore, the influence of the public on the political discourse could be assessed. Another interesting subsequent research would include the Polish discourse and could therefore compare Othering and Belonging discourses vice versa. Even if it is assumed that Othering can only be conducted by the more powerful actor, the discursive mechanisms can likely be found also in discourses of the less powerful side. This study would show whether the relationship is differently or similarly assessed. In addition, it could reveal if country-specific discourses influence each other, as it was indicated in chapter 3.3, where a discourse in Poland influenced a discourse in Germany. Hence, it would aim to answer the question: How much is Othering dependent on the evaluations of the opposite?

The limitations of the applied discourse analytical approach lie in its subjectivity, as a consequence, the study is neither generalizable nor replicable. However, reasoned in its constructivist perspective, this approach also does not intend to create (true) knowledge (Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, 2018). Due to the selection of the time frames with regard to events standing in relation to the EU, a particular discourse on this subject has been found. Moreover, the second period has especially been chosen because of the controversial events happening in Poland during that time. Therefore, especially this period could constitute an exceptional case, or marks the beginning of an intensified debate. Certainly, a different sample would have shown different subjects, arguments and findings.

Apart from these evident limitations of the study, it nonetheless contributes to the academic knowledge in several ways. Firstly, two topoi have been derived and added to the topoi developed by Wodak (2001): The topos of constitutionality is specific for Othering discourses inside one group, and can be directed to members of an organization or citizens and groups in a state. In addition, the sub-topos of benefit is employed in the discourse on migrants and highlights their belonging. Secondly, the study underscores the applicability and relevance of the categories East and West, especially because of their flexibility. Thirdly, it was shown that Othering is not only used by right-wing politicians or journalists, but also can be found in (left-)liberal newspapers. It can be assumed that this occurs primarily in polarized societies, in which it is important for all actors to choose their side. Fourthly, the integration of the Belonging concept and the understanding of Othering and Belonging as a spectrum leads to a more balanced assessment of the discourse than a focus on Othering only – which is particularly relevant in the analysis of ambiguous cases.

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Appendix

Appendix A

Original quotations in German

	page
(1) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16.05.2014 (Ulrich, 2014)	23
<p>Vor 75 Jahren lag die furchtbarste Zeit in der deutsch-polnischen Geschichte noch vor uns. Da hatten die Leute hier Angst vor Krieg, und die Regierung meines Landes wollte Krieg. Und jetzt? Sind wir gemeinsam, gleichberechtigt, als Freunde in der Europäischen Union.</p>	
(2) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.01.2016 (Sattar & Schuller, 2016)	23
<p>Regierungssprecher Seibert sagte mehrfach, Deutsche und Polen seien Partner und Freunde, es sei das Interesse Berlins, diese engen Beziehungen, „wo immer möglich“, im Dialog mit der neuen Regierung auszubauen.</p>	
(3) Bild, 30.04.2014 (Reiter, 2014)	25
<p>Schwäche können wir [Mitglieder der EU/Europäer] uns nicht mehr leisten.</p>	
(4) Bild, 10.05.2014 (Diekmann & Vehlewald, 2014)	25
<p>Ich bin froh, dass wir Europäer uns auf einen Weg geeinigt haben, die Aggression Russlands zu verurteilen und sie zu stoppen versuchen, auch wenn die Sanktionen gegen Moskau bisher noch wenig Wirkung zeigen.</p>	
(5) Die Zeit, 22.05.2014 (Krupa, 2014)	25
<p>“Jetzt wollen wir zeigen, dass wir dazugehören” Der Pole Bogdan Wenta aber will dazugehören.</p>	
(6) Die Welt, 14.05.2014 (Siems, 2014)	26
<p>In Polen und Deutschland leben die überzeugtesten Europäer.</p>	
(7) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23.12.2015 (Brössler, 2015)	26
<p>Wenn Deutsche nach Osten schauen, glauben sie, Bastionen der Euroskeptiker zu sehen</p>	
(8) Die Welt, 14.01.2016 (Reding, 2016)	27
<p>Wem es nicht passt, der kann ja gehen!</p>	
(9) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24.12.2015 (Ulrich, 2015)	28

Die Pis-Regierung tauschte Führungsfiguren in Politik, Justiz, Verwaltung und Wirtschaft durch Gefolgsleute aus und setzte sich offen über eine Entscheidung des Verfassungsgerichts hinweg. Jetzt haben die Machthaber endgültig den Rubikon zwischen freiheitlichen und autoritären Systemen überschritten. [...]

Ziel des Streichs ist es, die Regierung zum Leviathan zumachen, der jeder Kontrolle entzogen ist. Durch das neue Gesetz kommt Polen diesem furchterregenden Zustand näher. [...]

