

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE – FILOZOFICKÁ FAKULTA

ÚSTAV ANGLOFONNÍCH LITERATUR A KULTUR

Mentální a ontologická simulakra: ne-racionalita a ne-reálno v dílech Philipa K. Dicka

Mental and Ontological Simulacra: Non-Rationality and Non-Reality in Works by Philip K. Dick

DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE

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Praha 2020

Studijní obor (Subject):
Anglofonní literatury a kultury

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V Praze 9. května 2020.

David Kudrna



Poděkování

I wish to thank doc. Erik Sherman Roraback, D.Phil. for being generous in offering his guidance and encouragement in writing this thesis. Without his input, this project would not have taken its current shape.

David Kudrna

Klíčová slova

Posun reality
Multiplicita
Simulakra
Gilles Deleuze
Fokalizace
Fokalizační perspektiva
Narativní realita
Ne-reálno
Ne-racionalita
Dokážeme vás stvořit
Marsovský skluz v čase
Klany Alfanského měsíce

Key Words

Reality shifting
Multiplicity
Simulacra
Gilles Deleuze
Focalization
Focalizing perspective
Narrative reality
Non-reality
Non-rationality
We Can Build You
Martian Time-Slip
Clans of the Alphane Moon

Abstrakt

Tato diplomová práce předkládá model základní architektury narativní reality v dílech vědecké fikce Philipa K. Dicka, podle kterého světy Dickových děl zakládá dalekosáhlá proměna – jednotící dojem posunu – narativního tkaniva řídicího se principy *ne-racionality* a *ne-reálna*. Novotvary se spojovníkem příhodně zastupují paradigmatu reality a mentálních konfigurací v díle PKD vyvracející zdánlivě přirozené dichotomické opozice a hierarchie reálna/nereálna a racionality/iracionality. Tato práce postihuje ne-racionalitu a ne-reálno Dickových světů za přispění ontologie *diference* Gillesse Deleuze, v důsledku čehož tak z hlediska interpretace ne-racionalita a ne-reálno zaprvé navozují dojem, že narativní realita realizuje přirozený potenciál bytí jeho nepřetržitým nabýváním v mnohočetných podobách, a zadruhé znemožňují – v duchu Deleuzeovských simulaker – jednoznačné uchopení a kategorizaci narativní reality. Práce řeší a hodnotí základní předpoklady a tvrzení společná různým přístupům k tématu reality v beletrii PKD s cílem poskytnout nezbytný kontext pro následný rozvoj teoretického základu ne-racionálních a ne-reálných posunů reality. Pozornost je věnována jednotnému zaměření na logiku kontradikce v literární kritice Dickova díla a vysvětlení reduktivismu centralizujícího konstrukt reality stejně jako komentáři na vrub kritiků, kteří neutralizují kontradikci a nejednoznačnost v tvorbě PKD. Zde obhajovaná teoretická koncepce posunu reality v Dickových dílech se soustředí na posun reality ve smyslu široce pojatého efektu nestability narativních realit PKD a dále na fokalizaci, fokalizační perspektivy a multiplicitu v díle PKD zasazené do kontextu filozofie *diference*. Praktická analytická část práce sleduje ne-racionální a ne-reálné posuny reality v pasážích vybraných ze tří Dickových románů, včetně *Dokážeme vás stvořit*, *Marsovský skluz v čase* a *Klany Alfanského měsíce*, a ilustruje mechanismus ne-racionálních a ne-reálných posunů reality společně s exegezí prvků Dickova stylu ve vybraných dílech vědecké fikce s důrazem na tematické komponenty.

Abstract

This thesis offers a model for the underlying architecture of the narrative reality in science-fiction works by Philip K. Dick, arguing that Dick's fictional worlds are grounded in the pervasive metamorphosis – the overarching perception of the *shifting* – of the narrative fabric operating under the conditions of *non-rationality* and *non-reality*. The hyphenated coinages conveniently stand for the paradigms of the reality and mental configurations in PKD subverting the seemingly natural dichotomizing oppositions and hierarchies of the real/unreal and the rational/irrational. Bringing in Gilles Deleuze's ontology of *difference*, this thesis explains the non-rationality and non-reality of Dick's worlds in Deleuzian terms as, firstly, inducing the perception of fictional reality as realizing the innate potential of being by the perpetual becoming of being in multiplicity and, secondly, engendering – in the vein of Deleuzian simulacra – the impossibility of apprehending and categorizing fictional reality unequivocally. The thesis considers and evaluates the underlying assumptions and claims common to various approaches to the subject of reality in PKD's fictions in order to provide the essential context for the following development of the theoretical basis for non-rationality and non-reality shifting. Attention is given to the unifying focus of Dick criticism on the logic of contradiction and to laying out the reductivism of the centralizing reality construct as well as commenting on critics' neutralizing of contradiction and ambiguity in PKD. The theoretical conception of shifting reality in Dick's works which is defended in this thesis puts focus on the reality shifting as the broadly conceived effect of the instability of PKD's narrative realities and on the focalization, emerging focalizing perspectives, and multiplicity in PKD, which are contextualized in the philosophy of difference. The practical analysis part of the thesis traces the non-rationality and non-reality shifting in the passages from three Dick's novels, including *We Can Build You*, *Martian Time-Slip*, and *Clans of the Alphan Moon*, illustrating the workings of the non-rationality and non-reality shifting in conjunction with the exegesis of the elements of Dick's style in the selected science fictions, the focus being on their thematic components.

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1 Narrative Reality in Philip K. Dick's Works: Introduction

This thesis offers a model for the underlying architecture of the narrative reality in science-fiction works by Philip K. Dick (PKD). My main argument is that PKD's fictional worlds are grounded in the pervasive metamorphosis – the overarching perception of the *shifting* – of the narrative fabric operating under the conditions of *non-rationality* (NON-RA) and *non-reality* (NON-RE). The hyphenated coinages conveniently stand for the paradigms of the reality and mental configurations in PKD subverting the seemingly natural dichotomizing oppositions and hierarchies of the real/unreal and the rational/irrational. Bringing in Gilles Deleuze's ontology of *difference*, this thesis explains the NON-Rationality and NON-Reality of Dick's narrative worlds in Deleuzian terms as, firstly, inducing the perception of fictional reality as realizing the innate potential of being by the perpetual becoming of being in multiplicity and, secondly, engendering – in the vein of Deleuzian simulacra – the impossibility of apprehending and categorizing fictional reality unequivocally.

Structurally, the thesis is divided into the introductory, theoretical, textual analysis and concluding chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 considers and evaluates the underlying assumptions and claims common to various approaches to the subject of reality in Dick's fictions. The sections devoted to existing literary criticism provide the essential context for the following development of the theoretical basis for NON-RA and NON-RE shifting. Subchapter 2.1 briefly represents Mackey's, Jameson's, and Rossi's propositions about reality and rationality in PKD, underlining the unifying focus of criticism on the logic of contradiction. Subchapter 2.2 lays out the reductivism of the centralizing reality construct in Dick criticism and touches on the neutralizing of contradiction and ambiguity in PKD using the examples of Mackey, Jameson, Rossi, Simkins, and the possible world theory. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework and rationale for NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in PKD's fiction. Subchapter 3.1 redefines the starting points for this thesis's approach to reality shifting in Dick

in reaction to Dick criticism. Subchapter 3.2 puts forward how broadly conceived instability, focalizing perspectives, and multiplicity found the conception of shifting reality in PKD which I defend in this thesis. Subchapter 3.3 explains the properties of shifting reality per this conception – the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE – for which debate I bring in Gilles Deleuze. Chapter 4 consists in the analysis of passages from three Dick's novels, including *We Can Build You*, *Martian Time-Slip*, and *Clans of the Alphane Moon*. The chapter illustrates the workings of NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in conjunction with the exegesis of elements of Dick's style in the selected science fictions, the focus being on their thematic components. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the viability of NON-RA and NON-RE for the interpretation of Dick's oeuvre. Chapter 5 is the thesis conclusion, which reiterates the thesis statement and the key points of the thesis. Chapter 6 lists the works cited. Chapter 7 lists the works consulted.

While my point in coining the expressions NON-RA and NON-RE is to escape the limitations erected by the dichotomizing oppositions and hierarchies of the real/unreal and the rational/irrational, I am unable to justify my ideas without establishing a connection with recognizable default conceptualizations of reality and rationality in literature. As concepts with strong abstract components, reality and rationality are not only defined by what constitutes them but also by their obverse – by what they are not. Similarly, nowhere is a negative definition as apposite as when we tackle intra-fictional reality and rationality in a work of literature. Accordingly, I propose to start my discussion by mentioning several critical opinions underwritten by conventional hypotheses about reality and rationality in Dick's worlds, against which I can later begin discussing pervasive NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in the works of the author.

2 Narrative Reality in Philip K. Dick's Works: Literary Criticism

2.1 Unifying Focus on Logic of Contradiction

PKD scholarship has tackled the strangely convoluted nature of the author's fictional worlds from its early days. Apart from my preferred term of choice, i.e. shifting realities, the issue has been explored under the names like "construction of realities, only apparently real worlds, schizoculture . . . [, or] universes falling apart" (Rossi 8). Individual responses of commentators possess some commonality. A major undisputed pivot around which the orientation of extant criticism of PKD revolves is the notion of contradiction. This is crystalized in Douglas A. Mackey's observation that PKD's novels "constitute some kind of topological form as in an Escher drawing, with its own internal logic, completely self-referential, the equivalent of the paradoxical logic loop: 'The following statement is true. The preceding statement is false'" (Mackey qtd. in Rossi 2).

Despite agreement on the irrational logic of Dick's world-building, critics have had different views about what lies at the core of Dick's fictional realities. Fredric Jameson tackled the shifting of reality in PKD under the agency of ontological "uncertainty" ("After Armageddon" 350). Quoting Jameson:

Every reader of Dick is familiar with this nightmarish uncertainty, this reality fluctuation, sometimes accounted for by drugs, sometimes by schizophrenia, and sometimes by new SF powers, in which the psychic world as it were goes outside, and appears in the form of simulacra or of some photographically cunning reproduction of the external. ("After Armageddon" 350)

Of particular interest is Umberto Rossi's study *Twisted Worlds of Philip K. Dick* as it employs the concept of ambiguity to give a comprehensive reading of 20 out of 40 novels by Dick (including a number of stories and novelettes). Rossi, like other critics, has a particularized sense of the contradiction at the basis of PKD's works. Drawing on Jameson's assertion that

“Dick’s force lies in the effort to retain possession and use of both apparently contradictory, mutually exclusive subjective and objective explanation systems all at once” (Jameson, “After Armageddon” 350), Rossi construes ontological uncertainty at the root of Dick’s fiction as the “switching” between the two interpretive modes (7). While inspired by Jameson, Rossi’s reading of uncertainty is, nevertheless, in principle very different from Jameson’s. Most obviously, for example, Rossi’s broad definition of uncertainty does not confine him to hallucinations in PKD.

2.2 Reductivism of Centralizing Reality Construct: Neutralizing Contradiction and Ambiguity

Beside validating this thesis's treatment of mind and reality as intertwined entities, Mackey's, Jameson's, and Rossi's individualized views help to focus attention on the common features of the reality construct that is habitually employed in PKD criticism. This chapter argues for abandoning the practice of construing the PKD fictional reality structure on the projection of extra-fictional reality, the currency of which premise in literary criticism I exemplify on the formalizations of the possible world theory, which is also implemented by Rossi in his examination of Dick's works. This chapter then identifies the disadvantages of such a reality construction and comments on the restrictive consequences of these deficiencies in relation to particular pronouncements about PKD's worlds by Simkins, Jameson, and Rossi.

Mackey's, Jameson's, and Rossi's positions on reality and rationality can be discerned from their quotes above. Mackey highlights the subjective/objective dyad by referencing the "internal logic" (with the implied opposite of external logic) and the binary of the "true"/"false" (qtd. in Rossi 2). Rossi distinguishes between the real (objective) and the unreal (as in the real somehow compromised by the subjective) (7). Similarly, as Jameson in the above quote describes how the mind creates reality – his descriptions including the "nightmarish" quality evoking the notion of a dream, the picturing of a drug-addled mind, and the referring to "schizophrenia" and "SF powers" (the contrast being implicitly made here is between the world (of a work) of SF literature and the world shared by the readers) – Jameson's language uniformly qualifies the "psychic world" ("After Armageddon" 350) as unreal, hallucinatory, and imagined. Consequently, according to Jameson, "psychic world" – which is producing "simulacra" or "photographically cunning reproduction[s] of the external" ("After Armageddon" 350) – is in opposition to external, objective reality.

