

Charles University
Faculty of Arts
Department of Political Science
Political Science

DISSERTATION

Daniel Šitera, M.A.

**Europeanization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe:
Political Economy of European Structural Funds**

Europeizace a stát ve střední a východní Evropě: Politická ekonomie
evropských strukturálních fondů

Supervisor: prof. Dr. Pavel Barša, M.A., Ph.D.

2020

Prohlašuji, že jsem disertační práci napsal samostatně s využitím pouze uvedených a řádně citovaných pramenů a literatury a že práce nebyla využita v rámci jiného vysokoškolského studia či k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.

V Praze dne 1. listopadu 2020

Daniel Šitera

Abstract

This Dissertation explores the impact of the European Union's (EU) Cohesion Policy (and its structural and investment funds) on the transnationalization and subsequent transformation of state in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The Cohesion Policy is commonly known as a redistribution framework which transfers developmental aid from the West European core to the less developed periphery of South Europe and CEE through the EU budget. The dissertation explores the impact of this core-peripheral redistribution from a critical perspective in the Comparative Capitalism (CC) scholarship. More concretely, it focuses on the so-called Visegrád states – Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – and their dependent market economies between the EU eastern enlargement in 2004 and the mid-2010s. This generates the first main contribution by bringing the EU structural funds into the CC debates on CEE which are mostly preoccupied with the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the transnationalization of Visegrád states. The contribution is impossible without historicizing the role of Cohesion Policy in shaping the EU historical core-peripheral relations since the late 1980s. Such a historization facilitates the second main contribution when examining how the post-2004 CEE integration transforms these core-peripheral relations in return. Without neglecting their material and institutional effects, the dissertation inspects especially the developmental *purpose* of such transformations, while theoretically conceptualizing the Cohesion Policy as a *transnational regulation of peripheral development* (TRPD). Through the study of primary documents, it proceeds via an inter-scalar (incorporated) comparison of the three – EU supranational, Visegrád national, Visegrád subnational – scales of European integration. Thanks to it, the TRPD is not only conceptualized theoretically but substantiated empirically as well.

Key words

Comparative Capitalism, Central and Eastern Europe, Cohesion Policy, European Studies, European Union, Foreign Direct Investment, Developmental State, Europeanization, Dependent Development

Abstrakt

Tato disertační práce zkoumá dopad Kohezní politiky Evropské unie (EU) a jejích strukturálních a investičních fondů na transnacionalizaci a následnou transformaci států ve střední a východní Evropě (SVE). Kohezní politika je obecně známá jako redistribuční rámec, jehož prostřednictvím dochází k transferu rozvojové pomoci ze západoevropského jádra do méně rozvinuté periferie jižní Evropy a SVE pomocí rozpočtu EU. Tato dizertace zkoumá dopad této redistribuce mezi jádrem a periferiemi Evropy z kritické perspektivy oboru srovnávacího kapitalismu. Konkrétněji se zaměřuje na takzvané visegrádské státy – Česko, Maďarsko, Polsko a Slovensko – a jejich závislé tržní ekonomiky v období od východního rozšíření EU v roce 2004 až do poloviny 10. let 21. století. První příspěvkem práce je to, že otázku strukturálních fondů EU přináší do debat komparativního kapitalismu o zemích SVE, které se většinou zabývají dopadem přímých zahraničních investic (PZI) na transnacionalizaci visegrádských států. Tento příspěvek je zároveň nerealizovatelný, aniž bychom historizovali roli Kohezní politiky při utváření historických vztahů mezi jádrem a periferiemi EU od pozdních 80. let 19. století. Podobná historizace umožňuje druhý hlavní příspěvek této práce, tedy zdokumentovat, jak integrace SVE zpětně transformovala tyto vztahy mezi jádrem a periferiemi. Aniž by opomíjela jejich materiální a institucionální rovinu, práce zkoumá *rozvojový účel (developmental purpose)* těchto transformací. Teoreticky při tom Kohezní politiku pojímá jako *transnacionální regulaci periferního rozvoje* (TRPD). Studium primárních dokumentů docházím k oběma příspěvkům metodou inter-skalárního (integrovaného) srovnání třech – evropské nadnárodní, visegrádské národní a visegrádské regionální – rovin evropské integrace. Její pomocí je koncept TRPD pochopen nejen teoreticky, ale i empiricky.

Klíčová slova

Komparativní kapitalismus, Střední a východní Evropa, Kohezní politika, Evropská studia, Evropská unie, přímé zahraniční investice, rozvojový stát, europeizace, závislý rozvoj

Acknowledgements

My debts are collective and individual. I am indebted to all my colleagues from the University of Leipzig, Charles University, and the Institute of International Relations in Prague. Without having the chance to discuss with them my dissertation in progress on various occasions such as winter and summers schools as well as regular seminars and colloquia or simply lunch meetings, it would hardly have its current shape.

In Prague, I am immensely thankful to Pavel Barša for his personal and intellectual encouragement and valuable comments on the various drafts of the dissertation. The same goes for Ondřej Slačálek. In Leipzig, I am thankful to Frank Hadler for his patience, intellectual help and valuable comments on various drafts of the dissertation. I am also very grateful to Martina Keilbach for her unending organizational support in making the PhD Thesis and my doctoral studies possible especially in their very uneasy beginnings. Ulf Engel's few but very productive and important comments were a path-shaping moment in making my theoretical contributions more coherent and intelligible. As well, many thanks to Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski for his friendly support at the start of my PhD studies when this was most necessary. Let's not forget Mario Gavenda who remained supportive of the Thesis from its original proposal to its final steps in many respects. My colleagues from the Institute of International Relations are a chapter for itself. Many thanks to Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Pert Kratochvíl for hiring me in the first place and Ondřej Ditrych for giving me time to finish the PhD Thesis. My thanks also go to Jan Daniel, Jakub Eberle, Petr Burda, Linda Flanderová, Kristýna Tamchynová, Jiří Mach and many others for their comradeship which has made the IIR the best place for finishing this Thesis and starting my academic career at full.

Above all, this dissertation would hardly be written without the wholehearted support of my family in all thinkable ways.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THEORIZING THE EU COHESION POLICY IN CEE

<i>Table of Contents</i>	v
<i>List of Illustrations</i>	vii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	x

1. Introduction	1
1.1. Europeanization: Development Fixing in Europe’s Capitalist Order.....	4
1.2. Structural Funds: Dependent Developmental State in Visegrád Capitalism.....	8
1.3. Comparative Capitalisms Methodology: Incorporated Comparison.....	12
1.4. Outline of the Thesis.....	16
2. Theorizing Cohesion Policy: A Transnational Regulation of Peripheral Development	20
2.1. Going beyond the EU Studies Scholarship on Cohesion Policy.....	21
2.1.1. Recasting Intergovernmentalism.....	22
2.1.2. Recasting Governance Approaches.....	23
2.2. Cohesion Policy in Europe’s Capitalist Order.....	28
2.2.1. Socio-Institutional Fixing.....	29
2.2.2. Infrastructural Fixing.....	32
2.2.3. Semantic Fixing.....	35
2.3. Dependent Developmental State in Visegrád Capitalism.....	38
2.3.1. Asymmetric Transnationalization of Peripheral State.....	40
2.3.2. Embedding Neoliberalism in Dependent Development.....	43
2.3.3. Rescaled Dependency in Visegrád City-Regional Development.....	48
2.4. A Transnational Regulation of Peripheral Development.....	50

II. DEVELOPMENT FIX IN THE EU

3. Cohesion Consensus: Negotiating Asymmetric (Inter-)Dependencies in Europe	52
3.1. Negotiating the Cohesion Consensus.....	54
3.1.1. From Institutional Void to Fixing.....	56
3.1.2. Partnership: From Regional to Cohesion Policy.....	60
3.2. A Solidarity of North-Western Payers.....	63
3.2.1. Europe 1992: Limits of Supranational Dirigisme.....	65
3.2.2. Agenda 2000: Governmentalizing Turn.....	68
3.3. An Added Value of South-Eastern Recipients.....	72
3.3.1. Lisbonization in Global Crisis: Strategic Turn.....	73
3.3.2. Europe 2020 in Eurozone Crisis: Conditionality Turn.....	77
3.4. Cohesion Bureaucracy.....	80
3.4.1. Operationalizing Cohesion Governance.....	81
3.4.2. (Self-)Evaluating Own Performance.....	83
3.5. Development Fix – Institutions and Transfers.....	85
4. Neoliberal Developmentalism: Regulating Uneven and Dependent Development in Europe	87
4.1. Origins of Neoliberal Developmentalism.....	89

4.1.1. From Statistical Void to Semantic Fixing	90
4.1.2. From Less Developed Regions to Less Developed States.....	92
4.1.3. An Outlook of Post-Fordist Developmentalism: European Competitiveness	94
4.2 Embedding the South-Northern Relations	96
4.2.1 Neoliberalizing Development: Global Competitiveness.....	99
4.2.2 Cohesion Four: Laboratory of Neoliberal Developmentalism.....	101
4.3 Embedding the East-Western Relations	103
4.3.1 Governmentalizing Neoliberal Developmentalism	107
4.3.2 The New Eastern Periphery	110
4.4 Global Crisis of European Post-Fordist Order	113
4.4.1 Indexing Neoliberal Developmentalism in Crisis.....	115
4.4.2 Debt-Driven Divergence in Southern Eurozone Periphery	117
4.4.3 FDI-Led Convergence of the EU's Eastern Periphery	118
4.5 Development Fix - Ideology	121

III. VISEGRÁD DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

5. Dependent Developmental State: A Visegrád Model	123
5.1 Governmentalizing Dependency.....	125
5.1.1. Governing through Nodal Agency	127
5.1.2. Operationalizing Complementarity	129
5.1.3. Performing Governance	133
5.2 Articulating Neoliberal Developmentalism	135
5.2.1 Self-Evaluating Own Backwardness	138
5.2.2 Articulating Peripheral Catch-Up.....	140
5.2.3 (Post-)Crisis Resilience?.....	143
5.3 Investing in Development in Czechia	146
5.3.1 Inside the Operational Programme: OPs EC, RDI, and RDE.....	158
5.3.2 Complementarity: Large Innovation Infrastructures	151
5.4 Consuming Development in Czechia.....	154
5.4.1 Regional Capture: ROP North West.....	156
5.4.2 State Capture: Agrofert, Babiš and the Conflict of Interests.....	157
5.5 Dependent Developmental State.....	161
6. Rescaled Dependency: From Lagging to Leading Regions	163
6.1 Governmentalizing Uneven Regional Development.....	165
6.1.1. Building Complementary Regions	167
6.1.2. Rescaling Governance	169
6.2 Articulating Competitive City-Regionalism	172
6.2.1 Lagging Regions	174
6.2.2 Leading Regions.....	177
6.3 A “Central European Silicon Valley”: South Moravian Region.....	179
6.3.1 Development Coalition.....	180
6.3.2 Development Strategy.....	183
6.3.3 City-Regional Competitiveness.....	185
6.4 Brno: Fixing the Innovation “Ecosystem”	189
6.4.1 Landscapes of Knowledge-Based Economy	190
6.4.2 Innovation Ecosystem	194
6.5 Rescaled Dependency	196

7. Conclusion	198
7.1. Peripheral Perspective	199
7.2. The Past and Future of Cohesion Consensus	201
7.3. The Past and Future of Dependent Developmental State	205
<i>Bibliography</i>	207

List of Illustrations

Table

1.1 Correlation between EU Net Payers and Major Investors in Visegrád States.....	4
2.1 Analytical Levels of TRPD between Regulation Theory and Conceptual Practice.....	30
2.2 Dependent Development State: Ideal Type	47
3.1 Technologies of Cohesion Governance	63
3.2 Concentration: Hierarchization of Regions by Type of Development.....	67
3.3 Programming: From Supranationalization to Governmentalization	77
3.4 Comparison of GDP Per Capita in PPS between the North, South, East, 2000-2018	116
5.1 Dependent Developmental State: National Scale, 2004-2020	126
5.2 Partnership: Membership in Czech, Polish, and Slovak Monitoring Committees for OPs in the Innovation Domain, 2007-2013	130
5.3 Priority Axis: European Centres of Excellence and Regional R&D Centres, 2007-2013	152
6.1 Uneven Convergence of Visegrád City-Regions as the NUTS 2, national and regional GDP per capita in PPS (index: EU = 100)	165
6.2 Innovation Infrastructures in Brno.....	188

Graph

1.1 Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Cohesion Investment (CI) Inflows.....	9
2.1 Share of Cohesion Investment in the National Public Investment.....	44
3.1 Cohesion Investment in the EU Budget: Total Payments and Percentage of EU GNI	54
3.2 Governmentalization across Reform Turns in Key Visions of Governance, 1973-2014	61
4.1 Cohesion Investment Flows to the South and the East, 2004-2018.....	89
4.2 Rise of Neoliberal Developmentalism in Key Hegemonic Visions, 2018-2017	110
5.1 Concentration: Thematic Comparison of Cohesion Investment in the EU, Baltic, Southern, North-Western, and Visegrád states, 2007-2013	137
5.2 Indicator: Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D (GERD) and the Composition of R&D Expenditures in Czechia by Sources	148
6.1 Capital and Second-Tier City-Regions: Regional Development and Cohesion Inflows, 2004-2018 (EUR).....	173
6.2 Second-Tier City-Regions: Regional Level of Development and Cohesion Inflows, 2004-2018 (EUR).....	173

Box

1.1 Scalar Hegemonic Dilemmas in the TRPD.....	17
--	----

Plate

4.1 Occurrence of Terms in the Chapter Headlines and Semantic Devices (tables, graphs, etc.) in Periodic Reports and Cohesion Reports Compared, 1980-2017	97
4.2 Mapping Core-Peripheral Relations in Thompson, Periodic and Cohesion Reports, 1973-2017	104
6.1 CEITEC Visualization in the VTU and MU Campuses and the Spatial Plan of Czech Technology Park	193

List of Abbreviations

AA	Auditing Authority
CA	Certifying Authority
CC	Comparative Capitalism(s)
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEITEC	Central European Institute of Technology
CF	Cohesion Fund
COCOF	Committee of the Coordination of Funds
CStF	Common Strategic Framework
CSuF	Community Support Framework
CSG	Community Strategic Guidelines
DG EMPL	Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion
DG REGIO	Directorate-General for Regional Policy
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMU	European and Monetary Union
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
ESFRI	European Strategic Forum on Research Infrastructures
EU	European Union
EERP	European Economic Recovery Plan
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
IB	Intermediate Bodies
ICRC	International Clinical Research Centre
IMP	Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
MA	Managing Authority
MC	Monitoring Committee
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
NSRF	National Strategic Reference Frameworks
OLAF	<i>Office de Lutte Anti-Fraude</i>
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
OP	Operational Programme
OP EC	Education for Competitiveness
OP EI	Enterprise and Innovation
OP EIC	Enterprise and Innovations for Competitiveness

OP RDE	Research, Development and Education
OP RDI	Research and Development for Innovations
PA	Partnership Agreement
R&D	Research & Development
RDASM	Regional Development Agency of South Moravia
ROP	Regional Operational Programme
ROP SE	ROP South-East
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SMIC	South Moravian Innovation Centre
SMRA	South Moravian Regional Authority
SPD	Single Programming Document
TNC	Transnational Corporations
TRPD	Transnational Regulation of Peripheral Development
VoC	Varieties of Capitalism

1. Introduction

The Cohesion Policy and its Structural Funds constitute one of the major institutional domains of the European Union (EU) policymaking. They have been also at the epicentre of political debates in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since the late 1990s and the region's EU membership after 2004. In 1988, the Cohesion Policy developed officially from the reform of European Communities' Regional Policy when uniting the existing funds – European Social Fund (ESF), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and later the Cohesion Fund (CF) – under one institutional roof.¹ This seemingly path-dependent evolution represented a historical conjuncture between the old and the new socioeconomic orders in Europe. The new order was institutionally underpinned by the EU (Ryner and Carfuny, 2016). Having originally emerged on a redistribution consensus between the *new* Southern and the *old* North-Western European member states, the Cohesion Policy reoriented to mediate the *new* East-West core-peripheral relations after 2004. Its eastward expansion aimed at transforming the so-called less developed CEE from a socioeconomic threat to the opportunity of the EU's global competitiveness.

The impact of cohesion funding on CEE state-society complexes was ambivalent in the programming periods of 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 under review in this PhD Thesis. Covering especially these two programming periods of Cohesion Policy, I study them in the interrelation with the CEE's post-2004 integration and the management of global economic and Eurozone debt crises up to the ascending populist turn between the late 2000s and the mid-2010s. The policy's n+2/n+3 rule allows this as it extended the later period to officially end in 2016, while overlapping with the new 2014-2020 period. The Cohesion Policy intermediates transfers of development capital from the core economies of Western Europe to fill the gap in the internal funds of the EU's peripheral economies. I study how these capital flows problematize the development trajectories in recipient states as they condition the asymmetric transformation of CEE states through their dependent integration into the EU.

There is a seldom research on how and in what ways the Cohesion Policy impacts on the

¹ By the mid-2010s, the structural and investment funding included also the pre-accession funds Phare, ISPA, SAPARD, IPA in various periods. It also included the guidance section of European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).

state transformations and *market* integrations of CEE *social* formations. Much of this is due the lack of political economy research. I strive to change it by synthesizing the following literatures: The EU studies scholarship dominates the research programme (Bachtler and Mendez, 2013), while narrowing it to public policy inquiries into the policy's institutional performance. This prevents to ask broader questions on the its role in reordering the socioeconomic inequalities and power asymmetries inherent to core-peripheral relations in Europe. Meanwhile, the political economy scholars in the Comparative Capitalism (Ebenau et al., 2015) and critical European Studies (Carfuny and Ryner, 2012) fields remain mostly silent on the topic. There is thus only a forgotten knowledge of early European dependency scholarship on structural funds (Weissenbacher, 2018). What is more, the exceptions from the rule (Streeck and Elsässer, 2015; Gill, 1998: 14; Offe, 2001: 467; Becker et al., 2016) in both mainstream and critical political economy disregard it as irrelevant for and thus marginal in the study of European integration. Against this background, I open space for the broader inquiry exactly by mutually engaging the problem-solving EU studies with the heterodox CC literatures on both EU and CEE integrations.

Foregrounding core-peripheral relations, I do not ascribe CEE the peripheral position due to my theoretical bias. Rather, this bias allows me to address the overlooked fact that the management of core-peripheral relations is explicit in the knowledge-production and policy practices of the EU Cohesion Policy. The management is inherent to the main role of Cohesion Policy: to fix the EU as a coherent regional order through the regulation of Europe's uneven capitalist development (Smith, 1984/2010; Harvey, 1985; Jessop, 2012). European integration is driven by the political promise that the integration eventually leads to the mutual socioeconomic convergence through the *equalization* between Europe's (semi)core and (semi)periphery in the deepened and expanded Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The Regional turned Cohesion Policies embodied this promise under the heading of *economic, social and territorial cohesion* (Single European Act, 1986; Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). The continuing *differentiation* in core-peripheral relations begs, however, a question on whether this promise is not only a "developmentalist illusion" (Arrighi, 1990). The illusion drags accordingly the (semi)peripheral societies into equalizing catch-up which inevitably ends up in their ongoing differentiated integration. The lack of critical political economy scholarship on the Cohesion Policy in (Central and East) European integrations

makes this question underresearched.

Inquiring into this question, I study the experience of the so-called Visegrád model of capitalism which is a cluster of Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Visegrád economies are often observed as successful integrationist examples of semiperipheral catch-up during their post-2004 EU membership which remain moreover resilient to the global economic crisis (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012; Bohle, 2017). Far from being homogenous, the Visegrád-type capitalism can be differentiated as a political-economic model from the rest of the EU (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a), all post-socialist transition economies (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011), and other cases of (semi)peripheral integration in the global South under neoliberal globalization (Nölke et al., 2015). To explain this dependent model, most CC scholars focus narrowly on the transnational power relations and socioeconomic effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) with the West European origin. However, the FDI bias fails to fully acknowledge the impact of EU integrations on the FDI trajectories. As a prelude to this, the Table 1.1 identifies the Western origins of both cohesion investment and FDI in the Visegrád material dependence. Bringing in the EU funding, I also foreground the heterodox political economy perspective to further close this knowledge gap with respect to both Europe's core-peripheral relations and CEE's dependent development.

For exploring this dual dependency, I offer a transdisciplinary concept of *transnational regulation of peripheral development* (TRPD). The TRPD provides a conceptual framework which allows to explore how and in what ways the Cohesion Policy fixes the uneven and dependent development in Europe's core-peripheral relations. The TRPD facilitates also a conceptual coherence and theoretical-empirical bridge for the Thesis and this introduction. The chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce the other concepts related to the TRPD: development fix, dependent developmental state, and rescaled dependency. These concepts make sense of the Europeanization-led effects of the structural funding on the supranational scale of EU regional ordering, as for the development fix, and the two – national and subnational – scales of Visegrád model of capitalism with regard to the dependent developmental state and the rescaled dependency. Second, I explain how the method of inter-scalar (incorporated) comparison operationalizes these concepts for researching the effects of Cohesion Policy across three scales. Last, I outline the structure of this Thesis.

Table 1.1 Correlation between EU Net Payers and Major Investors in Visegrád states (descending order from the larger to lower value)

Net Payers into EU budget <i>Average net operating balances in the EU multiannual financial framework, 2004-2013</i>	Main Investors in Visegrád states <i>FDI stock positions by country of origin in Visegrád states (aggregate sums), 2004-2013</i>
Germany	Germany
United Kingdom	Netherlands
France	Luxembourg
Italy	Austria
Netherlands	France
Belgium	Spain
Sweden	United States
Austria	Ireland
Denmark	Switzerland
Finland	Italy
Luxembourg	United Kingdom

Source: Own preparation; EU Financial Reports (annual) and Central Banks of Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia

1.1. Europeanization: Development Fix in Europe’s Capitalist Order

As I show in the theoretical chapter 2, the EU studies scholarship on Cohesion Policy has only a limited understanding of Europeanization. It is able to grasp the “institutional manifestations” of Cohesion Policy but ignores the interrelated „dimension of [its] social purpose“ which allows the scholars to „predict the *form* of the [European] international order, but not its *content*“ (Ruggie, 1982: 382). Therefore, the mainstream scholarship is unable to address its own elephant in the room: the regulation of uneven and dependent development in Europe. In this Thesis, I focus especially on the ideological content or *developmental purpose*, as I denote it later, without however neglecting the institutional and material realms of this TRPD. Addressing the elephant in such a way, I offer the concept of development fix. The concept explores the Cohesion Policy as an institutional part of the EU’s broader cohesion agenda. Accordingly, the institutional form only intermediates the material and ideological dimensions of such a developmental agenda. The development fix is only a contextual and concrete variation of *spatiotemporal fix* that is inspired by David Harvey (1981, 2003) and Bob Jessop (2006, 2013). As other spatiotemporal fixes, it helps to understand how the EU strives to establish a political regulation of its crisis-ridden economic heterogeneity to restore its “structured coherence” as a transnational regional order (Jessop, 2006; Harvey,

2004: 101-102). By doing so, the concept captures all the three dimensions – material, institutional, and ideological – of such fixing with respect to the Cohesion Policy as a TRPD.

The most exemplary case of a spatiotemporal fix was the Marshall Plan in the post-1945 Western Europe which underpinned the trans-Atlantic capitalist order under the US state-capital leadership (Harvey 2003: 120; van der Pijl, 1984/2012: 138-187). Hence, I interpret the Cohesion Policy agenda as a more comprehensive Marshall Plan-type arrangement which materially, institutionally, and ideologically matured into the TRPD during the EU integration since late 1980s. This happened under the West European core state-capital leadership. Indeed, the European Commission (henceforth as Commission) (1996: 92) described it in this way:

“One comparison for the appreciation of the scale of assistance under EU cohesion policies is that of the Marshall Plan, the archetypal structural aid programme for the reconstruction of post-war Europe, which was equivalent to 1 % of US GDP and contributed on average about 2 % of the European annual GDP over the period 1948-51. The Community's effort is some 0.5 % of Union GDP per year but it is a longer-term commitment which will have amounted cumulatively to 6.5 % of Union GDP over the decade 1989-99, compared to 4 % of US GDP committed by the US between 1948 and 1951.”

The development fix, according to Harvey, must be always “literal” or material as much as “metaphorical” or ideological (Harvey, 2003: 115). According to the original Regulation Approach (Aglietta 1979/2015; Jessop and Sum, 2006), these two levels are institutionally fixed in the material-economic *regime of accumulation* and the ideological-political *mode of regulation*. Institutions intermediate the relationship of both levels, while researching their content allows for analysing the EU’s capitalist accumulation and political regulation as mutually constituted. From this perspective, the essential problem of European integration is to transnationally fix the “heterogeneity” of various national regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation within European capitalist diversity (Sharpf, 2002; Höpner and Schäfer, 2012a). I analyse thus the role of Cohesion Policy with respect to the material flows of cohesion investment and ideational transfers of development strategies which condition them. Then, I ask how they shaped the EU-driven reordering of the “impossible” heterogeneity of core-peripheral capitalist institutions (Jessop, 2014a). More precisely, I study the role of Cohesion Policy in organizing the “transnationally (inter)dependent regimes

of accumulation on the one hand and the mode of multi-level regulation that has emerged on the other” (Bieling et al., 2016: 65) in the EU.

Given my interest in the metaphorical content of TRPD-based development fix, I follow neo-Gramscian regulationists when analyzing the multi-level mode of transnational regulation (Bieler and Morton, 2001; Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn, 2009; Bieling et al., 2016). The neo-Gramscian analysis ignores Cohesion Policy even when investigating the peripheral integrations of Southern Europe and CEE peripheries (Holman, 1998; 2004a). At the same time, it traces the social purpose of European integration (Van Apeldoorn, 2002). Neo-Gramscians contextualize it also into the global structural changes. Following them, I can inquire into the purpose of Cohesion Policy in the change from the post-1945 Fordism to the post-1980s post-Fordism and up to the post-Fordist crisis in the mid-2010s (Jessop, 2002; Ryner and Carfuny, 2016).

Fordist strategies of political regulation and capitalist accumulation favoured nation state as its primary scale of production relations. National varieties of embedded liberalism constituted their social purpose. Post-Fordism tended to favour a dual transnationalization of capitalist accumulation and political regulation which relativized the national scale of production relations. Its social purpose turned into a variously contested and hybridized forms of embedded neoliberalism. According to Brenner (2003), inherent to such post-Fordist projects was moreover the transformation of spatial strategies through state rescaling. Therefore, the transnationalization shifted the political regulation of nation-state governance up to the supranational and down to the subnational levels of governance. In sum, the neo-Gramscian emphasis on extra-economic hegemony allows us to research what I consider a *developmental purpose* of Cohesion Policy as inherent to the broader social purpose of EU’s multi-level mode of regulation. In relation to the argument on the post-Fordist embedded neoliberalism, I ask thus on whether this developmental purpose could be defined as a type of “neoliberal developmentalism” (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 296-324) under emergence since late 1980s.

If durable and hegemonic, political regulation of any regional order must be regularized into “institutional compromise” (Jessop, 2006) through such a development fix. It is thus pertinent to ask if and how Cohesion Policy underpinned such an institutional compromise. A hegemonic order must regularize the core-peripheral relations into an interdependent, yet

asymmetric inter-state consensus (Cox, 1983, 1987). Through their expansion, capitalist orders avoid the tendency to economic crises by interconnecting core with new markets, investment locations or sources of raw materials and cheaper labour power. The expansion skews the economic interests and innovations of class relations in favour of capitalist core and subordinates the peripheral interests. As no hegemonic order can however durably exist on pure relations of domination and exploitation, there must be “economic concessions” to peripheral populations (Jessop, 2006). Such concessions underpin a redistributive consensus that co-opts peripheral elites into the general interest to avoid economic crises within the normality of established political and economic hierarchies. In the EU, the institutionalized consensus fixes them into the multi-level mode of transnational regulation. Indeed, the concept of multi-level governance was firstly described by scholars (Marks 1992, 1993; Hooghe, 1996) studying the emergence of the EU with respect to the Cohesion Policy. Accordingly, the EU has been transnationally organized through the multi-level networks dominated by the Commission in this emergent multi-level polity. Neo-Gramscians understood these public-private networks as embedded in the broader networks of global governance and analysed how the Commission navigated them to hierarchically produce and naturalize the hegemonic purpose of the EU as a globalized regional order (Gill, 1998; Van der Pijl, 1998; Van Apeldoorn and Hager, 2008).

Considering the literal meaning, the regulationists’ view on the EU as a transnational capitalist order of (inter)dependent regimes of accumulation is also helpful. It allows us to realize the material role of Cohesion Policy as primarily an economic concession in patterning the uneven (inter)dependence into temporarily coherent order. These concessions return us to the need to research how the Cohesion Policy defines their developmental purpose and thus also the strategies of this patterning in peripheral states. For Harvey (1981: 413-445; 2003), capitalist orders expand through the export of social relations of production and consumption from capitalist cores to capitalist or non-capitalist peripheries. The durability of this expansion is, however, impossible without investment into immobile infrastructures or the so-called “fixed capital” (Harvey, 1981: 204-238) so that mobile forms of capital can circulate through the globalizing accumulation process (Harvey, 2001). In other words, the internal intensification in and external expansion of the EU as a capitalist order depends on its continuing investment

into social and physical infrastructures which enable and interconnect the circuits of capital such as FDI, trade exchange, and other (non-)material flows.

In capitalism, state and public investment overtake the task to organize and territorialize such primary conditions for a sustained accumulation (Harvey, 1976) in core and also peripheral catch-up strategies (Gerschenkron, 1962; Skocpol et al., 1985; Nölke, 2012). South European and CEE states were historically unable to generate internal funds to guarantee own infrastructural investment, which made them dependent on capital transfers from core states to fill own internal funds (Janos, 1989). Aware of this, I inquire into the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy and which strategies of infrastructural integration into the EU it has promoted in the Southern Europe and CEE in particular.


Development fix is metaphorical and literal at once. While considering the literal dimension, the theoretical chapter 2 and empirical chapters 3 and 4 inquire especially into its metaphorical dimension to illustrate how it underpinned the Cohesion Policy as TRPD. I explore how the TRPD aimed at reordering the EU's capitalist heterogeneity into a structurally coherent order through the regulation of its uneven and (inter)dependent development. This, as I show, was a historically contingent process which, though managing development assistance from European cores to peripheries, strived to organize the transnational political patterning of uneven accumulation regimes in the EU. Regarding the mode(s) of regulation and regime(s) of accumulation, I also show how the development fix formed through the mutual constitution of (literal) infrastructural fixing, (intermediating) socio-institutional fixing, and (metaphorical) semantic fixing within the TRPD. In other words, I ask how the development fix was mediated on institutional level of more ideological regulation and more material accumulation patterns in Europe's variegated landscapes of core-peripheral relations.

1.2. Structural Funds: Dependent Developmental State

Therefore, I argue against the claim that there was no Marshall-plan type arrangement for CEE (Ivanova, 2007). I rather develop a research agenda which identified the EU's transnational integration as providing development programs or policies in CEE, albeit insufficient in the illusory promise of intracontinental equalization (Bruszt and McDermott, 2012; Bruszt and Vukov, 2017). As discussed in the theoretical chapter 2, I extend the

argument and go beyond its institutionalist view to explore whether and how the development fix translated into a variety of *dependent developmental state* in the Visegrád variety of capitalism. Again, I am interested more in the developmental purpose of this translation but consider the institutional and material conditions of these process, too. I focus on Visegrád capitalism because it was already epitomized as a FDI-based “dependent market economy” (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009) which emerged in the late 1990s and remained resilient during the global economic crisis by the mid-2010s. There is already an inquiry into the role of EU funds in these FDI-based regimes of accumulation as a new source of material dependence (Medve-Bálint, 2014; Jacoby, 2014; Bohle and Greskovits, 2018). The scholarship does not straightforwardly research the dual dependence, as documented in the Graph 1.1, in the actual complementarity between the FDI and cohesion investment. By inquiring into the strategic purpose of these Visegrád development state projects, I also complement the institutionalist inquiries into the developmental effects of Cohesion Policy in CEE.

Graph 1.1 Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Cohesion Investment (CI) Inflows (annual, % GDP)



Source: European Commission (Financial Reports, Revenues and Expenditures data) on CI, OECD database on FDI

State projects are, according to the regulationist state approach (Jessop, 1990; Drahokoupil, 2009a), accumulation strategies which translate the modes of regulation into comprehensive political regulation. I bring the Cohesion Policy in to nuance thus the understanding of this (trans)national regulation of Visegrád dependent development in comparison to the rest of the EU and the world. First, I ask how the Cohesion Policy shapes the development *capacity* and relative *autonomy* of these FDI-based state projects (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012; Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). Visegrád experience is commonly derived from the comparison with the East Asian developmental states as superior peers of semiperipheral catch-up on the one hand and the West European market economies as core development patterns on the other. The comparison is historical as much as geographical. While the later cases are institutional products of the post-1945 embedded liberalism, the Visegrád model fully institutionalized under the conditions of post-1980s embedded neoliberalism (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a). Visegrád accumulation strategies lack the East Asian scale of autonomous development and capacity in their catch-up trajectories (Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; Schmidt, 1996; Amsden, 2001). This proves to be an impossible trajectory under the emerging neoliberal globalization even for East Asia due to the intensifying “internationalization” of states (Amsden et al., 1994; Glassman, 1999; Wade, 2018). Nevertheless, the globalist reindustrialization has appropriated Visegrád state projects, along with Slovenia, with more coherent developmental capacity to the rest of post-socialist world and, as the mid-2010s crisis revealed, Southern Europe (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a; Bohle, 2017).

Second, and more importantly, I inquire into whether the Cohesion Policy tendentially shapes the accumulation strategies along the lines of TRPD-based neoliberal developmentalism. Asking about a neoliberal developmentalist, I rely on the ongoing research on the Visegrád regime of “dependent embedded neoliberalism” (Bohle, 2009). Such a regime is characterized as combining the neoliberal reforms and FDI-oriented industrial strategies with the social appeasement of otherwise less protected and cheap but skilled labour. The historical genesis of this regime is based on the strategies privileging the institutional and social embedding of globalist *outward-looking* competition over the FDI (Drahokoupil, 2009a). In the late 1990s, these strategies replaced the nationalist *inward-looking* strategies and opened the intra-Visegrád competition over the same-type FDI which

resulted into the intra-Visegrád convergence on similar accumulation regime since the early 2000s. Following the post-crisis challenge of inward-looking and developmentalist program of nationalist forces in Poland and Hungary in the mid-2010s (Bluhm and Varga, 2019), its content remains rather resilient or undergoing a heterodox adaptation at best (Bohle and Greskovits, 2018; Toplišek, 2019). These inquiries into the content of state strategies remained often on the level of formal policies with respect to the accumulation regimes. Focusing on the Cohesion Policy, I am interested in demasking the Commission's role when regulating these development strategies (Jacoby, 2010; Medve-Bálint, 2014). Furthermore, I go beyond the formal policies to study the developmental purpose on ideological level of state projects which can be identified as a neoliberal developmentalism.

In the same manner, I inquire into whether the multi-level nature of Cohesion Policy resulted in the rescaled dependency with respect to Visegrád subnational or inter-local relations (Brenner, 2004, 2019). By the rescaled dependency, I describe the strategies through which the Visegrád states regulate their uneven regional development. That is by shifting the management of Visegrád dependency downwards to the regional actors. Through state rescaling strategies (Drahokoupil, 2009a), the FDI have sociospatially polarized the intra-national development into leading and lagging regions (Brown et al., 2007). As an accession conditionality for the EU funds, the EU enforced the formation of multi-level governance which formed diverse landscapes of regional and local governance in Visegrád states (Bruszt, 2008). What is more, the redistribution of structural funding has moreover reinforced the polarizing pattern rather than alleviating it (Medve-Bálint, 2018). As our inquiry into the strategies of rescaled dependency shows, this was due to the fuelling of both the inter-local competition over the cohesion investment as complement to the parallel competition over the FDI. Beyond these institutionalist inquiries, I thus investigate the Cohesion Policy and its varied translations to survey whether its rescaling developmental purpose legitimizes this polarization (Lang et al., 2015; Lang and Görmar, 2019). The rescaled dependency presumes a turn in the development responsibilities to lower tiers of subnational governance and expects the selective privileging of entrepreneurial strategies of inter-local competition not only intra-nationally but within the whole EU.

The dependent developmental states are thus projects inherent to the TRPD. As I show in the theoretical chapter 2 and empirical chapters 5 and 6, they represent state projects at the

intersection of transnational integration and national embeddedness. This variegated integration is exemplified in chapters 2, 5 and 6 which document these development projects as tendentially rescaled. First, I am interested in how the development fix translated into these state projects. My aim is not to analyse the funds as only a new source of dependency next to the FDI but inquire into their complementarity. Although equally analysing its material and institutional manifestations on the regime level, I am interested especially in the development ideology promoted by the Cohesion Policy. What is more, this involves the inquiry into the change of state-space relations because the multi-level emphasis of Cohesion Policy invites into the research on how it mobilizes city-regional competition in Visegrád states.

1.3. Comparative Capitalisms Methodology: Incorporated Comparison

The heterodox understanding of Cohesion Policy as a TRPD allows us to decipher its transformation as co-constitutive with Europe's historically changing core-peripheral relations. I use this heterodox potential of the CC field at the transdisciplinary conjunction of International, Comparative, and Geographical Political Economy. This potential is methodologically operationalized in the *incorporated comparison* which prefers substantive to the formalistic comparative approach (McMichael, 1990, 2000). The incorporated comparison embeds the inter-scalar comparison of the three – EU, national and subnational – scales of European integration. We can thus analyse the EU's spatial and historical reordering and its post-2004 eastward expansion as interrelated, while avoid various methodologically centrist traps (Jessop et al., 2008). As practiced already by Drahokoupil (2009a), this substantive strategy builds a single-case oriented multi-scalar approach which puts the in-depth study of Czech case in Cohesion Policy into the centre of analysis. We can firstly understand the TRPD as an interlinking variable which takes different, yet interrelated scalar articulations as (i) *development fix* on the EU scale, (ii) *dependent developmental states* on the Visegrád state scale, and (iii) *rescaled dependency* on the Visegrád subnational scale. Observing such general tendencies, the single-case oriented multi-scalar approach allows for then for their concrete substantiation.

The substantivist approach departs from the critique of neo-institutionalist EU studies and CC mainstream literatures in order to arrive at a critical materialist CC standpoint. The critical perspective reconciles the problem-solving inquiries into institutional performance with focus on socioeconomic inequalities and power asymmetries. More concretely, we can thus decipher how these inequalities and asymmetries between cores and peripheries shape but are simultaneously being regularized or normalized in the social purpose of EU governance or better the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy. The critical materialist CC stream combines *critical* realist and historical *materialist* standpoints to understand social life as historically ordered into open-ended and contingent material structures which pre-exist and thus limit human agents but are simultaneously (re)produced by them through their discursive interactions (Van Apeldoorn, 2004). The political economic difference consists in the emphasis on the fact that we must talk about *capitalist* social life where social power and production relations are basis of socioeconomic institutions in the variegated landscapes of global capitalism (Bruff, 2011; Macartney and Shields, 2011). This perspective allows us to incorporate the spatiotemporal repositioning among the various levels and units of analysis as much as to grasp uneven interrelationships between the TRPD's material and ideological dimensions through the means of qualitative methodological strategy.

We thus avoid the formal juxtaposing of the TRPD articulation on the three– EU supranational, Visegrád national, and Visegrád subnational – scales as units of analysis to be “separate vehicles of common or contrasting patterns of variation” (McMichael, 2000: 671). Rather, the single-case oriented multi-scalar approach follows the *substantivist* “inquiry, where process-instances are comparable because they are historically connected and mutually conditioning” and units are compared „in relation to one another and in relation to the whole formed through their inter-relationship“ (McMichael, 2000: 671). The incorporated comparison opens up thus to conceive the three scalar entry points as interrelated and analyses the historically cumulative processes of the Cohesion Policy's transformation across its 1960s origins, late 1980s turning point, the eastern enlargement and until the post-crisis 2010s. This sort of multi-scalar substantivism tries to make sense of “unity in diversity without reifying either” as the units of analysis become “specified in time and place” rather than “outside time and space relations” (McMichael, 1990: 395). From that viewpoint, the in-depth

single case study of Czechia in and of Cohesion Policy is observed from a polymorphous perspective on Visegrád capitalism in the EU's variegated integration.

Instead of treating the units of analysis as self-enclosed, I sympathetically move from the neo-institutionalist *varieties of capitalism* (VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 2001) paradigm on the comparative institutional advantages to the heterodox *variegated capitalism* (Peck and Theodore, 2007; Sum and Jessop, 2013) perspective. The heterodox perspective is cognizant of transnational power relations (Bohle and Greskovits, 2009) and socioeconomic inequalities (Ebenau, 2012). This allows to research the Czech case in Cohesion Policy as inherent to the spatiotemporally emergent TRPD within the semantic (ideological), socio-institutional (institutional), and infrastructural (material) levels of development fix. The Czech single-case and comparative approach brings the in-depth qualitative analysis of the central case into the discussion to make concrete translation of the development fix into dependent developmental states (material, institutions, and ideological) in the Visegrád variety of capitalism. Under these conditions, the single-case standpoint allows both for theoretical generalization and then to test the theoretical propositions regarding the TRPD in CEE. The comparison enables then the compositional exploration of the single case as an integral part of global or at least European spatiotemporal variation in outcomes but makes also sense of causal regularities which the contextualization of the single case makes observable.

As for concrete methods, I use a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. They are concerned with the reading of primary documents (i.e. reports, strategies, legal regulation) produced in the domain of Cohesion Policy and the interpretation of economic data on its redistributive character from the 1960s/1988 up to the mid-2010s. For the qualitative content analysis, I am using the interpretative reading of these documents at all the three scales (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Montgomerie, 2017). These documents are produced by the Commission, the Visegrád national governments, and the Visegrád regional and municipal governments. Each empirical chapter starts with identifying these types of documents and their position in the inter-textual and inter-scalar hierarchies of the TRPD. As for the three (inter)scalar entry points, the timeframes of identified documents change, although they are researched through their varied interrelationship within the TRPD. On the EU scale, the content analysis covers strategic documents which have been published by the Commission between the 1960s/1980s to the mid-2010s. On the Visegrád scale, the national and

subnational strategic documents are then compared in the timeframe of 2004 and mid-2010s. Within these same timeframes, I search for economic data inside and outside of the Cohesion Policy as a supportive means of the content analysis to illustrate the material context of the institutional and ideological dimensions of the TRPD.

The reason for selecting the in-depth study of Czech case in Cohesion Policy is clear. First, Czechia forms a Visegrád middle ground in economic integration but facilitates a more Eurosceptic political context. Along with Slovakia, Czechia represents the most radical turn from nationalist to integrationist states projects in the late 1990s (Drahokoupil, 2009a). In the mid-2010s crisis, these projects remained politically more resilient than the ones in Hungary and Poland which turned to political and economic nationalism (Toplišek, 2019). Unlike Slovakia, Czechia restrained from entering the EMU membership along with Poland and Hungary (Pechova, 2012). Moreover, it recorded relatively higher co-occurrence of harder and open Euroscepticism at both levels of party-based politics and overall society than the rest of Visegrád societies (Kopecký and Mude, 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). This long-term combination of middle-ground socioeconomic integration and more hostile socio-political context allows us to test the role of Cohesion Policy in making the EU a hegemonic order. Second, it is the best ground for testing the EU funds as economic concessions in the dilemmas of (pre-accession) dependence, (post-accession) embeddedness and (post-)crisis resilience. As evidenced in many instances below (see Tables 1.1 and 2), Czechia's public investment and general economic convergence has been less reliant on structural funding in all these periods (EC, 2010a: 249; 2014a: xvi; 2017: xxii). As illustrated too (see Table 3.4, Graph 5.2, Plate 4.2), Czech socioeconomic indicators allowed to observe its development position as "moderately developed" in contrast to the "less developed" Visegrád rest (EC, 2010a: x, 2; 2014a: viii, 15; 2017: viii, 16). Slovakia converged on this status over time, while Poland and Hungary remained in the latter category. The Czech case allows thus to test the dependency thesis in the less dependent and more embedded Visegrád case with respect to the cohesion assistance as economic concessions.

The Czech case is thus an empirical mirror of the Cohesion Policy as TRPD. Through the approach of incorporated comparison, the three-scalar empirical comparison allows then for a generalizing theorization of the Cohesion Policy and recognizing the empirical particularities of the central case in these broader general tendencies. The TRPD as an interlinking variable

can be thus conceptualized as development fix, dependent developmental state, and rescaled dependency on the three scales through a conceptual discovery which is then substantiated through the empirical research. The organization of this two-way inquiry is explained below.

1.4. Outline of the Thesis

The structure of this thesis reflects the structure of its argument. It consists of a methodological-conceptual introduction, theoretical chapter and two following empirical parts including two chapters each. The theoretical chapter accounts for the conceptual discovery, while the empirical parts for the empirical substantiation of the TRPD. In sum, this analysis covers the transformation of Cohesion Policy and Visegrád states *before* and *after* the eastern enlargement and *during* the global economic crisis.

The theoretical part I – introduction chapter 1, theoretical chapter 2, and also the concluding chapter 7 – identifies the existing knowledge gaps, operationalizes the comparative framework and incubates the theory-driven conceptual discovery. The interlinking concept is the TRPD. In relation to the interlinking concept, this part presents three navigating concepts. The concept of development fix examines the Cohesion Policy's multifaceted enabling role in the transnational (re)regulation of power asymmetries and socioeconomic inequalities in Europe's core-peripheral relations. The concept of dependent developmental state inquires into the role of Cohesion Policy in shaping state strategies within the Visegrád-type accumulation regime. Third, the concept of rescaled dependency relates to the policy's role in mobilizing subnational economic self-governance. The chapter 2 provides especially open-ended questions for the next two parts which reflects the dilemmatic nature of regulating uneven development in European capitalist heterogeneity and how its *abstract* equalization-differentiation logic unravelled *concretely* across the three scales (see Box 1.1).

In the empirical part II – chapters 3 and 4 – historicizes the development fix as inherent to the transformation of Cohesion Policy since its 1960s origins to the mid-2010s. It grapples then with two interrelated questions: How has the Cohesion Policy shaped core-peripheral relations in the EU's enlarged transnational capitalism and vice versa over time? What developmental purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion Policy's development strategies

and how have they become tendentially hegemonic in solving the question of uneven and (inter)dependent development in Europe? In chapter 3, I explore thus the formation of cohesion governance and how it institutionalized core-peripheral redistribution into a cohesion consensus. I focus on the Commission’s agency in producing this asymmetric consensus through the dilemma between core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness. Accordingly, the cohesion governance has historically privileged the effectiveness discourse which responsabilizes the peripheral states for effects of cohesion governance as a post-Fordist type of development governance.

Box 1.1 Scalar Hegemonic Dilemmas in the TRPD

Scale	Dilemma	
	<i>equalization</i>	<i>differentiation</i>
<i>European</i> development fix	core solidarity/European cohesion	peripheral effectiveness/global competitiveness
<i>national – peripheral</i> dependent developmental state	national consumption	integrationist investment
<i>regional – peripheral</i> rescaled dependency	sociospatial justice	competitive regionalism

Source: Own preparation

In the chapter 4, I study then the Commission-led transformation of its developmental purpose. The chapter identifies the formation of neoliberal developmentalism as a post-Fordist strategy oriented at regulating uneven and (inter)dependent development in Europe. Looking into the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy, I show how neoliberal developmentalism emerged from the dilemmatic interplay between the discourses of cohesion and competitiveness. Accordingly, the dilemma has been resolved in the discursive primacy of competitiveness. Thus, I argue that the TRPD is *de facto* a post-Fordist development strategy which reconfigures the development fix to regularize discourses of effective (institutional) performance and (socioeconomic) competitiveness in peripheries and

under the conditions of lowering core solidarity. This is documented as a global trend preceding but simultaneously intensifying with the eastern enlargement.

The empirical part III - chapters 5 and 6 – solves two questions as well: What sort of state transnationalization-*cum*-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU's de facto regional and urban policy promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state projects and through these catch-up strategies? The chapter 5 is thus dealing with the post-2004 dependent development projects in Visegrád states, while having Czechia as a central case study. Here, I expand the existing research on Visegrád state projects. I explore how the effectiveness discourse has been operationalized into cohesion bureaucracies which form a nodal agency between transnational integration and national embeddedness of these development projects. Analyzing this socio-institutional fixing, I research how the effectiveness-driven transnationalization opens the national dilemma of consumption and investment with respect to cohesion transfers. The result is the contradictory tendency of the dependent developmental states: The cohesion investment is either invested under the Commission's disciplinary supervision into the enhancement of FDI-based competitiveness or captured by the political and economic elites of Visegrád states through grand corruption schemes. More particularly, I explore how the visions of R&D and innovation and corruption-free good governance, which increasingly underpin the neoliberal developmentalism on the supranational level, form the new catch-up promise.

In the last chapters 6, it is documented how the Visegrád developmental states rescale the dependency management to local elites. This management translates the dilemmas on upper scales into the last dilemma between sociospatial justice of equalized inter-regional redistribution and competitive city-regionalism. Using Brno and the South Moravian Region, which is one of the Visegrád leading second-tier city-regions, as its central case, the chapter surveys how the Cohesion Policy enabled this rescaled dependency. I explore how it enabled the formation of a locally-led hegemonic project of competitive city-regionalism which incorporates the local growth coalition and transforms it into local developmental coalition. The analysis of Brno's innovation-oriented local project gives a pretext to analyse the investment process of large-scale urban flagship projects in Brno. In this chapter, I focus thus

on the analysis of these innovation infrastructures, especially the case of Central European Institute of Technology (CEITEC). Reconstructing the investment process behind this project, I explore the micro-agential practices of local mobilization in the concrete infrastructural fixing. This completes the previous analysis of macro-structural processes inherent to the TRPD in CEE.

2. Theorizing Cohesion Policy: Transnational Regulation of Peripheral Development

This chapter theorizes the Cohesion Policy as a TRPD by synthesizing the mutually overlapping yet disconnected literatures, while filling the identified theoretical gaps with a conceptual discovery. It departs from the critical engagement with the EU studies scholarship. The EU studies debate represents the main source of knowledge-production on the Cohesion Policy. Competing over the explanations of the inter-institutional relations in Cohesion Policy, EU studies scholars only implicitly situate their research into power struggles over the regulation of Europe's capitalist heterogeneity. They neither analyse the institutional embeddedness of Cohesion Policy in the power asymmetries and socioeconomic inequalities, nor the purpose underpinning their regularization. Much of it is due to the multiple reductionist tendencies inherent to the mainstream EU studies research which take roots in the discipline's neo-institutionalist origins and problem-solving bias (Ryner and Carfuny, 2016). The contemporary research tends to further narrow the theoretical viewpoint away from *politics* to the issues of *public policy* (Piattoni and Polverari, 2016). My critical engagement does not however throw the baby out with the neo-institutionalist bathwater as I sympathetically explain its merit when theorizing the Cohesion Policy as a TRPD.

Against this background, this chapter aims to provide theoretical guidance on the question opened in the introduction chapter and simultaneously facilitate the theoretical framework for the empirical chapters. This is done with respect to the multi-scalar dilemmas elaborated therein (see Box 1.1). The mainstream EU studies research substitutes the absent *critical* political economy perspective on Cohesion Policy. It also safeguards the critical perspective from the trap of overly pessimist reading of contemporary capitalist relations in Europe (Šitera, 2015, 2017; Bruff and Ebenau 2017). Producing such a perspective, I engage the EU studies literatures on Cohesion Policy with the critical materialist conjunction of heterodox varieties of political economy on European integration and CEE (Nölke, 2011; Sheppard, 2011; Shields, Bruff and Macartney, 2011; Ebenau et al., 2015). The conceptualization of TRPD is the result of this engagement.

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, it departs from the sympathetic critique of the EU studies scholarship with respect to the (liberal) intergovernmentalist and (multi-level) governance approaches. Informed by the critique, it introduces then the conceptualization of development fix through the regulationist and VoC-inspired discussion of its semantic, socio-institutional and infrastructural dimensions. Third, I interconnect the discussion with the CC and EU studies literatures on CEE to theorize the dependent developmental states. Last, I finish the literatures on the multi-level governance and post-socialist urban transformation in CEE with respect to the rescaled dependency.

2.1. Beyond the EU Studies Scholarship on the Cohesion Policy

The EU studies scholarship on the Cohesion Policy is locked in the binary discussion between intergovernmentalist and supranationally-oriented governance scholars. A solution to this debate has been the middle standpoint of multi-level governance approaches (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). However, this standpoint only reproduces the scholarship's institutionalist reductionisms with respect to the EU as a regulatory laboratory of new governance methods. The alternative stream of constructivist/discursive institutionalist approaches (Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2014) or even critical European Studies ignore the Cohesion Policy altogether. Although the EU studies field fails to embed the Cohesion Policy into the transnational power relations and neglected its developmental purpose, it provides still a helpful starting viewpoint on the TRPD. We can however use it only when recasting the EU studies in a more critical manner.

The theoretical narrowness stems from the scholarship's ontological origins in the four new institutionalisms. These dominate the political and social sciences research including the CC mainstream literatures (Hall et al., 1996; Pollack, 2008; Schmidt, 2010). Despite of its reductionist bias, the institutionalism establishes a bridge between the EU Studies on Cohesion Policy and the political economy. The rational-choice institutionalism and its concepts, which originated in neoclassical economics, dominate still the analysis of Cohesion Policy. They are also central to the synthesis of other three historical, sociological, and constructivist institutionalisms. The synthesis builds on the transactionist paradigm. The paradigm perceives European integration as driven by either inter-state bargaining or

accumulative and complex interactions of institutionally individualized agents in the emergent multi-level governance. The former one views central governments as rational actors which use cost-benefit analysis to calculate and negotiate their own national preferences in the European Council and the Council of the EU. The later sees the governments as sharing power with other supranational institutional actors such as the Commission and subnational actors in the lower tiers of governance so that the costs and benefits are redistribute across the multi-level polity. Both reduce the research into a problem-solving observation of functional positions and efficient performances in the narrow realm of inter-institutional relations.

The EU studies approaches nevertheless provide important inputs on inter-state relations and their regional ordering for the TRPD theorization. Intergovernmentalists understand the unceasing role of state managers in structuring the European integration through inter-state bargaining and within the relative autonomy of their national institutional realms. In contrast, governance approaches intermediate the daily agenda-setting power of multi-level bureaucracies under the Commission's leadership. Recasting the EU studies approaches through a political economy perspective requires, however, to analytically embed both in global capitalist relations. Thereby, the interpretation of Cohesion Policy must go beyond the handling of politics and economy as external to each other and individualistic reading of the agenda as an insulate institutional form of Cohesion Policy.

2.1.1. Recasting (Liberal) Intergovernmentalist Approaches

Due to their methodological nationalism, intergovernmentalists are less cognizant of how the Cohesion Policy enacts state transformations. However, the liberal strand of this state-centrist perspective is useful for its threefold inquiry into the "asymmetric interdependence" (Moravcsik, 1993) which underlines the inter-state consensus in the distributional conflict over the Cohesion Policy. First, it views the core-periphery transfers in the Cohesion Policy as indispensable for such a consensus. Second, it emphasizes that the bargaining terms of this redistributive consensus are asymmetric and depend rather on state preferences of core than peripheral governments, whereas the Commission supervises the compliance with the core-peripheral deal. Last, it explains the institutional diversity of Cohesion Policy across states as a result of the sovereign autonomy of central governments against the Commission.

However, this state-centric and narrowly rationalist perspective prevents the intergovernmentalists to take the full implications of their analysis with respect to the asymmetric consensus as documented below.

Shifting the explanations of cohesion transfers from impactless “pork-barrel politics” (Wallace, 1977) to functional “side-payments” (Moravcsik, 1991), intergovernmentalists understand them as economic concessions to peripheral states. This explains the asymmetry of core-peripheral relations between net-recipient and net-paying states (see Table 1.1). The cohesion transfers are understood as co-opting means to offset peripheral state managers and populations for otherwise core-dominated and market-making integration process. The eastern enlargement exemplifies this argument (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003; Vachudova, 2005). The rationalist bias explains these transfers initially as “trade-off” or “compensation bargain” for the South European periphery and then “extended bargain” for CEE periphery (Allen, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2010). However, the literature does not go beyond interpreting the cohesion transfers as an agreed lump-sum concession which only functionally underpins the inter-state consensus. Neither does it attempt to conceptualize how these politically negotiated transfers entangle with Europe’s other circuits of capital to fully appreciate the argument about the peripheral integration. Nor is there any appreciation of their developmental purpose beyond the functional consensus.

Intergovernmentalists acknowledge the asymmetric power relations between net-paying and -receiving states, which facilitates binary but still a historical pattern of core-peripheral bargaining. They observe how the core paymasters strive to minimize the volume of cohesion transfers, while simultaneously calling for their stricter oversight under the “value for money” heading (Anderson, 1990; Pollack, 1995). The peripheral state managers tend simultaneously to maximize the volume due to the bargaining rationale but also as a concession to the ongoing market-enabling integration. Beside this, the state-centric lenses contribute little in explaining the differentiated impact of these inter-state asymmetries on power relations between peripheral states and the Commission. With respect to the value-for-money discourse, which I research in the next chapter 3, there has been accordingly no impact on net-recipient states. Using the rationalist principal-agent approach, the states are understood in unison as being principals in the Cohesion Policy during both inter-state negotiations and national implementations (Blom-Hansen, 2005). This reading offers a limited but helpful

appreciation of power asymmetries. Negotiating the consensus, the bargaining is skewed to core preferences which officially require the Commission bureaucrats to privilege a stricter oversight of cohesion investment in peripheries. Perceiving the Commission as a simple agent of these (inter)governmental principals downplays however the resulting power asymmetries during the implementation period between the Commission the peripheral states.

National governments are then viewed as “extended gatekeeper” in relations to the Commission bureaucrat’s execution of the negotiated consensus (Bache, 1999). National governments operate subsequently at all stages and levels of implementation which assumedly counters the argument about the Cohesion Policy’s role in empowering subnational regions and the Commission at once (Sutcliffe, 2000). The scope of the gatekeeping explains then the national institutional diversity of cohesion agenda across the individual states. Pointing out the ongoing resilience of state managers within the national government is important as they remain central nodes interconnecting the EU’s multilevel governance even in peripheral states. To treat them as insulate institutional actors, however, perpetrates the dichotomist view on the functional contest over subnational, national and supranational sovereignties which otherwise exist in socioeconomic vacuum. The variation is then individualized as a (sub)national failure to reach the supposedly neutral cohesion and clearcut goals such as the sociospatial justice inherent to the emancipation of subnational regions and proportional allocation of the funding to those most underdeveloped (De Rynck and McAleavey, 2001; Stoffel and Dellmuth, 2012; Bloom and Petrova, 2013). The neutrality is explained as being compromised by the deliberate policy (non-)compliance, political distortion or institutional incapacity of peripheral (sub-)national actors. However, I claim that taking uncritically the institutional rules for granted omits how the national variation is driven not only by institutional relations but the contradictory dilemmas of the Cohesion Policy’s developmental purpose.

Exemplifying the relative persistence of state autonomy in the TRPD, intergovernmentalists cannot however reach beyond the world of states. Their state-centric analysis fails to take consequently its own suggestion about the cohesion transfers as economic concessions institutionalized in an asymmetric cohesion consensus of the core-dominated international regime. The institutionalist reduction of states into insulate and transhistorically unchanging units is neither helpful. Intergovernmentalists hardly notice how

the transnational inequalities in the economic interdependence condition the asymmetric political position of peripheral states in relation to the Commission. In the chapter 3, I show how the cohesion consensus skewed these relations through the effectiveness discourse of EU added value – as an extension of value-for-money discourse – to regularize the core-peripheral asymmetry. As then evidenced in chapter 4, along with the competitiveness discourse, it also shifted the responsibilities for solving socioeconomic inequalities to the peripheral catch-up.

2.1.2. Recasting (Multi-level) Governance Approaches

A more pluralist account of the TRPD is provided by the governance approaches which analyse the institutional forms of Cohesion Policy in the emergent multi-level regional order. Governance scholars are interested in the variation of new forms, modes or networks of institutional actors across the Cohesion Policy's supranational, national, and subnational levels of governance (Marks, 1996; Ferry and McMaster, 2013). They highlight the Commission's "conditional leadership" (Wozniak Boyle, 2006) and acknowledge its asymmetric relations with peripheral states when explaining the varied emergence of subnational governance inside the cohesion agenda. There is also an inquiry into the policy content of the agenda, although the scholarship narrows it into problem-solving explanations of making the compliance and surveillance more efficient. This views the Europeanization as only a coupling of policy rules and norms and (post-)accession conditionalities in CEE (Schimmelfering and Sedelmeier, 2004; Börzel and Sedelmeier, 2017). Although taken more complexly, the transfers of cohesion investment are then researched by asking whether the policy norms enable more effective financial and rule compliance (Bachtler and Mendez, 2013; Mendez and Bachtler, 2017). The governance approaches identify and simultaneously naturalize a loosely connected institutional skeleton decision-making hierarchies in the Cohesion Policy, while hardly engaging with the surrounding socioeconomic flesh.

Governance scholars privilege the Commission as agenda-setter for the inter-state bargaining and, in disagreement with intergovernmentalist, explore it as a principal during the implementation periods in peripheral states (Bachtler and Mendez, 2007). They also uncover the Commission's central position when powerfully shaping the national variation in the plural policy networks of cohesion bureaucracies. Among others, the partnership

principle is identified at central technology of governance in this (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). The principle underpins the nodal agency between the *vertical* hierarchies of bureaucratic networks organized by the Commission and *horizontal* hierarchies of domestic governance networks within member states (Thielemann, 2002; Dąbrowski, Bachtler and Bafoil, 2014). The Commission was identified as a heterogeneous agent with internal division between neoliberals and supporters of regulated capitalism with respect to the Cohesion Policy (Hooghe, 1998). This conflict includes the cleavages among its various Directorate-Generals (DG) such as the DG REGIO, as a *de facto* ministry of Cohesion Policy, and those representing competition policy agendas (Wishlade, 1998). Yet, the analysis treats the Commission as locked in the supranational governance level rather than operating in and through the transnational network of cohesion governance and organizing its embeddedness in broader socioeconomic relations.

