



**Vyslovení neplatnosti součásti státní zkoušky „obhajoba diplomové práce“, na základě stanoviska přezkumné komise, že obhájená práce není původní a jde o plagiát.**

Po provedených řízeních vydala rektorka Univerzity Karlovy rozhodnutí č. j. UKRUK/300367/2023-11, že součást státní zkoušky, obhajoba diplomové práce s názvem „China’s Sharp Power: How China Seeks to Influence and Coerce its Neighbours“ konaná dne 22. 6. 2020, je neplatná.

Dnem, kdy rozhodnutí nabylo účinnosti, pozbyl účastník řízení vysokoškolského vzdělání získaného studiem daného studijního oboru a akademického titulu magistr. Dále pozbyly platnosti vysokoškolský diplom a dodatek k diplomu.

**Declaration of the invalidity of the section of the state examination “thesis defence” based on the review committee’s opinion that the defended work is not original and constitutes plagiarism.**

Following the proceedings, the Rector of Charles University issued a decision, ref. no. UKRUK/300367/2023-11, stating that a section of the state examination, defence of the thesis entitled “China’s Sharp Power: How China Seeks to Influence and Coerce its Neighbours” held on 22 June 2020, is invalid.

On the day the decision became effective, the participant in the proceedings surrendered their higher education degree obtained by studying the specific area of study and the academic title of Master. Moreover on that day, their university diploma and diploma supplement became invalid.

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
Institute of Political Studies  
Department of International Relations

**Master's Thesis**

**2020**

**Roman Štěpař**

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
Institute of Political Studies  
Department of International Relations

**China's Sharp Power:  
How China Seeks to Influence and Coerce its Neighbours**

Master's thesis

Author: Roman Štěpař

Study programme: International Relations

Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, Ph.D., M.A.

Year of the defence: 2020

## **Declaration**

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on  
21.05.2020

Roman Štěpař

## References

ŠTĚPAŘ, Roman. *China's Sharp Power: How China Seeks to Influence and Coerce its Neighbours*. Prague, 2020. 69 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of International Relations. Supervisor doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, Ph.D., M.A.

**Length of the thesis:** 130,664 characters

## **Abstract**

In my thesis, I will answer question of what is sharp power, how China use sharp power and then on 4 cases illustrate that China has different strategies of influence operations. In Japan, respectively Okinawa, China is focusing on their common history and trying to lure Okinawans away from Japan. In South Korea, China exploit Korean economic dependence during the THAAD dispute to their advantage. In Taiwan, thanks to common cultural ties China wants to change everybody mind about Taiwanese “status-quo”. In New Zealand, China utilize overseas Chinese community to spread Chinese propaganda. In the end, I will compare each country situation and find out where China’s sharp power was effective and where it wasn’t.

## **Abstrakt**

Ve své diplomové práci odpovím na otázku, co je to ostrá síla, jak Čína používá ostrou sílu a poté na 4 případech ilustruji, že Čína má různé strategie ovlivňujících operací. V Japonsku, respektive na Okinawě, Čína se zaměřuje na jejich společnou historii a snaží se získat Okinawany pryč od Japonské moci. V Jižní Koreji, Čína během sporu o THAAD využívá korejskou ekonomickou závislost ve svůj prospěch. Na Taiwanu, Čína chce díky společným kulturním vazbám změnit názor všech Taiwanců na „status-quo“. Na Novém Zélandu, Čína využívá k šíření čínské propagandy zámořskou čínskou komunitu. Nakonec porovnáám situaci v každé zemi a zjistím, kde byla čínská ostrá síla účinná a kde nebyla.

## **Keywords**

Sharp power, value diplomacy, China, influence operations, coercion, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand

## **Klíčová slova**

Ostrá síla, hodnotová diplomacie, Čína, ovlivňující operace, přinucení, Japonsko, Jižní Korea, Taiwan, Nový Zéland

## **Title**

China's Sharp Power: How China Seeks to Influence and Coerce its Neighbours

## **Název práce**

Ostrá moc Číny: Jak se Čína snaží ovlivňovat a přinucovat své sousedy

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to express my gratitude to my family for their support and my supervisor for his advices. I want to thank all my Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese friends that help me with difficult translations and fact checking, and to all my Czech friends for keeping my sanity. And I wish everyone affected by the current coronavirus pandemic speedy recovery.