As I have shown, Mackey, Jameson, and Rossi all assume the same vantage point when commenting on PKD's fictional realities – one which relies on thinking in hierarchies and oppositions, mostly dyadic and/or dichotomic, which texture the semantic system of a fiction with clearly demarcable regions with regards to reality and rationality. This is demonstrative of a conventional critical approach in which the structure of fictional reality in a work of literature is felt to imitate, to a varying degree, the human experience with extra-fictional reality. The previous can be restated by quoting Marie Laure Ryan, who refers to what she calls “the principle of minimal departure” in her discussion of the possible world theory (PWT):

we reconstrue the central world of a textual universe in the same way we reconstrue the alternate possible worlds of nonfactual statements: as conforming as far as possible to our representation of [the actual world]. We . . . project upon these worlds everything we know about reality, and we . . . make only the adjustments dictated by the text. (51)

Even when a fictional world moves away from experientially familiar arrangements of reality, something of the fictional reality remains that anchors the world to our own. This is why Ryan insists that “every text is placed under the authority of the principle of minimal departure,” even if only to defy epistemological assimilation by means of extreme anomalism, impossibility (57), inversion, and contradiction (58).

As a result, the PWT depicts a work of literature as “a semantic universe consist[ing] of a plurality of worlds” (Ryan 42) – some of which are as short as a sentence (Ryan 19-20). However, due to the analogy consisting in the distinction between the “actual world, center of our system of reality,” and an “alternative possible world in a modal system of reality” (Ryan vii) – the latter being only constructs of the mind (Ryan 19) – the PWT distinguishes between “[t]he textual actual world” and (a) “[t]extual alternative possible world” (Ryan vii). This means that, on account of the projection of extra-fictional reality in the PWT, all realities in the semantic system of a work orbit around one central reality – the only world considered real and objectively knowable. Ancillary realities are not actual, having been possibly subjectively

created – expressions used to describe them include: fictional, fake, counterfactual (as applies to, for instance, the alternative history of Dick's *The Man in the High Castle*), dreamed, hallucinatory etc.

Concerning the critical understanding of Dick's worlds, the main shortcoming of a reality construct derived in this way is its reductivism. Since what is projected is a symmetrical rationally coherent system, we reconstruct the encountered narrative fracturedness and nonhomogeneity of realities in Dick's works as largely non-integrable events, whose forces of repulsion (including contradiction and ambiguity) sabotage the rational logic of meaning. Criticism, as a rule, handles contradiction and ambiguity in PKD – which I classify among expressions of far-reaching narrative instability of Dick's works – by deemphasizing their full force. This involves sidestepping and eliminating instances of contradiction and ambiguity through the application of the laws of the material universe to the fictional world, which, however, seems to do its best to deny foothold to any rational construction of reality. Criticism overcomes these obstructions by the selective interpretation, integration, and harmonization of the paradoxical energies of Dick's worlds.

For example, Jennifer Simkins competently argues that “the notion that the perceived world is illusory and that the true structure of the universe is occluded . . . [is] a concept that we see included in much of Dick's SF” (100). While her conclusion is valid and pertinent, it is, at the same time, made possible by the process of distillation and abstraction which tacitly deflects from equally strong competing counter-spheres of signification in Dick's narratives, which Simkins's interpretations simply do not flash out. It is such maneuvering that is necessary to make possible the construction of similarly definitive – but one-sided – statements as given above.

Simkins's example hints at the fact that – because of their universal fluctuation – Dickian narratives often challenge attempts at their description. Methodologies that spontaneously neutralize the element of fluctuation from Dick's fictions – thereby imposing

artificial stability on the innately unstable – keep the narrative realities opaque. The case in point includes Rossi's and Jameson's versions of reality shifting as ontological uncertainty.

Concerning Rossi's study, Rossi barely takes a step beyond promoting the use of empty dichotomous labels (e.g. real/fictional) and makes no attempt at real insight. The absent analysis in *Twisted Worlds of Philip K. Dick* of the morphology and syntax of Dick's narrative realities in many ways reflects Dick criticism's preoccupation with thematic content at the cost of a superficial exposition of the mechanisms of fictional reality. Though ontological uncertainty is the subject of Rossi's, he advocates that it "should be preserved in the interpretive discourse, not explained away" (7). Indeed, the lack of the concept's elaboration on Rossi's part means that it remains inherently unclear. This allows Rossi to move with impunity in his study and declare ontological uncertainty whenever it is needed, though the concept on that account becomes incrementally – and frustratingly – more fuzzy throughout Rossi's study.

My contention with Jameson in "After Armageddon" is that he presents a very narrow view of reality shifting in PKD. If the instability of fictional realities in PKD only sometimes seems to conform to Jameson's ontological uncertainty, and if Jameson's definition often cannot even accommodate a character's actual uncertainty (since often no "drugs, . . . schizophrenia . . . [, or] SF powers" are involved, or "the psychic world as it were [does not] go[] outside," nor does it "appear[] in the form of simulacra or of some photographically cunning reproduction of the external" ("After Armageddon" 350)), then Jameson's ontological uncertainty cannot adequately capture the pervasive instability in PKD's fictions. Moreover, despite Jameson's "refus[al]" to read "the hallucinatory experiences" in the light of "surrealism," "symbolism[,] and modernism" "as the sheer fantasy and dream narrative" – as Jameson "affirm[s] their reality" ("After Armageddon" 350-351) – Jameson's statements express his undeniable critical dependence on the dualism between the real and the unreal. This explains why Jameson conceives of "reality fluctuation" in PKD ("After Armageddon" 350), firstly, as an essentially localized and scarce phenomenon and, secondly, in terms of causal

sources that intrinsically produce the irrefutably unreal (i.e. (semi-)hallucinations). The inhibiting power of the dualism is exposed by the fact that although Jameson declares in his essay that “Dick’s work” at the moments of these fluctuations “transcends the opposition between the subjective and the objective” (“After Armageddon” 350), Jameson is incapable of expanding his theoretical stance beyond this depth of argument. As the dualism of the real/unreal falters in PKD, the collapse produces paradoxes and aporia, which are irresolvable by the logic that relies on the same dualism for understanding the reality construct of Dick’s worlds.

3 NON-RA and NON-RE Reality Shifting in PKD

3.1 Reaction to Dick Literary Criticism: Redefining Starting Points

Having contextualized reality in PKD's fictional worlds in relation to existing approaches in literary criticism, I have readied the stage for setting out the theoretical starting points for NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in this subchapter. Firstly, this thesis shares the interest of other authors in the incongruity and ambiguity found in Dick's works but proposes own solutions to "Dick's ontological and evaluative undecideability" (Jameson, "History and Salvation" 367). Secondly, this thesis abandons narrow conceptualizations of reality, including the strictly centralizing framing of reality in PKD, which conceives of the realities in the semantic system of a Dick's work as orbiting around one central reality (the real). Thirdly, I discard the dichotomous thinking underpinning the centralizing reality model because the destabilizing effect of Dick's realities on dichotomies (like the dichotomy between the subjective/internal and the objective/external) evidences that Dick's treatment of reality transcends straightforward categorizations. When metaphysical universals (prominent among them being: actuality, rationality, truth, centrality, and their cognates, near-cognates, and affiliated concepts), oppositional categorization, and hierarchization are used in this thesis, care is taken that they do not promote reductivism by obscuring the volatility of narrative reality in the process of interpretation by imposing an artificial sense of stability on Dickian worlds, which in many ways follow the trajectory of entropy towards the disintegration of reality.

Consequently, in this thesis, I attempt to work with and within contradictions and ambiguities in order to look at constellations of variously conceived carriers of signification and to explore their dynamism. My approach can be reasonably called 'illogical,' by which I mean that it makes the point of studying realities in PKD while concentrating on the incoherency and self-contradiction of junctures of meaning. Whereas criticism usually dismisses them as reality-denying/-destroying – as it holds that multiplying meanings mutually

invalidate each other and so cannot found a concept of the world – I see contradiction and ambiguity as capable of supporting a complex vision of reality as a promise of the future not necessarily bound by the past shaping the modalities of actuality, possibility, or probability: a space of relative randomness dedicated to the play of meaning that disrupts established structures of reality, explores (potentially unheard of) combinations of being, and distils new facts. In this project, contradiction and ambiguity are consequently considered reality-enhancing. They are building blocks of fictional spaces subject to their own laws and independent of other reality models – places of perceived multiplicity and indefiniteness, by the dint of which they compel us to tap into our creative imagination and to relinquish preconceptions about reality.

3.2 New Definition of Reality Shifting: Instability, Focalizing Perspectives, Focalization, Multiplicity

This subchapter first deals with how multiplicity and focalization found the conception of reality in Dick which I defend in this thesis. Following the previous explanations about the narrowness of conventionally conceived reality in works by PKD, I aim here to refine the concept by arguing the belief that reality shifting deserves to be examined from a broad perspective of the generic pattern of instability weaving as a thread through the fabric of reality created by Dick's style. This instability in the fictional worlds of PKD – since fictional worlds communicate images of reality – is naturally perceived as the shifting of the perspectives on reality. The first part of the present thesis's main argument is that this hermeneutically inescapable fluctuation (metamorphosis, shifting etc.) is the foundational pattern of reality in PKD's fictional worlds. There are two more aspects to my understanding of reality fluctuation in PKD: multiplicity and focalization. The broadly understood pattern of multiplicity of the fictional world is the product of the shifting perspectives on reality, which are themselves generated by focalizations. Focalization is understood as “a selection or restriction of narrative information in relation to the experience and knowledge of the narrator, the characters[,] or other, more hypothetical entities in the storyworld” (Niederhoff). Since perspectives focalize/reflect (I use the words equivalently) a certain vision of reality, I often qualify them as focalizing/reflecting to put emphasis on their function. This is the basic definition of Dick's reality shifting in my thesis.

The perceived significance and magnitude of shifting follows the basic protean nature of Dick's texts, which results in typological multiplicity that comprises various degrees and aspects of the actualization of reality shifting. The shifting movement widely varies in kind from the spatial and temporal movement within thought/thought patterns in the mind's eye, memory, or imagination of a focalizer, through the movement in a character's environment, to

the shifting of motif- and theme-related content. There are two levels at which shifting occurs: in and between perspectives. Perspectives are fluid with regards to the multivocality of meaning but also their dimensionality (including the ‘map’ – geographical, mental, psychological etc. – of the reality they produce or co-produce) as a result of their diachronous development and synchronous change (at a given moment a perspective framed by consciousness as if internally oscillates – keeps repositioning itself with respect to meaning, its modality, etc.). Similarly prolific and mutable is perspectives’ mutual interaction. Ultimately, a perspective reflects an independent vision of reality that is, however, in a constant dynamic interplay with other fluctuating and mutually-shaping realities in the universe of the fictional world.

The fluidity of the reflections of reality brings up questions about the epistemological subjectivism (including solipsism) and objectivism in Dick’s fiction. Dick’s works do not explicitly deny the possibility of objective reality, nor do they explicitly embrace subjective reality as the only possible mode of existence. The tensions presented by the principle of a world being a projection of subject or subject-like consciousness are best distilled in Dick’s short story “The Electric Ant,” in which the robot protagonist’s subjective reality alters and ceases to exist after tempering with own micro-punched tape. The story leaves the reader to ponder the topics directly and implicitly presented by the story, including questions about the relationship between the subjective perception and the objective existence of reality. What is left to be inferred is the sense that these questions are a red herring because the distinction between the subjective and the objective or the actual and the fictional can lose meaning within the space of a word in PKD, but perceiving beings cannot know the world in any other way beside through their subjective idiosyncratic perception of reality. This subjectivized quality – in degrees shared by all Dick’s fictional universes – makes them appear, in the first place, as projections of reflecting perspectives that belong to subjective or subjective-like consciousnesses.

3.3 ***NON-Rational and NON-REal Properties of Shifting Realities in Dick's Works***

In the previous subchapter, I refined the first half of the main argument of this thesis, which claims that PKD's fictional worlds are grounded in pervasive metamorphosis (shifting). Now, concerning the second half of the main argument, I would like to spell out the distinctive NON-RAtional and NON-REal conditions in PKD works under which the fictional realities and mental configurations originate and evolve. At this point, I bring in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Parallels and points of contact between Deleuze's philosophy and Dick's narrative practice enable the use of Deleuze's philosophy of difference to explain the NON-RAtionality and NON-REality of Dick's narrative worlds in Deleuzian terms as, firstly, inducing the perception of fictional reality as realizing the innate potential of being by the perpetual becoming of being in multiplicity and, secondly, engendering – in the vein of Deleuzian simulacra – the impossibility of apprehending and categorizing fictional reality unequivocally.