Europeanization is then researched as a policy content of cohesion governance with its performance-oriented concerns of effectiveness and efficiency. Much of it studies the potential of effective compliance with supranational policy rules and norms by national and supranational actors. When social constructivism is employed, it measures the level of Europeanization as a degree to which the cohesion bureaucracies in peripheral states efficiently socialize with the compliance norms (Scherpereel, 2010; Bachtler et al., 2014). Parallely, the scholarship makes sense of the methods of new economic governance in the Cohesion Policy (Mendez, 2011, 2013). Hereby, governance scholars describe and explain the institutional evolution of compliance and surveillance systems. This includes new conditionalities, strategic reporting practices, and management principles which operationalize hierarchies in the Commission-led networks of cohesion bureaucracies (Mairate, 2006; Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007; Bachtler and Mendez, 2011; Bachtler and Ferry, 2013). However, the scholarship's performance bias on policy content studies the Cohesion Policy shallowly and tends to normalize rather than problematize the hierarchies which this policy content regularizes.

This relates to the normalization of transnational inequalities when inquiring into the agenda's official purpose of reaching socioeconomic "cohesion" and "convergence" or institutional "empowerment" of subnational regions (Smyrl, 1997; Bailey and De Propriis, 2002). Governance researchers observe the impact of Cohesion Policy on the formation of

subnational regions in the pre- and post-accession CEE (Brusis, 2002; Bruszt, 2008; Ferry and McMaster 2005). The Europeanization of subnational regions is however understood as only an institutional problem of varied compliance with or resistance to transferred norms, conditionalities, and principles such as the partnership. Institutional incapacities or shallow (non-)compliance drive the variation (Dąbrowski, 2011, 2012, 2014). The question of empowering the subnational actors reifies then the individualized logic of inter-institutional balancing among self-enclosed (sub)national units in socioeconomic vacuum. The question of inequalities appears when measuring the performance of Cohesion Policy in mobilizing inter-regional convergence through effective absorption of cohesion investment and implementing the strategic planning on subnational level (Tatar, 2011; Dąbrowski and Piskorek, 2018). Its failure is attributed to the (sub)national funding misallocation, institutional incapacity or varied undermining of supranational policy norms oriented at convergence (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Simona, 2007; Surubaru, 2017). Once again, there is no critical inquiry into the purpose of the terms such as cohesion, convergence or empowerment. The failure to reach (sub)national convergence is then individualized as an institutional failure of peripheral states and regions.

Governance approach takes thus the heterogeneity problem in the TRPD more seriously. It allows explaining the state transformation as inherent to the formation of EU as a multi-level order. It also exemplifies the Commission's position of an institutional entrepreneur which intermediates inter-state bargaining, while building multi-level networks of cohesion bureaucracies to play the decision-making principal during the implementation process. However, their inquiry into the content of cohesion governance only normalizes the master policy discourses of EU "added value" (Mairate, 2006), performance, and overall compliance. This either neglects or normalizes power asymmetries and socioeconomic inequalities. In contrast, the chapter 3 denaturalizes the effectiveness discourse as a power discourse which privileges the Commission's decision-making and agenda-setting in peripheral states and regions through the governance technologies such as the partnership (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). Furthermore, it also engages with the changing meaning of cohesion and convergence discourses when analyzing them in the inter-relationship with the competitiveness discourse in the production of Cohesion Policy's developmental purpose.

2.2. Cohesion Policy in Europe's Capitalist Order

The concept of development fix deepens the EU studies scholarship inquiry. It allows us to embed the institutional form of TRPD into the scholarship's elephant in the room: the regulation of Europe's uneven and (inter)dependent development. I do this by bringing in the CC literatures on the European core-peripheral relations. In this sense, the development fix denotes the transnational-organized efforts to replace the crisis-ridden tendencies in these relations by regulating the peripheral development. As explained in the chapter 1, I take advantage of the regulationist view on the EU as a post-Fordist mode of multi-level regulation which transnationally reorders the continental capitalist heterogeneity. This reordering is inherent to the equalization-differentiation dilemma which translates into the concrete overlaps between solidarity-effectiveness and cohesion-competitiveness dilemmas on the EU scale (see Box 1.1). My aim is to address the role of the Cohesion Policy in negotiating the power asymmetries over the resolving these dilemmas of Europe's core-peripheral relations. Connecting to the EU studies literatures, the development fix makes thus further sense of the inter-state consensus and its multi-level governance within the TRPD as a hegemonic strategy to make the EU coherent on its peripheries and in the context of global circuits of capital.

The empirical substantiation of the development fix is facilitated in the chapters 3 and 4. Here, I provide the theoretical-conceptual particularities which all refer to the discussion of spatiotemporal fix (Harvey, 1981, 2003; Jessop 2006, 2013). As sketched in the Table 2.1, the development fix is contingently reconstituted through the mutually conditioned production of (i) infrastructural, (ii) socio-institutional, and (iii) semantic fixing. As the development fix is always unstable, all its three material, institutional and ideological levels are continuously changing but also analysed on all the three scales of European integration. This way, TRPD can be analysed as constituting primarily a socio-institutional form which governs Europe's heterogeneity dilemma by patterning the peripheral regimes in sync with the core regimes of accumulation as it shapes the peripheral development strategies in the EU's multi-level mode of regulation. The socio-institutional fixing is mutually constituted at the intermediate level with semantic and infrastructural fixing. By infrastructural fixing, I denote the cohesion investment transfers which as development aid flows are simultaneously fixed through the TRPD into peripheral infrastructural conditions of their physical and human resources. The semantic fixing refers then to the selective privileging of hegemonic visions in the

development purpose which are further institutionally regularized into the strategies of developmental (institutional and infrastructural) change in the TRPD.

In other words, I provide framework for grasping the variegated change in spatial and strategic selectivity (Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2008a, 2008; Lagendijk, 2007) of Cohesion Policy from its 1960s origins to the mid-2010s. I am less interested in the problem-solving inquiry into performance but critically review it through the neo-Gramscian regulationist perspective on transnational socioeconomic inequalities and power asymmetries (Bieler and Morton, 2001; Carfuny and Ryner, 2003; Van Apeldoorn et al., 2009; Nousios et al., 2012). However, I equally make case for studying the TRPD as an enabling development arrangement of consensual peripheral co-optation which is oriented at periodical reconstitution of EU's market-enabling structured coherence.

2.2.1. Infrastructural Fixing

The infrastructural fixing is best understood by geographical political economists. This way, the development fix manifests itself most literarily through the real investment process which embeds the cohesion flows "in and on the land for a relatively long period of time" (Harvey, 2004: 115). As the Table 2.1 suggests, we can study the cohesion transfers as a public investment in "(European and global) circuits of capital" which are organized through particular state-rescaling strategies into human and physical infrastructures (Brenner, 2004: 16, 259-206; 2019: 46-86). As I illustrate in the part I, the infrastructural fixing embeds the core-peripheral inequalities in the Single Market and the EMU when filling the infrastructural peripheral gap to also enable their participation in the EU's comprehensive Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 strategies. The state-rescaling paradigm allows us to understand the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma which I research in the chapter 4. Accordingly, the post-Fordist development strategies solve the dilemma by orienting the investment on the redistributive equalization of immobile capital so that the differentiating operability of mobile capital can be simultaneously promoted. The Cohesion Policy underpinned this EU's state-rescaling dilemma of fixing Europe's infrastructural gaps and socioeconomic inequalities (Mykhnenko and Wolff, 2018).

Table 2.1 Analytical Levels of TRPD between Regulation Theory and Conceptual Practice

Regulation Theory <i>abstract level</i>	TRPD <i>abstract level</i>	(Neo-Gramscian) State-Space Approach <i>mid-range level</i>	TRPD <i>mid-range level</i>
Mode of Regulation Regime of Accumulation	Development Fix Semantic Fixing Socio-Institutional Fixing Infrastructural Fixing	EU as Transnational Project(s) EU Multi-Level Governance Fixed and Circulating Capital in the EU	Supranational Developmental Strategies Cohesion Governance Cohesion Investment as Inter-State Transfers
Mode of Regulation Regime of Accumulation	Dependent State Semantic Fixing Socio-Institutional Fixing Infrastructural Fixing	State Projects State Apparatus National Infrastructural Conditions	National Developmental Strategies National Developmental Coalitions Cohesion Investment as National Investment
Mode of Regulation Regime of Accumulation	Rescaled Dependency Semantic Fixing Socio-Institutional Fixing Infrastructural Fixing	City-Regional Projects Local Growth Machines Regional Infrastructural Conditions	Local Developmental Strategies Local Developmental Coalitions Cohesion Investment as Regional Investment

For Harvey, the infrastructural fix aims at establishing conditions for the “complementarity” of global circuits of capital (Harvey, 1982: 407-408). The infrastructural fixing is underpinned mainly by the (i) fixed capital along with (ii) the technological innovation, on the one hand and (iii) the consumption patterns along with (iv) social expenditures on the other. The “fixed capital” (Harvey, 1982: 204-38, 264-5) forms a built environment that enables ongoing accumulation. It consists of large-scale flagship projects such as transport, communication, and innovation infrastructures. The types of these infrastructural conditions have differed between the Fordist and post-Fordist ones but their productivist orientation is similar as explored below. Although primarily immobile, the fixed capital moreover circulates indirectly as its value becomes integrated into the mobile capital (investment, goods, services, labour) with the spatially expanding accumulation cycle of production, distribution, exchange and consumption. These infrastructures facilitate a double function as some of them – highways or airports – constitute fixed inputs in the “consumption fund” (Harvey, 1982: 229-231; 256-5). Besides these physical infrastructures, other – social, human, and environmental infrastructures – became part of built environment with respect to the conditions oriented at the (re)production of healthy, skilled, and appeased labour (Brenner, 2019: 130-1). The cohesion transfers can be analysed as filling this infrastructural gap and embedding thus the peripheral development in the EU.

The role of state in the infrastructural fixing was further explained by Jessop (2002) and Brenner (1999, 2003). In capitalism, infrastructural conditions are secured through state-organized public investment into the built environment. Besides different national variations of state involvement in economy, there were two historical manifestations of its infrastructural fixing in the Western core. First, the Fordist strategies were characteristic of “spatial Keynesianism” (Brenner, 2004: 114-171, 181-188). Spatial Keynesianism was realized on national scale and preferred equalizing strategies which embedded Europe’s market-reordering in national regimes of accumulation, while the capital remained bound to national projects. Second, the post-Fordist logic of state-rescaling foregrounds differentiation in development of Europe’s multi-scalar landscapes as an investment goal for spatial redistribution of fixed capital. The post-Fordist strategies incentivize state managers to privilege core regions as places of strategic infrastructural investment to make them fully competitive in the transnationalizing accumulation process. Therefore, all city-regional

“growth coalitions” are simultaneously mobilized to form strategies of “urban entrepreneurialism” to promote own regions in the capital circuits through upgrading their large-scale physical and social infrastructures (Harvey, 1989; Jessop et al.; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner, 2019). West European states and the EU are a prototype of this multi-scalar regime change. The state-rescaling was identified in other non-Western and originally non-Fordist contexts such as the post-socialist Europe and (post-)development East Asia (Drahokoupil, 2007; Park, 2013). This state-rescaling perspective helps us to understand the link between the changing spatial selectivity of infrastructural fixing in the Cohesion Policy and the peripheral states.

Thus, the infrastructural fixing constitutes literal and primarily material underpinning of the core-peripheral relations in the TRPD. However, it cannot be separated from the socio-institutional and semantic fixing which organise its transformation from cohesion investment transfers into the actual infrastructural development. The state-rescaling perspective makes a case for studying such rescaling practices which are inherent to the Cohesion Policy (Harvey, 1996; Brenner, 2009). As Jensen and Richardson (2003) show, the EU used infrastructural planning to discursively project itself as a competitiveness-oriented spatial order of an accelerated polycentric mobility. As I show in chapter 4, the observation of core-peripheral infrastructural gaps has been used by the Commission to legitimize the institutionalization of Cohesion Policy into the TRPD in the end.

2.2.2. Socio-Institutional Fixing

The analysis of socio-institutional fixing brings together the regulationist perspective (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Jessop, 2001) with the EU governance as well as the VoC scholars (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Höpner and Schäfer, 2008). This loose exchange addresses how the TRPD as an institutional form tendentially establishes the structured coherence of crisis-ridden “heterogeneity” in the EU (Becker, 2014). We must however go beyond the VoC framework (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and its broader CC critique about methodological nationalism, institutionalist determinism, microeconomic bias, absent role of state, and its overt orientation on the Western core among others. This critical inquiry highlights then the more nuanced version of the institutionalist CC perspective’s main conceptual underpinning: *institutional complementarity* (May and Nölke, 2015: 88-89). In the chapter 3, I show how the

Commission became a leading institutional entrepreneur which organized the inter-state cohesion consensus to synchronize the multi-scalar complementarities between the peripheral socioeconomic institutions and the emergent multi-level mode of regulation. This was then oriented at resolving the (core) solidarity-(peripheral) effectiveness dilemma inherent to the heterogeneity problem. Trying to resolve it, I document how the Commission legitimized the coordination of such complementarities and coherence-seeking “nodal agency” (Chibber, 2002: 958-960) which embedded these complementarities in the multi-level networks of cohesion governance as a strategy to transnationalize the peripheral states.

The concept of institutional complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Crouch et al., 2005) explains how socioeconomic institutions form coherent institutional orders both nationally and under transnational integration (Nölke, 2011). The CC scholars identify multiple central institutions within capitalist accumulation. The corporate (and public) governance, financial system (and public investment), industrial relations (and welfare state), and (education and private-public) transfer of innovation are the most important as exemplified later in the Tables 2.2 and 5.1. To form a coherent national variety of capitalism, these institutions must become complementary and organized through the nodal agency of bureaucracies in the state apparatus. The individual characteristics of national complementarities allow also identifying different forms of integration into global economy (Nölke et al., 2015). In the VoC-inspired research, the recognition of state role in organizing these complementarities came only gradually and replaced a firm-centric view in which this complementary is primarily and productively arranged by the capital (Schmidt, 2009). In CEE, the VoC-inspired research highlighted the role of “state capacity” and developmental activity in coordinating these complementarities (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). These accounts also highlighted the Europeanization as asymmetrically shaping this state *capacity* through reduced *autonomy* of state action in comparison to Western Europe (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). Except of some institutionalist accounts for CEE (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017; Medve-Bálint and Sčepanović, 2019), the discussion has not yet differentiated the role of Cohesion Policy in shaping state capacity in European peripheries.

This perspective allows us to understand what has been governed in Cohesion Policy. We can thus link more clearly the research on the EU governance with the CC scholarship on

(trans)national complementarities of socioeconomic institutions in the EU. It is possible to explain then how the persistent lack of complementarities and nodal agencies makes the EU ridden with crisis contradictions in the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma of core-peripheral relations inherent to its inter-national and multi-level ordering inside the Single Market and the EMU (Nölke, 2016; Streeck and Elsässer, 2016). The combined reading of both literatures offers a view on how the Commission-led transnational network of cohesion bureaucracies, as I show in chapter 3, governs the heterogeneity contradictions.

In this perspective, the post-1980s integration was explicitly researched as a dilemma between positive and negative integration. Accordingly, the technocratic bureaucracies preferred negative integration to solve this heterogeneity dilemma which promotes market-making reconfiguration of national institutions as barriers to the Single Market and the EMU (Höpner and Schäfer, 2010, 2012). Negative integration asymmetrically privileges these supranational market institutions at the expense of the socially embedded national models. The positive integration into a “European social model” has been simultaneously hindered by the growing capitalist diversity, especially with respect to the peripheries, and the political incapacity on the supranational level to commit their socially-oriented European convergence before and equally after the latest global crisis (Offe, 2001; Scharpf, 2012). This explains the scholarship’s pessimist reading of the Cohesion Policy given its impotence to successfully regulate core-peripheral relations (Streeck and Elsässer, 2016). Despite this pessimism, the literature allows us still to inquire into how the cohesion governance reorders the institutional complementarities to embed the peripheral complementarities into and enable thus this market-making integration.

The socio-institutional fixing constitutes then not only the intermediate level of development fix. Analyzing the institutional form of Cohesion Policy provides an opportunity for the intermediation of EU governance and CC literatures. We can analyse how the TRPD not only reorders the peripheral institutional complementarities but links them with the complementarity of capital circuits in the EU. Unlike the original VoC approach, the nuanced view goes beyond the economic reading and embeds the cohesion governance in social and political interactions and contexts (Streeck, 2012) to think of how particular core national models are prioritized as patterns of EU integration. We can also inquire into the developmental purpose of this institutional form and discuss the contradiction between its

market-correcting and -marking rationalities (Behrens and Smyrl, 1999). At the intersection of CC and neo-Gramscian regulationist analysis, the Cohesion Policy was randomly identified as inherent to the German “*Ordnungspolitik*” wherein the state is “neither *laissez faire* nor *étatiste*, but rather as an ‘*enabling state*’” (Streeck, 1997: 241; Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 163-65, 180-184). The chapter 3 inquiries into how the TRPD contingently formed into such an enabling institutional fixing, which hybridized both the market-making and dirigiste features, to explain how this overlapped with the semantic fixing in the chapter 4.

2.2.3. Semantic Fixing

The neo-Gramscian approach is suitable for inquiring into the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy but also its production through semantic fixing (Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Bruff, 2008). The viewpoint allows for a reflexive standpoint between the analysis of the circuits of capital and the common-sense analysis of hegemonic (regional or state) projects. Neo-Gramscians foreground the transnational inequalities and power relations and the strategies of their regularization across the EU’s multi-level mode of regulation. They recognize the post-Fordist global transformation in the 1980s and the gradual disruption of its hegemony in the global and then eurozone crisis of 2010s (Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012). Their critique of institutionalism makes them share ground with the critical ideationalist accounts when, in particular, analyzing the comprehensive rise and historical configurations of the “competitiveness” discourse (Rosamond, 2002, 2012; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Sum and Jessop, 2013). The combination of dependency and neo-Gramscian varieties of regulationist approach (Agnew, 2001; Becker and Jäger, 2012; Becker et al., 2016) adds a spatial awareness of how the hegemonic visions of competitiveness have been selectively privileged over other alternatives such as cohesion in the regulation of Europe’s core-peripheral relations. In chapter 4, I do thus the genealogy of cohesion-competitiveness dilemma and how it merged into the strategic purpose of neoliberal developmentalism.

Neo-Gramscians analyse the discourse of competitiveness as primarily formed through the hegemony of neoliberal transnational project in the EU. Van Apeldoorn (2002) identifies it as a result of transnational social struggle with and a later co-option of two alternative class projects in the 1980s. Accordingly, the social forces behind the two alternatives – Social-Democratic and Euro-mercantilist projects – were integrated through the negotiated consensus. The cohesion

consensus entailed a promise of “Social” and selectively protectionist Europe which, under the Commission led by Jacques Delors, aimed at a third-way embedding of the competitiveness visions. This transnational consensus was however further neoliberalized through the Commission-led “asymmetric integration” in the EU’s “multidimensional” and “new economic” governance since the 2000s (Holman, 2004b; Van Apeldoorn and Hager, 2008). The asymmetric integration was just another articulation of negative integration described by other CC scholars which however recognized it as a class-based strategy rather than an institutional dilemma. Following the Southern peripheral expansion in the 1980s, the EU’s eastward expansion to CEE was a logical consequence of this asymmetric neoliberal project (Holman, 1998, 2004a). What is more, the transnational co-option of CEE state-society formations into the project under the heading of competitiveness only deepened the asymmetric neoliberalization (Bohle, 2006; Shields, 2011). As latecomers to the cohesion consensus, CEE states received less social embedding in this already matured neoliberal project.

The transnational projects were equally variegated historical cumulation of national ideologies and accumulation imperatives (Macartney and Shields, 2011; Jessop, 2014b). The ideological change was thus not only historical between Fordism and post-Fordism. It was also a crystallization of French Euro-mercantilist dirigisme, British globalist neoliberalism, and German hybrid of ordoliberalism which, along with other less dominant national models, merged into the EU governance (Jessop, 2019). This variegated governance was skewed to the imperatives of “German space economy” (Jessop, 2014b) oriented at forming the EU into an open and export-oriented order. This space covered the Benelux in the West, Switzerland and Northern Italy in the South and crossed Austria to reach Visegrád economies, while closing the circle around the Baltics and Northern Europe. Regarding Visegrád economies, the correlation of FDI and cohesion flows is clearly visible in the Table 1.1. In the chapter 4, I show how the TRPD transformed from tendential supranational dirigisme to this *Ordnungspolitik*-type agenda in connection with the EMU, Single Market, and EU Trade Policy. Ordoliberalism sets market-enabling intervention which besides establishing basic infrastructural and institutional framework to market economy favours *Vitalpolitik* as a social policy oriented at maximizing the competitiveness of the population’s human capital (Bonefeld, 2012). Although defining the so-called *Sozialmarktwirtschaft*, its *social* adjective was only materialized in Germany’s social market economy through historical social contestation and

negotiation (Young, 2014). Ordoliberalism tends otherwise to constitutionalize austerity in Germany and the EU. What is more, the ordoliberal concept of *Standortpolitik* stood at the root of state-rescaling strategies in the EU (Brenner, 2003a, 2004: 16).

“Neoliberal developmentalism” has been identified at the core of contemporary global governance (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 296-323). It was also observed as the core of the EU “multi-level metagovernance” (Jessop, 2002: 2016-46; Jessop, 2008b). Haahr and Walters (2005: 139) identify the Commission as producing this hybrid of ordoliberal and neoliberal governmentalization which uses the “matrices of benchmarking and performativity” to fix Europe’s uneven development into a knowable and thus governable socioeconomic space. For the EU, the neoliberal developmentalism could be also described as “embedded neoliberalism” which both configures the competitiveness discourses as the major hegemonic vision of the EU’s position in global markets (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 159-189). As one of competing “hegemonic visions” (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 201-3, 248-58; Jessop, 2016: 84-88) produced in transnational governance networks, neoliberal developmentalism fixes European socioeconomic inequalities within extensive production of semantic devices (e.g. maps, indices, tables, graphs, rankings). Such comprehensive visions tend to render the EU a coherence- or cohesion-seeking order. They also fill the purpose of major transnational regional projects so that the regulation to give the developmental purpose to the institutional complementarities of core-peripheral relations within the globalizing circulations of capital in the EU.

Given the Cohesion Policy incubated originally in the Social Europe project, I identify how the hegemonic visions of neoliberal developmentalism represent its ideological articulation as the TRPD in the EU’s post-Fordist project. In this sense, the semantic fixing is thus an institutionalized practice oriented at the (re)production of developmental purpose in the development fix. With respect to the institutional fixing, the analysis of semantic fixing allows us to decipher the content of TRPD at the centre of EU’s inter-state cohesion consensus. We can thus bring the analysis of global circuits of *economic* capital and developmental purpose of the EU as a variegated *political* project together. With respect to the infrastructural fixing, we can then understand the knowledge production on Europe’s uneven and (inter)dependent development and how it becomes tendentially skewed towards one development imperatives over others in and through the TRPD. In other words, it is possible to inquire how the historically changing hegemonic visions shape the content of Cohesion Policy.

2.3. Dependent Developmental State in Visegrád Capitalism

The concept of dependent developmental state complements the research on Visegrád *dependent* market economies or embedded neoliberalism (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Bohle, 2009; see Graphs 1.1 and 2.1). It can explore the complementarity of FDI and cohesion investment inflows with respect to the EU's development fix. I intend to study the cohesion investment transfers as neither a new source of dependency in isolation, nor solely material transfers which infrastructurally and institutionally underpin the Visegrád regime(s) of accumulation. First, this is illustrated in the Graphs 1.1 and 2.1. Second, the chapter 1 documents how this was done already elsewhere. While considering these levels of Visegrád development (see Table 1.2), I rather study the TRPD's impact on the transformation of Visegrád state projects and the developmental purpose of their catch-up strategies (Drahokoupil, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Broadening the FDI bias, I extend it with the focus on the role of EU funding on the Visegrád post-socialist integration and (post-)enlargement catch-up strategies until the mid-2010s. I show how these integrationist strategies became articulated with respect to the cohesion consensus and the neoliberal developmentalism, which were primarily produced on the EU scale as analysed in the chapters 3 and 4. Then, it is possible to analyse how the development fix translates into not only developmental but also rescaled states in the Visegrád countries.

Following Drahokoupil, I use the Poulantzasian approach to evidence how this is due to the transnationalization of Visegrád state. Poulantzas saw uneven and (inter)dependent development in Europe as dialectically driven by *external* international forces as much as *internal* national forces. In this logic, given the dependence on EU funds, TRPD is borne out of asymmetric transnationalization of Visegrád states which is simultaneously being re-embedded in the "concrete specificity" (Poulantzas, 1974a/1978: 78) of Visegrád state-society relations. Poulantzas (1974b: 173; emphasis added) sums up this variegated integration in the following pattern:

"This [continuing] dominance of the state corresponds to the considerable increase in the economic functions of the state that are absolutely indispensable to the extended reproduction of large capital. But this deals with only a part of the problem and in particular does not explain why these economic interventions continue to have, and this is the essential aspect, the national states as their *supports*. [...] Now, there is no doubt

that the forms of co-ordination of the economic politics of the different states are currently proving necessary (various international institutions, the EEC). But these institutional forms do not in fact constitute apparatuses either supplanting the national states or superimposed on them. [...] It is therefore impossible to separate the different interventions, and their aspects, of the state, in envisaging the possibility of *effective transfer* of the 'economic functions' to the supra-national or superstate apparatuses, with the national state maintaining only a repressive or ideological role. [...] In fact, by straining in that direction, one loses sight of the *real tendencies, namely, the interiorized transformations of the national state itself with a view to assuming responsibility for the internationalization of public functions with respect to capital*. [...] In fact these international institutional forms are not, moreover, 'superadded' to these national states but they are precisely the expression of their interiorized transformations. These transformations are not concerned solely with the economic interrelations of the national state but also with the repressive and ideological aspects of the state by means of which these interventions are realized."

Rather than viewing it as superadded, the part II studies thus how the governmentalizing tendency in the TRPD tendentially ignites *interiorized transformations* of Visegrád state projects. In other words, the transnationalization proceeds as governmentalization. The developmental states can be thus conceived as sedimented modes of regulation which resemble a "form-determined condensation of the changing balance of political forces" (Jessop, 1990: 149) in the concrete Visegrád context. The state constitutes institutionalized form of social power relations which periodically differ in privileging one regimes of accumulation over others as a result of past social struggles. Any form of state becomes hegemonic only when it successfully condensates into comprehensive national-popular "state project" (Jessop, 1990: 161) which gives cohesion to the ascending elite "power bloc" (Jessop, 1990: 42). Once institutionalized, hegemonic state projects simultaneously legitimize and constrain the use of "state power" within the contentious cycle of negotiation, selection, articulation, and regularization of particular hegemonic visions of socioeconomic development as national interest (Jessop, 2008a). Hegemony is reached through the balancing of various forms of coercion and consent, while the latter is being preferred and the former looming behind (Gramsci, 1971: 169–70). Against this background, the part II studies how the TRPD facilitated cohesion transfers as economic concessions to Visegrád elites and populations, while conditioning them with the Commission-led negotiation, selection, articulation, and regularization of neoliberal developmentalism in Visegrád states.

In the part II, I show how the TRPD constituted two embedding dilemmas between the *strategic capacity* and *relative autonomy* of Visegrád states (Jessop, 1990, 2008a; Drahekoupil,

2009a). I analyse how the cohesion governance was internalized in Visegrád states through the multi-level formation of cohesion bureaucracies in their state apparatuses. I also show how these bureaucracies were operationalized to follow the hierarchies of cohesion governance but became simultaneously embedded in Visegrád state apparatuses. We can thus observe how the governmentalization of Visegrád dependency translated the supranational dilemmas of solidarity-effectiveness and cohesion-competitiveness. That is how it translated them into the national dilemmas between consumption and investment on the state level and the subnational dilemmas between sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism on the city-regional level. Both these issues are discussed in the chapters 5 and 6.

2.3.1. Asymmetric Transnationalization of Peripheral State

The classical understanding of developmental state expects a relatively autonomous sector of nationally embedded development bureaucracies. These include a network of ministry departments and investment or planning agencies within state apparatuses oriented at (re)industrialization efforts (Evans, 1995). This state-centric account expects bureaucratic apparatus which preserves a relative autonomy from both national and international forces. Such development bureaucracies remain moreover contingent on success in organizing their “nodal agency” inside such developmental states (Chibber, 2002: 958-960). The post-Fordist global arrangements rendered these nationally autonomous solutions unavailable (Glassman, 1999). Rather, the developmental arrangements in CEE have been shaped by the transnationalization of state and its compliant transformation in sync with the EU market-enabling integration (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017). Following the chapter 3, the chapter 5 documents thus the national institutional commonalities and variation of TRDP-based transnationalization in Visegrád states. In particular, it investigates the governmentalizing tendencies of cohesion governance which hierarchically reduces the Visegrád state *relative autonomy* to increase its *strategic capacity* as a way to resolve the consumption-investment dilemma in favour of effective investment for competitiveness (see Table 2.2).

The TRPD can be understood as a historical product of asymmetric transnationalization which was identified already since the 1980s. Its first wave was organized by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the 1990s, these IFIs promoted a fast neoliberal

restructuralization along the Washington Consensus which set an institutional framework for the triple programme of privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, and overall liberalization. For the post-socialist CEE, this recognized the FDI as a neoliberal form of Marshall Plan (Gowan, 1995). Although inducing the brownfield FDI through privatization this way had not materialized (Jensen, 2006), the Washington-type transformation disrupted the state autonomy from above and below to the detriment of development capacity of CEE states (Böröcz, 2002; Bandejl, 2017). Visegrád economies retained such capacities without however utilizing them for a state-led upgrade (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). Neo-Gramscian scholars (Shields, 2004, 2011, 2012) exemplified this transnationalization as an asymmetric combination of coercion and consensus. It enforced the state restructuralization through external “conditionalities” in exchange for financial support (Stone, 2002), while subordinately co-opting CEE state managers into Western transnational governance structures. Despite of their varying interpretations, this asymmetry was observed by other scholars (Jacoby, 2001; Smith, 2002). Besides the conditionality strategy, they also identified the governmentalizing “technologies of transition” (Pickles and Smith, 2005) which both institutionally transformed and semantically fixed the CEE transitions in global governance.

The EU accession agenda was inherent to this transnationalization as illustrated in the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. A wide array of researchers highlighted the conditionality approach in the accession process (Schimmelfering and Sedelmeier, 2004; Grabbe, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). Unlike its first phase of plain neoliberalization, the later stages of accessions shifted to a more developmentalist direction oriented at building state capacity, while requiring more comprehensive forms of state transnationalization. This followed the Accession Partnerships of 1998 and was also reflected in the changing developmental purpose of the pre-accession (structural) fund Phare (Grabbe, 2005; Bruszt and McDermott, 2012). In the chapter 3, I show how the accession and cohesion agendas merged to promote the ordoliberalizing strategies of development in Europe’s peripheries. Although remaining within the confines of institutionalist and policy-oriented inquiries, the research identified high asymmetry between Commission bureaucrats and CEE state managers. Acting on behalf of member states, the Commission not only manufactured the accession conditions but it used Phare to finance their fulfilment, while publishing evaluation reports which benchmarked the performance of CEE states in this respect. The combination of

Commission's asymmetric position, Phare funds, and the semantic technologies of evaluation remained oriented at FDI as development remedy (Vliegenthart and Horn, 2007). This tendency mirrored the same transformation in the cohesion agenda with respect to the EU's internal peripheries.

This asymmetric transnationalization shaped the balance of forces in CEE power blocs. The immediate power bloc was heterogenous (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley, 1998) including various contenders in the re-emerging class struggle over becoming new political and economic elite. For Drahekoupil (2009a) and Hanley et al. (2002), the bloc became differentiated between nationalist and globalist political forces. Jacoby (2010) and Medve-Bálint (2014) highlighted the role of Commission in privileging the integrationist FDI-orientation among CEE elites. The "comprador" managers (Drahekoupil, 2008; Vliegenthart, 2010) and the resultant "foreign capital-state nexus" (Pavlínek, 2016), a nexus of corporate and state managers servicing the interests of transnational capital, could shape the balance in favour of the FDI-oriented state strategies. It was simultaneously capable to enforce FDI-based policies in CEE and lobby for making them compliant with the enlargement rules in the Commission (Bohle and Husz, 2005). Following the global crisis, it was however possible to observe the uneven rebalancing of power with respect to nationalist forces and national capital (Scheiring, 2019; Toplišek, 2019). Even during the enlargement, CEE state managers were able to bend the accession conditionalities as documented by Hughes et al. (2005) on the case of multi-level regional policies. Likewise, the EU funding tended to increase the propensity to the "high-level corruption" in CEE (Fazekas and King, 2018). However, the FDI-based orientation remained high despite of the nationalist turn (Bohle and Greskovits, 2018). This turn was visible in Poland and Hungary rather than Czechia and Slovakia. Against this background, the chapter 5 explains these contradictory shifts as inherent to the TRPD-based transnationalization as interiorized transformation embedded primarily in the cleavage between nationalist and globalist forces.

Therefore, the governmentalization through cohesion governance was primarily oriented at reconfiguring these power blocs into developmental coalitions inside the Visegrád state apparatuses (see Table 5.2). This was through redesigning these apparatuses from afar by integrating the new category of cohesion bureaucracy inside them, while promoting its nodal agency through the technologies of cohesion governance. First, I use the Poulantzian

understanding of bureaucracy as a distinct “social category” (Poulantzas, 1968/1975: 332-360, 1978: 154-60) which gains operational cohesion through the production of socially autonomous organizational hierarchies, practices, and rationalities. Rationalizing own position as neutral force acting on behalf of societal general interest, bureaucracy gives thus coherence to state projects and the relational power asymmetries therein. Second, I recognize the nodal position of cohesion bureaucracies as embedded in the national administrations but also transnationally integrated as CEE nationals in the higher supranational ranks which include the Commission. A successful core-peripheral hegemony co-opts best talents from peripheries (Cox, 1983). Bureaucracy is, as the Poulantzasian logic advises, however far from a homogenous force and is rather riven with socially relevant internal cleavages and relational conflicts in the *narrower* power bloc and *wider* state-society relations. The transnationalization of Visegrád state is thus always rescaled across the varying national degrees of scalar embeddedness and transnational integration (Panitch, 1994).


In the chapter 5, I analyse how the governmentalization of Visegrád dependency through cohesion governance socio-institutionally fixed the dependent developmental state projects. In particular, I show how cohesion governance tendentially articulated the dilemma between national consumption of cohesion funding inflows and their effective investment to be secured by the technologies of cohesion governance. More specifically, the chapter shows how the coherency-seeking effectiveness visions prioritized the *relative autonomy* of Visegrád states from above so that the upgrade of their *strategic capacity* could be secured. Through this contradictory governmentalizing rationality, as evidenced on the Czech case, Cohesion Policy has become a part of political and social power politics in Visegrád states.

2.3.2. Embedding Neoliberalism in Dependent Development

Through governmentalizing its dependency, TRPD semantically fixed the “relative backwardness” of CEE (Gerschenkron, 1962; Janos, 2000) so that it selectively privileged integrationist visions of Visegrád catch-up strategies of development over others. In chapter 5, I further show how the material dependence allowed the Commission to promote visions of neoliberal developmentalism in relation to the FDI-based regime of dependent embedded neoliberalism as recognized elsewhere (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012, 2019). I also document how the cohesion transfers and FDI-based development were made complementary to

normalize the less developed position of Visegrád states in Europe’s uneven and (inter-)dependent development. I also show how they were discursively articulated as a development assistance to be invested effectively given the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma inherent to the neoliberal developmentalism. As sketched in the Table 2.2 and later empirically elaborated in the Table 5.1, much of this consisted in reconfiguring the role of state (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015) in coordinating (trans)national complementarities (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009) which intermediate the relations between Visegrád state, (trans)national capital, and local labouring populations. As the Graph 2.1 documents, this reconfiguration was conditioned by the high shares of cohesion transfers in the public investment on all Visegrád levels of governance. In Visegrád states, the articulation of these (trans)national complementarities embedded them more firmly as integrated periphery in the German-led export-oriented space economy (Jessop, 2014b; Krpelec and Hodulák, 2018). However, the TRPD was primarily a co-optive endeavour despite of its coercive features. As the blueprint of neoliberal developmentalism was determined by the Commission, it still demanded Visegrád state managers to rearticulate it – under ongoing consultations and negotiations - into national developmental strategies.

Graph 2.1 Share of Cohesion Investment in the National Public Investment (%)



Source: Own preparation; Eurostat and EU Financial Reports and Revenues and Expenditures database (data on the cohesion investment and the general government gross fixed capital formation incl. all levels of government)

The dilemma of consumption and investment was historically inherent to the dependent development in Visegrád economies as (semi)peripheries of Europe's continental order(s) (Ther, 2014). Its relative economic backwardness *vis-à-vis* the West European core changed its form but remained historically persistent through the uneven exchange of capital across the East-West divide (Janos, 2000). The late socialist dependence on and consumption of foreign debt provided by Western creditors – banks and states – evidenced this and shaped the asymmetric power relations in the initial phase of postsocialist transitions (Böröcz, 1992). The degree of this indebtedness also differentiated the initial globalist opening of highly indebted Hungary and Poland to the FDI and the low-indebted Czech and Slovak strategies of national capitalism (Myant, 2003; Fisher et al., 2007). As King and Sznajder (2006) exemplify on the Polish case, even later reversal of the neoliberal restructuring by the state-led industrial strategies resulted in the FDI-based dependence. Either way, according to Drahokoupil (2009a), the material dependence and the transnational structures enforced the reversal of initial divergence among Visegrád state strategies in favour of convergence on similar FDI-oriented strategies since the late 1990s. A decade later in the late 2010s, this material dependence, according to Bohle and Greskovits (2018), prevented the attempted nationalist reversal of these FDI-based strategies as well.

In the chapter 5, I evidence the role of cohesion transfers in embedding this dependent development. This role oscillates between their conflicting visions as economic concessions, which legitimize the discourse of cohesion, and the effective investment, which underpin the catch-up discourse of competitiveness. As economic concessions, cohesion transfers embedded the exhaustive features of FDI-based strategies. As shown in the Table 2.2, since the late 1990s, the Visegrád state managers produced a similar sets of investment incentives to attract transnational corporations (TNCs) in complex manufacturing sectors. These involved advantages such as long tax holidays and various tax exemptions, land grants for greenfield complexes, highway links and additional infrastructures, as well as refinancing of workforce training and education (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Bohle, 2009; Pavlínek, 2016). Besides these direct incentives, the non-direct ones included radical tax cuts for business and simplification of tax codes, loosened labour regulations and other adaptations of physical and social infrastructures (O'Dwyer and Kovalčík, 2007). Second, rather than a development catch-up by the mid-2010s, these strategies only reproduced the international integration of

Visegrád economies as providers of skilled but cheap labour along with less innovative but technologically adaptive subcontracting sectors of mostly small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). Third, FDI inflows flattened during the global economic crisis, while the profits in FDI-based export-oriented industries and banking sectors started to outflow in the form of dividends back to their home markets rather than being reinvested (Galgóczi et al., 2015). These exhaustive features deepened thus the infrastructural gap which could be then partially compensated by and embedded through the consumption of cohesion transfers.

Across the main institutions (see Table 2.2), the cohesion transfers could be explained as complementary investment not only in the long-term embeddedness but also (post-)crisis resilience of Visegrád market economies (Myant et al., 2013). Such economic models could be characterized as a combination of export-oriented manufacturing, relative fiscal austerity, and welfare for middle classes to produce relatively equal societies. Visegrád states were accordingly able to produce business-friendly environment combined with a sustainable infrastructural development and skilled labour, which kept the TNCs in the region. At the same time, they lagged in the innovation and educational infrastructures, which was allegedly reflected in their low innovation potential (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). The cohesion transfers equally formed a *de facto* transnationally organized industrial policy for SMEs (Medve-Bálint and Sčepanović, 2019). According to Medve-Bálint (2018), the cohesion spending remained however misallocated as they were spent on physical infrastructures rather than innovation projects involving the Research & Development (R&D) and the upgrade of human capital. Although recognizing the lack of Visegrád innovativeness as a material reality in the next chapters, I rather explore how it is being discursively articulated in the Cohesion Policy to individualize Visegrád economies' failing catch-up as a regularization practice of making sense of the region's semiperipheral integration.

Against this background, the chapter 5 exemplifies how the cohesion investment inflows are semantically fixed as a developmental assistance which becomes conditional on the Visegrád state managers' ability to articulate the infrastructural gaps with respect to the FDI-based catch-up. The resultant developmental purpose is produced within the TRPD, while the cohesion governance tendentially regularizes it inside the Visegrád states. It is articulated in the asymmetric relation between the Commission's hierarchical guidance and peripheral

manager's self-assessment of their societies' relative socioeconomic backwardness against the benchmark of EU objectives and targets. Against these objectives, the self-assessment opens for two courses of action. First, it negotiates and thus regularizes the relative backwardness as inherent to the endogenous trajectories of Visegrád states. Second, it allows for negotiating the national configurations of neoliberal developmentalism within the determined developmental frameworks. Oriented at enhancing state capacity to organize developmental catch-up, the developmental purpose remains externally determined, albeit nationally embedded.

Table 2.2 Dependent Developmental State – Ideal Type

Institutions - Infrastructures	<i>Dependent Market Economies</i>	<i>Dependent Developmental State</i>
Coordination Mechanism/Capacity	Hierarchies in TNCs	Hierarchies in the EU and especially cohesion governance
Corporate/State Governance	Control by headquarters of TNCs	Proxy multi-level control by the European Commission
Investment Finance	FDI and foreign-owned banks	Structural Funds and the Operational Programmes
Industrial/Welfare Relations	Appeasement of skilled labour, company-based agreements	Activating employment and welfare policies including social inclusion and healthcare
Education and Training	No provisions beyond basic education	Adapting education to investor demand and intra-firm training
Innovation	Intra-firm transfer within TNCs	Creation of public-private innovation clusters
Business Development	Investment incentives for TNCs	SME bias and upgrade from dual economy
Physical Sustainability	Exploitation of infrastructural conditions (also as a part of incentive packages)	Improving transport and environmental infrastructures
Transnational Integration	Full export orientation towards global product markets	Catch-up with higher positions in global value chains

Source: Own preparation; Inspired by and adapted from Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015: 160; Nölke and Vliegthart, 2009: 680; Nölke et al., 2015: 546, Nölke et al., 2019: 195.

2.3.3. Rescaled Dependency in the Visegrád City-Regional Development

Given that the Cohesion Policy is the EU's regional and urban policy, the dependent developmental states take the form of rescaled states (Brenner, 2004; Drahokoupil, 2009a). The governance accounts assume that the rescaling process of European enlargement involved institutional transformation of regional governance (Bruszt, 2008). Given the technology of multi-level partnership, the institutional capacities were said to shape the variation of this governance in individual regions (Dąbrowski, 2014; Dąbrowski, Bachtler and Bafoil, 2014). In the chapter 6, I take the advantage of previous parts to go beyond this institutionalist view, which neglects the socioeconomic polarization (Lang et al., 2015; Lang and Görmar, 2019), by asking about the issue of rescaled dependency. I relate the rescaled dependency to the spatial selectivity of cohesion governance in Visegrád states. By the rescaled dependency, I mean thus a process whereby not only management but also responsibility for socioeconomic development is delegated to lower scales of governance, while remaining constrained by the catch-up strategies articulated at upper scales. Here, the TRPD arrives at the last rearticulation of the dilemmas inherent to Europe's core-peripheral relations (see Box 1.1): the dilemma between sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism. Inquiring into the Europeanized promotion of strategic spatial planning (Dąbrowski and Piskorek, 2018), I am thus interested in its developmental purpose (Lang and Török, 2017) to decipher how it semantically fixed the Visegrád inter-regional "uneven transformations" (Smith and Timár, 2012).

Against this background, the TRPD connects the state rescaling theory and urban research on the so-called postsocialist city (Golubchikov et al., 2014) and regions more broadly (Lang et al., 2015). The research on postsocialist city asks about the ways CEE city-regions have been integrated into the political and economic landscapes of globalizing capitalism (Wiest, 2012). With the exceptional research on Cohesion Policy (Lang and Görmar, 2019), the state-rescaling impact of Cohesion Policy in the full political-economic perspective has been so far neglected in efforts to broaden the inquiry into these urban transformations (Grubauer, 2012). Accordingly, with the advantage of this political economic perspective, we can critically and contextually inquire into the "ideology" (Golubchikov, 2018) of the rescaled dependency in Visegrád city-regions.

Recontextualizing thus the state-space discussion, especially its neo-Gramscian pathway (Jessop, 1997; Jessop et al., 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999), I use its concepts to explore the downscaled dilemma between sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism (Harvey, 1989, 1996; Brenner, 2019: 206-32; Jones et al., 2019). I illustrate in the chapter 6 that, despite its promise of such a justice, the Cohesion Policy retained its neoliberal orientation on the competitiveness (Lang and Török, 2017). Therefore, I trace how the downscaling of Visegrád dependency aimed at establishing comprehensive “(local/regional) accumulation strategies and state strategies/project” (Jessop, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999), while focusing on the Visegrád second-tier city-regions outside of the capitals. Through these projects, the local or regional state managers articulate their catch-up strategies of overcoming own backwardness through “inter-local competition”(Peck and Tickle, 2002). As explained above, this competition has been particularly over the FDI among other forms of mobile capital. Such projects are then semantically as well as infrastructurally fixed especially through “large-scale urban development projects” (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 2002).

Enabled and simultaneously conditioned by cohesion investment inflows, neoliberal developmentalism rearticulates the sociospatial justice as productivist investment into the visions and infrastructures of competitive city-regionalism. Given the dependent public budgets (see Graph 2.1) and thematic prioritization of filling the institutional-infrastructure gaps (see Table 2.2), the chapters 3, 5 and 6 explore how particular catch-up visions differentiate between the *old* (Fordist) priorities as misallocated consumption and the *new* (post-Fordist) priorities as catch-up investment. The old ones are those including “large-scale transportation infrastructures such as highways, canals, ports, tunnels, bridges, railroads, airports, and public transport systems; the management of key public utilities and energy resources such as gasoline, electricity, and nuclear power as well as water, sewage, and waste disposal systems; the expansion of public housing, schools, universities, and other research facilities; the maintenance of communications networks such as postal, telephone, and telecommunications systems” (Brenner, 2004: 124). Meanwhile, the post-Fordist “soft-neoliberal techno-utopias of ‘smart,’ ‘sustainable,’ or ‘ecological’ urbanism” prioritized „growth-oriented, market-disciplinary strategies of urban development, postwelfare state institutions“ that were infrastructurally underpinned by or as „financial centers, industrial

districts, technopoles, enterprise zones, science and technology parks, innovation hubs“ to selectively turn the city-regions into „putatively distinctive, innovative, and competitive locational products on the world market“ (Brenner, 2019: 147, 315).

Although increasingly based on the smart, sustainable and ecological visions (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015), the justice side has been transformed into a social embedding which mobilized city-regional elites for the market-oriented strategies of inter-regional competition over the FDI among other flows across the EU. This only regularized the practices of hierarchizing logic between less developed periphery and developed core (Leick and Lang, 2018), that between the FDI-oriented leading and those lagging city-regions without the FDI (Brown et al., 2007). In effect, the cohesion investment was competed over and won by the leading ones (Medve-Bálint, 2017). Here, the chapter 6 documents how the rescaled dependency has been also underpinned by the technologies of cohesion governance. They reconfigure the Visegrád city-regional elite power blocs into growth “machines” to establish them as local developmental coalitions (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Brenner, 2004: 295-296). These coalitions include actors such as regional authorities, local municipalities, universities, local development agencies, non-governmental organizations or private consultancy agencies, as well as business associations, and trade unions.

2.4. A Transnational Regulation of Peripheral Development

The TRPD is thus a conceptual toll which allows to merge the often-separated discussions on European integration and Cohesion Policy into a heterodox and transdisciplinary perspective, on the one hand, and mediate it with the empirical reality on the other. It departs from the EU studies literatures, which dealt with the Cohesion Policy, and engages them with the CC literatures on CEE and EU integrations. By doing so, it brings in the emphasis on the regulation of Europe’s uneven and (inter)dependent *capitalist* development. Admittedly and by its nature, this theorization of the Cohesion Policy as TRPD is not all-explaining. It has its contextual, yet open limits: I develop firstly it in interconnection between the theoretical discussions and historization of Cohesion Policy on the supranational scale of EU integration. Then, I focus empirically on the scales of Visegrád states and their city-regions as a case of the EU’s eastward expansion and the CEE’s westward (semi)peripheral integration.

To recap the questions suggested in the introduction chapter 1, this theorization facilitates open-ended inquiry rather than narrow answers for empirical chapters. On the EU scale: How has the Cohesion Policy shaped the core-peripheral relations in the EU's enlarged capitalist order and vice versa over time? What hegemonic purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion Policy's development strategies and how have they become tendentially hegemonic in solving the question of uneven and (inter-)dependent development in Europe? On the Visegrád scale of dependent developmental states: What sort of state transnationalization-*cum*-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU's de facto regional and urban policy promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state projects and through these catch-up strategies?

3. Cohesion Consensus: Negotiating the Asymmetric Inter-Dependency in Europe

In this chapter, I trace the institutional form of TRPD since its origins in the mid-1960s up to the mid-2010s. I investigate the process of socio-institutional fixing. The transformation involved several path-dependent but also shaping conjunctures through period reforms of 1974, 1979, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1999, 2006, and 2013. Three of them – 1974, 1988, and 2006 – constituted landmarks. The 1974 reform institutionalized the Regional Policy, the 1988 reform turned it into the Cohesion Policy. The 2006 reform adapted it to the enlarged EU. Against this background, this chapter inquiries into the institutionalist purpose of this constitutionalizing process as a historically contingent regularization of hierarchies in the multi-level cohesion governance. Embedding the reform process in the global (post-)Fordist transformation, I recognize it as a tendential turn from a dirigiste supranationalization to *ordnungspolitik*-type multi-level governmentalization. Both types of this TRPD promoted different historical forms of asymmetric regulation of core-peripheral (cohesion) consensus inherent to European integration.


Using the content analysis of the official legislative documents published within the Cohesion Policy, I focus on the Commission's conditional leadership in negotiating this cohesion consensus. Contrasting these two historical forms allows us to observe the changing configurations of regulating the core-peripheral relations within the European integration. The chapter documents this when tracing the discursive origins and rearticulation of the hegemonic dilemma between the core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness. Regarding this institutional consensus, I explore how the Commission used the two discourses in two periodic processes of (i) inter-state bargaining over the volume and shape of cohesion transfers and (ii) institutional implementation of their formal governance. This allows us to document the governmentalizing tendency as historically sedimented along the selective prioritization of the effectiveness visions under the latest heading of the EU added value.

Supporting the content analysis with economic data, I document how the prioritization of peripheral effectiveness over core solidarity reflected the growing austerity in the 5- and later

7-year long EU budgets, the so-called Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The trend was an “expansion” through the doubling of cohesion transfers in 1988, as the cohesion consensus was institutionalized, which was followed by the “dilution” by 1999 and further relative “retrenchment” ever since the 2000s (Bachtler and Mendez, 2013: 81-109). This tendential infrastructural erosion of the cohesion consensus is sketched in the Graph 3.1 on the share of the MFFs and the cohesion funding payments in the EU GNI that are contrasted with the total payments (EU, 2007l; 2014g; 2019a). Hence, the packages Delors I of 1988-1993 and the Delors II of 1993-1999, the first articulated MFFs, raised the average ceiling of appropriated budgetary commitments to the 1,22 % of EU GNI. The announced doubling allowed then for the average budgetary share of cohesion investment on the level of 21,7 % by 1993 and 33,3 % by 1999. Three 7-year MFFs followed in 2000-2006, 2007-2013, and 2014-2020. Although the average ceiling was lowered to 1,09 % share of EU GNI in the first period, while it slightly increased 1,12 % in the second one only to be reduced to the 1,03 % share in the 2014-2020 period. Although the share of cohesion funding grew to the average level of 36 % in the first period and remained there for the second period, it was reduced to 32,6 % for 2014-2020. Therefore, I document the discursive regularization of these trends of initial budgetary expansion which has been however contradictorily reversed in the context of post-Fordist institutional deepening and post-enlargement peripheral enlargement of the EU.

The chapter is structured as follows: First, it traces the 1974 institutional origins of cohesion consensus which developed during the 1980s Southern enlargement and the initiation of the Single Market and the EMU between the 1987 Single European Act and the Europe 1992 strategy. Second, it exemplifies the 1988 reform as a comprehensive strategy enacting the Commission-led supranationalization which coincided with the expanding solidarity of North-Western core. It also explores how this multi-level supranationalization gave way to the neoliberal governmentalization under the Agenda 2000. Third, it shows how the Agenda 2000 shifted the cohesion consensus from the core solidarity to the effectiveness-driven responsabilization of the old Southern and new Eastern peripheries. Since the 2006 reform, the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 strategies made the turn comprehensive under the global crisis. Last, the chapter concludes with the surveying how the governmentalization impacted on the everyday hierarchies inside the cohesion bureaucracies.

Graph 3.1 Cohesion Investment in the EU budget: Total Payments and Percentage of EU/Community GNI



*% of cohesion investment is also the adjusted share of the total EU budget.
 Source: Own preparation; Financial Reports on the EU budget

3.1. Intermediating the Cohesion Consensus

The cohesion consensus had been under negotiation since the mid-1960s. Failing to articulate it into a comprehensive institutional form, the Commission’s intermediating role fixed its comprehensive configuration only in 1988. The articulation was inherent to a twofold process. Originating in the relatively coherent club of six core economies, the integration process expanded into Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark in 1973 and Southern peripheries of Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. This territorial expansion was accompanied with the market-oriented deepening which stalled by the mid-1970s but was relaunched in the mid-1980s. The Fordist nationally-oriented fixation prevented the supranational institutional maturation of Cohesion Policy. However, the 1970s economic and political crisis of Fordism established discursive conditions to institutionalize it in the 1988 reform as a part of the Single European Act (EC, 1987a, 1987b). In other words, the cohesion consensus was comprehensively institutionalized only as an early post-Fordist arrangement

which highlighted the “European solidarity” as indispensable for “encouraging greater competitiveness and more convergence between Member States” with respect to the Single Market and the EMU (EC, 1987a: 13). The Fordist origins can be however traced in the Commission’s Thomson Report (1973a: 7, emphasis added) which spelled out the growing heterogeneity problem under the market-making integration through the first articulation of the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma:

No *Community* could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the peoples which belong to it so long as same have very different standards of living and have cause to doubt the common will of all to help each Member to better the conditions of its people. [...] For it is clear that rapid progress towards Economic and Monetary Union would be arrested if national economies had not undergone the *transformations needed to avoid excessive divergencies between the economies of Member States*. [...] No Member State can be expected to support the economic and monetary disciplines of Economic and Monetary union without *Community solidarity involved in the effective use of such instruments*; equally Member States must be prepared to accept the *disciplines of Economic and Monetary union as a condition* of this Community support.

George Thomson was the third Commissioner for Regional Policy. In 1973, he started the line of Commissioners which made the Cohesion Policy constitutive to the double peripheral and social dimension of the integration relaunch (Apeldoorn, 2002). Thomson was preceded by Hans von der Groeben (1967-1970) and Albert Broschete (1970-1973) which represented Germany and Luxembourg respectively. The two first Commissioners supervised the establishment of regional policy as an appendage to their more important portfolios of, firstly, Single Market and, secondly, competition. Especially Von der Groeben, who supervised the formation of Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG Regio) in 1968, was not only a founding father of the Single Market. He was also affiliated with the ordoliberal circles which established the Social Market Economy in Germany. In contrast to these two, the following Commissioners represented a combination of socialist parties, peripheral states or states with large peripheral areas. Thomson (1973-1977) was a Scottish member of Labour Party, Antonio Giolitti (1977-1985) was a member of Italian Socialist Party, and Grigoris Varfis (1985-1989) was a member of Greek socialist PASOK. All the three played major roles in intermediating the cohesion consensus as a basic condition of core-peripheral compromise on European integration which was later foregrounded by Jacques Delors, himself a French Socialist, as the President of the Commission (1985-1995) during the integration relaunch.

According to Wozniak Boyle (2006), these Commissioners intermediated the inter-state consensus so that it, however, resembled the DG Regio's technocratic visions. By the 1988 reform, the intermediation had already skewed the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma in favour of effectiveness discourse. The 1983 communication *On Ways of Increasing the Effectiveness of the Community Structural Funds* was a turning point (Commission, 1983c). Foregrounding "the twin requirements, inextricably bound together, of Community solidarity and effectiveness", Commission bureaucrats (1983c: 11) strived to overcome the stalemate of 1979 and 1984 reforms. The communication offered the framework of „financial solidarity“ which entailed the "doubling" of cohesion transfers for "multiannual" programming periods (Commission, 1983c: 7, 10, 14-15). The core solidarity was to be conditioned by "enhancing effectiveness" to be guaranteed by the Commission's enhanced coordination powers over peripheral states. However, the framework became accepted only when it linked "European solidarity" with the "greater competitiveness [of Single Market] and more convergence [towards the EMU] between Member States" in the late 1980s (EC, 1987a: 13). Here, "most prosperous" states compensated the "less prosperous" ones (EC, 1987a: 7, 12, 19-20). Failing when articulated as a core assistance to periphery in the "present economic crisis" (EC, 1981a: 1) of Fordism, solidarity discourse succeeded later as a compensation for the "painful" restructuralization during the integration relaunch. The Commission's supranational dirigisme guaranteed to switch the cohesion transfers from „compensatory devices“, „offsetting mechanism“ or merely „budget transfers“ (EC, 1987a: 7, 13, 20) to effective investment into peripheral integration. Although fixed only in the late 1980s, the two Fordist decades remained crucial to make this a consensual underlining of the post-Fordist EU.

3.1.1. From Institutional Void to Fixing

The socio-institutional fixing privileged the effectiveness concerns of establishing "complementarity", "coherence", and "coordination" of the supranational and national regional policies as the major purpose of Cohesion Policy (EC, 1965: 6; 1969: 36; EC, 1973a: 12-13). This strategy allowed the Commission (1973b: 1-2) to establish the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1974 which initially aimed only to "complement" national and regional policies. However, the ERDF underpinned the core-peripheral consensus not only institutionally but infrastructurally. Only in the 1980s, the Commission succeeded in pushing

these complementarity-oriented reforms of the ERDF into the establishment of Cohesion Policy as a “comprehensive policy” (EC, 1965: 22; 1973b: 3). This became necessary with the Southern expansion and the increasing peripheral demands on financial compensation in exchange for the external coordination of their development. Following the ERDF in the 1970s, the 1980s Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP) allowed the Commission to fix the Cohesion Policy as both co-optive and hierarchically coordinated instrument of peripheral integration.

The ERDF was instrumentalized as an “important test of Community solidarity” (EC, 1973a: 14). It complemented other existing instruments such as the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) within the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Social Fund (ESF), and the loan-based European Investment Bank (EIB). Legitimizing them as a sign of solidarity, the Commission strived to turn these instruments into a comprehensive developmental policy, while emphasizing the effectiveness imperative of coherent integration. Thus, the proposal on its 1979 reform highlighted the need for their “complementarity” (EC, 1977a: 9). Only this way, it was accordingly possible to establish a “systematic link between Community policies and regional problems” where integrated “guidelines”, proposed by the Commission and “fixed by the Council” later, complied with the effective intervention. Dissatisfied with the reform process, Giolliti’s DG Regio voluntarily tested the shared guidelines on the Integrated Development Operations which, under the “combined use” of all instruments, aimed at „fuller and more effective“ impact (EC, 1979a: 1). The Commission (1981a: 61) used the integrated approach of „joint financing“ to positioning itself from „bookkeeping and checking conformity“ to the powers of „devising policy, promotion, planning and providing technical assistance“.

The integrated approach expanded the Commission’s multi-level tendencies to “effective cooperation between the regional, national and Community authorities” (EC, 1965: 18). The effectiveness visions regularized its leadership which moved from expecting to “add its own effort” to later argumentation about closely “coordinated joint action” so that it could privilege the long-term “integrated development operations” in the 1980s (EC, 1973b: 2; 1977a: 14; 1981a: 7). Although the method changed, the purpose remained oriented at adapting the “institutional framework of economy” in peripheries in order to synchronize the “new requirements of economic structures” (EC, 1969: 52). Focusing on the mobilization of

peripheral “indigenous [development] potential” (EC, 1981a: 5, 1981b: 60), this still expected to change the „psychological aspects“ and ignite an „active cooperation of the people in the area“ for enforcing their „initiative and sense of responsibility“ (EC, 1965: 29). Such multi-level strategies were promoted as deliberative “consultations” which included the partnership of “Community, the Member States, the social partners and the regional and local representatives” (1977a: 14). The effectiveness discourse legitimized their hierarchical institutionalization at once.

The hierarchies were negotiated in the core-peripheral bargaining, while incubating many future technologies of cohesion governance (see Table 3.1). Demanding the doubled resources, the effectiveness visions responded to the North-Western core states’ arguments about “ever-tighter budgetary constraints” following the Fordist crisis, while appeasing them with the emphasis on financial “discipline” (EC, 1981b: 59; 1983c: 14). In this sense, the Commission (1983c: 10) offered itself as the guarantor of this discipline because it was “not prepared to accept that the negotiations deal solely with the financial redistribution” without any sense of “coherent programme of reform”. Such a programme was proposed in the 1983 communication on effectiveness which reframed it as necessarily leading to the “*value added*” effects (1983c: 6). The added value of cohesion funding could be then guaranteed only through “conditionality” approach which included “*ex ante* technical, economic and financial assessment and *ex post* monitoring of the results of operations” in peripheral states (EC, 1983c: 13). Finding effectively the “complementary character between Fund aid measures and those of Member States” (EC, 1981a: 5) was consequently up to the Commission’s hands-on management of peripheral development.

