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EU Development Aid: Idealism or Pragmatism?

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2020

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on
27th July 2020

Xuan Mai Phamová

References

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Abstract

My thesis looks into development into why European Union provides development assistance. My hypothesis is that it is becoming more pragmatic throughout the period 2014 to 2019. I begin my work with introduction into the topic, literature overview and presentation of the hypothesis. In the second part, I present theoretical framework of constructivism and methodology of motive analysis. Motive analysis is a method developed for studying motives via discourse. I have defined 7 motives in a coding book, which will be analysed in the speeches of EU representatives, concretely European Commission's Presidents and High Representatives / Vice-Presidents responsible for European External Action Service. In the third part, I provide brief overview and context of EU's aid policies. In the last, analytical part, I analysed the speeches and identified each motives one by one, I have looked into development of motives throughout time and came to conclusion that most of time, all motives are prevalent behind development aid, only their occurrence and importance slightly changes, depending on internal and external factors. It can be seen that while in 2014 the aid was slightly more tilted towards idealism, in 2019 the aid motives slightly shifted towards pragmatism.

Abstrakt

Moje diplomová práce se věnuje motivaci Evropské unie v rámci rozvojové pomoci. Mojí hypotézou je, že se motivace k rozvojové pomoci stává více pragmatičtější v období 2014 do 2019. V úvodu představuji stručný vhled do tématu, hypotézu a shrnutí literatury. V druhé části se věnuji představení teoretického rámce konstruktivismu a metodologii, kde jsem zvolila analýzu motivů (motive analysis) – jedná se o analytický nástroj ke studiu motivů skrze diskurz. V rámci kodifikování motivů jsem definovala 7 zkoumaných motivů, jež budou vyhledány a analyzovány skrze proslovy zástupců EU a to konkrétně Prezidenta Evropské komise a Vysokého představitele pro zahraniční vztahy. Ve třetí části poskytují stručné shrnutí a kontext evropské rozvojové pomoci. V poslední, analytické části, představuji jednotlivé motivy a ukázky z mluvených projevů v průběhu roků jednotlivých roků a zjistila jsem, že většinu časů je více existujících motivací pro darování rozvojové pomoci, jen se liší jejich výskyt a důležitost, v jaké se objevují, lišících se se kvůli interním a externím faktorům. V závěru bylo zjištěno, že zatímco motivace

v roce 2014 se více blíže idealismu, v průběhu let se do roku 2019 mírně posunula na stranu pragmatismu

Keywords

European Union, Development assistance, Motive analysis, Constructivism, Discourse Analysis

Klíčová slova

Evropská Unie, rozvojová pomoc, analýza motivů, konstruktivismus, diskurzivní analýza

Title

EU Development Aid: Idealism or Pragmatism?

Název práce

Rozvojová pomoc EU: Idealismus nebo pragmatismus?

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1. Introduction

The European Union presents itself as the largest donor of development aid in the world. Which is correct, if we combine altogether development assistance provided by EU institutions and its Member states - in 2019, the amount reached 75,2 billion EUR which makes 55,2 percent of whole development assistance provided in the world¹.

Development aid until now stays a contested area within international relations. Does it work? Is it effective? Is the aid we are providing enough? Up until now, these questions remain in the field with proponents on both side of the discussion².

No wonder, development aid (often called also as foreign aid, development assistance or development cooperation) is still fairly a new area that emerged mainly after Second World War when USA implemented Marshall Plan to help Europe with economic reconstruction. At that time, while it was a sign of generosity, it also served to United States as a tool of strategical importance for their political and economic interests³.

Aid can be given from multiple reasons: for political influence, trade benefits or from idealistic values. Most of time, all factors come in together and rarely, there is only one motive behind. In my work, I would like to study motives in European Union's development assistance. Personally, I find it interesting and important to the field of international relations for several reasons. Firstly, when we investigate main EU documents outlining development aid, we can find that the primary objective of development aid is poverty eradication, alongside with other objectives as human rights, democracy, and sustainable growth⁴. This objective is reinstated multiple times in various legislative documents of EU.

However, when we look into where aid flows from European Union really go, it might surprise us that when we look at EU as EU Institution's spending by countries within bilateral aid,

¹ The European Union remains world's leading donor of Official Development Assistance with €75.2 billion in 2019. [online]. European Commission, @2020. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/european-union-remains-worlds-leading-donor-official-development-assistance_en

² EDWARDS, Sebastian. Economic development and the effectiveness of foreign aid: A historical perspective. [online] VOX EU, @2014. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available from: <https://voxeu.org/article/development-and-foreign-aid-historical-perspective>

³ The Marshall Plan. [online] World 101. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available form: <https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/development/marshall-plan>

⁴ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. [online] European Commission, @2011. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/acp/dv/communication_/communication_en.pdf

the highest share of aid goes into upper middle-income countries (approx. 26%) and then Least developed countries receives approx. 23% of EU aid. Among its top recipients, we can find Turkey with overwhelming 1 907,6 mil. US dollars and on second place, after a huge gap in spends - Serbia with 687 mil. US dollars.⁵ If the goal is to achieve poverty eradication, shouldn't the aid go into LDCs?

Secondly, in 2016, European Union released the Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy in which term "principled pragmatism" was coined and named as a guiding value of EU's external policy. These values applied together with "realistic assessment of the current strategic environment" are the way how to achieve a better world⁶.

According to Snyrer and Vinjamuri, it means that EU is going to advance its norms and values in places where certain strategic conditions already exist -- an example is geographical location: EU can play much larger role than in its neighbourhood than in further states. The idea implies that EU doesn't want to give up its values and ideas, but according to Biscop, simply said, it could be a "Realpolitik with European characteristics"⁷.

The document presents strategy for foreign and security strategy, which also includes development policies. There, we can find statements as "*trade and development – working in synergy – can underpin long-term peacebuilding.*" or "*Finally, we will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity,*" and "*we will build stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, energy and climate, science and technology, notably to improve food security.*"⁸ These statements imply that aid is connected to other external policies of EU and that it also might have other objective except development as security and economic importance.

Therefore, the aim of my work is to look into motives of European Union in development aid policies and the motives development in time. Given the recent events as migration issues in 2015 and growing instability at the Middle East, it is also mentioned in various international NGO claims that EU's development policy is becoming more a tool in foreign policy.

⁵ European Union institutions. [online] OECD iLibrary. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available from: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c0ad1f0d-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/5e331623-en&_csp_=b14d4f60505d057b456dd1730d8fcea3&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=chapter

⁶ A STRONGER GLOBAL ACTOR. In: *European Commission* [online]. Brussels [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/2-years-on-stronger-global-actor_en_1.pdf

⁷ JUNCOS, Ana E. Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn? *European Security*, 2017, 26:1. 1-18.

⁸ A STRONGER GLOBAL ACTOR. In: *European Commission* [online]. Brussels [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/2-years-on-stronger-global-actor_en_1.pdf

My starting point is a hypothesis, that: “In recent years, EU’s developmental aid is taking more pragmatic turn.”

To achieve my goal, the research is separated into 3 parts: theoretical part, EU’s aid context and analytical part. Theoretical part outlines theory of constructivism which serves me as framework for study of language, in which motives of the actors are embedded⁹. Then, I present motive analysis framework (which is form of discourse analysis) created by Swedish professor Esaisson which allow me to study occurrence of motives in text or speeches. In order to use the model, one must first define an actor which is studied and then operationalize selected motives. For my work, I have decided to look at European Union as a unitary actor and I have chosen representatives of EU’s external and foreign policy – European Commission’s Presidents and High Representatives for Common Security and Foreign Policy). Afterwards, I define meaning of “pragmatism” and “idealism” and select 7 motives sorted on the “pragmatism-idealism” continuum. Based on selected motive indicators, I created a code book for these 7 motives.

Before analytical part, I provide brief introduction and context to (EU’s) development assistance. After that, analytical part follows with diachronic analysis of speeches of EC’s Presidents and HRVPs in 2014 versus 2019 with findings presented in discussion.

1.1. Purpose of this work

At the beginning, I would like to mention that I have slightly moved away from the original research target set out in my thesis project. There, I intended to look and analyse development discourses during negotiations of Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF from now on) before negotiation in 2014 and 2021. As the MFF sets out political priorities of the EU, it seemed to be a viable option for analysis of speeches, negotiation boxes or press releases by European Commission or head of states to analyses motives and direction of development aid.

While in 2014, development aid under European Development Fund was not included in the EU budget, the proposal by Commission for budget 2021 was to integrate it into one of the headings. Despite such change, even after extensive research, there was lack of mentions of development aid or assistance in the MMF negotiations especially in recent round of negotiations. Insufficient source materials led me to slight change of work scope.

⁹ 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and new own resources. In: *European Parliament* [online]. European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/db93fa39-84ce-44fe-b4fa-4c6824185e13/2021-2027_Multiannual_financial_framework_and_new_own_resources_-_Analysis_of_the_Commission's_proposal_.pdf

Therefore, I have decided to look into time period of aid motives in 2014 and 2019. I have selected this period since after 2014 (meaning from 2015 and on), the development assistance increased visible, signifying a change in development aid policy¹⁰. Therefore I find it relevant study motives before this change in 2014 and after the change in 2019.

Main question, I am asking during research on this thesis is: what are the motives of EU behind their foreign aid? Is it idealistic and based on its values or it serves as a pragmatic tool of foreign policy to achieve EU's goals?

My main research questions are:

- What are the motives of European Union in development aid?
- Have the EU's motives towards development policy changed during 2014 and 2020? If yes, what were the main changes and key drivers of this change?

The donor's motives are rarely just "purely idealistic" and "purely strategic" – these are in most of time extreme or ideal cases than a reality. They change with time due to both external or internal factors and for that reason, the motives will be broken down into more smaller motives sorted on the pragmatism-idealism axis to account for the more nuanced view.¹¹

1.2. Literature review

Several works were published studying motivations behind aid allocation. Most of them falls into one of these categories and argue that aid is distributed based on either donor preferences or altruistic motivation. Most of the works are based on quantitative research and they investigate relationship between aid allocation and UN support, economic trade (for donor interest) or democratization levels, poverty levels (for altruistic motivations).

One of the most widespread work is from McKinley and Little from 1977 when they identified "donor interests vs. recipient needs" model¹². The recipient's need model is built on premise that aid is proportionally allocated to those that need it the most, therefore the poorest countries should be received the most - the need is for missing capital that would allow these countries to develop their economy.¹³

¹⁰ European Union institutions. [online] OECD iLibrary. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available from: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c0ad1f0d-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/5e331623-en&_csp_=b14d4f60505d057b456dd1730d8fcea3&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=chapter

¹¹ BOUNTAGKIDIS, Georgios K.; FRAGKOS, Konstatinos C.; FRANGOS, C. Christos. EU Development Aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the Normative Principle. Soc. Sci, 2015, 4:1, 85-116

¹² SEN, Onur. Strategic Aid: Explaining The Motives And Choices Of International Donors. 2018, 1-131. Dissertation thesis. Georgia State University.

¹³ MCKINLAY, Robin, LITTLE, Roderick J.A. The US aid relationship: A test of the recipient need and the donor interest models. Political Studies, 1979, 27:2., 236-250.

The other model - donor interest model presumes that aid is given for other reasons than need. Aid can be considered as a tool of foreign policy to achieve interests of given states. The states can apply aid in two different forms: either aid as a commitment or aid as a leverage. The commitment strategy aims to reward recipient states for pursuing policies favoured by donor state, thus creating commitment between donor and recipient. On the other hand, leveraging strategy aims to give donor state a leverage over a recipient state to shun it from its course of following a policy not in favour of donor or its opponents.¹⁴

Another author, covering the donor's motivations is Berthelemy who studied 22 donor countries included in Development Assistance Committee (knowns as DAC) in OECD during 20-year time period. Again, quantitative method of analysis was chosen, and it looks into statistical relationship between beneficiary needs and their policy performances variables and self-interest of donors variables. According to his work, he found a growing impact of trade and economic benefits to influence aid as well as those recipient countries, who perform better in social policies tend to receive more aid¹⁵.

Similar findings were also found by Alesina and Dollar that argue that aid goes mainly to the countries which provide some political or strategic leverage. The humanitarian aspects as poverty level play insignificant role in aid allocation. Another variable influencing aid allocation is colonial past.¹⁶

Extensive work and analysis were also done by Van der Veen, who deployed both qualitative and quantitative method. He began with framing analysis in study of 4 European countries. Via discursive analysis of legislative debates, he first identified and counted occurrence of development frames in the discourse and after that, delved influence of frames into aid allocation policies. Some of his discoveries include examples as Belgium, where there was strong occurrence of obligation motive (that is providing aid from an obligation either from some international organisation or from moral obligation), Belgium tended to send former colonial employees into aid programme into their former colonies as they felt obligation towards them.¹⁷

¹⁴ The same as above.

¹⁵ BERTHÉLEMY, Jean-Claude a Ariane TICHIT. *Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions—a three-dimensional panel analysis*. 2004, **13**:3, 253-274. DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2003.11.004. ISSN 10590560.

¹⁶ ALESINA, Alberto a David DOLLAR. *Journal of Economic Growth*. **5**:1, 33-63. DOI: 10.1023/A:1009874203400. ISSN 13814338. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1009874203400>

¹⁷ VAN DER VEEN, A. Maurits. *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. ISBN 110700974X.

Most of the models or countries analysed are in favour of donor interests. However, there has also been models arguing for altruistic motives as work from Dudley and Montmarquette finding positive relationship that higher infant mortality results in higher aid allocation¹⁸.