Deleuze and Dick have a shared interest in the nature of reality. Specifically, for Deleuze, “[p]hilosophy is ontology” (May 21) that is motivated, above all, by concerns about “what other possibilities life holds open to us, or, more specifically, . . . how we might think about things in ways that would open up new regions for living” (May 3). Answering those questions, Deleuze

see[s] the study of what there is as a creation rather than a discovery, or, better, as a project where the distinction between creation and discovery is no longer relevant. Suppose that ontology were not a project of seeking to grasp what there is in the most accurate way. Suppose instead ontology were to construct frameworks that, while not simply matters of fiction, were not simply matters of explanation either. (May 17)

Deleuze's creative orientation is, consequently, a reaction to an ontology whose “point is to articulate the nature or essence of what is”; and since “[a]n identity requires conceptual

stability,” such an ontology “[,] far from being an engagement with what is, denies the shifting character of reality” (May 18).

Considering Deleuze’s “engagement with . . . the shifting character of reality” and PKD criticism’s concern with various manifestations of ontological instability in Dick’s works, we can reasonably conclude that PKD’s and Deleuze’s ontologies share the same goal: the destabilization of reality. Appropriately, Dick’s world-building of self-proclaimed fractured realities meets its match in Deleuze’s thought, which “does not seek to offer a coherent framework from within which we can see ourselves and our world whole” (May 19). In this thesis, I see further relevance to contemplating Dick’s shifting of reality in terms of Deleuze’s ontology as neither solely a discovery nor a creation on account of the fact that this kind of destabilizing ontology “does not settle things” but “disturbs them . . . by moving beneath the stable world of identities to a world of difference that . . . both constitutes and disrupts those identities” (May 19).

One of the ways in which Deleuze’s difference is relevant for the analysis of PKD’s fictions consists in the implications of difference for the conceptualization of reality and rationality in relation to the notion of truth. In traditional ontology “concepts *identify* what there is,” whereas Deleuzian difference cannot be “directly comprehended” (May 20) as “what can be identified is only a single manifestation . . . of what there is” (May 21). This means that “concepts of *difference* are not seeking to articulate a truth; they are creating a perspective on what there is” (May 22).

While Deleuze’s philosophy destabilizes reality through concepts, PKD’s realities touch difference (Deleuze uses the word *palpate* for connecting with that which cannot be seen (May 20)) in a fiction primarily through the iterative re-writing of reflecting perspectives (reality shifting), which produces multiplicities, and only secondarily through concepts. The reason why reflecting perspectives in Dick’s worlds ultimately function as a Deleuzian concept palpating “a difference that lies beyond its grasp” (May 21) is because each reflecting

perspective of each (version) of reality in Dick can be shown to be at some point (at least potentially) defeated by another in the same way as a concept of difference is inevitably outrun by the world since there is more to the world than what we can perceive and conceive.

The abundance of ways in which reality actualizes itself – another consequence of Deleuze’s difference – is linked to the Nietzschean concept of the eternal return. Deleuze’s understanding of Nietzsche’s eternal return is consequential for Deleuze’s specific vision of the transformational and effusive nature of reality, which constitutes a germane insight into the shifting of reality in PKD. For Deleuze, the eternal return “is not the recurrence of the same” (May 59) – as interpretations of Nietzsche often go – “it is the recurrence of difference . . . itself” (May 59), “of differences whose actualization into identities is not a matter of the continuation of rigid forms but instead an experimentation in a world of inexhaustible creative resources” (May 68). Importantly, “return is the being of becoming itself” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 24) – i.e. all becoming is the return of difference. Most profoundly, Deleuze holds that “there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity . . . [, which] is the inseparable manifestation, essential transformation[,] and constant symptom of unity” (May 60).

If we concede that multiplicities constituting realities in Dick must be reducible to a more general principle – which we may speculate must be somehow essentially identifiable as we can see its materializations – then, possibly, the principle itself, as suggested above, is being as becoming, which would explain why reality in PKD can take on many different forms, through which it speaks. To put it differently, behind multiplicity that pervades (and in so doing constitutes) PKD’s realities is what Deleuze calls difference (multiplicity in PKD is here understood as being describable in terms of identity, i.e. what are, for Deleuze, manifestations of difference (May 89)). The same idea can be restated in directly Deleuzian terms: “The world . . . lives by unfolding its virtuality into actual forms . . . These identities . . . are suffused with difference” (May 129). Nietzsche’s eternal return as interpreted by Deleuze in his ontology of

difference thus allows us to connect the reality shifting (as a broadly conceived instability of the fictional world), focalizing perspectives, and multiplicity of reality in PKD by the function of the eternal “recurrence of difference” as an inherent trajectory of being.

With respect to the multiplicity of being, Deleuze’s difference may present a methodical solution to the problem of “recurrence of difference” usually standing in the way of arriving at a non-reductive synthesis in truth-and-reality-oriented expositions of multiplicity-generating shifting in PKD (not to be mistaken for Deleuzian being as multiplicities – an alternative wording conceptually equivalent to being as difference; multiplicities having “neither sensible form . . . [,] conceptual signification,” or existence, being “inseparable from a potential” (May 89)). In order to explore the difference behind multiplicity in PKD, our method should, probably obviously, follow where the expressions of difference lead us. However, Deleuze’s theory usefully brings to our attention the pertinence of the focus on rendering in interpretation the creativity and playfulness of the reality shifting of Dickian narratives. To paraphrase in terms of Deleuzian ontology, interpretation in this thesis is not meant to be “a matter of telling us what there is” (May 86) irrefutably or what is true – it is “an experiment” (May 81) “taking us on strange adventures” (May 86) and “opening up fields of discussion, in which there are many possible solutions” (May 83). This seems an adequate strategy when dealing with fictional worlds characterized by extreme instability, which – to restate the main argument of this thesis – induce the perception of fictional reality as realizing the innate potential of being by the perpetual becoming of being in multiplicity.

Let us now consider the other part of this argument, the other property of reality in PKD which I subsume under the paradigms of NON-Rationality and NON-REality: the impossibility – on account of reality fluctuation in PKD – of apprehending and categorizing fictional reality unequivocally. I explain this fact by referring it to NON-Rationality and NON-REality behaving as Deleuzian simulacra.

The Deleuzian sense of simulacra is different from other thinkers' understanding of the term, which goes back at least to Plato. In "Sophist," Plato distinguishes between two kinds of "image-making – the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances" (498). For Plato, "[c]opies are secondhand possessors, well-grounded claimants, authorized by resemblance. *Simulacra* are . . . built on a dissimilitude, implying a perversion, an essential turning away" (Deleuze and Krauss 47). In the twentieth century, Baudrillard defines simulacra as products of simulation, which is "the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal . . . It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real" (1-2).

In the Deleuzian philosophical frame of inverted Platonism, a simulacrum is perceived neither as Baudrillard's hyperreal nor as Plato's inauthentic imitation. In fact, a simulacrum is not "a simple imitation" at all "but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned" (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 69). Deleuze, thus, "rejects . . . both the distinction between model and copy on the one hand and possible and real on the other . . . Both distinctions . . . compare what is in existence to something outside by means of which the existence is judged" (May 49).

In the same ways as the Deleuzian notion of simulacra negates the distinction between an original versus derived reality, and with it the idea of grounding existence in unchanging metaphysical principles ("Multiplicity, difference, is not transcendent; it is immanent" (May 60)), non-reality and non-rationality in Dick's narratives make it impossible to unequivocally apprehend and categorize that which is in terms of transcendental universal principles (like truth, reality etc.) because all realities, if to a varying degree, channel being as difference. Alternatively, we can say that the instrumentalities of the paradigms of non-reality and non-rationality are responsible for the fact that PKD's fictional realities – as the actualizations of being – import the fact that "being is always more and therefore other than what representation posits for it" (May 82).

As a consequence, despite identitizing perspectives – which are often local/transient, and even if sustained, not unambiguous – Dickian fictional realities are neither real nor unreal: their overriding quality is that, no matter what they thematize, they actualize being as “the overflowing character of things themselves” (May 82). This equally means that Dick’s narratives – as there is no center to reality (multiplicity being the repudiation of transcendental axioms like truth, reality etc.) – signify no center to the mental configuration spaces projected by the fictional realities on any level (including, most obviously, the one of characters/narrators). In the Deleuzian vein of creatively foregrounding interesting perspectives on reality (or, specifically, shifting reality), let us now proceed to an analysis of the textual material from Dick’s fictions that exemplifies the workings of reality shifting under the paradigms of non-rationality (NON-RA) and non-reality (NON-RE).

4 Analysis of Dick's novels: Tracing NON-RA and NON-RE Reality Shifting in *We Can Build You*, *Martian Time-Slip*, and *Clans of the Alphane Moon*

Let us begin by going over several – relatively ‘light’ – instances of the playful propagations of the vectors of multiplicity in *We Can Build You*, which pave the way narratively towards more subtle and/or protracted manifestations of reality shifting that more explicitly realize the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE. My point here is to prove that the effect of reality shifting in Dick is really pervasive – that it can be found throughout the novel and that it exists in multiple variations. Starting with their simple forms, already early in the first chapter of the novel, we can observe temporal- and spatial-based shifting. The following passages are from the narrator:

For years we've run this ad in newspapers in one town after another, all up and down the western states and as far inland as Colorado. . . .

Anyhow, we place the ad, say in the San Rafael Independent-Journal, and soon letters start arriving at our office in Ontario, Oregon, where my partner Maury Rock takes care of all that . . . and then when he has enough contacts in a particular area, say around San Rafael, he night-wires the truck. Suppose it's Fred down there in Marin County. . . .

I got to Ontario, Oregon, late, having been down south around Santa Monica . . .

Ontario isn't my hometown, or anybody else's. I hail from Wichita Falls, Kansas, and when I was high school age I moved to Denver and then to Boise, Idaho. In some respects Ontario is a suburb of Boise; it's near the Idaho border—you go across a long metal bridge—and it's a flat land, there, where they farm. The forests of eastern Oregon don't begin that far inland. The biggest industry is the Ore-Ida potato patty factory, especially its electronics division, and then there're a whole lot of Japanese

farmers who were shuffled back that way during World War Two and who grow onions or something. The air is dry, real estate is cheap, people do their big shopping in Boise; the latter is a big town which I don't like because you can't get decent Chinese food there. It's near the old Oregon Trail, and the railroad goes through it on its way to Cheyenne.

Our office is located in a brick building in downtown Ontario across from a hardware store. We've got root iris growing around our building. The colors of the iris look good when you come driving up the desert routes from California and Nevada. (Ch. 1)

As we can see, the character's thought progression frames spatial shifting involving both the description of movement between points referencing the physical, diegetic space of the narrative and the transitions between juxtaposed locations in the character's thoughts. The locations include specific place names (e.g. "San Rafael"), generic ones (e.g. a "town," "inland," "factory," "where they farm" = farmland), and (loosely) implied or evoked ones (e.g. "Japanese farmers" = Japan, "Chinese food" = China). The spatial shifting in the quotes above is interknit with the temporal dimension. The temporal dimension makes itself felt through, for example, signals of temporal duration ("After years") and imminence ("soon"), the temporality of the causality relationship ("we place the ad . . . and soon letters start arriving"), the transitions between the (relatively recent) past/present and observations lacking in a distinct time frame ("I got to Ontario, Oregon, late" and "Ontario isn't my hometown"; "when I was high school age" and "In some respects Ontario is a suburb of Boise"), or the transition between the present and the distant past ("World War Two"). These examples are not isolated cases.

A more sophisticated pattern of the same is found in Chapter 8, where Dick's world-building technique connects the locale of "California[']s volcanic mountains, black, dull and ashy" with "the age of giants" and the beyond of the land of Thanatos (implied in the "disappearance and the sudden silence" of "[t]wo tiny yellow finches," which are revealed in

the narrative to have “gone into the radiator grill. Cooked and dead in an instant”), which gives in to the mundaneness of the birds’ burial “at the edge of the highway” in “the litter of plastic beer cans and moldering paper cartons.” From there the perspective eye of the narrative swiftly moves through the spaces of “Mount Shasta and the border station of California,” “a motel at Klamath Falls,” “the coast,” and “the road,” on the “shoulder” of which the narrator witnesses “[a]n enormous ship, on its way back from Luna or one of the planets.” The spatial movement has, again, an attendant temporal dimension.

Another instance of reality shifting from the beginning of Chapter 1 does not concern the movement between elements of multiplicity (as in the spatial and temporal reality shifting above) but the propagation of multiplicity by aggregating naming onomastic entities (elements of multiplicity) around points of reference. The example consists in the narrator’s exposition on the names used for the business with which he is involved and the introduction of the narrator’s name and the names of his partner.