# Table of Contents

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....  | <b>2</b>  |
| <b>1. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL BASIS</b> .....                          | <b>4</b>  |
| 1.1 <i>Research target, research question</i> .....                        | 4         |
| 1.2 <i>Conceptual and theoretical framework, research hypotheses</i> ..... | 4         |
| 1.3 <i>Empirical data and analytical technique</i> .....                   | 11        |
| <b>2. CHINA'S SHARP POWER</b> .....  | <b>14</b> |
| 2.1 <i>The role of the CCP in Chinese foreign policy</i> .....             | 15        |
| 2.2 <i>China's current political influence agenda and methods</i> .....    | 18        |
| 2.3 <i>China's strategic objectives</i> .....                              | 21        |
| <b>3. JAPAN</b> .....  | <b>24</b> |
| 3.1 <i>History</i> .....   | 24        |
| 3.2 <i>Culture</i> .....   | 26        |
| 3.3 <i>Economic dependence</i> .....                                       | 27        |
| 3.4 <i>Geographical importance</i> .....                                   | 28        |
| 3.5 <i>Overseas Chinese community</i> .....                                | 30        |
| <b>4. SOUTH KOREA</b> .....  | <b>31</b> |
| 4.1 <i>History</i> .....   | 32        |
| 4.2 <i>Culture</i> .....   | 33        |
| 4.3 <i>Economic coercion</i> .....   | 35        |
| 4.4 <i>Geographical importance</i> .....                                   | 39        |
| 4.5 <i>Overseas Chinese community</i> .....                                | 43        |
| <b>5. TAIWAN</b> .....   | <b>44</b> |
| 5.1 <i>History</i> .....   | 44        |
| 5.2 <i>Culture</i> .....   | 46        |
| 5.3 <i>Economic coercion</i> .....   | 50        |
| 5.4 <i>Geographical importance</i> .....                                   | 50        |
| 5.5 <i>Overseas Chinese community</i> .....                                | 52        |
| <b>6. NEW ZEALAND</b> .....  | <b>53</b> |
| 6.1 <i>History</i> .....   | 53        |
| 6.2 <i>Culture</i> .....   | 54        |
| 6.3 <i>Economic coercion</i> .....   | 56        |
| 6.4 <i>Geographical importance</i> .....                                   | 58        |
| 6.5 <i>Overseas Chinese community</i> .....                                | 59        |
| <b>7. COMPARISON</b> .....   | <b>63</b> |
| <b>8. CONCLUSION</b> .....   | <b>66</b> |
| <b>SUMMARY</b> .....   | <b>69</b> |
| <b>LIST OF REFERENCES</b> .....  | <b>70</b> |



## **Introduction**

China's quick rise to the power and establishing themselves as a major power in Asia, is a current popular political and scholar topic. But majority of scholar work about the rising China focuses on the rise itself, on the economic and political reforms, on problems that Chinese dominance in manufacturing sector or Chinese military advancements presents, et cetera. These dimensions rightly deserve attention, but they are looking into the past. Today's Chinese foreign policy transformed under the leadership of president Xi Jinping. China's ambitions are not to replace United States as a global superpower. In this new era, China's role on the global stage is to promote its own ideas, norms and approaches to governance that are favourable to China, Xi Jinping calls it "a community of shared destiny". This looks like a classic soft power, but there is underlying difference in how China use soft power. It's noteworthy that when Nye wrote about soft power nearly 30 years ago, he hardly mentioned China. In his articles in Foreign Policy, China rarely came up.

This has created need for a fresh new way of thinking about Chinese power. The term "Sharp Power" was created, first coined by Joseph Nye in 2018 by publishing two papers in Foreign Affairs magazine, where he describes Chinese sharp power as something between soft and hard power. Sharp power is an approach to international affairs that involves efforts at censorship and the use of manipulation to lower the integrity of independent institutions. Sharp power has the effect of limiting free expression and distorting the political environment.