Die Pis-Leute rechnen offenbar damit, ihr Tabubruch bleibe in Europa ohne Folgen. Sie glauben, dass sich die EU mit all ihren Problemen nicht noch einer weiteren Großkrise stellen will. Sollten sie recht behalten, käme dies einer europäischen Kernschmelze gleich. Europa wäre dabei, seine Identität zu verlieren, und sollte dann nie wieder in der Welt als Mahner für Demokratie und Recht auftreten.

(10) Die Welt, 22.12.2015 (Schmitt, 2015)

29

Bundeskanzler Werner Faymann hat recht, wenn er sagt, dass Solidarität keine Einbahnstraße ist. Sollten sich die Regierungen in Warschau, Budapest, Pressburg und Prag auch in Zukunft weigern, Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen, müssen EU-Subventionen für diese Staaten gekürzt werden. Denn es widerspricht dem europäischen Gedanken, das Geld der Nettozahler zu kassieren, gleichzeitig aber nichts zur Bewältigung der Flüchtlingskrise beizutragen.

(11) Die Welt, 14.01.2016 (Beutelsbacher, Sommerfeldt, & Zschäpitz, 2016)

30

Die am schwierigsten zu überwindende Grenze in Europa hat keine Zäune und keine Türme. Sie verläuft in den Köpfen. Auf der einen Seite stehen jene, die die Flüchtlingsströme stoppen wollen, sofort. Wie der linksnationalistische slowakische Regierungschef Robert Fico, der bedauert, dass Migranten eine „geschützte Art“ geworden seien. Oder Ungarns Ministerpräsident Viktor Orbán, der „keine große Zahl an Muslimen im Land“ haben will. Polens Regierungschefin Beata Szydlo wirft „einigen Ländern“ vor, „ihre Probleme zu exportieren“. Auf der anderen Seite steht Deutschland. [...] Der Ton ist schärfer geworden zwischen West und Ost, vor allem, seit in Polen die nationalkonservative PiS die Regierung stellt. Hier die, die ein offenes Europa wollen. Dort jene, die sich abschotten wollen. „Nie zuvor war die Kluft zwischen ihnen so groß“, sagt Ian Bremmer, Gründer der Eurasia Group, eines der weltweit wichtigsten politischen Analysehäuser. 2016 werde zum Schicksalsjahr. Hält Europa die Spannung aus – oder bricht es darunter zusammen? Nicht Alexis Tsipras, nicht Griechenland, nicht die Schulden seien die größten Risiken. „Es ist der Aufstieg von Populismus und Nationalismus“, sagt Bremmer.

Europa spaltet sich. [...]

Nicht wenige halten die Ost-Erweiterung inzwischen für einen Fehler

(12) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 09./10.01.2016 (Wielński, 2016)

31

In Polen ist etwas sehr Schlimmes im Gange. Gut, dass Europa reagiert. Von der Familie ist in schweren Zeiten Hilfe zu erwarten.

- 71
- (13) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 04.01.2016 (Felsner, 2016) 32
- Es ist beschämend: noch immer stehen wir mit dem Rücken zu Oder und Neiße. Von Zeit zu Zeit werfen wir den Polen gleichsam, ohne uns auch nur umzudrehen, mahnende Worte oder Schulzeugnisse über die Schulter.
- Es wird Zeit, anzuerkennen, dass 1989 der Eiserne Vorhang tatsächlich gefallen und es seit nun mehr als 25 Jahren nicht mehr angemessen ist, Polen um den Beweis seiner Zugehörigkeit zu Europa zu bitten.
- (14) Die Welt, 12.01.2016 (Winterbauer, 2016) 36
- Antideutsche Verschwörungstheorien stehen im Polen hoch im Kurs: Die Zeitschrift „Wprost“ stellt Angela Merkel und die Spitzen der EU als machthungrige Invasoren dar
- Sein Cover zeigt die drei deutschen Politiker und EU-Kommissionschef Jean-Claude Juncker über eine Karte gebeugt. Das Bild mit der Europafahne im Hintergrund erinnert an Aufnahmen aus dem Hitler-Hauptquartier im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Titel: „Sie wollen Polen wieder kontrollieren.“ Unter normalen Umständen müsste man dieser eigenwilligen Interpretation der Realität keine Bedeutung beimessen.
- (15) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30.12.2015 (Marsovszky, 2015) 37
- Die neuen EU-Länder sind Angstgesellschaften. Sie sind verspätete Nationen, weil sie sich zur Zeit der Aufklärung im nationalen Aufbau befanden. Die Ideen der Menschenrechte konnten deshalb nicht durch breite Massen verinnerlicht werden, und von den Idealen der Aufklärung blieb vor allem die Achtung der (gerade entstehenden) Nation zurück. Die Nation wurde abstammungsorientiert gedacht und nicht republikanisch-freiheitlich. In ethnisch orientierten Gesellschaften gehört das Stammesdenken durch Ausgrenzung zur Stärkung des Selbstverständnisses, während der Individualismus Angst erzeugt.
- (16) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.01.2016 (Frankenberger, 2016) 38
- Das deutsch-polnische Verhältnis ist eng, Deutschland und Polen sind wichtige Partner füreinander. Angesichts ihrer Geschichte ist das großartig.
- (17) Die Zeit, 15.05.2014 (Schieritz, 2014) 40
- In der Praxis aber sind derlei weitreichende Finanz- und Handelssanktionen derzeit eher unwahrscheinlich, weil sie auch für den Westen mit erheblichen Kosten verbunden wären. Ein Energieembargo etwa träfe die Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas hart, die einen großen Teil ihrer Gaslieferungen aus Russland beziehen
- (18) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.04.2014 (Schwarz, 2014) 40
- Der Westen des Ostens verwandelte sich rasch in den Osten des Westens.
- (19) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10.05.2014 (Bartetzko, 2014) 41