MASA ASSOCIATES . . . stands for MULTIPLEX ACOUSTICAL SYSTEM OF AMERICA, a made-up electronics-type name which we developed due to our electronic organ factory . . . It was Maury who came up with Frauentzimmer Piano Company, since as a name it fitted our trucking operation better. Frauentzimmer is Maury’s original old-country name, Rock being made-up, too. My real name is as I give it: Louis Rosen, which is German for roses. One day I asked Maury what Frauentzimmer meant, and he said it means womankind. I asked where he specifically got the name Rock.

“I closed my eyes and touched a volume of the encyclopedia, and it said ROCK TO SUBUD.”

“You made a mistake,” I told him. “You should have called yourself Maury Subud.” (Ch. 1)

This kind of simple localized (concentrated locally in the body of the text) shifting involving the multiplicity of naming expressions prefigures the more complex protracted

development (shifting) of reflecting perspectives on different themes throughout the narrative. Significantly, I chose this passage because it explicitly demonstrates the kind of approach towards the narrativizing of the fictional realities in Dick's works for which I argue in this thesis. Though the quote uses words "made-up," "original" and "real," the narrator's casual acceptance of the interchangeability of the proper names signals a perspective on reality which erases the oppositions suggested by these words. What earns a commentary from the narrator is not Maury's changing of his name to "Rock" – the exchange of the actual for the fictional/fabricated – but the error in judgement (the "mistake") that Maury made when choosing his invented name. By having Maury choose his fake name from an "encyclopedia" – an authoritative source of facts – and incorporating Maury's lie to the narrator (that "Frauenzimmer . . . means womankind") – Maury's distortion of the truth being revealed as such to the narrator only later on in the novel – the narrative further ironizes the conventional sense of reality as a perception of what there is that can/must be objectively assessable and contrastable with that which there is not.

These deviations from what could be reasonably expected set a new standard for the concept of reality in the novel – one in which things are not possessed of a positively identifiable singular nature but are viewed instead through multiple angles that are equal. There are significant consequences to the fact that none of these lens fully capture the essence of reality: any perspective is latently provisional but no perspective can be outright dismissed; all perspectives implicitly compete with each other at all times, and yet irreconcilable views can offer equally relevant, though diametrically different, takes on reality. Needless to say that this conceptualization of reality as diverging reality perceptions (multiple realities) is indicative of a model far removed from the traditional rational logic of reality. The above excerpt is thus worth citing for the foreshadowing of and the introduction into the operation of the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE in the narrative.

In *WCBY*, the destabilizing effect of the shifting reflecting perspectives on the fictional reality prominently foregrounds a cluster of overlapping themes (including rationality, sanity and mental health) converging on, broadly speaking, the exploration of the configurations of mental spaces. What complicates the perspectives on the mental spaces is the fact that they are, as a consequence of the pervasive multiplicity-generating instability in the novel, polyvalent at a given moment with respect to interpretation. Consider the character of Maury Rock. In the novel, Maury Rock is a partner in Fraunzimmer Piano Company, which, at the behest of Maury's daughter, Pris, begins the development of human-looking simulacra (androids) in order to save the declining business. The novel not only presents an evolving take on Maury's psychology, but each re-writing of the outlook on Maury deliberately avoids commitment to a uni-dimensional vision of Maury's behavior or the supposed state of his psyche.

For example, Maury's defense of the proposal of the business expansion into the making of synthetic humans acquires multiple competing aspects in a single scene, which invade and combine with each other in a way that makes it hard to distinguish where each angle begins and where it ends. There is Maury's in itself realistic assessment of MASA's business situation: "I know [the electronic organs are] going to diminish in sales volume all the time . . . What we need is something which is really new; because . . . Hammerstein makes those mood organs and . . . they've got that market sewed up airtight" (Ch. 2). Here, Maury's seemingly demonstrated capacity for rational thinking and pragmatism somewhat mitigates – if it does not obliquely contradict – the suggestion of Maury's compromised emotional equilibrium put forward by the narrator's earlier assertion that Maury has "the emotional excitability of the hyperthyroid. His hands tend to shake and he digests his food too fast; they're giving him pills" (Ch. 1).

Despite the fact that Maury needs to medicate himself for an emotionally disqualifying condition, the narrative stops short of explicitly indicating how he copes with stress and psychological strain. It is debatable whether or not the narrative gathers enough critical mass

for us to be able to substantiate the interpretation that Maury is implied to be susceptible to psychological lapses in his mental processes and resulting irrational reactions. Boldly enterprising, Maury's solution to the problem of the declining sales – to manufacture simulacra in the forms of historical figures “for educational purposes” (Ch. 2) – might ultimately be a long shot, including in terms of the available industrial capacity or financing, however, considering that the company possesses a working prototype of a simulacrum, the idea of manufacturing educational simulacra is, in principle, not beyond reason.

So far, there are no hints that Maury's judgement cannot be trusted. What is already curious, however, is the singularity of Maury's decision to make the first simulacrum in the likeness of relatively obscure Edwin M. Stanton – Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of War during the American Civil War – instead of any other truly high-profile character from history. For that matter, does Maury's remarkable choice of the period speak of any unusual level of fascination with the Civil War and does it betray an unhealthy obsession with violence itself? Anyway, even if there is nothing wrong with Maury, there is still something bizarre about what is happening through his agency in the reality of the novel.

By doggedly re-writing the perspectives on Maury, the narrative keeps extending the same principle of shifting that suffuses the perspectives reflecting the levels of consciousness governed by more mundane thinking through the less ordinary, the irrational, and, possibly, to the insane spectrum. Dick's coup de grace with respect to Maury's portrayal through a character speech is as follows:

We propose to President Mendoza in our nation's Capital that we abolish war and substitute for it a ten-year-spaced-apart centennial of the U.S. Civil War, and what we do is, the Rosen factory supplies all the participants, simulacra . . . of everybody. Lincoln, Stanton, Jeff Davis, Robert E. Lee, Long-street, and around three million simple ones as soldiers we keep in stock all the time. And we have the battles fought with the participants really killed, these made-to-order simulacra blown to bits, instead

of just a grade-B movie type business like a bunch of college kids doing Shakespeare.

Do you get my point? You see the scope of this? . . . “We could be as big as General Dynamics in five years,” Maury added. (Ch. 2)

This passage further advances the epistemic fluctuations that define the perpetual perspectivizing of Maury in the previously analyzed passages. The existence of that fluctuation is substantiated by the questions arising from it. Does the presumptuousness and grandiosity of Maury’s scheme speak of Maury’s delusional state of mind? Is Maury a simpleton or in need of medical intervention? Is Maury’s emotional volatility a result of compromised mental health? Irrespective of the almost phantasmagorical leap (considering the size of their business), is Maury an eccentric genius, a visionary with a megalomaniacal streak? At the same time, despite his febrile ambition, Maury’s diagnosis of the business’s current situation is, on its face, very sane. In fact, he is the only one who is sounding the alarm that it is time to act now, trying to shake the narrator and his father out of their lethargy.

The described sequence of the shifts exemplifies how the novel maintains a multiplicity of competing epistemic frames by manipulating epistemic possibilities (i.e. by opening and closing of particular interpretive avenues) through the shifting of narrative-produced perspectives. What is characteristic of the way Dick creates these multiplicities are exactly the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE, under which the juxtaposition of perspectives creates the distortive effect of misalignment in the narrative space established by the perspectives. In *WCBY*, as in other PKD’s fictions, the destabilizing discontinuity has at least two causes. Firstly, Dick’s characters remain elusive, and so their thoughts and actions, including silences (like the silence immediately following Maury’s speech), always remain open to sundry readings – none seeming less evanescent than others. Secondly, the characters’ perceptions of reality are always slightly askew with one another.

To illustrate both of these points, let us consider Louis’s (the narrator) and Jerome’s (the narrator’s father) reactions to Maury’s overblown, fantastical plans. The low-key but striking

disproportion between their responses speaks to the fact that they occupy different perceptual realities. Their contributions are both asymmetrically impassive and intangible when compared with Maury's speech. The understatement involved in the narrator's train of thought ("Yes, I thought, there is scope to it" (Ch. 2)) hints at the reservations the narrator has about Maury's proposition. The exact meaning of his reservations, however, remains occluded, and, moreover, Louis does not verbalize his doubt to either Jerome or Maury. Thus, though Louis interacts with other characters, his mind remains unknown. Jerome's communication, while verbal, also reveals little about Jerome's true meaning and connects with Maurice's perspective only at an angle ("No, your idea is too—ambitious, Maurice. We are not that great" (Ch. 2)). Ultimately, considering the characters of Maury, Louis, and Jerome in the context of the analyzed scene, the shifting NON-RA and NON-RE patterns make it impossible to decide which character or which perspectives on reality are more or less rational or real. In their own ways, they are all both deficient and yet equally plausible.

WCBY, like many other Dick's fictions, revolves around the questions about humanity intertwining with the exploration of reality, the examination of one being the working out of the other and vice versa. As the nexus for the thematization of the topics in the novel, all of which inevitably feed back into the central issues of reality and humanity, the character of Pris is a doorway to the discussion of the (aberrated) configurations of reality, humanity and psychology. In the novel, the themes suggested by the narrative-provided perspectives on Pris are interlinked with aberrative mental and behavioral states by virtue of Pris's history of mental illness and her influence on the world around her (including her part in the declining mental health of the narrator).

The shifting around Pris's schizophrenia involves Dick's maneuvers in Chapter 3, where the point of entry into the subject is the absurdly facetious presentation of the creativity often associated with a mental disorder. Having returned from a stint at a mental clinic to live with her father, Pris entertains herself with a "tiling orgy," cracking tiles into irregular pieces in order

to tile in a variety of grotesquely garish colors the sketches she made in the bathroom of “all sorts of sea monsters and fish, even a mermaid.” The narrator notices: “The mermaid had red tiles for tits . . . The panorama both repelled and interested me. ‘Why not have little light bulbs for nipples?’ I said.”

From there, the tone of the perspective internally shifts from a mocking, comic voice tempting obscenity to the darker undertones that shade the theme of mental spaces. Pris’s taking refuge in the fevered compulsive execution of the task (“bus[iness]”), and its implication of the lack of complete control over one’s choices, give an ambivalent twist to the usually positive idea of creativity, which angle further clashes with the sense of being imprisoned by the drives of own mind, facilitated (or reinforced) by the imagery of the “involuntary . . . commit[ment]” of patients at mental facilities and the connotations of the illness presenting itself suddenly, incapacitating one in an ambush (“psychosis . . . strike”). The reference to physical confinement also prefigures social and emotional isolation as a result of mental illness. The change in tone away from humor at the beginning of Chapter 3 is later in the text of the same chapter echoed by Maury describing how Pris “lost her sense of humor” on account of her schizophrenia. Such correlations are also part of the patterns of shifting found in PKD.

Under the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE, however, the local and global trends of the shifting of reality with respect to the themes in the novel become defined by an oscillation in which no previous position is completely replaced by the most recent one, which motion signifies in the novel the undeniability of the complexity (multiplicity) of reality. This is seen, for example, towards the end of Chapter 3, where the narrative slightly shifts the perspective on Pris’s manic obsessiveness (“She never stops being active. I don’t know where she gets the energy”), and yet it does not allay the suddenly benighted perspective on Pris’s mental condition from the start of the same chapter.

This perspective continues to shift in Chapter 3 past Pris’s obsessive compulsive symptoms to an equivocal perception of her appearance and physicality. Within the

grotesqueness of Pris's other-than-"normal" looks – the "little hard, heart-shaped face, with a widow's crown, black hair" and "her odd make-up, eyes outlined in black, a Harlequin effect, and almost purple lipstick" – the narrative accentuates the transformation of Pris towards a de-anthropomorphized shell of the formerly human being, the over-emphasis on the artificialness of her outward characteristics symbolically magnifying the internal devolution: "the whole color scheme made her appear unreal and doll-like, lost somewhere back behind the mask which she had created out of her face." From a marionette of Thanatos effecting the simulation of life ("And the skinniness of her body . . . she looked to me like a dance of death creation animated in some weird way"), the perspective quickly shifts twice within a space of two sentences through the angle of attractiveness ("But anyhow, from one standpoint she looked good, although unusual to say the least.") back to the 'mechanical/dehumanized being' outlook via the comparison with a robotic simulacrum of a human being ("For my money, however, she looked less normal than the Stanton"). The loss of Pris's anthropomorphic qualities is one way the narrative articulates Pris's distancing from humanity (in the sense of falling away from the human condition) apart from her stunted emotional and social engagement. Pris's de-anthropomorphization fits a wider strategy found throughout Dick's fiction in which human subjects/life are portrayed as deficient as to the characteristics defining the human condition while artificial beings to an increasing degree take on the organic features of human existence, including thought and emotional patterns.