The core-peripheral negotiation about financing the cohesion consensus became inherent to the negotiations over common budget resolved only in the mid-1980s. It was the Commission (1979b) and the peripheral states – rather than core state managers - which brought the “budget and convergence questions” together, albeit with differing logics. Much of it, however, formally differentiated the net-paying core and net-recipient periphery. The establishment of ERDF was enforced only through the threats of Ireland and Italy, due to its peripheral area of Mezzogiorno, to boycott the inter-governmental summits in the 1970s. Later, the issue of “convergence of [national] economic policies” (EC, 1973a: 16; 1977a: 6, 16-17) was tightly attached to the demands for reform and budgetary increase of ERDF. Much of

the peripheral strategy was practiced by Southern state managers in the 1980s. The convergence question was also skilfully used by the UK, which had own north-western peripheries, during the budgetary negotiations to reach the maximal return of its payments. For the Commission (1973a: 16; 1977a: 6, 16-17), the logic of solidarity appeals, aiming at net-paying core of north-western Europe and West Germany in particular, denied the game of United Kingdom-type “juste retours” between net-paying and -recipient positions. Rather, the Commission bureaucrats articulated the net-payments as a core contribution to the shared regional order which politically integrated the socioeconomic peripheries.

The IMP became the testing ground of this asymmetric, yet consensual integration. The anticipation of Greek, Portuguese and Spanish accessions opened the Southern peripheral question at full. The Commission (1981b: 59) used this to promote its integrated approach as merging the “[effective] coordination and [financial] solidarity” with respect to the convergence question. Following the Greek accession, the new socialist Government of Greece (1982: 90) under the PASOK leader Andreas Papandreu opened this question when requiring financial compensation given that the existing structures tended to “suit the central and developed economies”. The Commission (1981c: 1; 1983a: 4) concurred that Mediterranean regions “benefited less” from the market-making integration and suffered “more acutely” from the Fordist crisis, which required robust „adjustment efforts“ to establish “interdependence between the[ir] ‘catching-up policies’ [...] and other Community policies“. At the end, the IMP encompassed the Southern regions of Italy, France, and “whole of Greece” (1986: 6) after being introduced following the Greek threat to bloc Portuguese and Spanish accessions. Compensating these regions, the Commission used the IMP to define “overall strategy and retrospective control” and receive a “wide margin of manoeuvre” in their coordination (EC, 1986: 9). Appealing to “joint efforts” and “dialogue”, the IMP were to enable the “programme partners [...] themselves be forced” to address “problems of [their] modernization” with respect to the “realization of big European projects” (EC, 1986: 10).

Following the ERDF, the IMP turned the Cohesion Policy into a testing framework which foregrounded the concertation of development intervention on peripheral areas. By the mid-1980s, the Commission failed to fix the Cohesion Policy in both respects of socio-institutional and infrastructural resources. However, the two decades of discursive struggles over the 1974, 1979, and 1984 reforms represented a powerful incubation period for the

pattern of solidarity-effectiveness dilemma. The increase in core solidarity was matched with the market-making integration. Moreover, the core solidarity became ever more conditioned by the effectiveness visions which privileged the Commission's leadership in fixing peripheral development. Given that peripheral state managers and the peripheral or socialist Commissioners shaped this intermediation of cohesion consensus, the 1988 reform became thus a social-democratic and peripheral agenda in the overall post-Fordist shift.

3.1.2. Partnership: From Regional to Cohesion Policy

The 1988 reform doubled the cohesion resources in the first multiannual EU budget, the 5-year financial perspective known as the Delors I, and established the Cohesion Policy. For Delors Commission, the Cohesion Policy formed a chance for supranational dirigisme which allowed it to facilitate an industrial policy consistent with the visions of Euro-Mercantilist and Social Europe. It tended to establish the cohesion consensus on both scales of transnational – social democratic, Euro-mercantilist, and neoliberal – projects and inter-governmental relations. In both respects, core states and neoliberal forces were demanded “adequate financial resources” (1987b: 7) which legitimized the peripheral co-option and social embedding of the Single Market and, later, the EMU in the conditions of liberalizing world trade (EC, 1985, 1987a, 1987b). In this logic, the Commission established the multi-level cohesion governance to fix the socio-institutional form of Cohesion Policy. It stood on the five more or less articulated technologies of governance which tended to “complement each other and form a whole” (EC, 1989: 13; see Table 3.1): partnership, programming, concertation, additionality, simplification.

Out of the five technologies, the partnership was the key one. It bound the other principles together and adhered to the coherence-seeking nodal agency of cohesion governance. It represented “close” and “genuine” deliberation and structured the coordination hierarchies as a “guarantee of effectiveness” at once (EC, 1987b: 14; 1989: 15, 43, 63, 78, 91). Adhering to the multi-level governance, it was to operate “at all levels” and “each stage” of the integrated “multiannual operational programmes” (EC, 1987b: 22, 1990a: 9). The Commission

Table 3.1 Technologies of Cohesion Governance

Technology	Reform	Original Purpose	Reformed Purpose (if any)
partnership	1988	„[C]lose consultation between the Commission, the Member States concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal“. Accordingly, this covered “the preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of operations“. This was to especially happen in the Monitoring Committees (MC) during the implementation periods.	In 2007, it was “further widened” from regional, social and economic partners to include “environmental partners, non-governmental organisations and organisations responsible for promoting equality” during „negotiations“ and “at every programming stage (setting up, follow-up and evaluation)“. In 2014, „highlighting the importance of the partnership and multi-level governance“, the Commission could enact “a European code of conduct on partnership through the adoption of a delegated act“.
concentration	1988	“Concentration on these priority objectives requires a continuing effort to coordinate not only the financial instruments but also the back-up policies they serve.“ This „opens the way to a global approach which should make it easier to achieve the priority objectives and to administer more effectively the substantial growth in the financial resources“.	Turn from the territorial concentration in Objectives to the “thematic concentration” by the 2014 reform. Here, the “new rules on thematic concentration set out minimum level of resources which should be spent on some specific areas of intervention and a minimum allocation“ with respect to the Europe 2020 strategy and within new hierarchization among less developed, transition, and developed regions.
programming	1988	Turn from “project-based to programme-based approach” to give the investment planning “necessary depth and width, while at the same time allowing greater flexibility“, so that the combination of „some degree of decentralization of the management“ through partnership and its „predictability“ is arranged for „improved assessment“ and „better administration“.	Especially since 2007, the “strategic approach” has been foregrounded. This upscaled the definition of content to the supranational level including the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 and their fixing in CStF and CSG above all.
additionality	1988	“While the additionality arrangements will be appraised on a case-by-case basis when the Community support frameworks are drawn up, a monitoring system needs to be set up as of now to assess the extent to which the Community effort is matched at national level“.	In 2007, underpinning the added-value discourse: It had to be verified only in less developed “convergence objective“ regions due to proportionality. A „financial corrective mechanism in the event of this principle not being respected“ was added here. Then, the financing had to „target the European Union priorities in terms of the promotion of competitiveness and employment creation“ - Lisbon Strategy.
decentralization	2000	Establishment of Managing Authority (MA) with detailed tasks of managing “collection and transmission of financial and statistical data“, „annual implementation report“, conformity with Community policies“, „mid-term evaluation“, „implementation of any Commission recommendations for changes in monitoring or management procedures“. Facilitating MCs with tasks such as „approval of proposals for changes“ of OPs, „approval of the criteria for selecting the operations to be funded“, „monitoring and evaluation“ or specifying „monitoring indicators“ and approving „annual implementation report“.	In 2007, three sorts of separate bodies originating in 2000 reform were restructured within member states: Certifying (formerly Paying) Authority, Auditing (formerly Control) Authority and Intermediate Bodies (often state agencies acting on behalf of MA) within the management, implementation, and control responsibilities were assigned bigger responsibilities. Certifying Authority then “draws up and sends to the Commission a certified inventory concerning expenditure and requests for payment“. It assures “compliance of expenditure” returns “Community credits in the case of irregularities“. Auditing Authority “is an operationally independent body“ which „takes charge of the audits“, “writes up the annual control reports and offers an opinion on the audits carried out“.
proportionality	2007	„Modulating the obligations attributed to the member states, contingent on the total amount of expenditure on an OP“, where core states with lower funding have (i) „the choice of indicators used to measure up a programme, the obligations in terms of evaluation, management and reports“ and (ii), in „control and monitoring“, such states have „less obligations“ where, e.g., their „auditing authority is not obliged to present an auditing strategy to the Commission“.	In 2014, it has been absorbed by the partnership and simplification technologies and the multi-level governance imperative.
simplification	1988/ 2014	Appeared in 1988 reform but was later backgrounded: “assured in the first place through uniformity of the procedures under which assistance is provided by the three structural Funds although each of these retains certain features specific to it“.	Foregrounded in 2014 as „harmonisation of rules“ between the funds „with regard to rules on eligibility and durability“; „increased proportionality“ with regard to „reporting, evaluation, management and control“; „legal certainty through clearer rules“; Facilitation of „more efficient delivery and lighter reporting“ when focusing „in particular on core common indicators that facilitate data gathering and reporting on achievements at EU level“ and transfer to a „results-based management“.

Source: EC, 1989: 14-5, 21-2; 2000: 23-6, 28-31, 133; 2007: 35; 2015: 15, 19, 24, 201, 219.

interpreted thus the partnership as inherent to the whole cycle of “preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of operations” (EC, 1987b: 27). For the “maximum synergy”, the Commission had to “be a great deal more involved and to maintain a higher profile than in the past in the [peripheral] regions and social groups” (EC, 1987b: 15; 1989: 16). Besides the “official partnership”, the “broadly based partnership” extended the scope of cohesion governance from state managers to also “various economic and social partners (chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture, trade unions, employers, etc.)” (EC, 1989: 15).

The partnerships were operationalized in the Community Support Frameworks (CSuFs). Firstly, this included Operational Programmes (OP) and Monitoring Committees (MC) (see Table 3.1 and 3.3). These frameworks were based on expecting the peripheral managers to self-assess own backward development which were then negotiated with the Commission. Accordingly, their negotiation followed the submission of multi-annual – national and regional – development plans. These plans had to involve the self-assessment of own socioeconomic problems, offer own proposal of development strategy and priorities, as well as estimates of necessary aid. Following these preparation and negotiation stages, MCs were then established to form “the machinery for monitoring and assessing” of operationalized partnerships (EC, 1989: 22) in the CSuFs-based OP. Therefore, the institutionalization of the cohesion bureaucracy remained a mix of co-option and disciplining. It allowed for „many forms and expected decentralization“ within national and local conditions, while leaving the CSuFs “amended each year” if needed (EC, 1989: 15, 22). However, it simultaneously required the peripheral elites to submit “jointly agreed reporting procedures“, establish national compliance with “public procurement financed from the structural Funds” as well as actively pursue “publicity” to make “potential beneficiaries” and “general public” aware of the development assistance (EC, 1989: 85).

All the other governance technologies strategically cultivated the partnership-based nodal agency under the heading of effectiveness, coherence, and transparency (EC, 1989: 16). First, the programming integrated the project- to program-based operations. This way, the negotiated purpose in CSuFs gained higher comprehensiveness within the MFF-based programming periods. Second, the concentration aimed at spatially concentrating the resources only on five specific objectives and organized thus the basic development hierarchies between the regions (EC, 1990a: 9, see Table 3.2): “Most of the resources

available“ were territorially oriented at the Objective 1 which involved peripheral regions „lagging seriously behind“. The Objective 2 covered the „selected areas hard-hit by industrial decline“, while the Objective 5b focused on those “requiring a special effort in rural development”. Furthermore, regions with „long-term unemployed (Objective 3)“, “young people entering the labour market (Objective 4)“, and “modernizing agriculture (Objective 5a)“ were included. Third, the additionality expected the cohesion investment to bring added value rather than substitute national investment, whereby “equivalent increase” of cohesion funding was expected to be “matched at national level” (EC, 1989: 21). This blended the supranational and national transfers, while subordinating the developmental purpose of national to supranational ones. Last, the simplification was not recognized initially as a formal rule. However, it emerged later through the initial logic which aimed to “simplify procedures” in order to reduce the “complexity” and establish “uniformity” of procedures for the sake of higher “effectiveness” and prevention of “opportunities for fraud” (EC, 1989: 22).

The governance technologies of partnership, programming, concertation, additionality, and simplification underpinned the formation of a comprehensive institutional form in the cohesion agenda. Underpinning the emergent multi-level governance, Delors Commission conceptualized it as a first step to consolidate a transnational network of cohesion bureaucracies under its supranational dirigisme. Its purpose was a supranationally-led industrial policy which was to, firstly, secure the peripheral integration and, secondly, reconcile the ascendant leadership of the neoliberal project with its social-democratic and Euro-mercantilist counterparts (Van Apeldoorn, 2002). In the first round, the Cohesion Policy was associated primarily with the Single Market, while the Delors Commission expected its further EMU-oriented budgetary and institutional expansion under its technocratic leadership.

3.2. Solidarity of North-Western Payers

In the 1990s, the expansion of core-peripheral consensus reached its limits as a dirigiste and embedding of the emergent neoliberal project. Evoking the “solid [cohesion] consensus”, the Commission bound its extension as a condition to the realization of “new ambitions” on the way to the EU (EC, 1990: 3; 1992a: 15). Against the background of the 1992 Maastricht

Treaty, the core solidarity was further extended in exchange for the peripheral co-option and in favour of the Commission's dirigisme in the 1993 reform. The expectations of new doubling, however, collapsed into its dilution under the emergent neoliberal governmentalization to be fixed in the 1999 reform. Either way, the cohesion consensus locked the peripheral states in the extending system of "multilateral surveillance" orchestrated within the EMU preparations (EC, 1992b: 46; 1992c: 3, 24). Although the establishment of the EU was associated with the solidarity of North-Western core, "assuring [this] financial solidarity" gradually shifted to be the task of peripheral effectiveness against the background of increasing budget restraint in the EU and with the prospect of eastern enlargement (EC, 1997: 21). In 1992, the promise of second doubling in the Delors II perspective aimed already at co-opting the peripheral states and regions into the new ambitions of neoliberal developmentalism (EC, 1992b: 29):

The strengthening and readjustment of structures in regions whose development is lagging behind is made all the more urgent by the creation of the internal market, the increased competition which this implies between businesses and regions and the need for a substantial and rapid reduction of economic disparities between the Member States in order to achieve economic and monetary union. [...] If the Community is to adapt to a world where economic conditions are constantly changing, assistance must take account of the pressing need to improve the Community's competitiveness, with the social consequences that this implies. In addition, support for the liberalization of world trade in the context of GATT and for the progress of the countries of central and eastern Europe towards a market economy must take account of the Community's overall effort to achieve cohesion.

The governmentalizing turn was clear between the Europe 1992 and Agenda 2000 strategies. The Europe 1992 followed the emerged pattern which bound core solidarity with peripheral consensual subordination to supranational hierarchies of ongoing market-enabling integration. The market-enabling integration was complemented with budgetary doubling under the 5-year Delors II perspective. The doubling was possible due to the peripheral threat, this time led by Spanish socialist government under Felipe Gonzáles, to bloc the Maastricht Treaty. Delors Commission was instrumental in delivering the consensus to be sealed during the Edinburgh Council (EC, 1993c). The 1993 reform only reinforced the *dirigisme*, while simultaneously embedding the EMU preparations with a new fund – the CF. The 1990 German reunification and the anticipation of 1996 enlargement with core-type Austria, Sweden, and Finland made this possible. From then, the 1997 communication Agenda 2000 introduced a

turn whereby the core solidarity remained restrained in favour of peripheral effectiveness. The Commission (1997: 37) reevaluated its “executive and management functions and a change in its administrative culture” on the eve of 1999 reform. The original doubling of Delors II was diluted as the 5-year perspective was extended to a 7-year framework. As illustrated below and in the chapter 4, under this budget restraint, the Single Market, EMU preparations and liberalized EU Trade Policy became regularized as a necessity of the EU’s global competitiveness. As well, the eastern enlargement no longer constituted the imperative to increase core solidarity but rather enforce the new and old peripheries to the effective use of the existing one.

In stark contrast to the previous decades, the neoliberalizing turn was supervised by the Commissioners for Regional Policy who represented a mix of core and conservative forces. The 1992 doubling and 1993 reform were implemented by Bruce Millan (1989-1995), a Scottish Labour politician, in Delors Commission. In contrast, the 1999 reform was organized by Monika Wulf-Mathies (1995-1999), a West German Social Democrat, against the background of East German integration. Although social democrats, both Millan and Wulf-Mathies were nominated by the Conservative and Christian-Democratic governments of their respective member states. Implementing the 1999 reform, Michel Barnier (1999-2004) confirmed this trend as a French centre-right politician.

3.2.1. Europe 1992: Limits of Supranational Dirigisme

The early 1990s set the limits to the Commission’s supranational leadership. By that time, the cohesion governance matured into a comprehensive form which integrated the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma with the dilemma of “competitiveness and cohesion” (EC, 1992a: 2; see chapter 4). In the Europe 1992 strategy, the Commission (1992a: 2) rationalized the core solidarity when highlighting the “major contradiction here” between the EMU rules of *nominal* convergence, including the „budgetary rigour“, and the need of *real* convergence of social standards through the „march towards greater cohesion“ on the Single Market. The Cohesion Policy had to thus embed this financialization-*cum*-marketization to reconcile the „aims of [social] cohesion, [nominal] convergence and [economic] growth“ (EC, 1992a: 8). Its purpose aimed thus at reconciling two imperatives of „economic expansion and monetary

stability“ to reconfigure the cohesion governance into an “effective policy of structural assistance“ oriented at building peripheral „competitive advantages“ (EC, 1992a: 8).

Europe 1992 extended the cohesion consensus. It aimed to compensate the peripheries but equally realign the cohesion governance with the new screening methods of nominal convergence and performance with the EMU’s financializing convergence rules. The CF, which replaced the IMPs, was established to compensate the Southern periphery. Moreover, the doubled funding in the post-Maastricht EU aimed to “demonstrate its solidarity“ with the emergent Eastern periphery of the Eastern Germany and then CEE in the pre-accession “Phare operations“ (EC, 1992a: 17, 21). The eligibility of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece for the CF became thus „conditional on the introduction of a programme to meet the convergence conditions, particularly on budget deficits, and subject to Community monitoring in the context of multilateral surveillance“ during the EMU preparations (EC, 1992c: 26). The surveillance was said to prevent the “risk” whereby the “convergence of economic policies” conflicted with the “goal of cohesion” (EC, 1992c: 13). In other words, the surveillance as inherent to the supranational dirigisme guaranteed that the cohesion transfers were effectively allocated to “productive resources and improvements on the supply side rather than the establishment of a system of redistribution“ (EC, 1992c: 14).

The supranational dirigisme was articulated with respect to the partnership, programming, and additionality in the 1993 reform (1992b, 1993c, 1996b). First, it emphasized the “extension of partnership“ which had to include „economic and social partners“ (EC, 1993a: 19-20). The preparation of nation-wide development plans to “some extent restricted“ the participation of regional authorities which were „more fully involved“ only during the CSuF negotiations (EC, 1992b: 23). Only the MCs on regional level enabled the „three-way partnership“ between the Commission, national governments, and regional governments. This concerned also social partners whose participation was “unsatisfactory“ during the national operationalization of Cohesion Policy (EC, 1992b: 23). Second, the programming failed “to adopt a ‘strategic approach’” (EC, 1992b: 24). The reform required the strategic self-assessment which required the national articulation of development „objectives, quantified“ (EC, 1993a: 22; see Table 3.3). For the more developed states and their regions outside of Objective 1, this approach was streamlined into Single Programming Document (SPD). The SPDs merged the “development plan and the applications for assistance relating

to it“ to require only “a single decision” from the Commission vis-à-vis the thorough negotiations over CSuFs with less developed states (EC, 1993a: 22). Third, the additionality suffered from an insufficient “verification” and “availability of information” to check whether the cohesion transfers were complemented with “comparable expenditure” on national level and allocated according to the rules” (EC, 1992b: 26). Deepening of these technologies was a prelude to the governmentalizing turn.

Table 3.2 Concentration: Hierarchization of Regions by Type of Development Needs, Regions-Objectives

1988-1999	Objective 1 <i>seriously lagging behind</i>	Objective 2 <i>deindustrializing</i>	Objective 3 <i>long-term unemployment</i>	Objective 4 <i>youth unemployment</i>	Objective 5a/5b <i>rural development/modernizing agriculture</i>	Objective 6 <i>least densely populated</i>
2000-2006	Objective 1 <i>seriously lagging behind</i>	Objective 2 <i>structurally suffering</i>	Objective 3 <i>labour market issues</i>			
2007-2013	Convergence <i>new Eastern periphery after 2004</i>	Phasing In – Out <i>old lagging regions after 2004</i>	Regional Competitiveness and Employment <i>old structurally suffering regions after 2004</i>			
2014-	Less Developed <i>below 75% of EU GDP</i>	Transition <i>between 75-90% of EU GDP</i>	Developed <i>over 90% of EU GDP</i>			

Source: Own preparation

Fourth, the concertation rescaled the doubled finance upwards and further to the peripheral coverage as sketched in the Table 3.2. Making them more supranationally-led and peripherally-oriented, the cohesion transfers concentrated ever more on peripheral areas, while being partially retained for the Commission’s (1992b) “Community initiatives”. Then, the Commission advocated a “stronger concentration of structural Fund operations on Objective 1” on around 70 % of total allocation which included “the new German Länder” since 1994 (EC, 1992c: 24). With respect to the CF, the peripheries were differentiated between “two types of country”, that is the eligible Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal and non-eligible „other Objective 1 regions“ (EC, 1996: 16). The new Objective 6 on least densely

populated area was added to integrate the territorially peripheral northernmost regions of newly accessed Sweden and Finland in 1996 (EC, 1996: 15). Regarding the initiatives, they accumulated “between 5 and 10 % of total resources committed” which aimed at further „complementing“ the national CSuFs and SPDs, as well as other supranational policies (EC, 1993b: 11; 1998b: 7). These 13 initiatives facilitated its coordination powers through promoting “cross-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation and networks” which aimed at disseminating the policy transfer and technical assistance within the cohesion governance (1993b: 14; 1994: 7; 1998b). The supranational dirigisme went thus hand in hand with the peripheralizing focus of Cohesion Policy.

3.2.2. Agenda 2000: Governmentalizing Turn

The Agenda 2000 governmentalized the tendential dirigiste supranationalization when turning it into the *ordnungspolitik*-type governance. The governmentalizing tendencies were always inherent to the cohesion governance. Already in 1992, with an aim at “improving the effectiveness”, the Commission (1992b: 40-41) considered to “participate less in the detailed implementation in order to step up its activities in the definition of strategies and policies, assessment, monitoring and control“. The turn signalled progressing neoliberal leaderships inside the Commission and the whole post-Fordist regional project itself. The turn emerged simultaneously with the anticipation of eastern enlargement which was no longer fixed with the Commission’s readiness as well as core states’ willingness to extend the solidarity. It equally coincided with the member states’ resistance against the Commission’s supranationalizing tendencies. In connection with the formerly dominant technologies, the 1999 reform proposal shaped their purpose when foregrounding the formerly less important ones of “simplification”, “flexibility”, “decentralization”, and “subsidiarity” (EC, 1998a). However, rather than any retreat of its “institutional and political responsibility as guarantor of the Community”, the Commission (1998a: 10) aimed to change the purpose and forms of its asymmetric leadership to execute a proxy command and control power.

The simplification logic aimed at reshaping the “clear division of responsibilities“ among various levels and stages of “deeper and broader partnership” (EC, 1998a: 9). Reconfiguring them aimed at unmaking the “complicated, slow and cumbersome“ as well as „over-bureaucratic“ tendencies of the dirigiste model (EC, 1998a: 10). In reality, the Commission

reshaped the asymmetries so that it could define the strategic framework of the initial programming stage and keep control over the assessment of the peripheral performance in the last stage. The “partners benefiting” from the cohesion assistance assumed thus a “greater responsibility” for the intermediate phase of implementation which responsabilized the state managers as “guarantors for monitoring, management, evaluation and control” (EC, 1998a: 11, 20). Therefore, the decentralization shifted the implementation responsibility to member states as a form of deepened partnership, while broadening it with “economic and social partners” as well as “other relevant organizations” such as non-governmental organizations and other interest groups (EC, 2000: 26). The deepening involved clear distribution of tasks inside the MC of every OP and the state bureaucracies for the “correct implementation” in general (EC, 1998a: 11).


From the proposal, the decentralization made it into the final regulation as the newly recognized governance technology (EC, 1998a, 2000). Through it, the downscaled responsabilization through flexible decentralization brought back the proposition of governance through conditionality from the early 1980s (EC, 1983: 13). As Table 3.2 shows, the shape of MCs was reshuffled, while the new function of Managing Authority (MA) had to be established in member states. Through the Managing Authorities, the states and regions have overtaken responsibility for the proliferating duties in the management of cohesion governance. The Commission legitimized this as a guarantee that the processes to “cement solidarity within the Union are as effective as possible and monitored at all levels” (EC, 1998a: 12). The surveillance strengthened “the links between programme monitoring, financial management and controls”, while extending the effectiveness vision with the emphasis on “principles of sound financial management” (EC, 1998a: 28). With this logic, the “monitoring and evaluation systems” of national governance and performance were to be complemented with “management and inspection systems” (EC, 1998a: 28). The supranational intervention was thus replaced with the “greater integration of” ex ante, mid-term, and ex post “evaluations” to verify the additionality of cohesion investment under the heading of institutional “efficiency” (1998a: 27; 2000: 26-31).

Downscaling the implementation responsibilities, the power over strategic programming was upscaled. Although the loose supranational guidelines existed before, the Commission gave stricter emphasis on the consolidated “Community guidelines” (EC, 1998a: 8; 1999a;

2003c). This required the peripheral state managers to articulate their CSuFs/SPD against these guidelines so that there was their tighter complementarity with the final OPs. As evidenced in detail by the chapter 4, the Commission was already developing guidance on the complementarities between selected national and supranational socioeconomic institutions and policies with respect to the neoliberal developmentalism over the 1990s. These aimed at privileging investment which involved: research and development, labour markets restructuring, sustainable development, and transport (EC, 1993d, 1994b, 1995, 1999b). These sectoral complementarities materialized in the formation of comprehensive guidelines on “integrated strategies” of socioeconomic development which brought together peripheral and EU development objectives (EC, 1999a: 3; 2001b; 2003c). The simplification of the strategic planning legitimized thus the increase of the Commission’s power over privileging particular developmental purpose in the cohesion investment.

The asymmetry grew also in the core-peripheral consensus. As the EMU entered in force and the eastern enlargement neared, the core solidarity was no longer extended. Thus, the “tight[er] budgetary framework” (1997: 11) expected the Commission’s leadership as well as the peripheral state managers to find “cost-effectiveness” (EC, 1997: 25, 1998b: 5). Although the eastern enlargement made the EU solidarity „more important than ever“, this solidarity had to be „undertaken with safeguards for the achievements of 40 years of European integration“ (EC, 1997: 21, 96). The effectiveness-oriented efforts were thus oriented to „maintain financial solidarity“ in volume and scope (1998a: 5), while the cohesion redistribution had to remain oriented at both regions of “the present 15 Member States and to those of the future Member States“ (EC, 1997: 21, 63, 113; 1998a: 5). Much of the turn was equally reflected in the concertation of financial resources (EC, 2000: 18). The immediate effect was the simplified concentration of objectives from 6 to 3, as well as reduction of supranational initiatives (see Table 3.2). The Objective 1 on less-developed regions and the Objective 2 on conversion of structurally suffering ones remained preserved, absorbing around 70 % in the former case and around 11,5 % of total funding in the latter one. The Objective 3 refocused on labour market issues with about 12.3 %. Much illustrative was the reduction of Community initiatives from 9 to 5,35 % in the next MFF.

Graph 3.2 Governmentalization across Reform Turns in Key Visions of Governance, 1973-2014 (trends)



Source: Own preparation with Voyant Tools; EC, 1973b, 1977a, 1983c, 1989, 1992b, 1997, 2000, 2004c, 2007b, 2011c, 2015

3.3. Added Value of South-Eastern Recipients

The discourse of EU added value regularized the neoliberal governmentalization into a comprehensive form. The turn resonated with the core states' call for the "value for money" which were upheld especially by the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, France, and other net-payers since at least the 1990s (Pollack, 1995; Wozniak Boyle, 2006: 141-3, 155, 268; see Table 1.1). The Commission's (EC, 1997: 17, 19, 37; 1998: 11, 39) tendency to privilege the Cohesion Policy's "real", "clear", "significant" or "greater added value at Community level" was evident already at the eve of the 1999 reform. However, only the 2006 reform fixed and the 2014 reform deepened this governmentalizing tendency. As documented by the Graph 3., this tendency was characterized by the rapid emergence of particular visions of command and control in the regulation. There were four important contexts in the span of two programming periods of 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. As I show in the next chapter 4, the added value was double-edged as it privileged effectiveness in the institutional governance and linked it with competitiveness in socioeconomic performance. This synthesis structured neoliberal developmentalism. Its *ordnungspolitik*-type features became also evident as the cohesion governance's added value became ever more articulated with respect to its *enabling* effect on the peripheral integration in the EMU and Single Market governance within a globalizing world economy. First, this was bound to enabling peripheral participation in the decade-long development agendas of Lisbon Strategy of 2000s and the Europe 2020 during the 2010s. Second, this was articulated against the waves of eastern enlargement from the large-scale one in 2004 and the small-scale ones in 2007 and 2013. Third, the global economic crisis or, in other words, post-Fordist crisis of late 2000s and the consequent eurozone crisis of mid-2010 played prominently in the latest transformation of Cohesion Policy.

The *ordnungspolitik*-type neoliberalization became clearer as the Cohesion Policy was attached to the overall aim of Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which replaced the Maastricht Treaty, to constitutionalize the EU as a "highly competitive social market economy" (Article 3). It also extended the role of Cohesion Policy from enabling "economic and social cohesion", as constitutionalized in the Single European Act of 1987, to "economic, social and territorial cohesion" in Lisbon Treaty (Articles 174 and 178). In defence against the core's demands for even deeper retrenchment of post-2007 budget and the cohesion share thereof (see Graph

3.3), the Commission (2004b: 14-15) foregrounded this “added value of cohesion policy”. This expected “a Europe of solidarity and partnership” where “[g]rowth must be underpinned by solidarity” and „[c]ompetitiveness and cohesion reinforce each“ other but must equally avoid „excessive and unjustified fiscal burdens“ on core states (EC, 2004b: 4-5, 37). Amid the economic crisis, the proposal for post-2014 budget reasserted the message in which cohesion transfers represented an „important expression of solidarity” which benefited “all parts of the EU, rich and poor, big and small” and facilitated “scarce” resources and “more needed than ever” growth-oriented investment (EC, 2011b: 11). While the proposal for the post-2007 budget linked the cohesion to Lisbon Strategy, the post-2014 one guaranteed “effectiveness of cohesion spending by tying cohesion policy more systematically to the Europe 2020 objectives” (EC, 2011b: 11).

There was a mix of core and peripheral Commissioners for Regional Policy which included new CEE nationals. The main contours of 2006 and 2014 reforms were however influenced more by core and centre-right Commissioners. Barnier supervised the proposal for 2006 reform, while the Austrian Christian-Democrat Johannes Hahn (2010-2014) supervised and negotiated the 2014 reform. During the post-accession restructuring of the Commission, Péter Balázs (2004), who was a Hungarian Social Democrat, joined Barnier as a twinned Commissioner. A former Polish Social Democrat, Danuta Hübner (2004-2009) became the first long-term Commissioner from CEE, while being replaced with a Polish technocrat Paweł Samecki (2009-2010) as she became a Christian-Democratic member of the European Parliament. Following Hahn’s reforms, Romanian Social Democrat Corina Crețu assumed the task of implementation and preparation of the post-2021 reform.

3.3.1. Lisbonization in Global Crisis: Strategic Turn

The emergence of added-value discourse was inherent to what became termed as the strategic turn. As the Graph 3.2 shows, the strategic turn was further fixed increasingly proliferating grammar of command and control of this type. Through the 2006 reform, it rearticulated the old paradigm of increasing “complementarity, coherence, coordination, conformity and additionality” (EC, 2007b: 27). This strategic turn aimed at allowing the Commission to steer the peripheral investment to the Lisbon strategic “objective[s]” or “target[s]” through the “reprogramming of the Structural Funds” (EC, 2003c: 5-6; 10-11). The

turn assumed that the peripheral problems did not derive only from the real economy but also within the lack of “institutional and administrative capacity” (EC, 2003b: 5). Always implicit in the effectiveness discourse, the added value made this explicit as the neoliberal governmentalization interlinked the questions of socioeconomic competitiveness and institutional performance of national governance. With both respects, the Commission proposed the further skewing of asymmetries in the cohesion governance at the expense of peripheral states with the new “framework of shared management” (EC, 2004c: 9). This way, peripheral states became responsabilized through the technologies of “simplification and decentralization” as well as “differentiation and proportionality”, while being enforced to “more rigorous systems for monitoring, control and evaluation” (EC, 2003d: 1; 2004c: 8).

A key in this turn, the hierarchy of strategic programming was further upscaled as evidenced in the Table 3.3. The new Community Strategic Guidelines (CSG) formed a strict supranational framework for the articulation of National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF) and the delineation of OP within them (EC, 2007b: 28-30). In contrast to the more nationally embedded CSuFs-based OP, CSG further reinforced the primacy of supranational objectives. The Commission negotiated the CSG with the Council and gained then the right of final approval of OP in the NSRF. The governments had to then submit regular “strategic reports” on the progress in realizing the NSRF (EC, 2010c, 2013b). The added value of Cohesion Policy was thus legitimized by its CSG-based complementarity with the 2005 “re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy” and its enabling in peripheral states and regions (EC, 2005b: 6, 13). The NSRF negotiations equally provided an “added value” as they deepened the multi-level “dialogue” and reinforced “good governance, ownership and institutional capacity” in peripheries (EC, 2008c: 2, 8, 11-12). Moreover, a concept of earmarking emerged during these negotiations in which new member states were voluntarily expected to “ earmark” a portion of cohesion transfers to Lisbon objectives (EC, 2007b: 3, 2008c: 4, 2010c: 6-8).

Given the relative retrenchment of core solidarity, the cohesion resources were “genuinely concentrated” through the transformation of former Objectives 1-3 to the three objectives of Convergence, Phasing In-Out, and Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions (EC, 2005b: 11; 2007c: 10-24). Additionally, the European Territorial Cooperation replaced the former Community initiatives. The transformation regularized the concentration of resources in old and new peripheries despite the “statistical effect” (EC, 2004b: 15; 2004c: 4, 5, 12). Due

to the statistical effect, old peripheral areas were rendered ineligible for cohesion funding as they became relatively richer than the new ones (see the chapter 4). The Graph 3.5 shows the result of reorientation of cohesion funding to the new Eastern periphery. To reduce the effect, the Commission came with two solutions. The newly introduced “capping” allocated funds at the maximal level of 4 % of member state GDP in the Convergence regions (EC, 2004b: 28; 2004c: 12) to retain funds for older peripheries. The Convergence regions received 81,5 %, while the Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions received 16 % of total funding. Between these two, the *phasing out* and *in* regions were introduced to cover those regions affected by the statistical effect on both sides. Following the further decrease in share of supranational initiatives, the 2,5 % of the funding was absorbed by the European Territorial Cooperation. Foregrounding less developed regions as ever more “top priority” (EC, 2004c: 4), the statistical effect reduced the funding for those old ones in absolute terms, while the capping reduced it for the new ones in relative ones.

The added value was de facto rearticulation of the additionality technology along the lines of neoliberal developmentalism in the NSRFs (see Table 3.1). Both the Lisbon Strategy and the later “global financial crisis and the current economic slowdown” formed opportunity to demonstrate it (EC, 2008b: 2). Using the strategic planning to bring “greatest impact and added value” of Lisbon Strategy was another way how to prioritize and make the neoliberal developmentalism comprehensive in the blend of national private and public investment (EC, 2005b: 7). The “Lisbon-related objectives” were fixed at the rate of 65 % for Convergence and 82 % for Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions (EC, 2007b: 4). In the global crisis, the cohesion transfers were showcased as adding to the “major fiscal stimulus combining national and Community actions” in the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) between 2008 and 2009 (EC, 2008b: 9). Making “over 50 %” of total public investment in peripheral member states, the strategic approach facilitated its smoother “availability” in the context of “severe cash-flow difficulties” in national budgets (EC, 2008: 3; 2009b: 3-4, 12, 20, 25). However, this fiscal stimulus aimed still at keeping the “‘earmarked’ Lisbon investment priorities” so that they could „contribute to quicker recovery and address long-term challenges“ later on (EC, 2008b: 12). In other words, the strategic earmarking secured that

the transfers remained sustainably invested during the economic crisis to legitimize the resilient forms of Lisbon-based peripheral integration.

Indeed, the 2006 reform rearticulated most of the technologies of cohesion governance, while adding the proportionality technology. With respect to the decentralized partnership, new performance system was institutionalized. This further responsabilized the national Authority and Monitoring Committees, while further differentiating new functions of Auditing Authority (AA) and Certifying Authority (CA). The partnership became more inclusive as it had to include “different types of partners (including NGOs, universities or regional development agencies as well as social partners)” (EC, 2008c: 8-9). However, its deepening subordinated these partners to a more rigorous system of monitoring, control, and evaluation. This way, the “verification, through partnership, of the principle of additionality” had to be secured by the means of “evaluation before, during and after the end of the [operational] programmes” and a general “annual dialogue” (EC, 2004c: 11).

The proportionality technology only differentiated the degree of responsabilization between the developed and less developed states. Accordingly, the stricter audit-based evaluation system was only introduced in the less developed convergence regions given the higher “extent of the financial resources allocated to them” (EC, 2007: 41). This regularized the reform as a tool to strengthen “institutional capacities and governance [in peripheral regions and states] where they are considered to be weak” (EC, 2005b: 10). Thus, the transfer of “unique delivery system for cohesion programmes” promoted new forms of governance but aimed equally to guarantee that the „ownership of the Lisbon agenda has been further extended to the regional and local level and to a broader spectrum of stakeholders” (EC, 2008c: 9). Besides this coercive system, the national “performance reserve”, which originated in previous reform, was foregrounded. It allowed to reallocate transfers up to the 3 % of total national allocation “to the most effective programmes” so that the OP competed among each other in fulfilling the objectives set. (EC, 2007b: 34). To improve the partnership performance forwarded the logic of Commission’s surveillance, control, and command, while peripheral states became ever more subject to the new legislative grammar of being controlled, managed, evaluated, audited, and so on as the Graph 3.2 shows.

Table 3.3 Programming: From Supranationalization to Governmentalization

Actor - Scale	1989-1992	1992-1999	2000-2006	2007-2013	2014-2020	
Negotiation Stages (interrupted line indicates tighter overlap) 	Commission (informing or in negotiation with the Council)			Lisbon Strategy	Europe 2020	
		guidelines	guidelines	indicative guidelines	Common Strategic Framework (CStF)	Community Strategic Guidelines (CSG)
	member state (designing and negotiating with the Commission)	Development Plans	Development Plans	Development Plans	National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) for all states	Partnership Agreements (PAs) for all states
	Commission (adopting in negotiation with member state)	Community Support Frameworks (CSuFs)	CSuFs for Objective 1/Single Programming Documents (SPD) for other Objectives	CSuFs/SPD		
member state (adopted by the Commission)	Operational Programmes (OP)	CSuF-based OPs	CSuF-based OPs	OPs	OPs	

Programming Periods (grey colour indicates starting documents)

Source: Own preparation based on EC, 1989: 28-31, 1993a: 22-3, 2000: 20-3, 2007b: 29, 2015: 19-21

3.3.2. Europe 2020 in the Eurozone Crisis: Conditionality Turn

The transmission of global economic crisis into the eurozone debt one enforced the subordination of Cohesion Policy to the EU neoliberal governance in the mid-2010s. The eurozone crisis amplified the EU governance as an “ordoliberal iron cage” due to its prioritization of fiscal austerity which aimed at the *nominal* convergence to the monetary stability in the EMU at the expense of *real* convergence through economic growth on the Single Market (Ryner and Carfuny, 2016). The debt crisis subordinated the core solidarity to the peripheral orientation on “[funding] effectiveness and [governance] efficiency” in the conditions of lowering EU and national budgets (EC, 2015: 2, 49, 54, 74, 98). This touched the 2014-2020 MFF especially (see Graph 3.3). First, the effectiveness visions linked the cohesion governance closer to the austerity governance enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact which was an arrangement built-in into the EMU but made more comprehensive during the crisis. As well, the links with the Europe 2020 strategy were made even more direct. Second, the emphasis on peripheral institutional “capacity” or “performance” to comply with the strategic objectives (EC, 2011c: 4-5) hardened the monitoring, control and evaluation

evasions. The introduction of ex-ante conditionalities, especially the macroeconomic ones, was illustrative in this.

The expectations of the strategic turn and the urgency of economic crisis made the Commission to further upscale the strategic programming. The 2014 reform replaced the “non-binding” CSG with the new “legal” Common Strategic Framework (CStF) which became directly integrated in the regulation (EC, 2011c: 5; 2015: 16; see Table 3.3). The CStF formed thus a legal basis for negotiating new Partnership Agreements (PA) that replaced the NSRFs. The PAs could be then reprogrammed through “country-specific recommendations” in the European Semester which annually updated the Europe 2020 objectives (EC, 2015: 22-23). The Europe 2020 heralded the further deepening of “strategic programming process” (EC, 2011c: 7). Both the hardening tendencies in the 2014 reform and Europe 2020 resulted from the failure of Lisbon Agenda and the Commission’s striving to further streamline the effectiveness orientation. Therefore, the regulation-based CStF were to prevent “delays” as it happened during the NSFR negotiations and make the “strategic reporting exercise” comprehensive in the implementation period (EC, 2010c: 4, 11-13). The reason was the unsatisfactory reporting practices in the 2009 and 2013 national strategic reports which only loosely reported on fulfilling the “Lisbon earmarking” and the “contribution to competitiveness and job creation” within the Europe 2020 (2011c: 6-9; 2013b: 5).

Within the shared management, the performance-oriented upscaling of programming was inherent to the ever-tightening tendency to responsabilize the lower scales especially through hierarchical innovation of two technologies (see Table 3.1): partnership and final foregrounding of simplification. Facilitating “clear added value in enhancing the effectiveness of the implementation”, a delegated act on the European Code of Conduct on Partnership (EC, 2014c) formalized the partnership technology. More “representative” partners were thus legally obliged for MCs and “throughout the whole cycle”, while “the performance and effectiveness of the partnership during the programming period” became subjected to the “assessment” as well (EC, 2014c: 5). This only furthered the established strategy of simultaneous inclusion of various private and non-governmental actors into the cohesion networks and their disciplining. Referencing to the experience with the newly introduced reporting, the Commission was less satisfied with “strong mechanisms for tracking the flow of money and absorption” which however remained weak in “setting, monitoring and

evaluating objectives“ (EC, 2013b: 12). Rather, the simplification was highlighted to streamline the “more results oriented policy“ where „better programming“ had to establish clear links between the funding and „a convincing narrative, supported by quantified information on progress in achieving objectives“ (EC, 2010c: 11; 2013b: 12). Although oriented at lowering the administrative burdens, the simplification equally expected upscaled harmonization of diverse national procedures on lower scales.

Moreover, the ex-ante evaluation was now turned into ex-ante conditionalities. The most prominent was the macroeconomic conditionality which linked the Cohesion Policy to the Stability and Growth Pact. Under the heading of “sound economic governance“ (EC, 2015: 17-22), the cohesion transfers became conditioned by the EMU convergence criteria which were now connected with country-specific recommendations in the European Semester. The ex-ante conditionalities identified minimal conditions for the approval of PA. These conditions were based on “Fund-specific rules“ but had to be negotiated through the cycle of national “self-assessment“, “Commission assessment“, and the “resolution of disagreements“ (EC, 2014d: 4-5). Later, the implementation “reporting“ to the Commission could result in the option of “suspension of interim payments“ in a case of non-compliance (EC, 2015: 22). Thus, the conditionality turn was another way of linking the peripheral socioeconomic institutions with the austerity and competitiveness imperatives inherent to Europe 2020 and the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides this coercive measure, the role of performance reserve as an incentivizing instrument grew too as it was now set at 5 and 7 % to motivate the OPs to compete over setting and reaching “clear, realistic and measurable milestones and targets“ (EC, 2015: 22-23).

The conditionality turn happened in the conditions of reduced EU budgeting, while lowering the capping from 4 to 2,35 % to retain concentration on peripheral regions of core states. This time, the former mix of thematic and territorial objectives turned them into territorial ones of “less developed“ (formerly convergence), “transition“ (formerly phase in and out), and “more developed“ (formerly regional competitiveness and employment) regions (EC, 2011c: 10-12; 2015: 29-40). The less developed ones covered those regions below 75 %, those transition ones represented ones between 75 % and 90 %, and those more developed ones involved regions with 90 % of the average EU GDP. The less developed ones, located mostly in CEE and Southern Europe, received 52,45 %; transition regions, those

located mostly in Southern and North-Western Europe, were allocated 10,24 %; while the more developed regions mostly in North-Western Europe received 15,67 % (EC, 2015: 110). In all regions, the thematic development objectives were strictly realigned with Europe 2020 in the conditions of widespread fiscal austerity.

3.4. Cohesion Bureaucracy

The effectiveness vision underpinned the multilevel cohesion governance. It regularized the asymmetric hierarchies of the nodal agency in the variegated networks of cohesion bureaucracy. As shown by the Graph 3.2, the effectiveness grammar secured the multilevel hierarchies so that the transnationalization of peripheral states was tendentially regularized as a coherent management of the provided transfers. The Commission's power was thus structural when shaping the nodes of cohesion networks in the lower scales of peripheral states and regions. The 2006 and 2014 reforms made this more evident. The associated technologies of cohesion governance aimed thus at a dual effect. On the one hand, they insulated the cohesion bureaucracies in peripheral states through this asymmetric transnationalization. On the other, the partnership aimed at embedding the cohesion networks into peripheral state-society complexes, while disciplining them at the same time. On the everyday implementation level, the TRPD became thus regularized through the production of indicative guidelines, guides, COCOF (Committee of the Coordination of Funds) notes, common draft templates on national reports and other strategic documents, information papers, and working papers with respect to the legal rules.

Since the 2006 reform, the imperative of shared management invited moreover to "strengthen the Commission's supervisory role" in the implementation responsibilities of member states within its Action Plan on shared management (2008d). Despite the relative retrenching of cohesion transfers, "the central place of solidarity" in Cohesion Policy had to be accordingly secured through „effective and efficient internal control system“ during the implementation of investment process. The shared management was legitimized by the repeated reports of the European Court of Auditors on the „high level of errors in expenditure“, „ineffective or moderately effective“ management and control (EC, 2008d: 3). It only intensified the emphasis on the coordination through the practices of auditing, reporting, and financial surveillance (EC, 2009d).

3.4.1. Operationalizing Cohesion Governance

The operationalization was fixed through OPs. The OP remained historically a backbone of the cohesion governance operationalization, although in different forms with respect to lose supranational guidelines, CSG, and CStF (see Table 3.3). First, as demonstrated by the Tables 2.2 and 5.1, OP fixed the cohesion transfers into state strategies across their sectoral complementarities with peripheral socioeconomic institutions in the form of „infrastructure, human capital, research and development and productive investment” (EC, 2006b: 7, 21; 2008h). This strategic complementarity was embedded in the negotiation of CSuFs/SPDs, NRSFs, and PAs.

Within the OPs, cohesion bureaucracies arranged this complementarity through variegated forms of nodal agency within the vertical partnership between the Commission and state apparatuses. A range of functional roles emerged through MA, CA, AA, and MCs. The MA – one of national ministries or development agencies – and the OP – integrated in one specialized or multiple sectoral ministries – were the most important as coordinative bodies for partnership with the Commission. Through the MCs, which consisted of MA representatives, other specialized bureaucracies and socioeconomic partners – the OP was interconnected within horizontal partnerships. CA and AA – often Ministries of Finance – were then responsible for the financial control to the Commission. Interpreting the regulations and guidance, the Commission could nevertheless steer the everyday practices of this operationalization through its effectiveness discourse.

Therefore, the evaluation procedures behind the NSFR negotiations combined an emphasis on deliberation with effectiveness-oriented identification of added value. The Commission (2006b: 1, 5-6) made the ex-ante evaluations an “iterative and interactive process” which produced a „Community Added Value” when regularizing the governance hierarchies through the “exchange of experience and networking at a transnational, national or regional level”. Prepared by “independent” experts, this process set a strategic “coherence” between CSuFs, NSFRs, and OP (EC, 2006b: 10, 18). This was initially based on a “socioeconomic analysis” which required self-assessment in the “identification of the disparities, gaps and potential for development” in the realms of human and physical capital in selected OPs (EC, 2006b: 7, 21). The main aim was to identify the additionality of cohesion investment and set methods of its “verification” through “written consultations and bilateral

meetings“ during the methodological and content negotiations over the NSFRs and individual OPs (EC, 2009d: 4). The negotiations over the NSFRs formed thus a broader strategy which organized the OPs as the centre of the cohesion governance in individual states through the combination of iteration, guidance, and enforcement of rules.

The NSFR negotiations and the implementation allowed thus to prioritize particular strategic content of cohesion bureaucracies in individual state-society complexes through selecting development indicators and methodological guidance for their identification and realization. For example, the Commission published guidance on the innovation strategies in “national and regional Operational Programmes“, while criticizing their missing “links to national initiatives” and generally “little information“ and „few details“ on their implementation through partnership (EC, 2006d: 7). The negotiations constituted thus an invitation for the Commission’s methodological guidance. The concepts, such as the “earmarking“, asked for the methodological guidance on their “calculation“ within the “new generation of operational programmes“ oriented at the innovation-driven „growth and jobs“ of the Lisbon Agenda (EC, 2007c: 1-3). The guidance set everyday frameworks for activities of cohesion bureaucracies which centred on initial setting and monitoring of indicators and the later articulation and visualization of their effects into the categories of “Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impacts, Community Added Value, Sustainability” (EC, 2010e: 4). This operationalization allowed thus to regularize the asymmetric complementarities between the supranational and national content of national and regional partnerships.

In result, the operationalized networks of cohesion bureaucracies involved developmental coalitions as the chapter 5 explores on Visegrád power blocs (see also Table 5.2). The operationalization involved a co-optive inclusiveness of multi-level and public-private partnerships which simultaneously regularized the management hierarchies and practices. Through the investment process, this differentiated “Managing Authorities, Intermediate Bodies [mostly governmental, ministerial or regional agencies but also private consultancies acting on behalf of the MA] and Beneficiaries“ and attributed them with responsibilities (EC, 2008f: 5). Ordered by the Commission (2014e), a study on OP-based cohesion bureaucracies revealed the variability of management bureaucracies ranging from various forms of employment and temporal contracts. This ranged from public bureaucracies within OP which outsourced or delegated services to separated or mixed public or private intermediate bodies

(IB) and beneficiaries. From evaluation to auditing, the management was outsourced to independent consultancy sector, although the overall responsibility for “sound financial management” remained with the MA (EC, 2008f: 5-6, 12; 2008g). This public-private partnerships involved also MCs in the manner of monitoring and adjusting performance indicators and financial engineering (EC, 2006b, 2008f, 2009d). Such partnerships required regional actors and cities, SME associations, and other actors like universities (EC, 2006c; 2007h; 2008a; 2010d; 2012a). Once inside the network, the “technical assistance” was provided to enhance the capacity of the cohesion bureaucracies with respect to their development agency (EC, 2007e, 2007d, 2011d).

3.4.2. (Self-)Evaluating Own Performance

The co-optive features regularized the governmentalizing tendency to “on-going evaluation” (EC, 2007i: 4-13). The on-going evaluation was nothing but another rearticulation of ex-ante, interim, and ex-post evaluations. The governmentalization turned the cohesion governance into nothing else than compliance system of auditing, reporting, and evaluating of peripheral performance against the benchmark of supranational indicators. Besides the Commission, and the DG Regio in general and the DG Empl (Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion) in particular issues, European Court of Auditors and the Commission’s OLAF (*Office de Lutte Anti-Fraude*) became involved. On lower scales, the compliance system responsabilized MAs, CA, and AA, IB, beneficiaries to follow a general “audit strategy” (EC, 2007k). Centred in the state apparatus, the administrative demands of on-going evaluation necessitated its partial “outsourcing” to the consultancy industry of “other auditors” and “independent evaluation companies or consortia” on all levels of cohesion governance (EC, 2009g: 2, 8; EC, 2016: 3). Therefore, the cohesion bureaucracies were also turned into public-private compliance networks where the development was reduced to technocratic exercise of everyday surveillance.

The question of “financial engineering” and its “transparency” regularized this surveillance of investment process within the “compliance assessment” (EC, 2007j). The methodological notes made the national authorities “strongly recommended” to follow the „key requirements” of assessment procedures (EC, 2008h: 1). Through auditing, the Commission could thus supervise the “management and control system” which was to „ensure value for

money, proper management of the programmes and consistency with Community policies“ in OP (EC, 2009j: 6; EC, 2008h). Not only detecting potential fraud, the auditing provided a chance to correct the future procedures and everyday practices of cohesion bureaucracies by detecting and correcting “errors” in the national levels of cohesion governance (EC, 2011g). The transparency through audit became this way another form of proxy control and command for the Commission.

The auditing of financial compliance was linked to the reporting at the end. The ongoing evaluation was fixed to Lisbon and Europe 2020 objectives to initially generate quantifiable „measurement of an objective to be met, a resource mobilised, an effect obtained, a gauge of quality or a context variable“ (EC, 2006f: 5). The cohesion bureaucracies were then reduced to a chain of “suppliers of information on indicators“ which were systematized by managing authorities and used then by the “users of information” ranging from MCs, external evaluators, and the Commission (EC, 2006f: 21). The quantified “core” indicators formed “evaluation plans” which could be monitored and later serving for strategic “reporting” in the on-going evaluation process (EC, 2007i: 12-17; 2009e; 2009f). Not only did the Commission instruct on the indicative content and structure of national strategic reports on the progress and achievements (EC, 2009i, 2012b). It also developed a system of reporting to track the “outcome indicators” and their summarization in “outcome targets” (EC, 2011f).

The ongoing evaluation had two other reasonings in the Commission’s technocratic visions besides the regularization of multi-level hierarchies inside the cohesion networks. Ex ante, this “new logic” was expected to support public debate for a “fair and reasoned choice of policy objectives“ which exerted „an ex-ante disciplinary pressure on policy makers“ as it raised „questions on whether policy is effective“ with respect to indicators and targets established (EC, 2011f: 7). Ex post, the Commission (EC, 2016: 43-45) justified it as a strategic necessity to identify the “EU added value” with regard to “relevance, effectiveness and coherence” of Cohesion Policy after the eastern “enlargement” and during the “deep global economic and financial crisis”.

3.5. Development Fix – Institutions and Transfers

This chapter historicizes the (trans)formation of the cohesion consensus as inherent to the core-peripheral compromise in the EU integration. From this historicizing viewpoint, CEE states entered the consensus only when the infrastructural fixing turned from its financial expansion to retrenchment under the growing fiscal austerity. There were three reasons involved. First, the core solidarity became hard to levy as the post-Fordist frameworks of Single Market, EMU, and the open EU Trade Policy became institutionalized by the late 1990s. Second, the cohesion consensus became neoliberalized as the neoliberal transnational project prevailed over its Euro-Mercantilist and Social Democratic alternatives over time. Much of this tendency paralleled the neoliberalization of social consensus in the core and peripheral states alike. Third, while the Southern state managers and peripheral or Social Democratic forces in the Commission negotiated this post-Fordist consensus as a *de facto* co-optive strategy for internal peripheries, there was no longer a will to expand it for the newly arriving external peripheries of CEE states on the same scale.

Therefore, the CEE state-society complexes entered the consensus only once the dilemma between core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness was already skewed to the added-value visions. This heralded the governmentalizing turn to the institutional form of *ordnungspolitik*-type development policy. Through its strategic and conditionality turns, the Commission tended to upscale the decision-making powers over the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy, while downscaling responsibilities for its implementation through fixed control and performance frameworks. This socio-institutional fixing deepened the surveillance system of monitoring, evaluation and control through expanding auditing and reporting practices. The Commission leadership has thus consisted in the interiorized transformation of peripheral states rather than superimposition through the multi-level cohesion bureaucracy.

The TRPD-based development fix has thus tended to become more asymmetric in terms of infrastructural and socio-institutional fixing over time. On the level of accumulation regimes, it however established development framework oriented at the post-2004 market-enabling integration of CEE states, while facilitating an anti-crisis resilience for them during the economic crisis. However, the cohesion governance established an institutional form which tended to the increasingly conditional and surveillance-based hierarchies. This variety

of TRPD privileged the Commission's primacy over the definition of neoliberal developmentalism, while responsabilizing peripheral states and regions for its effective implementation for competitiveness. This is the topic of following chapter.

4. Neoliberal Developmentalism: Regulating Uneven and Dependent Development in Europe

This chapter traces the semantic fixing of developmental purpose in the TRPD. I track its Fordist origins and transformation by the post-Fordist crisis of mid-2010s. To do so, I investigate two series of Periodic and Cohesion Reports. With six editions, the *Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions of the Community* was published by the Commission from 1980 to 1999. The edition was replaced by the *Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion* since 1996. Between 2001 and 2014, additional series of *Progress Reports* was published. The difference between these series tells the difference between the Regional and Cohesion Policy. Periodic Reports were established by the 1979 reform to “form the basis for periodical comparison of regional problems” when constituting „the first stage of a coordination process“ in the Cohesion Policy (EC, 1977a: 9). Cohesion Reports were constitutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty to evaluate “every three years on the progress made towards achieving economic and social cohesion” which was to be „accompanied by appropriate proposals“ (Article 130b). Through these reports, the Commission gained primacy to fix uneven and dependent development in Europe.


As show by this chapter, these reports regularized the developmental purpose of cohesion governance with respect to the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma. We can thus analyse them to trace the contingent articulation of neoliberal developmentalism inherent to this dilemma. These reports constituted a broader source of strategic planning for the CSuFs, CSG, and CStF. Despite of its implicit origins in the 1960s, Delors Commission openly articulated the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma only in the 1980s. Rather than simply contradicting each other, the cohesion and competitiveness discourses emerged together as documented in Graph 4.2 since the 1980s. They were put into relational configuration with respect to the transnational projects of and inter-state consensus on EU integration which I analysed in previous chapter 3. Thus, I study neoliberal developmentalism in order to reevaluate the enabling role of Cohesion Policy on “embedded neoliberalism” in the EU (Van Apeldoorn,

2002: 159-61; Van Apeldoorn, 2008) generally and its dependent variation in the Visegrád state-society complexes particularly (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a; 2018).

The cohesion-competitiveness dilemma in semantic fixing was not isolated from the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma in socio-institutional and infrastructural fixing. I evidence how they constituted each other within the neoliberal governmentalization since the Agenda 2000. Just as peripheral effectiveness was privileged over core solidarity, I document how economic competitiveness became relationally privileged over social cohesion in the EU's regulation of uneven and dependent development. As the Graph 4.1 documents, this coincided with the eastern enlargement which, first, relocated the cohesion flows from the South to the East and, in effect, established two distinct peripheries in the EU. Furthermore, I investigate how these dilemmas merged in the added-value discourse underpinning the Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies at the same time. Hardly articulated into a comprehensive developmental purpose during the Fordist period, this chapter explores how the regulation of Europe's capitalist heterogeneity was comprehensively articulated only in post-Fordism. Given its transformation to an *ordnungspolitik*-type instrument as illustrated in the chapter 3, I show how the cohesion governance became fixed as an *enabling* framework of peripheral development in the enlarged and deepened market-making order.

The chapter follows the historizing approach in parallel with the chapter 3. I structure it as follows. First, I trace the 1960s origins of neoliberal developmentalism with respect to the technologies, objects and purpose of making uneven and dependent development observable and thus regulatable by the late 1980s. My aim is not to trace neoliberal developmentalism back in the 1960s but identify the origins of semantic infrastructure which underpinned its contingent (trans)formation later on. Second, I show its articulation during the Southern enlargement and especially the formation of the Single Market and EMU from the mid-1980s to late 1990s. This part evidences the changing emphasis on the embedding of core-peripheral relations from European cohesion to global competitiveness. Third, we can thus discuss why and how the pre- and post-accession CEE became observed as a threat as well as opportunity to the EU's global competitiveness and why the infrastructural complementarity of cohesion investment and FDI became privileged as the post-2004 development promise (see Graph 1.1). Last, I conclude with the post-2008 crisis and its regularization into debt-driven Southern and FDI-led Eastern peripheries of the EU.

Graph 4.1 Cohesion Investment Flows to the South and the East, 2004-2018 (EUR billion)



Source: Own preparation; European Commission (Financial Reports, Revenues and Expenditures data)

4.1 Origins of Neoliberal Developmentalism

In 1965, the first communication concerning regional policy was published. In this document, the Commission (1965: 3) appealed to the principles of “harmonious development of economic activities”, “narrowing the gap”, and reduction of „differences between the various regions“ with an attention to "mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured". All these imperatives were enshrined in the founding Rome Treaty of 1958 and replicated in the later treaty revisions mentioned above and below in this text. Against this background, the Commission called for a regional policy because the regional „disequilibria“, „imbalances“, “disparities” or, in other words, „gap does not seem to have narrowed much in recent years“ (EC, 1965: 5-6, 9). This was one way of calling for the establishment of „development policy“ against the background of intensified competition in the „unified economic area of the Six and the development of trade with non-member countries” (EC, 1965: 5). The other way was to produce developmental purpose of regulating Europe’s uneven and dependent development which would steer this supranational development policy.

The 1965 communication set thus three courses of action. First, the statistical void had to be replaced with the new practices of semantic fixing. As the Commission (EC, 1965: 7)

made only general “forecasts”, the lacking national “regional statistics” had to be fixed through the supranational “means to collect and standardize statistical data”. Second, this allowed systematizing their „degree of backwardness“ given the “heterogeneous nature“ of regions in member states so that the individual „less developed“ or „large peripheral regions“, including south-western France or South Italian Mezzogiorno, became eligible for assistance (EC, 1965: 7, 11-12). Third, the developmental purpose could be thus fixed against the „general conditions“ of peripheral backwardness which consisted of „complementary economic activities“ and „infrastructure facilities provided by the public authorities“ (EC, 1965: 11-12). Therefore, “the building-up of infrastructure so that companies setting up in less-developed areas“ accessed equal infrastructural conditions to become „competitive in the Common Market or able to meet external competition“ legitimized the development policy (EC, 1965: 10, 18). These three actions turned into a comprehensive policy only in the late 1980s but underpinned the content-formation of cohesion governance.