Dass die polnische Gruppe Donatan & Cleo mit folklorischem Pseudostriptease und eindeutigem Butterfass-Gefummel spießiges Puffniveau bietet, wagt beim ESC, weil Polen im Ukraine-Konflikt Schulterschluss mit dem Westen übt, kaum jemand zu sagen.

(20) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.12.2015 (Veser, 2016) 41

Budapest, Bukarest, Warschau: Im Osten viel Neues, aber wenig Gutes

(21) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 07.01.2016 (Hassel, 2016) 41

Polen: Wie in Budapest oder Moskau

(22) Die Welt, 11.01.2016 (Die Welt, 2016b) 42

Der Präsident des Europaparlaments, Martin Schulz, warf der Regierung eine Politik nach russischem Vorbild vor. „Das ist gelenkte Demokratie nach Putins Art, eine gefährliche Putinisierung der europäischen Politik.“

(23) Bild, 15.05.2014 (Bild, 2014b). 44

So schnell verschwindet ein geklautes Auto in Polen

(24) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16.05.2014 (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2014) 45

Es handelt sich, wie Brandenburgs Ministerpräsident Dietmar Woidke (SPD) betonte, nicht vorrangig um Straftaten von Polen, sondern oft um „europaweite Kriminalität von multinationalen Banden aus bis zu sechs Ländern“

(25) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.04.2014 (Astheimer, 2014a) 46

Flut von Kindergeldanträgen aus Osteuropa

[...]

Die Familienkasse kommt mit der Bearbeitung nicht hinterher: die Zahl der unbearbeiteten Vorgänge beläuft sich auf 30.000. Die meisten kommen aus Polen. Den deutschen Staat kostet das Hunderte Millionen Euro, wie das Bundesfinanzministerium auf Anfrage dieser Zeitung mitteilte.

(26) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.05.2014 (Astheimer, 2014b) 46

1 Milliarde Kindergeld für Ausländer

(27) Bild, 07.05.2014 (Bild, 2014a) 46

366 751 EU Ausländer bekamen deutsches Kindergeld

(28) Die Welt, 02.05.2015 (Crolly & Gaugele, 2014) 47

Nehmen Sie die Zuwanderung aus den osteuropäischen EU- Staaten. Ich rate allen, die sich plakativ und negativ äußern, kurz die Augen zu schließen und sich die polnischen, bulgarischen und rumänischen Pflegekräfte in Deutschland

wegzudenken. Ihnen haben wir es doch zu verdanken, dass wir unsere Angehörigen nicht in ein Heim geben müssen