In *WCBY*, the de-anthropomorphization of human beings and the anthropomorphization of artificial beings foreground the physical and metaphysical questions about existence. The shifting perspectives on the human-like simulacra (robots) in the novel – the characters of Edward M. Stanton and Abraham Lincoln – investigate the various nuances of what it means to be alive. However, under NON-RA and NON-RE, the shape of the perspectives that express the explicit and implicit questions and answers around the subject of life mutate incessantly. At times, the perspectives show the simulacra as displaying characteristics, psychical and

psychological, that make them equal to or more human than human beings. At other times, the perspectives present the otherness/inferiority of artificial life. At times, human beings appear unique and without competition from the simulacra. At other times, humans do not match up to the best of the ideas of humanity. One might say that such variation is not unusual for a novel. I would argue that what makes *WCBY* divergent from the familiar constellations of ontological and epistemic aspects of fictional reality specifically with respect to the theme of humanity is that – due to the world-modelling under NON-RA and NON-RE – we encounter a paradox consisting in the fact that the stuff of reality in the novel used to construe the coordinates of the human condition (and alternately used to claim its uniqueness, superiority or declined status) can neither prove or disprove the otherness/inferiority of artificial life to humanity any more than it can define human existence.

So far, I have looked at specific passages from *WCBY* to establish by example several ways in which we can conceive, in a conservative fashion, of the destabilizing, multiplicity-producing effect of shifting under the NON-RA and NON-RE paradigms in Dick's works. I have also discussed the role of shifting with respect to the center of the thematic orientation in Dick, touched upon the (de-)anthropomorphizing textual strategies in PKD's works, and exemplified my arguments in the specific context of *WCBY*.

In the spirit of experimentation envisioned by Deleuze, I will now attempt to illustrate how theorizing fictional reality in terms of NON-RA- and NON-RE-controlled shifting has a potential to open up atypical interpretative avenues. The reason why aporia-producing paradoxes do not pose a completely insurmountable obstacle to meaning in rationality-controlled fictional universes of Dick's worlds is because the prevailing interpretation naturally sidesteps the problem – the unreal and the irrational are boundaries at which reality literary ends. This is why in a relatively static projected reality, aspects of being contravening such a reality system by virtue of their instability that exceeds the reality-delineating limits of the rationally possible are discounted as irrational/impossible (or are re-rationalized).

In comparison, I conceptualize what are elsewhere deemed as ‘impossible’ aspects of being (concealed under the wider umbrella denotations of ‘irrational’ and ‘unreal’) in the fictional worlds of Dick’s literature as merely existing outside of the scope of the static view of reality. Instead, the dynamic view of reality in Dick – expressed as the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE – gives rise to an interpretative space where (what was formerly known as) the unreal and the irrational are no longer obstacles to discovery because fictional reality at any given time points to the-more-there-is – signaling there are no fixed boundaries to reality despite its observed strangeness. I, therefore, intend now to push past the boundaries of the universally conceived rational and real to discover what the paradoxes/aporia produced by the reflecting perspectives in Dick’s works hide and what meanings can be sustained by the text despite them.

Two closely connected topics thematized through the character of Pris in *WCBY* are sociability and emotionality, both of which take, by the benchmarks set by the narrative, arguably psychologically anomalous forms in Pris. The perspectives on Pris sketch her mind-set in the shifting light of varying sociability and emotionality levels ranging from the display of social and emotional disconnectedness (potentially with sociopathological overtones) to the seeking of interpersonal proximity and the showing of emotional vulnerability. These changing perspectives freely intersect with the shifting strength of the implication as to the dependency of her aloofness on her psychological condition. In other words, the question presenting itself to us is to what extent the manner of Pris’s social and emotional interaction with others in the novel is a matter of choice as opposed to being symptomatic of the development of her illness.

The coinciding perspectives render Pris’s distant coldness by interfacing several notions in varying arrangements. The narrative oscillates within different shades of meaning between the powerlessness to overcome emotional impairment and social dyspathy on the one hand and the unwillingness to do so on the other. These are cut across with and interject into the theme of psychological afflictions. The resulting complex of significances that are evoked by the

narrative shifts in a way that paints the picture of reality, psyche and the human condition as being both in and outside our control.

In line with its NON-Rational logic, *WCBY* shows Pris from the angle of the weakness to own psychological impulses on account of her diagnosis, which also shapes her as a human being: “You’re no guest of mine. Just my father’s. And don’t talk to me about going to bed or I’ll wreck your life. I’ll tell my father you propositioned me, and that’ll end MASA ASSOCIATES and your career” (Ch. 3). And yet, Pris is in control of her disorder: “Undoubtedly Pris was much better now, or they would not have released her into the outer world” (Ch. 3). If anything, it is the narrator who is deteriorating psychologically. Since Pris’s pronouncements (““You can barely handle your hostility, can you? Is that because you’re a failure in your own eyes? Maybe you’re being too hard on yourself. Tell me your childhood dreams and goals and I’ll tell you if—””) about the narrator’s psychological fragility in Chapter 4 lack weight for their abruptness and the lack of contextual evidence at the time – not to mention the unreliability of Pris’s judgement suggested by her mental history – the early signs of the narrator’s decline become visible for what they are only retrospectively in the second half of the novel, where the frustration of the narrator’s desire for Pris accelerates his psychological dissolution, culminating in a full-blown psychological episode. Similar retrospective re-writing of reality with respect to the theme of mental illness occurs after the narrator’s institutionalization, when he meets Pris at the clinic, learning that she obfuscated the fact that her condition had at some point gotten worse, despite past appearances to the contrary.

These two cases of retrospective shifting – establishing that the narrator’s and Pris’s existences were supposedly, at least for some time, affected by their abnormal mental circumstances – illustrate how concepts behave under the NON-RA and NON-RE paradigms in Dick’s works. In elaborating concepts with difference (i.e. by incrementally shifting their meaning toward other realities), NON-RA and NON-RE make it possible for concepts to exist in an epistemic space where the distances between them are simultaneously unimaginably great,

equal to a zero, and expressive of anything in between. The boundlessness – difference itself (in the Deleuzian sense) – of the epistemic spaces drawn by Dickian realities is what defines the life of concepts in Dick's fictions. For this reason, the concepts of rationality and irrationality (and of reality and unreality) – which the Dickian paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE play upon and rise above – exist in multiplicities of simultaneous perspectives that see them moving through all the points of the epistemic space (or staying still) closer or further apart, changing (including themselves mutually), and possibly merging/erasing themselves in convoluted ways (in one of their aspects, NON-RA and NON-RE are products of such erasures – i.e. concepts' mutual invasions into their conceptual spaces enable NON-RA and NON-RE, though what defines NON-RA and NON-RE is faithfulness to difference, not their dependence on specific relational/interference patterns). At any rate, NON-RA and NON-RE in Dick's fictions endow concepts with fluidity, dynamism, and absolute nuance, which engender the kind of epistemo-ontological multiplicity of the world that, under the projection of right mental framing, always overrides what are only tentative incompatibilities by providing more epistemo-ontological room (so that epistemo-ontological choices need not exclude one another) in an ever-expanding multi-layered universe of realities.

For example, specifically with respect to *WCBY*, the mechanisms of the epistemic spaces in which concepts exist in the novel allow for (yet do not oblige) the *retrospective* establishing of the 'truth' of the narrator's and Pris's past in relation to psychological deterioration. In other words, with the benefit of the hindsight, we may come to see the narrator's and Pris's behavior earlier in the novel – though it may not have appeared so at the time – in the light of eroding and relapsing mental states. These perspectives may feel more definitely stable and 'real' than others because under projected rationality they would be, seemingly, the most reasonable and logical explanations of 'reality' – considering the narrator *does* undoubtedly lose his mind in the second half of the novel, and the inflections of the focalizations of Pris *do* suggest not just any, but a sinister condition of mental divergence. If

we accept this to be true, these particular instances of retrospective shifting embody the idea that reality in its specificity (whether by reality we mean: that which is real as opposed to the unreal; or that which is) is always established only retrospectively with respect to the failure of other, previous perspectives on reality. In other words, the reality shifting in Dick's fiction suggests to us – at least per this particular angle and reach of the currently isolated reality frame – that the human perception of reality – and indeed other subjects in the context of this reality (including rationality and humanity) – cannot be experienced outside of a series of imperfect shifting illusions, where each apprehended moment transforms the past but, in unmasking the past illusions, speaks, by analogy, to the illusoriness of the perceived reality of the present that unmasked the past.

The same retrospective shifting involving the narrator's and Pris's mental struggle itself exists in an oscillation that alters the focus and nuance of the considered reality frame. Let us leave aside the interpretation in which the assumed truth of the narrator's and Pris's past psychological deterioration feels real (assumed reality frame 1) in a way other explanations do not. Considering the uncertainty of whether the narrator's meeting with Pris at the clinic is a hallucination or not is *not* resolved (by the way, if she is a hallucination, we cannot establish the (tentative) 'truth' of her worsening condition in the past, as we did in the paragraph above), other perspectives may come into play for us. By co-existing with the previous 'reality,' (assumed reality frame 1), these perspectives represent the potential (of assumed reality frame 2 synchronous with assumed reality frame 1) in which the notion of unreality can be divorced from the notion of illusoriness. While in assumed reality frame 1 we might conclude that all (perception of) reality is deceptive, in assumed reality frame 2 no reality is any more unreal (including assumed reality frame 1) than others but can be, by choice of perspective, (at least provisionally) less illusory. Assumed reality frame 2, consequently, puts front and center the Deleuzian idea that, reality and perception being entangled, reality need not be a product of passive reception – it can be a process of active participation in the creation of being. As

evidenced by the outlined example from *WCBY* of the reality frames enhancing/intersecting each other, NON-RA and NON-RE reality shifting is thus conducive to rethinking the nature of reality with the emphasis on the subtle variations of and within the tentatively drawn boundaries of shifting meanings.

Before we proceed to other examples of the consequences of the reality shifting in PKD, let me point out that the above particular meanings coded into the changing reality in *WCBY* are not obviously accessible without conceptualizing the fictional reality as the result of multiplicity-producing shifting under NON-RA and NON-RE. Without focusing on the relevance of the shifting in *WCBY* as such – were we interested only in the (ultimate) truth – we would be satisfied with discerning one reality, which would be the only reality discernible (the real as opposed to the unreal), and there would be no ground for us (accessible from the text – not wishfully applied to the text without evidence from within it) to substantiate or even think of the possibility that reality can ‘fail’ us (again, I am here concerned with the subtleties that the narrative communicates when its potential is more fully realized in our interpretation). There would be, as there indeed is for many critics, the untangled mystery of failing, unreliable, chaotic reality – a veritable mess, possibly an example of bad writing.

Without contemplating the reality in *WCBY* in terms of shifting, we would not be able to properly apprehend the reality as a multiplicity of perspective (realities) in the first place. We would not be then presented with the paradox of more ‘truths’ existing equally in a manner that does not require reconciliation to the detriment of any of these truths (this equals to the creation of a single reality). Without this paradox, we would not be forced to solve it. In traditional criticism of PKD, a paradox like this one is circumvented completely – since there can be only one truth/reality, a paradox at a reality-busting level must be eliminated. Hence, in traditional criticism, the only message *WCBY* potentially carries about reality is that there are many perspectives on reality – none can fail, though, because there really is only one reality by

default. And yet, it is when constructions of reality come into conflict and deconstruct one another that the Dick narrative frequently occasions thought-provoking moments.

Some of the most stimulating ones are tied in with the narrator's psychological unravelling, which illustrates the repercussions of thinking of existence as a singular reality. The narrator is confided in a static world whose omnipresent focal point of being is Pris with her enslaving magnetism. She is "the cosmos" – in the language of the novel – onto which the narrator projects his "anima, . . . the embodiment of [his] unconsciousness" – as Doctor Nisea explains in Chapter 17 – which the narrator "worship[s]," beholding Pris

as a dangerous, hostile, and incredibly powerful yet attractive being. The embodiment of all the pairs of opposites: it possesses the totality of life, yet is dead; all love, yet is cold; all intelligence, yet is given to a destructive analytical trend which is not creative; yet it is seen as the source of creativity itself.

Unable to conceive of life as a series of tentative illusory realities, the narrator's reality starts unravelling with Pris's departure for Seattle. The reality's eventual eruption in a psychological conflagration is inevitable because Pris represents to the narrator archetypes, which "cannot be assimilated by the ego" (Ch. 17). Her vague pursuit of wealth and social status in exchange for offering herself to the amoral multi-millionaire playboy Sam K. Barrows begins in earnest the narrator's mental decline, which climaxes in a dissociative hallucination of the narrator copulating with Pris – a compensating illusion which forcibly replaces the reality that cannot be since Pris is emotionally incapable of reciprocating the narrator's feelings. The psychotic event is a threshold marking the "eventual[] disrupt[ion] of [the narrator's] ego" (Ch. 17), which completely annihilates the narrator's reality, throwing his psyche into chaos.