4.1.1. From Statistical Void to Semantic Fixing

Making the uneven and dependent development observable through various indexes and indicators was the first course of action for the Commission. As the DG Regio was established, the Commission filled the statistical void with irregular reports which became the incubators of semantic fixing for the later regular reports. Therefore, the Commission’s (1969: 9) first comprehensive report highlighted the “limitations of the data given“ and announced thus the intention to improve the „machinery for keeping track of regional development“. Facilitating „systemic information“ was thus a precondition to organize „harmonized statistics and regional development plans“ together (EC, 1969: 52-53). An Analytical Survey followed which aimed to illustrate the lack of systematic information by identifying “quantitative criteria” to establish “number of indicators” (EC, 1971: 6). From listing the separate statistics in member states, the survey proposed to calculate these indicators to establish inter-regional relationships and upscale the observation of their uneven and dependent development on the supranational level. This made the thorough interpretation of “the notion of ‘gap’” central to the systematization of “complete list of indicators” on socioeconomic inequalities

in Europe (EC, 1971: 114-115). By putting together this list, the Commission overtook the control over its interpretation.

Although the 1979 reform was a minor success of socio-institutional or infrastructural fixing, the Commission received symbolic power over this interpretation by establishing the semantic fixing in Periodic Reports. These regular reports followed the irregular reporting such as the Thomson Report, regional development atlas, and two short brochures (EC, 1973a, 1977b, 1980a, 1980b). All of them urged the need of semantic fixing as the “gravity of the present [Fordist] crisis intensified” (EC, 1977b: 7). In this ever „more complicated and worrying“ context, the Commission’s (1977a: 6, 9, 12) the 1979 reform established a „comprehensive system of analysis and assessment of regional economies“ this way . Although a draft of the Periodic Reports was to be submitted for dialogue with other national actors in the emerging networks of cohesion bureaucracies, the content-formation remained solely with the Commission. Since 1996, Cohesion Reports followed the same pattern as a way to “lend structure to this dialogue“ between national actors and the Commission (EC, 1996: 129).

Gaining this symbolic power, the Commission (1980c: 118) could both learn the nature of uneven and dependent development and simultaneously articulate strategies of its regularization as well as regulation “from the vantage point of Community”. In 1980, the first Periodic Report (EC, 1980c: 111-121) started to make the „relative intensity of regional problems“ measurable through “devising composite indicators, however judiciously this may be done“. Referring initially to statistical „gaps in the analysis“, the reports became progressively concerned to calculate “all quantifiable indicators“ to make the uneven and dependent development observable through various semantic devices as maps, statistical matrices, indexes, graphs (EC, 1980c: 6, 120) as visible in the Plates 4.1 and 4.2. Especially the Plate 4.1. shows the most used devices but also the semantic content of their observation. Inherent to the Spatial Keynesianism, uneven development was initially fixed in grammar of demographics and labour markets, sectoral structures with emphasis on productivity, and incomes levels measured by GDP (see Plate 4.1).

4.1.2. From Less Developed Regions to Less Developed States

Making uneven and dependent development observable was the first step to differentiate relational hierarchy between the variegated degrees of regional backwardness. This differentiation, and the accompanied knowledge-production on peripheral backwardness, became reinscribed from interregional relations inside the original six economies to inter-state relations with the new rounds of peripheral enlargement. The first step fixed the regions as “certain limited geographical areas”, while systematizing the surveillance of “interregional economic dependence” on European scale (EC, 1973a: 8; 1980c: 45, 63). Initially, the regions were systematized into „the basis of the 100 regions“ to gradually develop into the scale of the statistical „Level II regions“ which became a medium category of the „Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)“ since the mid-1980s (EC, 1971: 7, 1973a: 2, 1980c: 3-4, 1984: 2-3). As the Plate 4.2 documents, the Thomson Report fixed thus firstly the regional hierarchies when categorizing their (regional) GDP per capita as a percentage level in the index of “average of Community of Nine = 100”. While the indicators became more diverse, they remained nevertheless hierarchizing the regions through binary hierarchies: The peripheral regions as ‘less developed’, ‘backward’, ‘lagging’, ‘disadvantaged’, ‘less fortunate’, ‘least-favoured’, ‘weaker’, ‘poor’, ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘problem’ regions. The core regions became defined as ‘more developed’, ‘more advanced’, ‘richer’ or ‘stronger’.

Fixing the backwardness of peripheral areas was thus derived from the observation of their relationship in the “interregional linkages” with core ones (EC, 1980c: 44). This invited to various but often mutually reinforcing explanations of peripheral backwardness. From the Fordist viewpoint, there was a hierarchy of socioeconomic stages of industrial, semi-industrial, and agricultural regions. The territorial proximity to the industrial core decided the backwardness of “frontier regions” early on (EC, 1969: 14, 35). The backwardness was nevertheless primarily infrastructural in both “classical” and “broad” (EC, 1969: 22) senses. The classical sense denoted the peripheral backwardness as the absence of “transport, communications and telecommunications” infrastructures, while the broad sense included the “whole network of public amenities” ranging from the basic “to the less common services generally designated higher tertiary or quaternary (universities, research and training centres, computers, etc.)” (EC, 1969: 23). What is more, these infrastructures involved the “factor of prime importance” in the “large and skilled population” which necessitated to

equally invest in the „amenities of civilization“ such as healthcare, cultural and recreational infrastructures (EC, 1969: 24). The absence of or territorial distance from such infrastructural fixes could regularize the persistence of socioeconomic inequalities, while simultaneously guiding the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy (EC, 1969: 25).

Fixing the peripheral backwardness was already a double-edged dilemma of equalization and differentiation. The first 1969 comprehensive report regularized the persistent socioeconomic inequalities due to the peripheral lack of “technical and economic requirements governing location“ (EC, 1969: 22). Having these institutional and infrastructural conditions, core regions could „guide industry in the choice of location“ and govern thus the „strong pull on business and people“. In contrast, the first Periodic Report used the equalizing imperative to recognize that this competitive “location pattern of headquarters functions of large industrial and non-industrial corporations“ reinforced undesirably the uneven and *dependent* relations (EC, 1980c: 62-5):

The structural characteristics of regional production systems - size of firms, ownership and decision making patterns and linkages within and outside the regions - also have an important bearing on regional development. On the one hand are to be found [peripheral] regions composed of small, locally based units (e.g. agricultural, service activities) while at the other extreme are found [peripheral] regions where large and often externally controlled units are found. [...] Another characteristic of economic structure in the less favoured regions is [in other words] the subordinate role they play in regard to ownership and control of firms and decisions on investment [in headquarters located in core regions]. This dependence of peripheral regions on the centre has a number of undesirable consequences. First, production in the peripheral regions in firms controlled from outside the region is geared towards exports often involving application of labour saving technologies. Second, few significant intra-regional linkages or economies of scale are achieved.

Either way, the observation of backwardness incubated with respect to peripheral regions. With the enlargement to new “southern and western periphery“, it had been however upscaled to peripheral states: Ireland in the 1970s as well as Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s (EC, 1984: 200-5). The large peripheral areas in old and new core member states remained observed but their relative backwardness diminished in contrast to peripheral states. As the plate 4.1 shows, the relevance of observing regions relatively diminished in relation to states between the Fordist and post-Fordist reports. Combining the socioeconomic

performance and territorial distance between core and peripheral regions, the new “peripherality index” mapped (see also Plate 4.2) thus the late 1970s trend as such: “All regions of Greece, most regions of Italy - especially the south and centre -, south-western France, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, parts of northern England and Wales and most of Denmark can be placed in the peripheral class of regions” (EC, 1984: 135-9, 1987c: 119). The 1980s Southern enlargement made, however, the relative shift from regional to national scales more evident. The Greek accession signified thus “fundamental consequences” to be engraved by Spain and Portugal as the enlarged bloc tended to become “more heterogeneous than the current Community” (EC, 1984: 183). Since the mid-1980s, the new periphery included no longer regions but „the least developed countries of the Community of Twelve (Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy)” (EC, 1984: 183).

4.1.3. An Outlook of Post-Fordist Developmentalism: European Competitiveness

At the conjuncture of its internal deepening and external expansion, and more than a decade of semantic fixing, the Commission could articulate the “notion of convergence and cohesion” (EC, 1987c: 52) by the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1970s, the purpose of the “convergence of national economies” (EC, 1980c: 2) established the main legitimization for the emergent core-peripheral consensus on the relaunched integration. However, the developmental purpose of this consensus became articulated into a comprehensive content only under Delors Commission in the 1988 reform which merged the socio-institutional, semantic, and infrastructural fixing. As the imperative of “economic and social cohesion” became constitutionalized in the 1987 Single European Act, the Commission articulated it in the dilemmatic configuration of cohesion and competitiveness in the emergent neoliberal developmentalism. Here, the net-paying “stronger” and net-recipient “weaker” Member States” could be differentiated by the Commission (EC, 1987c: v, 8) in order to strategically steer “the necessary catching-up and convergence process [wherein] the assisted countries and regions share a special responsibility”.

By articulating the neoliberal developmentalism, Delors Commission tried only to resolve the conflict between equalizing and differentiating rationales pervading the Cohesion Policy since its origins. The first 1969 report and the Thomson Report provided a telling contrast. The former was written under Von der Groeben’s ordoliberal founding years of DG Regio, the

later under the first independent, socialist, and Keynesian Commissioner. Both reports accepted “sever conditions of competition between one country and another within the Common Market but also between Community and non-Community countries” (EC, 1969: 31), as well as the potential “disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union” under discussion at that time (EC, 1973a: 7). Their difference was in configuring the regulation of core-peripheral socioeconomic inequalities. The 1969 report foregrounded market-enhancing locational competitiveness as the “top priority”, the Thomson Report allowed for market-correcting means to “attack and reduce the regional imbalances” in order to enable peripheries to attain a “more equal competitiveness” (EC, 1969: 31; 1973a: 5-6, 18). The Thomson Report facilitated an equalizing purpose and made it evident for the initial Periodic Reports which then viewed the socioeconomic equalization as natural “terms of hard economics” and the question of “future development and even existence” of the bloc in the aftermath of Fordist crisis (EC, 1980b: 9). Accordingly, regional inequalities wasted the idle factors of production, hindered the peripheral participation in economic integration, and severed its political legitimacy in effect.

As for the cohesion visions, the Commission subordinated the equalizing rationale as a factor of equal conditions of competitiveness. Much of this trend emerged in the context of late Fordist crisis and early post-Fordist articulation of integration relaunch. In the “increasing competitiveness of world markets”, the Commission (EC, 1980c: 2-3, 58) legitimized the effective use of cohesion transfers to enhance „higher competitiveness of weaker regions“ as the best strategy to the greater inter-national convergence. The cohesion investment was to enable the “indigenous [growth] potential” of regions in competition over “mobile investment” and in a need to “attract such investment to weaker regions” (EC, 1984: 133). This locational mobilization required not only to invest into the “threshold level of infrastructure” but channel the “‘traditional’ investment aid” into the productivity-enhancing „technological development in industry and tertiary [service] sectors“ (EC, 1984: 133, 201).

As competitiveness gained qualitatively discursive primacy within the Cohesion Policy, the notions of convergence and cohesion remained reconfigured with respect to the Single Market and EMU. There were two – nominal and real – notions of convergence that rearticulated socioeconomic inequalities in these two structures. The real convergence denoted the “convergence in living standards” which was conditioned by „above-average

growth rates of income generation, i.e. of employment and productivity“ in peripheral states (EC, 1987c: 52). The real convergence was understood as both a political condition and desirable consequence of the successful “completion of a large internal market“ (EC, 1987c: viii). However, it became already conditioned by the nominal convergence as a “prerequisite“ and “necessary but not a sufficient condition for real convergence“ (EC, 1987c: vi, 1991: 4-2). In the face of future EMU and the past inflationary crisis of Fordism, nominal convergence ordained “price stability“ and balanced “public finance and balances of payments“ to guarantee „sound, macroeconomic growth“ (EC, 1987c: vi). As real convergence in core-peripheral relations became subordinated to the nominal convergence, the cohesion visions expected the structural adjustment of national structures to the market-making integration as a proper catch-up strategy.

The origins of neoliberal developmentalism, in other words, navigated the 1988 reform to the market-enabling structural adaptation of peripheral states. As the cohesion transfers doubled in Delors-I perspective, neoliberal developmentalism solved the regulation of uneven and dependent development by privileging their investment into the competitiveness-enhancing complementarity which brought together “private capital flows supplemented by organized capital flows and transfers in the form of investment aids“. The developmental purpose was thus market-oriented because the „assistance available under Community regional policy“ responsabilized peripheral state managers to abide by the rules of „nominal convergence and adequate profitability“, while investing into inter-state and -regional competition to „attract national and foreign investors“ (EC, 1987c: x). Subordinating the cohesion funds and – domestic and foreign – to the private investment imperatives became key to neoliberal developmentalism.

4.2 Embedding the South-Northern Development


The ordoliberal tendencies of making Cohesion Policy a market-enabling development framework were deepened in the 1990s. Published under the Commissioner Wulf-Mathies, the first Cohesion Report (EC, 1996: chapter 1) spelled out its overall purpose to transform the EU into a “social market economy“ that would underpin the “European model of society“.

Plate 4.1 Occurrence of Terms in the Chapter Headlines and Semantic Devices (tables, graphs, etc.) in Periodic Reports and Cohesion Reports Compared, 1980-2017 (size relative to the frequency of main 200 terms)

Periodic Reports (1980-1999)



Cohesion Reports (1996-2017)



Source: own preparation in Voyant Tools; EC, 1980c, 1984, 1987c, 1991, 1994d, 1996, 1999d, 2001a, 2004a, 2007a, 2010a, 2014a, 2017.

As the cohesion changed form from dirigiste supranationalization to *ordnungspolitik*-type arrangement, its content changed in neoliberalizing direction. The developmental purpose shifted to promote “structural adjustment” of core-peripheral relations with respect to the *internal* Single Market and EMU formation and in the *external* context of “globalization of economic activity and financial services” (EC, 1991: 3-1; EC, 1996: 10). In this post-Fordist trajectory, the regulation of uneven and dependent development became preoccupied with regulating the “interregional differences in competitiveness” as the underlining factor behind socioeconomic inequalities and the target of cohesion investment priorities as well.

The asymmetries of core-peripheral consensus expected the hierarchical differentiation between the advanced core and the catching-up periphery as they were hierarchized though differing “averages”, “shares”, “rates”, “levels” (see Plate 4.1) and mapped in different shades of development (see Plate 4.2). This developmental difference was made between “northern” and „southern“ states or, in other words, the „the North of the Union“ and „the South of the Union“ (EC, 1996: 30, 37, 54, 60-62; 1999: 10, 27, 85, 93, 96, 105, 149). The early differentiation between Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece as “EUR(4)” of “cohesion countries”, given their GDP below 75 % of the indexed EU average, and the developed rest of “EUR(8)” of “non-cohesion countries” (EC, 1991: 45; 1994: 134, 1996: 18, 76) could legitimize the core investment into peripheral states due to their backwardness. At the same time, it regularized their lagging status and normalized the peripheral states as laboratories of structural adjustment. The German unification and the 1995 enlargement with Austria, Sweden, and Finland changed little in the inter-state differentiation. On inter-regional scale, “the two large [less developed] Objective 1 regions in other countries (Southern Italy, Eastern Germany)” than the four cohesion states and “small Objective 1 regions” in other core states were however recognized (EC, 1996: 100;). At the same time, peripheral regions in core states were differentiated as objects of national rather than supranational intervention.

The simultaneous tendency to “deepening and widening” (EC, 1994d: 14) of the EU’s post-Fordist order shaped neoliberal developmentalism. Indeed, as the comparison of semantic fixing in the Period and Cohesion Reports shows in Plate 4.1., there was a growing tendency to observe the public expenditure and the priorities of public investment including the effects of cohesion investment since the mid-1990s. On the one hand, the cohesion budget was initially doubled as a showcase of core solidarity in the Delors II package. On the other hand,

the Commission could legitimize thus the Southern restructuralization as a necessity for its resilience in the „greater intensity of [international] competition“ on the Single Market and in the „changing global environment“ (EC, 1991: 63, 1994d: 50, 1999d: 33). Furthermore, this competition was more severe because the EMU fixed the exchange rates, which constrained the conventional peripheral strategies to “offset a loss in international competitiveness“ through devaluation of national currencies in peripheral states (EC, 1994d: 149). Now, the peripheral catch-up model became fixed as enhancing own competitiveness through either „lower costs of labour,“ by introducing wage restraint mechanisms or investment into the productivity-enhancing „human and physical capital“ or a combination of both at best (EC, 1991: 80-81). Given the „sustained fiscal constraint“ in the EMU, the Commission (1994d: 148-150) promoted effective investment of cohesion transfers as a third way between meeting “budget targets” and “maintaining the relatively high levels of development-related public expenditure“ to transform peripheral states into “attractive [investment] locations“ at once.

4.2.1. Neoliberalizing Development: Global Competitiveness

Enabling the EU as a social market economy, the Commission (1996: 13) highlighted cohesion transfers as a compromise between differentiating “economic organisation based on market forces“ and equalizing „commitment to the values of internal solidarity“. Within this compromise, it was clear that “competitiveness is not, therefore, an end in itself but a means of consolidating the European model of society“ (EC, 1996: 122). In other words, European cohesion was to be achieved through competitiveness-oriented restructuring, while solving thus overlapping dilemmas of economic, social, and political legitimacy (EC, 1996: 115-6). Against this background, the cohesion funds were oriented at embedding the uneven “geographical pattern of gains and losses“ (EC, 1994d: 81) of neoliberal restructuralization as they enabled a market-oriented framework for peripheral states.

The aim was to regularize the EU as a globalizing space which was both aware of social losses in cohesion and capable to “reap the benefits” and “new opportunities for exporters and investors” in the Single Market and within the global economy (EC, 1991: 9, 1994d: 145, 1996: 67). In general, this market-enabling integration was thus “favourable in terms of economic growth“ and had „equally favourable consequences in reducing regional disparities

in incomes and rates of unemployment“ (EC, 1991: 9). In particular, it facilitated higher “costs or risks” for peripheral states (EC, 1994d: 145). Although the exposition of their economic sectors and labour markets to the “greater competition” was about to “speed up the modernisation process“, the structural adaptation “could give rise to considerable costs in social terms“ (EC, 1991: 79). Moreover, EMU preparations imposed “strict nominal convergence criteria regarding inflation and public finances, as well as to maintain exchange rate stability“ which risked to „adversely affect economic and social cohesion“ in peripheral states (EC, 1994d: 145). For the Commission, the cohesion transfers did not serve to contradict the painful restructuralization but rather embed it into an adaptive framework which reconfigured the peripheral state-society complexes along the globalist visions.

The more the hegemonic visions of FDI- and trade-driven globalization emerged, the more they became integrated into the developmental purpose of cohesion governance. Meanwhile, the competitiveness heading expanded textually from the corpus into titles of chapters (EC, 1991, 1994d), whole sections (EC, 1999d), and report as such (EC, 2004). With globalization, the rise of “multinational firms” or “large transnational companies” allegedly propelled the state and regional managers to compete over new export and investment opportunities (EC, 1994d: 83, 1996: 68). The Commission (1994d: 12) could thus praise FDI inflows from core economies as “a significant source of potential investment for the Community's weaker regions“. It became “generally accepted that a balanced development strategy which succeeds in attracting and integrating inward investment can significantly assist the convergence of lagging regions“ (EC, 1994d: 86). The Commission could this way establish complementary between the cohesion transfers and the FDI. Here, the peripheral competitive advantage depended on whether the cohesion transfer helped to attract and integrate FDI. In the very contrast to the dictum of past Fordist decades, the Commission regularized the FDI dependence this way (EC, 1999d: 115, emphasis added):

A common fear, in particular, is that the investing company will have less attachment to the area and may at any time cut back production, and employment, as part of its global strategy [...] *Another concern*, sometimes expressed, is that the presence of a foreign investor tends to drive up wages. Instead of recruiting people and training them, it is argued, multinationals tend to entice the most qualified, and already well-trained, workers away from local companies by offering them high rates of pay. Forced to follow suit, the cost competitiveness of local businesses therefore suffers. *There is, however,*

little evidence that multinationals act in this particular way - indeed, since low wages may well have been a motivating factor behind the move in the first place, they have little incentive to do so. [...] *A further view* holds that a significant part of FDI consists of companies relocating their activities primarily to benefit from investment aid. If the relocation takes place between Member States, then there need be no net expansion of the capital stock in the Union as a whole. *Again, however, there is no evidence that this is a prevalent activity* and, even if it were, the capital stock is likely to be modernised and made more productive as a result.

Against this background, the double-effect of cohesion transfers was acknowledged but simultaneously skewed to an effective investment into peripheral competitiveness. As a source of “*European solidarity*”, cohesion funds allowed “*income transfers*” that prevented „worsening of the balance of payments“ (1996: 116). However, the “*so-called Keynesian, or demand, effect on output and employment*” was never their „essence but a side-effect“ (EC, 1987c: 53, 1994d: 130, 1999d: 155). Rather, they represented productive investment into the supply of peripheral physical and human infrastructures. Besides the traditional investment into “*transport and energy networks, telecommunication links and environmental facilities (i.e. waste treatment and water supply)*”, the investment purpose increasingly foregrounded the priority of „qualified manpower“ and „Research and Technological Development“ (EC, 1994d: 65, 95, 148; 1996: 7; 1999d: 186). Enabling this infrastructural investment, the painful structural adaptation was thus envisioned to manage peripheral transition into social market economies along with the EU adaptation trajectories of globalization.

4.2.2. Cohesion Four: Laboratory of Neoliberal Developmentalism

The “*Cohesion Four*” (EC, 1996: 20) of Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal was fixed as a laboratory for identifying peripheral backwardness and testing the neoliberal trajectories of development catch-up. First, these economies were grouped as double treats to the EU’s global competitiveness. Their backwardness made them „more vulnerable to trade liberalisation because of weaknesses in their exporting and import-competing sectors“ as well as having simultaneous problems to „curb inflation“ and “*reduce budget deficits*” (EC, 1994d: 148). Grouped often with Italy due to its Mezzogiorno problem, the four peripheral states were equally observed as a testing ground for the peripheral catch-up due to their “*double challenge of catching up with the present, as well as adapting to the future*” (EC, 1994d: 9,

88). The divergent paths of Ireland and the rest, especially Greece, fixed then the visions of successful and failed peripheral catch-up.

Their backwardness was always fixed in relation to the core development trajectories. The Commission (1994d: 10) performed this in the following way: “Compared to the rest of the Community, the regions of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal tend to have fewer roads, fewer motorways (and higher road accident rates), fewer and more outdated rail lines, fewer telephone lines, poorer access to the major energy networks and are less likely to be collected to waste and water supply systems“. Equally, the educational levels as well as competitive skills of labour were explained relationally such as “the proportion of employment in RTD [Research and Technological Development] in the South and in Ireland is generally around a half that in the more prosperous Member States“ (EC, 1996: 37). Establishing this relational backwardness had a twofold purpose. It regularized the expected painful structural adaptation as the effect of this backwardness, while foregrounding the infrastructural need to legitimize cohesion transfers to these states. Furthermore, the infrastructural backwardness legitimized the complementarity between FDI and cohesion funding as it supported “improvements in infrastructure and training to raise the skills of the work force, so making the areas concerned more attractive to foreign investors“ (EC, 1999d: 119).

Ireland was exemplified as a catch-up model thanks to making the FDI and cohesion funds complementary. Although all four economies were “catching up at a rapid rate“, Ireland was exemplified (EC, 1999d: 29). It formed the main „exception“ given that the other three economies performed well „like Ireland“, underperformed „except“ of Ireland, while their common negative trends applied „even for Ireland“ (EC, 1994d: 145, 148; 1996: 75; 1999d: 10, 28-30, 123). Unlike the rest of three economies, Ireland used the funds to support its otherwise neoliberal strategy of highly globally integrated economy. This allowed it to become rebranded as „the major destination for both external and intra-Community foreign investment in relation to its size“ which specialized in the “modern productive base in [capital-intensive] industries such as electronics and pharmaceuticals“ (EC, 1994d: 91). The Irish case also legitimized a catch-up strategy which offered “low wages, low corporate taxation and generous [investment] incentives“ but was still capable „in attracting higher quality investments“ (EC, 1994d: 85, 1996: 54).

In contrast, Greece became a “notable exception” where the challenge of adaptation was “the toughest of all” (EC, 1999d: 10, 93-4). One reason for this was because it “attracted relatively low levels of inward investment” which centred moreover on tourist industry and hardly upgraded „skills relevant to high value-added industry“ (EC, 1994d: 91). “[S]till relatively underdeveloped“, Greek economy experienced thus “few signs of improvement“ as its unreformed structure could hardly “take advantage of the export opportunities“ instead of remaining in „overdependence on domestically generated demand“ (EC, 1996: 67, 1999d: 31).

Therefore, the “Irish experience” of mutual complementarity between the cohesion transfers and FDI attraction became a “‘good practice’ of the first order“ for present and future peripheral cases of development catch-up (EC, 2001: 71). Irish upward development could be thus traced in the changing shades of development which reattached it from the Southern shades to the North-Western ones (see Plate 4.2). For the present ones, only the FDI led to the upgrade. Within this fix, the domestic structures were otherwise viewed as producing “low value-added products“ either in agriculture or labour-intensive industries such as textiles or wood products. This made them “extremely vulnerable to increased competition from developing countries and Eastern Europe“ with the immediate effect of „deterioration of export performance“ and resultant „trade deficits“ (1991: 80, 1999d: 29). What is more, the Commission regularized the Irish experience as the development pattern for CEE as shown below.


4.3 Embedding the East-Western Development

The Commission reinscribed these restructuring visions for the post-socialist states “to the East of the Community“ (EC, 1991: 85). Since the mid-1990s, the Irish strategy became privileged as a development strategy of transforming CEE into growth opportunity more than “financial burden” as future member states given the increasing „heterogeneity of the EU“ (EC, 1994d: 167-9; 1999d: 161). The Irish-type restructuring strategy became more urgent as the status of CEE states moved from ‘neighbouring’, ‘applicant’, ‘accession’, and ‘candidate’ to ‘new member’ states and once they became observed as more backward than the Southern periphery. Thus, the urgency of “geographical shift” eastwards was rearticulated


Plate 4.2 Mapping Core-Peripheral Relations in Thompson, Periodic and Cohesion Reports, 1973-2017

PLATE 9


Gross domestic product per head of population
(Index: average of Community of Nine = 100)




Thomson Report, 1973 – GDP Index



2nd Periodic Report, 1984 – Synthetic Index




3rd Periodic Report, 1987 – Peripheralities Index




5th Periodic Report, 1994 – Eligibility by Objectives


4th Cohesion Report, 2007




4th Cohesion Report, 2007



5th Cohesion Report, 2010



7th Cohesion Report, 2017



as well as remapped as “an unprecedented challenge for the competitiveness and internal cohesion of the Union“ (EC, 2004a: xxv; see Plate 4.1). What is more, eastern enlargement co-constituted but also simply happened during the governmentalizing turn in the cohesion governance as explained in the chapter 3. As its institutional form shifted further to the effectiveness visions, its purpose shifted simultaneously to privileging new configurations of competitiveness under the “added value“ discourse (EC, 2001: 142; 2004a: iii; 2007a: vii; 2010a: xxiv). In other words, the eastern enlargement invited the Commission to a rearticulation of its development intervention.

The *de facto* first eastern enlargement with “new [East] German Länder“ was a prelude to this comprehensive rearticulation (EC, 1991: 151). The deeper restructuralization of all post-socialist economies was fixed as urgent because they suffered from the “same problems induced by centralised planning“ as well as the „similar syndrome of distorted structures, decay, lagging development and low efficiency“ (EC, 1991: 7). However, East German restructuralization was different. However, East German restructuralization was different. The new German Länder became fixed as “the weakest region, or collection of regions, of the strongest economy in the Community“ and thus primarily an internal matter of Germany and then the EU (EC, 1991: 92; 1994d: 151-6). This still required to normalize the “risks“ inherent to the “inevitable short-term adjustment costs“ produced by the sudden exposure to “monetary union with West Germany“ and the transition to the “competitive“ and simultaneously “social“ market economy (EC, 1991: 93; 1994d: 151). In contrast, the rest of post-socialist economies was initially fixed as an external source of “competition“ to internal peripheries before it became viewed as a core “opportunity“ for the FDI and trade expansion (EC, 1991: 10, 80; EC, 1994d: 15, 53; 1999d: 33, 161, 193).

The added-value visions corelated with the governmentalization of Cohesion Policy through its strategic and conditionality turns. This made the semantic fixing more comprehensive, while prioritizing global competitiveness through the matrices of Lisbon indicators, objectives, and targets (EC, 2007a: 87, 22-23; see Plate 4.2). By doing so, the Commission attached the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy to the Lisbon Strategy, agreed by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, which was supplemented by the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001. Lisbon Strategy set the aim to make the EU „the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy in the world, capable of

sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion“ (EC, 2001: 109; 2002a: 4; 2003a: 10; 2004a: 36). Orchestrated by the Commission, the 2005 relaunch of Lisbon Strategy urged the EU to “renew the basis of its competitiveness“ (EC, 2006a: 8). The Lisbon Strategy involved originally three principles of „transition to knowledge-based economy“, „modernising the European social model“, and „sustaining the healthy economic outlook [...] by applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix“ (European Council, 2000). The Gothenburg addition complemented the principle of sustainable economic development with “environmental protection“ (EC, 2004a: xxvi, 59-63). In this sense, the peripheral backwardness and catch-up development were not only expanded in scope but became normalized as indicator-based targets.

Both objectives of making EU globally competitive and expanded to CEE urged thus a call for a more comprehensive developmentalism. The Commission fixed the restructuring urgency when highlighting that enlargement added “much more to EU population (just under 20 %) than to its GDP (around 5 % in terms of Euros)”, while rendering the new „EU of 25“ poorer as its average GDP per capital was „12½ % less than the average in the EU of 15“ (EC, 2004a: 12). The accession of Eastern periphery did not solve the development problem of Southern periphery as its regions became more developed only through “statistical effect” in consequence (EC, 2001: 9). CEE states have nevertheless become new object of development surveillance and intervention throughout the expansion to the ‘EU25’ in 2004, ‘EU27’ in 2007, and ‘EU28’ in 2013. Along with it, there remained the hierarchical differentiation between the old ‘EU15’ and the new ‘EU10’, ‘EU12’, and ‘EU13’. What is more, the urgency became more evident as the visions of sustainability and innovation were rapidly foregrounded in the grammar of Cohesion Policy as the Graph 4.2 documents.

4.3.1. Governmentalizing Neoliberal Developmentalism

Imagining the added value of Cohesion Policy as a development framework for enabling the Lisbon Strategy in European peripheries, the Commission normalized the past wave of neoliberalization through the EMU, Single Market, and open Trade Policy. In this sense, the developmental purpose of cohesion transfers was set as a “crucial link between Europe’s economic strength and its social model“ (EC, 2001: 37). This reattachment extended the “standard definition of regional and national competitiveness” from the endowment of

human and physical capital to include also “environmental capital”, “innovation capacity” as well as “efficiency of public institutions” or, in other words, “good governance” (2001: 36; 2004a: xxvi; 2007a: iv, 74). Such an extension merged the neoliberal strategy of the EU’s exposure to economic globalization with the newly emergent paradigm of “sustainable” growth or development and peripheral “sustainable convergence” (EC, 2001: 109, 126; 2004a: 36; 2007a: iv). Besides the economic infrastructures, the institutional infrastructures of political governance became new target of fixing peripheral backwardness and thus new area of development intervention.

Extending the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma by rapid foregrounding of the visions of (i) sustainability, (ii) innovation, and (iii) institutional efficiency was not mutually exclusive but rather constitutive. The Graph 4.2 illustrates how the governmentalization of neoliberal developmentalism was supported and simultaneously rearticulated by the rapid rise of these three visions especially since the late 1990s. The Plate 4.1 pictures then how this related with the new scope of intervention into the peripheral development such as (i) social and environmental policies, (ii) R&D and innovation, education; (iii) quality of government policies and expenditures. Their articulation within the neoliberal developmentalism is explored below.


Rather than real convergence, the measurement of cohesion became a quantification of successful or failed peripheral convergence with the interim 2005 or final 2010 targets of Lisbon Strategy. The governmentalization intensified thus the regularization of uneven development through benchmarking, indicators, and other goals. Spreading across the whole EU governance under the heading of Open Method of Coordination, this strategy aimed at new forms of securing the “coherence of national and community priorities” (EC, 2001: 148). Especially following its 2005 relaunch, the Lisbon strategy’s objectives renewed also an impetus to widen the technologies of surveillance with Lisbon synthetic “index” and “indicator” (EC, 2007a: 78-79, 87-88; 2010a: 196; see Plate 4.2). These indicators moreover changed the notion of such convergence to privilege new objectives of ‘innovation’, ‘adaptability’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ in social, institutional, and infrastructural measures. For example, the R&D activities could be identified as innovation only when they enabled Europe “adapting to the conditions of competitiveness in a global economy” (EC, 2001: 58).

This indicator-generating governmentalization was fixed against the EU’s growing

concerns with “key competitors” (EC, 2007a: 5). Hence, the Commission shaped the globalization discourse so that it externalized uneven and dependent development in Europe as an effect of global economy. Since the mid-2000s, these global competitors were gradually diversified from Northern core economies like the United States and East Asia to the newly emerging China and other Global South economies. Therefore, the cohesion was no longer a question of solving internal uneven development but regulating it with respect to these differentiated competition of European core and peripheral states with their respective global – core and peripheral – rivals. Against this background, the EU’s global task was still the overall upgrade where the “shift towards the service sector is likely to continue, while agriculture and manufacturing will continue to experience consolidation of production in higher value added activities” (2001: 3).

Through this effectiveness-driven deepening of the standard definition of competitiveness, peripheral backwardness and thus a scope of co-optive development intervention were extended (see Plate 4.1; Graph 4.2). This involved the peripheral partners in public and private governance. First, the competitive development of public governance became dependent on “institutional and administrative capacity” to engage in the vertical partnership of multi-level cohesion “governance”, while simultaneously managing horizontal “public-private partnership[s]” nationally and regionally (EC, 2001: 132; 2002a: 3; 2004a: xiii, 58, 141; 2005a: 7-8; 2006a: 8-9; 2007a: xiv, 111, 115, 124-125, 123-135, 160; 2008a: 6). The horizontal partnership involved the organization of domestic “productive relationships between the various actors involved in the development process” which included both “the social partners and representatives from civil society” (EC, 2004a: xiii, xxxvi;). Second, the local domestic sectors of small and medium enterprises (SME) became foregrounded in these partnerships. Not only were they “predominant type of firm in the EU” but represented also “vital source of competitiveness and job creation” in peripheral regions (EC, 2001: 110, 133). The SME were observed as depending on the “capacity to access technology and know-how from outside” through transfers in the „business networks“ and also links with public „knowledge base, including with universities and research centres“ (EC, 2004a: 53, 58). Therefore, the extended observation of this public-private governance, under the headings of entrepreneurialism, innovation, and adaptability deepened the scope of surveillance and equally intervention into the organization of peripheral development.

Graph 4.2 Rise of Neoliberal Developmentalism in Key Hegemonic Visions, 2018-2017 (trends)



Source: Own Preparation using Voyant Tools; EC, 1980c, 1984, 1987c, 1991, 1994d, 1996, 1999d, 2001a, 2004a, 2007a, 2010a, 2014a, 2017

4.3.2. The New Eastern Periphery

For the Commission, the new Eastern periphery needed both deeper neoliberalization and more comprehensive development. The backward development of CEE states as a group was observed beyond comparison “with that in the present EU” and as a subject to „the importance of [their] restructuring“ (EC, 2001: 8). The Commission picked the Irish-type strategies of attracting and integrating FDI as the main purpose of cohesion investment to assist these states to „realise their economic potential“ in order to “strengthen their competitiveness [and catch-up with the rest]“ (EC, 2004a: xxii, 2, 170). The CEE was not however fixed as „a single entity“, but in the manner of uneven inter-national and -regional development. Thus, the new hierarchization categorized most of CEE into “convergence” or

“less developed” regions when initially establishing the former peripheries as intermediate “phasing-out and -in” or “transition regions” that formed bridge to “more developed” regions in core economies (EC, 2008a: 8-9). This resembled the later differentiation between “less developed”, “moderately developed” and “highly developed” states (EC, 2010a: x; 2014a: viii; 2017: viii). A new blend of “an intermediate group of Greece, Spain and Portugal, together with Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and the Czech Republic” emerged then between more developed member and less developed candidate states (EC, 2001: v).

The restructuring urgency of physical and human infrastructures, with an increasing emphasis on institutional public and private governance, was fixed by the Commission already in the pre-accession period (EC, 1991, 1994d, 1999d). As the accession neared, the CEE transition status invited to repurpose their industrial legacies in the vision of convergent integration through immediate restructuring and future promise of cohesion investment. Scattered across reports and indices, the observation of “acute and wide-ranging” backwardness, given the “worn out, obsolete or non-existent” infrastructures, was summarized in tables referring to the cohesion „challenge ahead“ (EC, 2004a: 16, 174-5): Thus, the challenge consisted in replacing the „largely inadequate“ communication and transport infrastructures which had to be built with environmental concerns to overcome the „decades of neglect“ and the „[industrial] legacy of degraded areas“. Equally important was to adjust the human capital as the „ostensibly high“ educational levels of skilled labour did not respond to labour market needs „in the new economy which is emerging“. The similar diagnosis was provided for „productive investment“ into SME especially in service sector where the „most acute“ restructuring was matched with an overall urgency of „strengthening innovative capacity“. Inherent to all these problems was however the „questionable“ and „inadequate“ expertise of regional and state managers or, in other words, lack of „institutional capacity“ which risked misallocating the productive potential of cohesion transfers. This backwardness was, however, envisioned also as an opportunity by the Commission in the case of successful restructuralization (EC, 2004a: 14-5):

The challenge for cohesion policy is to help them bring their infrastructure up to date, modernise their education and training systems and create a business environment favourable to investment [...] This is not impossible, as the experience of Ireland demonstrates forcibly, but it will require effective support from the EU [...] Given the

increasing interdependencies which exist in trade and investment, the economic development of the new Member States can potentially provide the dynamic to initiate and sustain higher rates of growth throughout the EU. [...] Structural deficiencies in endowment of infrastructure and human capital mean that these countries, as well as many lagging and problem regions in the EU15, are not able to contribute as much as they might to the competitiveness of the EU as a whole. [...] The [potential] gains to Germany and Italy, in particular, of stimulating growth in the new Member States are, therefore, substantial, though all existing EU countries stand to benefit from this and from the higher growth of the EU market.

Against this background, the FDI was found “particularly important” for CEE states given the „substantial restructuring of their economies“ (EC, 2004a: xiv). Once restructured, these economies represented growth opportunities in return because they facilitated „lower wages“, „proximity“ to the FDI countries of origin, and „low corporate taxes“ along with modernized infrastructural and institutional fixes (EC, 2007a: 73-4). Since the 1990s, the Commission had observed the EU-driven flows of “FDI to CEE countries” as establishing initial links for their later integration (EC, 1999a: 185). The FDI was privileged as the main solution to integrate and adjust their non-competitive domestic sectoral structures. Various “spill-over effects” were expected to produce “a significant impact on the productivity and competitiveness of resident enterprises” in there (EC, 2004a: 97; 2007a: 74). That promise derived from observing CEE economies as „concentrated in [lower value added subsectors of] agriculture and manufacturing“ only (EC, 2001: 3). In this sense, the FDI-led development risks were normalized as only a dilemma of how „national and regional governments are likely to be able to influence its location“ (EC, 2004a: 84). This „dilemma“ derived from the tendency of FDI to concentrate in capital and few other second-tier regions which ruined their initial promise of „reducing regional disparities“, while reinforcing them instead (EC, 2001: 75; 2004a: xiv, 97, 174; 2007a: 73). Given that intra-national enforcement of FDI to locate in more peripheral regions could „discourage the multinational from investing in the country“, the role of regional strategies was to rather „increase the attractiveness of problem regions for foreign investors“ (EC, 2004a: 97).

Following the 2004 enlargement, the Commission (2007a: iv) fixed CEE states as converging overall but simultaneously positioned this convergence into the new „global context [where] catching up takes different forms“. Although in a variegated manner, CEE states were still observed as generally suffering from a combination of „low value added“

production sectors and poor infrastructural conditions, which made them reliant on the risk of distorted „cost competitiveness“ especially when facing „competition from the emerging Asian economies“ (EC, 2007a: 32-36). Within these globalist forms of CEE integration, CEE convergence could be observed „occurring“ and likely to „continue“ but became framed as contingent on its competition with European and other global peripheries. Thus, CEE states succeeded in „reducing their budget deficits while at the same time expanding public investment in much-needed infrastructure“ (EC, 2007a: 149). The overall fix observed them as relatively sustaining „budget balance“ and „the rate of inflation“, as well as increasing „export performance“ in the conditions of appreciating „exchange rates“ on their expected way to the EMU (EC, 2007a: 147-154). No longer the vision of EU accession but the post-accession integration under globalization formed thus the new developmental purpose of their peripheral restructuring in CEE.

4.4. The Global Crisis of European Post-Fordist Order

The 2008 global economic crisis, soon to be spilled over into the (mid-)2010s Eurozone debt crisis, disrupted the globalist visions and convergence optimism. The crisis also opened the contradictions between cohesion and competitiveness visions which had to be fixed anew in neoliberal developmentalism. In particular, economic disruption and the following social and political crisis in core and peripheries and within core-peripheral relations, as illustrated in the austerity management of Eurozone crisis (Ryner and Carfruny, 2016; Becker et al., 2016), risked to delegitimize the post-Fordist order in crisis. What is more, the crisis formed a context within which the governmentalization of Cohesion Policy shifted from strategic to conditional turn as the chapter 3 analyses.

Both the crisis context and ongoing governmentalization increased the contradictory tendencies of developmental purpose between hardening neoliberalization, on the one hand, and shifting emphasis on social development on the other. The crisis disrupted the Lisbon objectives by 2010, while forming context for the articulation of Europe 2020 strategy. Europe 2020 foregrounded a vision of „smart“, „inclusive“ and „sustainable“ development but articulated them under the framework of national and now explicitly subnational „budget consolidation“ during the fiscal crisis and reformist „smart specialisation“ under intensifying global competition (EC, 2010a: xx, 1, 57, 99; 2013a: 19, 2014a: xxv, 235; 2017: 181).

The economic vulnerability and social pains of the crisis were firstly regularized as an „opportunity“ which rechannelled the cohesion transfers to enable „necessary structural reforms and investments“ so that the EU could „emerge faster and stronger“ (EC, 2008a: 3-5). Secondly, the „worst financial and economic crisis in recent history“ (EC, 2010a: xi) forced the Commission (2010: 169) to reemphasize the backgrounded role of cohesion transfers as complementing Keynesian national „stimulus plans“ and newly introduced indicators of sustainable social „well-being“. Following this logic, the transfers remedied “the funding difficulty and so accelerate[d] the process of convergence” in lagging areas (EC, 2014a: 205).

The crisis reopened the peripheral question as a double one of Southern and Eastern periphery. This included reopening the Mezzogiorno and Eastern German questions. Indeed, the crisis „interrupted“ the visions of nominal convergence and the reality of real convergence which the Commission rearticulated as new strategies of „resuming“ convergence (EC, 2010a: xv-xvi; 2014a: 5, 96; 2017: 1-4, 9). As show below, the East came out of it as convergent periphery, the South as divergent one in real terms. As the Table 4.7 evidences, this convergent-divergent trend remained only on the peripheral scale of crisis-driven South and FDI-based East rather than the core-peripheral real convergence.

In fact, the existence of double, yet different – Southern and Eastern – peripheral developments were fixed to individualize responsibilities for stalled converge as an internal peripheral problem and externalize its resumption as contingent on global competition. Hence, the crisis evidenced that „belonging to a large free trade zone alone is not sufficient to enable less developed regions to catch up“ because they were not capable to close the „gap in infrastructure, institutional efficiency and innovation“ (EC, 2010a: vii). As the crisis „disrupted many of these [investment and trade] flows“ underpinning convergence formerly (EC, 2010: viii), the post-crisis development expected its automatic resumption. To realize it, amidst global competition from „low-cost locations and highly innovative competitors“, peripheral states had to firstly match their global peers (EC, 2010a: 1; 2017: 24). Their post-crisis convergence was now only a subject of „sound economic governance“, on the one hand, and effective investment into closing the infrastructural and institutional gap so that they could „move up the value chain“ towards economic activity with „higher value added“ (EC, 2008a; 2014a: 248-251; 2017: xii, xxiv, 5, 9, 14, 23-25, 31-32, 49, 139).

4.4.1. Indexing Neoliberal Developmentalism in Crisis

Europe 2020 expanded the governmentalizing tendencies in crisis to fix the reopened contradiction of disrupted economic, social, and territorial cohesion. The Commission globalized it in *practice*, which integrated cohesion semantic fixing in the practice of global governance, as well as *scope*, which included the benchmarking with so-called key competitors such as the US, East Asia, and the so-called BRICS including China, India, and Brazil. A new „Europe 2020 [achievement] index“ (EC, 2010a: 29, 35-7, 40; 2014: 99; 2017: 80-82) was invented to replace the Lisbon indicators. As illustrated in the Plate 4.2, another new „[regional] competitiveness index“ was integrated which was directly linked with the competitiveness index produced by the World Economic Forum (EC, 2010a: 68-69; 2014: 49-54; 2017: 46-52). The EU „human development index“ was simultaneously inspired by the two human development and poverty indexes generated by the United Nations, while the following „EU Regional Social Progress Index“ derived from the Global Social Progress Index (EC, 2010a: 113-5; 2014a: 95; 2017: 91-4). Last, the „European quality of government index“ as well as the „corruption perception index“ were inspired with or adopted from the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Transparency International reports (EC, 2014a: 161-171; 2017: xx, 137-144, 154-7).

Through these indexes, the Commission prioritized the need to intervene into economic and social impact of the crisis but normalized its severity as peripheral problem at once. First, it widened the social sustainability and well-being indicators only to integrate them into the competitiveness discourse. As the plate 4.1 suggests, the widening scope of health, gender equality, poverty, and social exclusion indicators proliferated in Cohesion Policy since the first Cohesion Report but turned into a comprehensive content only since the crisis (EC, 2010a: 68, 113, 2014a: 50-53; 2017: 49, 167). Over time, it became thus clear that „health forms part of human capital and constitutes a key determinant of growth and competitiveness as well as of individual well-being“ (EC, 2010a: 190). Searching social cohesion „beyond GDP“, the competitiveness, human development and social progress indexes established nevertheless „close link“ with the economic (under)performance of peripheral areas (EC, 2014a: 196-2011; 2017: 93-94). The bigger social pains of economic crisis were due to the peripheral backwardness, while the vision of more cohesive population was simultaneously mainstreamed as an effect of sustainable competitiveness.

Second, these indexes refixed peripheral backwardness to explain stalled convergence with respect to the institutional governance of „sound macroeconomic policies, a favourable microeconomic environment and strong institutional frameworks“ (EC, 2010a: xxv). As discussed above, the observation of efficient institutional governance emerged since the of the 1990s and the 2000s (EC, 1999d, 2001). Since the 2010s, the Commission foregrounded it as the „missing“ organizational factor behind the infrastructural fixing of „physical capital, human capital (or labour) and innovation (or technical progress)“ (EC, 2017: 136). Privileged at the centre of „economic and social development“, the inadequate governance institutions explained the stalled convergence and normalized it as the main factor behind the gap in „innovation and entrepreneurship, health, well-being and the reduction of poverty“ (EC, 2014a: 161-177, 188, 196; 2017: 138-9, 145, 161). What is more, the corruption was mainstreamed as a new factor behind the peripheral lagging. Harming „the Union as a whole“, corruption became fixed as an important factor „particularly relevant for cohesion“ because peripheral states and regions tended „to score poorly on corruption and governance indicators“ (EC, 2014a: 165).

Table 4.7 Comparison of GDP per capita in PPS between the North, South and East, 2000-2018 (index: EU = 100, 4- to 5-year averages)

Territory	Pre-Accession 2000-2003	Post-Accession 2004-2008	Crisis 2009-2013	Post-Crisis 2014-2018
North	130	129	130	128
Austria	130	129	130	130
Germany	123	120	122	124
Denmark	127	127	129	129
Netherlands	142	141	137	131
South	99	98	90	84
Greece	92	96	80	78
Italy	120	111	104	98
Portugal	84	84	80	78
Spain	100	103	94	91
East	60	66	73	76
Czechia	76	82	84	89
Hungary	59	63	66	69
Poland	49	53	65	69
Slovakia	54	65	76	75

Source: Own preparation, Eurostat

4.4.2. Debt-Driven Divergence in Southern Eurozone Periphery

Eurozone crisis reconstituted the relationship of Southern periphery to the core and new Eastern periphery in the semantic fixing. Indeed, the Table 4.7 shows its divergent trajectory from the North-Western core to the Eastern periphery. The South was the main victim of the debt crisis because it reduced the GDP per head “in around 40 % of regions, located mainly in Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece” between 2009 and 2015 (EC, 2017: 6). This „contraction“ of GDP and employment reversed the „convergence achieved“ when the disposable income of these states declined to or below „2005 levels“ during the crisis (EC, 2017: 10). Moreover, the Southern dependence on foreign debt was exposed due to the „deterioration“ of national and subnational budgets, which regularized „fiscal consolidation“ as a strategy of resumed convergence (EC, xiv, 2010a: 171-2; 2013a: 7-10; 2014a: xxxii, 140, 152-4, 147-160, 235; 2017: 164). There was differentiation as the Commission regularized the Irish divergence as short-term, Italian divergence as regional, while the Spanish divergence remained intermediate between these more developed and those lagging peripheral states of Portugal and Greece. Overall, for the South, the developmental purpose of cohesion investment became conditioned by and privileged assistance in austerity reforms.

The social costs of both the crisis and its austerity management were normalized as effects of the Southern lack of competitiveness. Therefore, their „deterioration“ in the EU human development index could be observed as an effect of a long-term lack of or immediate decline in competitiveness. Indeed, „Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece“ suffered from immense „regional differences in competitiveness“ which affected their overall national competitiveness (EC, 2010a: 71). Moreover, these differences explained not only the „highest levels of human poverty“ therein before the crisis but also the deteriorating material deprivation during it (EC, 2010a: 113; 2014a: 71). As a common signifier for the Eurozone periphery, the „substantial increase in the unemployment rates“ explained then the link between higher social costs and the lack of competitiveness in human capital (EC, 2011a: 32). Most of Southern regions were regularized to „score low“ historically in their capacity to produce skilled workforce, while the share of highly skilled workforce remained low „even in their capital region“ (EC, 2008a: 9-10; 2009a: 6). With the lack of competitive labour forces, which only added to the lack of overall competitiveness, the social pains of crisis restructuring could be fixed easily.

Beside non-competitive social and economic infrastructures, the „quality of government and institutions“ was identified as the „main obstacle to development“ in most of these countries as they belonged among the „least effective“ in the EU and witnessed „deterioration“ during the crisis (EC, 2014a: 168; 2017: 139). Inadequate governance structures explained then the „deterioration of public finances“ on (sub)national scales (EC, 2014a: 171). The benchmarking could thus single out that „the highest ratios of government debt to GDP are recorded in Greece (156.9 %), Italy (127.0 %) and Portugal (123.6 %)“, while the Irish public debt remained still „higher than the annual GDP“ (EC, 2013a: 24; 2014a: 154). Despite of its relative decrease (Graph 4.1), the cohesion investment inflows could be rearticulated as an investment substitution at the time of sever budgetary cuts to restore „sustained and sustainable economic recovery“ (EC, 2017: 164). The funding was however conditioned by institutional reform and simultaneously oriented at „growth-friendly expenditure“ rather than remedying the social demand as the „decline was around 60 %“ in public investment in, among others, Greece, Spain and Ireland between 2008 and 2013 (EC, 2014a: xv, 142). The vision of resumed Southern convergence, as supported by cohesion funding, expected thus strategies of sound economic governance as a priority.

Although the primary script of EU15 and EU13 remained relatively intact, the Commission’s semantic fixing rearticulated the hierarchical relationship between the old Southern and new Eastern peripheries in two ways. Sharing the debt-driven growth and the rise in unemployment and EMU membership, Southern eurozone periphery was matched and compared with the successful austerity-led crisis management in „Baltic States“ (EC, 2001: 13, 32; 2008a: 9, 34; 2009a: 5, 14; 2010a: 3, 31, 82, 117; 2014a: 12, 58, 71, 83, 168). At the same time, the low institutional efficiency and overall position „furthest away from achieving the EU targets“ attached Greece especially to the post-2007 CEE member states including Romania, Bulgaria, and eventually Croatia (EC, 2014a: 168; 2017: 80). Benchmarked with the East overall, the South was refixed as both really and nominally diverging periphery.

4.4.3. FDI-Based Convergence of the EU’s Eastern Periphery

During the crisis, the resilient Visegrád core of converging Eastern periphery became refixed as a catch-up model which partially overlapped with core trajectories. Once again, this convergence was however relative as the East converged with the diverging South rather than

with the North-Western core (see Graph 4.7). The Commission observed this model to “perform relatively well” or “recover quite quickly” along with generally retaining overall “public debt below 60 % of their GDP” even in times of contracting FDI inflows (EC, 2010a: 3; 2013a: 7). Here, the social pains of deliberate fiscal austerity and the disrupted FDI inflows required regularization. The relative increase of cohesion investment (see Graph 4.1) became articulated as a complementary “source of public investment” which substituted FDI and equally supported the resumed convergence promise in the (post-)crisis years. The complementarity between FDI and cohesion investment was thus further regularized as a catch-up strategy for the East. This applied especially for the core of the Eastern periphery: While Czechia and Slovakia retained or acquired a ‘moderately developed’ status, Poland was fixed as a ‘less developed’ catch-up model that “escaped the crisis relatively unscathed” (EC, 2013a: 17). The moderately developed Slovenia and the less developed Hungary were associated with fiscal vulnerability but remained included in this semi-peripheral cluster.

In this sense, the opened contradiction of FDI-based development had to be regularized through prioritizing its past developmental benefits in relation to present crisis. By the time of the crisis, the large sectoral share of “[gross] value-added” produced in the FDI-based export-oriented manufacturing was fixed as the main factor behind the convergence (EC, 2010a: 3; 2013a: 8; 2014a: xxix, 11; 2017: 24). Recognizing that “the FDI is a crucial source of investments for almost all” CEE, the Commission foregrounded the advantages of its resultant exportist regimes, while normalizing its tendency of being “volatile and highly sensitive to the economic cycle” (EC, 2009a: 7; 2013a: 10). Although this form of integration risked to expose CEE to “major reductions” in the EU intra-trade and -investment transactions, it also formed “an opportunity to develop a strong cluster” to facilitate “positive knowledge spillovers” through these trade and investment links (EC, 2009a: 32; 2014a: xxx). Meanwhile, although “available resources [were directed] back to ‘mother’ companies” in European core, the pre-crisis “rise [in FDI] stocks was never reversed” in the Visegrád economies (EC, 2013a: 8-10). Moreover, the Commission normalized the volatility of increased FDI and export dependency as a trade-off for the sustained convergence. Therefore, Slovakia converged only to become part of a “geographical distribution of high and medium-high tech manufacturing” which consolidated through the FDI around “the central part of Europe, notably in Germany, Northern Italy and the Czech Republic” (EC, 2008a: 28; 2013: 8).

Indeed, the Commission highlighted the dependency as facilitating the catch-up model with the attribute of social cohesion on the level of core qualities during the crisis rather than causing its disruption due to austerity. By the end of the crisis, its resilience could be observed given the “growing regions” were identified “in Poland, Germany, Sweden, Slovakia and the Czech Republic” (EC, 2013a: 32). Meanwhile, the EU human development index “increased considerably in all German and Polish regions”, while other Visegrád regions belonged among those with “an increase in the index” as well (EC, 2014a: 69). Indeed, “Poland achieved a remarkable reduction of its share of severely materially deprived persons” during the crisis (EC, 2013: 12). The group of “Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia” belonged then already among those with lowest levels of human poverty, while Czechia fulfilled “criteria used in Europe 2020” for social wellbeing already during the crisis (EC, 2010a: 110-5; 2017: 81-2).

Rather, the Commission normalized the stalling convergence as inherent to inadequate public governance, persisting infrastructural backwardness, and the lack of innovation capacity of domestic SMEs. Visegrád regions belonged thus among those where “competitiveness as measured remained largely unchanged” during the crisis (EC, 2017: 51). Moreover, the „Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia” exemplified the CEE pattern wherein capital regions absorbed most of the high value-added investment but “not (as yet) boosted the competitiveness of neighbouring regions” (EC, 2010a: 45, 161; 2014: 54). The capital cities could thus selectively compete with leading regions in European core, as in the case of “people employed in high-tech sectors”, but remained “pockets of excellence” in their national economies (EC, 2010a: 45; 2017: 33). Much of this related to the innovation performance which was „lower than average” in core states, while only some CEE states “(Cyprus, Estonia and the Czech Republic) [tended to] perform better than Southern EU-15 Member States” (EC, 2010a: 39-40). Thus, the “capital city regions in Hungary and Slovakia” reached the EU average but were “located in catching up countries whose overall innovation performance” remained below it (EC, 2010a: 42, 49).

Hence, the slow convergence was not a result of the dependent model but inefficient and corrupt governance in CEE. Through the corruption and ease-of-doing-business indexes, the lower value-added of FDI and the quality of „transfer of innovative technologies” were fixed with their sensitivity to a “corrupt or inefficient government” (EC, 2014a: 163-4; 2017: 142,

155). Except of Hungary, CEE states experienced „improvements“ and “increases” which explained their convergence through FDI (EC, 2014a: 163-4; 2017: 142, 155). However, the peripheral lagging remained still contingent on the “relatively low scores” on the corruption perception index, as exemplified by Czechia and Slovakia, or “greatest variation between regions in“ Czechia and Hungary with regard to the quality of public services (EC, 2014: 166; 2017: 139).

Through this fixing of FDI and trade dependence as well as infrastructural and institutional gaps in convergence potential, the Commission highlighted the complementarity of cohesion transfers in the manner of neoliberal developmentalism. As the cohesion funds “accounted for half or more of the total“ in public investment of CEE states, they made “a substantial contribution to growth” and underlined “the benefits of joining the Single Market” this way (EC, 2014a: 54; See Graph 2.1). Not only did the cohesion investment substitute the FDI in crisis, it preserved „growth-friendly expenditure“ to resume CEE convergent trajectories afterwards (EC, 2014a: xv-xvii, 142-144; 2017: xxi-xxv, 164-170). In this way, the multiple dependency was fixed as convergence-prone but remained envisioned as hindered by national – infrastructural but especially institutional – incapacities in CEE with respect to the advanced development in core states.

4.5. Development Fix – Ideology

In parallel to the chapter 3 on the institutional form of cohesion governance, this chapter historicized its changing developmental purpose. Recognizing the *ordnungs politik*-type form, this chapter traced the origins and the transformation of neoliberal developmentalism. CEE states and regions became subject to this developmentalism only when the semantic fixing in the Cohesion Policy shifted to the strategic selection of global competitiveness in EU peripheries. There were three reasons involved. First, the Commission regularized the visions of core-peripheral cohesion through real convergence as possible ends rather than means to pattern Europe’s capitalist heterogeneity. Second, the globalist vision normalized the regulation of core-peripheral relations as the responsibility of peripheral states to catch-up with the EU’s competitiveness-oriented transformation as a bloc in the intensified global competition. Third, the relative backwardness of the new Eastern periphery allowed the Commission to fix CEE societies as a threat and opportunity to this global competitiveness.

This, in effect, subjected it to the more comprehensive visions of neoliberal restructuralization. Under the added-value discourse, this no longer involved solely infrastructural fixing but extended also into the institutional fixing.

Neoliberal developmentalism had been already skewed to the strategic prioritization of global competitiveness as a development strategy to enable the regulation of continental uneven and dependent development during and after eastern enlargement. During this process, cohesion became appendage to competitiveness which was reduced to the nominal convergence of peripheries with developmental indicators embedded in the Lisbon and Europe 2020 agendas. Thus, this variety of developmentalism was to embed the post-2004 neoliberal integrations of CEE as a new periphery and was then instrumentalized to make them resilient during the crisis. By doing so, the Commission deepened, however, the scope of peripheral backwardness which originally denoted gaps in physical and human infrastructures but inevitably included the questions of political-institutional governance. The resultant surveillance of peripheral backwardness identified the strategic aims of its regulation but simultaneously normalized the core-peripheral relations as inherent to this peripheral backwardness.

The TRPD-based development fix has thus tended to regularize uneven and dependent development as a normal fact of the EU's globalist integration. Rather than shifting the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma into the *equalizing* visions of real convergence, it furthered the *differentiating* visions of varied embedded competitiveness which synchronized peripheral development with the supranational objectives of globally resilient Single Market and the EMU. Two – Southern and Eastern – peripheries were fixed in effect. Accordingly, the Southern Eurozone periphery failed to take the complementary opportunities of FDI and cohesion investment transfers and became a debt-driven threat to the EU competitiveness. In contrast, following the Irish strategy, especially the (Visegrád) core of Eastern periphery was fixed as taking the same complementary opportunities of FDI and cohesion investment flows in a catch-up model which combined fiscal austerity with export performance. This developmental model is the subject of next chapters.

5. Dependent Developmental State: A Visegrád Model

This chapter takes the advantage of two previous historicizing chapters. By doing so, I investigate how the TRPD-based developmental fix has translated into *dependent developmental state* projects in the Visegrád dependent market economies (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). As conceptualized in Table 2.2, which is empirically substantiated by this chapter in the Table 5.1, the cohesion investment inflows are thus explored through their complementarity with the FDI impact on such developmental arrangements. In other words, this chapter shows the effects of Cohesion Policy on the transnationalization-*cum*-transformation of Visegrád state projects during their post-2004 integrations. First, I study this transnationalization as governmentalization which fixes the technologies of cohesion governance (see Table 3.1) and the effectiveness-driven nodal agency to promote developmental coalitions inside the Visegrád state-society complexes. Second, I investigate how these forms of *interiorized transformation* (Poulantzas, 1974b) powerfully shaped, albeit hardly determined the Visegrád state strategies. These regime strategies of embedded neoliberalism (Bohle, 2009; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a, 2018) could be thus sustained with the neoliberal developmentalism.