Appendix B

List of press articles

- Astheimer, S. (2014a, April 30). Flut von Kindergeldanträgen aus Osteuropa [Flood of child benefit applications from Eastern Europe]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 15.
- Astheimer, S. (2014b, May 12). 1 Milliarde Kindergeld für Ausländer [1 billion child benefit for foreigners]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 15.
- Astheimer, S. (2014c, May 21). Deutschland zweitbeliebtestes Zuwandererziel [Germany second most popular immigration destination]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 5.
- Bannas, G., & Kohler, B. (2014, May 16). "Russland wendet sich wieder altem Denken zu" ["Russia turns back to old thinking"]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 3.
- Bartetzko, D. (2014, May 10). Frau Kümmernis [Mrs. Worries]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 11.
- Beutelsbacher, S., Sommerfeldt, N., & Zschäpitz, H. (2016, January 14). Ein neuer Plan für Europa [A new plan for Europe]. *Die Welt*, p. 11.
- Bild. (2014a, May 27). 366 751 EU Ausländer bekamen deutsches Kindergeld [366 751 EU foreigners received German child allowances]. *Bild*, p. 1.
- Bild. (2014b, May 15). So schnell verschwindet ein geklautes Auto in Polen [That's how quickly a car disappears to Poland]. *Bild*, p. 6.
- Bittner, J. (2016, January 7). Im Reich der Rechtlosen [In the realm of the lawless]. *Die Zeit*, p. 5.
- Bohsem, G. (2014, May 14). Finanzausgleich für Eltern [Financial compensation for parents]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 6.
- Brill, K. (2014, May 2). Feier einer Erfolgsgeschichte [Celebration of a success story]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7.
- Brössler, D. (2015, December 23). "Am Anfang muss die Kontrolle stehen" ["In the beginning there must be control"]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 8.

- Burghardt, P. (2016, January 5/6). Europäischer Grenzgang [European Border Crossing/Walk]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 5.
- Crolly, H., & Gaugele, J. (2014, May 02). „AfD an der Grenze zur Verfassungsfeindlichkeit" ["AfD on the verge of unconstitutionality"]. *Die Welt*, p. 4.
- Die Welt. (2014, May 22). Fünf Milliarden Euro für Hartz IV an Nicht-EU-Ausländer [Five billion euros for Hartz IV to non-EU foreigners]. *Die Welt*, p. 4.
- Die Welt. (2016a, January 6). Ein Toter, viele Verletzte, neun Supermärkte [One dead, many injured, nine supermarkets]. *Die Welt*, p. 24.
- Die Welt. (2016b, January 11). Polen verschärft Ton gegenüber Deutschland [Poland sharpens the tone towards Germany]. *Die Welt*, p. 1.
- Diekmann, K., & Vehlewald, H.-J. (2014, May 10). "Putins Politik zerstört das Gerüst Europas" ["Putin's policy destroys the framework of Europe"]. *Bild*, p. 2.
- Felsner, M. (2016, January 4). Polen ist der entscheidende Test für Europa [Poland is the crucial test for Europe]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 8.
- Fischer, J. (2015, December 29). Der Niedergang des weißen Mannes [The decline of the white man]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 2.
- Frankenberger, K.-D. (2016, January 12). Mehr Gelassenheit [More serenity]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 8.
- Gauweiler, P. (2016, January 8). Zuerst vor der eigenen Tür kehren [First sweep out your own door]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 25.
- Hassel, F. (2016, January 7). Polen: Wie in Budapest oder Moskau [Poland: Like in Budapest or Moscow]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 4.
- Hein, R. (2014, May 22). Plädoyer für ein geeintes Europa [Plea for a united Europe]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 43.
- Kafsack, H. (2016, January 8). Nur nicht überdramatisieren [Just do not overdramatize]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 4.
- Krupa, M. (2014, May 22). Vier, die alles geben [Four who give everything]. *Die Zeit*, p. 6.

- Maak, N. (2016, January 8). Flucht nach Polen [Flight to Poland]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 9.
- Marsovszky, M. (2015, December 30). Verspätete Nationen [Belated nations]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 2.
- Martin, M. (2016, January 04). Welche Werte, bitte? [What values, please?]. *Die Welt*, p. 2.
- Molinari, W. (2016, January 07). Die Gefahr wächst [The danger increases]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 15.
- Mühlhauer, A. (2016, January 4). Was die EU tun muss [What the EU needs to do]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 4.
- Neef, H. (2014, May 8). Bei Princçis Fans. *Die Zeit*, p. 81.
- Reding, V. (2016, January 14). Wem es nicht passt, der kann ja gehen! [Anyone who doesn't like it can leave!]. *Die Welt*, p. 4.
- Reiter, J. (2014, April 30). Das Wunder an Weichsel und Spree [The wonder of the Vistula and the Spree]. *Bild*, p. 2.
- Sattar, M., & Schuller, K. (2016, January 12). Kritik und Aggression [Criticism and Aggression]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 3.
- Schieritz, M. (2014, May 15). Stufe drei tut richtig weh [Stage three really hurts]. *Die Zeit*, p. 25.
- Schilitz, C. B. (2016, January 12). „Die beste Lösung wären Besuche deutscher Politiker!“ [“The best solution would be visits by German politicians!”]. *Die Welt*, p. 6.
- Schmitt, C. (2015, December 22). Fehlende Solidarität [Lack of solidarity]. *Welt*, p. 3.
- Schuller, K. (2016, January 7). Mit System [With a system]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 8.
- Schwarz, K.-P. (2014, April 30). Attraktives Europa [Attractive Europe]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 8.