Majority of the most influential studies applied quantitative research. Therefore, I am picking also examples quantitative work which inspired me in my research one of them being the comparative study by Forsudd who analysed motives behind aid in Nordic countries. He deployed motive analysis (as one of forms of discourse analysis) in comparative study to identify motivations of Nordic countries¹⁹. The same methodology for studying motives was used by Anderson²⁰ in her work in studying Swedish aid allocation motives. These analyses showed, that Nordic countries incline to provide aid for altruistic motives more than for political ones.

For my research, I have partly combined definitions of aid motives from van der Veen and used analytical framework from Forsudd.

2. Theoretical and methodological part

2.1. Constructivism

The 1990s marked an emergence of new theoretical approach within international relations - constructivism. As existing dominant theories were unable to explain end of Cold War and sudden international change, constructivism became a prominent theory that was able to provide useful insights into international politics and relations²¹.

¹⁸ CIVELLI, Andrea, Andrew W. HOROWITZ a Arilton TEIXEIRA. A Signal of Altruistic Motivation for Foreign Aid. 2016, 16:4. DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2016-0024. ISSN 2194-6108. Available from:

<http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2016.16.issue-4/bejeap-2016-0024/bejeap-2016-0024.xml>

¹⁹ FORSUDD, Magnus. *The Motives of Aid Donors – A comparative study of the aid allocation of Denmark, Norway and Sweden* [online]. Vaxjo, 2009 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:234182/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. Master thesis. Vaxjo universitet.

²⁰ ANDERSSON, Maria. *Motives behind the Allocation of Aid: A Case Study Regarding Swedish Motives for Aid Allocation* [online]. Goteborg, 2009 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16329259.pdf>. Goteborg Universitet.

²¹ JUNG, Hoyoon. The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present. *SAGE Open*. 2019, 9:1. DOI: 10.1177/2158244019832703. ISSN 2158-2440. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2158244019832703>

The main idea of constructivism emphasizes the role of non-material factors (such as identity, norms and beliefs) that constitutes the political action. It also seeks to explain the mutually constitutive relationship between the structure and the agency²².

Why did constructivism rise to prominence? It challenged the mainstream view of dominant theories by providing a middle ground - between individualism and holism or single truth and relativism²³. Below, I will shortly sum up features of constructivism.

As visible from the main ontological premises, norms and ideas play the main role in study of international relations. These are social facts that create international relations²⁴. The turn to social theory in international relations allows us to open the “black box” of its agent and see how actor’s behaviour construct the social reality. According to constructivists., the study of normative and ideational factors is intersubjective because all research of norms, ideas and so on requires interpretation, which is not neutral due to researcher’s involvement in the interpretation²⁵.

Apart from the influence by the researcher’s views, also other factors come into play - structure given by time, political order, location within given order – all of that influence given situation. This notion further highlights importance of meaning of certain context (location, time, society) over materialistic power as found in other theories.²⁶

Despite the fact the constructivism is one of the vital theoretical approaches in IR, some authors say that role of constructivism is not to challenge other IR theories, as compared to realism or liberalism, it does not provide solutions to IR issues or policy recommendations. Instead, constructivism can give us different understanding on relationship between identity and political action.²⁷

There are different branches of constructivism. The primary categorization is conventional approach and interpretative approach, some authors also identify critical / radical approach of

²² REUS-SMIT, Christian. *Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School*. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 2016, 4:3, 487-509. DOI: 10.1111/1467-856X.00091. ISSN 1369-1481. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/1467-856X.00091>

²³ GUZZINI, STEFANO. A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*. 2016, 6:2, 147-182. DOI: 10.1177/1354066100006002001. ISSN 1354-0661. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066100006002001>

²⁴ The same as above.

²⁵ JUNG, Hoyoon. *The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present*. *SAGE Open*. 2019, 9:1. DOI: 10.1177/2158244019832703. ISSN 2158-2440. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2158244019832703>

²⁶ KLOTZ, Audie a Cecelia M. LYNCH. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (International Relations in a Constructed World)*. Routledge, 2007. ISBN 9780765620231.

²⁷ SMITH, Steve; HADFIELD, Amelia; DUNNE, Tim. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (3rd edn)*. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 9780198708902.

constructivism. The conventional strand is also alternatively called as “standard” or “American” constructivism and it focuses on relationship between actors, norms and identity.²⁸

On the other hand, the interpretative constructivism is an European approach that is more focused on understanding social reality through language and ‘speech acts’.²⁹ The critical variant can be seen as an offshoot of interpretative branch as it also has linguistic focus, but it also challenges researcher’s possible implications in the interpretation of one’s examination.³⁰

Given the objective and interest of my study, which is motivation of European Union behind development aid, I am choosing interpretative constructivism as a framework of my thesis. Interpretative constructivism is looking at the object of the research via lens of language and study existing speech acts and discursive structures instead of shaping of international policies via identity³¹.

2.2. Discourse analysis

Various methods are available for constructivist researchers. Among qualitative methods, we see usage of case studies, process tracing or discourse and narrative analysis, other uses qualitative methods as statistics or mix of both³². Below, I will outline basis for discourse and discourse analysis that belongs to favoured style of analyses among constructivist scholars.³³

The word “discourse” comes all the way back from 14th century, meaning “conversation”. It includes both spoken and written form of language.³⁴ Discourse analysis was firstly employed in 1980s with post-structuralist scholars. In international relations, discourse analysis is a method to discover how language influence agents’ behaviour and social processes.

²⁸ BEHRAVESH, Mayasam. The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis. In: *E-International Relations* [online]. 2011 [cit. 27-7-2020]. Available from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/17/the-relevance-of-constructivism-to-foreign-policy-analysis/>

²⁹ Same as above.

³⁰ JORGENSEN, Knud Erik, POLLACK, Mark, ROSAMOND, Ben. *The SAGE Handbook of European Union Politics*. SAGE Publications, 2007. ISBN 9781412908757.

³¹ The same as above.

³² CARLSNAES, Walter, Thomas RISSE a Beth A. SIMMONS. *Handbook of International Relations*. 2. SAGE Publications, 2012.

³³ AYDIN-DÜZGİT, Senem a Bahar RUMELILI. Discourse Analysis: Strengths and Shortcomings. *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*. DOI: 10.20991/allazimuth.477300. ISSN 2146-7757. Available from: <http://dergipark.gov.tr/doi/10.20991/allazimuth.477300/>

³⁴ DRID, Thouria. *DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: KEY CONCEPTS AND PERSPECTIVES* [online]. Ouargla, 2010 [cit. 2020-07-28]. University of Ouargla.

While for most of theories, language is seen as a side unit of analysis³⁵, for constructivists - language is seen as an important aspect of social reality and can be a useful source for analysis. Language is not seen as a mean to describe the world, but instead it is seen as a power - power which creates and changes values, norms and identities³⁶. Through language, meanings are generated and therefore language can have impact on reconstructing social realities. Without language, we are not able to explore the motivations or ideas behind as there is no possibility to study this “behind” outside of language dynamics.³⁷³⁸

However, for studying the language, we must realize that it does not have one general meaning, but each social language has various meanings due to different meaning and values attached to them. These meanings form different systems in which the given value differ and therefore discourse to discourse too - language is fluid.³⁹

There are two major ways how discourse analysis can be produced: formal approach and functional one. The formal approach (or also micro-concept) is mostly used in linguistics or social psychology and it concerns itself with analysis of linguistic arrangements within everyday interactions among individuals.⁴⁰

The functional approach does not concern itself with relations within the sentence but investigates usage of language within certain context. While for formal discourse analysis, morpheme is a main unit of analysis, the functional approach dives into study of utterances within certain context and how language contain or induce agent towards certain actions or influence social processes.⁴¹

Within functional approach, multiple analysis of discourse exists. Therefore, Glynos mentions three dimensions of how we can approach discourse analysis: macro or micro analysis, linguistic or non-linguistic analysis and lastly, purpose of the analysis - explanatory or critical.⁴² Purpose is the main motivation why researcher is using discourse analysis. Explanatory researchers use discourse to study how concrete policy formulation impact limits of policies - either enabling or

³⁵ Same as above.

³⁶ SMITH, Steve; HADFIELD, Amelia; DUNNE, Tim. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (3rd edn)*. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 9780198708902.

³⁷ LARSEN, Henrik. Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign Policy. *Rethinking European Union foreign policy*. United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2004, s. 62-80. ISBN 0719060028.

³⁸ The same as above.

³⁹ The same as above.

⁴⁰ LARSEN, Henrik. Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign Policy. *Rethinking European Union foreign policy*. United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2004, s. 62-80. ISBN 0719060028.

⁴¹ The same as above.

⁴² GLYNOS, Jason. *Discourse Analysis: varieties and methods* [online]. 2009 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/796/>

disabling it and explain, while critical analysts are more critical towards their own motivation and challenges their own interpretation⁴³. Discourse also produces meaning through difference which is a vital part in identity construction and ideas used in discursive struggles can build identity structure.⁴⁴ On the other hand, critical function

Discourse is an analytical tool via which we can study norms and identities through which foreign policy is shaped. The certain discourse is pushed by various actors (groups or individuals) who are called “norm entrepreneurs”.⁴⁵

2.3. Hypothesis

As mentioned in the introduction, my hypothesis is: “In recent years, EU’s developmental aid is taking more pragmatic turn.”

Further in my work, I will operationalize what is meant by pragmatic and idealistic and present a coding book with observed motives and motive indicators. However, in short - by pragmatic, I understand behaviour that is driven less by practical judgements of what is appropriate at a given moments, while idealistic motive is driven by values – humanitarian, morality or other values important for the actors itself.

2.4. Research design

2.4.1. Methodology

I have decided to pursue qualitative in-depth diachronic study. The method used is called motive analysis (form of discourse analysis) that will allow me study motives behind EU’s development aid policy.

The original analytical framework was described by Swedish professor Peter Esaiasson in book *Metodpraktikan*. However, since the original work is in Swedish without English translation, I taken its application and information from secondary works, concretely from academic works of

⁴³ Same as above.

⁴⁴ DIEZ, Thomas. Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy. *Cooperation and Conflict*. 2013, **49**:3, 319-333.

DOI: 10.1177/0010836713494997. ISSN 0010-8367. Available from:

<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010836713494997>

⁴⁵ The same as above.

Forsudd⁴⁶, Kjelin⁴⁷, Jerneck⁴⁸ and Andresson⁴⁹. The application of motive analysis consists of two parts: defining the actor of study (which has been done in section 2.4.2.) and defining set of motives. For studying motives, then we need to codify or establish motive indicators – the way in which motive manifests itself in the actor’s speech, that is done in section 2.4.3.⁵⁰

For purposes of my work, I have decided to analyse speeches of HR/VPs and European Commission Presidents in 2014 and 2019. Below, I offer explanation for why I chose these two.

Firstly, European Commission President’s role is to promote EU’s interests and represent Union externally in specific areas as in trade policy or aid⁵¹. President leads the European Commission and oversees its responsibilities which include proposals for new legislation, execution of decisions made by European Parliament of Council or Europe or creates and monitor EU budget.⁵² EC’s President also represent the Commission and European Union at world forum as G7 meetings⁵³.

Secondly, the role of High Representative/Vice-President is to oversee Common Foreign and Security Policy. HR/PV oversees EU’s external policy and coordinates all areas given to him/her by Treaty of Lisbon which includes trade, development and humanitarian aid and neighbourhood policy. Similarly, as EC’s Presidents, HR/VP represents EU in the international stage.⁵⁴

I have chosen these two as they represent European Union abroad and have influence over development policy.

The speeches are archived on the website of European Commission and European External Action Services in the press corner and press archive. As there is no possibility to filter the speeches by speaker (that is available only for current Commission members), I used filtering via keyword

⁴⁶ FORSUDD, Magnus. *The Motives of Aid Donors – A comparative study of the aid allocation of Denmark, Norway and Sweden* [online]. Vaxjo, 2009 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:234182/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. Master thesis. Vaxjo universitet.

⁴⁷ KJELINA, Sofia. *Political leaders’ motives to action* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1387851/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. Master thesis. Linnaeus University.

⁴⁸ JERNECK, Magnus. *A Federal Vision of Europe – Or Just Xenophobia?* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1319036&fileId=1319037>. Essay. Lund University.

⁴⁹ ANDERSSON, Maria. *Motives behind the Allocation of Aid: A Case Study Regarding Swedish Motives for Aid Allocation* [online]. Goteborg, 2009 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16329259.pdf>. Goteborg Universitet.

⁵⁰ JERNECK, Magnus. *A Federal Vision of Europe – Or Just Xenophobia?* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1319036&fileId=1319037>. Essay. Lund University.

⁵¹ European Commission. In: *European Commission* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission_en

⁵² Same as above.

⁵³ Role and election of the President of the European Commission. In: *European Parliament* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637983/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)637983_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637983/EPRS_BRI(2019)637983_EN.pdf)

⁵⁴ High Representative/Vice President. In: *European External Action Service* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3598/high-representativevice-president_en

“Barroso” and “Juncker” to filter speeches from 1st January 2014 to 31st December 2014 and the same process was repeated for 2019, where I filter keywords “Juncker” and date from 1st January 2019 to 31st December 2019. The results given still included speeches from other Commissioners, but to lesser extent and Barroso’s/Juncker’s speeches we had to be manually selected.

As the office terms was changing in 2019, I was able to filter speeches of von Leyden via existing filters on the page in the same period.

For speeches of HR/VPs, those are available at EEAS press corner page. There, it is possible to filter via year and by category HR/VP speeches and Speeches by HR/VP. This helped me find speeches by Federica Mogherini in 2019. There were no speeches found by Josep Borell in 2019 as the terms changed as of 1st of December 2019. The press corner at EEAS page documents only speeches until 2015. The older speeches by Catherine Ashton were documented at EEAS archive, where I could filter only speeches by Catherine Ashton in 2014.