More particularly, the chapter illustrates the scalar rearticulation of the supranational dilemmas on the national scales of peripheral Europe: the (national) consumption- (integrationist) investment dilemma (Box 1.1). Having illustrated the material dependence (Graphs 1.1 and 2.1), I inquire into the commonalities and then varieties of how it has been institutionally organized and ideologically articulated. In other words, I ask about the national interiorizations of this dilemma and interpret it as inherent to the Visegrád dependent developmental states. I illustrate this through the comparative analysis of national documents within the cohesion governance – CSuFs, NSFRs, PAs, and OPs strategies (see Table 3.3) – to investigate their commonalities in the early parts of this chapter. The later parts investigate the Czech single case to explore the main contradiction in the consumption-investment dilemma inherent to these developmental arrangements. I illustrate the impact of cohesion governance on identifying the Visegrád innovation incapacity, while enabling the

developmentalist visions of investment for the innovation-led catch-up (see Table 5.1; Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015; Medve-Bálint, 2018). As well, I explore how the governmentalizing tendency to fix the Visegrád institutional incapacity of nationalist consumption becomes implicated in the reproduction of state capture (Innes, 2016; Fazekas and King, 2018).

By deciphering this inherent contradiction, I research the interiorization of cohesion bureaucracies and the resultant articulation and realization of state developmental strategies (Nölke and Vliegthart, 2009; Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). More concretely, the Table 5.1 follows the production of (trans)national *institutional* complementarities in the Visegrád economies. As already discussed in the chapter 1 and 2, there was a dominant cleavage in the Visegrád states: an ambivalent tendency to inward-looking *nationalist* and outward-looking *integrationists* projects. The chapter explores how the Cohesion Policy institutionalized an embedding framework behind the post-accession integrationist projects, while making the resultant FDI-led strategies resilient during the crisis. Given the (post-)crisis turn to a more nationalist developmentalist projects, especially in Hungary and Poland (Bluhm and Varga, 2019; Toplišek, 2019; Scheiring, 2019), I document how the Cohesion Policy was made more inward-looking, albeit within the confines of neoliberal developmentalism. Furthermore, I illustrate then the Czech case. This involves the two contradictory tendencies of consumption-investment dilemma: On the one hand, the integrationist investment into the large innovation infrastructures as an innovation catch-up. On the other, the case of state capture of cohesion governance by the crony and oligarchic networks around the prime minister Andrej Babiš and the ANO party (Innes, 2016; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018) is discussed.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it explores the transnationalization of Visegrád states through the governmentalizing interiorization of cohesion governance within their state-society relations. Second, it investigates the (post-)accession and (post-)crisis articulations of neoliberal developmentalism in the Visegrád dependent market economies. Third, the chapter refocuses on the Czech case to exemplify the national variation of consumption-investment dilemma and the essential contradiction in the Visegrád states where the national networks and transnational integration co-constitute each other.

5.1. Governmentalizing Dependency

The operationalization of cohesion bureaucracies has been central to the socio-institutional fixing of Visegrád dependent developmental states. This aimed at transforming the Visegrád power blocs into developmental coalitions. Under the effectiveness visions, the governmentalization aimed contradictorily at upgrading their organizational *capacity* (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015; Bruszt and Vukov, 2017; Medve-Bálint, G. and V. Šćepanović, 2019) but simultaneously reducing their *autonomy* (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Bandelj, 2017) under the Commission's developmental leadership. Although taking different national shapes, this socio-institutional fixing was modelled on common institutional arrangements. These arrangements were complementarily grounded in the CSuFs, NSFRs, PAs in Czechia (GoCR 2003a, 2007a, 2014a), Hungary (GoRH 2003, 2007a, 2014), Poland (GoRP 2003a, 2007, 2014a) and Slovakia (GoSR 2003a, 2007, 2014) and their elaborations in the respective sectoral and territorial OPs as the Table 5.1 illustrates below. Therefore, the cohesion bureaucracies formed a distinctive category inside Visegrád state apparatuses. They were responsible to establish a partnership-based nodal agency which organized supranationally-led governance technologies inside the Visegrád state-society relations. Since the CSuFs in 2004, these governance technologies underpinned this agency as being driven by an "effective" system of "management", "monitoring", "evaluation", and "control" (GoCR 2003a: 128-148; GoRH 2003: 199-212; GoRP 2003a: 145-160; GoSR 2003a: 141-171).

The conflicting aim of increased developmental *capacity* and upscaled *autonomy* of Visegrád developmental coalitions was organized across the three levels of (i) nodal agency, (ii) institutional complementarities, and (iii) management practices. First, the partnership technology underpinned the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies, which were operationalized especially as the new MAs, to embed them into public-private networks of various institutional actors in the MCs among others. This *social* nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies underpinned the (trans)national *institutional* complementarities. Second, through the programming and concertation technologies, these complementarities were rearticulated in the CSuFs, NSFRs, PAs but sectorally embedded in the OPs. All these documents aimed to operationalize the sectoral and territorial synergies between Visegrád economies and the Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies. Third, the additionality technology along with the decentralization and simplification configured the cohesion bureaucracies' everyday

Table 5.1 Dependent Developmental State: National Scale, 2004-2020

Institutions – Infrastructures	Coordination Mechanism/Capacity	Corporate/State Governance	Investment Finance	Industrial/Welfare Relations	Education and Training	Innovation	Business Development	Physical Sustainability	Transnational Integration
Dependent Market Economies	Hierarchies in TNCs	Control by headquarters of TNCs	FDI and foreign-owned banks	Assessment of skilled labour, company-based agreements	No provisions beyond basic education	Intra-firm transfer within TNCs	Investment incentives for TNCs	Exploitation of local physical conditions (also as a part of incentive packages)	Full export orientation towards global product markets
Dependent Developmental State	Hierarchies in the EU and cohesion governance (MA, CA, IB, MC)	Proxy multi-level control by the European Commission	Structural Funds (ESF, EFRD, CF) and national OPs	Activating employment and welfare policies including social inclusion and healthcare	Adapting education to investor demand and intra-firm training	Creation of public-private innovation clusters	SME bias and upgrade from dual economy	Improving transport and environmental infrastructures	Catch-up with higher positions in global value chains
Czechia 2007-13	Ministry of Regional Development (central MA)	OP Technical Assistance, Integrated OP	OP Human Resources and Employment, Integrated OP	OP Education for Competitiveness	OP Enterprises and Innovations OP Research and Development for Innovations	OP Transport OP Environment	OP Economic Development	OP Transport OP Environment	Complementarity with Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 agendas (i.e. National Programmes, National Reform Plans)
Hungary 2007-13	National Development Agency (central MA)	OP Implementation OP State Reform OP Electronic Public Administration	OP Social Renewal OP Social Infrastructure	OP Human Capital	OP Economic Development	OP Environment and Energy, OP Transport	OP Innovative Economy	OP Infrastructure and Environment	
Poland 2007-13	Ministry of Regional Development (central MA)	OP Technical Assistance	OP Human Capital	OP Information Society, OP Education	OP Research and Development	OP Transport OP Environment	OP Innovative Economy	OP Infrastructure and Environment	
Slovakia 2007-13	Ministry of Construction and Regional Development (central MA)	OP Technical Assistance	OP Employment and Social Inclusion, OP Health	OP Information Society, OP Education	OP Research and Development	OP Transport OP Environment	OP Competitiveness and Economic Growth	OP Transport OP Environment	

Ideal Types

Empirical Cases, Programming Period 2007-13

Source: Inspired by and partially adapted from Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015: 160; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009: 680; Nölke et al., 2015: 546; Nölke et al., 2019: 195. The source includes also the following programming documents for the following OPs: GoCR 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2014a; GoRH 2003, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g, 2007h, 2007i, 2014; GoRP 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2013, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2014a; GoSR 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 2014.

management practices of command and control from their 2004 introduction to the increasing demand of “effective implementation” (GoCR 2014a: 157; GoRH 2014: 118; GoRP 2014a: 180; GoSR 2014: 118).

5.1.1. Governing through Nodal Agency

Nodal agency is organized through the partnership technology. It underpins the role of cohesion bureaucracies as the organizational backbone of the developmental coalitions in the state apparatus and embeds the institutional complementarities. Partnership is a precondition to both articulate the programming documents during their negotiations with the Commission and implement them during the programming periods. Since its origins, it fixed these developmental coalitions as vehicles of comprehensive “coordination” mechanism (GoCR 2003a: 2, 128; GoRH 2003: 145; GoRP 2003a: 114; GoSR 2003a: 7) of effective and transparent investment. It established thus variegated networks which were supranationally disciplined but equally oriented at their capacity-enhancing national embedded. These networks originated already in the pre-accession period within the Phare through the processes of “preparation and implementation of pre-structural instruments and also programme periods of 2004-2006 and 2007-2013” (GoCR 2014a: 137). This nodal agency was driven by contradictory logic which deliberately incorporated “[all] relevant” and “key partners” (GoCR 2014a: 138; GoRH 2014: 101; GoRP 2014a: 172; GoSR 2014: 107) but disciplined them within the supranationally designed governance frameworks.

As a central node, the DG Regio governed the national nodes of cohesion governance at distance by responsabilizing the national MAs, CAs, AAs, their IBs, and MCs. This governance from afar was hierarchically skewed to the DG Regio’s control, surveillance, and command functions. DG Regio bureaucrats “consulted” and “approved” (GoRP, 2007: 5-9; GoSR, 2007a: 7-9) the operationalization of national cohesion bureaucracies at the outset of every programming period. During its implementation, they were the receiving end of the information chain of reporting and evaluation, the main intermediary of methodological guidance and recommendation and a final approver, auditor, and payer of the nationally certified investment. The MAs were thus responsabilized to “guaranteeing flow of” or “supplying continuous information to the Government and to the European Commission” where the DG Regio was to receive „information“ for its evaluation, verification,

and command function (GoCR, 2007a: 94; GoRH, 2007a: 137, 147; GoRP, 2007a: 113). The authorities supervised then the subnational “compliance” with the Commission’s “methodological” guidance and directives, while remaining responsible for the “coordination” and “submission” of regular reports to it (GoCR, 2007a: 94-5; GoRH, 2007a: 142-7; GoRP, 2007a: 108-111).

Managing authorities constituted thus main national nodes of cohesion bureaucracies to organize the central “coherence” or “synergies” between the Commission and the state apparatuses (GoCR, 2007a: 34-35; GoRH, 2007a: i-iii, 72; GoRP, 2007a: 151-152; GoSR, 2007: 97). As the Table 5.1 documents, two – more and less institutionally centralized – forms of coordination developed by the mid-2010s. In Czechia and Slovakia, there were two central MAs: the Slovak Ministry of Construction and Regional Development and the Czech Ministry of Regional Development. However, individual OPs remained managed by the “division of competencies” on the level of “state/Ministries” so that they became sectoral MAs of these OPs as illustrated later in this chapter. For example, the OPs Environment were managed by Slovak and Czech Ministries of Environment (GoCR 2012b; GoSR 2015b). In Poland and Hungary, one central body formed MA for all the OPs: the Polish Ministry of Regional Development and the Hungarian National Development Agency (GoRH, 2007a: 45-6; GoRP, 2007a: 109-10). Although still reliant on the “relevant [line] ministers [and national agencies]” (GoRH, 2007a: 14, 147-9; GoRP, 20), this coordination was more centralized. Irrespective of these differing forms, MAs constituted the primary object of partnership, while being responsabilized to interconnect the agenda with the rest of state apparatus in a dual logic. Within this logic, the resultant “inter-ministerial” (GoCR, 2007a: 35, 89; GoHR, 2007: 154, 164; GoSR, 2007a: 7, 100-1) networks established a bureaucratic backbone of the cohesion governance. The MAs firstly organized the surveillance and control systems to retain national organizational autonomy, while being subjected to the supranational leadership. They had to then extend the bureaucratic nuclei into deliberative networks encompassing the whole state-(civil)society relations.

As the Table 5.2 illustrates, MCs (Cartwright and Batory, 2012) materialized this incorporative extension as they integrated the most powerful economic and social partners and non-governmental organizations (GoCR 2014a: 138; GoRH 2014: 100-9; GoRP 2014a: 172-3; GoSR 2014: 107-110): Based on the tripartite logic, they firstly incorporated the

collective capital-labour interests through the representation of business “associations” and labour “unions” so that the otherwise weak labour and national capital were co-opted. Other civil society and sectoral “organizations” were included sectorally as the Table 5.2 exemplifies on the representatives of higher education in the innovation-based OPs. These committees were embedded in broader forms of incorporation like “roadshow” (GoCR, 2003a: 2), “workshops” (GoSR, 2007: 8), “seminars” (GoSR, 2007: 8), “working groups” (GoRH, 2007b: 10), and “fora” (GoRH, 2007a: 169-171). Thus, the preparation of Polish NSFR included “60 meetings and conferences” with a participation of approximately „4800 persons“ (GoRP, 2007a: 151). Meanwhile, the preparations of Czech and Hungarian NSFRs included consultations with the biggest capital and labour interest representations: the Czech Chamber of Commerce and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions and the National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (GoCR, 2007: 5, GoRH, 2007a: 169-171). The forms of MCs differed once again as the Slovak MC for Knowledge Economy monitored three OPs Research and Development, Information Society, and Competitiveness and Economic Growth (GoSR, 2011a: 3-4), while there were two separate MCs needed for two OPs in Czechia (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

Irrespective of its differing forms, the operationalization of nodal agency followed a purpose to consolidate developmental coalitions behind the increase of Visegrád state capacity, while upscaling the governance hierarchies at once. Rather than reducing Visegrád state power, this upscaling of command and control powers to the Commission and the downscaling of coordination responsibilities was programmed to selectively reorient the strategic intervention of these dependent developmental states. This was linked to the operationalization of institutional complementarities.

5.1.2. Operationalizing Complementarity

The nodal agency operationalized the increasing emphasis on transnational institutional ‘[synergies and] complementarities’ (GoCR, 2014a: 157-173; GoRH 2007: 154-164; GoRP, 2014a: 185-9; GoSR 2007: 80). It has been driven by the programming and concentration technologies. These technologies established the conditions through which the national developmental strategies of 2004 CSuF, 2007 NSRFs, and 2014 PAs could enable

Table 5.2 Partnership: Membership in Czech, Polish, and Slovak Monitoring Committees for OPs in the Innovation Domain, 2007-2013

MC for Knowledge Economy* (Slovakia)	MC for OP Innovative Economy (Poland)	MCs for OP EC, RDI, and EI (Czechia)
Governmental Representative for Knowledge Economy	Ministry of Regional Development (8)	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (14)
Office of the Government (4)**	Ministry of Digital Affairs	Ministry of Industry and Trade (10)
Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Sport (2)	Ministry of Science and Higher Education	Ministry of Regional Development (3)
Ministry of Economy (3)	Ministry of Economy (2)	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2)
Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development	Ministry of Sport and Tourism	Ministry of Environment (3)
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family	Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance (3)
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Ministry of Labour and Social Policy	Ministry of Health
Ministry of Interior	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Justice	Ministry of Environment	Individual Regions or Regional Councils (29)
Ministry of Environment	Office of Prime Minister	Council of Higher Education (3)
Governmental Representative for Territorial Authorities and Integrated Management of Waters and Landscape	Union of Polish Metropolises	Czech Rector Conference (2)
Governmental Representative for Information Society	Association of Polish Cities	Czech Chamber of Commerce (3)
Association of Towns and Communities	Association of Polish Voivodeships	Confederation of Industry (3)
Union of Towns and Cities	Convention of Marshals	Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (3)
Individual Regions (8)	Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union <i>Solidarność</i>	Association of Towns and Municipalities (2)
Ministry of Finance (2)	All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions	Governmental Council for Roma Community Affairs
Ministry of Culture	Trade Unions Forum	Governmental Council for Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organisations (2)
Research Agency of the Ministry of Education, Research and Development, and Sport	Employers of Poland	Czech School Inspectorate
Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency	Lewiatan Confederation	Czech Academy of Sciences (3)
Slovak Agency for Tourism	Association of Polish Crafts	Research, Development and Innovations Council (3)
Slovak Innovation and Energy Agency	Business Centre Club	Union of School Associations
Slovak Research and Development Agency	Polish Federation of Engineering Associations	Permanent Conference of Associations in Education
Slovak Rector Conference	Polish Academy of Sciences	CzechInvest (2)
Slovak Academy of Sciences	Main Council of Science and Higher Education	Association of Research Organizations (2)
Federation of Employers' Associations	Main Council of Research Institutes	CzechTrade
Confederation of Trade Unions		Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank
Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry		Association of Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organizations
Association of Research and Development Industrial Organizations		Food Chamber
National Union of Employers		Confederation of Employers' and Entrepreneurs' Associations
Slovak IT Association		Association of Female Entrepreneurs and Managers
Partnership for Prosperity		

Source: GoSR, 2007c; GoRP (2014b); GoCR (2013a, 2017a, 2017b)

* Slovak MC integrated monitoring into one committee for three OPs Research and Development, Information Society, Competitiveness and Economic Growth; Polish MC served for one OP which encompassed whole innovation domain; There were then three Czech MCs for three OPs Education for Competitiveness (EC), Research and Development for Innovations (RDI), and Enterprise and Innovation (EI), however, with overlapping memberships.

** The numbers in parentheses indicate amount of memberships for an individual institutional actor or its organizational unit.

the transnational integration of Visegrád dependent economies (Table 5.1): This concerned the investment finance in structural funds – ESF, ERDF, and CF – and the OP-led institutionalization of the developmental frameworks. These frameworks derived from the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020, as articulated by the 2006 CStF and 2014 CSG (Table 3.3), but were nationally organized through the sectoral and territorial OPs. Thus, the dependent developmental state could be tightly fixed to and simultaneously reshape the national socioeconomic institutions.

In the absence of any fixed supranational guidelines, the 2004 CSuFs and their OPs retained loose link to the post-accession integration. Following the 2007 strategic and 2014 conditionality turns, the national strategies and their OPs were more firmly “match[ed]”, “interlink[ed]” and “condition[ed]” with the supranational CSG and CStF (GoCR, 2007: 38-58, GoRH, 2007: 182-190, GoRP, 2014a: 77-87, 185-6; GoSR, 2014: 78-74). Here, these national CSG and CStF formed an enabling framework for prioritizing the targets of Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 in the national developmental strategies. Therefore, the NSRFs and PAs were gradually instrumentalized as transmission belts which strategically privileged supranational imperatives in Visegrád development trajectories. However, these strategic documents constituted also rulebooks which organized the institutional complementarities so that the investment finance were productively invested into the transnational integration across the sectoral institutions.

Through OPs, the national complementarities were then concentrated around and simultaneously overlapping the socioeconomic institutions. Between 2004 and 2014/2020, their thematic concertation in the domain was fixed in the main headings which followed a set of simple keywords. These keywords in the OPs often implied the developmental purpose (see Table 5.1): Oriented at integrating the cohesion bureaucracies and improving the state capacities, the State Governance domain was underpinned by OPs “Technical Assistance”, “Implementation”, “[Electronic] Public Administration” or “State Reform”. Industrial/Welfare Relations were managed by OPs “Human Resources [Development]”, “Employment”, “Social Infrastructure”, “Health” or “Social” to promote a sustainable workforce under activating employment policies. They overlapped with the Education and Training which was oriented at the “Education [for Competitiveness]”, bringing together the “Research, Development and Education”, and improving the “Human Capital”. This production of human capital spilled

over into the Innovation domain in the OPs oriented at “Research & Development”, “Innovation” and “Digital” transformation for a “Smart Growth” through upgrading the universities and research facilities. Indeed, the Innovation domain brought together the public infrastructure and workforce production with the Business Development in the OPs oriented at the “Industry and Enterprise” as well as “Innovations” for “Economic Competitiveness” and “Development” for the “Innovative Economy” and “Economic Growth”. What is more, the investment purpose remained vastly oriented at built environment in the domain of Physical Sustainability which includes “Environmental Protection”, “Integrated Transport”, as well as the “Environmental and Energy Efficiency”. The next chapter 6 overviews the territorial OPs which were less important and rather appendages to the sectoral ones.

Establishing these overlapping – supranational and national – complementarities was lastly operationalized through the detailed *priority axes* and the *strategic* and *thematic goals* in 2007 and 2014. The axes enabled the OPs to span multiple socioeconomic institutions by privileging particular priorities and aims across them. Grounded in the innovation domain, the Polish OP Innovative Economy of 2007-2013 consisted of nine “axe[s]” to interlink investment across the institutions of state governance, business development, and education and training. These axes foregrounded “R&D”-, “innovation”-, “ICT”-oriented modernization of “infrastructures”, “institutions”, and “human resources” within these domains (GoRP 2015: 82-140). This OP illustrates as well how the aforementioned nine *national* priority axes derived from the *six* supranational “goal[s]” within the CGS, while re-appropriating them under the “main goal: development of Polish economy on the basis of innovative enterprises” (GoRP 2015: 62-86). Although the strategic content of individual OPs and their synergies were articulated by the national cohesion bureaucracies and the wider national partnerships, they remained thus constrained by the ever-tighter transnational frameworks of axes and goals. As the next subsection discusses, such goals could be then quantified in indicators which fed the performance systems of monitoring, compliance, and evaluation.

The programming and concentration technologies enabled thus the developmental capacity of Visegrád state intervention when simultaneously fixing institutional arrangements for the Commission-led strategic leadership. They enabled the reordering of Visegrád institutional complementarities when hierarchically integrating them into the EU’s

transnational regulation. Through the ongoing governmentalization, these complementarities were made comprehensive in the performance system.

5.1.3. Performing Governance

The complementarities have been made more comprehensive by the every-day responsibilities of nodal agency within the compliance and performance framework of ongoing monitoring, evaluation, reporting, and control. Here, the governance technologies of additionality, decentralization, and simplification legitimized its gradual hardening. Under the “transparency”, “efficiency” or “simplicity” headings (GoCR, 2007: 22-3; GoRH, 2014: 65-71; GoRP, 2014a: 152-5; GoSR, 2007: 74, 97), the framework normalized the governance hierarchies to retain autonomy of cohesion bureaucracies from the domestic political influence. With the progressing governmentalization, such frameworks moved from the aim to enhance state developmental capacities to enforcing the supranational surveillance and intervention. In this sense, the institutional transformation of state has become the developmental goal itself to be monitored, (self-)evaluated, and reported.

Besides the MAs and MCs, the CAs and AAs became important nodes in this compliance responsabilization (GoCR, 2007: 92; GoRH, 2007a: 152-3; GoRP, 2007a: 111; GoSR, 2007: 99). In all Visegrád states but Poland, the certifying and auditing functions were overtaken by the Finance Ministries and their respective departments. While the Ministry of Finance became an auditing authority in Poland, the certifying function remained with the Ministry of Regional Development. The formalization of these functions was symptomatic for the “audit explosion” after the 2006 reform according to Mendez and Bachtler (2011). The auditing turn has become thus a contradictory vehicle of this effectiveness-driven governmentalization.

The state capacity was articulated as an “institutional”, “administrative”, and “absorption” (GoCR, 2007: 98-110, GoRH, 2007a: 126-30; GoRP, 2014a: 152-7, 194-7; GoSR, 2007: 92-100). This capacity expected the Visegrád state apparatuses to comply with the cohesion governance and effectively absorb the cohesion investment. In the 2004-2006 period, this cohesion investment was conditioned by the public reforms of “public procurement”, “state aid”, and “competition policy” to make them compliant with the “Community” or “Commission” rules (GoCR 2003a: 84-90; GoRH 2003: 146-9; GoRP 2003a: 76-90; GoSR 2003a:

165-9). The next programming period aimed at a much deeper institutional transformation. Using the OPs on the technical assistance and public reform, this transformation supported the integration of cohesion bureaucracies into the state apparatuses, while simultaneously reconfiguring their bureaucratic functioning beyond simple legal compliance. Financing the human resources through the technical assistance to support the performance frameworks working smoothly, the public administrations were required to undergo structural reform even outside of the cohesion governance. This was made necessary given the “problems” in Visegrád state governance which could cause “negative impacts” on the “fulfilling of cohesion policy” and the “whole economy and society” (GoCR, 2007: 32). As the 2014-2020 programming period neared, this tendency deepened, while requiring concrete transparency “measures” and programs of “battle against corruption” among others (GoCR 2014a: 61-71; GoSR 2014: 63-7).

After 2014, the conditionality turn indicated this deepened emphasis on the state apparatus restructuring. While the conditions of effective cohesion governance were already involved in the ex-ante evaluation of NSRFs, the ex-ante conditionalities for PAs included wider scope of inquiry into the general functioning of whole public administrations. Such “conditionalities” (GoCR 2014a: 180-2; GoRH 2014: 135-210; GoRP 2014a: 191; GoSR 2014: 126-258) narrowed further the surveillance of state governance frameworks which could be ranked “fulfilled”, “partially fulfilled” or “not fulfilled”. When not fulfilled, the negotiations over the Actions Plans – ranging from transparency strategies against corruption to macroeconomic conditionalities – were opened between the Commission and the national governments for fulfilling these conditionalities as a condition for the cohesion funding.

This framework of “[ongoing] evaluation” was established through the “indicator”-based surveillance (GoCR, 2007: 66-70; GoRH, 2007a: 61-74; GoRP, 2007a: 81-4; GoSR, 2007: 66-74). The system of indicators derived from the system of quantified goals and axes established in the supranational strategic programming. These indicators bound together the operationalized complementarities with the financial management and control, while prioritizing the programmed developmental purpose across various OPs. The indicators included simple statistical indicators such as the growth in GDP, employment or productivity. As analysed by the chapter 4, these indicators were however embedded in the EU’s semantic fixing which included the European Innovation Scoreboard and various global rankings such

as the World Economic Forum's competitiveness index, World Bank's Doing Business or the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, among others (GoCR, 2007: 67-8; GoRH, 2014: 46, 157, 200; GoRP, 2014a: 18-20; GoSR, 2007: 37, 69).

Meanwhile, the new instrument of mid-term (self-)evaluation was introduced in the 2009 and 2012 strategic reports (GoCR, 2009a, 2012a; GoRH, 2009, 2012; GoRP, 2009, 2012; GoSR, 2009, 2012c). The reports utilized the indicator-based performance evaluation to make the national MAs comprehensively inform the Commission about the implementation, investment progress and the major problems. They also served to express the need to reorient the developmental purpose in the new context like the economic crisis as detailed below. The reports regularized thus the process through which Visegrád cohesion bureaucracies regularly informed the Commission on deficiencies and best practices in both the fulfilment of Lisbon and Europe 2020-based developmental targets and the management and control systems implementation.

Hence, the compliance and performance frameworks completed the governmentalization on everyday level of bureaucratic practices. The inherent asymmetry was double-edged with respect to the questions of state capacity and autonomy. While these frameworks aimed at increasing the state capacity, they rather tendentially regularized the Commission's proxy control and command powers. This fixed the supranational articulation of neoliberal developmentalism within the Visegrád state apparatuses. As documented on the Czech case below, the deepening governmentalization and bureaucratic formalization contradictorily reproduced the state capture by Visegrád economic and political elites which these frameworks tried to target and prevent.

5.2. Articulating Neoliberal Developmentalism



Neoliberal developmentalism imbues the developmental purpose of cohesion governance as a socio-institutional basis of the developmental projects in Visegrád states. Although varying among the Visegrád states as documented by the Graph 5.1 in terms of investment priorities, Visegrád investment priorities could be singled out in comparison with other arrangements in the EU. Besides this real investment, the neoliberal developmentalism underpinned the deeper ideological level to shape the consumption-investment dilemma. From the (post)accession

2000s to the (post-)crisis mid-2010s, this purpose rested on the prioritization of the “sustainable development based on competitiveness” (GoCR, 2003a: 54-9). Such convergence visions were thus produced through a varying “economic strategy” oriented at the FDI-led and export-oriented “modernisation and catching-up to the EU-15 average” (GoRH, 2007a: 20).

The model of export-led FDI dependence and strategies of complementing or overcoming its vulnerabilities figured prominently in the Visegrád articulations of neoliberal developmentalism. They accepted the perspective of “trade[-based]” and “open” economies in an ever more “competitive” and “European” or “global” conditions and overcoming the “crisis” of such conditions (GoCR 2003a: 8, 2007: 7, 2014a: 110; GoRH 2003: 9, 2007a: 19-24, 2014: 7-22; GoRP 2003a: 33, 2007: 43-52, 2014a: 50-1; GoSR 2003a: 34-7, 2007: 53-9, 2014: 84). Although varying among the Visegrád states and the (post-)accession and (post-)crisis phases of their integration, the Visegrád articulation(s) of neoliberal developmentalism have remained generally resilient as discussed below. Across the complementarities showed in the Table 5.1, the catch-up visions contemplated the cohesion investment (see Graph 5.2) as supporting the upward value positioning in the global production networks.

There was a shift to economic nationalism from more integrationist strategies between the mid-2000s and -2010s. It has been rather gradual and less radical than suggested by the proliferating literature on the national or conservative developmentalism in the post-2010 Hungary and post-2015 Poland (Naczyk, 2014; Appel and Orenstein, 2018; Buzogány and Varga, 2018; Bluhm and Varga, 2019; Toplišek, 2019; Scheiring, 2019; Toplišek, 2019). The shift remained fixed at the “catch-up” or “convergence” visions with the “levels” or “scales” of EU(-15) “average[s]” (GoCR 2014a: 8, 29; GoRH 2007a: ii, 2, 11, 20-3, 59, 2014: 8-11; GoRP 2007: 15-8, 2014a: 18; GoSR 2007: 55-8, 2014: 8). Three periods and forms of articulating these catch-up visions could be analysed: First, the catch-up was inherent to the self-evaluation of Visegrád backwardness as a form of identifying the scope of developmental intervention. Second, this established semantic space for (re)articulating the convergence visions of sustainable competitiveness, while privileging the visions of overcoming innovation- and institutional-based backwardness as major factors of failing but also future catch-up. Third, the shattering of FDI-based visions through the global and Eurozone crises foregrounded the national economic resilience but simultaneously opened scope for a more nationally oriented vision, albeit within the confines of neoliberal developmentalism.

Graph 5.1 Concentration: Thematic Comparison of Cohesion Investment in the EU, Baltic, Southern, North-Western, and Visegrád states, 2007-2013 (averages, % of total funding)



Source (both graphs): European Commission, Cohesion Data database (cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu)

*Averages of structural funding in the Visegrád (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), EU-27, Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Southern (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), North-Western (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark) member states.

5.2.1 Self-Evaluating Own Backwardness

The self-evaluation of backwardness has had a dual purpose when regularizing the “ineffective”, “backward”, “lagging”, “weak”, “inadequate” or “insufficient” forms of Visegrád “competitiveness” or “development” under the EU(-15) averages (GoCR 2003a: 50-3, 2007: 27-30; GoRH 2003: 61-7, 2007a: 23-58; GoRP 2003a: 5-41, 2007: 17-24; GoSR 2003a: 156-60; 2007: 43-51). Enforcing Visegrád governments to identify the gaps in the human, infrastructural, and institutional conditions of their respective economies, it legitimized the cohesion investment inflow as an economic concession and developmental assistance at once. At the same time, the self-evaluation fixed the domestic conditions as inherently backward and normalized thus the FDI-oriented reindustrialization in combination with the Commission-led supranational intervention as necessary developmental trajectories. In the post-accession years, the barriers to the actual convergence were thus regularly found in the domestic growth conditions, while its resumption had to be oriented at maximizing the transnational integration. These barriers originally consisted in the physical and human infrastructures but were gradually reoriented at the inadequacies of institutional and innovation-driven governance in the state governance and business development.

The Graph 5.2 identifies the physical and environmental sustainability as major investment targets. These targets involved infrastructural gaps or obsolescence of all sorts of transport – roads, rail, airport – and energy transmission networks. The environmental infrastructures like sewage, waste disposal or water supply systems were included. The absence of these *old Fordist* infrastructures fixed the sheer scale of infrastructural underdevelopment, while highlighting the necessity of physical integration between the new Eastern periphery to establish connectivity through the transport and transmitting infrastructures with the rest of the Single Market. The “backward”, “missing” or “not yet constructed” transport “links” had to be built from the scale of intra-regional and -national to underpin the trans-regional and -border links within the eastward expansion of the Trans-European Transport Network (GoCR 2003b: 16-25, 2011b: 22-33; GoRH 2007i: 43-51; GoRP, 2003c: 7-23; GoSR 2012b: 12-54). Moreover, the Visegrád physical conditions were characteristic of lacking “sustainability” which consisted in the missing or obsolete “environmental infrastructure” and led to the “excessive” pollution (GoCR, 2003b: 36-56; GoRH, 2007c: 6-38; GoPR, 2016a: 6-19; GoSR, 2015b: 20-65).

The Visegrád workforce was simultaneously framed as backward due to the combination of “unreformed” labour markets and welfare states, “underdeveloped” social infrastructures, and “outdated” educational and training systems (GoCR, 2003d: 9-54, 2012a: 8-78; GoRH, 2007e: 11-56, GoRP, 2003b: 93-153, 2016b: 7-102; GoSR, 2003c: 5-14). First, the labour markets suffered from the inadequate flexibility which hindered the lack of “[profession and spatial] mobility” only to expose the low “adaptability” of workforce and firms to the structural and technological restructuring (GoCR, 2012a: 19; GoRH, 2007f: 19). Second, this reflected the inadequate instruments of “active” labour market policy and missing infrastructures and institutions to enable the “equal opportunities” for the labour market participation (GoSR, 2013a: 29-43; GoRP, 2016b: 20-4, 150-3). There were incomplete systems of strategic monitoring and human capacities and institutions, that is the employment offices and agencies to provide the employment assistance and information. The most detrimental was however the quality of educational and training systems which were unresponsive to the market signalling and generally weak in terms of life-long learning, requalification, and other activating forms of workforce training. In result, the qualification supply of Visegrád populations could not thus appropriately respond to the “investor demand for labour force in its full complementarity (from workers up to developers, researchers, and mainly qualified managers)” (GoCR, 2012a: 43).

The lagging physical and human capital indicated the backward conditions for the *new post-Fordist* economic governance due to the weak institutional coordination of innovation and business development domains. This strategic incapacity had a triple nature: weak domestic public institutions, weak corporate governance in the domestic SMEs, and weak coordination between both private and public governance (GoCR, 2011c: 11-37, 2011e: 9-37, 2012c: 8-42; GoRH 2007h: 13-46; GoRP, 2003d: 233-53; 2015: 9-49; GoSR, 2011: 15-47). Concerning the public governance, the state institutions failed in cultivating sustainable business environment, while offering no consultancy assistance to the domestic enterprises. Meanwhile, the educational and research institutions lacked infrastructural and human capacities not only to produce highly-skilled workforce but also form partnerships with private sector for technology, know-how, and innovation “diffusion” and “transfers” (GoCR, 2012c: 37; 2011e: 35-46; GoRH 2007h: 20-9; GoRP: 2015: 7, 86; GoSR, 2012a: 42; 2011: 46). Regarding the corporate governance, domestic SMEs suffered simultaneously from low

“innovation capacity” which belonged among major side effects of their low “internationalization” and utilization of spill-overs resulting from their subcontracting function to foreign TNCs. In contrast to the TNCs, the domestic enterprises suffered from lacking modern strategic and managerial skills (GoCR, 2003c, 2011c; GoRH, 2007b; GoRP 2015).

The urgent need to solve the underdevelopment legitimized thus the inflows of cohesion investment, while however constructing it as an internal problem of Visegrád socio-economic development. Articulating their national development strategies, Visegrád state managers constructed thus the relative domestic backwardness within the Commission-led semantic fixing of neoliberal developmentalism. Therefore, the multiple backwardness as an internal barrier to the convergence was equally fixed as set of catch-up “opportunities” for unleashing the unused “[developmental] potential” (GoCR 2003a: 52-6, 2007: 30-6; GoRH 2003: 18-20, 2007a: 22-3; GoRP 2003a: 61-7, 2007: 20-5; GoSR 2003a: 158-63, 2007: 14-5).

5.2.2. Articulating Peripheral Catch-Up

Overcoming these “performance gaps” (GoCR, 2007: 34) through the cohesion investment, the Visegrád state managers have been incentivized to articulate strategies to utilize the aforementioned opportunities for their sustainable competitiveness. Facing the domestic gaps, the combination of cohesion investment and FDI gained priority. Therefore, the convergence strategies aimed at channelling the cohesion investment to make the FDI “organically imbedded” (GoRH, 2003: 20). From that viewpoint, the cohesion investment could strengthen the Visegrád competitive advantage. The advantage consisted in the “integration into the European economic space” and “competitive wages” of otherwise “adaptable and skilled” workforce, while the “industrial tradition” enabled the presence of “internationally integrated manufacturing amongst large firms” thanks to the „massive” waves of FDI (GoCR 2003a: 50, 2007: 27; GoRH 2003: 159, 2007a: 23; GoRP 2003a: 60, 2007: 21; GoSR 2007: 43). This catch-up strategy of transnational reindustrialization could then become politically legitimate by sourcing investment for a more socially cohesive and environmentally-oriented, yet market-enabling restructuralization.

For the business development (see Table 5.1), the cohesion investment underpinned the main infrastructural backbone of incentive packages for “domestic and foreign investors”, that is the “business infrastructure” (GoCR, 2003c: 81, 2011c: 42-3; GoRH, 2003a: 81, 121,

2007b: 80-4). Although the cohesion investment could serve as direct incentives, it complemented these types of “indirect support” or “incentives” (GoCR, 2003a: 55, 61, 94) especially for the FDI. The business infrastructure denoted the construction of new “industrial zones” and “parks” for the “greenfield” FDI and in attempts to revitalize the post-socialist brownfields, while offering complementary infrastructure such as new roads and consultancy services (GoCR, 2011c: 66; GoRH, 2007b: 82-3; GoRP, 2003d: 297-9, 2015: 58-9; GoSR, 2013b: 63-6). These cheap infrastructural conditions formed the most important forms of investment promotion besides other “nonmarket” direct incentives and “favourable investment environment which is characterized by skilled labour power, low labour costs, low tax burden” among others (GoSR, 2007a: 27, 32, 53).

Attracting primarily the FDI, this business infrastructure was deemed complementary with the interests of domestic capital as well. The zones were held as infrastructures for productive spillovers which internationalized the domestic SMEs by offering their “supplier” function to the foreign TNCs and thus integrating them into the global “subcontracting chains” (GoCR, 2007c: 74; GoRH, 2007a: 80-1, 2007b: 85-89; GoRP, 2015: 117; GoSR, 2013b: 63-6). While driving the intra-Visegrád competition over the FDI, these transnationally-led industrial strategies could be supplemented by the cohesion investment to upgrade the SMEs. Investing into the SMEs remained an imperative because the “multinational firms are not willing to subcontract with firms that lack appropriate management skills, products, trained workforces and modern technology” (GoRH, 2003a: 21).

The FDI-led strategies necessitated also social and environmental embeddedness to become politically legitimate within the visions of “competitive sustainable economic growth” (GoCR, 2012a: 9). Investing in the physical sustainability was thus articulated as necessary, desirable and complementary. This increased the “capital” and “economic and social attractive[ness]” of Visegrád city-regions because the urban redevelopment modernized their transport, environmental or cultural infrastructures to make them attractive locations to live, work, visit and invest in (GoCR, 2007: 35; GoRH, 2007a: 83; GoRP, 2007a: 46-7; GoSR, 2007a: 54). Therefore, the (re)construction of transport facilities ranging from roads to airports, cultural institutions or sewage systems translated the FDI development into sensible real convergence to be consumed by local populations but equally increase the locational attractiveness for the “foreign investors” (GoCR, 2011: 64; GoRH,

2007i: 71-4; GoRP, 2003c: 14, 2016a: 109-111; GoSR, 2003b: 80, 2012b: 72-3). Even the environmental sustainability could be paired with “competitiveness” exactly when being envisioned to promote the “investment attractiveness” of Visegrád city-regions with respect to the “localization of [their] economic activities” (GoCR, 2012b: 9-10; GoRH, 2007c: 14; GoRP 2016a: 88; GoCR, 2015b: 127).

Following the same dual logic, the upgrade of human capital and social infrastructures co-opted Visegrád labour, while promoting flexible labour market restructuring. This promoted the conditions of relatively skilled, appeased but subordinated labour in the industrial and welfare relations, as well as education and training. The cohesion investment promoted the upgrading of educational and training systems beyond basic education. Therefore, the “inclusive” labour force was to retain high employability through its increasing “qualified”, “adaptable”, “flexible”, and “mobile” profile when matching the qualification demand of the “investors” (GoCR, 2003d: 56-7, 2012a: 49-50, 85-7; GoCR, 2012c: 90-3; GoRH, 2007f: 59-66; GoRP, 2003b: 129-33, 2016b: 165-177; GoSR, 2003c: 31-5, 2013a: 116-37). To appease the Visegrád populations, the cohesion investment flew into social infrastructures and inclusion arrangements within the industrial and welfare relations. Besides this, the healthcare infrastructures (GoCR 2011a; GoRH, 2007f; GoRP, 2016b) were sponsored. From this viewpoint, the health formed a “basis of competitiveness” and „one of the most important factors influencing its level and quality“ because „healthy workforce is a synonym for a prosperous and productive workforce creating higher profit“ (GoSR, 2007c: 23).

The FDI-based contradiction opened in the innovation and business development domain. Although being discursively privileged, the reality of innovation-driven and SME-based investment remained comparatively low in Visegrád states as the Graph 5.2 documents. This investment was needed because, as claimed by the Czech NSRF (GoCR, 2007: 29, 36), the FDI dependency posed a “threat” because the TNCs focused mostly on “low-cost strategy” which entrapped the Czech economy in a “low added value” position in the global production networks. They deepened the problem of “dual economy” where the TNCs determined the economic development *vis-à-vis* the domestic SMEs which lagged behind. Articulating the promise of upgrading to the “higher value added” positions (GoRH, 2007a: 77-80; GoRP, 2007a: 59-71; GoSR, 2007a: 26-27, 52-60), Visegrád state managers found a common strategy. The strategy rechannelled the investment from the industrial zones to the new

business infrastructure: “[knowledge-]technological”, “R&D”, and innovation “networks”, “clusters”, “parks” and other “centres [of excellence]” (GoCR, 2011c: 52-8, 2011e; GoRH, 2007b: 80-7; GoRP, 2015: 62-80; GoSR, 2011b, 2013b: 85-100). Through this infrastructural fix, the future channels of cohesion investment aimed at enabling cooperation among TNCs, SMEs, and local public research institutions. Rather than abandoning the FDI-led development, its contradiction was thus solved by shifting the developmental focus but also responsibilities on the domestic SMEs and university and research institutions.

Until the 2008 crisis, neoliberal developmentalism has been fully realigned with the FDI-based strategies to regularize the integrationist state projects. Such developmental visions streamlined the catch-up opportunities in a transnationally-led and complex industrial strategy. This strategy stood at managing complementarity between the cohesion investment and FDI inflows. Through this, the Cohesion Policy enabled the otherwise observed intra-Visegrád convergence on the dependent export-led model of peripheral catch-up.

5.2.3. (Post-)Crisis Resilience?

Since 2008, the economic crisis shattered the integrationist features of Visegrád FDI-based state projects. Especially in the post-2010 Hungary and post-2015 Poland, the new governments led by the conservative parties FIDESZ and PiS discursively privileged the more nationalist economic strategies. This political “rhetoric” has brought only an “asymmetric path-correction” as explained by Bohle and Greskovits (2018: 2). Indeed, the centre-right nationalist governments, which were led by the neoliberal and Eurosceptic ODS, ruled Czechia already from 2006 to 2013 before the post-2014 turn to the Czech variety of populist governmental forces (Císař, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018). As the chapter documents above and shows below, the neoliberal developmentalism has been rather rearticulated than abandoned after the crisis. Such a rearticulation has partially contradictory as it expected to utilize the cohesion dependency to overcome the FDI dependency. Despite of the gradual shift to economic nationalism, the FDI-oriented trajectories remained rather resilient.

In Hungary, the FIDESZ-led government exemplified the rhetorical trick. It initiated a New Széchenyi Plan in 2011 to correct the 2007 NSFR, while producing a prelude to the PA titled Széchenyi 2020 (GoHR, 2007a, 2010, 2014). Titled after one of the biggest 19th century economic reformer István Széchenyi, the strategic plans were framed as a patriotic plan of

economic renewal. In Poland, the 2017 Strategy for Responsible Development 2020, which was informally known as Morawiecki Plan, rearticulated the Polish PA (GoRP, 2014a, 2017) under the PiS governments led by economic deputy prime minister and then prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Against this rhetoric, the Hungarian and Polish nationalist developmentalism was not however radically different from the less articulate Czech PA (GoCR, 2014a: 38) and its (post-)crisis developmental repurposing:

Besides its unquestionable positive sides, the *established strong dependence of local economy's performance on foreign firms* has also negative sides which have become fully evident since the outbreak of serious problems in world economy in 2008. The global volume of production, investment, and thus employment is considerably dependent on decisions of foreign firms. *Especially SMEs are not able to compensate for the lowered demand of their major buyers. Their own ability to find and enter new (territorial and product) markets is limited.* On these grounds, besides the SME development, Czechia needs to support also large firms which have bigger capacity to systematically invest into the R&D, including the KET [key enabling technologies], and improve thus the innovation performance of the economy as a whole.

The 2009 and 2012 strategic reports explained the gradually shifting resilience on both levels of accumulation regimes and state strategies (GoCR, 2009a, 2012a; GoRH, 2009, 2012; GoRP, 2009, 2012; GoSR, 2009, 2012c). The continuing inflow of cohesion investment proved as “a major contributor to alleviating impact of the crisis” in Czechia (GoCR, 2012a: 45) and “probably the only significant source for a possible fiscal stimulus” in Poland (GoRP, 2009: 3). In the hardly hit Hungary, the cohesion investment could be viewed to ease the “balance adjustment measures” which were conditioned by the “loan agreement” from the IMF, the Commission, and the World Bank (GoRH, 2009: 6-7). In the contrasting success of Poland, it belonged among the factors of its “relatively high resilience” (GoRP, 2009: 8). Articulated within the EERP, Visegrád state managers could use it as an immediate macroeconomic injection which however retained orientation on the convergence with Lisbon and Europe 2020 targets. Therefore, the cohesion investment facilitated scarce capital which materialized an “important stimulating factor of qualitative, pro-innovation changes” (GoRP, 2009: 11) even during the crisis.

The FDI “dependence” and export “openness” had been meanwhile matched with the “vulnerability” of especially Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary as small and more trade-based

economies (GoCR, 2009a: 8-20; 2014a: 38; GoRH, 2009: 90-3; GoSR, 2009: 14, 2012c: 134, 2014: 17). In contrast, the “low[er] share of exports in GDP, substantial internal market and strong [domestic consumer demand]” explained Polish resilience (GoRP, 2009: 8, 2012: 7). The „extensive presence of foreign ownership“ and export openness were still fixed as an “advantage” which helped to “recover faster” from the crisis (GoRH, 2009: 18; GoSR, 2009: 14, 2012c: 134). The crisis made however apparent the immediate negative impact and structural limits of pre-crisis catch-up trajectories. Immediately, the dependency was made urgent as the Czech full post-crisis rebound depended on the recovery of FDI from and trade with “Western Europe (especially Germany)” (GoCR, 2009a: 8). Structurally, the potential of pre-crisis developmental strategies proved to be “exhausted” and “not sustainable” anymore in Slovakia (GoSR, 2009: 15; GoSR, 2012c: 15). It was thus realized by the Visegrád state managers that the post-crisis recovery had to overcome the FDI-based growth organized around the “low[er]”-cost factors and move from “low[er]” to “high[er] value added” economic activities (GoCR, 2009a: 7-10, 2012a: 6-7, 2014a: 29-38; GoRH, 2009: 13, 2012: 26; GoRP, 2009: 14, 2012: 14, 2014a: 18-22; GoSR, 2014: 16-23).

All this opened the question of “dual economy” at full scale (GoCR, 2009a: 18; GoRH, 2014: 20-1; GoSR, 2014: 16-17). The duality was envisioned as an unintended consequence of past FDI strategies which embedded the TNCs by adapting the domestic SME subcontractors to the demand of foreign capital, while leaving other domestic sectors underdeveloped. There was thus an investment shift to prefer “endogenous business sector” and promote the innovation-oriented upgrade of SMEs but “large [domestic industrial] enterprises” as well (GoCR, 2014a: 39-41). Rather than repudiating the FDI integration, the cohesion investment was to assist the national capital to move upwards in the global and innovation “supply” and “value chains” or succeed in foreign “markets” alone (GoCR, 2014a: 38-43; GoRH, 2014: 10-24; GoRP, 2014a: 19-22, 98-103; GoSR, 2014: 16-23, 78-80). More surprisingly, this positive rearticulation of *de facto* integrationist strategy was most keenly articulated in the post-2010 Hungarian strategies. The draft of the New Széchenyi Plan blamed the previous decade for deepening the problem of “duality” structure on “declining competitiveness”, while urging to utilize the “EU and state funds to create [European and global] competitiveness” of domestic business (GoRH, 2010: 16-7, 22). Presented as a national economic strategy under the title Széchenyi 2020, the Hungarian PA (GoRH, 2014: 21-22) solved the duality in a predictable way:

As close links between the global corporate sector and the domestic SME sector have only partially developed [...] The great challenge of Hungarian economic policy for two decades has been how to connect these two sectors more closely, how [the domestic] small and medium-sized enterprises can catch up with large [foreign] enterprises in technology, business knowledge, and productivity (see below for opportunities). [...] In order to improve the growth potential of SMEs, it is essential to develop resource-deficient SMEs in a focused and differentiated way including the creation and expansion of already developed capacities of enterprises belonging to key sectors, regions and target groups of entrepreneurs. These developments will help bring the production and service infrastructures of SMEs closer to the level represented by large enterprises, thus enabling SMEs to enter markets, retain their markets and further expand.

Neither did the post-2010 Hungary under FIDESZ engineer any radical departure from neoliberal developmentalism, nor was the post-2015 Polish turn under PiS exceptional in the broader Visegrád trajectories from this viewpoint. Although the economic crisis shifted the pre-crisis developmental visions towards a more internally oriented investment, this remained within the confines of FDI-led development. What is more, the implicit tendencies of this turn could be found in the Czech NSRF under ODS-led governments before the economic crisis only to become mainstreamed in PAs of all Visegrád states for the post-crisis period.

5.3. Investing in Development in Czechia


Innovation has emerged as the main priority in the catch-up visions, while signalling major deficiency. Drahekoupil and Myant (2015: 163) observe the “lack [of private and public] infrastructure for high-level innovations” as a major deficiency of the Visegrád developmental model. As the chapter 4 shows, the innovation promotion followed the trends in the supranational articulation of neoliberal developmentalism as well. Such visions ran against the reality of infrastructural fixing as the *new* innovation investment lagged behind the one into the *old* transport infrastructures (see Graph 5.1). For some, this indicated a consumption-oriented case of “misallocated funds” (Medve-Bálint, 2018) instead of effective investment into the innovation-led catch-up. As the Czech case documents in the Graph 5.2, the cohesion investment played nevertheless an important material role in underpinning the innovation visions even during the economic crisis. The graph exposes the coincidence between the rise of structural (foreign public) funds and the gradual catch-up of Czech governmental

investment with the EU average since 2010. It shows the scale of Czech and Visegrád dependency too when the effect of decreasing cohesion inflows is observed between the end and the start of new and old programming periods in the mid-2010s.

Between 2004 and 2013/2020, the Czech innovation domain was institutionally fixed in the following OPs: Industry and Enterprise (OP IE), Enterprise and Innovation (OP EI), Enterprise and Innovations for Competitiveness (OP EIC), Education for Competitiveness (OP EC), Research and Development for Innovations (OP RDI), and Research, Development and Education (OP RDE) (GoCR, 2003c, 2011c, 2011e: 68-72, 2012c, 2014b, 2015a). As the Tables 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate, the Czech innovation domain involved two to three different OPs, two different ministries as MAs and two to three MCs. In comparison, the Slovak management included three different OPs and MAs but remained monitored in a shared MC between 2007-2013 (GoSR, 2007c). Then, Polish governments retained the domain managed in one OP under one MA and one MC (GoRP, 2015). This was also the Hungarian case (GoRH, 2007b). Regardless of these changing forms, the OPs consolidated similar types of developmental coalitions in this domain.

Investigating how the innovation domain was fixed in Czechia through the Cohesion Policy, the subchapter focuses on the OP RDI along with the OP EC and the OP RDE. The Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (henceforth as Education Ministry) managed these OPs. First, I show how the OPs incubated the cohesion bureaucracies inside the state apparatus, while providing institutional and infrastructural conditions for a broader innovation-oriented agenda in the Czech state apparatus and planning. Second, I document how the OPs enabled the institutional and infrastructural establishment and consolidation of the complementary agenda of Large Research Infrastructures outside of the cohesion agenda. Organized in partnership with the “industry”, this national programme enabled Czechia to join the institutional networks of European Research Area and the Lisbon Strategy-based European Strategic Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) (GoCR, 2010: 8).

Graph 5.2 Indicator: Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D (GERD) and the Composition of R&D Expenditures in Czechia by Sources (both in %)



Source: Czech Statistical Office and Eurostat

5.3.1. Inside the Operational Programme: OPs EC, RDI, and RDE

The OPs RDI, EC, and RDE enabled to establishment and construction of innovation infrastructures and human capital through the inflowing investment (see Graph 5.2). Institutionally fixing the investment concentration on innovation, their vision was clear. The OPs “enhance[d] the research, development, and innovation potential of Czechia to contribute to the growth, competitiveness, and producing highly qualified jobs” so that the country’s “worsening global competitive position” was reversed and reoriented to the upward direction in the “global value chains” (GoCR, 2011e: 6, 2014b: 6). Enabling visions of *internal* innovation for *external* competitiveness, the OPs socio-institutionally secured the investment process into the infrastructures which validated these visions in return.

Since becoming the MA for innovation OPs in 2007, the Education Ministry almost doubled its original capacities. The establishment of cohesion bureaucracies required thus both the quantitative expansion of state apparatus and its purposeful responsabilization to the hierarchies of cohesion governance. Comparing the Ministry’s Organizational Structure prior

and after becoming the MA (cf. GoCR, 2007b, 2009b, 2014c), the Cohesion Policy became institutionalized in 1 section consisting of 2 subsections, 10 departments, and 30 units in 2014. The Ministry's other 5 sections were meanwhile structured into 4 subsections, 23 departments, and 35 units in the same year. This organizational fixing was gradual. In 2008, the new Section for the Management of Operational Funds was established as the Section IV next to other six of these highest organizational units. This equalized the Cohesion Policy with other core agendas in the Ministry. Managed by a temporary Section Director, the section received own Deputy Minister only in 2011. Since then, it has become the biggest and most complex section, while being institutionally reshaped to serve its nodal position on a regular basis. Securing the Ministry's MA responsibilities, the section established a chain of departments and units named and authorized to facilitate the "management" of the OPs, "implementation" of their investment purpose, ongoing "evaluation" of this implementation, "methodological" guidance for other actors, "financial control" and "audit" of the investment projects, while securing the public relations "promotion", "archiving" of documents, and also "analysis" for the "preparation" of the future OPs (GoCR, 2014c).

The MCs for the OPs embedded then the Ministry's cohesion bureaucracies into broader coalitions of interest as the Table 5.2 illustrates. The MCs commonly included between 40 and 50 institutional members for each of the three OPs reviewed (GoCR, 2017a; 2017b; 2020), albeit there was a similar pattern in this representation. Besides the representation of the Ministry's complementary sections as the Section III for Higher Education, Science and Research, there were other representatives of complementary ministries. This concerned especially the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which was responsible for the innovation-oriented OPs IE, EI and EIC, and its agencies like the investment-promotion agency CzechInvest as IB for these OP. Other newly established state agencies participated which included the Technological Agency. The city-regions were represented individually and through the Association of Regions. Following the sectoral logic, Academy of Sciences was included next to the Rector Conference and Council of Higher Education. Among the variety of smaller and bigger NGOs and professional associations, the social partners were incorporated as well: Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions, Czech Chamber of Commerce, and the Czech Confederation of Industry.

The OPs established such developmental coalitions but regularized their organizational purpose too: enabling the technological transfer. Fixing the innovation infrastructures, the OP RDI was central to this. It was based on five priority axes: European Centres of Excellence, Regional R&D Centres, Commercialization and Popularization of R&D, Infrastructure for Teaching in Higher Education Connected with Research, and the Technical Assistance (GoCR, 2011e: 80-93). Investment into these axes enabled “technology transfer” when fixing infrastructural “‘bridge’ between Czech regions and key foreign public and private partners [...] in developed regions” and also incentivizing public research institutions into the “cooperation” with the “application sphere” (GoCR 2011e: 24-5, 80). There had to be then “coherence” with the EU and national innovation but also “synergy” with the OP EI which were managed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade to incentivize the “application sphere” in return (GoCR, 2011e: 56, 71-2). The application sphere included SMEs “and their associations” but especially “strong growth of interest from the side of foreign firms” given the “growing private spending on R&D and attractiveness of Czechia for the investment in the R&D activity” (GoCR, 2011e: 25-27). Against this background, the public research sector suffered not only from the “absence” of innovation infrastructures but also the “lack of incentives and unsatisfactory motivation” to purpose the “involvement of partners from business sphere” (GoCR, 2011e: 24-32, 35-6). In order to become innovation infrastructures, the priority axes had to simultaneously become sites for both research but also “excellent partnerships with the application sphere” (GoCR, 2011e: 47).

The priority axes were translated into the investment process which led to the construction of these innovation infrastructures as the Table 5.3 documents. The investment could be legitimized as “appropriate prerequisites for overcoming the negative trend [of losing competitiveness] that has been identified and even for overcoming the economic crisis” (GoCR, 2009c: 17). In total, the OP supported 48 research centres (GoCR, 2018: 12-3). The flagship axis of European Centres of Excellence was allocated one third of the total allocation around 806 million EUR. Out of these six flagships, the ELI, BIOCEV and SUSEN were located on the Prague outskirts in the Central Bohemia Region, while the IT4Innovations project was located in Ostrava. As the next chapter 6 details, the CEITEC and ICRC were integrated into the Brno urban landscape. An outcome of competitive tenders among major national research institutions, these projects became integral institutional and infrastructural

components of Academy of Sciences, the Centre of Research Řež, Masaryk University in Brno, and Technical University of Ostrava along with their other local partners. Fixed as “pioneer” or “exceptional” in the IT or natural science fields across the national, ECE or European scales (GoCR, 2014d: 85-8), the compliance logic viewed them firstly as completing essential evaluation indicators of the increasing R&D jobs, reported academic outputs and their commercialization in the application sphere (GoCR, 2014d: 66-7). They could thus infrastructurally fix the visions of upgraded “[inter]national” and also “regional competitiveness” (GoCR, 2018: 19-48) as discussed below.

The operationalization of the cohesion bureaucratic machinery required thus to equalize the Cohesion Policy with the other agendas and establish their mutual complementarities in the state apparatus. The Education Ministry’s Section IV exemplified it in the case of Czech innovation domain. As an institutional precondition for the cohesion investment inflows, the Section fixed embedded the cohesion governance within the state apparatus and wider socioeconomic coalition, while however reorienting their purpose towards the neoliberal developmentalism. The infrastructural outcomes materially underpinned the institutional afterwards.

5.3.2. Complementarity: Large Research Infrastructures

Although the six large infrastructures in the OP RDI were only finished by 2015 and 2017, their infrastructural visions played a central role in the institutional fixing of “Large Research, [Experimental] Development and Innovation Infrastructures” programme already since 2009 (GoCR, 2010, 2011f: 10-12, 2015b, 2019). Constituting two separate initiatives, there was a tight institutional complementarity between the OPs and the national programme of large research institutions which “mingle” and “cannot be easily categorized, differentiated, and separated” (GoCR, 2018: 15). In this “full complementarity” between national and cohesion funds, the „investment costs“ of the infrastructural development and „operational costs“ of such infrastructures could be thus underpinned by the OPs RDI and RDE (GoCR, 2015b: 10-3, 2019: 11). Besides this infrastructural fixing, the institutional practices and strategic content overlapped as well.

Table 5.3 Priority Axis: European Centres of Excellence and Regional R&D Centres, 2007-2013

Infrastructure	Investment (mil. EUR)	City-Region/NUTS	Institutions	Developmental Purpose
ELI <i>Extreme Light Infrastructure</i>	245	Prague/Central Bohemia	Academy of Sciences	“ELI Beamlines will host a major international research infrastructure attracting world leading researchers and businesses. The facility will provide more than 2200 researcher days per year yielding an additional local economic impact. By a projected workforce of more than 250 employees, ELI Beamlines will generate high-level long-term career opportunities for researchers, engineers and technicians, primarily those involved in optics and laser sciences, electronics, mechanical engineering, and material sciences. In addition, the Czech optics and photonics industry is expected to take a significant role in developments required for the construction of ELI Beamlines and future maintenance of its facilities.”
BIOCEV <i>Biotech & Biomed Research Centre</i>	85	Prague/Central Bohemia	Academy of Sciences, Charles University	“CIISB [Czech Centre for Phenogenomics, collaboration of CEITEC and BIOCEV] stimulates national and trans-national collaborations across mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and medicine at academic and industrial levels. CIISB serves mainly basic research. Nevertheless, innovations and technology transfer are among the strategic priorities of the hosting institutions of CIISB. CIISB supports progressive development in biomedicine and biotechnology by providing the best available technological platform for obtaining high resolution structural data for biotechnological applications, drug related research, development of new biomarkers, and improvement of food technologies.”
CEITEC <i>Central European Institute of Technology</i>	189	Brno/South East	Masaryk University (main), Brno Technical University, Mendel University, University of Veterinary Pharmaceutical Sciences, Czech Academy of Sciences	“One of the most important characteristics of CEITEC Nano is the open access to technological equipment of the research infrastructure with shared self-service equipment, which enables researchers to control devices without help. Further, together with the sharing of research know-how between the users and the CEITEC Nano staff, enables the research groups to reach high expertise and international level. The positive impact of CEITEC Nano is also the cooperation with high-tech companies on development of products with high technological and knowledge added value.”
ICRC <i>International Clinical Research Centre</i>	86	Brno/South East	St. Anne’s Faculty Hospital (FNUSA)	“The goal of the FNUSA-ICRC project is to establish a top-quality international centre for applied medical research, which will use the most contemporary methods for cooperation in order to speed up the development of breakthrough medical and diagnostic techniques, new technologies (including biotechnologies and nanotechnologies), and new medications by at least 50%. [...] The ICRC will be focused primarily on cardiovascular and neurological research with possible overlap into other fields.”
IT4Innovations <i>National Supercomputing Center</i>	61	Ostrava/Moravia-Silesia	Technical University of Ostrava	“HPC [high performance computing] is globally recognized as an important innovation enabler in research as well as industry. Supercomputing simulations are often the only way to understand complex problems and to solve grand scientific challenges. The expertise and capacity of IT4Innovations supports multiple R&D areas having significant socioeconomic impact, e.g. in flood prevention, crash tests, drug design, chemical catalysis and personalised medicine.”
SUSEN <i>Sustainable Energy</i>	88	Prague/Central Bohemia	Research Institute Řež (main), West Bohemian University in Pilsen	“International range and uniqueness of SUSEN research infrastructure will contribute to the development of a highly professional competence of researchers, technical personnel and young researchers and students. SUSEN will contribute to the safe operation of power units, both present and future generations of fission and fusion reactors. This will support the energy security of the Czech Republic, reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions and safe operation of current and future nuclear power plants.”