- Siems, D. (2014, May 14). Europäer misstrauen den EU-Institutionen [Europeans distrust the EU institutions]. *Die Welt*, p. 4.
- Siems, D. (2016, January 8). Europa aus den Fugen [Europe out of joints/out of whack]. *Die Welt*, p. 3.
- Stuttgarter Nachrichten. (2016, January 5). Der Vorschlaghammer des Jaroslaw Kaczynski [The sledgehammer of Jaroslaw Kaczynski]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 2.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2014, May 16). Deutsche und Polen stärken Grenzkontrollen [Germans and Poles strengthen border controls]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 6.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2015, December 31). Europas Populismus [Europe's populism]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 11.
- Ulrich, S. (2014, May 16). Eurovision. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 3.
- Ulrich, S. (2015, December 24). Jenseits von Europa [Beyond Europe]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 4.
- Vehlewald, H.-J. (2016, January 4). Haben die Polen einen Vogel? [Do the Poles have a bird/have bats in the belfry?]. *Bild*, p. 2.
- Veser, R. (2015, December 21). Was vor der Wahl verschwiegen wurde [What was concealed before the election]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 2.
- Veser, R. (2016, November 11). Das polnische Dilemma [The Polish dilemma]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, p. 1.
- Wefing, H. (2016, January 14). Im Namen des Volkes? [In the name of the people/On behalf of the people?]. *Die Zeit*, p. 8.
- Wielński, B. (2016, January 9/10). Bitte nicht schweigen [Please do not be silent]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, p. 5.
- Winterbauer, J. (2015, December 21). Die Angst der Polen um ihre Freiheit [The Poles' fear for their freedom]. *Die Welt*, p. 6.
- Winterbauer, J. (2016, January 12). Kritische Berichte unerwünscht [Critical reports undesired]. *Die Welt*, p. 6.

Wisdorff, F. (2014, May 21). Deutschland erlebt Boom bei Zuwanderung [Germany experiences boom in immigration]. *Die Welt*, p. 1.

Appendix C
Code book

Table 1

Codebook of all codes used for the analysis, total frequency

Codes	Frequency
1 Polarization Within Germany	9
2 Polish Polarization	31
3 Linguistics	0
3.1 Emphasizing Difference	10
3.2 Emphasizing Polishness	5
3.3 Pronouns	2
3.4 Metaphors	38
3.5 Military/Fight Metaphors	8
3.6 Direct Ascriptions	14
3.7 Naming	11
3.8 Exaggerations	4
3.9 Comparisons/Analogies	15
4 German-Polish Relationship	40
5 Religion	12
6 Refugees	20
7 Migrants	21
7.1 Well Integrated	1
7.2 Dependency	7
7.3 Compassion	4
8 Othering	12
8.1 History	24
8.2 Solidarity	11
8.3 Victim Myth	2
8.4 Own German Standards	1
8.5 Politically Right	7
8.6 Dependent	4
8.6.1 Need For Guidance	16

8.7 Lack Of Tolerance	10
8.8 Undemocratic	38
8.9 Backward	19
8.10 Anti-German	16
8.11 Nationalists	25
8.12 Foreign	4
8.13 Threat	16
8.14 Burden	16
8.15 Not EU/European	43
8.16 Criminal	21
8.17 Abuse	20
8.18 Lack Of Morality/Civilization	10
8.18.1 Low Ranked Civilizationally	7
8.19 Emotional	15
8.20 Slavic	2
8.21 Eastern	32
8.22 Irrational	36
8.23 Inferior	10
9 Belonging	10
9.1 Freedom/Democracy Fighters	15
9.2 Modern	10
9.3 Successful	9
9.4 Relaxed	6
9.5 Democracy	12
9.6 Pro EU/European Positive	56
9.7 Rational	25
9.8 Equal	19
9.9 Western	12
10 Polish Women	7
11 Martyr	3
12 Polish Culture	29
12.1 Degrading	8
13 Climate	5
14 Alcohol	3
15 Poverty	11

16 Economy	42
17 Interviews With Poles	3
18 EU-Funds	10
19 EU-Institutions	8
20 Holiday Destination	8
21 Homosexuality	9
22 Voices Of Leftist Poles	7
23 History	3
23.1 Suppressed	3
23.2 Communism	10
23.3 Second World War	5
23.3.1 Perpetrators/Anti-Semits	8
23.3.2 Victims	28
24 Security	34

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