I have documented only speeches in English language. Especially President Juncker, often delivered speeches in French and German, those were not included in my analysis. While mechanic language translation is progressing quickly, it is possible that the translator is not able to capture the context well.

In total, I have identified 137 speeches in English mad by European Commission President in 2014, and only 31 in 2019. The HR/VP made less speeches, only 28 in 2014 and 29 in 2019 were documented. In total, 225 speeches were identified.

From available documented speeches, I was looking for those containing mention of aid or aid context to be analysed. For that, I decided to pursue hand-based analysis and went through the speeches, where I looked for common phrases related to development aid as “aid”, “development”, “assistance”, “package”, “investment”, “help” or “donor” - in sum, 63 speeches containing aid were found.

Some authors further refine their list of speeches either via random sampling or purposive sampling. Random sampling can provide fair and unbiased representation for analysis⁵⁵ while purposive sampling is a method where the researcher chooses a sample based on his/her assumption, that the selected example represents the whole ample⁵⁶. In the end, I have resorted to include all the 63 speeches in my sample due to the fact that in the preliminary research, some of motives were appearing only rarely and random sampling could lead to elimination of finding some the of motives in selected speeches. I also rejected notion of using purposive sampling in order to avoid wrong

⁵⁵ Definition of 'Random Sampling'. In: *Economic Times of India* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/random-sampling>

⁵⁶ LAVRAKAS, Paul. *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods*. 2008. DOI: 10.4135/9781412963947.

generalization of research findings⁵⁷. The final list of analysed speeches can be found in Appendix, table 5.

The next part involves identification of the motivations of the speaker in the speeches according to defined indicators above. Per each motivation, I will provide context of given speech and argue for why I have categorized the speech within the given class. I will also categorize speeches by year which will give us comparison of change of discourse in time.

The identification of motives will be done according to a coding book described in 2.4.3. and will be given a value according to observed importance in the speeches between 2014 and 2019.

Table 1 Proposed table for valuation of the motives

	Security	Power/ Influence	Economic/ Wealth	Self- enlightened interest	Self- affirmation	Obligation	Humanita- rianism
2014							
2019							

To value each motive, I will use a scale - each category be valued depending in importance by star. 3 stars signify the highest importance, 2 star means intermediate importance and 1 star means low importance. It is also possible that the motive will be absent, in that case no stars are given. Based on this scale, I will be able to compare developments and changes in the motives throughout the year.

2.4.2. EU as an actor

Before applying motive analysis, we have to decide who is the actor. Can EU be seen as a unitary and independent actor in the international policy field and especially development policy? What makes EU an actor? Does it make sense to apply discourse analysis on European Union if we want to study shaping of EU policies at EU level? The same question was posed by Henrik Larsen in his analysis of European foreign policy. It would not make sense if EU is not seen as a foreign policy actor or does not have a joint representation to investigate discourse on the EU level in the international arena⁵⁸.

The international forum is comprised mainly by nation states and as EU is not a state, it still maintains an unique position as an international organisation and entity sui generis,

⁵⁷ The same as above.

⁵⁸ LARSEN, Henrik. Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign Policy. *Rethinking European Union foreign policy*. United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2004, s. 62-80. ISBN 0719060028.

this is a vital question we need to answer before approaching our research as in case there is no common EU actor in foreign and development aid, then it is not meaningful to study EU discourse on EU level⁵⁹.

Since the adoption of The Treaty of European Union in 1990s, the EU presented new foreign and security policy pillar which enabled EU to present itself as an international actor. Within European Union, there exists horizontal and vertical division of EU – the division between the EU institutions and member states and the Council and the Commission. Each EU policy is therefore fragmented into smaller policies, making it less coherent for the external world.

As there are multiple institutions and actors within EU that can and shape the EU external agenda and that is: European Council, European Commission and Council of the EU - each of them advancing their own agenda and shaping altogether the agency outcomes of EU, therefore it is important to look into who is the most important player advocating for EU's external policy.

Each of the institutions has formally different powers in the agenda setting. Despite lack of legislative power, The European Council - made up of the highest heads of states is the main institution for setting “political direction and priorities”.⁶⁰

Secondly, there is European Parliament with directly elected members from each state. However, its agenda setting powers are limited.

Last institution coming to play is the Commission consisting of 28 Commissioners, each coming from different state and responsible for aa given area. They are the institution with legislative power and also administrative (executive) body. Together, they can initiate, implement and monitor policies⁶¹. Together with Commission Resident and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, they defend European interest and represent EU outside⁶².

In international relations, the definition of actor can be “entity or individual capable of devising a strategy and acting autonomously in order to achieve certain objectives”⁶³. From an internal perspective, European Union considers itself as an actor in international relations. This can be seen from multiple strategies deployed by EU named as “A stronger global actor” focusing on

⁵⁹ The same as above.

⁶⁰ TOSUN, Jale, BIESENBENDER, Sophie, SCHULZE, Kai. *Energy Policy Making in the EU*. London: Springer, 2015. ISBN 9781447166443.

⁶¹ CARBONE, Mauricio. *The European Union and international development*. Routledge, 2011. ISBN 0415663962.

⁶² European Commission. In: *Age Platform* [online]. Age platform [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.age-platform.eu/european-commission>

⁶³ YANN, Richard, Van Hamme Gilles, "The European Union as an Actor in International Relations. A Geographical Assessment of European Actorness", *L'Espace géographique*, 2013. 42:1, p. 15-30. Available from: <https://www.cairn.info/journal-espace-geographique-2013-1-page-15.htm>

external policies of EU, development aid included.⁶⁴ However, the internal perspective is not the only thing that matters as i.e. terrorist groups do also considered themselves as legitimate actors while they are not widely accepted.

It is generally agreed, that EU have the ability to act. Several studies about what consists of an actor exist and below I am taking model of Carbone, who explicitly focuses of EU's actorness in international development. According to him, two conditions need to be fulfilled: which is autonomy and coherence. For achieving autonomy and coherence, it is achieved only via existence of convergence of interests between EU Member States and EU Institutions. Also, ability to implement policies on EU level is important – signifying EU's actorness⁶⁵. The actorness of European Union changes from policy field to policy field – in some EU has a stronger or shared say together with Member States while some other area stays solely in scope of member states.

EU's actorness in development aid has been strengthened by Treaty of Lisbon which lay the groundwork to EU's external policy and included development policy as a shared policy area of EU and Member states⁶⁶. European Commissions is considered as an the main driver of EU's actorness in development aid and is considered as a proxy of EU's development aid implementation.⁶⁷ It is due to the fact that EU (Institutions) also act as a donor (with approximately of 18% of total EU + Member states development budget) but also, EU is contributing to the development agenda on international forum, proving that it can act independently from its Members.

The status and nature of EU has been long studied in international relations. According to the realists' perspective, only states are considered as legitimate actors in the international anarchistic system. However, with time and emergence liberal theory, the status of actor has been given to other entities within the international relations as companies, individuals or NGOs.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ A STRONGER GLOBAL ACTOR. In: *European Commission* [online]. Brussels [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/2-years-on-stronger-global-actor_en_1.pdf

⁶⁵ CARBONE, Maurizio. Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Relations*. 2013, **27**:3, 341-355. DOI: 10.1177/0047117813497300. ISSN 0047-1178. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0047117813497300>

⁶⁶ Same as above.

⁶⁷ CARBONE, Maurizio. Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Relations*. 2013, **27**:3, 341-355. DOI: 10.1177/0047117813497300. ISSN 0047-1178. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0047117813497300>

⁶⁸ YANN, Richard, Van Hamme Gilles, "The European Union as an Actor in International Relations. A Geographical Assessment of European Actorness", *L'Espace géographique*, 2013. 42:1, p. 15-30. Available from: <https://www.cairn.info/journal-espace-geographique-2013-1-page-15.htm>

EU as an actor within development field is by some scholars considered since 2000. It is thanks to European Commission that is executing EU's development aid both at recipient countries or on international level such as by participating at Paris Declaration or Accra Agenda for action.⁶⁹

Its aid allocation, already since first creation of EDF (European Development Fund) made around 20 percent of European aid allocation and EU (without its member states) is also the largest donor in Europe, exceeding budget of the UK or Germany⁷⁰.

We have established that EU can be considered as an actor represented by European Commission in international relations and development aid.

2.4.3. Operationalization of motives

The motivations behind aid vary and change overtime - from security, moral purpose or historical ties, all comes into play for aid policy. Knowing what the objective and motivation behind aid is will help us understand aid implementation as different goals lead to different policy decisions⁷¹. What can play a role in determining where the aid goes? There are various frameworks for categorising aid, below you can see model presented by Radelet.

1. Strategic aspects of aid:

- a. **Political determinants:** during Cold War, development aid was often used for gaining support for either US or Soviet Union. Similarly, it was used by Taiwan and China for gaining recognition for their governments or by former colonizers to keep some political influence in their former colonies. The aid was often provided without considering whether it was helping the development of its recipient⁷². Several studies show that political or economic interests determine aid allocation as
- b. **Economic interest** is often visible in bilateral aid provisions. The aid provided is occasionally "tied", meaning that donor expect the recipient to provide trade benefits for aid.⁷³

2. Developmental aspects:

⁶⁹ LA CHIMINA, Annamaria. *Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in the Framework of EU and WTO Law*. 1. Hart Publishing, 2014. ISBN 9781782251620.

⁷⁰ GANZLE, Stefan, Sven GRIMM a Davina MAKHAM. *The European Union and Global Development*. London. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2012. ISBN 978-0-230-31967-7.

⁷¹ VAN DER VEEN, A. Maurits. *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. ISBN 110700974X.

⁷² RADELET, Steven. A Primer on Foreign Aid. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.983122. ISSN 1556-5068. Available from: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=983122>

⁷³ The same as above.

- a. Aid provided for bringing positive improvements in economic growth or improvement in education or health area.

Most of the models used in the academia are similar, including both selfish or strategic motives and altruistic / humanitarian motives.

Based on my hypothesis, my preliminary assumption is that EU's aid is becoming more pragmatic and less idealistic. But what does 'pragmatic' and 'idealistic' mean and how to operationalize the terms to be able to measure it?

Definition of pragmatic according to Cambridge Dictionary is something "based on practical judgments rather than principles (often based on morality, or what is accepted as appropriate):"⁷⁴.

According to Cochrane Molly also, the field of IR is taking a pragmatic turn and pragmatism as such is often connected in relation to realist's theory: pragmatic policies are those that are in accordance with (national) interest of actors.⁷⁵

Application of pragmatism can be often found un US foreign policy. It is a policy that is focused on immediate problem-solving and do not take into considerations possible limitations as moral or legal limits. For those advocating for pragmatics policies, actors are following and protecting their interests with any means and therefore, force is allowed if necessary. Often the main interests are military power and economic power⁷⁶. Example of such pragmatic aid policy can be China who is a donor to Africa. China provides aid to Africa which is important from at least 2 aspects:

- continually growing as an economic partner to China
- is rich in natural resources

On the other hand, Africa is still in need for economic stimulation for market growth and lack of sufficient infrastructure. China's pragmatic policy is implemented in the way that they: provide loans to resource rich countries with resources backed as a collateral and "tied their aid" to infrastructure projects built in Africa by Chinese (state-owned) companies.⁷⁷

Despite the fact that "idealism" or "idealist" thinking can be found in philosophy since long time, there is not an universally accepted definition and can range from broader concept of idealism

⁷⁴ Pragmatic. In: *Cambridge Dictionary* [online]. Cambridge Dictionary [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/pragmatic>

⁷⁵ COCHRAN, Molly. Pragmatism and International Relations. *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*. 2012, IV:1. DOI: 10.4000/ejap.777. ISSN 2036-4091. Available from: <http://journals.openedition.org/ejap/777>

⁷⁶ International Law - Pragmatism. In: *American Foreign Relations* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/International-Law-Pragmatism.html>

⁷⁷ China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? In: *Brokings* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/>

as a paradigm⁷⁸ to a term often used by realist to condemn policies they find impossible to achieve⁷⁹. Idealistic according to Cambridge dictionary is “believing that very good things can be achieved, often when this does not seem likely to other people”⁸⁰. According to dictionary.com, “idealism” is a “cherishing or pursuit of high or noble principles, purposes, goals”⁸¹. The term idealism can have many different meanings and usage often depends on context or the speaker/reader. It also happens that there are different types of “idealisms”. According to Winicky Rafaul, one of main features of idealism is that “foreign policy should remain in agreement with the catalogue of moral values.”

At the most general level, idealism refers to an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place.⁸² Similar definition is given by Nel Philip who says that idealism is based on assumption that there are ideational factors driving human behaviour (as beliefs, attitudes or motivations).⁸³ Second assumption is that normative ideational factors play bigger role than other factors in policy field.⁸⁴

The case for idealist aid policy is that aid is being given more on recipients’ needs, moral obligation of donors or altruism⁸⁵. One example of idealist motivation in aid giving can be found in The Principled Aid Index that measures performance of OEACD DAC donors based on principles as aid allocation to “countries to address critical development needs and vulnerability” or “aid to facilitate and support global cooperation”. Based on the index, countries are ranked and on top, we can find states Luxembourg, UK or Sweden as the most principled donors.⁸⁶

Based on the explanation above, we are going to set more detailed motive and indicators, for each of the approach. In order to avoid one-sided view on the matter, I have selected proposal from

⁷⁸ WILSON, Peter. Idealism in international relations. *Encyclopedia of power*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2011, s. 332-333.