Source: GoCR (2011f: 12; 2014d: 85-7, 2015b: 29, 33, 60, 85, 114)

This national programme remained thus institutionally synchronized with the cohesion governance, while enabling its further transnationalization. It was supervised by the “Large Research Infrastructures Council” as a parallel to the MC model, which was presided by the Minister of Education, involved other Ministry’s representatives including the cohesion bureaucrats, the country’s delegates in ESFRI, and the research and university sector (GoCR, 2016a). Although its “evaluation methodological approach” was “inspired by ESFRI evaluation processes”, the newly established practices of „ex-ante“ and „interim evaluation“ were synchronized into the „7-year Large Infrastructures funding framework“ to copy the sequence of 7-year programming periods (GoCR, 2015: 14-5, 2019: 16). While the national framework adapted the EU general governance frameworks, it was thus deeply intertwined with the cohesion governance. There was then a mutually reinforcing purpose of enabling transnational integration of Czech innovation “ecosystem” (GoCR, 2015: 9-12).

Out of 58 large research infrastructures, 26 ones have been financed by the OPs by 2015 (GoCR, 2015: 122-5). They underpinned the innovation visions through neoliberal developmentalism. As put by the two subsequent Ministers of Education in their forewords to the periodic revisions of this infrastructural strategy, this integrated ecosystem enabled a “knowledge triangle” of “education, research and industry” (GoCR, 2015: i, 2019: 4). The infrastructures were thus regularized as “a key prerequisite for the competitiveness of Czech research“, which subsequently enabled the “higher [crisis] resistance and economic competitiveness“ on both sides of „the Czech Republic and the entire EU“ (GoCR, 2011f: 18; 2019: 5, 22). After being subjected to the Commission’s “assessment” and “decision”, the six flagships (see Table 5.3) developed from “major individual RDI OP projects” to those of “nation-wide, but also European, macro-regional, and exceptionally also global dimensions, importance and impact“ (GoCR, 2011f: 10, 2019: 11).

As this global exception, ELI project developed from an original plan to construct the “world’s most modern laser facility“ which was oriented at „attracting world leading researchers and businesses“ and the subsequent formation of industries based on “highly developed technologies with high value added” (GoCR, 2011f: 11, 2019: 45). On the European level, CEITEC brought together two fields of “nanostructures and advanced materials“ and „biomedicine“, while its division Nano exemplified a „cooperation with high-tech companies on development of products with high technological and knowledge added value” (GoCR,

2011f: 12, 2019: 44). The “high[est]-performance supercomputer” nation-wide was then established under the IT4Innovations so that it could be integrated into the national e-infrastructure network to ensure „the competitiveness of the Czech Republic on both European and global scales“ (GoCR, 2011f: 12, 2019: 119).

Through the complementarity-seeking arrangements, the innovation OPs enabled the visions of catch-up in the Czech developmental strategy within the confines of neoliberal developmentalism. As only developmental visions in the late 2000s, the Cohesion Policy was infrastructurally fixed only in the mid-2010s. It could meanwhile enable, if not condition the institutional integration of the national innovation domain through the transnational complementary of the OPs, the large research institutions programme, and the ESFRI. Appropriating the competitiveness visions, this combined fixing could not be made an effective investment only as competitive research sites but had to facilitate a promise of turning their research into innovation through partnership with foreign or domestic enterprises. Only in this way these infrastructures could be evaluated as contributing to the sustainable competitiveness.

5.4. Consuming Development in Czechia

With innovation as one end of the consumption-investment dilemma, its opposite end was the corruption-prone institutional incapacity. The chapter 4 describes how the governance issues and corruption were added into the semantic fixing since the early 2010s. Using the Czech case, the rest of this chapter discusses how this governmentalization aimed at resolving the “corporate state capture” (Innes, 2016) which became an inherent and contradictory feature of the Visegrád developmental states. The grand corruption risk was increasingly reproduced by “redirecting the bureaucratic effort toward [effectiveness-driven] formalistic, procedural compliance” (Fazekas and King, 2018: 4-5). As I claim below, this was caused by the contradictory tendency of the governmentalization between the Commission’s promotion of institutional capacity through the reduction of Visegrád state autonomy, on the one hand, and the state capture tendencies from the selected sectors of Visegrád local and state elite on the other.

Two major cases of Regional Operational Programme (ROP) North-West and Andrej Babiš' Agrofert are analysed. The former case documents the regional capture in the early 2010s, while the later one shows how these regional captures were pushed into state captures. The Agrofert case illustrates the post-2014 Czech turn to the nationalist tendency in the Visegrád states under the coalition governments of technocratic populist ANO and the social-democratic ČSSD. The Czech turn is less recognizable than the post-2010 Hungarian and post-2015 Polish examples for two reasons. The ANO's populism replaced the centre-right governments which were led already by the Eurosceptic and neoliberal nationalist ODS as discussed above. The Czech case remained also more internally contested and formed rather a capture from economic than political sphere (Hanley and Vachudova, 2018). However, the two cases compared exemplify the contradictory nature of Visegrád developmental states between the investment for FDI-led competitiveness and the consumption of local crony networks.

The ROP North-West was a part of the territorial ROPs which I analyse closely in the next chapter 6. During the ODS-led governments, the ROP North-West came to represent the corruption and capture of regional governments to explain the lagging of the most backward regions such as the North-Western Bohemia (RCNW, 2013: 46-7). The latter case of Agrofert Holding documents the state capture on national level (OLAF, 2017; EC, 2019b, 2019c). As put by the Commission's audit, "the AGROFERT group comprises approximately 900 companies, including branches throughout the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Netherlands, Russia and Germany" (EC, 2019b: 18). The group has been owned by Andrej Babiš who, after establishing his anti-corruption populist movement ANO in 2011, served simultaneously as the Czech Minister of Finance since 2014 and the Prime Minister since 2017. As the largest domestically owned agro-chemical industrial enterprise, Agrofert depended heavily on the cohesion investment. Given that one of the biggest national capitalists became the leading state manager, the ongoing struggle over interpreting Babiš' "conflict of interests" (EC, 2019b, 2019c) between the Commission and the Czech government exposed these aforementioned contradictions.

5.4.1. Regional Capture: ROP North-West

The ROP North-West became notorious for the institutional incapacities of Czech (regional) governance. It is also a helpful case study of the audit-driven governmentalization in the conditions of more integrationist tendencies where the Czech state apparatus complied with the Commission's leadership. The North-West was established as a NUTS 2 region upon the EU accession but consists of two city-regions around Karlovy Vary and Ústí nad Labem. As the Plate 4.2 shows, it has been envisioned as generally "lagging" behind and having "below-average" indicators on both the EU and national scales (RCNW, 2013: 28, 47, 52, 59, 63-6). This backwardness proved to be institutional once the ROP operations were "suspended" by the central MA and AA – the Regional Development and Finance Ministries – due to the high rates of audited "irregularities" between 2011 and 2013 (RCNW, 2017: 86-90). The police investigation exposed then the capture of the regional MA – the Regional Council North-West (RCNW) – by the crony networks of high regional managers. They included a party cartel of ČSSD and ODS, that is the leading government and opposition parties on the national level at that time. The national actions followed the Commission's 2012 "audit mission" which issued a "correction" which demanded the ROP to return back "approx. 1,8 billion CZK (i.e. 66,6 million EUR)" due to such irregularities only to repeat this practice after its 2015 "audit mission" in a smaller extent (RCNW, 2017: 94-7). Through this governmentalization, the ongoing lagging of the North-West was fixed as a simple problem of the region's self-governing incapacity.

According to the evaluation audit (RCNW, 2016: 12-3), the ROP capture by the "employees of the bureau of RC [Regional Council] and political representation of regions" legitimized the reassertion of governmentalizing authority. This "political" capture was "organized" in the wider regional networks of "political [inter-]party" interests of ODS and ČSSD in cooperation with the local entrepreneurs (RCNW, 2016: 15-6, 171-2). Soon, this invited an audit-driven conflict over the nature of these irregularities. In 2011, the results of external audit by the Prague-based office of global consultancy Deloitte gave the content to the Commission's (EC, 2011h: 1-3) correction "letter[s]" which asked "Czech authorities" for information on the "police investigation" and the implementation of "corrective measures". In result, the RCNW was reorganized (RCNW, 2012). Following its own audit mission in 2012, the Commission demanded a financial correction of 66,6 million EUR. By this time, the Regional Development

and Finance Ministries (GoCR, 2012b, 2012e, 2013b) took a “common approach” to downscale the “responsibility”, while suspending the ROP operations and declining the RCNW’s calls for co-financing the correction. Meanwhile, the audit control was upscaled to the national level from all ROPs (RCNW, 2013, 2017). The ministries resumed the ROP’s operations only after the RCNW submitted to this supranational and national demands in 2013.

The Commission’s command and control power was thus reasserted during the complex “negotiation[s]” and “meeting[s]” or interpretations of “audit” results and “letter[s]” across the rescaled hierarchies of cohesion governance (RCNW, 2012: 13-7, 2013: 13-20, 2017: 86-97). This disciplining endeavour involved cohesion bureaucracies at their marginal regional scale, national nodal scale, and the dominant scale of the DG Regio and OLAF. It also involved political negotiations between the prime minister and the regions’ political representations. In result, the developmental purpose got skewed to the institutional affairs. The ROP NW bureaucracies had to subsequently catch up with the advancing delayed timelines of investment process due to the previous suspended operations by the end of the programming (RCNW, 2016, 2017). In the result, the rather than prioritizing the upgrade of regional developmental indicators, the ROP North-West activities were consumed with resolving the compliance issues.

Becoming recognized as a developmental failure, the ROP North-West fits well into the governmentalizing logic. The chapter 6 shows that such city-regions could be foregrounded as a case of ongoing backwardness in contrast to the leading city-regions as the ROP South East. Instead of regional catch-up, they became subjectivized to the external imperatives of corrective governance. Although the ROP North-West was regularized as an exemplary case of developmental pathology, similar problems occurred in other ROPs which resulted in the upscaling of their governance to the Integrated Regional Operational Programme (GoCR, 2014e) under the management of the Ministry of Regional Development.

5.4.2. State Capture: Agrofert, Babiš and the Conflict of Interests

What is more, the regional capture was upscaled to the state capture. Following the post-2014 populist rise of Babiš’ “anti-corruption” technocratic movement ANO (Císař, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018), the Agrofert case shows how the state capture became reproduced through the cohesion governance. This time, the Czech government contested the

Commission's interpretations of Babiš' "misappropriation", "fraud", "irregularity", and "conflict of interests" (GoCR, 2016b; OLAF, 2017: 1; EC, 2019b, 2019c). Rather than simply reinforcing the Commission-member state audit-driven conflict, I exemplify how this state capture intensified internal power cleavages in the state apparatus, if not the whole state-society relations. Here, the national failure to comply with supranational rules and the ongoing competition over their interpretation reinforced the governmentalizing tendencies. It could validate the hardening of these rules, while fixing the Czech corruption-prone and institutionally deficient governance as a barrier to the real convergence (see chapter 4).

In a paradox, the electoral support of ANO derived initially from its anti-corruption and managerialist rhetoric which promised to provide effective managerial solutions to the state governance. This included the cohesion governance. Including the ROP North-West, the ANO attacked the ODS and ČSSD already within the governmentalizing logic. Under the ODS-led governments, there were ongoing problems with the absorption capacity of cohesion investment. Starting slowly, the national and regional OPs faced repeated suspensions of operations by the Commission due to the reported irregularities and non-compliance with the Commission's Action Plan on shared management (see chapter 3; EC, 2008d; GoCR, 2012d; KPMG, 2012; SAO, 2013: 30-3). Moreover, the ongoing lag in the funding absorption performance placed Czechia below the EU average in this indicator and risked depriving it of the non-allocated part by the de facto end of the 2007-2013 period in 2015/6. The expectation of this non-allocated funding was "EUR 436,8 million" (SAO, 2014: 36). Given the political resonance of these issues, they were foregrounded in the ANO's populist strategy.

The state capture was symptomatic by the capture of AA, CA, and MA by the ANO. In the two coalition governments with ČSSD since 2014, ANO took firstly the positions of Minister of Regional Development and Minister of Finance only to turn Babiš into Prime Minister in 2017. On the national level, the escalation over the Agrofert case with the Commission and within the national power cleavages only incentivized the stronger capture of these central AA, CA, and MA. From the supranational level, given that Babiš served as Minister of Finance, the Vice-Minister for Economy and the Prime Minister, while formally and then informally owning Agrofert, invited the Commission to intervene through the audits and the threats of funding suspensions and corrections (OLAF, 2017; EC, 2019b, 2019c). Although played out in the late 2010s, the roots of the conflict date back to the 2008 project *Farma Čapí hnízdo*

(Stork's Nest Farm), while developing into the dispute over the interpretation of Babiš' conflict of interests.

The difference between the *Čapí Hnízdo* project and the conflict-of-interests procedure illustrates the rescaling dynamics from a regional and family-based capture to the state and the party-based state capture. *Čapí Hnízdo* was an EU-funded project for conference and tourist sites in the countryside areas which was turned by Babiš into the construction of a private manor. The project involved the use of Babiš "family" ownership networks and was a "project" within another ROP Central Bohemia (OLAF, 2017: 5-7, 46). Implemented between 2008-2010, it was uncovered in 2015 within the ongoing internal political struggle. The case was simple. In order to exploit ROP's cohesion investment, which was allocated to the SMEs, an autonomous family-controlled SME was established to first receive cohesion assistance and be then reintegrated into the Agrofert structures. In contrast, the conflict-of-interests procedure concerned Babiš in office when covering the Agrofert-related operations in the OPs EI and EIC, Environment, Human Resources and Employment, and the OP Prague-Adaptability in the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 periods (EC, 2019b: 1). Inquiring into the quality of "regulatory framework and its effective functioning as regards avoiding conflict of interests", the Commission audits opened the conflict over interpreting the nature of the Prime Minister's indirect control of Agrofert through a newly formed "AB private trust I and private trust II" funds (EC, 2019: 18).

Externally, both matters became thus a conflict between the Czech government and the Commission. The *Čapí Hnízdo* formed a small risk of corrections amounting to around 1,6 million EUR (OLAF, 2017: 2). Involving the likely return of either 11,77 or even 17,49 billion EUR due to "random errors" in Agrofert funding operations and "systemic errors" due to Babiš' conflict of interests (EC, 2019c: 66), this risk turned the Agrofert interests into the national economic ones. The division between the intensifying ANO-led state capture through the executive control of central MA, CA, and AA and the preservation of national autonomy became similarly blurred. Identifying systemic errors in the management and control system, the Commission's (2019b, 2019c) draft audit report interpreted the national regulation, as well as its compliance with the EU rules. Including the national response from the Regional Development and Finance Ministries, the final audit offered thus the Commission's (2019b: 13) "findings and actions to be taken/recommendations" for the national level.

However, the conflict line did not go simply between the Commission and the member state. Rather, it shaped the internal political cleavages in the state apparatus and the legal system. The OLAF audit procedure on *Čapí hnízdo* was initiated once the case was reported by an “anonymous source” (EC, 2017: 4). It primarily relied on the outcomes of ongoing police investigation and the earlier audit prepared by the Ministry of Finance (GoCR, 2016b). As well, the Commission’s secret audit draft and final reports were leaked to the public by one of the national bureaucrats to further politicize the issues in the national political struggle.

The internal and external interventions reinforced thus each other. The Commission’s audit procedures reinforced the national political struggles and vice versa. This was illustrated by the sessions of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament (CDPCR, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2019a, 2019b) on these issues: Already in March 2016, there was an “extraordinary” meeting on the “*Čapí hnízdo*”. In January 2017, the Chamber’s meeting approved the so-called *Lex Babiš* as an amendment to the Law on the “Conflict of Interests” thanks to the majority which consisted of the ODS in opposition and the ČSSD in government. Among other rules, the amendment explicitly excluded all enterprises, which are owned by government members, from claiming public procurement, subsidies and investment incentives. Not only has this forced Babiš to establish the AB private trust funds, it eased the Commission’s position during the auditing procedure. Meanwhile, there were decisions before and after the parliament elections which repeatedly deprived Babiš of immunity against the “criminal investigation” in September 2017 and January 2018. Finally, the Commission’s audit draft report returned the favour as it allowed to hold sessions on the potential national “financial losses” in June 2019 and to discuss the final audit on the “conflict of interests” in December 2019.

The Czech state capture and the Commission’s governmentalization reproduced thus each other. Although differing from the Polish and Hungarian cases, this dynamic was at the centre of the Czech so-called populist turn. Rather than unfolding on the division between the transnational integration and national embeddedness, it asymmetrically reshaped the power relations inside the Czech state-society relations. At the same time, the audit-driven governmentalization fixed the Czech state as institutionally weak in this conflict, while enforcing the Commission’s interpretation of national regulation to reassert its command and control powers. Through this contradictory dynamic, the state capture was reproduced as an inherent feature of dependent developmental state in Czechia.

5.5. Dependent Developmental State

The chapter exemplifies how the Visegrád dependent developmental state projects are formed by two countervailing forces of asymmetric transnationalization and national state capture. In the conditions of Visegrád peripheral integrations, the TRPD is a powerful factor in their reproduction. Accordingly, it reinscribes the supranational dilemmas into these state projects as a domestic investment-consumption dilemma. Effective investment has been envisioned in the convergence strategies of FDI-based development where the cohesion investment supports the sustainable competitiveness of Visegrád economies. Such strategies legitimize the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies which increases the state developmental capacities only through reduced state autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission. In contrast, the consumption signifies the national strategies which restore the national autonomy by capturing the networks of cohesion bureaucracies. Rather than negating the governmentalizing logic, the outcome is its further reproduction which privileges the self-governance problems as the reason for ongoing backwardness and the site for the deepened supranational intervention.

We can thus understand the governmentalization as a variety of Poulanzian *interiorized transformation*. This chapter illustrates it on the two differing periods of Commission-led (post-)accession integration and post-crisis renationalization under FIDESZ-, ANO-, and PiS-led governments. In terms of economic strategies, it shows how these differences remained a variation within the enduring trajectories of dependent developmental states projects. First, the Commission-led governance hierarchies are not simply superadded on the Visegrád state-society relations but are internalized within them through the technologies of cohesion governance. Given the Visegrád dependency on the cohesion investment, the state transformation represents asymmetric transnationalization which has been nationally re-embedded before and after the crisis. Second, this transformation both incentivizes and enables the Visegrád state managers to embed the FDI-led export-oriented regimes within the catch-up visions of neoliberal developmentalism. Indeed, rather than giving up on the competitiveness visions, the post-crisis renationalization partially reoriented from embedding especially the foreign capital to assisting more the national one. By doing so, these strategies paradoxically plan to use the cohesion dependency to balance rather than simply remove the FDI dependency.

The Visegrád developmental states were rescaled states given that the Cohesion Policy served as the EU's urban and regional policy. Therefore, the next chapter 6 details how the TRPD has downscaled the responsibilities for management of Visegrád dependency the scale of city-regional competition. The next chapter benefits from but equally corrects this chapter in two ways. First, it explores how the TRPD-driven developmental projects (see Table 5.2) unevenly redistribute the Visegrád national models of dependent market economy through the regulation of regional development. Second, it benefits from the understanding that the city-regional actors and projects should not be analytically reduced as *regional* because they not only operate and are projected as *national* but become incentivized to act in the *European* if not *global* accumulation horizons (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). While this chapter opens the question of uneven city-regional development with the ROP North-West, the next chapter complements it with a more complete view.

6. Rescaled Dependency: From Lagging to Leading Regions

As the previous chapters exemplify, the TRPD is structured by the inter-governmental negotiations over the EU cohesion consensus, while being translated into the national developmental frameworks in peripheral states. Given that the Cohesion Policy is the EU's multi-level urban and regional policy, the Visegrád developmental projects remain rescaled states. They tend to downscale the developmental responsibilities to the subnational management. As the Table 6.1 documents, these projects remain *de facto* national because they cover almost all Visegrád city-regions due to their status as less developed or transition regions even in the late 2010s. What is more, the exception of Visegrád capitals as developed regions shows that the envisioned national convergence has led to the increasing differentiation which solidified the duality between the leading and lagging regions. This made the rising intra-national core-peripheral inequalities much more visible. In this chapter, I document how the Cohesion Policy's developmental purpose has become implicated in this inter-local polarization contrary to the Cohesion Policy's official formal target of restoring sociospatial justice and equality.

Observing the differentiating process, I investigate it as a result of *rescaled dependency*. For this, I study the institutional form and the developmental purpose of the Regional Operational Programmes (ROP). Complementary to the sectoral OPs, which are analysed in the previous chapter, the territorial ROPs endow the Visegrád developmental projects with a spatial bias. Organized by the central governments or city-regional governments in the NUTS 2 frameworks (see Table 6.1), the ROPs rescale the Visegrád state more directly than the sectoral OPs ones. Primarily through the partnership technology, the rescaled dependency mobilizes the city-regional elites to design own local catch-up projects, while downscaling thus the management of dependent development. While the OPs mobilize the local elites through the interregional competition over the nationally redistributed competitive funding, the ROPs have been directly allotted to the city-regions. In this chapter, I research thus how the TRPD enables these city-regional elites to form local developmental coalitions.

Furthermore, I inquire into this rescaling process to decipher how it allows these coalitions to design their *developmental projects* and *strategies* which give them coherence.

From this analytical extension, the chapter inquiries into the last dilemma between the sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism (see Box 1.1). This dilemma defines the “inter-regional” and “intra-regional” forms of “dual[ity]” in the “spatial differences” between the FDI-based leading regions and those lagging regions without FDI (GoRP, 2016: 110; GoCR, 2011a: 70; GoRH, 2007p: 46; OMV, 2011: 110). I argue that the neoliberal developmentalism skews the dilemma in favour of competitive city-regionalism in the local developmental projects. In result, the duality is widened between the FDI-led city-regions, which win the competition over the cohesion investment, and those lagging losing it. This reinforces the FDI-based transborder cluster of leading city-regions which encompasses the South-Western Poland, most of Czechia, Western Slovakia, and North-Western Hungary (see also Table 6.1). Inquiring into the developmental purpose of the regional projects, I extend thus the institutionalist observations of this differentiating trend (Brown et al., 2007; Medve-Bálint, 2017) to explain how the Cohesion Policy reproduced the overlap between the national sectoral and regional duality.

The chapter focuses on the programming period 2007-2013/6. It is structured in parallel with the previous one as follows: First, I discuss the forms of institutional downscaling in the cohesion governance and its impact on the regulation of Visegrád inter-regional development. Second, the chapter studies how the neoliberal developmentalism skews the catch-up strategies to competitive city-regionalism, while regularizing thus the division between lagging and leading regions. Third, I detail both processes on the case study of leading city-region of South Moravia within the NUTS 2 South-East. More precisely, I look on the formation of the region’s developmental project: Central European Silicon Valley. Last, I illustrate how the project is being infrastructurally underpinned by the local universities and the innovation infrastructures such as CEITEC (see chapter 5) which were produced by the cohesion investment.

Table 6.1: Uneven Convergence of Visegrád City-Regions as the NUTS 2, national and regional GDP per capita in PPS (index: EU = 100)

Region NUTS 2/ROP	Metropole	Pre-Crisis 2008	Post-Crisis 2018	Type of Development 2018
Czechia		85	91	
Prague	–	185	192	<i>Developed</i>
South-East	Brno – Jihlava	76	84	<i>Transition</i>
Central Bohemia	Prague	80	82	<i>Transition</i>
South-West	Plzeň – České Budějovice	72	78	<i>Less Developed</i>
Moravia-Silesia	Ostrava	71	76	<i>Less Developed</i>
North-East	Hradec králové – Pardubice – Liberec	69	76	<i>Less Developed</i>
Central Moravia	Olomouc – Zlín	67	74	<i>Less Developed</i>
North-West	Ústí nad Labem – Karlovy Vary	66	64	<i>Less Developed</i>
Poland		56	71	
Warsaw	-	126	156	<i>Developed</i>
Lower Silesia	Wrocław	64	78	<i>Less Developed</i>
Greater Poland	Poznań	60	76	<i>Less Developed</i>
Silesia	Katowice	61	72	<i>Less Developed</i>
Pomeranian	Trojmiasto (Gdańsk – Gdynia – Sopot)	55	69	<i>Less Developed</i>
Lodz	Łódź	53	66	<i>Less Developed</i>
Lesser Poland	Kraków	50	63	<i>Less Developed</i>
Mazovian	Warsaw	48	60	<i>Less Developed</i>
West Pomeranian	Szczecin	48	59	<i>Less Developed</i>
Lubusz	Lubusz	47	58	<i>Less Developed</i>
Opole	Opole	46	56	<i>Less Developed</i>
Kuyavian-Pomeranian	Toruń	47	57	<i>Less Developed</i>
Swietokrzyskie	Kielce	43	51	<i>Less Developed</i>
Warmian-Masurian	Olsztyn	41	49	<i>Less Developed</i>
Lublin	Lublin	40	48	<i>Less Developed</i>
Subcarpathian	Rzeszów	40	50	<i>Less Developed</i>
Podlaskie	Białystok	41	50	<i>Less Developed</i>
Slovakia		73	78	
Bratislava	-	171	173	<i>Developed</i>
Western Slovakia	Trnava – Trenčín – Nitra	69	67	<i>Less Developed</i>
Central Slovakia	Žilina – Banská Bystrica	58	59	<i>Less Developed</i>
Eastern Slovakia	Prešov – Košice	51	53	<i>Less Developed</i>
Hungary		64	71	
Budapest	-	139	145	<i>Developed</i>
Western Transdanubia	Győr	63	72	<i>Less Developed</i>
Central Transdanubia	Székesfehérvár	58	66	<i>Less Developed</i>
Pest (Central Hungary)	Budapest	56	56	<i>Less Developed</i>
Southern Great Plain	Szeged	40	52	<i>Less Developed</i>
Southern Transdanubia	Pécs	43	49	<i>Less Developed</i>
Northern Hungary	Miskolc	39	49	<i>Less Developed</i>
Northern Great Plain	Debrecen	40	46	<i>Less Developed</i>

Source: Eurostat, own preparation

6.1. Governmentalizing Regional Development

There were multiple institutional forms of cohesion governance which differed among the Visegrád states and across the programming periods within them. The basic distinction oscillated between the centralized and decentralized ROPs. The centralized ones have been

managed by the MAs in central governments, while the regional governments received the position of IBs (see chapter 5). The decentralized ones have been managed by the regional governments in the NUTS 2 delineations (see Table 6.1). Between 2004-2006, the integrated ROPs were centralized in all four states. In Slovakia, the ROP remained centralized in the next programming periods of 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. In Hungary, the management remained centralized but was split into eight ROPs for the next programming period to be recentralized into one integrated ROP since 2014. In Czechia, there was a decentralized management in seven ROPs and OP for Prague which was however recentralized into one ROP since 2014. In Poland, the management of seventeen ROPs remained decentralized for the following programming periods.

Regardless of these varying institutional forms, the main purpose of the ROPs was simple. As on the national scale, they consolidated the subnational coalitions in an attempt to increase their strategic capacity. Many of these coalitions gained institutional coherence in the “pre-accession programmes SAPARD, Phare a ISPA” (RCCB, 2012: 26; GoSR, 2016: 77; OVLP, 2012: 40-3). Through the partnership technology, these programmes nevertheless incorporate simultaneously these coalitions into the governance hierarchies of cohesion governance and subject them to its other technologies. Here, the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies is fixed in the downscaled system of MAs, MCs, and IBs: In Poland, the sixteen Offices of the Regions served as the MA to institutionalize the most decentralized system. In Slovakia, eight regional governments gained IB position under the ROP management by the central ministry. In Hungary, the central National Developmental Agency served as the central MA only to share the management with the regional developmental agencies as the IB. In Czechia, the fourteen regional governments within the eight NUTS 2 regions established the Regional Cohesion Councils as MA of their seven ROPs and one OP for Prague between 2007-2013.

When downscaling the multi-level networks of cohesion bureaucracies, the governmentalization of Visegrád dependency was thus further operationalized as a problem inherent to the regulation of uneven regional development. First, oriented at increasing the regional developmental capacity through improved “coherence, complementarity and coordination” (GoRH, 2007I: 116), the governmentalization locked the local elites into the competition over their strategic positions within the Visegrád developmental states (see Table 5.1). This was driven by the technologies of programming and concentration (Table 3.1).

Second, shifting thus the developmental management downwards, the rescaling process subjected the local coalitions to the already discussed management of "implementation", "financial management", "control and audit", "monitoring", and "evaluation" (RCNE 2011: 206, 212, 215, 218, 224) at once. In practice, the partnership principle downscaled the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies (Table 3.1).

6.1.1. Building Complementary Regions

The cohesion governance and the ROPs in particular signified the first comprehensive programmes of strategic planning in Visegrád city-regions after post-socialism (Dąbrowski and Piskorek, 2018). Through the concentration and programming technologies, they mobilized and funded the local coalitions to self-organize this planning but reoriented it upwards. The strategic regional planning was thus integrated into the multi-level hierarchies of cohesion and national economic governance. First, the ROPs mediated the "complementarity/synergy" (GoSR, 2016: 135) between the EU and national strategic documents and the newly articulated regional strategies. Second, the ROPs were designed to define their "complementarity and demarcation" (OWPV, 2016: 81) with the sectoral OP through the priority axes so that they complemented the national developmental state projects (see Table 5.1). Such a socio-institutional fixing of decentralization through enabling regional planning was thus already built in and further reproduced its inter-scalar and inter-regional hierarchies.

Through these inter-scalar hierarchies, the Lisbon and Europe 2020 agendas have been transmitted to the regulation of uneven regional development through the programming technology. Although the degree of centralization varied among the Visegrád states, the ROPs were generally instrumentalized to interlink the complementarities among the European, national „sectoral and/or regional strategies“ (GoRH, 2007m: 107). There was an inter-regional inequality because the leading regions had a more advanced planning, although the ROP necessitated the "preparation or update of developmental documents" (GoSR, 2016: 77) which had been funded in all regions previously. Articulating the "comprehensive and integrated urban development strategy" (GoRH, 2007o: 58), the ROPs "fulfil basic mission" (GoCR, 2011a: 60) of the Lisbon and Europe 2020 agendas inscribed in the CStF between

2007-2013. In the same way, the national level of the NSRF and other various national strategies of “economic growth” (RCCM 2011: 89-90) and “sustainable development” (OKPV, 2011: 55-7; GoRH, 2007l: 115) had to be reflected. On the most marginal scale, the ROP was thus the dominant document which required the adherence of local “multiple principle documents” such as sectoral “strategy”, “plan[s]”, “programmes”, and other “conceptual and analytical documents” (OLV, 2007: 2; RCSW, 2012: 60; GoRH, 2007k: 36; GoSR, 2016: 179).

The hierarchical patterning of inter-regional relations was already shaped by the concertation technology. The difference between the capital regions of Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, and Warsaw and the other second-tier metropolises (see Table 6.1) made this most visible. As core regions above 90% of the EU average, Prague and Bratislava risked being attributed lower cohesion investment but followed the “competitiveness and employment” (MACCP, 2007: 6; 2011: 4; GoSR, 2011c: 6) objectives for developed regions in the special OPs. Integrated into the ROP Central Hungary and Mazovian Voivodship, Budapest and Warsaw’s GDP was lowered statistically to mix the benefits of the “phasing in” (GoRH, 2007p: 7) and “less developed” (OMV, 2011: 4) regions. The investment in both capitals was still concentrated more on the so-called developed objectives such as innovation. As Prague’s less developed surroundings, the ROP Central Bohemia illustrated the hierarchical patterning because it formed appendage to the OP Prague through their mutual “coordination” (RCCB, 2012: 47-8). On the other end of most lagging regions, the OP Development of Eastern Poland was set up as an “additional instrument of support” (GoRP, 2016c: 7) to the ROPs. Thus, the economic integration of the five easternmost lagging Voivodships of Swietokrzyskie, Warmian-Masurian, Lublin, Subcarpathian, Podlaskie was secured additionally by the central ministry.

Even in the decentralized Poland, the territorial ROPs formed elementary conditions for the planning and investment frameworks. Their institutional and infrastructural purpose reoriented the city-regions for the integration into the OP-based national developmental project managed by the central government. Through the “priority axes” (GoSR, 2016: 124), the developmental objectives of lagging and leading regions were partially differentiated again. While the lagging regions comprised of the basic axes shared by all ROP, the leading regions extended these axes to the innovation sphere. The first axis of “technical assistance” aimed at integrating the cohesion bureaucracies in the subnational governments, as well as

the “modernization” of the regions’ “administrative” and “absorption” (GoSR, 2016: 96; OPodV, 2011: 118; GoRH, 2007i: 109) capacities. The second axis included the regeneration of natural and built environment in the “urban and regional development” (GoRH, 2007k: 132). The third axis of transport “infrastructure” and “services” was another basic priority (RCNW, 2013: 165). All these axes correlated with the last one of the “income-generating” development of tourist infrastructure (GoRH, 2007l: 65). Furthermore, the health and “social infrastructure” were included (OKPV, 2011: 70). Even though outlined in all ROPs for Poland and Hungary, especially the leading regions in all Visegrád states prioritized the advanced axes of the “firm competitiveness” (OGPV, 2015: 109) and the “innovation- and enterprise-oriented development of the knowledge-based economy” (GoRH, 2007p: 77).

The ROPs established the basic institutional conditions for downscaling the management of Visegrád uneven and dependent regional. Building thus the city-regional capacity of strategic planning, they have reoriented it to the national and EU hierarchies of decision-making. Through organizing the regional complementarity with the national developmental projects, the regional decentralization only institutionally reproduced the emerging inter-scalar hierarchies and historical inter-regional differences.

6.1.2. Rescaling Governance

The aforementioned institutionalization mobilized local elites into developmental coalitions which shape this process in return. Similar to the national level, the partnership principle extended the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies. The nodal agency aimed at incorporating and simultaneously subjecting these coalitions by introducing the regional networks of MAs, IBs, and MCs. These “coordination” networks shared similarities across Visegrád states and regions, yet they varied not only inter-nationally but also intra-nationally. The inter-national variation relied on the scale of the ROP centralization which ranged from the most centralized Hungary to the most decentralized Poland. The intra-national variation highlighted the difference between leading and lagging city-regions again. Besides the ROP, the OPs were a powerful factor as well which sustained these developmental coalition-making through inter-regional competition in their competitive calls. In the leading city-regions, the coalitions were already mobilized, while their members were often *de facto*

actors of national importance. This is most evident in the capital regions but also the leading second-tier metropolises (see Table 6.1): Brno in Czechia; Wrocław, Poznań, Kraków, Gdańsk and Trójmiasto in Poland; Győr agglomeration in Hungary; Košice in Slovakia. In the lagging city-regions without large metropolises, these coalitions included historically less nationally prominent actors.

The MAs underpin the organizational nuclei of cohesion governance-based developmental coalitions. The institutional forms of decentralization varied. Through the “substantial decentralization” (OLSV, 2007: 49), the Polish ROPs were managed by specialized “departments” (OPodV, 2011: 133) or “sections” (OSiV, 2011: 147) in the Voivodships’ Offices of the Executive Boards (*zarząd województwa*). In Czechia, they were managed by the Offices of the Regional Council (*regionální rada*) which represented one to three regional governments (*krajský úřad*), while remaining entrenched in their “organizational structure” (RCSW, 2012: 111). In Slovakia, the integrated ROP was managed through the “decentralization principle” (GoSR, 2016: 197) whereas the central ministry was MA and the regional governments (*samosprávny kraj*) shared the status of “IB/MA” (GoSR, 2011c: 153-155, 2016: 197-8). In the most centralized Hungary, the “separate organisational units of the National Development Agency” managed the ROPs, while sharing the responsibilities with the regional developmental agencies established already earlier for implementing the “Hungarian and Phare programmes” (GoRH, 2007p: 125). These forms mirrored the differing scales of formal regional self-governance but remained nonetheless integrated in the Commission-led hierarchies of cohesion governance.

The coalition-making was extended with the MCs. Here, the decentralization was copied: The Slovak ROPs had one MCs, the Hungarian ROPs were monitored by the national “Convergence Monitoring Committee” but separated into “Regional Sub-Committees” for each ROP (GoRH, 2007n: 128-9). The Czech and Polish ROPs had their own separate MCs. Before the official monitoring committees were established, the regional “partners” were mobilized already during the ROP preparations in various “steering”, “expert” or “working groups”, “consultations”, „conferences“ or “fora” (RCCM, 2011: 9; GoRH, 2007m: 5; GoSR, 2016: 13; OVLP, 2012: 65). The committees facilitated an intermediate body for incorporating all city-regional actors given that “besides reliable partners from the programming phase, all subjects participating in the financing process become partners” (RCSE, 2013: 172). As the

regions participated in the MCs of sectoral OP on national level, the regional MCs included national ministries, developmental and also investment agencies to “improve partnership and synergic effects” (RCCM, 2011: 189). The local municipalities and regional governments ranging from their associations to various agencies followed. The “employees’ and employer’s sides” (GoRH, 2007l: 125) were represented as well through the regional branches of business associations and federations and labour unions. Furthermore, various sectoral associations and regional professional clubs were involved, as well as universities and other research institutions and non-governmental associations.

Through the decentralization, the regional actors in MAs and MCs were subjected to the tight system of coordination and control “determined in partnership with the European Commission” (GoRH, 2007o: 79). Within this system, the priority axes were meanwhile turned into performance “system” of “core” and “measurable” indicators (GoSR, 2016: 18). As MAs or IBs, the regional administrations became responsible for the implementation. Their obligations included “recording and storing the accounting records for each [investment] operation”, while turning them into “data” to feed the “financial management, monitoring, audits and evaluations” (GoRH, 2007l: 117). Such data filled the “annual and final reports” (OLSV, 2007: 143) for the Commission as well. Meanwhile, the MCs overviewed the “strategic, formal, and technical” (OLSV, 2007: 149) dimensions of the investment process. Before the data reached the upper levels of cohesion bureaucratic networks, the MCs had to „consider and approve“, „periodically review“ or „be informed“ about them to „examine the results“ of the implementation process or propose its „revision” (GoRH, 2007i: 127).

Mobilized for the self-organized economic strategies, the developmental coalitions were thus simultaneously subjected to the rescaled hierarchies of cohesion governance. As shown in the next sections, the sectoral and interest nature of these local elite coalitions has simultaneously shaped their capacities as developmental coalitions to comply with this governance. In effect, this had effect on the ongoing differentiating regional integration in favour of the leading capital and second-tier metropolises in the Visegrád developmental states.


6.2. Articulating Competitive City-Regionalism

Neoliberal developmentalism gave a strategic purpose to the regulation of uneven regional development. In two ways, it solved the dilemma between the equalizing sociospatial justice and the differentiating competitive city-regionalism in favour of the later side. In its deeper version, the city-regional governments are “firstly” incentivized to articulate their priorities in improving own regional “competitiveness and attractivity” as a way to “secondly” ensure the “sustainable” or “even” development (RCSW, 2012: 43; GoRH, 2007l: 58; GoSR, 2011c: 83; OVLP, 2012: 59-62). This articulation of regional catch-up strategies made them realize the regions’ specific forms of backwardness in competition on both “national and European” scales (OLSV, 2007: 56). Second, this was articulated on the shallower basis of inter-local competition. Among the developmental “threats” to Lower Silesia, there was thus an “economic competition of neighbouring Voivodeships or [regions in] Czechia and Germany” (OLSV, 2007: 51). The same went for Budapest as the “competitor regions (Vienna, Bratislava, Prague) [have been] gaining strength” (GoRH, 2007p: 43).


The competitive city-regionalism reproduced Europe’s divide between the leading West and the lagging East which had historical roots but was reproduced again within and through the cohesion agenda. The regional duality reflected the sectoral duality between the FDI-led and the FDI-scarce regions. It was regularized by the Commission’s cohesion reports when explaining the regional leadership through the “larger share of employment in foreign firms” and the “proximity to the rest of the EU internal market” (EC, 2014a: 49). Moreover, the Visegrád capital regions represented “the most competitive [ones] but this has not (as yet) boosted the competitiveness of neighbouring regions” with a hope that once the „economic and transport connections between the capital and the other regions become stronger, spill-over effects are likely to emerge” (EC, 2014a: 54). These visions were supported by the central and regional governments. There was thus a “national divide between the innovative Poland ‘A’ [in the West] and the lagging Poland ‘B’ [in the East]” which cut parallelly through the Mazovian Voivodship between the Warsaw agglomeration and the region’s lagging rest (OMV, 2011: 20). In a similar way, there was thus a diverse gap “especially between the more developed west and the less developed east of Slovakia” (GoSR, 2016: 29) in general.

The Graphs 6.1 and 6.2 evidence how the competitive city-regionalism reproduces the leading-lagging divide in material terms. They compare the regional redistribution of

Graph 6.1 Capital and Second-Tier City-Regions: Regional Development and Cohesion Inflows, 2004-2018 (EUR)



Graph 6.2 Second-Tier City-Regions: Regional Level of Development and Cohesion Inflows, 2004-2018 (EUR)



European Commission (cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu), Eurostat

* Calculated as a stock of cohesion inflows (2004-2018) – CF, ESF, ERDF (all OP and ROP) – to the region per capita of its population (2018)

cohesion investment in relation to the regional development levels since 2004. Rather than finding a strong redistribution to poorer regions, as it would be the official narrative, redistributive pattern is weaker. It is stronger when the capital regions are included (see Graph 6.1), albeit exposing the contradictions as well. In the starkest one, Bratislava has accumulated an equivalent cohesion investment stock per capita as the Eastern Slovakia. Comparing the redistribution among the second-tier city-regions only (see Graph 6.2), the trend even the still favouring the leading regions: The leading city-regions of above 20,000 EUR per capital accumulate often a similar stock to the lagging ones below 18,000 EUR per capita. As documented below, the competitive city-regionalism shapes and legitimizes this pattern by promoting a “spatial concertation of resources” into various “growth”, “development” or “competitiveness” poles (GoRH, 2007m: 11, 142; RCNE, 2011: 157; OGPV, 2015: 30). The Slovak ROP is illustrative for this. It established a hierarchy of metropolitan “innovation poles” and marginal “cohesion poles” where the former ones develop the “knowledge economy” (GoSR, 2016: 109) among and within the city-regions. Through these frameworks, the lagging city-regions were already fixed as having secondary priority, while still expected to participate in the competition over the cohesion investment with the leading regions.

6.2.1. Leading Regions

The leading city-regions are concentrated in a transregional FDI-based cluster along the western borders with the EU core states and the neighbouring leading regions in Visegrád states. Their local developmental coalitions could thus position them as “strategic place” at the crossroad of “east-west and south-north” links (OLSV, 2007: 4). Besides the capital regions, this included second-tier regions reaching above the threshold of 20,000 EUR per capital or 24,000 in Czechia respectively by the late 2010s (see Graphs 6.1 and 6.2). These regions remained still eligible to cohesion funds due to achieving only slightly above 75% of EU GDP average in Czechia, 70% in Slovakia, and 60% in Hungary and Poland respectively (see Table 6.1). Therefore, “5 areas of metropolitan scale compete with Warsaw (Trójmiasto, Poznań, Łódź, Wrocław, Kraków)” (OVLP, 2012: 25) over economic leadership in Poland. Although the capitals were more dominant in the three smaller Visegrád states, other leading second-tier metropolises emerged there too. This included Brno as the “industrial, trade,

administrative and cultural centre of the South-East and the whole Czechia” (RCSE, 2013: 33) among others. Outside of Budapest, the “Central-Eastern European (Vienna-Prague-Brno-Bratislava-Győr-Budapest) growth pole” (GoHR, 2007p: 62) absorbed the North-Central Hungary. The “Bratislava-Trnava agglomeration” connected Slovakia into this transboundary cluster along with the rest of Western Slovakia (GoSR, 2011c: 22, 75). The national leadership in the Visegrád inter-metropolitan competition legitimized thus the redistribution to these growth poles as a national priority.

Distinguished by the “significant engagement of foreign capital” (OGPV, 2015: 31), these poles had a new horizon of reaching “the attractiveness and competitiveness of the region’s economy, as well as its resilient success not only in the domestic competition” (OLSV, 2007: 59). This shifting horizon moved from the “investment oriented” to the „innovation oriented economic development“ (GoRH, 2007i: 53). The existing “industrial parks”, which were previously co-sponsored by the EU funds, had to transform into innovation-oriented infrastructures and institutions of business environment. The new clusters had to thus bring together the “existing regional advanced industries with high productivity” and the „innovation-oriented improvement and expansion of the higher-education institutions network“ (GoRH, 2007n: 42). Such innovation-led catch-up was possible only thanks to the existing universities and necessarily developing “so-called innovation infrastructures (e.g. industrial parks, technology parks, entrepreneurship incubators, centres of technology transfer, centres of excellence, and research units)” (OLSV,2007: 74). Much of the strategy had to moreover “assist SMEs by enhancing the attractiveness and availability of knowledge-intensive, higher added-value activities” for them to “close the gap with large [foreign] companies” (GoHR, 2007p: 18) in this respect. Despite the favourable conditions, even the developed regions as Prague required cohesion aid to solve their “inadequate development of R&D capacities” (MACCP, 2007: 45).

The same unfulfilled potential went for the human capital with respect to the labour markets, training and education facilities. Characterized by large metropolises of national importance, the city-regions had a highly skilled workforce and generally lower unemployment. They also hosted leading national research and university institutions. This made them competitive nationally but required an additional support to retain positions of “most dynamic and successful Central European regions” (MACCP, 2011: 4). What is more,

even the capitals such as Budapest faced the risk of “[out]migration of qualified workforce to Western Europe” (GoHR, 2007n: 29), while losing competitiveness due to the lack of key professions as the ones “with IT skills” (GoHR, 2007i: 29). Hence, the leading regions faced the same national dilemmas of improving the adaptability and mobility of its workforce, as well as solving the problem of mismatch between the workforce supply and investor demand. The supply of highly qualified workforce highlighted that the “effective development of human potential must be especially conditioned by the appropriate additional infrastructure along with the development of progressive economic sectors with high added value” (RCSE, 2013: 19).

Forming already the “main transport node[s]” (GoHR, 2007p: 29), the leading regions suffered from the underdeveloped intra-regional and inter-national transport infrastructures. Their positioning as „very important axis of international importance“ (RCSW, 2012: 17) in terms of “all modes of land, water, and air transport” (OPomV, 2010: 19) prioritized their region’s physical infrastructures as those of national importance. If these “preconditions of competitiveness” (GoHR, 2007p: 76) were missing even in the leading metropolises, these metropolises gained national investment priority in the inter-metropolitan competition on the EU scale. Not only was it important for the “effective use of the developmental potential” intra-regionally but it underpinned the “complex improvement of transport accessibility and interconnection of the region’s developmental poles” (RCSE, 2013: 63). More importantly, it was needed as connecting these city-regions to the “trans-European networks of transport (TEN-T)” (OVLP, 2012: 67) conditioned the whole national integration.

In the inter-European and -Visegrád competition, the leading metropolises had to be equally supplied by the cohesion investment through the territorial ROP in their complementarity with the sectoral OP. As innovation poles, their FDI potential and sectoral structures privileged them once again in the national upgrade to the “high value added” (OLSV, 2007: 81; GoRH, 2007n: 83-5; RCSE, 2013: 19; GoSR, 2011c: 75) positions in the global value chains. In other words, tending to “exceed” (GoRH, 2007i: 22) the national averages, the competitive city-regionalism legitimized the disproportionate redistribution to the leading regions for organizing the national catch-up with the EU averages.

6.2.2. Lagging Regions

In contrast, the lagging city-regions suffered from remaining or regressing “decisively under the national average” (OPV, 2007: 18) in most of the developmental indicators, let alone the EU one. By the late 2010s, they remained under the 18,000 EUR per capita or 22,000 to 24,000 in Czechia respectively (see Graph 6.2). Falling thus under the 75% of EU average GDP in Czechia, 70% in Slovakia, and 60% in Hungary and Poland respectively, they were more eligible for cohesion funding than the leading regions (Table 6.1): As already documented on the ROP North-West (see chapter 5), the continuing regional inequalities were blamed on the “ongoing backwardness” and self-governing incapacity of these city-regions (RCNW, 2013: 81). There were two types of regions: agricultural or those undergoing restructuration from the “original sectors of heavy industry (mines, steelworks, heavy engineering, etc.) to effective activities with high value added” (RCMS, 2011: 15). Such regions “did not attract significant foreign investments” (GoRH, 2007l: 14), while being disconnected from the crucial westward transport nodes. There are second-tier metropolises of national importance such as Ostrava in Czechia, Košice in Slovakia, Miskolc or Debrecen in Hungary. These metropolises are however often losing with their national western counterparts in the FDI-oriented competition, while being encouraged to bandwagon into the similar catch-up strategies.

In the developmental strategies of these regions, the transport infrastructures and built environment became priority as they form not only socio-economic but also territorial peripheries. On the one hand, investing into transport and other physical infrastructures could establish the preconditions for attracting foreign investors, on the other, the priority of this investment regularized these regions’ “low competitiveness” (OPV, 2007: 20). “Especially in Eastern Slovakia, where there was low share of roads of higher class (highways and expressways)”, there was thus need to firstly modernize the roads of class II and III which were of “poor” quality anyway (GoSR, 2016: 85-6). In Hungary, South Transdanubia suffered from the lack of “basic infrastructural conditions”, while the West Pomeranian Voivodship was inaccessible due to the “very serious lack of transport infrastructure” in Poland (GoRH, 2007k: 12, 100, 104; OWPV, 2016: 44). In Moravia-Silesia, “only the commencement of works on the D47 highway and the R48 speedway on the regional territory has somewhat increased the investors’ interest” (RCMS, 2011: 19) to prove the priority of investing into the transport infrastructures.

In terms of workforce, these regions suffered from demographic decline due to the “interregional and foreign [out]migration” in the conditions of “highest level of unemployment” than the national averages (GoRH, 2007o: 20; OPodV, 2011: 9). They also included “disadvantaged” and “marginalized” (GoSR, 2016: 126) populations such as Roma communities in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia. Just as the missing transport links, the “under-average shares of basically trained, as well as persons with higher professional and university education and simultaneously the over-average shares of persons with only basic or no education” normalized these regions lagging position. Indeed, the „shortage of labour force in the demanded professions“ was regularized as a “barrier” to the foreign and domestic investment (RCMS, 2011: 19-20). Much of the blame fell on the regional education and training systems in the predictable way. They required modernization due to lagging behind the “changing needs of the economy” from basic education to universities, while even the training systems failed to „stress practice oriented training and improving skills“ of the regional labour force (GoRH, 2007m: 33). Following the adaptability-oriented strategies, the local educational and training systems were to use the cohesion investment to adjust to the investor demand.

The dependence on external investment was much stronger due to the outdated sectoral structures. Either lacking the “presence of large companies” (GoRH, 2007l: 14) in rather agriculture-based economies or having “concentrated industrial production in large enterprises” (RCMS, 2011: 18), the domestic regional structures remained unreliable either way. The various “industrial” and “economic zones” were already sponsored in these regions since the pre-accession Phare (OPV, 2007: 16; RCMS, 2011: 39). However, the cohesion investment was necessary given these regions’ “still limited attractiveness for investors” (RCCM, 2011: 66), even though they could offer “higher investment incentives in comparison” (RCCM, 2011: 45) due to being poorer than the leading ones. There was moreover a limited number of “complexly equipped areas of investment complying with the expectations of potential investors” (OHCV, 2011: 87) or “inadequate infrastructure for the establishment of new technological firms using the R&D results” (RCMS, 2011: 46). Although some regions had a “long tradition of higher education” (RCCM, 2011: 37), it was clear that “incentive actions should be put in place with a view to set up institutions designed to utilise research findings, innovations among as wide a range of entrepreneurs as possible” (GoRH, 2007m: 21). For

this, the shift to the technology- and knowledge-oriented sectors required a double task to attract the foreign investment in these sectors and catch-up in terms of appropriated infrastructure with the leading city-regions.

Losing the competition over becoming the national leading poles, the developmental coalitions in lagging regions could only compete over the cohesion investment through self-evaluating themselves as more backward. Their resultant catch-up strategies articulated a much similar purpose as those of the leading regions, that is the investment into locational conditions for the FDI. Having less capabilities to compete over both the FDI and cohesion investment in consequence, their convergence remained attached to the developmental priorities of leading regions. This way, it only reproduced the uneven outcomes (see Table 6.1).

6.3. A “Central European Silicon Valley”: South Moravian Region

South Moravia belonged historically among the most developed city-regions in CEE thanks to its metropole Brno. Since the mid-2010s, its ambitions to retain this position has been reproduced by local and national state managers, as well as mainstream media under the city-regional project of “Central European”, “Czech”, “Moravian”, “Brno” Silicon Valley (Kočíčka, 2010; Toman, 2010; CEITEC, 2011; SMIC, 2015: 5, 29; 2017: 38; CoB, 2020). Included with the poorer Vysočina Region in the NUTS South-East, its city-regional leadership has been supported thanks to its fast catch-up but also developmental status of transition region (see Table 6.1). Since the early 2000s, this hegemonic vision emerged among the nuclei of local growth coalitions, while developing into a comprehensive city-regional project by the end of 2010s. As documented below, its following success remained entirely dependent on the discursive and material complementarity between the FDI and the cohesion investment.

The NUTS South-East exemplifies the trend by which the more prosperous city-regions accumulate disproportionately higher stock of cohesion investment than their less prosperous counterparts within their own states and on the Visegrád scale (see Graphs 6.1 and 6.2). Rather than solely either FDI- or cohesion investment-driven visions, the entanglement of both sources of external dependency underpinned the city-regional mobilization for such Visegrád-type Silicon Valley visions since the early 2000s. The ROP

South-East (ROP SE) expressed this purpose in its main “vision” for the region which was “to become the highly competitive region through several realms of development: growing knowledge-based economy of urban centres, well interconnected regional poles of development, and also through sustainable development of important and attractive tourist destinations” (RCSE, 2013: 62). This was possible only through the “joint influence of interventions” (RCSE, 2013: 63) among the South Moravian strategies, the ROP SE and the sectoral OPs. To increase the “scientific, research, innovation and educational potential of the region”, this was possible only through the complementarity among the “OP RDE, OP HRE [human resources and employment], OP EI, OP EC a ROP SE”, as well as the „experiences from the previous programming period“ (RCSE, 2013: 63; see chapter 5).

The hegemonic project of South Moravian competitive city-regionalism can be thus researched as follows. The project was established and historically emerged through the mobilization of a specific city-regional coalition. This coalition legitimized itself by the production of catch-up strategies which translated into an infrastructural development. This development underpinned the strategies of innovation-oriented regional competitiveness in return only to legitimize the South Moravian dependency.

6.3.1. Developmental Coalition

By the late 1990s, the socio-institutional nucleus of South Moravian growth coalition consolidated around the public sector, university sector, and the newly emergent regional business sector. This coalition-making merged three interrelated processes of Europeanization, privatization, and decentralization. In 2000, the South Moravian Regional Authority (SMRA) was officially established to give this coalition the socio-institutional platform for its self-organization and -governance through the state decentralization. The newly formed regional government was complemented by the City of Brno’s metropolitan governance, while the new Association of South Moravian Cities and Municipalities was established in 1999. In 1997, the South Moravian Regional Chamber of Commerce emerged to consolidate and represent the newly formed class of regional business which emerged from the wave of privatization and post-socialist restructuring. In contrast to most of the other regional metropolises, the new coalition could moreover rely on the fully developed and diverse university and research sector of national importance. It combined the traditional

Masaryk University (MU), the Brno University of Technology (BUT), the nature-science Mendel University, the University of Veterinary and Pharmaceutical Science, as well as the departments of Czech Academy of Sciences. This loose nucleus was mobilized only with the dual prospects of cohesion funding and the inter-regional competition over the FDI.

Two regional development, investment, and innovation agencies played a crucial role in the dual process of this coalition-formation and its dependent reorientation: The Regional Development Agency of South Moravia (RDASM) and the South Moravian Innovation Centre (SMIC). Familiar to other Czech and Visegrád city-regions (McMaster, 2006), the RDASM was “founded in September 1997 with the aim of supporting the use of funds of the European Union” (RDASM, 2007: 1). The agency was established by the Association of South Moravian Cities and Municipalities and the predecessor of the Regional Chamber of Commerce only to include the SMRA as its third shareholder since 2002. Ever since being contracted by the national investment promotion agency CzechInvest in 2000, it has also offered the “complete services to foreign investors” (RDASM, 2017: 33). Blending the cohesion investment and FDI, the coalition has become however innovation-oriented only after the SMIC establishment. Outlined in the Phare-funded Regional Innovation Strategy in 2002, the innovation centre broadened the existing coalition with the aforementioned hub of Brno universities and research institutions. Established within the RDASM in 2003, the SMIC soon became an independent agency with an aim to “enhance the level of utilization of EU resources in connection with research and development – both on the [foreign and local] company level and on the university level” (RDASM, 2002: 56).

Since the mid-2000s, the preparation and the management and monitoring of ROP NS and the South Moravian coalition-making for competing over the resources in the national OP was already secured. The coalition was broadened on the local level, while being integrated into the bureaucratic structures of cohesion governance. During the ROP strategic preparations, all the aforementioned institutions participated in articulating the regional priorities, while other actors were incorporated into the process. This included the Regional Council of Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions, the Association of Non-State Non-Governmental Organizations of South-Moravian Region or the Regional Agrarian Chamber (RCSE, 2013: 89). Some of these actors filled the MC. Besides the regional authority, this included the MU and BUT, the regional chamber of commerce and the NGO sector, while the trade unions

representation was missing (RCSE, 2008: 9): They were complemented by their counterparts from the Vysočina Region but also the representatives of responsible national ministries of regional development, transport, and finance, as well as the DG Region. Seated in Brno, the Offices of the Regional Council South-East operated as the semi-independent MA of the ROP NS entrenched in the structure of the Regional Authority.

The coalition became legitimized only when integrating the foreign capital interests and the endogenous innovation-led upgrade. How the RDASM and SMIC underpinned with the combination of FDI investment-promotion subsidies and EU funding is explored below. The electronics manufacturing TNC Flextronics case was illustrative in this. Arriving in Brno as a key large investor through the investment-promotion schemes in 2000, Flextronics relocated to cheaper destinations already in 2002 when preserving “only the research and development centre that employed 34 researchers” (Drahokoupil, 2004: 351). Given that the following “wave of redundancies was the impulse for formulating” the innovation-led project, the SMIC (2014: 14) could declare the project’s resilient success when informing that the „Flextronics is coming back to the region because of it“ in 2013. The immediate replacement of Flextronics by another TNC Honeywell in 2002 and the following R&D investments were an important factor for the innovation-led project. By the late 2010s, the RDASM (2017: 33) assisted in attracting and embedding these types of investment from the TNC in the field of advanced manufacturing, engineering and IT such as Honeywell, ABB, Phillips, Siemens, USU Red Hat, Daikin Devices, Daido Metal, SIAD, Zebra Technologies, IBM, Acer, PPG Industries, Lufthansa. This coalition gained legitimacy as it incorporated the local IT and star-ups from small to expanding and globally operating enterprises. Besides the anti-virus industries Avast and AVG (Beblavý and Mýtná Kureková, 2014), this included newly emerging companies hosted in the SMIC and the technological parks as illustrated in the next section.

Deepening the Silicon Valley vision, the coalition became deliberately articulated as an innovation “ecosystem” consisting of “strong [large foreign and smaller Czech] technological firms, representatives of the research centres, representatives of local government and the intermediary organizations” by the late 2010s (SMIC, 2014: 4). This was visualized as a multi-layered circle where the logos of key actors filled the particular layers of mutually interdependent stakeholders (SMIC, 2016). This ecosystem both shapes the regional strategic

planning in various working and steering groups to further prioritize the interests of its integral members as the general South Moravian interests.

6.3.2. Developmental Strategy

The innovation-led coalitions became consolidated around the renewed strategic planning which re-emerged since the late 1990s. Once again, the strategic planning was supported by the EU funds in order to incentivize the developmental strategies for absorbing the post-accession investment. The first such a document appeared in 1999 to underpin the establishment of the South Moravian Region on the regional level. Since then, it has become regularly updated as a long-term *Development Strategy* (SMRA, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d) and the mid-term *Development Programme of the South Moravian Region* (SMRA, 2014a, 2014b, 2018). The second such a document appeared on the City of Brno (CoB, 2009a, 2009, 2016) metropolitan level in 2002, while being updated in the long-term Strategy for Brno and its sectoral parallels in 2007 and 2016. Central to the innovation-led project, the four generations of the *Regional Innovation Strategy* (RIS) (RDASM, 2002; SMIC, 2005, 2009, 2014) were formed. These strategies have been prepared either by the RDASM and SMIC or the private consultancy companies in consultation with the key stakeholders of developmental coalition. Moreover, the regular updating of these “basic strategy and programme documents” became synchronized with the cohesion governance programming “in the interest of having better targeting” (SMRA, 2007: 4).