In my thesis I focus on areas where sharp power is mostly used, analyse the usage of sharp power and determine how factors like history, culture, economic coercion, geographical significance and size of overseas Chinese community affect Chinese influence operations strategy. In my assumption, China differentiate the specific conditions of individual countries and exerts its sharp power accordingly.

I couldn't find a comprehensive case study that would compare different cases of the sharp power utilization and find links with the general theory of sharp power. While there is some scholar work done on the idea of sharp power and Chinese influence operations, current debate about sharp power is very theoretical, lacking any practical

examples. And there is some research done in countries like South Korea and New Zealand about the use of sharp power in said countries, the debate about Chinese interference doesn't take into an account the theoretical findings of sharp power theory. There is a disconnect between those two, which I'm trying to solve by filling the gap.

# **1. Methodology and theoretical basis**

## **1.1 Research target, research question**

The thesis aims to contribute to evidence-based policy deliberation, formulation and implementation. In my work, I want to answer two main questions based on my research and selected case studies, how is China using influence operations, and why China chosen different strategies in different countries. With some subsequent questions dependent of each country special position.

## **1.2 Conceptual and theoretical framework, research hypotheses**

Constructivists believe that self-defined identity becomes the basis for choosing foreign policy goals and strategies, thereby shaping national interests.<sup>1</sup> In constructivist point of view, there is no doubt that a country's foreign policy reflects its historical experience, culture, norms and values, and constitutes its national identity. National identity includes different components, including a set of basic elements such as race, language, common culture and history, and conceptual elements such as norms, values and ideals. And a foreign policy reflects these deeply rooted values of national identity.

When values as a conceptual component of national identity refers to an abstract standards or principles of what is right and desirable, a country's foreign policy can be defined as a values-oriented diplomacy to advocate, promote and realize the specific embedded values of its national identity. The value diplomacy, goes hand in hand with specific roles and practices.

Although geopolitics is often conceptualized as a struggle between nations for local control and influence over space, from a constructivist geopolitical perspective, the world is seen as a kaleidoscope of identities, cultures, races, languages etc. that clashes together, thereby the competitiveness between nations is providing a geographical framework for political elites and the public to pursue their own values and interests in the world.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

<sup>2</sup> John A. Agnew. *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2003, 3.

Value diplomacy, as a part of public diplomacy, is also important source of soft power. When value diplomacy is recognized in the international arena, it may become a source of soft power. Those national values can establish norms in the international community, and like-minded countries can unite around these values.

Although the relationship between soft power and public diplomacy is ambiguous and sometimes controversial, the concept of soft power has become the core of many public diplomacy concepts. We can boil down public diplomacy concept to creating, projecting or enhancing the country's positive image abroad, which is also common goal of soft power. The theories of public diplomacy, value diplomacy, soft power, sharp power, nation brandings are constantly evolving, they should not be considered static but dynamic. They can transform according to the changes in the political, cultural and social environments. For example, Bátorá<sup>3</sup> defines public diplomacy as promoting soft power, while for Melissen<sup>4</sup>, public diplomacy is only one of the key means of soft power. While others argue that in Nye's conceptualization of soft power, national branding would be a more appropriate term to cover the meaning of soft power, because both are related to attractiveness.<sup>5</sup>

With the emergence of soft power, Peter van Ham<sup>6</sup> claims a shift happened in political paradigms. According to him, the modern world of geopolitics and power has been replaced by post-modern world of images and influence. He believes that traditional diplomacy is disappearing and identity politics is becoming the main activity of politicians and diplomats.<sup>7</sup> He places soft power as a "theory" within the constructivist school of international relations because it provides countries with options to build their own image, role and identity, and emphasize norms and values.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Jozef Bátorá. *Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada*. Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy 97, The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Jan Melissen. *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Gyorgy Szondi. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Difference*. Clingendael Institute 2008, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Van Ham. *The Rise of the Brand State - The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation*. Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001, p. 3-6.

<sup>7</sup> Gyorgy Szondi. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Difference*. Clingendael Institute 2008, p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 23

Value diplomacy is about the dissemination of idealized information about a country's positive values. The failure to sustain a wave of democratic change after the 1990s led politicians to reconsider value diplomacy to make it more persuasive through "civilian power" which we now refer to as "smart power".<sup>9</sup> In today's age, we now have two competing "powers" in the value diplomacy, smart power of democracies and sharp power of authoritarian states. Recently, the flow of information has accelerated, but new countermeasures developed by China have complicated the spread and effectiveness of "smart power". So far, the smart power is in a dormant state, while the sharp power is being developed.