⁷⁹ Same as above.

⁸⁰ Idealistic. In: *Cambridge Dictionary* [online]. Cambridge Dictionary [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/idealistic>

⁸¹ Idealism. In: *Cambridge Dictionary* [online]. Cambridge Dictionary [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/idealism>

⁸² WILSON, Peter. Idealism in international relations. *Encyclopedia of power*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2011, s. 332-333.

⁸³ NEL, Philip. Idealism resurgent (and what realists should do about it): Ideas and foreign aid. *South African Journal of International Affairs*. 1997, 5(2), 96-112. DOI: 10.1080/10220469709545226. ISSN 1022-0461. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220469709545226>

⁸⁴ Same as above.

⁸⁵ CIVELLI, Andrea, Andrew W. W. HOROWITZ a Arilton TEIXEIRA. Is Foreign Aid Motivated by Altruism or Self-Interest? A Theoretical Model and Empirical Test: Ideas and foreign aid. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. 1997, 5(2), 96-112. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2390448. ISSN 1556-5068. Available from: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2390448>

⁸⁶ The Principled Aid Index. *ODI* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12635.pdf>

Van der Veen who in his *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid* offers 7 motives how aid can be labeled in the literature and those categories can help us avoid black-and-white view of the world. Those categories are security, power/influence, wealth/economic interest, enlightened self-interest, reputation/self-affirmation, obligation/duty and humanitarianism.⁸⁷ These motives will be later on sorted on pragmatic-idealistic axis which will allow me to see changes in discourse during the years.

Below, you can find operationalization of those categories applied to European Union. The indicators are taken from van den Veen and also with addition from other authors to provide as much as relevant scope of the given motive possible.

Table 2. Coding book for development aid motives

Motive	Motive indicator	Communication example
Security	EU provides aid due to security-related issues important for EU as to prevent terrorism, control migration to EU. Aid can be connected to also building military capabilities, defence solutions.	<i>“Scores of immigrants arriving at Europe's external frontiers in search of a better future remind us of the need to reconcile the quest of solidarity with the demand for safe borders.”</i> ⁸⁸
Power/influence	EU provides aid to have some strategic influence in the recipient's country such as its allegiance in the international forum or to gain its political or economic potential.	<i>“The European Union and its Member States represent over half of the world's Official Development Assistance,we have a moral responsibility as well as a strategic interest to ensure that on the basis of our values – we help our partners improve their prosperity and security.”</i> ⁸⁹

⁸⁷ VAN DER VEEN, A. Maurits. *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. ISBN 110700974X.

⁸⁸ Setting Europe in Motion: President-elect Juncker's Main Messages from his speech before the European Parliament. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_705

⁸⁹ Speech - Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_519

Wealth/economic self-interest	EU provide aid to countries with trading opportunities or to gain advantage in investment opportunities or economic benefits.	<p><i>“Secondly, we need to show Ukrainians that their relation to Europe works to their benefit. This means helping them to stabilise the economy. The delivery of the comprehensive assistance package of 11 billion euro – grants and loans - from the European Union is underway”.</i>⁹⁰</p> <p><i>“As recently as this month we have adopted an additional €30 million package to assist the Republic of Moldova in the preparation for the future deep and comprehensive free trade area.”</i>⁹¹</p>
Enlightened self-interest	EU provides aid in order to provide collective good to satisfy its own “greater good” interests (democratization, spread of human rights). Aid is also seen as helping to attain SDGs which is commonly agreed as universal goal.	<i>“We have a crucial opportunity ahead of us to deliver effectively on the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development”</i> ⁹²
Reputation / self-affirmation	EU provides aid to affirm its status as the special donor or to stand out from other countries to build its identity as a unique actor. Aid is	<i>“Our ambitious development, trade and foreign policies have ensured the European Union remains the world's largest aid donor, the most important</i>

⁹⁰ Remarks by President Barroso on the results of the G7 Summit in Brussels. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_430

⁹¹ Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_383

⁹² Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_272

	given to gain higher recognition or visibility in international forum.	<i>trading bloc and the biggest economy in the world.</i> ” ⁹³
Obligation/self-duty	EU provides aid to fulfil expected outcomes (i.e. from United Nations or achieve generally accepted level of GNI). The aid is also driven through moral obligation or sense of collective responsibility to alleviate human suffering. ⁹⁴	<p>“As you know, there are talks today at the World Health Organisation in Geneva and this is a way for the European Union to increase not only its commitment...”⁹⁵</p> <p>“We really believe it is important that we commit globally. Recently I had the opportunity to discuss these matters here in Brussels with President Obama and President Xi of China. I believe it is critically important that these countries, as the two most important global emitters, can also show leadership.”⁹⁶</p>
Humanitarianism	EU provides aid from altruistic motives and the aid is given to those with greatest needs. The aid given is for humanitarian objectives as elevation of poverty or improving education and it is	“We have allocated for the next financial period (2014-2020) 6.683 billion euros for cooperation with Asia. This represents an increase of more than 1 billion euros compared with the previous period. And we will concentrate this support in the countries more in need.” ⁹⁷

⁹³ Post-college press conference. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_730

⁹⁴ DUNDON, Stanislaus J. Development aid: The moral obligation to innovation. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*. 1991, 4(1), 31-48. DOI: 10.1007/BF02229145. ISSN 1187-7863. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02229145>

⁹⁵ Remarks by President Barroso following the Tripartite Social Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_714

⁹⁶ Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_272

⁹⁷ Opening remarks by President Barroso at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_697

	not expected to bring anything in return.	
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Below, I have come up with pragmatism-idealism axis that sort each of the motive on the continuum.

In the valuation

Security	Power/ Influence	Economic/ Wealth	Self- enlightened interest	Self- affirmation	Obligation	Humanita- rianism
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Pragmatism

Idealism



2.4.4. Source material

All the source material used in analysis is transcription of speeches available at European Press Corner. Those are primary sources and the only one used to analysis. However, as they are only transcript, there exists a possibility that the actual speech may be slightly different from delivered content.

The transcription may also not reflect that well personal remarks, sound, and intonation of the speaker which can also play a role in discourse analysis.

I have also referred to secondary sources as academic literature, NGO statements, legislative and strategic policy documents to provide me with context and deeper knowledge on the issue.

2.4.5. Limitations

The disadvantage of qualitative methods lies in the fact, that its findings often cannot be used for generalisation.⁹⁸ As discourse analysis require researcher's (mine) interpretation, analysis and argumentation, the results might be biased⁹⁹ from my understanding of the social reality or existing beliefs about European Union.

⁹⁸ JERNECK, Magnus. *A Federal Vision of Europe – Or Just Xenophobia?* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from: <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1319036&fileId=1319037>. Essay. Lund University.

⁹⁹ MORGAN, Angela. Discourse Analysis: An Overview for the Neophyte Researcher. *Journal of Health and Social Care Improvement*. 2010. Available from: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cf03/f5ebb39eb9b2acc0ba97d88e8749d6371ec9.pdf?_ga=2.182557478.1277388613.1595973702-938770177.1595803002

Also, I have chosen only 2 actors whom are considered as representatives of European Union when it comes to external and development policy and study their speeches. The issue might be the fact that they do not speak in one voice with EU, but form the narrative from their personal motivation, political background and social reality. Larger representation is welcomed, but in that case, different research design would be proposed as discourse analysis is timely very demanding form of analysis.

Another disadvantage of my research design is that it has only qualitative aspect of research. By focusing purely on language, it may uncover part of the motives hidden behind, on the other hand, it does not concern with real implementation of development aid. For further research, it would be suitable to combine discursive analytical toolbox with quantitative testing of hypothesis.¹⁰⁰

Last thing I believe would make sense is to study motives of EU from a longer perspective if source materials allow it. It is possible that motives do not change that quickly, despite dynamic changes in the world.

3. Development aid context

3.1. *Development aid in general*

What is development aid or cooperation and what forms it can have? Development aid or also labelled as foreign aid or foreign assistance is a financial flow or technical assistance that is designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (excluding military aid or other non-development purposes)¹⁰¹.

OECD recognizes three categories of aid and that is: official development (ODA), official assistance (OA) and private voluntary assistance¹⁰². One of the most prolific definitions and the one I will use is official development assistance (ODA) that says it is “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, excluding loans and credits for military purposes.”¹⁰³ The aid is mostly goes from developed countries to developing one.

¹⁰⁰ Discourse Analysis and Its Advantage and Disadvantage. In: *JournoGyan* [online]. 2017 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: www.journogy.com/2017/03/discourse-analysis-and-its-advantage.html

¹⁰¹ RADELET, Steven. A Primer on Foreign Aid. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.983122. ISSN 1556-5068. Available from: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=983122>

¹⁰² Same as above.

¹⁰³ Net ODA. In: *OECD* [online]. 2020 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>

We should not mistake or interchange development aid for humanitarian aid or assistance. Compared to ODA, humanitarian aid is often short-term and targeted at certain event¹⁰⁴ - often natural or man-made disasters to provide immediate alleviation of suffering. Development aid's objectives are similar – to help alleviate people's suffering, however it is focused more on long-term projects and at structural issues¹⁰⁵.

There are many types of aid. Some are in form of:

- **Loans:** Provision of low-interest loans for development objectives¹⁰⁶.
- **Grants:** financial assistance without repayment.
- **Debt forgiveness:** Debt reorganisation which frees the recipient of a loan from burden of the aid¹⁰⁷.
- **Technical cooperation:** Activities enhancing knowledge and skills of people in developing countries or providing technical consultancy and support.¹⁰⁸

The development assistance can be provided in form of:

- **Bilateral/multilateral** - when the aid goes directly from donor to recipient, the aid is called bilateral. On the other hand, multilateral aid is usually channeled through international organisation as the United Nations or European Union¹⁰⁹.
- **Conditional aid** - this is controversial part of aid, since the aid for developing countries comes with a need for some commitment. The idea behind is to force the developing country to change (for example to make economic reforms, eliminate corruption etc.) however some authors claim that it has limited impact.
- **Tied aid** - is like the conditionality above, only in the different that tied aid requires recipient to also accept often expensive goods (equipment or products) from the donor despite the fact there might be a better alternative¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁴ What Are the Different Types of Foreign Aid? In: *Investopedia* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082616/what-are-different-types-foreign-aid.asp#humanitarian-assistance>

¹⁰⁵ Development aid: What's it all about? In: *Agence française de Développement* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://www.afd.fr/en/development-aid-whats-it-all-about>

¹⁰⁶ Official Development Assistance Loans. In: *Japanese International Cooperation Agency* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/oda_loans/overseas/index.html

¹⁰⁷ Official development assistance and debt relief. In: *UNCTAD* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://stats.unctad.org/Dgff2012/chapter4/4.3.html>

¹⁰⁸ TEW, Rob. TECHNICAL COOPERATION: Investments to End Poverty discussion paper. In: *Devinit* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Technical-cooperation-discussion-paper.pdf>

¹⁰⁹ KEELEY, Brian. *From Aid to Development*. 2012-06-25. DOI: 10.1787/9789264123571-en.

¹¹⁰ Same as above.

3.2. History of aid development

The development aid roots can be tracked back into beginning of 19th century, when American president provided goods as an emergency response to Venezuelan earthquake and Similarly, The United Kingdom provided loans to its colonies to improve infrastructure. These were one of first documented aid provisions.

However, it was end of World War II that marked beginning of first systematic policy of aid, known as Marshall Plan, provided by United States to Europe after World War II. The project is a showcase how aid can be effective n in rebuilding countries and their economies¹¹¹.

After World War II, following years also proved to be politically turbulent. In the 50s and 60s, the decolonization process started and more than 30 countries across Africa and Europe gained independence from Europe. With new and inexperienced political actors, often with lack of resources or infrastructure, providing aid was a moral imperative, but also part of foreign policy to gain more political partners during ongoing Cold War¹¹². Therefore, it is also widely agreed and recognized in the literature that initialized development aid came into existence as a “by-product” during Cold War.

The focus of aid in 60s went mainly into infrastructure building as it was believed that better infrastructure would improve the economic growth. Nevertheless, this idea was challenged in 70s as the focus turned toward fulfilling “basics of human needs” such as nutrition and education which are premises for building economic prosperity.¹¹³

In the upcoming years, aid levels were slowing down due to oil shocks in 1973. Rising oil prices made it more difficult for developing countries to buy oil which led them to borrow from Western banks. However, many of developing countries were impacted by oil shocks until 80s when their weakness was finally revealed - their inability to pay off debt led to another crisis touching both Latin America, Africa and Asia¹¹⁴

After this experience, developed countries once again changed their strategical focus, now requiring developing countries to focus more on ‘proper’ economical management. The donors demanded for stabilisation and structural changes in recipient’s economy and pushed neoliberal ideas onto recipients, in exchange for aid. ¹¹⁵

The major turn came after 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and Soviet Block collapsed. The previous need for allies in the bipolar world disappeared and the amount of money for development

¹¹¹ Same as above.

¹¹² Same as above.

¹¹³ SEN, Onur. Strategic Aid: Explaining The Motives And Choices Of International Donors. 2018, 1-131. Dissertation thesis. Georgia State University.

¹¹⁴ KEELEY, Brian. From Aid to Development. 2012-06-25. DOI: 10.1787/9789264123571-en.

¹¹⁵ Same as above.

aid significantly decreased. Also, as new countries emerged in Central and Eastern Europe - the donors from Western Europe shifted their focus to their close neighbourhood.

Post-Cold War era brought multiple changes again, first in form of 'donor fatigue' and second in form of shift in thinking. The amount of aid in GNP decreased from 0.38 levels (1982) to 0.22 levels (1997)¹¹⁶. Instead, the governmental aid was replaced by private aid flows.