Hence, the developmental strategies and programmes emerged originally to synchronize the periodicity, structure, analysis, and also targeting of South Moravian development planning with the strategic content and programming of cohesion investment. A *de facto* first comprehensive strategy, the 2006 strategic update of the region’s Development Strategy served as the “basic strategic document of the region for the upcoming programme period of 2007-2013” (SMRA, 2006a: 23). The resultant “priority strategic measures” were subsequently “adjusted” to succeed as complementary projects in competition over the cohesion funding from various OP (SMRA: 2006b: 3). The following 2012 update could thus further build on the previous strategy when readjusting it for the “EU Cohesion Policy priorities 2014+” (SMRA, 2012a). To evaluate the implementation impact of these

documents, the easiest way was then to overtake the “indicator system” or “method” used in the “individual operational programmes” (SMRA, 2012b: 11, 2012c: 9). The strategies and the immediate programmes conceptualized the region’s adherence to the “systemically linked, complementary and mutually non-duplicate” hierarchy of strategies from the Lisbon and Europe 2020 to the national strategic documents (2006a: 21). At the same time, they positioned the city-region’s edge in this rescaled system of strategy-making. Therefore, there was a “clear overlap of European priorities” with the focus on the “development of knowledge-economy, support for the firm competitiveness, and the area of education and social cohesion” (SMRA, 2012a: 12).

Among the South Moravian stakeholders, it has been regularly reminded that the region prepared the “first of its kind” RIS in Czechia (SMIC, 2005: 6), while playing the role model for other regions. The RIS 1 resulted from a Phare project. The RIS 2 of 2005 and the RIS 3 of 2009 reacted to new “opportunities” and the interest of “most effective use of resources prepared in the framework of structural funds” and the rapidly “changing firm environment” (SMIC, 2005: 7, 2009: 4). Since 2014, the RIS 4 became an “*ex-ante* conditionality” for receiving the EU funds, while being “reviewed” by the Commission during its preparation among other stakeholders (SMIC, 2014: 4, 14). Prepared by the SMIC, the RIS has been at the heart of the innovation-led project, while oriented at maximizing the capacities and strategies for accumulating “the biggest possible finances from external resources” (SMIC, 2009: 45-6) and the EU funds above all. During its updating, peer reviewing, consulting, implementing and steering in the “workgroups” and “steering committees” (RDASM, 2002: 55; SMIC, 2014: 31), the RIS merged the particular interests of local coalition with the developmental purpose of cohesion governance in this regard. This has therefore established a “link” (RIS, 2009: 79-81) with other strategic documents, especially the Development Programmes and the Strategy for Brno.

The ROP NS shaped but was simultaneously embedded in the regional strategic planning (RCSE, 2013: 62-79). Guaranteeing the cohesion investment for South Moravian actors solely, it formed a supportive framework for the nation-wide competition over the investment in other sectoral OPs. The innovation-led project emerged from the Phare funding but became underpinned by a search for complementarities with the OPs organized across the domains of education and training, business development, and innovation in the Czech developmental project (see chapter 5 and Table 5.1). The steady success in identifying the “links” between

the RIS and innovation-oriented OP IE, EI, RDI, and EC and their translation into “infrastructures” and “projects” legitimized the established regional planning and strategies within the innovation-led project (SMIC, 2005: 10, 2009: 2, 39, 52, 2014: 8-10).

Through this asymmetric matching of the South Moravian city-regional strategic planning, the Silicon Valley regional project could be fully integrated into the Czech developmental project. In the anticipation of the EU funding and the synchronization of the regional planning with programming technology, the developmental coalition could become mobilized. This was through the regular updating and realization of these documents to uphold the coalition’s interests as the regional developmental targets. This asymmetric interaction impugned the projects with a particular discourse which foregrounded the innovation as the developmental catch-up strategy.

6.3.3. City-Regional Competitiveness

The South Moravian and Brno’s competitiveness through innovation stood at the heart of the regional project’s developmental purpose. Through the visions of innovation-based competitiveness “on European/global scale” (SMRA, 2012d: 28), the diverse coalition of public institutions, local and foreign capital, and university and research sector could establish an ideological cohesion. These visions relied at modernizing the local potential by reinforcing the region’s mutual complementarities with and between the cohesion investment and the FDI. The “position of Brno in the hierarchy of cities” as the “second biggest and most important city” was important in this respect (SMRA, 2014a: 10). In this catch-up “vision”, South Moravia would become “the most innovative region in Czechia and belong among the fifty most innovative regions in the European Union” (SMIC, 2009: 4). The vision was integral to the “mission” of guaranteeing the region’s socio-economic convergence by increasing the city-region’s “international competitiveness” (SMIC, 2014: 19): First, it identified but searched also inspiration from the city-regional competitors in Czechia, CEE and the EU. Second, it set the sectoral priorities in the firm development of local SME and the specialization in attracting particular type of foreign investment. Third, this foregrounded Brno university sectors as the main actor and beneficiary of such a strategy. Fourth, this strategies envisioned also the necessary restructuring of local populations by turning them into students, scientists, and managers and advanced professionals.

Identifying the rival city-regions as competitors and inspirations was a moving target from the project's inception to its advanced stages. In its inception of early 2000s, the direct rivals were identified nationally "beyond Prague" and the Central Bohemian circle around it which represented "dominant" innovators: South Moravia was the Czech "most innovative region" along with the peer regions such as Moravia-Silesia given the shared "above-average conditions for the development of science and research" activities (SMRA, 2006: 52). As the project matured, it legitimized itself by reasserting the position of the most innovative region which is catching up with Prague and Central Bohemia. Here, the use of cohesion investment on unlimited scale was a competitive advantage unlike Prague which "could and can use funding from European funds only in the limited scale" (SMRA, 2018: 187). The new horizons for moving upwards to achieve the "level" of Europe's most innovative regions had to be found in the West. The competitors were identified within a four-level pyramid where Brno occupied the second level along with Bratislava, Kraków or Leipzig, while surpassing the bottom level of Košice, Szeged, Ostrava, Wrocław, "and many others" (SMIC, 2016). The immediate aim was to move up into the third level along with West European second-tier city-regions such as Stuttgart, Graz, Leuven or Turku. These cities constituted inspiration at the same time for the regional catch-up as a second-tier city-region.

This catch-up relied on the aim of "development of knowledge economy in key/strategic sectors of the region, high attractiveness of the region for foreign investment and functioning segment of small and middle-sized firms" (SMRA, 2014b: 9). This strategy received legitimization thanks to the "improving" inter-regional position in receiving the FDI which went "especially into services, engineering and electrotechnical industry" and came "almost exclusively" from the EU's core states (SMRA, 2018: 43). Moreover, Brno became "the main destination region besides Prague" for hosting the "renowned global enterprises doing business in sectors with higher added value" (CoB, 2016: 25). The South Moravia "coped with the economic crisis" and was the most quickly one to "adapt to new conditions and changes" in the interregional comparison (SMRA, 2018: 38). Within this, Brno only reproduced the differentiating trend as its metropolitan area accumulated around 73% of all incoming investments to the region by 2014 (SMRA, 2014a: 71). Even though the dependent position was clear as "the headquarter structures of the foreign enterprises do not reside in the

region”, the support to “endogenous” enterprises was to be realized only within the shared FDI-led ecosystem (SMRA, 2018: 187).

As explored below, the vision of this ecosystem relied heavily on the “ultimately great potential” (CoB, 2016: 27) of Brno universities and research institutions to attract investors (SMRA, 2018: 43-5; SMIC, 2014: 9-10). In essence, the capacity and specialization of local universities in attracting and embedding the innovation-led FDI substituted the role of local SME structures. They played a crucial role in the establishment of infrastructural conditions for the localization of foreign capital. These strategic conditions have been sponsored mainly by the cohesion investment. These key infrastructures and institutions included technological parks and incubators, centres of excellence and other R&D centres (see Table 6.2). Since the mid-2000s, these new proliferating infrastructures represented an upgrade from and complement of industrial zones and business centres. For the project’s resilience, as already explained in the case of innovation infrastructures in the chapter 5 (see Table 5.3), it was important that such investment projects could be realized precisely during the economic crisis.

The transport infrastructures and the built environment was equally found important to increase the region and Brno’s “(global) transport accessibility” (CoB, 2009b: 17). Much of this related to the regional production and inward migration of “qualified and educated indigenous and foreign workforce which participates in the production with high added value” (SMRA, 2012d: 28). This foregrounded the university interests and the newly emergent innovation infrastructures because “the foreign students and the highly qualified employees of the established science-research workplaces and newly developing research infrastructures” became a key source of Brno’s increasing investment attractiveness. Indeed, the regional human resources management was conceived as the weak point in the endeavour to either “attract” or “retain” the local “talent” or foreign “elites” such as managers and scientists (CoB, 2016: 134). This management was particular as well as general. In particular, both the universities and even the secondary education had to be continually modernized to produce workforce with “qualification responding to the needs of potential investors” (SMRA, 2014b: 8). In general, there was an “important match between the quality of environment (urban environment guaranteeing the quality of life, not only natural environment)” (CoB, 2009b: 10) which connected the investment needs into built environment and transport

Table 6.2 Innovation Infrastructures in Brno

Infrastructure	Founding Years	Source (EU and national co-financing)	Original Investment (mil. EUR)	Stakeholders	Campus
SMIC INTECH (Technological Incubator)	2004-8	OP IE/EI	3,5	SMIC	BUT
SMIC INBIT (Biotechnological Incubator)	2007-8	OP IE	5	SMIC	MU
Professor List Science-Technological Park	2010-3	OP EI	3	Brno University of Technology (BUT)	BUT
SMIC INMEC (Advance Materials and Technologies Incubator)	2010-4	OP EI	16	SMIC	BUT
Technology Innovation Transfer Chamber	2012-5	OP EI	13	BUT – South Moravian Regional Chamber of Commerce	BUT
Brno Biology Park	2011-5	OP EI	15,5	Masaryk University (MU) – South Moravian Regional Chamber of Commerce	MU
International Clinical Research Center (FNUJA-ICRC)	2011-5	OP RDI	86	St. Anne's University Hospital	St. Anne's University Hospital
Central European Institute of Technology (CEITEC)	2011-5	OP RDI	189	MU – BUT – Czech Academy of Sciences (CAS) – Veterinary Research Institute – Mendel University – University of Veterinary and Pharmaceutical Sciences	MU – BUT
CzechGlobe	2010-6	OP RDI	26	CAS	BUT
Centre for Advanced Microbiology and Immunology in Veterinary Medicine (AdmiVet)	2009-13	OP RDI	14,5	Veterinary Research Institute	BUT
Application Laboratories of Microtechnologies and Nanotechnologies (ALISI)	2010-4	OP RDI	20	CAS	BUT
Materials Research Centre	2010-3	OP RDI	8	BUT	BUT
Centre for Plasma and Nanotechnology Surface Modifications (CEPLANT)	2010-3	OP RDI	8,5	MU	MU
Centre for Research and Utilization of Renewable Energy (CVVOZE)	2010-3	OP RDI	10,5	BUT	BUT
Centre for Toxic Compounds in the Environment (CETOCOEN)	2010-3	OP RDI	21	MU	MU
New Technologies for Mechanical Engineering (NETME) Centre	2010-4	OP RDI	30,5	BUT	BUT
Regional Centre for Applied Molecular Oncology (RECAMO)	2010-4	OP RDI	11	Masaryk Institute of Oncology	Masaryk Institute of Oncology
Sensor, Information and Communications Systems (SIX) Research Centre	2010-3	OP RDI	11,5	BUT	BUT
Transport R&D Centre	2010-3	OP RDI	18	Transport Research Centre	Transport Research Centre
Advanced Materials, Structures and Technologies (AdMaS)	2011-4	OP RDI	26,5	BUT	BUT

Source: own preparation, EU projects database (dotaceeu.cz), webpages and annual reports of the projects.

infrastructures with the quality of human capital. Brno had to become thus an attractive place to visit and live in to match the requirements of investment attractiveness.

The competitiveness-bias propels the rescaled dependency as the South Moravian coalition is enforced and incentivized to compete over both the FDI and the cohesion investment to sustain its regional comparative advantage. Within the region, the Brno's dynamic development only replicates the national tendencies of "polarization" or "significant dichotomy" between the leading (regional) metropole and the "lagging" (regional) periphery (SMRA, 2018: 105, 109; SMIC, 2014: 5, 13). In the next section, the infrastructural fix of the visions of innovation-led competitiveness in Brno is discussed.

6.4. Brno: Fixing the Innovation "Ecosystem"

As the Table 6.2 documents, the Silicon Valley vision is a metropolitan strategy. It has been infrastructurally fixed only since the mid-2000s and through the strategic localization of the new built environment in the selected sites in Brno. Its spatial selectivity reinforces further the polarizing logic not only within the whole South Moravian Region but Brno's metropolitan area as well. Forming large-scale urban development projects and amassed infrastructurally in Brno, the innovation infrastructures underpin the catch-up visions by being listed in the RIS, the Strategy for Brno, as well as the Development Programme (SMIC, 2014: 9-10; CoB, 2016: 94-6; SMRA, 2018: 42-5). The new technology parks, centres of excellence and R&D centres are an outcome of rescaled investment process. Financed by the innovative OP, they are primarily organized by local actors, although their realization has been integrated into the hierarchies of decision-making, management and control of the cohesion governance. In return, their infrastructural realization legitimized the developmental purpose on the level of both the EU grand developmental strategies and Visegrád state agendas of moving to the higher-added-value economic activities.

Moreover, the innovation infrastructures fix the catch-up visions of innovation-based competitiveness, while becoming institutional extensions of the local developmental coalition. Already before their initiation, the visions of increasing the region's competitiveness relied on the "cooperation of scientific-research sphere and firms, as well as maximizing the benefits of scientific-research projects of International Clinical Research

Centre (ICRC) and Central European Technological Institute (CEITEC)” (SMIC, 2009: 4). “In the times of upcoming economic crisis”, these large innovation projects were “important” because they helped the “regional economy to diversify more, embed itself into local environment, and prevent thus maximally the departure of the production operations out of the region” (SMIC, 2009: 5). Even in their founding years, these infrastructures were imagined to solve the double task of catch-up and preventing the exit of foreign capital abroad to the cheaper production destinations. Following their establishment, they formed an “imaginary backbone of South Moravian research” (SMIC, 2014: 10).

In the rest of this chapter, I explain how the innovation infrastructures are inscribed into the Brno urban development as a new layer of knowledge-based economy. First, it is shown how they are strategically localized to complement the FDI-driven, post-socialist urban restructuring. Second, I document how the cohesion investment enables the public sector and universities within the local coalition to become key developers which shape Brno’s urban redevelopment. What is more, the following subchapters explain how these infrastructures territorialize the particular visions of development which primarily benefit the coalition of foreign and local capital along with the local governments.

6.4.1. Landscapes of Knowledge-Based Economy

Accumulating “the total value of 17 billion Czech crowns“, that is more than 600 million EUR, from the „infrastructural projects (so-called OP RDI projects)“, the innovation infrastructures constitute one of many types of cohesion investment in Brno (SMIC, 2014: 14-15). They are however prioritized in its catch-up strategies. Not only making the universities the city’s “biggest investors” which helped to “overcome the impact of declining construction sector” during the economic crisis, the new „infrastructures decisively shape the spatial characteristics and urban functions in the centre and especially the locations of the two university largest campuses in Brno“ (CoB, 2012: 13). Building a new “developmental pole” (CoB, 2009a: 28) of knowledge-based catch-up, these campuses are inscribed into Brno’s metropolitan landscape to complement or replace the old industrial poles and the FDI-based manufacturing poles. In result, the infrastructures materialize become key sites of South Moravian future socio-economic upgrade in the interregional competition.

Amassed around the BUT and MU's university campuses (see Table 6.2) in Pod Palackého vrchem and Bohunice districts, the emerging poles form an alternative to the post-socialist "brownfields" of textile and manufacturing industries, while complementing the "greenfield" FDI infrastructures in advanced manufacturing and engineering (SMRA, 2012: 18-20, 39-40; CoB, 2009: 13, 47, 2016: 127). With respect to the later, these FDI-based infrastructural projects were established in two kinds at the turn of 1990s and 2000s: The industrial zone Černovická terasa and the Czech Technology Park. Forming the largest industrial zone in Czechia, Černovická terasa was initiated by the Flextronics' building which was later acquired by Honeywell in the early 2000s. Since then, the zone attracted "global technological leaders" such ABB, Siemens, Dainkin or Bosch which localized both "important production capacity and develop here also capacities for R&D" (CoB, 2016: 29). Through such industrial zones, which were built in the cooperation of CzechInvest, Brno and South Moravian authorities and private developers, the regional economy retained its specialization in the complex manufacturing industries. It has become clear that "the consequences of world economic crisis and lower wage costs on Asian continent could lead to the relocation of this type of investment into other countries" (CoB, 2009a: 19, 2016: 29). Against this vulnerability, the Czech Technology Park facilitates a catch-up promise. Established through the cooperation of British real estate developer P&Q and the City of Brno, the park is assembled around the BUT campus. Together with the MU's Bohunice campus, these sites become gradually foregrounded as poles for embedding the FDI and knowledge-based catch-up.


Overlapping with the Czech Technology Park, the BUT campus is a crucial site for the innovation projects (see the Plate 6.1). Following its establishment in 2003, the SMIC resided in the campus to manage its first Technological Incubator, while transforming it into the INTECH which assists the start-ups in the IT sector. The campus hosts also the SMIC's newest building INMEC which houses the start-ups in advanced materials and technologies. The third incubator INBIT for the growth of biotechnological firms complements the MU's new campus for natural sciences in Bohunice. In the same pattern, the cooperation between the chamber of commerce and the universities resulted into the establishment of two technology parks with respective specializations in IT technologies and biotechnologies in the mid-2010s (see the Table 6.2). In the BUT campus, the "tight spatial neighbourhood" aims at the spill-over into the "concentration of human, commercial and research capacities" and the mutual

“positive synergy” (CoB, 2012: 14) between the foreign investors, local start-up, and the university. This involves technological TNC such as IBM, SAB, Vodafone or RedHat in the technological park. Meanwhile, Bohunice campus is to be further developed as a “prestigious project of university infrastructures in the framework of the whole Czechia” (CoB, 2012: 15).

Therefore, the localization and the infrastructural design of innovation infrastructures is equally important as their purpose of technological transfer. Located in the two flagship buildings in both campuses, the CEITEC is exemplary of this. Already since before their construction, the CEITEC’s architectural design was advertised to underpin the visions of knowledge-based restructuralization. As the Plate 6.1 shows on the Czech Technology Park’s spatial plan, they are incorporated into its mapping to increase the city and the region’s attractiveness. In result, the CEITEC and the R&D centres secure the visions of “long-term increase in the competitiveness” when facilitating conditions for merging the “scientific discovery at a globally competitive level” with the „creation of new innovative companies and attraction of domestic and international investors“ (CEITEC, 2012: 5, 2013: 7-9, 2018: 8). In this sense, the infrastructures offer the knowledge-based spaces as the specialized “laboratories, training facilities and office space”, as well as the “ultra modern” and „cutting-edge equipment“ (CEITEC, 2012: 9, 2018: 5, 49). Through these spaces, it is possible not only to “catalyse the existing basic and applied research“ but finance the „growth and internationalization“ (CEITEC, 2018: 30) of Brno’s human capital as their integral part: the research and scientific staff.

Through territorializing the new infrastructural layer of knowledge-based economy in Brno’s urban landscape, the innovation infrastructures fulfil several roles. As investment projects in the cohesion agenda, they match the national absorption rate of cohesion funding and the performance indicators inherent to their respective OPs above all. The resultant institutional and infrastructural development remains then “heavily dependent on competitive funding” on the national and European scale, while its “sustainability” must be simultaneously guaranteed by additional EU and national funds (CEITEC, 2019: 14). Hence, they underpin the modernization of national innovation domain, while infrastructurally guaranteeing Brno’s leadership and investment priority in the national catch-up with the higher added value positions in the global economy.

Plate 6.1 CEITEC Visualization in the VTU and MU Campuses and the Spatial Plan of Czech Technology Park



Source: CEITEC (2013), website of Czech Technology Park (<http://technologypark.cz>)

6.4.2. Innovation Ecosystem

The emerging assemblage of Brno-based private-public “institutions + networking + infrastructure” (SMIC, 2016) underpins thus the leading core of the developmental coalition. Envisioned as an ecosystem, it gains coherence through the preparation and realization of the RIS. Enabled by the cohesion funding, Brno universities became a keen urban entrepreneur in the coalition. They substitute the absence of strong domestic capitalist sectors after the post-socialist restructuring, while becoming prioritized in the city-regional strategies along with the foreign TNC and the locally headquartered innovation SME. The plan to become “the important centre of Central European education, science and research” (CoB, 2016: 86) can be thus reconciled with the strategy of knowledge-based prioritization of the “key/strategic sectors” through establishing the cluster of large TNC and local SME (SMRA, 2012b: 36, 2018: 109). In this ecosystem, the prospects of continuing cohesion investment dependency it then actively used to by the local actors and institutions as a strategy to locally embed the foreign capital interests.

Despite the visions of knowledge-based upgrade, South Moravia remains still characteristic of the national orientation on manufacturing positions in the – engineering and electrotechnical – industries. The innovation infrastructures legitimize the future promise of sectoral upgrade and shift to a more knowledge-intensive and digital specializations. They underpin the strategies of “connecting” the industrial base with the knowledge-based sectors as “supporting” infrastructures in the shift to the “matrix” of future research capacities and the following “application sectors” (RIS, 2014: 18): advanced production and engineering technologies, accurate measurement devices, hardware and software development, medicaments, healthcare and diagnosis, technologies for aircraft industry.

The members of the ecosystem, which supervise the designing and executing of the RIS, and the beneficiaries of the infrastructural development overlap. Besides the state managers from public authorities, the local agencies and the universities, this includes the local managers of TNCs and the managers of successful start-ups and SME. Within the RIS 4 framework, such interests have been represented in the steering committee and working groups on the “firm competitiveness”, “attractivity of the region”, and “excellence in the research” (SMIC, 2020a, 2020b): These monitoring committees integrated the assemblage of institutions, infrastructures and networks which cut across the five sectors mentioned above.

Representing the interests of foreign capital, the local managers of Honeywell and Red Hat, have sat in these fora. Along with the Brno-based global antivirus firm Avast, the local SME were also represented either through Tescan, which specializes in the measurement devices, or the Y Soft. An electronic hardware company, Y Soft represents one of the “most successful firms incubated [in SMIC] whose products are known worldwide” (SMIC, 2011: 42-43) and is now headquartered in the Czech Technological Park.

The regional labour is not represented but rather conceptualized as a problem of human resource management. Rather an exception from the rule, the local NGO specializing in the issues of social exclusion and the regional branch of national Employment Office have participated in the formulation of latest regional strategies (SMRA, 2018: 94). From this viewpoint, the new innovation infrastructures are only a “‘hardware’ followed by a certain ‘software’ in the form of human capital which is reinforced by the involvement of foreign scientists and workforce in general” (SMRA, 2018: 94, 188). The innovation infrastructures are therefore envisioned as enabling “absorption capacity” and setting the “key task for the following programming period” to fund the reskilling of Brno and South Moravian populations (SMRA, 2014c: 66-7). This focuses on upgrading the secondary and university education and attracting the highly qualified labour such as scientists, researchers but also managers. Indeed, even though having “the second highest qualified labour after Prague”, the region’s qualification structure “has not responded to the demand of economy” (SMRA, 2018: 187, 194). To resolve this contradiction, the consensus is to channel the EU “funding into the future (following the so-called ‘Irish model’), that is into building infrastructure and qualification (education) of workforce” (SMRA, 2018: 94, 188).

Without the innovation infrastructures, the transformation of the local developmental coalition under the visions of innovation ecosystem (SMIC, 2014, 2015: 3-5, 12, 2017: 12) would be thus hardly credible. The cohesion investment into the interregional competition as a strategy of embedding and upgrading the FDI-based economy has legitimized the catch-up visions and the particular interests of actors in the imagined ecosystem as both regional and national interests. At the same time, the ecosystem reinforced the region’s dependence on the external inflows as it not only relies on the reinforced inflow of national funds into the innovation infrastructures but the expectation that they will incentivize the TNC to localize activities with the higher added value in Brno.

6.5. Rescaled Dependency

This chapter shows how the Visegrád dependent developmental states regulate the intra-national inequalities in their uneven regional development. I show how they normalize the reproduction of the duality between the leading and lagging city-regions. This is the product of the TRPD-based rescaled dependency which promotes the two contradictory tendencies in the regional development as on the national level. First, mobilizing and materially enabling the regional developmental capacity, it incorporates the regional governance into the multiple-level hierarchies of cohesion governance. In effect, the neoliberal developmentalism translates into the competitive city-regionalism. Second, it supports thus the visions where interregional competition over the cohesion investment and the FDI leads to a sustainable regional catch-up. The Cohesion Policy fuels thus the differentiating process of inter-local competition rather than sponsoring the socio-spatial justice. In result, the rescaled dependency downscales the responsibility for the management of Visegrád dependency to the subnational level, while upscaling the decision-making hierarchies at the same time.

The South Moravian project of Central European Silicon Valley evidences how the rescaled dependency skews the city-regional dilemma to the competitive city-regionalism. The prospects of cohesion investment mobilize the local actor coalitions and transform them into developmental coalitions which invest the external funds into their regional competitive advantages. In Visegrád states, this interregional competition is primarily over primarily attracting and retaining the FDI and upgrading local SME sectors. In the conditions of post-socialist restructuring, other actors such as universities rather than the non-existent regional large capital become urban entrepreneurs. The historical legacies of Visegrád uneven regional development play role in articulating the specific regional strategies of catch-up and the possibilities of their success. The result of this rescaled regulation of uneven regional development is the polarization between the leading regions, which accumulate both the FDI and the cohesion investment, and those lagging regions which tend to lose the competition. The contrasting cases of the NUTS North-West (see chapter 5) and South-East (see Table 6.1) show this. Moreover, Brno's metropolitan project exemplifies that this Visegrád regional leadership produces a more embedded peripheral position but fails in the resolute catch-up with the EU's core city-regions.

From the subnational scale, the TRPD is materially, institutionally, and also intellectually enabling the local coalitions, projects and their catch-up strategies as bottom-up initiatives. Through the rescaled dependency, the TRPD regulates the uneven inter-regional relations by responsabilizing the local private-public partnerships with dependency management. Against this background, the city-regional structures are mobilized only within the multi-level hierarchies of Visegrád developmental state projects and the EU's developmental fixing. If the Visegrád state projects are transnationally organized to enable the *national* integrations into the EU through a combined competition over the same-type FDI and cohesion investment assistance, this competition is being simultaneously downscaled as a *regional* competition as well. The rescaled dependency is thus downscaling the developmental responsibilities in the conditions of inter-regional competition but upscaling the regulation of uneven regional development at once.

7. Conclusion

This Thesis is being finalized at the turn of two budgetary and programming periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 after the COVID-19 crisis. This turn is crucial because it is mutually shaped with the late phase of the post-Fordist order. Its cruciality consists also in reconfiguring the long-term trends within the hegemonic dilemmas explored by this Thesis (see Box 1.1). Studying the EU Cohesion Policy and Europe's core-peripheral relations, I try to understand the dilemmatic dynamics of this post-Fordist order in a historical perspective and also from the CEE's peripheral viewpoint. Focusing mostly on the trends until the mid-2010s, the Thesis does not fully appreciate the amassing multiple crises of the late 2010s. However, its historicizing perspective can provide a useful contribution to understanding both the past, contemporary, and future trajectories of EU and CEE integration(s) under the conditions of changing global capitalism.

We can do it by answering and restating the research questions and the dilemmas involved in the current context: How has the Cohesion Policy shaped the core-peripheral relations in the EU's enlarged capitalist order and vice versa over time? What hegemonic purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion Policy's developmental strategies and how have they solved the question of uneven and dependent development in Europe? What sort of state transnationalization-*cum*-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU's *de facto* regional and urban policy promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state projects and through these catch-up strategies?

Taking advantage of the preceding chapters, this concluding chapter is thus summarizing the answers to these questions as historical trends which allow us to open the inquiry for the post-2020 developments. I explain firstly why the political economy of EU Cohesion Policy as TRPD, which synthesizes the critical and institutionalist approaches, provides a helpful viewpoint on discussing the past and future of EU integration. Then, I ask about the future of Cohesion Policy. The text finishes by discussing the future of Visegrád development state.

7.1. Peripheral Perspective

The Thesis' theoretical contribution is the production of a political economy perspective on the Cohesion Policy when theorizing it as a TRPD. This is done in the chapters 1 and 2. I do it by synthesizing the multiple overlapping but still disconnected literatures. These include the EU Studies scholarship, the (critical) political economy of European integration and the CC scholarship on CEE varieties of capitalism. The synthesis both *deepens* and *broadens* the theory on the Cohesion Policy. The broadening happens by bringing the real case of Cohesion Policy into the theoretical debates on the political economy of European and CEE integrations. So far, the field has disregarded it as irrelevant for and thus marginal for discussing the EU's regulation of its crisis-ridden economic diversity. The CC scholarship on CEE is meanwhile preoccupied with the FDI. By introducing the Cohesion Policy, I refine exactly their research profile on the inter-state power asymmetries and economic inequalities in the EU core-peripheral relations. The broadening leads to the theoretical deepening because it nuances the EU Studies scholarship with this critical perspective on asymmetries and inequalities. Although substituting the neglect of political economy scholarship in studying the EU Cohesion Policy, the EU Studies tend to narrow the inquiry into the problem-solving questions solely on the policy's institutional performance and effectiveness.

Moreover, the TRPD brings together the often separate interests in the study of the European integration (Europeanization) and peripheral integrations (transnationalization of peripheral states). Let's firstly address the *transnational regulation* (TR). Through the synthesis, we can highlight the Cohesion Policy as the EU's main instrument in regulating its crisis-ridden economic heterogeneity which the transnational regulation attempts to temporarily and unstably resolve. This crisis tendency is driven primarily by the uneven and dependent development of European core-peripheral relations. While these relations are structured primarily by the inter-state redistributive negotiations between peripheral and core governments, our perspective allows for situating them into the broader transnational power and economic relations. The analysis allows for exploring how the inter-state negotiations are powerfully shaped by the transnational actors like the European Commission but the transnational capital as well. Therefore, the Cohesion Policy can be analysed as not only an enclosed institutional policy but rather integral part of the EU's broader agenda of transnational regulation. Last, our inquiry can also show how the peripheral development becomes the

problem of European heterogeneity in the development purpose of this Commission-led regulation. This purpose becomes then the hegemonic content of developmental strategies in the peripheral states as a condition of receiving the EU structural funds.

The Cohesion Policy is thus analysed as problematizing the *peripheral development* (PD) in the core-peripheral relations, while intervening to adjust it to the imperatives of core development. This transnational regulation emerged around the relations between the *new* South European periphery and *old* North-Western European core but has been enlarged with the *new* Eastern dimension since 2004. The main feature of economic periphery – both South European and CEE – is the lack of internal funds which makes it dependent on the external capital such as the FDI, trade exchange, foreign debt, and (as our theoretical framework adds) the EU funds. The TRPD framework is completed here by absorbing the CC literature on the CEE and its bias on the FDI dependency. During the eastern enlargement, the Europeanization of Visegrád states was organized and enforced by the Commission. This form of transnationalization established conditions for the expansion of West European transnational corporations into CEE which makes the Visegrád development dependent on the locational decisions of West European capital. Both processes transformed the Visegrád states and reoriented the developmental purpose of their economic strategies towards the FDI-based dependency. The Cohesion Policy is neglected in this analysis. Factoring it in as another source of dependency, we start to conceptualize its transformative impact on the Visegrád developmental strategies in relation to the FDI dependency. This can be done by finding the interrelationships between both dependencies rather than studying them apart.

The TRPD fills thus the theoretical gap by studying the Cohesion Policy at the intersection of EU Studies literatures as well as the political economy scholarship on the EU and CEE integrations. Without neglecting the material and institutional dimensions of the EU's manifold core-peripheral relations, the theorization offers the inquiry into the developmental purpose of their regulation in and through the Cohesion Policy. Offering to investigate the ideological content, the theorization of the Cohesion Policy as TRPD allows to investigate how this purpose fills the Visegrád dependency with the ideological content which reorients state catch-up strategies through foregrounding the EU funds-based strategies and also normalizes the region's uneven integration into the EU's core-peripheral relations. From this perspective, we can grapple with the aforementioned questions.

7.2. The Past and Future of Cohesion Policy

In the chapters 3 and 4, the Thesis answers the following questions: How has the Cohesion Policy shaped the core-peripheral relations in the EU's enlarged capitalist order and vice versa over time? What hegemonic purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion Policy's developmental strategies and how have they solved the question of uneven and dependent development in Europe? These questions target the transnational regulation in the TRPD.

By answering these questions, the chapters provided a historization of the Cohesion Policy as the TRPD. The TRPD had origins in the 1960s but became fully institutionalized only by the Cohesion Policy reform in 1988. Under the Commission's transnational leadership, the reform institutionalized a core-peripheral consensus between the Southern and North-Western states. In this cohesion consensus, the core states approved the increase in the EU funds for the peripheral states under the heading of core *solidarity*. In exchange, this solidarity conditioned the EU's transformation into a globalizing market-making order, while giving the Commission higher command and control powers over the *effective* EU funds investment in peripheral states. Moreover, the TRPD-based cohesion consensus is incubated a new developmental purpose for regulating the core-peripheral relations: neoliberal developmentalism. The neoliberal developmentalism highlights the developmental need of economic and social *cohesion* to solve the EU's capitalist heterogeneity but prioritizes the neoliberal imperative of global *competitiveness* as the means to achieve it.

Since the late 1990s by the mid-2010s, this cohesion consensus has been moreover eroding. The core solidarity for more cohesion continually declined, while the Commission's control and command over the effective investment in peripheral states for more competitiveness become more disciplinary. Although not causing it, the eastern enlargement was an integral part of this erosion towards a more austerity-based, effectiveness- and competitiveness-oriented transformation. Following the global and Eurozone crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s, the historical result has been the consolidation of the EU as a regional order consisting of one North-Western core and the two peripheries: the debt-riven South and the FDI-based East.

Can this historization tell us anything about future from the post-2020 turning point in the EU integration and vice versa? If the dilemmas of core-peripheral relations have been fixed in

favour of peripheral effectiveness and competitiveness by the late 2020s, can we identify the turn through observing the Commission's discursive return to the "solidarity, cohesion and convergence" (EC, 2020: 1) in the negotiations over the new MFF?

First of all, we must recognize the continuing power asymmetry as the turn is primarily shaped by the core hegemony under German leadership in an attempt to re-establish the EU as a consensual order. Under the old funds and the new climate-related funds and along the new EU Next Generation (EUNG) financing, this also heralds a hegemonic rearticulation of the core-peripheral relations (EC, 2019d: 6; 2020). Therefore, the dedicated Commission and the major paymaster are willing to shape this turn as the strategies of the new Commission under the President Von der Leyen and the German in the Council suggest (EC, 2019d; Government of Germany, 2020). What is more, the new reform of Cohesion Policy has been prepared by the peripheral and originally socialist Commissioners, namely the Romanian Corina Crețu and Portuguese Elisa Ferreira.

In effect, the cohesion consensus is being re-established with respect to both the Southern and Eastern peripheries. Following the COVID-19 crisis, a combination of "NGEU and MFF" (European Council, 2020: 1-2) has been offered by the Commission which extend the cohesion consensus in the volume of transfers. During the inter-state relations, it has been fiercely defended by the Southern state managers in cooperation with the Germany presidency against other core states under Dutch leadership. According to the Commission, the new funds are necessary as "if left to individual countries alone, the recovery would likely be incomplete, uneven and unfair" (EC, 2020: 3). Therefore, the core solidarity gains discursive primacy as the major incentive for organizing the post-2021 MFF. With the solidarity, the effectiveness remains. The "ex ante conditionalities" are simplified, but retained under the new brand of "enabling conditions" (EC, 2018a: 7). Despite this turn, the macroeconomic conditionality, which was formed to discipline the debt-driven South in the consequence of Eurozone crisis, remains in places. Reacting to the rise of right-wing populism in the East, the *de facto* "rule of law" conditionality is newly introduced (EC, 2018a: 5, 13; 2018b: 4).

What about the neoliberal developmentalism as a hegemonic purpose of the Cohesion Policy? It is being rearticulated rather than overcome. After the Lisbon and Europe 2020 agendas, the "European Green Deal" becomes the EU's new flagship strategy (EC, 2019d: 5-6; 2019f). The new grand strategy emerges from the historical merger of competitiveness and

cohesion within the visions of “European social market economy” (EC, 2019: 8). The hegemonic purpose blends now the “resilience and competitiveness” (EC, 2019f: 3; Government of Germany, 2020: 4) to recalibrate the EU’s regulation of uneven and dependent development under the heading of “competitive sustainability” (EC, 2020: 6). While the new strategy privileges the socio-ecological sustainability over the economic competitiveness, it remains constrained by the neoliberal institutional structures which developed during the last three decades. The strategic planning of the European Green Deal remains thus linked with the “European Semester process of macroeconomic coordination” (EC, 2019f: 3), while supporting the “ongoing economic reform process by Member States” (European Council, 2020: 22). The neoliberal developmentalism is thus being articulated away from competitiveness but remains serves to further embed the neoliberal bias to the open market-oriented order.

Studying the Cohesion Policy as the TRPD, we could explore it as a product of the EU as we knew it especially since the end of 1980s. The study of its past can tell us that its form and content are likely to be reshaped but not overcome in the post-2020 integration trajectories. What is more, the change is likely to be reproduced with the two historical dilemmas between the core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness, as well as the European cohesion and global competitiveness.

7.3. The Past and Future of Dependent Developmental State

In the chapters 5 and 6, the Thesis answers the following questions: What sort of state transnationalization-*cum*-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU’s *de facto* regional and urban policy promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state projects and through these catch-up strategies? These questions target the peripheral development in the TRPD.

Relying on the historization above, the diagnosis is following. Despite of the lowering core solidarity and the increasing orientation on effectiveness and competitiveness, the Cohesion Policy has still supplied these states with a robust developmental assistance. The assistance

provides further evidence on why the Visegrád dependent market economies remain rather resilient after the global and Eurozone crisis, while retaining relatively sustainable socio-economic development. Even in the post-crisis turn to a more economic nationalism especially in Poland and Hungary, these Visegrád state projects remain still oriented at providing physical and human infrastructures for the West European capital. These states however suffer from two contradictory tendencies. First, the EU funds are either invested under the Commission's disciplinary supervision into the enhancement of the FDI-based competitiveness or captured by the political and economic elites of Visegrád states through grand corruption schemes. Second, with respect to the rescaled dependency, the neoliberal developmentalism translates into competitive city-regionalism. The competitive purpose of the EU funds fuels the increasing inter-local polarization between the leading city-regions, which win the dual competition over the FDI and EU funds, and the lagging city-regions losing such a competition. Therefore, the promise of developmental catch-up with the Western core is likely to remain intra-nationally unequal and internationally within the confines of sustainable and productive, yet peripheral integration into the EU.

Can the contradiction be resolved or is about to further problematize the Visegrád peripheral development in the EU's post-2020 turn? Is the developmental illusion still legitimize the integrative tendencies of the Visegrád states projects? Is the EU turn anyhow change the developmental purpose of their catch-up strategies? Last but not least, how can they overcome the polarizing tendencies in the regulation of their uneven regional development?

Indeed, the developmental projects have hardly changed the developmental status of the convergent CEE periphery. Considered *less developed* during their EU accession, Visegrád economies are broadly categorized as such even after 15 years of their integration within the Cohesion Policy. With the exception of the capitals, Visegrád regions cover mostly the categories of *less developed* regions below 75% and only occasionally the status of the *transition* regions between 75% and 100% of the average EU's GDP. As the Visegrád state managers increasingly rely on the cohesion investment to substitute the decreasing FDI inflows or overcome the FDI dependency, the future of Visegrád developmental projects remains highly dependent on the cohesion consensus in the EU.

The economic nationalism in Poland and Hungary has so far remained within the confines

of the neoliberal developmentalism. The same can be said about the less prominent turn to internal development in the Czech and Slovak trajectories. After the global economic crisis, this shift has been a reaction to the disruptions of the FDI-led development. Although shifting the strategic developmental priorities from enabling the FDI inflows to the improvement of domestic firm structures, the scale of change has been gradual rather than radical. By 2020, we could nevertheless document that the two crucial sources of Visegrád dependent catch-up – FDI and cohesion investment – have been gradually decreasing. On the side of cohesion investment, the EU budget and the relative share of Cohesion Policy therein were reduced in volume. Moreover, the Visegrád convergence was rather statistical when measured against the divergent Southern periphery in crisis. In effect, the reversed *statistical effect* – which affected the South after the eastern enlargement – made the Visegrád economies seemingly richer and thus less eligible for the cohesion funding due to the ever poorer South periphery. The threat to the developmental projects is thus made by the external dependency than the internal forces.

The future opens the new dynamic in resolving the interrelated questions of capacity and autonomy of these states vis-à-vis the Commission and the core states. The institutional incapacities and corruption have been prioritized by the Commission as the major break on the peripheral convergence. The rise of conservative nationalist governments in Hungary and Poland and the Czech conflict of interests reinforce it. In the new EU turn, the Commission attempts to extend its command and control powers to cover also the “democratic resilience” and the “fundamentals rights and full respect of the rule of law” as conditionalities to receive the EU funding (EC, 2019f: 15). The prioritization of “our European values, rule-of-law and humanitarian standards” has been also supported by Germany (Government of Germany, 2020: 18). The Council agreed thus on the “importance of the protection of the Union's financial interests” and “the respect of the rule of law” (European Council, 2020: 7, 15). This rule-of-law conditionality is thus likely to drive new forms of governmentalization and conflict in the next programming period for the Visegrád states.

Under the European Green Deal, the developmental purpose of these state projects is also facing challenges due to the industrial character of their economies. The Visegrád regions fall still within the category of less developed and transition regions with an exception of the capital city-regions. Given the industrial nature of the leading regions and the carbon-

oriented energy sectors in the lagging regions. Having hardly caught up in the *traditional* forms of underdevelopment, the Visegrád states face fixed as underdeveloped in the terms of European Green Deal. They cover the category of “regions and sectors that are most affected by the transition [to the climate neutral development]” (EC, 2019f: 16). Therefore, the “Commission will work with the[se] Member States and regions” (EC, 2019f: 16) to provide them with the new developmental capital but also requirements to adapt their state and city-regional strategies of development. Whether this is to challenge the trajectories as we have known them so far remains an open question.

Bibliography

Primary Documents

Central European Institute of Technology (CEITEC) (2011): *CEITEC – Středoevropský technologický institut zahajuje svoji činnost* [CEITEC - Central European Technological Institute Commences its Activity], Press Release, 26 September 2011, retrieved from <https://www.ceitec.cz/ceitec-stredoevropsky-technologicky-institut-zahajuje-svoji-cinnost/t1223?researchGroup=43>

CEITEC (2013): *Annual Report 2012*, Brno: CEITEC.

CEITEC (2014): *Annual Report 2013*, Brno: CEITEC.

CEITEC (2018): *Annual Report 2017*, Brno: CEITEC.

CEITEC (2019): *Annual Report 2018*, Brno: CEITEC.

City of Brno (CoB) (2009a): *Strategie pro Brno* [Strategy for Brno], Brno: City of Brno and firmou DHV.

CoB (2009b): *Koncepce ekonomického rozvoje města* [Conception of the City Economic Development], Brno: City of Brno.

CoB (2012): *Strategie a koncepce rozvoje univerzitního školství v Brně: souhrnná zpráva* [Strategy and Conception of Development of the University Education in Brno: Summary Report], Brno: Bergmann Group and DHV.

CoB (2016): *Strategie pro Brno* [Strategy for Brno], revised version, Brno: City of Brno.

CoB (2020): *Město koupilo dalších 50 % akcií Technologického parku* [The City Has Bought Additional 50 % of Shares in the Technology Park], Press Release, 15 January 2020, retrieved from <https://www.brno.cz/brno-aktualne/tiskovy-servis/tiskove-zpravy/a/mesto-koupilo-dalsich-50-akcii-technologickeho-parku/>

European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (2017): *FINAL REPORT - Case: OF/2015/1348/B4*, OCM(2017)26223, Brussels: European Anti-Fraud Office.

Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (CDPCR) (2016): *1. Kauza Čapí hnízdo* [The Case of Čapí hnízdo], Stenographic record of the 43rd Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 23 March 2016.

CDPCR (2017a): *2. Zákon, kterým se mění zákon č. 159/2006 Sb., o střetu zájmů, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a další související zákony /sněmovní tisk 564/14/ - vrácený prezidentem republiky* [Law which Amends the Law n. 159/2006 on the Conflict of Interests, in the Later Regulations and Other Related Laws /Deputy of Chamber's Note 564/14/ - Returned by the President of the Republic], Stenographic record of the 54th Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 11 January 2017.

CDPCR (2017b): *45. Žádost o vyslovení souhlasu Poslanecké sněmovny k trestnímu stíhání poslance Andreje Babiše a poslance Jaroslava Faltýnka* [Request for A Permission of the

- Chamber of Deputies to the Criminal Prosecution of the Member of Parliament Andrej Babiš and the Member of Parliament Jaroslav Faltýnek], Stenographic record of the 60th Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 6 September 2017.
- CDPCR (2018): 40. *Žádost o vyslovení souhlasu Poslanecké sněmovny k trestnímu stíhání poslance Andreje Babiše a poslance Jaroslava Faltýnka* [Request for A Permission of the Chamber of Deputies to the Criminal Prosecution of the Member of Parliament Andrej Babiš and the Member of Parliament Jaroslav Faltýnek], Stenographic record of the 6th Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 19 January 2018.
- CDPCR (2019a): 239. *Projednání rizika možných finančních ztrát České republiky v souvislosti s předběžnou zprávou Evropské komise o šetření střetu zájmů předsedy vlády České republiky* [Hearing on the Possible Risk of Financial Loses to the Czech Republic in the Context of the Report of the European Commission on the Conflict of Interests of the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic], Stenographic record of the 30th Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 4 June 2019.
- CPDCR (2019b): 295. *Konečné znění auditní zprávy Evropské komise o střetu zájmů* [Final Wording of the Audit Report of the European Commission on the Conflict of Interests], Stenographic record of the 39th Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 5 December 2019.
- European Commission (EC) (1965): *Regional Policy in the European Community*, COM(69) 950, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1969): *A Regional Policy for the Community*, IJSEC(65) 1170, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1971): *Regional Development in the Community: Analytical Survey*, Brussels: European Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1973a): *Report on the Regional Problems in the Enlarged Community*, COM (73) 550, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1973b): *Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing Regional Development Fund*, COM(73) 1170, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1977a): *Guidelines for Community Regional Policy*, COM(77) 195, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1977b): 'The Community and its Regions', *European Documentation Periodical 1977/4*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1979a): *Commission Unveils Plans for Integrated Regional Operations*, P-34, Information Memo 3/79, 1-2.
- EC (1979b): *Convergence and Budgetary Questions*, COM(79) 620, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1980a): *Regional Development Atlas*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1980b): 'The Community and its Regions', *European Documentation Periodical 1980/1*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1980c): *The Regions of Europe. First Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation of the Regions of the Community*, COM (80) 816, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1981a): *New Regional Policy Guidelines and Priorities*, COM(81) 152, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1981b): *Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation no 724/75 Establishing European Regional Development Fund*, COM(81) 589, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1981c): *Mediterranean Programmes (Lines of Action)*, COM(81)637, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1982): *On the Greek Government Memorandum of 19 March 1982*, COM(82) 348, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1983a): *Commission's Proposals for the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes*, COM(83) 24, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1983b): *Integrated Mediterannean Programmes* (reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities No. 2/1985), Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1983c): *Report and Proposals on Ways of Increasing the Effectiveness of the Community's Structural Funds*, COM(83) 501, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1984): *The Regions of Europe. Second Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation of the Regions of the Community*, COM(84) 40, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1985): *Completing the Internal Market*, COM(85) 310, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1986): „The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes“, *European File 1/86*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1987a): *The Single Act: A New Frontier for Europe*, COM(81) 100, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1987b): *Reform of the Structural Funds*, COM(87) 376, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1987c): *The Regions of the Enlarged Community. Third Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions of the Community*, COM(87) 230, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1989): *Guide to the Reform of the Community's Structural Funds*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1990a): *The New Structural Policies of the European Community*, European File 7-8/90, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (1991): *The Regions in the 1990s. Fourth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions of the Community*, COM(90) 609, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (1992a): *From the Single Act To Maastricht and beyond: the Means to Match our Ambitions*, COM(92)2000, Brussels: European Commission.

- EC (1992b): *Community Structural Policies: Assessment and Outlook*, COM(92)84, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1992c): *The Community's Finances Between now and 1997*, COM(92) 2001, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1993a): *Community Structural Funds, 1994-1999*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1993b): *The Future of Community Initiatives under the Structural Funds*, COM(93) 282, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1993c): *Promoting Economic Recovery in Europe (The Edinburgh Growth Initiative)*, SEC(93) 1599, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1993d): *Cohesion and RTD Policy - Synergies between Research and Technological Development Policy and Economic and Social Cohesion Policy*, COM(93) 203, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1994a): *The Future of Community Initiatives under the Structural Funds*, COM(94) 46, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1994b): *Community Structural Assistance and Employment*, COM(96) 109, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1994c): *Guide to the Community Initiatives, 1994-99*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1994d): *Fifth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions of the Community*, COM(94) 322, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1995): *Cohesion Policy and the Environment*, COM(95) 509, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1996b): *Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund, 1994-1999: Regulations and Commentary*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1996): *First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1997): *AGENDA 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union*, COM(97) 2000, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1998a): *Reform of the Structural Funds*, COM(1998) 131, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1998b): *Guide to the Community's Initiatives (Volume 2)*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1999a): *Structural Funds and their Coordination with the Cohesion Fund: Guidelines for Programmes in the Period 2000-06*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (1999b): *Cohesion and Transport*, COM(1998) 806, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (1999d): *Regional Policy and Cohesion. Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions of the European Union*, SEC(1999) 66, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

- EC (2000): *Structural Actions 2000-2006: Commentary and Regulations*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2001a): *Unity, Solidarity, Diversity for Europe, its People and Territory. Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion*, COM(2001) 24, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2002a): *First progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Unity, Solidarity, Diversity for Europe, its People and its Territory*, COM (2002) 46, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2002b): *The 'Community Added Value': the Commission Extends the Debate on the Future of Cohesion Policy*, *Inforegio Newsletter* No. 97-98: 1.
- EC (2002c): *The Impact and Added Value of Cohesion Policy: Global Analysis*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2003a): *Second Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Unity, Solidarity, Diversity for Europe, its People and its Territory*, COM (2003) 34, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2003b): *Further Indicative Guidelines for the Candidate Countries*, COM(2003) 110, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2003c): *Structural Funds and their Coordination with the Cohesion Fund: Revised Indicative Guidelines*, COM(2003) 499, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2003d): *On the Simplification, Clarification, Coordination and Flexible Management of the Structural Policies 2000-06*, COM(2003) 1255, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2004a): *A New Partnership for Cohesion: Convergence, Competitiveness, Cooperation. Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion*, COM(2004) 107, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2004b): *Building our Common Future: Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013*, COM(2004) 101, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2004c): *Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down General Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund*, COM(2004) 49, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2005a): *Third Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Towards a New Partnership for Growth, Jobs and Cohesion*, COM (2005) 192, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2005b): *Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013*, COM(2005) 0299, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2006a): *Fourth Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. The Growth and Jobs Strategy and the Reform of European Cohesion Policy*, COM (2006) 281, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
- EC (2006b): *Indicative Guidelines on Evaluation Methods: Ex-Ante Evaluation, Working Document No.1*, August 2006, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2006c): *Cohesion Policy and Cities: the Urban Contribution to Growth and Jobs in the Regions*, COM(2006) 385, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2006d): Innovation in the National Strategic Reference Frameworks, *Working document of the Directorate General for Regional Policy*, 31 October 2006, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2006e): *Regions for Economic Change*, COM(2006) 675, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2006f): Indicative Guidelines on Evaluation Methods: Monitoring And Evaluation Indicators, *Working Document No.2*, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007a): *Growing Regions, Growing Europe. Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion*, COM (2007) 273, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (2007b): *Cohesion policy 2007–13: Commentaries and Official Texts*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (2007c): Earmarking, *Information paper No. 1*, COCOF/2007/0012/00-EN, 28 February 2007.

EC (2007d): *Guide to Cost Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects*, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007g): *Member States and Regions Delivering the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs through EU Cohesion Policy, 2007-2013*, COM(2007) 798, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007h): *Information Note of Commission Services Regarding ERDF Support to SMEs*, COCOF 07/0045/01, 04/07/2007, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007i): Indicative Guidelines on Evaluation Methods: Evaluation during the Programming Period, *Working Document No.5*, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007j): Guidance Note on the Compliance Assessment Exercise (Under Article 71 Of Regulation (Ec) No 1083/2006), Cocof/07/0039/01-En, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007k): *Guidance Note on the Audit Strategy (Under Article 62 Of Council Regulation (EC) N°1083/2006)*, Cocof 07/0038/01-En, 06 August 2007, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2007l): *EU Budget 2006: Financial Report*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (2008a): *Fifth Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Growing Regions, Growing Europe*, COM (2008) 371, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EC (2008b): *Cohesion Policy: Investing in the Real Economy*, COM(2008) 876, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2008c): *On the Results of the Negotiations Concerning Cohesion Policy Strategies and Programmes for the Programming Period 2007-2013*, COM(2008) 301, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2008d): *An Action Plan to Strengthen the Commission's Supervisory Role under Shared Management of Structural Actions*, COM(2008) 97, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2008e): Fostering the Urban Dimension: Analysis of the Operational Programmes Co-Financed by the European Regional Development Fund (2007-2013), *Working Document of the Directorate-General for Regional Policy*, Brussels: European Commission.

- EC (2008f): *Guidance Document on Management Verifications to Be Carried out by Member States on Operations Co-Financed by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund for the 2007 – 2013 Programming Period*, COCOF 08/0020/04-EN, 5 June 2008, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2008h): *Document on a Common Methodology for the Assessment of Management and Control Systems in the Member States (2007-2013 Programming Period)*, Cocof 08/0019/01-En, 6 June 2008, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2008h): *Cohesion Policy 2007-13: National Strategic Reference Frameworks*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009a): *Sixth Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Creative and Innovative Regions*, COM (2009) 295, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union.
- EC (2009b): *Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 Concerning General Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund as Regards Simplification of Certain Requirements and as Regards Certain Provisions Relating to Financial Management*, COM(2009) 384, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009c): *Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength*, COM(2008) 616, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009d): *Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan to Strengthen the Commission's Supervisory Role under Shared Management of Structural Actions*, COM(2009) 42, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009e): *Indicative Guidelines on Evaluation Methods: Reporting on Core Indicators for the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund, Working Document No.7*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009f): *Information Note: Reporting of Categorisation Data under Article 11 of Regulation N° 1828/2006* 18/05/2009, Cocof 09/0008/02-En, 18/05/2009, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009g): *Guidance Note on the Concept of Reliance on the Work of other Auditors*, 23/02/2009, Cocof 09/0002/01-En, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009h): *Indicative Guidelines on Evaluation Methods: Reporting on Core Indicators for the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund, Working Document No.7*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009i): *Information Note: Indicative Structure For The National Strategic Reports 2009*, Cocof 09/0018/01-En 1, 18 May 2009, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2009j): *The Control System For Cohesion Policy: How it Works in the 2007–13 Budget Period*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union.
- EC (2010a): *Investing in Europe's Future. Fifth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2010b): *Regional Policy Contributing to Smart Growth in Europe 2020*, COM(2010) 553, Brussels: European Commission.

- EC (2010c): *Cohesion Policy: Strategic Report 2010 on the Implementation of the Programmes 2007-2013*, COM(2010) 110, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2010d): *Regional Innovation Governance, Regional Focus – short paper series*, 02/2010, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2010e): *Measuring Structural Funds Employment Effects*, Working Document No.6, January 2007, COCOF/06/0017/03-EN, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2011a): *Seventh Progress Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion. The Urban and Regional Dimension of Europe 2020*, COM (2011) 0776, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2011b): *A Budget for Europe 2020*, COM(2011) 500, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2011c): *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying down Common Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic Framework and Laying down General Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006*, COM(2011) 615, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2011d): *Revised Guidance Note on Major Projects in the Programming Period 2007-2013: Threshold and Contents of Commission Decisions*, COCOF 08/0006/06-EN, 7 June 2011, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2011f): *Outcome Indicators and Targets: Towards a new System of Monitoring and Evaluation in EU Cohesion Policy, Revision Note of the Original Methodological Note Submitted to the High Level Group Reflecting on Future Cohesion Policy*, 15 February 2011, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2011g): *Errors In Cohesion Policy*, Working Document, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2011h): *Need for Corrective Measures and Observations Regarding the Regional Operational Programme North-West (2007CZ161PO008)*, Letter no. REGIO F2 1251641 from 10 November 2011, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2012a): *Connecting Universities to Regional Growth: A Practical Guide*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2012b): *Guidance Note on Indicative Contents and Structure for the National Strategic Reports 2012*, *Guidance Note*, Cocof_11-0040-01-En, 19 January 2012.
- EC (2013a): *Eighth Progress Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion. The Urban and Regional Dimension of the Crisis*, COM (2013) 475, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2013b): *Cohesion policy: Strategic report 2013 on Programme Implementation 2007-2013*, COM(2013) 210, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2013c): *Results of the Mid-Term Verification of Additionality 2007-2013*, 28 February 2013, Com(2013) 104, Brussels: European Commission.

- EC (2014a): *Investment for Jobs and Growth: Promoting Development and Good Governance in EU Regions and Cities. Sixth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2014b): *The Urban Dimension of EU Policies – Key Features of an EU Urban Agenda*, COM(2014) 490, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2014c): *The European Code of Conduct on Partnership in the Framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- EC (2014d): *Internal Guidance on Ex Ante Conditionalities for the European Structural and Investment Funds: Part I*, Version 2 - 29 August 2014, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2014e): *Co-Financing Salaries, Bonuses, Top-Ups from Structural Funds during the 2007-2013 Period*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- EC (2014g): *EU Budget 2013: Financial Report (Also Covering Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013)*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2015): *European Structural and Investment Funds 2014-2020: Official Texts and Commentaries*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2016): *Ex Post Evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007-13, Commission Staff Working Document*, SWD(2016) 318, 19 September 2016, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2017): *My Region, My Europe, Our Future. Seventh Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion*, COM (2017) 0583, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC (2018a): *Proposal for a Regulation Laying Down Common Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and Financial Rules for Those and for the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument*, COM(2018) 321 final, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2018b): *A Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027*, COM(2018) 321 final, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2018c): *SIMPLIFICATION HANDBOOK: 80 Simplification Measures in Cohesion Policy 2021-2027*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2019a): *EU Budget 2018: Financial Report*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union.
- EC (2019b): *FINAL AUDIT REPORT – Audit No. REGC414CZ0133*, REGIO/C4/AUD/2019, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2019c): *DRAFT AUDIT REPORT – Audit No. REGIO/C4/PH/AP/D(2019)3903015*, Brussels: European Commission.
- EC (2019d): *A Union that strives for More: My Agenda for Europe - By Candidate for President*

of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2019e): *Time to Decide on the Union's Financial Framework for 2021-2027*, COM(2019) 456 final, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2019f): *The European Green Deal*, COM(2019) 640 final, Brussels: European Commission.

EC (2020): *Europe's Moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation*, COM(2020) 456 final, Brussels: European Commission.

European Council (2000): *Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000. Presidency Conclusion*, retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm

European Council (2020): *Special meeting of the European Council (17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 July 2020) – Conclusions*, EUCO 10/20, Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council.

Government of the Czech Republic (2003a): *Rámec podpory Společenství - Česká republika 2004-2006* [Community Support Framework – Czech Republic 2004-2006], CCI: 2003CZ161CC001, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2003b): *Operační program Infrastruktura* [OP Infrastructure], Prague: Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Environment of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2003c): *Operační program Průmysl a podnikání na léta 2004 – 2006* [OP Industry and Enterprise 2004-2006], Prague: Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2003d): *Operační program Rozvoj lidských zdrojů* [OP Human Resources Development], Prague: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2007a): *Národní strategický referenční rámec ČR 2007-2013* [National Strategic Reference Framework of Czech Republic 2007-2013], Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2007b): *Organizační struktura MŠMT k 1. 7. 2007* [Organizational Structure of the MEYS, 1-7-2007], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2009a): *Strategic Report of the Czech Republic 2009* [Strategic Report of the Czech Republic 2009], Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2009b): *Organizační struktura MŠMT k 1.1.2009* [Organizational Structure of the MEYS, 1-1-2009], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2009c): *Annual Implementation Report for the Operational Programme Research and Development for Innovation 2009*, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2010): *Roadmap for Large Research, Development and Innovation Infrastructures in the Czech Republic*, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2011a): *Integrovaný operační program pro období 2007-2013* [Integrated OP for the Period of 2007-2013], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2011b): *Operační program Doprava na léta 2007-2013* [OP Transport 2007-2013], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic.

- GoCR (2011c): *Operační program Podnikání a inovace* [OP Enterprise and Innovation], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2011d): *Operační program Technická pomoc* [OP Technical Assistance], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2011e): *Operační program Výzkum a vývoj pro inovace* [OP Research and Development for Innovations], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2011f): *Roadmap for Large Research, Development and Innovation Infrastructures in the Czech Republic – May 2011 Update*, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2012a): *Operační program Lidské zdroje a zaměstnanost 2007-2013* [OP Human Resources and Employment 2007-2013], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2012b): *Programový dokument OPŽP pro období 2007-2013* [Programme Document of OPE for the Period 2007-2013], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Environment of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2012a): *Strategic Report II of the Czech Republic for the 2007–2013 Programming Period*, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2012b): *Vyjádření Ministerstva financí k auditu ROP Severozápad* [Statement of the Ministry of Finance on the Audit of ROP North-West], Press Release 23/5/2012, Prague: Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, retriever from: <https://www.mfcr.cz/cs/aktualne/v-mediich/2012/2012-05-23-vmediich-4922-4922>
- GoCR (2012c): *Operační program Vzdělání pro konkurenceschopnost* [OP Education for Competitiveness], revised version, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2012d): *Rizikové operační programy: Návrhy opatření směřující k naplňování cílů Národního strategického referenčního rámce* [OPs under Risk: Proposals for Measures Oriented at Fulfilling of the Aims of the National Strategic Reference Framework], Prague: Ministry of Regional Development.
- GoCR (2012e): *Společné kroky MF a MMR vůči řídicímu orgánu ROP Severozápad* [Common Steps of MF and MRD against the managing authority of ROP North-West], Press Release 4/6/2012, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic, retriever from: <https://www.mmr.cz/cs/pro-media/tiskove-zpravy/2012/spolecne-kroky-mf-a-mmr-vuci-ridicimu-organu-rop-s>
- GoCR (2013a): *Složení monitorovacího výboru operačního programu podnikání a inovace 2007 – 2013 (platný ke dni 19. 11. 2013)* [Composition of Monitoring Committee OP Enterprise and Innovation, 2007-2013 (effective since 19 November 2013)], Prague: Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic.
- GoCR (2013b): *Vláda není zodpovědná za chod ROP Severozápad* [The Government is not Responsible for the Management of ROP North-West], Press Release 23/5/2013, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic, retrieved from:

<https://www.mmr.cz/cs/pro-media/medialni-reakce/vlada-neni-zodpovedna-za-chod-rop-severozapad?feed=MedialniReakce>

GoCR (2014a): Dohoda o partnerství pro programové období 2014–2020 [Partnership Agreement for the Programming Period 2014-2020], Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2014b): *Operační program Výzkum, vývoj a vzdělávání* [OP Research, Development and Education], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2014c): *Organizační struktura MŠMT k 1. 4. 2014* [Organizational Structure of the MEYS, 1-4-2014], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2014d): *Výroční zpráva o provádění Operačního programu Výzkum a vývoj pro inovace za rok 2014* [Annual Implementation Report for the Operational Programme Research and Development for Innovation 2014], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2014e): *Integrated Regional Operational Programme*, revised version, Prague: Ministry of Regional Development.