It can be argued that the narrator's inability to think in terms of a multiplicity of perspectives on reality condemn him to an insufficiently creative – we could say non-Deleuzian – ontological outlook. This is why the narrator's treatment necessitates a more active participation in the self-creation of reality – an idea communicated by Doctor Nisea's Jungian

diagnosis of the need for the narrator to empower his consciousness to overcome and connect with the currently dominant unconsciousness (and its stereotypes in their benign forms). Nisea's suggestion amounts to taking the conscious initiative to mold own reality rather than be on the receiving end of own unconscious drives, which requires the mental flexibility to contemplate multiple versions of reality as possible ones. Similarly, the "*controlled fugue* therapy" (Ch. 18), prescribed by Doctor Shedd, aims to help the narrator to surmount his difficulties by reconstituting the static image of reality into a malleable one. The regimen – consisting in "the fulfillment of [the narrator's] regressive [libidinal] cravings" (Ch. 18) – involves the narrator's participation in transforming the realities created for him in drug-induced hallucinations in order for him to train his mental apparatus to consciously create his own reality outside the fugues.

With the appearance of Pris as a fellow patient, the narrative shifts between the perspectives on whether Pris is a hallucination or not ("you couldn't have run into Miss Frauzzimmer here at Kasanin. I checked the records carefully and found no one by that name . . . so-called meeting with her in the hall was an involuntary lapse into psychosis;" "I did not believe him; I knew that it had really been Pris there in the hall" (Ch. 18)). The paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE make it that the narrative shifting enacts realities (it is by no means clear that it is a single reality) in which Pris is present at the clinic ("That explained it. She was entered in Kasanin Clinic under her father's name, not her own." (Ch. 18)), but it does not foreclose realities where Pris is a hallucination, in which case the conversation with Doctor Shedd ("Let Mr. Rosen see a Miss Rock." (Ch. 18)) and the narrator's final meeting with Pris before being expelled are figments of his imagination.

The effect of shifting relativizes the reality (in the traditional sense of the characteristics of that which is real) of the clinic episodes involving Pris and the narrator to a point where the notion of a hallucination also denotes nothing else but another mode of reality, evidencing multiplicity that actualizes the difference of being through different perspectives on what is.

The possibility that some of the narrator's meetings with Pris at the clinic are hallucinations can, thus, neither establish nor invalidate the objective truth of the narrator's improving psychological functioning outside the fugue worlds shifts. If Pris is indeed an expression of his mind, she is, in that reality (or realities), an avatar of the narrator's reawoken creative imagination. It is unclear which Pris (from which reality/-ies) advises the narrator on how to get out of more therapy, following his proposal to Pris to leave together. Nonetheless, refusing the Pris ("Before I knew what I was doing I had reached back and slapped her in the face" (Ch. 18)) and the reality she is part of in the fugue ("Pris, is this real?" (Ch. 18)) for the Pris that seems more 'real' to him in the reality/-ies of the waking world ("I trust you" (Ch. 18)), the narrator takes control of his hallucination in the fugue in a way that feels less an attempt at deceiving his carers and more of a genuine expression of the acquired facility to create own reality.

Though the perspectives on Pris oscillate around the relatively static psychological and emotional positions defined by her emotional coldness, by the end of *WCBY*, Pris's unavailability has been dulled of its formerly ego-/reality-shattering components for the narrator, who has been revived through his tussle with and outside the fugue realities. In this process, the narrator's rejuvenated ego has subliminally acquired the conception of reality not as being but as becoming by means of the creative participation in the continuously fluctuating reality fabric (in/of multiple realities). This conclusion to the overall evolution of the theme of reality in the novel prompts questions with existentially-laden overtones, questions that impact not only psychic and emotional life but the whole human condition, of which questions let me formulate two. Are we not better off striving to understand the illusoriness of reality and embracing its fluctuation rather than living "a dream within a dream" (Poe 11) and suffering when the dream finally collapses? Is it not better to know the world by engaging with its confusing multiplicity than to experience the world twice removed by living in the prison of an artificially frozen reality?

While *WCBY* amplifies frozen life (i.e. the unchangeability of/the inability to change life/reality), in *Martian Time-Slip* the staging of frozen life/reality is tied up with the evolving representation of the overarching theme of change, which we will now follow in the continued effort to illustrate the mechanisms and effects of the NON-RA- and NON-RE-based shifting in PKD. The theme of change in *MTS* is realized by two subsets of motifs differentiated by – for the sake of schematic simplicity – their ipso facto positive and negative orientation. Whatever its contextualization, the effect of NON-RA and NON-RE reality shifting endows the submotifs with the Deleuzian properties of, on the one hand, being unfinished and in progress and, on the other, in expressing themselves, simultaneously indicating contents beyond themselves – other themes and motifs – and, indeed, the very inexhaustibility of the reality that lies outside them.

Within the shifting perspectives on settled Mars in *MTS*, one generalized set of coordinates thus contextualizes being as growth, progress, or success. These facets of reality can be seen to converge in the idealistic optimism of opportunity, in which Mars is a place of “[a] new, freer life . . . [, where] one can cast off the shackles . . . [of the] antiquated Old World, best forgotten in its own dust” (Ch. 13). The novel shifts between evoking a distinct frontier vibe and dismissing it (“the habitable parts of Mars were patently not” “the authentic frontier” (Ch. 1)). Bringing into focus the idea that a necessary part of personal freedom is self-sufficiency, the narrative advances the fulfilment of the optimism of opportunity in economic terms through the success stories of the colonies of “efficient and prosperous” Lewistown and New Israel, the latter colony, being the most proficient in reclaiming the desert for the cultivation of produce, even “export[s] its produce back to Earth” (Ch. 1).

A competing vein of significances expresses to a varying degree the idea of Mars as a failed promise (“We were promised so much, in the beginning” (Ch. 1)) – Mars being a deficient, underdeveloped simulacrum of Earth, its colonies having to work hard to support themselves food- and water-wise. In this respect, the motif of change comprises the negative sub-motifs of decay, entropy (gradual decline into disorder), destruction (including self-

destruction), and death: “All Mars, he decided, was a sort of Humpty Dumpty; the original state had been one of perfection, and they and their property had all fallen from that state into rusty bits and useless debris” (Ch. 6). With Mars’s dependence on the shipment of supplies from Earth and Earth’s insufficient backing of the development of Mars, decay and entropy percolate through the circumstances of life on Mars. As Earth’s superpowers “show no symptoms of rationality,” focusing on further exploration of space because of “[t]heir obsessive competitiveness” (Ch. 2), the desert is encroaching on the human civilization on Mars, which is clinging to a network of canals “barely adequate to support life” and agriculture – canals filled with “sluggish and repellent green . . . water . . . show[ing] the accretions of time, the underlying slime and sand and contaminants which made it anything but potable” (Ch. 1).

In this way, the imagery of water – a powerful symbol of life, especially in the infertile arid hard-to-irrigate desert landscape of the planet – is turned polysemous through its situation in the context of stagnancy, contamination, scarcity, and even death: “God knew what alkalines the population had absorbed and built into its bones by now. However, they were alive. The water had not killed them, yellow-brown and full of sediment as it was” (Ch. 1). Other decay and entropy vectors in the novel result from the insufficient provision of human, natural, and technological resources, and psychological pressures, including isolation, loneliness, boredom, or the hankering after the sense and creature comforts of the life back on Earth.

Concerning Earth, the novel utilizes shifting perspectives revealing varying strengths of the sense of human progress and the achievements of human civilization evident in the novel’s discussion of space exploration and colonization, urbanistic architecture, and consumerism, the material comforts of the last of which are so dearly missed by the immigrants to Mars. Commingling with this narrative ambience are decay, entropy, destruction, and death, which open up the potentials of interpretative lines with many internal variations. On Earth, decay, entropy, destruction, and death vectors are associated with the ideologies of: capitalism, mega-corporatism (represented by the co-op movement, speciously presented as “nonprofit” (Ch. 5)),

and monopoly (Ch. 6); materialism, compulsive acquisition, possessive ownership, and consumerism (Ch. 5); racism, xenophobia, and bigotry; labor exploitation and slavery (“even those fairies at the UN don't seriously propose we pay scale to Bleekmen niggers” (Ch. 2)); superpower and war (Ch. 3). Traces of the forces of decline are also apparent in the Earth environment, which is plagued by all kinds of pollution, including smog and the “contaminated atmosphere” from “H-bomb-testing” resulting in “abnormal births” (Ch. 4).

The narrative realizations of the motifs of decay, entropy, destruction, and death crystalize into an indictment of the dehumanizing, oppressive, exploitative, and lethal regimes and mechanisms of ideological orders in private, cultural, political, and economic spaces, which freeze life and reality in place to perpetuate themselves. Another thrust (shift) of meaning that originates in the narrative is the hint of the vector of unavoidable incompetence and internal dilapidation of such regimes and mechanisms (e.g. the mismanagement of/the lack of support for the Mars settlement by Earth authorities, like the UN).

In the novel, the destructiveness of ideological systems demonstrates itself also in the pressures that life in the setting of Earth exercises on individual psychology. Within the structural shifting of realities in PKD, frozen mental life is simultaneously a (contributing) cause and effect of mind-constructed unchanging realities circumscribing the human condition, the illness of the mind and the illness of reality being a continuation of each other. *MTS* makes this argument openly as part of the social critique.

Protagonist's identity and existential crisis – which prefaces his psychotic experience and motivates his departure for Mars – situates industrial capitalism, consumerism, dense urban environment, and over-crowding as causal factors for the development of a mental illness. The Mars public school, which embodies the culture of Earth transported to Mars, “want[s] a world in which nothing new [comes] about, in which there [are] no surprises. . . . the world of the compulsive-obsessive neurotic; . . . not a healthy world at all” (Ch. 5). The reason that Jack Bohlen is “repelled by the teaching machines” – being unable to accept the school “as the sole

arbiter of what [is] and what [isn't] of value” – is because “the values of a society [are] in ceaseless flux, and the Public School [is] an attempt to stabilize those values, to jell them at a fixed point—to embalm them” (Ch. 5).

In a twist, the values of motionless life indoctrinated into children are also the answer to the mentally ailing society the system produces by the inculcation of those values: “a neurosis [is] a deliberate artefact, deliberately constructed by . . . a society in crisis,” “the fixed, rigid, compulsive-neurotic Public School” being “a reference point by which one could gratefully steer one’s course back to mankind and shared reality” (Ch. 5).

In *Martin Time-Slip*, time – the fourth dimension of space, an inherent aspect of perceived reality – is an umbilical between different angles from which the narrative works out the emerging questions around issues related to the human condition. The effect of NON-RA and NON-RE shifting accentuates the temporal dimension of reality by disrupting the linearity of time in the narrative. A heightened example of this, which performs the disruption of the sense of time in a schizophrenic, is the retrospective that renders the happenings preceding and following the protagonist’s schizophrenic episode on Earth as well as the hallucinatory psychotic event itself.

The narrative transports us from Jack’s retrospective reflections, into which we perspectively entered from the location of the public school on Mars, to Jack’s memory of socially drinking at his friend’s home back on Earth sometime after his psychotic episode. “Later, as [Jack] walk[s] home to his own apartment,” Jack’s thought shifts further back in time, within which time frame it advances in a temporarily linear fashion (“He had cut the ties, in particular his job, had sold his Plymouth, given notice to the official who was his landlord.” (Ch. 5)) until Jack’s mind takes another step further into the past (“And it had taken him a year to get the apartment” (Ch. 5)). From there Jack moves a step forward in time (“the building was owned” (Ch. 5)) and then takes another step back (“and he had given it all up, suddenly” (Ch. 5)), from which point Jack’s perspective keeps moving forward until he skips ahead into another

time frame (Later on, when he had signed up . . . the sequence had blurred in his mind; he remembered the decision to go to Mars as coming first, and then the giving up of his job and apartment. It seemed more rational that way, and he told that story to his friends. But it simply wasn't true." (Ch. 5)). This temporal movement continues in a similar manner throughout Jack's encounter with the personal manager at his then-contemporary job – whom Jack perceives as a dead machine under, what Jack puts elsewhere in the novel as, the schizophrenic "aspect of eternity," which is "the substance of the sick, morbid vision" (Ch. 7). On the other side of the episode, after running away, Jack finds himself wandering streets, having lost time, from where the narrative leaps forward into Jack's present on Mars as he is repairing one of the school simulacra.