The 21st century brought us awakening interest in aid again. The United Nations initiated Millennium Development Goals in 2000 with ambitious and concrete goals to achieve by 2015 to increase amount of aid and improve the world¹¹⁷. Another important point, marking a slight change was brought by terrorist attacks on 9/11 when the world donors started linking aid with security interests.

In general, ODA levels are measured by ODA amount of total dollars by share of GNI (gross national income. Previously it was measured by GDP – gross domestic product) or GNI per capita. The long-term goal of United Nations since 1970s is to achieve 0.7% of GNI of ODA per country.

3.3. History of European Union's development aid

EU is a unique actor within international relations and domain of development aid. Not only it receives development funds from its members, but at the same time, it is a donor itself.¹¹⁸ EU institutions are the 4th largest donor in the world in OEC DAC framework, but EU and its member states as whole composed the largest one. Despite the fact if we take into consideration only funds coming from EU as an institution (or from European Commission), the aid allocated in 2010 was 10.2 billion US dollars which amounted to approximately 17.3 percent of whole EU aid¹¹⁹.

Development aid is one of key external policies of EU, since Lisbon Treaty. The historical roots of aid development can be traced back to the treaty of Rome. At that time, EDF then (predecessor of current EDF) was founded with voluntary contributions by current members. The development aid policies were expanded later in 60s with Yaoundé Convention and following agreements as Cotonou that formally set and gradually develop agreements with ACP (African,

¹¹⁶ TARP, Finn. *Foreign Aid and Development:: Lessons Learnt and Directions For The Future*. 1. Routledge, 2000.

¹¹⁷ VAN DER VEEN, A. Maurits. *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. ISBN 110700974X.

¹¹⁸ EU. In: *Donor Tracker* [online]. [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://donortracker.org/country/eu>

¹¹⁹ CARBONE, Mauricio. *The European Union and international development*. Routledge, 2011. ISBN 0415663962.

Caribbean and Pacific) countries within trade and development field.¹²⁰ Since then, the narrow focus to ACP enlarged to the whole world.

Factors that shape EU's development aid and relations with the developing world throughout the history were: European colonialism, global events as Cold War and gradual enlargement.¹²¹ Global events play an important role in shaping EU's development aid - end of Cold War partly shifted EU's attention to close neighbourhood countries (i.e. deployment of programme PHARE¹²²), then 9/11 led to linking aid with security. According to the newly released European Consensus on Development in 2017, it is suggested that there is a two-way relationship between security and development.¹²³

Also, the historical legacy of colonialism on the other hand created natural preferences of each EU member. Former colonial countries preferred strategic cooperation with their prior colonies while other countries preferred to focus on poverty eradication. Countries like Belgium in the 50s supported strongly their former colony Congo, the UK kept ties and invested in infrastructure in India, while countries like Denmark created development programmes from the beginning¹²⁴¹²⁵ and together with Germany or the Netherlands advocated for poverty eradication.¹²⁶

With each enlargement round, the aid priorities changed and apart from the above mentioned countries, accession of Spain and Portugal brought increased focus to Latin America, entry of Nordic countries on the other hand enlarged the scope of the topic in the development field as sustainability.

As aid policy is a shared responsibility, it often creates a policy tension between the EU's central institutions and its member states. Yet, EU's capability and responsibility developed significantly since 1993 which marked the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, gaining more independence

¹²⁰ LA CHIMINA, Annamaria. *Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in the Framework of EU and WTO Law*. 1. Hart Publishing, 2014. ISBN 9781782251620.

¹²¹ HURT, Stephen R. Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest? *Third World Quarterly*. 2010, **31**(1), 159-168. DOI: 10.1080/01436590903557488. ISSN 0143-6597. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590903557488>

¹²² CARBONE, Maurizio. *The European Union and international development*. Routledge, 2011. ISBN 0415663962.

¹²³ HURT, Stephen R. Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest? *Third World Quarterly*. 2010, **31**(1), 159-168. DOI: 10.1080/01436590903557488. ISSN 0143-6597. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590903557488>

¹²⁴ CARBONE, Maurizio. Introduction: The new season of EU development policy. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. 2008, **9**(2), 111-113. DOI: 10.1080/15705850801999321. ISSN 1570-5854. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15705850801999321>

¹²⁵ VAN DER VEEN, A. Maurits. *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. ISBN 110700974X.

¹²⁶ The same as above.

from Member states. The treaty included part about creation of foreign and security policy and finally recognized development aid policy as part of EU's external policies in Lisbon Treaty.¹²⁷

The primary declared objective of EU aid is poverty reduction. This goal was confirmed multiple times later, as in European Consensus on Development in 2005 and in Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Lisbon Treaty also included guiding principles for EU's external policy as democracy, freedom and human rights¹²⁸. These principles should be main guiding principles for member states to follow on.¹²⁹ However, in the very same treaty, it was also added that development policy should be realized in alignment with the rest of other external policies, meaning that other policies can influence the direction of development policy.¹³⁰ The development aid also belongs to shared competence between EU and its member states - both EU and member states can exercise development aid policies which should complement and reinforce each other.¹³¹

However, in special cases, different approaches to aid were also adopted as in in 2003, at the aftermath of 2001 terrorist attacks, EU adopted European Security Strategy where development was linked to security: security is a precondition for development.¹³²

Current development strategy is based on multiple documents defining EU's external action and direction. First one is EU Global Strategy, presented in 2016, sets out core interests of European Union abroad. EU also introduces guiding principles: among them is so called "principled pragmatism" that asserts that EU's interests and values are complementing each other.¹³³ The EU Global Strategy also mentions role of development aid that can support translation of EU values and objectives in external action.¹³⁴

¹²⁷ CARBONE, Mauricio. *The European Union and international development*. Routledge, 2011. ISBN 0415663962

¹²⁸ *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union*. In: . Official Journal of the European Union, 2012, 26 (13). Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

¹²⁹ LA CHIMINA, Annamaria. *Tied Aid and Development Aid Procurement in the Framework of EU and WTO Law*. 1. Hart Publishing, 2014. ISBN 9781782251620.

¹³⁰ HURT, Stephen R. Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest? *Third World Quarterly*. 2010, 31(1), 159-168. DOI: 10.1080/01436590903557488. ISSN 0143-6597. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590903557488>

¹³¹ *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union*. In: . Official Journal of the European Union, 2012, ročník 326, číslo 13. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

¹³² CARBONE, Mauricio. *The European Union and international development*. Routledge, 2011. ISBN 0415663962

¹³³ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe* [online]. In: . 2016, s. 1-60 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

¹³⁴ Same as above.

Other development priorities are set out in bigger detail in further documents. To align with United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (further referred as SDGs), EU adopted European Consensus on Development in 2017. The primary objective is again poverty eradication, followed by development in economic, social and environmental domains. Five areas of the consensus are defined by 5 Ps: people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership.

Financing of development aid comes mainly from these two sources: The Development cooperation Instrument (DCI) and The European Development Fund (EDF). Among other instruments, we also include European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and special measures as those taken in 2011 during Arab Spring where aid was provided to support economic recovery. These measures can be taken in only in exceptional cases.¹³⁵

According to OECD's peer review by end of 2018 – EU's Global Strategy and European Consensus on Development strengthened EU's coordinating role in field of development. EU also shows leadership in achieving sustainable development and is making programmes to be more inclusive and flexible at will and effective. EU is active in deepening its partnerships with various stakeholders as CSO, private sector and is leading development agenda

3.4. EU's aid motivation in the literature

Various perspectives on EU's motivation on aid exist. We can find application of McKinlay and Little model on EU's (respectively European Community) motivation during Cold War period arguing for 'donor interests', however with Ravenhill pointing out there is also certain aspect of aid that is given to ACP countries due to 'psychological satisfaction' for being able to provide aid to the least developed countries.¹³⁶

3.5. EU aid criticism

If we look at EU's webpages dedicated to development aid and cooperation, among first things we can notice is the claim that EU is the biggest aid donor in the¹³⁷ and commits the highest portion of the GNI.

¹³⁵ Regulation of Foreign Aid: European Union. In: *Library of Congress* [online]. Library of Congress [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/eu.php#Aid>

¹³⁶ STOKKE, Olav a Paul HOEBINK. *Perspectives on European Development Cooperation*. 1. Routledge, 2009. ISBN 9780415543941.

¹³⁷ European Union institutions. [online] OECD iLibrary. [cit.27-7-2020]. Available from: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c0ad1f0d-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/5e331623-en&_csp_=b14d4f60505d057b456dd1730d8fcea3&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=chapter

While the claim is true, we also must take into consideration criticism of EU's aid policy. One of the main visible problems for developing countries is existence of Common Agricultural Policy (further referred as CAP) - not only it has bigger budget than aid policy, but it is also a threat to the developing world.¹³⁸

Secondly, also in OECD peer review – EU is being criticized for amount of aid allocated to Middle and Upper Middle Income countries such as Turkey which soon will be cut off the list of ODA-eligible countries and also lack of qualified personnel to implement development policies, making it dependent of national experts coming from Member States¹³⁹.

4. Analytical part

The next part involves identification of the motivations of the speaker in the speeches according to defined indicators above. Per each motivation, I will provide context of given speech and argue for why I have categorized the speech within the given class. I will also categorize speeches by year which will give us comparison of change of discourse in time.

In the appendix, you can find table with 63 recorded speeches from 2014 and 2019 by both EC Presidents and HRVPs.

In the last part, I will value importance of each motivation within European discourse and discuss its development between 2014 and 2019.

4.1. Security motives

Motive indicator: EU provides aid due to security-related issues important for EU as to prevent terrorism, control migration to EU. Aid can be connected to also building military capabilities, defence solutions.

2014:

In the analysed speeches, there is prevalent absence of connection between aid and security issues. There are mentions of aid with military powers which as a comprehensive tool can achieve solution to international issues, but aid is not directly linked to security nor mentioned as a prerequisite for

¹³⁸ HURT, Stephen R. Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest? *Third World Quarterly*. 2010, **31**(1), 159-168. DOI: 10.1080/01436590903557488. ISSN 0143-6597. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590903557488>

¹³⁹ The Peer Review of EU aid: a challenge from the OECD. In: *European Think Tanks Group* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://ettg.eu/2019/01/18/the-peer-review-of-eu-aid-a-challenge-from-the-oecd/>

security. Aid does not have a significance for security, it belongs to one of many tools that EU has at its disposal and which can be used to solving security issues and bringing peace.

Manuel Barroso/Jean-Claude Juncker:

Lack of security motives were identified.

Catherine Ashton:

“I don’t just say this, but you can hear this said across the world because we bring together economic, diplomatic, development and military assets in support of a comprehensive approach to complex crises.”¹⁴⁰

“This is why we need a comprehensive approach to foreign policy, employing the broad spectrum of tools the EU has at its disposal. It combines our civilian and military missions with diplomacy and dialogue, as well as development policy to address the symptoms and causes of conflict, as in Somalia.”¹⁴¹

2019:

As of 2019, similar discourse was deployed. Firstly, aid is seen as one of the tools in the available mix that can help achieve security and stability. However, the occurrence of aid implications and security measures were more imminent. Additionally, the aid is directly linked to EU’s security, borders and to address migration and is used for prevention and similarly, the argument for using aid and other external policies as military and trade altogether to solve security problems in EU and around the world. You can also noticed that usage of phrase “We invest, as the European Union, more in development cooperation...[...]” which replaced tradition “We provide” or “we support”.

According to Cambridge Dictionary, “invest” means to “put money, effort, time, etc. into something to make a profit or get an advantage.”¹⁴²

Which indicates, that providing aid should give something in return. Development cooperation is seen as one of the pillars for security and peace in the international arena.

¹⁴⁰ R E M A R K S by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the European Parliament in the debate on foreign and defence policy In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ashton/media/statements/docs/2014/140403_03_en.pdf

¹⁴¹ To Secure Peace, Be Ready for Battle. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ashton/articles/20131218_wsj.pdf

¹⁴² Invest. In: *Cambridge Dictionary* [online]. Cambridge Dictionary [cit. 2020-07-28]. Available from:

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/invest>

Jean-Claude Juncker:

*“Our borders are more secure with the new European Border and Coast Guard we have put into place.[...] Our Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has proven to be an effective tool to address some of the root causes of irregular migration.”*¹⁴³

Federica Mogherini:

*“None of the security challenges our world faces today can be effectively addressed with a purely military approach.[...] And I believe we feel the need for a sort of ‘creative mix’ of tools that can – and sometimes does and sometimes has to – include the military one, but always requires also much more: economic support, protection and promotion of human rights[...] We invest, as the European Union, more in development cooperation and humanitarian aid than the rest of the world combined. And we have – this is a figure that we sometimes tend to forget – united, as European Union, the second largest defence budget in the world. And we are determined to put this strength at the service of international cooperation, multilateralism, peace and security globally.”*¹⁴⁴

*“In these years, we have made progress, I believe, for instance in linking our policies on security and on development, or the internal and the external side of our action through a more coordinated work within the European Commission, [...]”*¹⁴⁵

4.2. Power/influence motives

Motive indicator: EU provides aid to have some strategic influence in the recipient’s country such as its allegiance in the international forum or to gain its political or economic potential.