GoCR (2015a): *Operační program Podnikání a inovace pro konkurenceschopnost 2014 – 2020* [OP Enterprise and Innovation for Competitiveness 2014-2020], Prague: Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2015b): *Roadmap of Large Infrastructures for Research, Experimental Development and Innovation of the Czech Republic for the years 2016–2022*, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports.

GoCR (2016a): *Statut a Jednací řád Rady pro velké infrastruktury pro výzkum, experimentální vývoj a inovace* [Statute and Order of the Council for Large Infrastructures for Research, Experimental Development and Innovations], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2016b): *Zpráva o auditu operace: Multifunkční kongresový areál Čapí hnízdo* [Report on the Audit Operation: Multifunctional Congress Areal Compound Stork's Nest], ROPSC/2016/MO/001, Prague: Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2017a): *Monitorovací výbor Operačního programu Vzdělávání pro konkurenceschopnost - Seznam členů a jejich náhradníků platný ke dni 19. 5. 2017* [Monitoring Committee Operational Programme Education for Competitiveness – List of Members and their Substitutes Effective to the Date 19-5-2017], Prague: Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2017b): *Seznam členů a náhradníků monitorovacího výboru OP VaVpl* [List of Members and their Substitutes of the OP Research and Development for Innovations], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2018): *Závěrečná zpráva evaluace - Ex-post evaluace programového období 2007 – 2013 v oblasti výzkumu a vývoje* [Final Evaluation Report – Ex-post Evaluation of the Programming Period 2007-2013 in the Domain of Research and Development], Prague: Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic.

GoCR (2019): *Roadmap of Large Research Infrastructures of the Czech Republic for the years 2016-2022 - Update 2019*, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports.

- GoCR (2020): *Členové Monitorovacího výboru OP VVV* [Members of the Monitoring Committee of OP Research, Development and Education], Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.
- Government of Germany (2020): *Together for Europe's Recovery: Programme for Germany's Presidency of the Council of the European Union*, Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt.
- Government of Greece (1982): *Greek Memorandum: Position of the Greek Government on Greece's Relations with the European Communities*, Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 3/1982.
- Government of Republic of Hungary (2003): *Community Support Framework - Republic of Hungary 2004-2006 - Objective 1 of the Structural Funds*, CCI: 2003HU161CC001, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007a): *The New Hungary Development Plan - National Strategic Reference Framework of Hungary 2007-2013*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007b): *Economic Development Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007c): *Environment and Energy Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007d): *Implementation Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007e): *Social Infrastructure Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007f): *Social Renewal Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007g): *State Reform Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007h): *Electronic Administration Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007i): *Transport Operational Programme*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007j): *West Pannon Operational Programme 2007-2013*, CCI 2007HU161PO003, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007k): *South Transdanubia Operational Programme 2007-2013*, CCI 2007HU161PO011, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007l): *South Great Plain Operational Programme 2007-2013*, CCI 2007HU161PO005, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007m): *North Hungary Operational Programme 2007-2013*, CCI 2007HU161PO006, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.
- GoRH (2007n): *Central Transdanubian Operational Programme 2007-2013*, CCI 2007HU161PO005, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.

GoRH (2007o): *Central Hungary Operational Programme 2007-2013*, CCI 2007HU162PO001, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary. GoRH (2009): *National Strategic Report 2009*, Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.

GoRH (2010): *New Széchenyi Plan: The Development Strategy of Recovery and Progress (Preliminary, Abridged Version for Public Review)*, Budapest: Ministry for National Economy Hungary.

GoRH (2012): *Nemzeti Stratégiai Jelentés a 1083/2006/EK 29. alapján Magyarország* [Hungarian National Strategic Report under 1083/2006/EC 29], Budapest: National Development Agency of the Republic of Hungary.

GoRH (2014): *Magyarország Partnerségi Megállapodása a 2014–2020-as fejlesztési időszakra*, [Hungarian Partnership Agreement, for the 2014-2020 Programme Period], Budapest: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of National Economy and the Office of the National Economic Planning of the Republic of Hungary.

Government of Republic of Poland (2003a): *Narodowy Plan Rozwoju 2004-2006 (Dokument przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów w dniu 14 stycznia 2003 r.)* [National Development Plan 2004-2006 (Document Approved by the Council of Ministers on 14 January 2003)], Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2003b): *Sektorowy Program Operacyjny Rozwoj zasobow ludzkich 2004—2006* [Sectoral OP Human Resource Development 2004-2006], Warsaw: Ministry of Economy and Labour of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2003c): *Sektorowy Program Operacyjny Transport na lata 2004-2006* [Sectoral OP Transport 2004-2006], Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development.

GoRP (2003d): *Sektorowy Program Operacyjny Wzrost konkurencyjności przedsiębiorstw, lata 2004—2006* [Sectoral OP Improvement of the Competitiveness of Enterprise], Warsaw: Ministry of Economy and Labour of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2003e): *Zintegrowany Program Operacyjny Rozwoju regionalnego 2004—2006* [Integrated Regional OP 2004-2006], Warsaw: Ministry of Economy and Labour of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2003f): *Program Operacyjny Pomoc techniczna 2004-2006* [OP Technical Assistance 2004-2006], Warsaw: Ministry of Economy and Labour of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2007): *National Strategic Reference Framework 2007–2013 - National Cohesion Strategy*, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2009): *Poland. Strategic report 2009 – National Strategic Reference Framework (Summary)*, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2012): *Raport Strategiczny 2012* [Strategic Report 2012], Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2013): *Program operacyjny Pomoc techniczna* [OP Technical Assistance], revised version, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2014a): *Programowanie perspektywy finansowej 2014-2020 - Umowa Partnerstwa* [Programming of Financial Perspective 2014-2020 – Partnership Agreement], Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2014b): *ZARZĄDZENIE NR 32 MINISTRA INFRASTRUKTURY I ROZWOJU z dnia 30 maja 2014 r. w sprawie powołania Komitetu Monitorującego Program Operacyjny Innowacyjna Gospodarka, 2007-2013* [ORDER NO. 32 MINISTER OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT of 30 May 2014 regarding a request to monitor the Innovative Economy Operational Program, 2007-2013], Warsaw: Ministry of Infrastructure and Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2015): *Program Operacyjny Innowacyjna Gospodarka, 2007-2013* [OP Innovative Economy, 2007-2013], revised version, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2016a): *Program Operacyjny Infrastruktura i środowisko 2007-2013* [OP Infrastructure and Environment 2007-2013], revised version, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2016b): *Program Operacyjny Kapitał ludzki* [OP Human Capital], revised version, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2016c): *Program Operacyjny Rozwój Polski Wschodniej 2007-2013* [OP Development of Eastern Poland 2007-2013], revised version, Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development of the Republic of Poland.

GoRP (2017): *Strategia na Rzecz Odpowiedzialnego Rozwoju do roku 2020 (z perspektywą do 2030 r.)* [Strategy of the Responsible Development 2020 (With a Perspective of 2030)], Warszawa: Ministerstwo Rozwoju.

Government of Slovak Republic (2003a): *Národný rozvojový plán* [National Development Plan], Bratislava: Ministry of Construction and Regional Development of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2003b): *Operačný program Základná infraštruktúra* [OP Basic Infrastructure], Bratislava: Ministry of Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2003c): *Sektorový operačný program Ľudské zdroje* [Sectoral OP Human Resources], Bratislava: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2003d): *Sektorový operačný program Priemysel a Služby* [Sectoral OP Industry and Services], Bratislava: Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2007a): *Národný strategický referenčný rámec 2007-2013* [National Strategic Referential Framework 2007-2013], Bratislava: Ministry of Construction and Regional Development of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2007b): *Operačný program Informatizácia spoločnosti* [OP Information Society], Bratislava: Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2007c): *Operačný program Zdravotníctvo* [OP Health], Bratislava: Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2009): *The Slovak Republic 2009 Strategic Report*, Bratislava: Ministry of Construction and Regional Development of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2011a): *Štatút Monitorovacieho výboru pre Vedomostnú ekonomiku* [Statute of Monitoring Committee for Knowledge Economy], 26 May 2011, Bratislava: Ministry of Economy, Education, Science, Research and Sport and Office of the Government of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2011b): *Operačný program Výskum a vývoj* [OP Research and Development], Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2011c): *Operačný program Bratislavský kraj* [OP Bratislava Region], revised version, Bratislava: Ministerstvo pôdohospodárstva a rozvoja vidieka Slovenskej republiky.

GoSR (2012a): *Operačný program Vzdelávanie* [OP Education], revised version, Bratislava: Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2012b): *Operačný program Doprava* [OP Transport], revised version, Bratislava: Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2012c): *Strategická správa Slovenskej republiky 2012* [Strategic Report of Slovak Republic 2012], Bratislava: Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2013a): *Operačný program Zamestnanosť a sociálna inklúzia* [OP Employment and Social Inclusion], revised version, Bratislava: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2013b): *Operačný program Konkurencieschopnosť a hospodársky rast* [OP Competitiveness and Economic Growth], Bratislava: Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2014): *Partnerská dohoda SR na roky 2014–2020* [Partnership Agreement of Slovak Republic 2014-2020], Bratislava: Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2015a): *Operačný program Technická pomoc na roky 2007–2013* [OP Technical Assistance 2007-2013], revised version, Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2015b): *Operačný program Životné prostredie* [OP Environment], revised version, Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic.

GoSR (2016): *Regionálny operačný program* [Regional Operational Development], revised version, Bratislava: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic.

KPMG (2012): *Mid-term Evaluation of Physical and Financial Progress of the National Strategic Reference Framework Programming Period 2007 – 2013*, Prague: KPMG

Municipal Authority of Capital City Prague/MACCP (2007): *Operační program Praha – Adaptabilita* [OP Prague – Adaptability], Prague: Municipal Authority of Capital City Prague.

Municipal Authority of Capital City Prague/MACCP (2011): *Operační program Praha – konkurencieschopnosť* [OP Prague – Competitiveness], revised version, Prague: Municipal Authority of Capital City Prague.

Office of the Greater Poland Voivodeship/OGPV (2015): *Wielkopolski Regionalny Program Operacyjny na lata 2007–2013* [Greater Poland ROP, 2007-2013], revised version, Poznań: Office of the Greater Poland Voivodeship.

Office of the Holy Cross Voivodeship/OHCV (2011): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Świętokrzyskiego na lata 2007–2013* [ROP of the Holy Cross Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Kielce: Office of the Holy Cross Voivodeship.

Office of the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship/OKPV (2011): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Kujawsko-Pomorskiego* [ROP of the Kujawsko-Pomorskiego Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Toruń: Office of the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship.

Office of the Lower Silesian Voivodeship/OLSV (2007): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny dla Województwa Dolnośląskiego na lata 2007-2013* [ROP for the Lower Silesian Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Wrocław: Office of the Lublin Voivodeship.

Office of the Lublin Voivodeship/OLV (2007): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Lubelskiego na lata 2007–2013* [ROP of the Lublin Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Lublin: Office of the Lublin Voivodeship.

Office of the Mazovian Voivodeship/OMV (2011): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Mazowieckiego 2007–2013* [ROP of the Mazovian Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Warsaw: Office of the Mazovian Voivodeship.

Office of the Opole Voivodeship/OOV (2011): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2007-2013* [ROP of the Opole Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Office of the Opole Voivodeship.

Office of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship/OPV (2007): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Podkarpackiego na lata 2007-2013* [ROP of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Rzeszów: Office of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship.

Office of the Podlaskie Voivodeship/OPodV (2011): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Podlaskiego na lata 2007-2013* [ROP of the Podlaskie Voivodeship, 2007-2013], CCI 2007PL161PO014, Białystok: Office of the Podlaskie Voivodeship.

Office of the Pomeranian Voivodeship/OPomV (2010): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny dla Województwa Pomorskiego na lata 2007-2013* [ROP for the Pomeranian Voivodeship, 2007-2013], CCI 2007PL161PO015, Gdańsk: Office of the Pomeranian Voivodeship.

Office of the Silesian Voivodeship/OSiV (2011): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Śląskiego na lata 2007–2013* [ROP of the Silesian Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Katowice: Office of the Silesian Voivodeship.

Office of the Voivodeship of Lesser Poland/OVLP (2012): *Małopolski Regionalny Program Operacyjny na lata 2007-2013* [Lesser Poland ROP, 2007-2013], CCI 2007PL161PO010, Cracow: Office of the Voivodeship of Lesser Poland.

Office of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship/OWPV (2016): *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego na lata 2007-2013* [ROP of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship, 2007-2013], Szczecin: Office of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship.

Regional Council of the Central Bohemia Cohesion Region/RCCB (2012): *Programový dokument pro Regionální operační program Střední Čechy 2007–2013* [Programming Document for the ROP Central Bohemia 2007-2013], revised version, Prague: Regional Council of the Central Bohemia Cohesion Region.

Regional Council of the Central Moravia Cohesion Region/RCCM (2011): *Regionální operační program Střední Morava pro období 2007–2013* [ROP Central Moravia 2007-2013], revised version, Olomouc: Regional Council of the Central Moravia Cohesion Region.

Regional Council of the Moravia-Silesia Cohesion Region/RCMS (2011): *Regionální operační program regionu soudržnosti Moravskoslezsko 2007-2013* [ROP Moravia-Silesia Cohesion Region 2007-2013], revised version, Ostrava: Regional Council of the Moravia-Silesia Cohesion Region.

Regional Council of the North-East Cohesion Region/RCNE (2011): *Regionální operační program NUTS II Severovýchod pro období 2007–2013* [ROP NUTS II North-East 2007-2013], revised version, Hradec Králové: Regional Council of the North-East Cohesion Region.

Regional Council of the North-West Cohesion Region/RCNW (2013): *Regionální Operační Program NUTS II Severozápad pro období 2007–2013* [ROP NUTS II North-West 2007-2013], revised version, Ústí na Labem: Regional Council of the North-West Cohesion Region.

RCNW (2012): *Zpráva o průběhu realizace ROP Severozápad ke dni 31. 3. 2012 zpracována pro Monitorovací výbor ROP Severozápad konaný dne 22. 5. 2012* [Implementation Report ROP North-West on the date 31/3/2012 Prepared for the Monitoring Committee of the ROP North-West Meeting on the date 22/5/2012], Ústí na Labem: Regional Council of the North-West Cohesion Region.

RCNW (2013): *Zpráva o průběhu realizace ROP Severozápad ke dni 1.10. 2013 zpracována pro Monitorovací výbor ROP Severozápad konaný dne 22. 5. 2012* [Implementation Report ROP North-West on the date 31/3/2012 Prepared for the Monitoring Committee of the ROP North-West Meeting on the date 28/11/2013], Ústí na Labem: Regional Council of the North-West Cohesion Region.

RCNW (2016): *Evaluace přínosů ROP SZ* [Evaluation of Benefits ROP SZ], Prague: RegioPartner and AQE Advisors.

RCNW (2017): *Závěrečná zpráva Regionálního operačního programu regionu soudržnosti Severozápad* [Final Report of the Regional Operational Programme of the Cohesion Region North-West], Ústí na Labem: Regional Council of the North-West Cohesion Region.

Regional Council of the South-East Cohesion Region/RCSE (2008): *Výroční zpráva 2007* [Annual Report 2007], Brno: Regional Council of the South-East Cohesion Region.

RCSE (2013): *Regionální Operační Program NUTS II Jihovýchod pro období 2007–2013* [ROP NUTS II South-East 2007-2013], revised version, Brno: Regional Council of the South-East Cohesion Region.

Regional Council of the South-West Cohesion Region/RCSW (2012): *Regionální operační program NUTS II Jihozápad 2007–2013* [ROP NUTS II South-West 2007-2013], revised version, České Budějovice: Regional Council of the South-West Cohesion Region.

Regional Development Agency of South Moravia/RDASM (2002): *Regional Innovation Strategy*, Brno: Regional Development Agency of South Moravia.

RDASM (2008): *Výroční zpráva 2007* [Annual Report 2007], Brno: Regional Development Agency of South Moravia.

RDASM (2018): *Výroční zpráva 2017* [Annual Report 2017], Brno: Regional Development Agency of South Moravia.

SAO (2014): *EU Report 2014: Zpráva o finančním řízení prostředků Evropské unie* [EU Report: Report on the Financial Management of Resources of the European Union], Prague: Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic.

Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic (SAO) (2013): *EU Report 2013: Zpráva o finančním řízení prostředků Evropské unie* [EU Report: Report on the Financial Management of Resources of the European Union], Prague: Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic.

- South Moravian Innovation Centre/SMIC (2005): *Regionální inovační strategie Jihomoravského kraje* [Regional Innovation Strategy of the South Moravian Region], Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre.
- SMIC (2009): *Regionální inovační strategie Jihomoravského kraje, 2007-2013* [Regional Innovation Strategy of South Moravian Region 2007-2013], Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre.
- SMIC (2014): *Regionální inovační strategie Jihomoravského kraje, 2014-2020* [Regional Innovation Strategy of South Moravian Region 2014-2020], Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre.
- SMIC (2014): *Výroční zpráva 2013-2014* [Annual Report 2013-2014], Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre.
- SMIC (2015): *Výroční zpráva 2014-2015* [Annual Report 2014-2015], Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre.
- SMIC (2016): *Cesta Jihomoravského kraje k inovativnímu regionu* [A Way of the South Moravian Region to Innovation Region], Presentation by Václav Božek and Petr Chládek at the Annual Conference of the RIS, Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre, retrieved from http://www.risjmk.cz/userfiles/file/Konference/RIS%20JMK_Prezentace%20V%C3%BDro%C4%8Dn%C3%AD%20konference%20_2016.pdf
- SMIC (2017): *Výroční zpráva 2016-2017* [Annual Report 2016-2017], Brno: South Moravian Innovation Centre.
- SMIC (2020a): Pracovní skupiny a řídicí výbor [Working Groups and Steering Committee], *Regional Innovation Strategy Website*, <http://www.risjmk.cz/cz/predstaveni-ris-jmk/pracovni-skupiny-a-ridici-vybor/>
- SMIC (2020b): 'Na čem pracujeme' [What Are We Working On], *Regional Innovation Strategy Website*, retrieved from <http://www.risjmk.cz/cz/na-cem-pracujeme/excelence-ve-vyzkumu/>
- South Moravian Regional Authority/SMRA (2006a): *Regionální rozvojová strategie Jihomoravského region – Územní a regionální spolupráce* [Regional Development Strategy of South Moravian Region – Territorial and Regional Cooperation], Brno: GaREP and Brno University of Technology.
- SMRA (2006b): *Regionální rozvojová strategie Jihomoravského region – Návrhová část* [Regional Development Strategy of South Moravian Region – Implementation Section], Brno: GaREP and Brno University of Technology.
- SMRA (2007): *Regional Development Strategy of South Moravian Region – Concise Version*, Brno: GaREP and Brno University of Technology.
- SMRA (2012a): *Strategie rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2020 - Vazba opatření SRJMK 2020 na priority kohezní politiky EU 2014+* [Development Strategy of South Moravian Region 2020 – Links of DSSMR 2020 to the Priorities of Cohesion Policy EU 2014+], Ústí nad Labem: SPF Group.
- SMRA (2012b): *Strategie rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2020 – stručná verze* [Development Strategy of South Moravian Region 2020 – Concise Version], Ústí nad Labem: SPF Group.

- SMRA (2012c): *Strategie rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2020 – implementace, monitoring, financování* [Development Strategy of South Moravian Region 2020 – Implementation, Monitoring, Financing], Ústí nad Labem: SPF Group.
- SMRA (2012d): *Strategie rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2020 – Strategická část: Vize, problémy, cíle a opatření* [Development Strategy of South Moravian Region 2020 – Implementation, Monitoring, Financing], Ústí nad Labem: SPF Group.
- SMRA (2014a): *Program rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2014-2017 – Analýza – Profil Jihomoravského kraje* [Development Strategy of South Moravian Region 2020 Analysis – Profile of the South Moravian Region], Ústí nad Labem: SPF Group.
- SMRA (2014b): *Program rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2014-2017 – Programová část* [Development Programme of South Moravian Region 2014-2017 – Programming Part], Praha: HaskoningDHV.
- SMRA (2014c): *Absorpční kapacita území Jihomoravského kraje pro vymezení regionální dimenze a integrovaného přístupu v rámci přípravy na programovací období 2014+* [Absorption Capacity of the Territory of South Moravian Region for Definition of Regional Dimension and Integrated Approach in the Framework of Programming Period 2014+], Praha: HaskoningDHV.
- SMRA (2018): *Program rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje 2018-2021* [Development Programme of South Moravian Region 2018-2021], Ústí nad Labem: SPF Group.

Secondary Literature

- Aglietta, M. (1979/2015): *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience*, New York: Verso.
- Agnew, J. (2001): 'How Many Europes?: The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Uneven Development', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8:1, 29-38.
- Allen, D. (1996): 'Cohesion and Structural Adjustment: ', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds), *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 137-63.
- Allen, D. (2000): 'Cohesion and Structural Adjustment: Transfers and Trade-Offs', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.), *Policymaking in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209–33.
- Allen, D. (2005): 'Cohesion and Structural Funds: Competing Pressures for Reform?', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. A. Pollack (eds.), *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 213-42.
- Allen, D. (2010): 'The Structural Funds and Cohesion Policy: Extending the Bargain to Meet New Challenges', in H. Wallace, M. A. Pollack and A. R. Young (eds.), *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 229-52.
- Amable, B. (2003): *The Diversity of Modern Capitalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Amsden, A., J. Kochanowicz and L. Taylor (1994): *The Market Meets Its Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Amsden, A. (2001): *The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Anderson, J. (1990): 'Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of the Regions: Britain, Germany and the ERDF', *Journal of Public Policy* 10:4, 417-47.
- Appel, H. and M. Orenstein (2018): *From Triumph to Crisis: Neoliberal Economic Reform in Postcommunist Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arrighi, G. (1990): 'The Developmentalist Illusion: A Reconceptualization of the Semiperiphery', in: W. Martin (ed.), *Semiperipheral States in the World-Economy*, New York: Praeger, 11-42.
- Bache, I. (1999): 'The Extended Gatekeeper: Central Government and the Implementation of the EC Regional Policy in the UK', *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:1, 28-45.
- Bachtler J. and G. Gorzelak (2007): 'Reforming EU Cohesion Policy: a Reappraisal of the Performance of the Structural Funds', *Policy Studies* 28:4, 309-26.
- Bachtler, J. and C. Mendez (2007): 'Who Governs EU Cohesion Policy? Deconstructing the Reforms of the Structural Funds', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45:3, 535-64.
- Bachtler, J. and I. McMaster (2008): 'EU Cohesion Policy and the Role of the Regions: Investigating the Influence of Structural Funds in the New Member States', *Environment and Planning* 26:2, 398-427.
- Bachtler, J., & Ferry, M. (2013): 'Conditionalities and the Performance of European Structural Funds: a Principal-Agent Analysis of Control Mechanisms in EU Cohesion Policy'. *Regional Studies* 49:8, 1258-73.
- Bachtler, J., C. Mendez and H. Oraže (2014): 'From Conditionality to Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe: Administrative Performance and Capacity in Cohesion Policy', *European Planning Studies* 22:4, 735-57.
- Bachtler, J. and C. Mendez (2013): *EU Cohesion Policy and European Integration: The Dynamics of EU Budget and Regional Policy Reform*, London: Routledge.
- Bailey, D. and L. De Propris (2002): 'The 1988 Reform of the European Structural Funds: Entitlement or Empowerment?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 9:3, 408-428.
- Bailey, D. and L. De Propris (2004): 'A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-Assessment Aid and Capacity-Building in the Candidate Countries', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42:1, 77-98.
- Bandelj, N. (2017): 'On Postsocialist Capitalism', *Theory and Society* 45:1, 89-106.
- Beblavý, M. and L. Kureková (2014): 'Into the First League: The Competitive Advantage of the Antivirus Industry in the Czech Republic and Slovakia', *Competition and Change* 18:5, 421-37.
- Becker, J. and J. Jäger (2012): 'Integration in Crisis: A Regulationist Perspective on the Interaction of European Varieties of Capitalism', *Competition and Change* 16:3, 169-187.
- Becker, J., J. Jäger and R. Weissenbacher (2016): 'Uneven and Dependent Development in Europe: The Crisis and its Implications' in J. Jäger and E. Springer (eds.): *Asymmetric Crisis in Europe and Possible Futures: Critical Political Economy and Post-Keynesian Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 81-96.
- Becker, U. (2014): 'The Heterogeneity of Capitalism in Crisis-Ridden Europe', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 22:3, 261-275.

- Behrens, P. and M. Smyrl (1999): 'A Conflict of Rationalities: EU Regional Policy and the Single Market', *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:3, 419-35.
- Bieler, A. and A. D. Morton (eds.) (2001): *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy*, Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Bieler, A. (2005): 'Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives and the Analysis of European Integration', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8(4): 513-526.
- Bieling, H.-J., J. Jäger and M. Ryner (2016): 'Regulation Theory and the Political Economy of the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54:1, 53–69.
- Bohle, D. (2006): 'Neoliberal Hegemony, Transnational Capital and the Terms of the EU's Eastward Expansion', *Capital & Class* 30:1, 57-86.
- Bohle, D. (2009): 'Race to the Bottom? Transnational Companies and Reinforced Competition in the Enlarged European Union', in B. van Apeldoorn, J. Drahokoupil and Laura Horn (eds.) (2009): *Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 163-186.
- Bohle, D. (2017): 'European Integration, Capitalist Diversity and Crises Trajectories on Europe's Eastern Periphery', *New Political Economy* 23:2, 239-53.
- Bohle, D. and B. Greskovits (2007a): 'Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism: Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe', *West European Politics* 30:3, 443-466.
- Bohle, D. and B. Greskovits (2007b): 'The State, Internationalization, and Capitalist Diversity in Eastern Europe', *Competition and Change* 11:2, 89-115.
- Bohle, D. and B. Greskovits (2009): 'Varieties of Capitalism and Capitalism «Tout Court», *European Journal of Sociology*, 50:3, 355-86.
- Bohle, D. and B. Greskovits (2012): *Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bohle, D. and B. Greskovits (2018): 'Politicising Embedded Neoliberalism: Continuity and Change in Hungary's Development Model', *West European Politics* 42:5, 1069-1093.
- Bohle, D. and D. Husz (2005): 'Whose Europe is It?', *Politique Européenne* 15:1, 85-112.
- Bonefeld, W. (2012): Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism, *New Political Economy* 17:5, 633-656.
- Blom-Hansen, J. (2005) 'Principals, Agents, and the Implementation of EU Cohesion Policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 12:4, 624-48.
- Bloom, S. and V. Petrova (2013): 'National Subversion of Supranational Goals: 'Pork-Barrel' Politics and EU Regional Aid', *Europe-Asia Studies* 65:8, 1599-1620.
- Bluhm, Katharina and Mihai Varga (2019): "Conservative Developmental Statism in East Central Europe and Russia", *New Political Economy* advance online publication 10 July, doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2019.1639146.

- Böröcz, J. (1992): 'Dual Dependency and Property Vacuum: Social Change on the State Socialist Semiperiphery', *Theory & Society* 21:1, 77–104.
- Böröcz, J. (2000): 'Informality Rules', *East European Politics and Societies* 14:2, 348–80.
- Börzel, T.A. and U. Sedelmeier (2017): 'Larger and More Law Abiding? The Impact of Enlargement on Compliance in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 24:2, 197-215.
- Brenner, N. (1999): 'Globalization as Reterritorialization: the Re-Scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', *Urban Studies* 36:3, 431–51.
- Brenner, N. and N. Theodore (2002): 'Cities and the Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism'', in N. Brenner and N. Theodore (eds.), *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2–32.
- Brenner, N. (2003a): 'Standortpolitik, State Rescaling and the New Metropolitan Governance in Western Europe', *The Planning Review* 39:152, 15-25.
- Brenner, N. (2003b): 'Metropolitan Institutional Reform and the Rescaling of State Space in Contemporary Western Europe', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 10:4, 297–325.
- Brenner, N. (2004): *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N. (2009): 'Open Questions on State Rescaling', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 2:1, 123–139.
- Brenner, N. (2019): *New Urban Spaces: Urban Theory and the Scale Question*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, D., B. Greskovits and L. Kulcsár (2007): 'Leading Sectors and Leading Regions: Economic Restructuring and Regional Inequality in Hungary since 1990', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 31:3, 522–42.
- Bruff, I. (2008): *Culture and Consensus in European Varieties of Capitalism: A "Common Sense" Analysis*, Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Bruff, I. (2011): 'What about the Elephant in the Room? Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties in Capitalism', *New Political Economy* 16:4, 481-500.
- Bruff, I. and M. Ebenau (2017): 'Comparative Capitalisms Research: The Intellectual Openness and Political Possibilities inherent to Critical, Global Perspectives on Capitalist Diversity', *New Perspectives* 25:1, 131-141.
- Brusis, M. (2002): 'Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-Creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', *Governance* 15:4, 531-559.
- Bruszt, L. (2008): 'Multi-level Governance—the Eastern Versions: Emerging Patterns of Regional Development Governance in the New Member States', *Regional & Federal Studies* 18:5, 607-27.
- Bruszt, L. and G.A. McDermott (2012): Integrating Rule Takers: Transnational Integration Regimes Shaping Institutional Change in Emerging Market Democracies, *Review of International Political Economy* 19:5, 742-778.

- Bruszt, L. and V. Vukov (2017): Making States for the Single Market: European Integration and the Reshaping of Economic States in the Southern and Eastern Peripheries of Europe, *West European Politics* (online), 1-25.
- Buzogány, Aron and Mihai Varga (2018): 'The Ideational Foundations of the Illiberal Backlash in Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Hungary', *Review of International Political Economy* 25(6): 811-828.
- Carfuny, A.W. and M. Ryner (eds.) (2003): *A Ruined Fortress?: Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Cafruny A. and Ryner M. (2012): 'The Global Financial Crisis and the European Union: The Irrelevance of Integration Theory and the Pertinence of Critical Political Economy', in: P. Nousios, H. Overbeek and A. Tsolakis (eds.), *Globalisation and European Integration: Critical Approaches to Regional Order and International Relations*, London: Routledge, 32-50.
- Cartwright, A. and A. Batory (2012): 'Monitoring Committees in Cohesion Policy: Overseeing the Distribution of Structural Funds in Hungary and Slovakia', *Journal of European Integration* 34:4, 323-340.
- Císař, O. (2017): *Czech Republic: From Post-Communist Idealism to Economic Populism*, Prague: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Chibber, V. (2002): 'Bureaucratic Rationality and the Developmental State', *American Journal of Sociology* 107:4, 951-989.
- Cox, R.W. (1983): 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12:2, 162-75.
- Cox, R.W. (1987): *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Crouch, C. and Streeck, W. (1997): *Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity*, London: SAGE.
- Crouch, C., W. Streeck, R. Boyer, B. Amable, P. Hall and G. Jackson (2005): 'Dialogue on 'Institutional Complementarity and Political Economy'' *Socioeconomic Review* 3, 359-382.
- Dąbrowski, M. (2011): 'Europeanizing Sub-National Governance: Partnership in the Implementation of European Union Structural Funds in Poland', *Regional Studies* 47:8, 1-12.
- Dąbrowski, M. (2012): 'Shallow or Deep Europeanisation? The Uneven Impact of EU Cohesion Policy on the Regional and Local Authorities in Poland', *Environment and Planning* 30: 4, 730-745.
- Dąbrowski, M. (2014): 'EU Cohesion Policy, Horizontal Partnership and the Patterns of Sub-National Governance: Insights from Central and Eastern Europe', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 21:3, 364-383.
- Dąbrowski, M., J. Bachtler and F. Bafoil (2014): 'Challenges of Multi-Level Governance and Partnership: Drawing Lessons from European Union Cohesion Policy', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 21:4, 355-363.
- Dąbrowski, M. and K. Piskorek (2018): 'The Development of Strategic Spatial Planning in Central and Eastern Europe: Between Path Dependence, European Influence, and Domestic Politics', *Planning Perspectives* 33:4, 571-589.

- D'Apice, P. (2015): 'Cross-Border Flows Operated through the EU Budget: An Overview', *European Economy Discussion Papers* n.19, Brussels: European Commission (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs).
- Drahokoupil, J. (2004): 'Post-Fordist Capitalism in the Czech Republic: The Investment of Flextronics in Brno', *Czech Sociological Review* 40:3, 343-362.
- Drahokoupil, J. (2007): 'The State of the Capitalist State in East-Central Europe: Towards the Porterian Post-National Regime', in B. Sergi, W. Bagatelas and J. Kubicova (eds), *Industries and Markets in East and Central Europe*, 175–198.
- Drahokoupil, J. (2008): 'The Rise of the Comprador Service Sector: The Politics of State Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe', *Polish Sociological Review* 162, 175-189.
- Drahokoupil, J. (2009a): *Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: Politics of Foreign Direct Investment*, London: Routledge.
- Drahokoupil, J. (2009b): 'Internationalisation of the State in the Czech Republic: Igniting the Competition for Foreign Investment in the Visegrád Four Region', *Czech Sociological Review* 45:3, 549–570.
- Drahokoupil, J. and Myant, M. (2015): 'Putting Comparative Capitalisms Research in its Place: Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Economies', in M. Ebenau, I. Bruff and C. May (eds.), *New Directions in Critical Comparative Capitalisms Research*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 155-171.
- De Rynck, S. and P. McAleavey (2001) 'The Cohesion Deficit in Structural Fund Policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 8:4, 541-57.
- Ebenau, M. (2012): 'Varieties of Capitalism or Dependency? A Critique of the VoC Approach for Latin America', *Competition and Change* 16:3, 206–23.
- Ebenau, M., I. Bruff and C. May (eds.) (2015): *New Directions in Critical Comparative Capitalisms Research*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Epstein, R. (2013): 'When do Foreign Banks 'Cut and Run'? Evidence from West European Bailouts and East European Markets', *Review of International Political Economy* 21:4, 847-877.
- Epstein, R. (2014): Overcoming 'Economic Backwardness' in the European Union, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52:1, 17-34.
- Eyal, G., I. Szelenyi and E.R. Townsley (1998): *Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe*. London and New York: Verso.
- Evans, P. (1995): *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fazekas, M. and L. P. King (2018): 'Perils of Development Funding? The Tale of EU Funds and Grand Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe', *Regulation & Governance* 13:3, pp. 405-430.
- Ferry, M. and I. McMaster (2005): 'Implementing Structural Funds in Polish and Czech Regions: Convergence, Variation, Empowerment?', *Regional & Federal Studies* 15:1, 19–39.
- Ferry, M. and I. McMaster (2013): 'Cohesion Policy and the Evolution of Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe', *Europe-Asia Studies* 65:8, 1502-28.

- Fisher, S., J. Gould and T. Haughton (2007): 'Slovakia's Neoliberal Turn', *Europe-Asia Studies* 59:6, 977-998.
- Galgóczi, B., J. Drahekoupil and M. Bernaciak (2015): *Foreign Investment in Eastern and Southern Europe after 2008. Still a Lever of Growth?*, Brussels: ETUI.
- Gerschenkron, A. (1962): *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gill, S. (1998): 'European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe', *New Political Economy* 3:1, 5-26.
- Glassman, J. (1999): 'State Power beyond the `Territorial Trap': the Internationalization of the State', *Political Geography* 18:6, 669-696.
- Golubchikov, O. (2016): 'The Urbanization of Transition: Ideology and the Urban Experience', *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 57:4-5, 607-623.
- Golubchikov, O., A. Badyina, and A. Makhrova (2014): 'The Hybrid Spatialities of Transition: Capitalism, Legacy and Uneven Urban Economic Restructuring', *Urban Studies* 51: 617-633.
- Gowan, P. (1995): 'Neo-liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe'. *New Left Review* 21:3, 3-60.
- Grabbe, H. (2005): *The EU's Transformative Power*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Grubbauer, M. (2012): 'Toward a More Comprehensive Notion of Urban Change: Linking Post-Socialist Urbanism and Urban Theory', in M. Grubbauer and J. Kusiak (eds.), *Chasing Warsaw – Socio-Material Dynamics of Urban Change since 1990*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 35-60.
- Haahr, J.H. and W. Walters (2005): *Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration*, London: Routledge.
- Hall, P.A. and C. Rosemary and R. Taylor (1996): 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies* 44:5, 936-57.
- Hall, P.A. and D. Soskice (2001): *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hanley, E., L. King and I.T. Janos (2002): 'The State, International Agencies, and Property Transformation in Postcommunist Hungary', *American Journal of Sociology* 108:1, 129-167.
- Hanley, S. and M.A. Vachudova (2018) 'Understanding the Illiberal Turn: Democratic Backsliding in the Czech Republic', *East European Politics* 34:3, 276-296.
- Hardy, J. (2014): Transformation and Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe: A Combined and Uneven Development Perspective, *Capital and Class* 38:1, 143-155.
- Harvey, D. (1976): 'The Marxian Theory of the State', *Antipode* 8:2, 80-89.
- Harvey, D. (1982/2006): *Limits to Capital*, London: Verso
- Harvey, D. (1981): 'The Spatial Fix: Hegel, von Thünen and Marx', *Antipode* 13:3, 1-12.
- Harvey, S. (1985): 'The Geopolitics of Capitalism', in: D. Gregory and J. Urry (eds.), *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 128-63.

- Harvey, D. (1989): 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: the Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism', *Geografiska Annaler* 71:1, 3–18.
- Harvey, D. (1996): *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (2001): 'Globalization and the "Spatial Fix"', *Geographische Revue* 3:2, 23-30.
- Harvey, D. (2003): *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hay, C. and B. Rosamond (2002): 'Globalization, European integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives', *Journal of European Public Policy* 9:2, 147-167.
- Hooghe, L. (1996): *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hooghe, L. (1998): EU Cohesion Policy and Competing Models of European Capitalism, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36:4, 457-77.
- Höpner, M. and A. Schäfer (eds.) (2008): *Die Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration*, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.
- Höpner, M. and A. Schäfer (2010): 'A New Phase of European Integration? Organized Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe', *West European Politics* 33:2, 344-368.
- Höpner, M. and A. Schäfer (2012a): 'Integration among Unequals: How the Heterogeneity of European Varieties of Capitalism Shapes the Social and Democratic Potential of the EU', *MPIfG Discussion Paper* 12:5, 1-33.
- Höpner, M. and A. Schäfer (2012b): 'Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in a Hayekian Setting', *International Organization*, 66:3, 429-455.
- Holman, O. (1998): 'Integrating Eastern Europe: EU Expansion and the Double Transformation in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary', *International Journal of Political Economy* 28:2, 12-43.
- Holman, O. (2004a): 'Integrating Peripheral Europe: the Different Roads to 'Security and Stability' in Southern and Central Europe', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7:2, 208–36.
- Holman, O. (2004b): 'Asymmetric Regulation and Multidimensional Governance in the European Union', *Review of International Political Economy* 11:4, 714-735.
- Hughes, J., G. Sasse and C. Gordon (2005): *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality*, London: Palgrave.
- Innes, A. (2016) 'Corporate State Capture in Open Societies: the Emergence of Corporate Brokerage Party Systems', *East European Politics and Societies* 30:3, 594-620.
- Ivanova, M. (2007): 'Why There Was No 'Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe and Why This Still Matters', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 15:3, 345-376.
- Kohler-Koch, B. and B. Rittberger (2006): 'The 'Governance Turn' in EU Studies', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44:1, 27-49.
- Kopecký, P. and C. Mudde (2002): 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe', *European Union Politics* 3:3, 297–326.
- Jacoby, W. (2001): 'Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western Models', *Governance* 14:2, 169–200.

- Jacoby, W. (2010): 'Managing Globalization by Managing Central and Eastern Europe: The EU's Backyard as Threat and Opportunity', *Journal of European Public Policy* 17:3, 416–32.
- Jacoby, W. (2014): 'The EU Factor in Fat Times and in Lean: Did the EU Amplify the Boom and Soften the Bust?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52:1, 52–70.
- Janos, A. C. (1989): 'The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780–1945', *World Politics* 41:3, 325-58.
- Janos, A. C. (2000): *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands From Pre- to Postcommunism*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Jensen, O. and T. Richardson (2003): *Making European Space: Mobility, Power and Territorial Identity*, London: Routledge.
- Jessop, B. (1990): *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Jessop, B. (1997): 'A neo-Gramscian Approach to the Regulation of Urban Regimes: Accumulation Strategies, Hegemonic Projects and Governance', in M. Lauria (ed.), *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, London: Sage, 51–73.
- Jessop, B. (2001): 'Institutional Re(turns) and the Strategic-Relational Approach', *Environment and Planning A* 33:7, 1213-35.
- Jessop, B. (2002): *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jessop, B. (2006): 'Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes and Spatio- Temporal Fixes', in N. Castree and D. Gregory (eds.), *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 142-66.
- Jessop, B. (2008a): *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jessop, B. (2008b): 'Multi-level Governance and Multi-level Metagovernance: Changes in the European Union as Integral Moments in the Transformation and Reorientation of Contemporary Statehood', I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds.), *Multi-level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–74.
- Jessop, B. (2012): 'The World Market, Variegated Capitalism, and the Crisis of European Integration', in: P. Nousios, H. Overbeek, and A. Tsolakis (eds.), *Globalization and European Integration*, London: Routledge, 91-111.
- Jessop, B. (2013): 'Revisiting the Regulation Approach: Critical Reflections on the Contradictions, Dilemmas, Fixes and Crisis Dynamics of Growth Regimes', *Capital and Class* 37:1, 5-24.
- Jessop, B. (2014a): 'Capitalist Diversity and Variety: Variegation, the World Market, Compossibility and Ecological Dominance', *Capital and Class* 38:1, 43-56.
- Jessop, B. (2014b): 'Variegated Capitalism, das Modell Deutschland, and the Eurozone Crisis', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 22:3, 248-260.
- Jessop, B. (2016): *The State: Past, Present, Future*, London: Polity.
- Jessop, B. (2019): 'Ordoliberalism and Neoliberalization: Governing through Order or Disorder', *Critical Sociology* (online first), 1-15.

- Jessop, B., J. Peck and A. Tickell (1999): 'Retooling the Machine: Economic Crisis, State Restructuring, and Urban Politics', in A. Jonas and D. Wilson (eds.), *The Urban Growth Machine*, New York: SUNY Press, 141-159.
- Jessop, B. and N.-L. Sum (2006): *Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in their Place*, Cheltenham UK and Northampton: Edward Elgar.
- Jessop, B., N. Brenner and M. Jones (2008): 'Theorizing Sociospatial Relations', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 389-401.
- Jones, R., S. Moisiso, M. Weckroth, M. Woods, J. Luukkonen, F. Meyer and J. Miggelbrink (2019): 'Re-conceptualising Territorial Cohesion Through the Prism of Spatial Justice: Critical Perspectives on Academic and Policy Discourses', in T. Lang and F. Görmar (eds.), *Regional and Local Development in Times of Polarisation: Re-thinking Spatial Policies in Europe*, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 97-119.
- King, L.P. and A. Sznajder (2006): 'The State-Led Transition to Liberal Capitalism: Neoliberal, Organizational, World-Systems, and Social Structural Explanations of Poland's Economic Success', *American Journal of Sociology* 112:3, 751-801.
- Kočička, P. (2011): *Brno se mění v tuzemské »Silicon Valley« a nový ráj IT firem* [Brno is Changing into the National 'Silicon Valley' and Heaven of IT Firms], *Ekonom*, 18 August 2011, retrieved from <https://ekonom.cz/c1-52602420-silicon-brno-aneb-svratka-valley>
- Krpec, O. and V. Hodulák (2018): 'The Czech Economy as an Integrated Periphery: The Case of Dependency on Germany', *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, 1-31.
- Leick, B. and T. Lang (2018): 'Re-Thinking Non-Core Regions: Planning Strategies and Practices beyond Growth', *European Planning Studies* 26:2, 213-228.
- Lagendijk, A. (2007): 'The Accident of the Region: A Strategic Relational Perspective on the Construction of the Region's Significance', *Regional Studies* 41:9, 1193-1208.
- Lang, T., S. Henn, K. Ehrlich and W. Sgibnev (eds.) (2015): *Understanding Geographies of Polarization and Peripheralization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe and Beyond*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lang, T. and I. Török (2017): 'Metropolitan Region Policies in the European Union: Following National, European or Neoliberal Agendas?', *International Planning Studies* 22:1, 1-13.
- Lang, T. and F. Görmar (2019) (eds.): *Regional and Local Development in Times of Polarisation: Re-thinking Spatial Policies in Europe*, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Logan, J., and H. Molotch (1987): *Urban Fortunes. The Political Economy of Place*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Macartney, H. and S. Shields (2011): 'Space, the Latest Frontier? A Scalar-Relational Approach to Critical IPE', in: S. Shields, I. Bruff, H. Macartney (eds.): *Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 27-42.
- Mairate, A. (2006): 'The 'Added Value' of European Union Cohesion Policy', *Regional Studies* 40:2, pp. 167-77.
- Marks, G. (1992): 'Structural Policy in the European Community' in: A. Sbragia (ed.), *The Political Consequences of 1992 for the European Community*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 191-224.

- Marks, G. (1993): 'Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC', in A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), *The State of the European Community*, New York: Lynne Rienner, 391-410.
- Marks, G. (1996): 'Exploring and Explaining Variation in EU Cohesion Policy', in L. Hooghe (ed.): *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 388-422.
- May, C. and A. Nölke (2015): 'Critical Institutionalism in Studies of Comparative Capitalisms: Conceptual Considerations and Research Programme', in M. Ebenau, I. Bruff and C. May (eds.), *New Directions in Critical Comparative Capitalisms Research*. Houndmills: Palgrave, 83-100.
- McCann, P. and R. Ortega-Argilés (2015): 'Smart Specialization, Regional Growth and Applications to European Union Cohesion Policy', *Regional Studies* 49:8, 1291-1302.
- McMichael, P. (1990): 'Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method', *American Sociological Review* 55:3, 385-397.
- McMichael, P. (2000): 'World-Systems Analysis, Globalization, and Incorporated Comparison', *Journal of World-Systems Research* 6:3, 68-99.
- MacLeod, G. and M. Goodwin (1999): 'Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and Regional Governance', *Progress in Human Geography* 23,4 (1999) pp. 503-527.
- McMaster, I. (2006): Czech Regional Development Agencies in a Shifting Institutional and Policy Landscape, *Europe-Asia Studies* 58:3, 347-370.
- Medve-Bálint, G. (2014): 'The Role of the EU in Shaping FDI Flows to East Central Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52:1, 35-51.
- Medve-Bálint, G. (2017): 'Funds for the Wealthy and the Politically Loyal? How EU Funds May Contribute to Increasing Regional Disparities in East Central Europe', in: J. Bachtler, S. Hardy, P. Berkowitz, and T. Muravska (eds.): *EU Cohesion Policy: Reassessing Performance and Direction*, London: Routledge, 220-40.
- Medve-Bálint, G. (2018): 'The Cohesion Policy on the EU's Eastern and Southern Periphery: Misallocated Funds?', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 53:2, 218-238.
- Medve-Bálint, G. and V. Šćepanović (2019): EU Funds, State Capacity and the Development of Transnational Industrial Policies in Europe's Eastern periphery, *Review of International Political Economy* (online first).
- Mendez, C. (2011): 'The Lisbonization of EU Cohesion Policy: A Successful Case of Experimentalist Governance?', *European Planning Studies* 19:3, 519-537.
- Mendez, C. (2013): The post-2013 reform of EU cohesion policy and the place-based narrative, *Journal of European Public Policy* 20:5, 639-59.
- Mendez, C. and J. Bachtler (2011): 'Administrative Reform and Unintended Consequences: An Assessment of the EU Cohesion policy 'Audit Explosion'', *Journal of European Public Policy* 18:5, 746-765.
- Mendez, C. and J. Bachtler (2017): 'Financial Compliance in the European Union: A Cross-National Assessment of Financial Correction Patterns and Causes in Cohesion Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55:3, 569-592.

- Montgomerie, J. (2017): *Critical Methods in Political and Cultural Economy*, London: Routledge.
- Moravcsik, A. (1991): 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', *International Organization* 45:1, 19-56.
- Moravcsik, A. (1993): 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31:4, 473-524.
- Moravcsik, A. and M.A. Vachudova (2003): 'National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement', *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1, 42-57.
- Myant, M. (2003): *The Rise and Fall of Czech Capitalism: Economic Development in the Czech Republic Since 1989*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Myant, M. and J. Drahokoupil (2011): *Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley.
- Myant, M. and J. Drahokoupil (2012): 'International Integration, Varieties of Capitalism and Resilience to Crisis in Transition Economies', *Europe-Asia Studies* 64:1, 1-33.
- Myant, M., J. Drahokoupil and I. Lessay (2013): 'The Political Economy of Crisis Management in East-Central European Countries', *Europe-Asia Studies* 65:3, 383-410.
- Mykhnenko, V. and M. Wolff (2018): 'State Rescaling and Economic Convergence', *Regional Studies* (online), 1-16.
- Naczyk, M. (2014) 'Budapest in Warsaw: Central European Business Elites and the Rise of Economic Patriotism since the Crisis', paper presented at the 26th SASE Annual Meeting, Chicago, available at 10.2139/ssrn.2550496 (10 November 2018).
- Nölke, A. (2011): 'Transnational Economic Order and National Economic Institutions: Comparative Capitalism Meets International Political Economy', *MPIfG Working Paper* 11/3, 1-21.
- Nölke, A. (2012): 'The Rise of the 'B(R)IC Variety of Capitalism' - Towards a New Phase of Organized Capitalism?', H. Overbeek and A. Apledoorn (eds.), *Neoliberalism in Crisis*, Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Nölke, A. (2016): 'Economic Causes of the Eurozone Crisis: the Analytical Contribution of Comparative Capitalism', *Socioeconomic Review* 14:1, 141-161.
- Nölke, A. and A. Vliegthart (2009): 'Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe', *World Politics* 61:4, 670-702.
- Nölke, A., T. ten Brink, S. Claar and C. May (2015): 'Domestic Structures, Foreign Economic Policies and Global Economic Order: Implications from the Rise of Large Emerging Economies', *European Journal of International Relations* 21:3, 538-67.
- Nölke, A., T. ten Brink, C. Ma, S. Claar (2019): *State-permeated Capitalism in Large Emerging Economies*, London: Routledge.
- Nousios, P., H. Overbeek and A. Tsolakis (eds.) (2012), *Globalisation and European Integration: Critical Approaches to Regional Order and International Relations*, London: Routledge.

- Offe, C. (2001): 'The European Model of "Social" Capitalism: Can It Survive European Integration?', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11:4, 437-69.
- O'Dwyer, C. and B. Kovalčík (2007): 'And the Last shall be the First: Party System Institutionalization and Second-Generation Economic Reforms in Postcommunist Europe', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 41:4, 3-26.
- Panitch, L. (1994): 'Rethinking the Role of the State in an Era of Globalization', R. Miliband and L. Panitch (eds.), *Socialist Register 1994*, London: Merlin Press, 60-93.
- Pavlínek, P. (2016a): *Dependent Growth: Foreign Investment and the Development of the Automotive Industry in East-Central Europe*, Cham: Springer.
- Pavlínek, P. (2016b): 'Whose Success? The State-Foreign Capital Nexus and the Development of the Automotive Industry in Slovakia', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 23:4, 571-593.
- Park, B.-G. (2013): 'State Rescaling in Non-Western Contexts', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37:4, 1115-22.
- Piattoni, S. and L. Polverari (2016): *Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Pickles, J. and A. Smith, A. (2005): 'Technologies of Transition: Foreign Investment and the (Re-)articulation of East Central Europe into the Global Economy', in D. Turnock (ed.) *Foreign Investment and Regional Development in East Central Europe*, London: Ashgate, 21-38.
- Papageorgiou, F. and S. Verney (1992): 'Regional Planning and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in Greece', *Regional Politics and Policy* 2:1-2, 139-161.
- Pechova, A. (2012): 'Legitimising Discourses in the Framework of European Integration: The Politics of Euro Adoption in the Czech Republic and Slovakia', *Review of International Political Economy* 19:5, 779-807.
- Peck, J. and A. Tickell (1994): 'Searching for a New Institutional Fix', in A. Amin (ed). *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 280-315.
- Peck, J. and A. Tickell (2002): 'Neoliberalizing Space', *Antipode* 34:3, 380-404.
- Peck, J. and N. Theodore (2007): 'Variegated Capitalism', *Progress in Human Geography* 31:6, 731-72.
- Pollack, M.A. (1995): 'Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: The Making and Implementation of Economic Structural Policy' in C. Rhodes and S. Mazey (eds), *The State of the European Community: Building a European Polity?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 361-390.
- Pollack, M.A. (2008): 'The New Institutionalisms and European Integration', A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 125-143.
- Poulantzas, N. (1968/1975): *Political Power and Social Classes*, New York: Verso.
- Poulantzas, N. (1974a/1978): *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, London: New Left Books.
- Poulantzas, N. (1974b): 'Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation State', *Economy and Society* 2:1, 145-79.
- Poulantzas, N. (1978/2000): *State, Power, Socialism*, New York: Verso.

- Ritchie, J. and J. Lewis (2003): *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, London: SAGE Publications.
- Rodríguez-Pose, A. and U. Fratesi (2004): 'Between Development and Social Policies: The Impact of European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions', *Regional Studies* 38:1, 97-113.
- Rosamond, B. (2002): 'Imagining the European Economy: Competitiveness and the Social Construction of "Europe" as an Economic Space', *New Political Economy* 7:2, 157-177.
- Rosamond, B. (2012): 'Supranational Governance as Economic Patriotism? The European Union, Legitimacy and the Reconstruction of State Space', *Journal of European Public Policy* 19:3, 324-341.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1982): 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization* 36:2, 379-415.
- Ryner, M. and A. Carfruny (2016): *The European Union and Global Capitalism: Origins, Development, Crisis*, Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Scharpf, F. (2012): 'The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:4, 645-670.
- Scheiring, G. (2019) 'Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary', *Geoforum* advance online publication 5 September, doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.08.011.
- Scherpereel, J. (2010) 'EU Cohesion Policy and the Europeanization of Central and East European Regions', *Regional & Federal Studies* 20:1, 45-62.
- Schimmelfering, F. and U. Sedelmeier (2004): Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, *Journal of European Public Policy* 11:4, 661-679.
- Schmidt, J.D. (1996): 'Models of Dirigisme in East Asia: Perspectives for Eastern Europe' in: J. Hersh and J.D. Schmidt (eds.), *The Aftermath of "Real Existing Socialism" in Eastern Europe: Between Western Europe and East Asia*, Houndmills: Palgrave 196-216.
- Schmidt, V.A. (2009): 'Putting the Political Back into Political Economy by Bringing the State Back in Yet Again', *World Politics* 61:3, 516-546.
- Schmidt, V.A. (2010): 'Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth 'New Institutionalism'', *European Political Science Review* 2:1, 1-25.
- Schmidt, V.A. and M. Thatcher (2014): 'Theorizing Ideational Continuity: The Resilience of Neo-liberal Ideas in Europe', in: V.A. Schmidt and M. Thatcher (eds.), *Resilient Liberalism in Europe's Political Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-50.
- Sheppard, E. (2011): 'Geographical Political Economy', *Journal of Economic Geography* 11:2, 319-331.
- Shields, S. (2004): 'Global Restructuring and the Polish State: Transition, Transformation, or Transnationalization?', *Review of International Political Economy* 11:1, 132-154.
- Shields, S. (2011): 'From the Washington Consensus to the Brussels Consensus: Neoliberalisation by Depoliticisation in Post-Communist Poland', *Socialism and Democracy* 25:2, 81-103.

- Shields, S. (2012): *The International Political Economy of Transition*, London: Routledge.
- Shields, S., I. Bruff and I. Macartney (2011): *Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus*, Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Simona, M. (2007): 'Can Administrative Capacity Explain Differences in Regional Performances? Evidence From Structural Funds Implementation in Southern Italy', *Regional Studies* 41:4, 429-442.
- Šitera, D. (2015): 'On New Travels in Space-Time: Theoretical Rediscoveries after the Crisis in (Comparative) Capitalism(s)', *New Perspectives* 23:2, 77-92.
- Šitera, D. (2017): 'Varieties in Comparative Capitalisms Research: a Critical Juncture', *New Perspectives* 25:1, 141-156.
- Skocpol, T., P. Evans and D. Rueschemeyer (1985): *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, N. (1984/2010): *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, London: Verso, 2010.
- Smith, A. (2002): 'Imagining Geographies of the 'new Europe': Geo-Economic Power and the New European Architecture of Integration', *Political Geography* 21:5, 647-670.
- Smith, A. and J. Timár (2010): Uneven Transformations: Space, Economy and Society 20 years after the Collapse of State Socialism, *European Urban and Regional Studies* 17:2, 115-125.
- Smyrl, M. (1997): 'Does European Community Regional Policy Empower the Regions?', *Governance* 10:3, 287-309.
- Stoffel, M.F. and L.M. Dellmuth (2012): 'Distributive Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers: The Local Allocation of European Union Structural Funds', *European Union Politics* 13:3, 413-433.
- Stone, R. W. (2002): *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Streeck, W. (1997): 'German Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?', *New Political Economy* 2:2, 237-256.
- Streeck, W. (2012): 'How to Study Contemporary Capitalism?', *European Journal of Sociology* 53:1, 1-28.
- Streeck, W. and L. Elsässer (2016): 'Monetary Disunion: the Domestic Politics of Euroland', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23:1, 1-24.
- Sum, N.-L. and Jessop, B. (2013), *Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in its Place in Political Economy*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Surubaru, N.C. (2017): 'Administrative Capacity or Quality of Political Governance? EU Cohesion Policy in the New Europe, 2007-13', *Regional Studies* 51:6, 844-856.
- Sutcliffe, J.B. (2000): 'The 1999 Reform of the Structural Fund Regulations: Multi-level Governance or Renationalisation?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 7:2, 290-309.
- Swyngedouw, E., F. Moulaert and A. Rodriguez (2002): 'Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy', *Antipode* 34:3, 542-577.

- Taggart, P. and A. Szczerbiak (2004): 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', *Journal of Political Research* 43:1, 1–27.
- Tatar, M. (2011): 'The Impact of the European Union on Sub-National Mobilization in A Unitary State: The Case of Estonia', *Journal of Baltic Studies* 42:3, 379-407.
- Ther, P. (2014): *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent: Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Thielemann, E. (2002): 'The Price of Europeanization: Why European Regional Policy Initiatives Are a Mixed Blessing', *Regional and Federal Studies* 12:1, 43-65.
- Toman, K. (2010): Za tři roky budeme hlavní město inovace, věří Brno, Aktuálně.cz, 2.2 2010, retrieved from <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/ekonomika/ceska-ekonomika/za-tri-roky-budeme-hlavni-mesto-inovace-veri-brno/r~i:article:659557/>
- Toplišek, A. (2019): The Political Economy of Populist Rule in Post-Crisis Europe: Hungary and Poland, *New Political Economy* (online), 1-16.
- Vachudova, M.A. (2005): *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002): *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*, London: Routledge.
- Van Apeldoorn, B. (2004): 'Theorizing the Transnational: A Historical Materialist Approach', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 7:2, 142–176.
- Van Apeldoorn, B. and S. Hager (2008): 'The Social Purpose of New Governance: Lisbon and the Limits to Legitimacy', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 13:3, 209-238.
- Van Apeldoorn, B., J. Drahokoupil and L. Horn (eds.) (2009): *Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon*, Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Van Apeldoorn, B. and H.W. Overbeek (2012): 'Introduction: the Life Course of the Neoliberal Project and the Global Crisis', in B. van Apeldoorn and H.W. Overbeek (eds.), *Neoliberalism in Crisis*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 1-22.
- Van der Pijl, K. (1984/2012): *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, New York: Verso.
- Van der Pijl, K. (1998): *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London: Routledge.
- Vliegthart, A. (2010): 'Bringing Dependency back in the Economic Crisis in Post-Socialist Europe and the Continued Relevance of Dependent Development', *Historische Sozialforschung* 35:2, 242–265.
- Vliegthart, A. and L. Horn (2007): 'The Role of the EU in the (Trans)formation of Corporate Governance Regulation in Central Eastern Europe — The Case of the Czech Republic', *Competition & Change* 11:2, 137-154.
- Wade, R. (1990): *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wade, R. (2018): 'The Developmental State: Dead or Alive?', *Development and Change* 49:2, 518-546.

- Wallace, H. (1977): 'The Establishment of the Regional Development Fund: Common Policy or Pork Barrel?', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.), *Policy-making in the European Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 137-63.
- Weissenbacher, R. (2017): Peripheral Integration and Disintegration in Europe: the 'European Dependency School', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 26:1, 81-98.
- Wiest, K. (2012): 'Comparative Debates in Post-Socialist Urban Studies', *Urban Geography* 33:6, 829-849.
- Wishlade, F. (1998): 'EC Competition Policy: The Poor Relation of EC Regional Policy?', *European Planning Studies* 6:5, 573-597.
- Wozniak Boyle, J. (2006): *Conditional Leadership: The European Commission and European Regional Policy*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Young, B. (2014): 'German Ordoliberalism as Agenda Setter for the Euro Crisis: Myth Trumps Reality', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 22:3, 276-287.