The exaggerated manipulation with time consisting in abrupt transitions and lurching forwards and backwards in time puts focus on the mind experiencing a mental health crisis, wholly or partially in response to the suffocating artificial, machine-like – as the symbolism of the hallucination underscores – quality of life: the manager's "skeleton[,] . . . wired together, the bones connected with fine copper wire. The organs . . . replaced by artificial components . . . —everything was made of plastic and stainless steel, all working in unison but entirely without authentic life" (Ch. 5). The novel links this artificialness explicitly to the ideological orders of society and the sickness they cause, including possessive ownership ("Strange, how people cling to their possessions, as if they're extensions of their bodies, a sort of hypochondria of the machine." (Ch. 6)), compulsive acquisition ("His life had no purpose. For fourteen months he had lived with one massive goal: to acquire an apartment in the huge new co-op building, and then, when he had gotten it, there was nothing. The future had ceased to exist." (Ch. 5)), and consumer life ("he bought food at the supermarket and browsed in the building bookstore . . . but what for? he asked himself. Who am I?" (Ch. 5)).

However, Dick's novel shifts the hallucination of a human being as a machine into yet another context, from the entirely irrational to the rational within the irrational: "Instead of a

psychosis, he had thought again and again, it was more on the order of a vision, a glimpse of absolute reality, with the facade stripped away. And it was so crushing, so radical an idea, that it could not be meshed with his ordinary views. And the mental disturbance had come out of that” (Ch. 5). It is the rational sense identified by, despite all appearance to the contrary, a rationally thinking being (“I’m schizophrenic, he said to himself. . . . I need medical help.” (Ch. 5)) within an irrational vision of reality that struck him which gives the hallucination the synchronous rational plausibility of a reality.

These fluctuations of logic feed into the continuous displacement of the sense of rationality and reality, which, but temporarily, have no firm ground in Dick’s oeuvre. At moments like these, *MTS* brings the ‘irrational’ experience closer to ‘rationality’ (the problem with classical nomenclature here supports the overall use in this thesis of the NON-RA and NON-RE descriptors, which can support classical referents and yet be fluid at the same time) by virtue of the meaningfulness to an individual human being of seeing through the mask of reality put up by the semantic systems of society. Similarly, the ‘rational’ concession and/or capacity to “live out the drives implanted in [oneself] by . . . society,” i.e. “life which [is] learned” (Ch. 5), gain in proximity to ‘irrationality’ as they involve the self-defeating obeisance to the dictate of abolishing change in order to protect the values of society, which inevitably cause a psychological split with reality because ideology cannot provide access to what is or could be – it is meant to shape what must be.

The same shifting of epistemo-ontological referential frames takes place in *Clans of the Alphane Moon*. As in the other two novels, what differentiates the paradigms of NON-RA and NON-RE from regular perspectivizing/focalizations on reality and rationality is both the frequency and degree of shifting – this is something which should be rightly appreciated – and the effect of these radical and pervasive shifts. By means of NON-RA and NON-RE shifting, the narrative situates the culture of Earth with its aberrant and destructive impulses in the context of the mental disorders impairing the members of the seven human clans on the moon

Alpha III M2, whose population consists exclusively of the former patients of a local psychiatric hospital. Since the most severe strains of mental disorders on the Alphane moon – as a function of the capacity to inflict violence – are paranoiac and manic tendencies, the Earth-related perspectives that are expressive of these tendencies cast the same shadow of perniciousness and/or irreversibility.

The NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in the novel makes the mental conditions manifested by the clans appear in the relativizing light of the commonplaceness of the disturbances' constitutive traits as they exist in psychologically manageable forms in people with seemingly unexceptional mental make-ups. For example, the character of Annette Golding, a polymorphous schizophrenic, is at one moment depicted as “so close to rationality, to a balanced outlook” (Ch. 13). Some narrative perspectives overturn the differences between the populations of Earth and the moon, including the criteria for diagnosing a mental illness (“Surely if we can work together *we are not sick*. There's no other test you can apply except that of group-workability” (Ch. 10)), or reverse completely the presurmised rational-irrational dynamic between Earth and the moon (“She supposed, probably as a matter of self-justifying protection, that the origin of the fear and hostility lay with the council. But in fact it was Terra who displayed menacing tactics (Ch. 10)).

On the other hand, NON-RA and NON-RE fluctuating perspectives spotlight the shift of the portrayal of the irrationality of humanity towards the extremes of the irrational spectrum and irredeemability. This shapes the perspectives on the somewhat nebulous, but distinctly sinister, interest of the US government in the former colony in the Alphane system. With respect to the CIA, the movement of these shifts is between positions that satirize the CIA for its incompetence and those that picture the CIA's excessive suspiciousness bordering on paranoia. On the one hand, therefore, the “credulity of the CIA” is said to “pass[] all understanding” (Ch. 12); due to its “low operating budget” (Ch. 4) the CIA's personnel is “decidedly ineffectual” (Ch. 12) and lacking in intelligence (“They're just stupid, fat-headed cops.” (Ch. 3)). On the

other hand, the CIA obsessively surveils suspected Alphane agents on Earth and contends “that the Alphanes are interested in acquiring Alpha III M2” – the contention is, however, “a miserable bundle of random suspicions, a few separate facts strung together by an intricate structure of ad hoc theorizing, in which everyone is credited with enormous powers for intrigue” (Ch. 8).

Another instance of the novel advancing the themes of Earth-related paranoia and violence in the explicit light of mental illness is the shifting/multiplicity of the reasons given by “the US Interplan Health & Welfare Department” (Ch. 3) for Earth’s intervention on Alpha III M2. Firstly, the “therapeutic project is a coverup for Terra’s acquisition of” the “political[ly] and legal[ly] autonom[ous]” moon (Ch. 3). This focalization carries with it the emphasis on the ideas of empire-building expansionism and military aggression (represented by the arrival and attack of Terran ships on the moon). Secondly, the “project is in defense of our own lives and values” against “a society in which psychotics dominate, define the values, control the means of communication” (Ch. 3). Considering the society of the moon is a mirror reflection of the one on Earth, the second perspective on Earth’s intervention underlines the discourse of Earth culture in terms of “fanatical religious cult, a paranoiac nationalistic state-concept, barbaric destructiveness of a manic sort” (Ch. 3). Thirdly, the project is to find out what “technological ideas . . . the manics . . . [and] the paranoids” “may have come up” (Ch. 3). The willingness to exploit the theoretical and practical achievements of the manics and paranoids aligns the Earth culture with the moon’s manics’ cruelty and barbarism – their “perverse delight” in intimidation and enjoyment of “reckless violence” (Ch. 1) – and the paranoids’ incapacity of “empathy” – “for [a paranoid] others [do] not actually exist—except as objects in motion[–]” and love is “experienced . . . as a variety of hate” (Ch. 7).

The other main plot strand, apart from Earth’s intervention on the Alphane moon, is the hostilities and violence of the conflict between a divorced couple, including murderous ideation and behavior. Apart from foregrounding paranoia and violence through shifting involving the

US government organizations, the narrative employs the same strategy of competing movements with regard to Chuck and Mary Rittersdorf, bringing the irrational closer to the rational and vice versa, to stage the working out of the themes of hatred and vengeance in relation to violence. In the novel, Chuck – a CIA employee, who programs simulacra – covertly accompanies his separated wife – a psychologist – to the Alphan moon in the guise of a remotely operated simulacrum with a plan to kill Mary and blame the robot.

The trajectory of the shifting perspectives on the characters is such that at the beginning of the novel Mary appears – despite her cold calculativeness and ruthlessness – rational and mentally healthy while Chuck demonstrates suicidal ideation (“he felt rise up within him the familiar urge. The sense that it was pointless to go on” (Ch. 2)). The novel cultivates the image of Chuck’s instability through Chuck’s obsession with Mary’s murder (“like an *idée fixe* it had entered his mind and once there it stayed, could not be reversed” (Ch. 4)) even when it becomes clear that both the CIA and the Alphanes know about his plans. There is plenty of shifting of the perspective on Chuck’s situation. While for Chuck his revenge on Mary is a matter of “*fighting for [his] life*” (Ch. 6), his “long-held urge to murder [his] wife . . . may well be a symptom of an underlying emotional illness” (Ch. 13). Other perspectives describe Chuck as: “chronically ill” (Ch. 3); “sick,” with “a latent streak of hebephrenia in him” (Ch. 7); and depressive (“His smile had a pained quality . . . He was . . . addicted to gloom” (Ch. 11)).

As the novel progresses, the perspectives on Chuck’s mental health shift in tone from the narratorial imputation of Chuck’s mental disorder, through the recrimination of Mary’s hand in Chuck’s perception of reality (“minor sadisms which Mrs. Rittersdorf has practiced on you over the years; . . . Because of it you are ill and can’t perceive reality correctly” (Ch. 5)) and Mary’s actual tendency towards sadism in a sexual encounter under the influence of an aphrodisiac (“Dr. Rittersdorf bit him on the ear. Nearly severing the lobe. . . . this time she bit him on the mouth; her teeth clinked against him with stunning force . . . she grasped him . . . , gathering his hair between her fingers and tugging upward as if to pull his head from his

shoulders” (Ch. 10)), to Mary’s diagnosis at the end of the novel as a depressive while Chuck is tested as normal (“My continual pressing of you regarding your income—that was certainly due to my depression, my delusional sense that everything had gone wrong, that something *had* to be done or we were doomed.” (Ch. 13)).

Throughout the twisting realities of *CAM*, Chuck’s suicidal ideation and his hatred, fear, and murder thoughts towards his wife (on which he does not act) on one hand and Mary’s past and recent behavior driven by depression and sadism on the other – including her own attempt to kill Chuck – play out the same pathologies that plague the officially mentally ill on the moon and the similarly inflicted culture of Earth. Thanks to the NON-RA and NON-RE switching in *CAM*, as it means movement between different focalizations, the novel allows us to substantiate these following significant arguments with respect to the pathologies.

First of all, the reality switching in *CAM*, as it presents different modes of rationality and reality while expressing varying degrees of their harmfulness to the human condition, puts an emphasis on the extremes. Of the pathologies – found both in the Earth culture and, in its extreme manifestations, in the paranoids and manics of the moon – paranoia and hate are the most pernicious in the novel. This is, firstly, because of the paranoids’ and manics’ shared inclination towards destructiveness – “limited to impulse” in a manic but “systematized and permanent” in a paranoid – and, secondly, because – as the “[l]eadership in . . . society . . . naturally fall[s] to the paranoids” – “the dominant emotional theme” of society is hate (Ch. 7). Paranoia and hate lead to “the leadership . . . hat[ing] everyone outside its enclave and . . . tak[ing] for granted that everyone hate[s] it in return[, which] . . . involves the entire society in an illusory struggle, a battle against foes that [don’t] exist for a victory over nothing” (Ch. 7). Consequently, “the ultimate effect of their entire group activity” is “[t]otal isolation” and “hallucination, . . . psychological projection, . . . as a component of [one’s] world view” (Ch. 7). In this way, through the shifting realities, the novel emphatically insists on the absolute abjectness of such versions of reality/rationality.

Secondly, the NON-RA and NON-RE switching in *CAM* allows us to perceive another vein of signification in all that has been said so far – the relativism of everything. Through the relativism of rationality we understand the relativism of what makes up our reality and vice versa. Simultaneously, however, the NON-RA and NON-RE in the novel undermine themselves, including the notion of absolute relativism. Accordingly, in the novel, some mental conditions are so overwhelming, no matter the actual depth of mental illness, that the ill cannot be helped – this serves as a denunciation of paranoia, for example – and yet, at the same time, there is hope for everybody – whether the ill on the moon or the rest of humanity, which is in many ways equally afflicted: “[Mary,] as well as [Chuck,] as well as everyone on Alpha III M2 . . . struggled for balance, for insight; it was a natural tendency for living creatures. Hope always existed” (Ch. 13).

Because the NON-RA and NON-RE in *CAM* puts these two positions on equal footing, the novel coaxes us to explain the reality of hope despite the reality of destructiveness of certain mental configurations and behaviors. As the navigation of the perspectives shatters realities and entices the reconstitution of the loose pieces into other realities, the narrative forces us to become creative within the coordinates of the thinkable – including that which exists within and beyond the real/unreal and the rational/irrational oppositions – but it also asks us to think beyond the impossible. How can one think the inconceivable as opposed to merely the impossible? The novel stages this problem of logic again through shifting, one in which logic is alternately useless and useful.

The Manses, he thought, are fighting Terra; Mageboom, representing the CIA, is busy shooting it out with Hentman. My ex-wife Mary is fighting me. And Hentman is my enemy. Logically, what does this add up to? It must be possible to draw up a rational equation, extracted from this baroque interchange; it surely can be simplified. . . .

The equation simply could not be worked out . . . there were just too many participants in the struggle, doing too many illogical things, some, as in Mary's case, entirely on their own.

But wait; his efforts to make a rational sensible equation out of the situation had borne fruit after all; . . .—the situation could be viewed clearly for a moment . . .