The discourse in 2014 about aid and power/influence exists but seems to be light. The existing discourse seem to project that aid can indirectly have impact on EU’s interests and decision making and bring some benefits to European Union. Also, it is mentioned, that development

¹⁴³ Speech by President Juncker at the European Policy Centre Thought Leadership Forum. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6163

¹⁴⁴ Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: [v https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/58232/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-munich-security-conference_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/58232/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-munich-security-conference_en)

¹⁴⁵ Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the implementation of the EU Global Strategy at the plenary session of the European Parliament. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/65571/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-implementation-eu-global-strategy_en

cooperation is part of strategic intelligence, however it is possible that Barroso meant strategic intelligence for the whole world, not only EU. The extent of strategic intelligence here is not known, but it implies it can have wider usage than just providing aid to alleviate suffering.

2014:

José Manuel Durão Barroso:

“The European Union will continue to work closely with Africa in its aid programme, using its dedicated 28bn Euros between 2014-2020 to support Africa where we can add most value and have the desired impact. [...] And, why not, it can also be a way to merge the interests between Africa and Europe, our hopes, our strengths, our weaknesses.”¹⁴⁶

“European Union and its Member States continue to be the world's largest aid donor, providing more than half of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). EU collective ODA increased from €55.3 billion in 2012 to €56.5 billion in 2013 to help deliver the Millennium Development Goals and lay the foundations for a stronger global development agenda. That is both a human imperative and a matter of strategic intelligence.”¹⁴⁷

In 2014, Russia annexed part of Ukraine - Crimea. It is worth noting that many times, development assistance was mentioned in the speech regarding this issue that aid is a vital part of the relationship and it comes hand in hand with political assistance to support Ukraine.

“The Commission continues to work as a matter of the highest priority on the implementation of the Macro Financial Assistance package of 1 billion euros – also part of the support package I presented last week.[...]Let me stress that the economic support is just a part – an important part, but just a part – of our broader efforts to support Ukraine in the current difficult circumstances. Let me recall that, as a matter of priority, the European Union has decided to sign the political chapters of the Association Agreement with Ukraine.”¹⁴⁸

Catherine Ashton:

There was lack of power/influence motives in the analysed speeches.

¹⁴⁶ Speech by President Barroso at the closing ceremony of the EU-Africa Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_287

¹⁴⁷ Speech by President Barroso: "Global Europe, from the Atlantic to the Pacific". In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_352

¹⁴⁸ Speech: Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_205

2019:

The discourse of higher EU officers is different from 2014. It contains slightly stronger wording and includes phrases as geopolitical or strategic as well as power. From the Juncker's speech, we can see that Africa can be seen as a place of future's importance due to growing population, GDP and power in the international field. The relationship between EU and Africa via aid and trade is seen as strategic cooperation, giving EU certain political influence over African issues as migration and trade and increasing view on EU as a potential 'power' in international relations. Also, aid is seen as providing respect and some status in the international arena.

Jean-Claude Juncker:

*"We are respected, because the European Union is providing over half of the world's development and humanitarian aid. It is the European Union which is building new partnerships based on investments and on stronger commercial and economic ties, with our strategic partners, such as our twin continent Africa."*¹⁴⁹

In the speech by Juncker's successor, Van Leyden, we can see that every aspect of foreign policy will have a geopolitical notion, including development cooperation which should have strategic aspects to it.

Ursula van Leyden:

*"As President-elect of the European Commission, I want to ensure that the European Union is well equipped, to be truly geopolitical in the way that it thinks and acts - from foreign policy to trade and development cooperation, from humanitarian aid to security."*¹⁵⁰

The commentary from HRVP shows that once certain political actions were made by recipient a recipient's country, we can see that development assistance is conditional on political interests and demands from European Union.

¹⁴⁹ Speech by President Juncker at the European Policy Centre Thought Leadership Forum. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6163

¹⁵⁰ Speech by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen at the 2019 Paris Peace Forum In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6270

While the HRVPs had slightly different remarks, we can sense that development assistance is conditional on political interests and demands from European Union. Compared to remarks by European Commission's presidents, the power/influence motives are lighter, yet we can find similar notion in the second speech as well, hinting that after political agreement was reached, European Union released development assistance.

Federica Mogherini:

*"We are preparing a set of concrete measures to support the country, based on the implementation of reforms under the Association Agreement. The package we are working on also includes the release of assistance that had been put on hold."*¹⁵¹

*"It took too long for the world to understand, but I am proud that together, for instance, we managed to build the global consensus that led to the Paris Agreement against climate change.[...]Last June the European Union signed a Financing Agreement worth €5 million with the Government of the Maldives, and last month the European Investment Bank signed a €45million loan, to assist renewable energy projects."*¹⁵²

4.3. Wealth/economic influence

Motive indicator: EU provide aid to countries with trading opportunities or to gain advantage in investment opportunities or economic benefits.

The trade motives are not too visible in the analysed speeches. The aid and trade seem to go hand in hand, but trade is not necessarily a prerequisite for aid and vice-versa is also not implied. Compared to power/influence or security motives, the speeches do not contain words that would hint that aid is provided for gaining some benefit, instead, "working together". "partnerships" and such to maintain that recipient countries are considered as equal to EU.

¹⁵¹ Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the plenary session of the European Parliament on the situation in the Republic of Moldova. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/65556/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-plenary-session-european_en

¹⁵² Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Parliament of the Maldives (People's Majlis). In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/66305/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-parliament-maldives-people's_en

2014:

José Manuel Durão Barroso:

“We look forward to working together with the Philippines to strengthen our trade and investment relations, as these still hold, I believe, significant untapped potential. The allocation for bilateral development cooperation in the Philippines will more than double for the new programming cycle which runs from 2014 to 2020.”¹⁵³

“Africa is now more than ever a place of hope, continuing to record impressive growth figures. In 2012, for example, 8 out of the world's 10 fastest growing economies were African. The IMF predicts Africa's economic growth will be 6% in 2014, the highest rate since the start of the crisis and 1% more than last year. Private capital inflows have doubled since the outbreak of the crisis. Africa's population is also expected to double in the next 30 years, making it the youngest continent in the world. As ever, Europe has been at your side in continuing its commitment to African development through financial assistance and economic partnerships.”¹⁵⁴

“Only this year we have made available €131 million euros in technical assistance. As recently as this month we have adopted an additional €30 million package to assist the Republic of Moldova in the preparation for the future deep and comprehensive free trade area foreseen by the Association Agreement. As from last September we have unilaterally granted full access for Moldovan wines to the European market. And I can announce today that I have informed Prime Minister Leancă that we respond positively to Moldova's request to increase their contingent on exports for some fruits and vegetables.”¹⁵⁵

Compared to Barroso, Ashton’s speeches also imply that trade and development goes hand in hand. However, it also includes a notion that these two can serve to gain influence in recipients’ countries and therefore can be categorized in the power/influence category as well.

¹⁵³ Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_600

¹⁵⁴ Speech: A centenary to celebrate in Union and Unity. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_163

¹⁵⁵ Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_383

Catherine Ashton:

“For the EU to play a strong role, particularly at the crossing, particularly with being able to ensure support to the people of Gaza, and that the security of Israel is assured, and to do the things we've been talking about for a number of years in my visits to Gaza, about trying to help support longer term strategic thinking for Gaza that includes as well trade and development.”¹⁵⁶

“Following last Tuesday's presentation in the INTA Committee, we will be able to start implementing our overall support of 1.6 billion euro this month, with significant disbursements hopefully before the Ukrainian presidential elections on 25 May. [...] In the meantime, with the support of the European Parliament today, we will front-load, by the end of this month, the trade benefits of the agreement and temporarily remove customs duties on Ukrainian exports to the EU.”¹⁵⁷

2019:

Unfortunately, for 2019, lack of economic motives was found during this period.

Jean-Claude Juncker:

Among 2019 Speeches by Juncker, there were lack of economic motives.

Federica Mogherini:

Lack of evidence for economic motives were found.

4.4. Self-enlightened interest

Motive indicator: EU provides aid in order to provide collective good to satisfy its own “greater good” interests (democratization, spread of human rights). Aid is also seen as helping to attain SDGs which is commonly agreed as universal goal.

The main occurring self-enlightened interests are based on EU's values promoting human rights, good governance and democracy. It also includes sustainable development.

¹⁵⁶ R E M A R K S by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 15 August 2014. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Dostupné z: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ashton/media/statements/docs/2014/140815_02_en.pdf

¹⁵⁷ R E M A R K S by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the European Parliament in the debate on foreign and defence policy In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ashton/media/statements/docs/2014/140403_03_en.pdf

2014

José Manuel Durão Barroso:

“Because as we discussed today, good governance, human rights, the rule of law and adherence to the international rules based system are driving forces for development.”¹⁵⁸

“Development cooperation is inextricably linked to our shared values, to protecting Human Rights, and promoting democracy in its broadest sense. This includes not just elections and good governance but also inclusive and sustainable growth, and true solidarity. That is why, as part of our Agenda for Change, we are engaging with our global partners to fight for a better quality of life, a decent life for all by 2030.”¹⁵⁹

“Our partnership and cooperation agreement (that we signed in 2012) lays the foundation for deep cooperation – on development, economic relations and political dialogue, including through strengthened discussions on human rights, an issue that is very important for the European Union.”¹⁶⁰

Catherine Ashton/Federica Mogherini:

Among 29 speeches made by Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini, lack of evidence for self-enlightened motives were found.

2019

In 2019, less occurrence of self-enlightened motives was found. In one speech of Juncker, we can see a simple statement about Africa, that is still in need of provision of aid for better future.

Jean-Claude Juncker:

“This is a continent that needs our solidarity. But not just our charity. Charity is a traditional reflex of Europeans, but what is needed today is to establish a genuinely equal partnership between Africa

¹⁵⁸ Remarks by President Barroso following the bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dung of Vietnam. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_570

¹⁵⁹ Speech by President Barroso: Why Europe believes in GAVI. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_394

¹⁶⁰ Speech by President Barroso: Why Europe believes in GAVI. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_394

and Europe. Investing in Africa, creating jobs in Africa, that should be the mantra for our action, not viewing Africa solely in terms of the refugee crisis.”¹⁶¹

Federica Mogherini:

Lack of motives were found.

4.5. Self-affirmation

Motive indicator: EU provides aid to affirm its status as the special donor or to stand out from other countries to build its identity as a unique actor. Aid is given to gain higher recognition or visibility in international forum.

Self-affirmation is a recurring motive in multiple speeches in 2014. It usually appears alongside with other motives. Both European Commission President and High Representative often use “the largest donor in the world”. They also support the notion that Europeans should be proud and that that EU is a leader in the field. Occasionally, they also tend to dramatize the speech that despite the difficulties (at that time financial aspect after economic crisis) that EU managed to maintain its top position as the biggest donor and provide aid. There is also usage of strong words ad “leading force” and “key partner” and also personal assurance in form of “and I can tell you.” that EU is still a top donor. The difficulties are even repeated in Juncker’s speech twice to highlight its importance. Positive emotions signifying proudness are also included in the speech

2014:

José Manuel Durão Barroso:

“The European Union and its Member States represent over half of the world's Official Development Assistance, another thing that we should be proud of, another thing that our young people are proud of.[...]”¹⁶²

Jean-Claude Juncker:

“And I think we, Europeans, should also be proud of that, because we are still, together with our Member States, the most important donor for development aid in the world.”¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ 'Europe: a matter of the heart' – Speech by President Juncker at the European Parliament on the occasion of the debate on the review of the Juncker Commission. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6145

¹⁶² Speech - Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_519

¹⁶³ Two Europes or One Europe? In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_707

*“Our support to our developing partners has - and will always be – unwavering. Even during the recent period of economic crisis, we remained steadfast in our financial contributions – and I can tell you, these talks on our new multiannual budget until 2020 were not easy. According to the OECD, the EU and its Member States provide more than half of official development assistance worldwide, and we have actually managed to increase our collective effort this year, which is, I would say, really important considering the pressures on the budget of many of our Member States.”*¹⁶⁴

*“So that young people of Europe come out proud to say that we – in Europe- are the leading force combating climate change; that we are the leading force in the world combatting extreme poverty and underdevelopment; and that we can only solve that together.”*¹⁶⁵

Similarly, with speeches by Juncker, we can see highlighting of EU’s position as a world donor as “starting from EU” that EU is the first among other countries or that “EU is the key partner”, reminding of EU’s importance twice in one sentence.

Federica Mogherini/Catherine Ashton:

*“The international community, starting from the EU, is engaged in providing assistance for the rehabilitation of Gaza and help the parties to restart a peace process...”*¹⁶⁶

*“We are helping to build up regional maritime capacity. This year the EU year is chairing the international Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia. We are deeply engaged diplomatically and politically, and as Somalia's biggest donor, we are a key partner for development assistance.”*¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Speech by President Barroso: Why Europe believes in GAVI. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_394

¹⁶⁵ Speech by President Barroso: "Tearing down walls – building bridges". In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_170

¹⁶⁶ Statement by High Representative Federica Mogherini on the latest Israeli announcement on settlements. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/6842/statement-high-representative-federica-mogherini-latest-israeli-announcement-settlements_en

¹⁶⁷ Speech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Annual Conference of the European Defence Agency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ashton/media/statements/docs/2014/140327_05_en.pdf

2019:

The self-affirmation motive developed to be slightly weaker in 2019 and there were less occurrences found. Emotions are still part of the discourse as “I am happy / proud”, but there is no more usage of word “donor”, indicating that EU might want to change its position or image.

Jean-Claude Juncker:

“And I am proud to be able to say that we have supported you every step of the way. Our partnership is one of mutual solidarity and friendship. That is why we are backing that solidarity up with concrete support, notably for the Azov Sea region so affected by ongoing conflict and by in fact unacceptable tensions due to the behaviour of Russia. I am happy to announce today a new package of measures in support to the Azov Sea Region...”¹⁶⁸

Mogherini maintained similar narrative as in previous year. There was a slight change, as we can see the “largest donor” disappeared from the speech and instead, we can see more of EU’s comparison with the outside world as “other country” or “the rest of the world “ still indicating and highlighting EU’s unique position in the world. We can also see double repetition and occurrence of the same information in the given short piece of speech.

Federica Mogherini:

“We invest, as the European Union, more in development cooperation and humanitarian aid than the rest of the world combined.”¹⁶⁹

“Since 2014 we have put together for Ukraine the biggest support package in the history of the European Union. We have invested more in Ukraine than in any other country in the world, and no other partner has invested in Ukraine as much as we have done.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with President Tusk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, following the EU-Ukraine Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_3909

¹⁶⁹ Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: [v https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/58232/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-munich-security-conference_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/58232/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-munich-security-conference_en)

¹⁷⁰ Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament Plenary debate on eastern neighbourhood developments. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/71131/speech-federica-mogherini-european-parliament-plenary-debate-eastern-neighbourhood_en

4.6. Obligation

Motive indicator: EU provides aid to fulfil expected outcomes (i.e. from United Nations or achieve generally accepted level of GNI). The aid is also driven through moral obligation or sense of collective responsibility to alleviate human suffering

The obligation motive is weak throughout the years. As there can be an obligation towards an international organisation or towards moral obligation, both seem to occur – in the first speech, Barroso refers to obligation of the international community to achieve poverty eradication and in the second speech, it seems to be the moral obligation, to do more.

2014

José Manuel Durão Barroso:

“We have a crucial opportunity ahead of us to deliver effectively on the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development. As you know we see these issues very much together. All countries will have to contribute to this shared vision.”¹⁷¹

“But we can and must do more.[...] Let it be no doubts. The EU stands firmly on Vietnam's side on its path towards an industrialised country by 2020. We will continue to support Vietnam in its reform process including through our development assistance.”¹⁷²

“The European Union and its Member States represent over half of the world's Official Development Assistance,[...] we have a moral responsibility as well as a strategic interest to ensure that – on the basis of our values – we help our partners improve their prosperity and security, and secure a good outcome next year.”¹⁷³

Catherine Ashton/Federica Mogherini:

Lack of evidence for self-enlightened motives were found.

¹⁷¹ Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_272

¹⁷² Remarks by President Barroso following the bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dung of Vietnam. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Dostupné z:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_570

¹⁷³ Speech - Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_519

2019

Jean-Claude Juncker:

“Africa – yes. As Europeans, we can't forget our nearest neighbours: they are African. This is a continent that needs our solidarity. But not just our charity.”¹⁷⁴

Federica Mogherini:

Lack of evidence for obligation motives were found.

4.7. Humanitarianism

Motive indicator: EU provides aid from altruistic motives and the aid is given to those with greatest needs. The aid given is for humanitarian objectives as elevation of poverty or improving education and it is not expected to bring anything in return.

The humanitarianism motive is also weaker throughout the years. Rarely, concrete need or suffering is mentioned which is surprising, as all major development assistance documents highlights that the main objective of development cooperation is alleviation of poverty.

In the speeches below, we can see that EU aim to support those in need and those vulnerable. However, no concrete mention of what should be improved or what is the humanitarian objective is not found. The humanitarian motives are highlighted via words as “critical” and “we will concentrate”.

2014

José Manuel Durão Barroso:

“The European Union is ready to support EU-Asia cooperation through concrete financial support. We have allocated for the next financial period (2014-2020) 6.683 billion euros for cooperation with Asia. This represents an increase of more than 1 billion euros compared with the previous period. And we will concentrate this support in the countries more in need.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ 'Europe: a matter of the heart' – Speech by President Juncker at the European Parliament on the occasion of the debate on the review of the Juncker Commission. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6145

¹⁷⁵ Opening remarks by President Barroso at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_697

“Support to the most vulnerable parts of the global community is critical in this regard. That is why today, I can specifically announce that over the next 7 years, the EU aims to allocate more than €3 billion in grants to support sustainable energy in developing countries.”¹⁷⁶

Catherine Ashton/Federica Mogherini:

Lack of evidence for humanitarian motives were found. There were some humanitarian motives found in speeches, but connected to humanitarian aid, which is not included in my research.

In 2019, in total, 4 speeches by European Commissions’ president were found. However, there is a large absence of humanitarian motives in the speeches, in general, there is absence of aid mentions. The need here is not directly mentioned, but it implies vulnerability of those living in poverty where aid should be aimed.

2019

Jean-Claude Juncker:

“If there is one area where the world needs our leadership, it is on protecting our climate. This is an existential issue for Europe – and for the world. How can it not be existential when 85% of people in extreme poverty live in the 20 countries most vulnerable to climate change?”¹⁷⁷

There was also one mention of humanitarian motive in the 2019’s speeches by HRVP. and it directly address that EU wants to alleviate suffering and provides concrete tools how to do so.

Federica Mogherini:

“As you know, in these years we have worked constantly to alleviate the suffering of the people of Gaza. With the Gaza desalination plant, we are providing concrete and long-lasting support, which will benefit hospitals, schools, companies and every citizen of Gaza.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Speech by President Barroso at the Climate Summit 2014. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_616

¹⁷⁷ Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with President Tusk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, following the EU-Ukraine Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6408

¹⁷⁸ Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary debate on the situation in Israel and Palestine, including the settlements. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2019 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/71134/speech-federica-mogherini-european-parliament-plenary-debate-situation-israel-and-palestine_en

4.8. Valuing the motives

In general, based on my observation, occurrence of aid decreased in 2019 compared to 2014 which can possibly mean that aid plays lesser role in EU's interest and discourse. From observed speeches, in 2014 - all motives were identified in the speeches, but with prevalence of power/influence motives, enlightened self-interest and self-affirmation motives were found. However, in 2019, less motives were observed, and they clustered mainly around security and power/influence motives.

As we can also see from the analysis, in 2019, several motives were not identified in the speeches. Below, I provide a table with summarization of findings for each motive and provide comparison between individual years. This table will serve me as a base from which I will evaluate the development of EU's motives and conclude my findings.

Table 3 Diachronic comparison of motives

Motive	Year	Observed indicator
Security motives	2014	EU sees development aid as one of many tools of EU to support security and peace.
	2019	EU directly links aid to security and migration-issues to provide safety to EU and highlights its strategic and geopolitical importance.
Power/ influence	2014	EU sees development policy as a policy that comes along with other EU policies (as trade of political agreements)
	2019	EU sees aid as a strategic and geopolitical tool in foreign affairs that requires some prerequisite from recipients state in order to receive aid.
Economic / wealth interest	2014	EU provides aid in order to improve economic situation in recipient country to gain benefits from trade relations.
	2019	EU does not show any economic motives in relation with aid.
Enlightened self- interest	2014	EU sees aid to achieve public 'higher good' in line with EU's values as democracy, human rights and sustainable development.
	2019	EU still sees aid to achieve "higher good", but no concrete interests were mentioned.
Self-affirmation	2014	EU is proud of its achievements in development aid, its unique position among other countries and maintains its position as a world largest donor, despite the economic challenges.

	2019	EU is proud of its achievements and continues to position itself a unique actor in development aid.
Obligation	2014	EU provides aid because EU feels both moral and collective responsibility for alleviating suffering.
	2019	EU show very little evidence of obligation motives in relation with aid.
Humanitarianism	2014	EU provides aid to those in need and in vulnerable parts of the world.
	2019	EU shows less evidence on humanitarian aid motives but is concerned for the those in vulnerable areas.

4.9. Discussion

Here, you can see the importance I assigned to each individual motive in diachronic comparison.

Table 4 Valuation of motives

	Security	Power/ Influence	Economic/ Wealth	Self- enlightened interest	Self- affirmation	Obligation	Humanita- rianism
2014	*	**	*	**	***	*	*
2019	***	**	Absent.	*	**	Absent.	*

Pragmatism

Idealism



Hypothesis I tested was that EU's development policy is becoming more pragmatic. As visible from table above, we can notice that while motives in 2014 were spread across the pragmatism-idealism continuum with the highest importance of self-affirmation motive, in 2019 that continuum slightly shifted to left side with security and power/influence motive as driving motives behind development policies, but otherwise the EU's motives to be relatively stable.

From both tables above, we can see that in 2019, several motives were absent or showed little evidence and that is economic/wealth motives and obligation motives. Disappearance of some motives can also signify weakening of development aid importance in EU's external policy field.

I have valued the self-affirmation motive to have the highest priority in 2014 since it was widely used by both EU representatives on multiple occasions and in various context. Not only that EU repeatedly claims to be the "largest donor" or "biggest provider of aid" but also it expresses

strong emotions about it in sense of “I am proud” and “I am happy” to elevate the statement even more. The sentiment in 2019 is still, but weaker and that is why its importance was lowered.

In 2019, on the other hand I valued the security motive as the most important motive. It is due to direct statements that link development policy with security objectives of European Union and giving it “strategic” and “geopolitical” feature, elevating aid as a needed element in provision of security and peace.

The often-occurring patterns in favour of security motives are migration and border control via aid allocation to mitigate security problems. Also, the development aid gains strategic a geopolitical aspect to it, while before it served as one of many dispoible tools available to EU’s external policy making.

Other motives, except trade and obligation motives appear to be relatively stable. That can be due to fact that motives change slowly, and longer time frame would be recommended if sufficient source materials are available.

My findings also show that in aid, there are multiple motives existing at the same time, instead of just one or another.

I have also investigated secondary sources whether my findings correlate with findings of other authors or organisations. The similar claims were declared by NGO Concord, that raised objections against Commission’s proposal of first MFF 2021-2027 draft, whether they were concerned about linking of development aid objectives with migration control.¹⁷⁹

Also, it is worth noting that during 2019, there were less occurrence of aid policies and aid motives found in speeches of EU representatives. On the other hand, I could see growing narrative of “climate change” and “sustainable development” in the speeches, possibly showing shift in both external and internal priorities. Disappearance of aid in speeches of Commission’s Presidents and High Representative is also in line with one of previous findings mentioned at the beginning of the work that there was lack of discussion around aid in relation to MFF negotiation which sets out political priorities of EU. Lack of existing sources may imply declining interest in aid and being replaced or included in sustainable development.

I have few recommendations for further research. First, there can be study about emergence of sustainability motive in development policy and, my work was conducted purely via quantitative method, it would be useful to doublecheck the hypothesis with quantitative methods. One possible approach would be to statistically test each of give motives in similar ay as outlined in Van der Veen’s book *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid* where for example trade motives are checked against export & ODA variables.

¹⁷⁹ EU budget: development aid blended with foreign policy objectives. In: *CONCORD* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: <https://concordeurope.org/2018/06/14/eu-budget-legal-framework-external-instruments-reaction/>

Based on my current work, I also have an assumption of one more thing and that is the subtle change of EU's narrative during 2014 and 2019. Speeches in 2014 often included narrative across all motives that EU's focus more outward looking, meaning that whatever EU does, they do it with external partners or for the world. However, it seems that in 2019, the speeches were more inward looking in sense that the development aid policy should foremost serve EU's internal priorities and then to serve the objectives of other actors.

I believe it would also be interesting to make a study about EU's usage of "largest donor" and similar phrases within self-affirmation motive, whether these phrases were not used for strategic purposes of projecting EU's image in the international relations.

5. Conclusion

In the history of development aid, development was used for multiple purposes. During Cold War, strategic interests were dominating the field while after end of Cold War, rise of altruistic motivations were found. Similarly, poverty eradication is stated as the main objective of development aid across multiple EU's documents. However, recently, multiple international NGOs object that EU uses development aid as a tool to tackle migration to Europe which raises a question, what is the true objective of EU's development aid policy?

In my thesis, I set out to answer whether EU's development aid is becoming more pragmatic than in previous years. In the first part of my thesis, I lay out theoretical and methodological foundations for my research. I have used constructivist theory that allows me to study actor's motives via language. As we cannot not know what the objective reality is and can partly understand reality via language, which helps us uncover a so-called "black box" of the actors, I used discourse analysis to identify existing motives in development aid of European Union.

For that, I have decided to analyse transcript of speeches of two main EU representatives – European Commission's Presidents and High Representatives for Common Security and Foreign Policy from 2014 and 2019. These two were selected as members of European Commission, they defend EU's values, represents EU abroad and also can influence international agenda via their actions. In total – 63 speeches were identified to contain development aid motives.

For motive analysis, I firstly had to define what motives I am going to study. I have adopted motive model from Van der Veen, who introduced a model 7 motives to avoid black-and-white view of the world as usually, many models identify only 2 to 3 motives in their study of donor's motivation's. Those motives are security, power/influence/ wealth/economic interest, self-enlightened interest, self-affirmation, obligation and humanitarianism. These motives are sorted on a pragmatism-idealism continuum. Afterword's, I determined associated motive indicators to create a coding book according to which each aid-related speech was categorized into.

In total, **63** speeches were analysed. Based on the motive analysis model, we can see that most of the motives exist alongside with each other, indicating more motives play a role instead of just one or two. I have valued the self-affirmation interest as the most important motive of 2014 due to multiple reasons: the notion that EU is the largest donor appeared throughout all speeches of both EC's Presidents and HRVPs. The statements were further strengthened by emotional subtext and occasionally, repeated twice to highlight its importance.

However, in 2019, the self-affirmation motive became less visible and instead was replaced by security motive. The security motive gained on importance due to strong and direct linking of aid to security, also in relation of "strategic or geopolitical interest". Other analysed motives didn't change that much as for study of motives, it is recommended to use longer timeframes as they do not change that quickly.