But the clans of Alpha III M2 were fighting Terra, he remembered all at once; the equation was even more complex than he had first seen. . . .

. . . So there was no way of ignoring the conclusion of the entire line of his logical reasoning, melancholy as it was. He was both an ally and an enemy of the clans of Alpha III M2; he was for and against them.

At that point he gave up. Forewent the use of logic. (Ch. 12)

Accordingly, the solution suggested by *CAM* to that which threatens humanity and the human condition from within ourselves and from without is that our heart should take over when logic fails us. The reality shifting in the novel reveals that paranoia, hatred, destructiveness, and violence are both 'reality' and 'illusion,' between which, as with mental health and mental illness, "[t]here's not that much difference" (Ch. 13). As the perception of 'what is' is a matter of "degree" (Ch. 13), it follows that we cannot banish the possibility that at every moment we may engage in the misconception of 'what is,' including when we find out about our supposed misconceptions at a later time. While this makes the escape from the illusoriness of reality an impossibility and the continual misperception of reality a certainty (as demonstrated in the shifting perspectives on the reality in the novel), what matters is that, as *CAM* claims, we can tear ourselves away from a static, deadlocked reality – creating for ourselves a vision of "[t]he universe" that "possesses an infinitude of ways by which it fulfills itself" (Ch. 10) and values equality, cohabitation, cooperation and communication between all beings.

5 Conclusion

This thesis sought to represent the narrative reality in science-fiction works by Philip K. Dick, arguing that at the base of Dick's fictional worlds is the universal *shifting* of reality that escapes the dichotomizing oppositions and hierarchies of the rational/irrational and the real/unreal. For this manner of 'rationality' and 'reality' I coined the expressions *non-rationality* (NON-RA) and *non-reality* (NON-RE), which I described by means of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of *difference* as situating PKD's worlds in continued becoming through the multiplicity of fictional reality, which cannot be regarded in absolute categories.

In order to contextualize this approach, the thesis points out the shared emphasis on logical contradiction in the individualized responses of Dick literary scholarship to the reality fluctuation in his works. Mackey's "paradoxical logical loops" (qtd. in Rossi 2), Jameson's and Rossi's versions of ontological uncertainty, as well as the possible world theory approach commit themselves to an essentially extra-fictional reality construct employing dichotomies that contrast the subjective/internal/unreal/untrue on one hand and the objective/external/real/true on the other. I denounce this approach for its centralization of a single reality and reductivism, exposed by the tendency to smooth over contradiction and ambiguity and to generally coordinate conflicting features of Dick's worlds in their semantic unfolding, binding them into a semantic unity and attributing to them the consistency of meaning. For illustration, I cite the examples of Simkins, Rossi, and Jameson artificially cancelling the fluidity of PKD's fictional realities.

In contrast, this thesis recognizes and evinces the transience of the complex narrative territory of Dick's work by paying attention to the role of NON-RA and NON-RE, which requires negotiating contradiction and ambiguity in Dick's works and reflecting how shifting continues to rearrange and reconstitute fictional reality through initiating new associations of meanings, deriving new semantic locales out of the immense diversity and immeasurable

potentiality of the reality fabric. To that aim, this thesis employs the expansive definition of reality shifting as far-reaching instability actualizing itself in the multiplicity of reality produced by shifting focalizing perspectives, each perspective representing a selection of narrative information from the point of view of a (hypothetical) entity of the storyworld.

This thesis takes time to describe the NON-Rational and NON-REal properties of the shifting realities in Dick's works from the context of Deleuze's philosophy of difference. Deleuze's and Dick's philosophical outlooks are shown to aim in comparable measure at the destabilization of reality. Like Deleuzian concepts of difference, Dick's reality shifting undercuts the stability of reality in order to perspectivize – not to reveal truth. The destabilization is realized in PKD through the iterative readjustment of multiplicity-engendering focalizing perspectives, which aligns the instability in Dick with Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return as the return of difference. The focalizing perspectives in PKD – like Deleuzian concepts of difference – are in time defeated by the intricate stuff of reality. NON-RA and NON-RE carry the aspect of Deleuzian simulacra, which represent the rejection of the model/copy and the possible/real distinctions. Consequently, the realities in PKD's narratives elude stable categorization. In fact, there is no one keystone supporting a definite crucial sense of reality in Dick, nor is there one fixed center to the mental spaces informed by the fictional realities.

To illustrate the NON-RA and NON-RE reality shifting of PKD, this thesis provides an analysis of *We Can Build You*, *Martian Time-Slip*, and *Clans of the Alphane Moon*. Discussing *WCBY*, I show how an early instance of simple, localized shifting thematically incarnates the NON-RA and NON-RE narrativization of reality free from the dependence on the impermeability of the categories of the objective/subjective, the true/untrue, the real/unreal, and the rational/irrational. Accordingly, in *WCBY* the text signals no absolute reality, only equal perspectives on being, whose strands are entangled in the web of enduring polyvalence and hermeneutic evolution. These are illustrated by the analysis of the perspectives on the characters

of Maury and Pris, Pris being a link between the novel's themes and decidedly heteroclitic mental and behavioral positions.

The thesis comments on how reality shifting in PKD opens the narrative to offbeat interpretative accounts through a dynamic picture of reality drawn by the NON-RA and NON-RE in *WCBY*. This stems from the capacity of NON-RA and NON-RE shifting to create absolute epistemic space consisting in shifting multiplicities that are perceived to pass through all the points of the epistemic space simultaneously. The resulting elasticity and mobility of the epistemo-ontological framework of the narrative – far from collapsing reality – give rise to the potentiality of the narrative universe's infinite expansion.

The examined instance of the simultaneity of perceived epistemic frames in *WCBY* shows how the two isolated frames are able to mutually influence each other, which is conducive to the articulation of a more nuanced elaboration of the basic meanings of the frames. The NON-RA and NON-RE shifting, in this specific case, conveys the simultaneous visions of reality as, on the one hand, a series of shifting illusions – which, by retrospectively failing us, reveal the illusoriness of the present moment – and, on the other, the intimation of the participatory nature of being, which gives humanity agency in a way that the static vision of the universe cannot.

This thesis demonstrates that incongruous reality constructions in PKD (the products of multiplicity-generating NON-RA and NON-RE reality shifting) deconstruct each other in intellectually stimulating ways by examining in *WCBY* the narrator's fixed concept of reality, the deconstruction of the perspectives on which relativizes the perception of reality by shifting perspectives on Pris as real or as the narrator's hallucination and, more importantly, by transforming the significance of the hallucinations, which become only a different mode of what is and so are no longer indicative of what is categorically real or rational as opposed to unreal and irrational.

I used the theme of the inflexible permanence of life/reality as a stepping stone to the analysis of the NON-RA and NON-RE reality shifting in Dick's novel *Martian Time-Slip*. In *MTS*, deadening inertness is part of the larger theme of transformation narrativized by means of positive and negative submotifs. The NON-RA and NON-RE reality shifting in the novel gives the submotifs the Deleuzian processual aspect of becoming, which enables them to both signify themselves and what lies beyond them – including other themes, motifs, and the infinite essence of reality itself.

The shifting perspectives on Mars in *MTS* focalize reality in terms of the submotifs of growth, progress, or success – Mars being a counterpoint to Earth, the culture of which stifles life. The rival group of sub-motifs – including decay, entropy, destruction, and death – convey different shades of the notion of Mars as a failed, backward version of Earth on account of Mars's inadequate human, natural, and technological assets, and the psychological burdens of living on the planet. The shifting perspectives on Earth move between the humanity's evolved state and its accomplishments on the one hand and on the other the destructiveness of the ideologies of the Earth culture, which promote mental stagnation in order to eternalize themselves.

In *MTS*, the working out of the theme of time – which unites various perspectives on topics around humanity – is shaped by the NON-RA and NON-RE shifting, which fragments the linear flow of time. As an example, this thesis gives attention to the temporal transitions in the narrative that highlight the disturbances in the schizophrenic's perception of the passage of time through successive convulsive temporal jolts in the narrator's internal monologue. The temporal non-linearity imparts a sense of psychological chaos in reaction to the experience of the artificiality and mechanicity of life, which is connected to the ideologies of Earth and their pathological effects.

The most pronounced instance of NON-RA and NON-RE shifting with respect to *MTS* that is discussed by the thesis concerns the narrator's hallucination of a human being as a

machine. The intense effect of shifting in this case results from the fact that the perspectives involved multiply paradoxes. This is because parallel with the entirely irrational perspective is the rational meaning coded into the mode of perceiving reality that is inherently associated with the irrational (the hallucination). Moreover, the realization that the irrational holds the rational is made by an irrationally perceiving being (the narrator), who is at the same time rational enough to realize own irrationality.

These shifts of logic are part of the novel's continued dislocation of the meanings of reality and rationality, an oscillation whereby the irrational comes closer to the rational and vice versa. Regarding the narrator's schizophrenic hallucinations discussed above, the irrational moves in meaning closer to the rational in consequence to the significance of the unmasking of reality erected by the semantic systems of society (i.e. the hallucination presents an insight into the irrationality of society's rationality). Accordingly, in *MTS* the rational moves closer to the irrational as society imposes inertia and resistance to safeguard itself and so causes individual psychological alienation from reality – the culture's freezing of life, which impacts the narrator, articulates the fact that ideology does not concern itself (beyond erecting a specific narrow view of reality) with either what is (the present – the living 'truth') or with alternatives and possibilities to current life (the future).

As in the previous two novels, the NON-RA and NON-RE in *Clans of the Alphan Moon* define the peculiar rhythms, intensities, and effects of the reality shifts, which are radical, prevalent, and unlike regular perspectivizing/focalizations on reality and rationality. Through the NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in the novel, the deformed and disastrous drives of the culture of Earth – especially paranoia and violence – are contrasted and correlated to the illnesses of the population of a moon consisting exclusively of former psychiatric patients. In this way, the narrative spells out the malignancy and indelibility of the Earth culture's character. Beside the US government's effort to annex the moon in order to prevent the suspected take-over by the Alphanes, the other plot strand narrativized through the NON-RA and NON-RE

oscillation between the rational and the irrational is the conflict of a divorced couple, including mutual attempted murder as vengeance, through which the novel continues to explore the themes of hatred and violence.

The NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in *CAM* enables the simultaneity of the distinctive evocations of psychological configurations with various degrees of deleteriousness, on the one hand, and the view that all human relationships are plagued to a degree by the same pathologies, on the other, while giving prominence to the psychological extremes of paranoia and hate. The reality shifting thus serves the condemnation of those versions of reality/rationality which promote destruction, constant illusory struggle, and isolation.

The NON-RA and NON-RE switching in *CAM* assists to formulate the idea of absolute relativism, the relativism of rationality being used to explore the relativism of reality and vice versa. The repositioning of reality with respect to rationality then helps to elaborate the notion of all aspects of the universe in perpetual motion. As the NON-RA and NON-RE perspectives mutually erode themselves, the absolute quality of relativism is, however, only one of a plurality of tenable positions on reality/rationality. By making viable both the irremediableness of and the unconditional hope for remedying certain mental configurations and behaviors, the NON-RA and NON-RE in *CAM* invites the reader to consider why one perspective would be viable despite the other. Breaking realities into discontinuous pieces, the Dickian narrative entices us to be creative within but also without realities that seem available to us. *CAM* dramatizes the logical problem with thinking beyond what is possible in a scene where logic is intermittently of use and of no use to the narrator, who is in mortal danger from the forces of irrationality.

In order to close our discussion of the NON-RA and NON-RE shifting in PKD, allow me to consider its role in the three novels tackled in this thesis from the macro-thematic level of Dick's oeuvre – specifically, with respect to the concern about the perils which human beings and their humanity face from within and without, which topic features prominently in many Dick's fictions. The answer proposed in *We Can Build You*, *Martian Time-Slip*, and *Clans of*

the Alphane Moon is unavoidably emblemized by and narratively rendered through NON-RA and NON-RE shifting, whose analysis in this thesis creates the following composite picture of reality and rationality in the fictional worlds. *Clans of the Alphane Moon* enunciates that the perception of things is a matter of degree and that between reality and illusion as well as between rationality and irrationality is thus limited difference. When the perception of reality is relative, it follows that – as *We Can Build You* puts emphatically forward – we cannot banish the possibility that at every moment we may engage in the misconception of what is. While this makes the escape from the illusoriness of reality an impossibility and the continual misperception of reality possibly a certainty, what makes a difference is that – as all three novels articulate so well – we can tear ourselves away from a static, deadlocked reality – creating for ourselves a vision of the universe as multiplicity and of being itself as becoming. What also matters, however, is most candidly articulated in *Clans of the Alphane Moon*: that all throughout our search for meaning, humanity leads with our hearts, not only our intellects, and values equality, cohabitation, cooperation and communication between all beings.

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