Therefore, to answer the question whether EU's development aid policy is becoming more pragmatic, I come to conclusion that the motives of European Union slightly shifted towards pragmatism in development policy. However, as seen in my findings, the motives are relatively stable and to see bigger change, larger time frame for analysis is needed. More motives exist at the same time and to claim, that EU's policy is purely pragmatic would be misleading as usually more factors always come into play.

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21. Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mr. Sushil Koirala, Prime Minister of Nepal. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_642
22. Statement by President Barroso at the press conference following the Canada-EU Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_631
23. Speech by President Barroso at the Climate Summit 2014. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_616
24. Speech - The European Union in the New World Order In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_612
25. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_600
26. Speech by President Barroso at the Vietnam High-level business leaders' lunch In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_572
27. Remarks by President Barroso following the Western Balkans Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_574
28. Statement by President Barroso at the press conference following the Canada-EU Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_631
29. Remarks by President Barroso following the bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dung of Vietnam. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_570

30. Speech by President Barroso: Tackling economic crises and global challenges through regional integration and international cooperation. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_571
31. Speech - Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_519
32. Speech by President Barroso at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy University. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
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33. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_463
34. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_462
35. Opening remarks at the Moldova Investment Conference. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_451Speech -
Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_519
36. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Moldova, Iurie Leancă. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_453
37. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting the President of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_461
38. Remarks by President Barroso on the results of the G7 Summit in Brussels. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_436
39. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_432

40. Remarks by President Barroso on the results of the G7 Summit in Brussels. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
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https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_411
42. Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of Georgia. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: h
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_398
43. Speech by President Barroso: Why Europe believes in GAVI. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_394
44. Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
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45. Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Ukrainian Government. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_372
46. Speech by President Barroso: "Global Europe, from the Atlantic to the Pacific". In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
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47. Speech by President Barroso at the closing ceremony of the EU-Africa Summit In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_287
48. Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_272
49. Speech by President Barroso: Emerging Africa. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_261
50. Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following the first session of the European Council. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_240

51. Speech: Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_212
52. Speech: Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_205
53. Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following the extraordinary meeting of EU Heads of State and Government on Ukraine. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_190
54. Remarks by President Barroso on Ukraine. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_184
55. Speech by President Barroso: "Tearing down walls – building bridges". In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_170
56. Speech: Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_168
57. Speech: A centenary to celebrate in Union and Unity. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_163
58. Statement by President Barroso following the meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_43
59. Speech by President Juncker at the European Policy Centre Thought Leadership Forum. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6163
60. 'Europe: a matter of the heart' – Speech by President Juncker at the European Parliament on the occasion of the debate on the review of the Juncker Commission. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6145
61. Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with President Tusk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, following the EU-Ukraine Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_3909

62. Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with President Tusk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, following the EU-Ukraine Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6408
63. Speech by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen at the 2019 Paris Peace Forum. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6270

Master's Thesis Summary

In my thesis, I try to answer the question of whether EU's development aid policy is becoming more pragmatic or not. I have defined 7 motives: security, power/influence, wealth/economic interest, enlightened self-interest, self-affirmation, obligation and humanitarian motives which were ordered on a pragmatism-idealism continuum to discover which motive is more prevalent. These motives were coded into a coding book with indicators I was looking for.

Then, I decided to use motive analysis as my analytical framework to study existing motives via speeches of EU's representatives (European Commissions Presidents and High Representatives for Foreign Affairs) so see which motive had the highest importance. I focused on their speeches in 2014 and 2019. I selected this time period since after 2014, there was incremental increase to development aid and therefore I found it relevant to see whether there was any change in motives.

I have found out, that most of the motives appear throughout the time and that they are relatively stable. However, I could also identify slight change in the motives. While in 2014, the main occurring theme was self-affirmation motive, in 2019, it was the security motive. Therefore, I argue that the EU's development aid policy is becoming slightly more pragmatic in recent years.

7. List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Proposed table for valuation of the motives (table)

	Security	Power/ Influence	Economic/ Wealth	Self- enlightened interest	Self- affirmation	Obligation	Humanita- rianism
2014							
2019							

Appendix no. 2: Coding book for development aid motives (table)

Motive	Motive indicator	Communication example
Security	EU provides aid due to security-related issues important for EU as to prevent terrorism, control migration to EU. Aid can be connected to also building military capabilities, defence solutions.	<i>“Scores of immigrants arriving at Europe's external frontiers in search of a better future remind us of the need to reconcile the quest of solidarity with the demand for safe borders.”¹⁸⁰</i>
Power/influence	EU provides aid to have some strategic influence in the recipient's country such as its allegiance in the international forum or to gain its political or economic potential.	<i>“The European Union and its Member States represent over half of the world's Official Development Assistance,we have a moral responsibility as well as a strategic interest to ensure that on the basis of our values – we help our partners improve their prosperity and security.”¹⁸¹</i>

¹⁸⁰ Setting Europe in Motion: President-elect Juncker's Main Messages from his speech before the European ParliamentIn: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_705

¹⁸¹ Speech - Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_519

Wealth/economic self-interest	EU provide aid to countries with trading opportunities or to gain advantage in investment opportunities or economic benefits.	<p><i>“Secondly, we need to show Ukrainians that their relation to Europe works to their benefit. This means helping them to stabilise the economy. The delivery of the comprehensive assistance package of 11 billion euro – grants and loans - from the European Union is underway”.</i>¹⁸²</p> <p><i>“As recently as this month we have adopted an additional €30 million package to assist the Republic of Moldova in the preparation for the future deep and comprehensive free trade area.”</i>¹⁸³</p>
Enlightened self-interest	EU provides aid in order to provide collective good to satisfy its own “greater good” interests (democratization, spread of human rights). Aid is also seen as helping to attain SDGs which is commonly agreed as universal goal.	<i>“We have a crucial opportunity ahead of us to deliver effectively on the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development”</i> ¹⁸⁴
Reputation / self-affirmation	EU provides aid to affirm its status as the special donor or to stand out from other countries to build its identity as a unique actor. Aid is	<i>“Our ambitious development, trade and foreign policies have ensured the European Union remains the world's largest aid donor, the most important</i>

¹⁸² Remarks by President Barroso on the results of the G7 Summit in Brussels. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_430

¹⁸³ Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_383

¹⁸⁴ Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_272

	given to gain higher recognition or visibility in international forum.	<i>trading bloc and the biggest economy in the world.</i> ¹⁸⁵
Obligation/self-duty	EU provides aid to fulfil expected outcomes (i.e. from United Nations or achieve generally accepted level of GNI). The aid is also driven through moral obligation or sense of collective responsibility to alleviate human suffering. ¹⁸⁶	<p><i>“As you know, there are talks today at the World Health Organisation in Geneva and this is a way for the European Union to increase not only its commitment...”</i>¹⁸⁷</p> <p><i>“We really believe it is important that we commit globally. Recently I had the opportunity to discuss these matters here in Brussels with President Obama and President Xi of China. I believe it is critically important that these countries, as the two most important global emitters, can also show leadership.”</i>¹⁸⁸</p>
Humanitarianism	EU provides aid from altruistic motives and the aid is given to those with greatest needs. The aid given is for humanitarian objectives as elevation of poverty or improving education and it is	<i>“We have allocated for the next financial period (2014-2020) 6.683 billion euros for cooperation with Asia. This represents an increase of more than 1 billion euros compared with the previous period. And we will concentrate this support in the countries more in need.”</i> ¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Post-college press conference. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_730

¹⁸⁶ DUNDON, Stanislaus J. Development aid: The moral obligation to innovation. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*. 1991, 4(1), 31-48. DOI: 10.1007/BF02229145. ISSN 1187-7863. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02229145>

¹⁸⁷ Remarks by President Barroso following the Tripartite Social Summit. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_714

¹⁸⁸ Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_272

¹⁸⁹ Opening remarks by President Barroso at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In: *European Commission* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2020-07-29]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_697

	not expected to bring anything in return.	
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Appendix 3: Diachronic comparison of motives (table)

Motive	Year	Observed indicator
Security motives	2014	EU sees development aid as one of many tools of EU to support security and peace.
	2019	EU directly links aid to security and migration-issues to provide safety to EU and highlights its strategic and geopolitical importance.
Power/ influence	2014	EU sees development policy as a policy that comes along with other EU policies (as trade of political agreements)
	2019	EU sees aid as a strategic and geopolitical tool in foreign affairs that requires some prerequisite from recipients state in order to receive aid.
Economic / wealth interest	2014	EU provides aid in order to improve economic situation in recipient country to gain benefits from trade relations.
	2019	EU does not show any economic motives in relation with aid.
Enlightened self- interest	2014	EU sees aid to achieve public 'higher good' in line with EU's values as democracy, human rights and sustainable development.
	2019	EU still sees aid to achieve "higher good", but no concrete interests were mentioned.
Self-affirmation	2014	EU is proud of its achievements in development aid, its unique position among other countries and maintains its position as a world largest donor, despite the economic challenges.
	2019	EU is proud of its achievements and continues to position itself a unique actor in development aid.
Obligation	2014	EU provides aid because EU feels both moral and collective responsibility for alleviating suffering.

	2019	EU show very little evidence of obligation motives in relation with aid.
Humanitarianism	2014	EU provides aid to those in need and in vulnerable parts of the world.
	2019	EU shows less evidence on humanitarian aid motives but is concerned for the those in vulnerable areas.

Appendix no.4: Table Valuation of motives

	Security	Power/ Influence	Economic/ Wealth	Self- enlightened interest	Self- affirmation	Obligation	Humanita- rianism
2014	*	**	*	**	***	*	*
2019	***	**	Absent.	*	**	Absent.	*

Appendix 5: List of analysed speeches

Year	Month	Date	Name of the speech
2019	11	27	Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary debate on the situation in the broader Middle East region, including the crises in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon
2019	11	27	Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary debate on the situation in Israel and Palestine, including the settlements
2019	11	27	Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament Plenary debate on eastern neighbourhood developments
2019	10	28	Opening remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the International Solidarity Conference on the Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis
2019	9	13	Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the occasion of the International Day of Democracy
2019	8	8	Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Parliament of the Maldives (People's Majlis)
2019	7	17	Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the implementation of the EU Global Strategy at the plenary session of the European Parliament

2019	7	17	Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the plenary session of the European Parliament on the situation in the Republic of Moldova
2019	3	12	Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the United Nations' Security Council
2019	2	15	Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference
2014	11	11	Statement by High Representative Federica Mogherini on the latest Israeli announcement on settlements
2014	8	15	R E M A R K S by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 15 August 2014
2014	4	3	R E M A R K S by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the European Parliament in the debate on foreign and defence policy
2014	3	27	peech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Annual Conference of the European Defence Agency.
2014	2	18	To Secure Peace, Be Ready for Battle
2014	10	29	Post-college press conference
2914	10	23	Remarks by President Barroso following the Tripartite Social Summit
2014	10	22	Setting Europe in Motion: President-elect Juncker's Main Messages from his speech before the European Parliament
2014	10	21	Two Europes or One Europe?
2014	10	16	Opening remarks by President Barroso at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
2014	9	30	Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mr. Sushil Koirala, Prime Minister of Nepal
2014	9	29	"Regional integration and global developments – a view from the European Union"
2014	9	26	Statement by President Barroso at the press conference following the Canada-EU Summit
2014	8	23	Speech by President Barroso at the Climate Summit 2014
2014	9	21	Speech - The European Union in the New World Order
2014	9	15	Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines

2014	8	28	Remarks by President Barroso following the Western Balkans Summit
2014	8	26	Speech by President Barroso at the Vietnam High-level business leaders' lunch
2014	8	25	Remarks by President Barroso following the bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dung of Vietnam
2014	8	25	Speech by President Barroso: Tackling economic crises and global challenges through regional integration and international cooperation
2014	7	2	Speech - Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency
2014	4	14	Speech by President Barroso at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy University
2014	6	13	Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili
2014	6	13	Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili
2014	6	12	Opening remarks at the Moldova Investment Conference
2014	6	12	Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Moldova, Iurie Leancă
2014	6	12	Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the President of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili
2014	6	8	Address by President Barroso at the Hebrew University: "ut inveniam viam aut faciam"
2014	6	5	Remarks by President Barroso on the results of the G7 Summit in Brussels
2014	6	4	Remarks by President Barroso on the results of the G7 Summit in Brussels
2014	5	27	Remarks by President Barroso following the informal European Council
2014	5	21	Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of Georgia
2014	5	20	Speech by President Barroso: Why Europe believes in GAVI
2014	5	15	Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova
2014	5	13	Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Ukrainian Government
2014	5	1	Speech by President Barroso: "Global Europe, from the Atlantic to the Pacific"

2014	4	3	Speech by President Barroso at the closing ceremony of the EU-Africa Summit
2014	4	2	Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
2014	3	31	Speech by President Barroso: Emerging Africa
2014	3	21	Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following the first session of the European Council
2014	3	12	Speech: Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine
2014	3	11	Speech: Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine
2014	3	6	Speech: Remarks by President Barroso following the extraordinary meeting of EU Heads of State and Government on Ukraine
2014	3	5	Remarks by President Barroso on Ukraine
2014	3	3	Europe's cultural dimension 10 years on
2014	3	1	Speech by President Barroso: "Tearing down walls – building bridges"
2014	2	27	Speech: A centenary to celebrate in Union and Unity
2014	1	21	Statement by President Barroso following the meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey
2019	10	24	Speech by President Juncker at the European Policy Centre Thought Leadership Forum
2019	10	22	Europe: a matter of the heart' – Speech by President Juncker at the European Parliament on the occasion of the debate on the review of the Juncker Commission
2019	7	8	Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with President Tusk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, following the EU-Ukraine Summit
2019	11	27	Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with President Tusk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, following the EU-Ukraine Summit
2019	11	12	Speech by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen at the 2019 Paris Peace Forum