The sharp power is often described as interference in internal affairs through covert operations, subversion, causing political dissent with false information and influencing elections and public opinion through deception. Sharp power is nicknamed as "authoritarian influence", but the influence is not primarily about attractiveness or persuasion like soft power, but it's focused on manipulation. The authoritarian government is trying to subtly attract outstanding regional leaders from multiple fields, including politicians, academics, journalists, former diplomats, current government officials and students. The sharp power helps the authoritarian regime to coerce and manipulate public opinion abroad. There is a series of connected elements of sharp power, including subversion, bullying and pressure.

Why authoritarian countries use sharp power? The most obvious answer is that they are not very good at soft power, we can see this in the case of China,<sup>10</sup> which got all the right stuff to be a soft-power giant, but is just not "cool", especially when we compare it with its neighbours, South Korea and Japan, who are masters of soft power with their K-pop and Anime. And hard power is increasingly accompanied by high political costs, the world is turning away from using hard power as a legit tool of diplomacy. On the other hand, new communication technology has made sharp power cheaper and cheaper, and the threat of retaliation has also decreased. The authoritarian countries enjoy comparative advantages in this field. Whereas the information

---

<sup>9</sup> Hillary Clinton. *Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development*. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010.

<sup>10</sup> George Gao. "Why Is China So ... Uncool?." *Foreign Policy*, March 8, 2017. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/why-is-china-so-uncool-soft-power-beijing-censorship-generation-gap/>. Accessed 10 December 2019.

environment is decentralized in many democratic countries, authoritarian countries often have strict and centralized control over their information ecosystems. So far, this comparative advantage has been the main reason for the recent rise of sharp power. Question is if an authoritarian state like China would resort to sharp power, would they have the ability to achieve their goal by soft or hard power alone.

Why it's called "sharp power"? China's recent efforts to cooperate with journalists, cultural centres and think tanks in various democratic countries, in seemingly "public diplomacy" fashion, are in fact tools of censorship and control. Unlike soft power, designed to softly charm target countries through attractiveness and shared value, these efforts are "sharp" in the sense of piercing or penetrating the target country's information environment.<sup>11</sup>

The government in Beijing uses very diverse set of tools, that includes not only soft and hard power, but also sharp power. A keen ability of sharp power is the ability to influence others to obtain the desired result, but not by attraction of others like soft power, but by influencing others, by dispersing and manipulating information. Governments often try to use sharp power to guide, buy or coerce political influence, and try to control global discussions on sensitive topics through non-transparent and questionable, or even completely illegal means.<sup>12</sup>

The main difference between soft power and sharp power is the motivation behind it. Soft power motivation is "kind" aimed at attracting people rather than sharp power "malicious" effort aimed at manipulation. But we need to be cautious not to mix up power motivations with regime types, not always we can describe democratic regimes motives as kind, and authoritarian regimes motives as vicious. Empirically we saw in the past democracies to engage in sharp power tactics, for example the United States secretly funded anti-Communist parties during the 1948 Italian election.<sup>13</sup> And of course, not all of China's estimated 10 billion dollars annual investment projects in soft power has

---

<sup>11</sup> Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. *From 'Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power': Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World*. National Endowment for Democracy, 2017. p. 13.

<sup>12</sup> Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig. *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence*. National Endowment for Democracy, 2017.

<sup>13</sup> Joseph Nye Jr., "How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence." *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>. Accessed 4 September 2019

potential or hidden “sharp” motives.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, although the motivation behind the diplomatic strategy may be loosely linked to the type of regime, equating the two would severely limit the usefulness of sharp power analysis.

Although hard power and soft power are often portrayed as opposites, they actually share have one key aspect, both focus on exerting power from the outside. Hard power achieves it through coercion, and soft power through attraction, but the driving force in both cases comes from the outside. Similar to soft and hard power, sharp power is also about applying “carrots and sticks” to push the target state to work in the desired way. The main way sharp power differs from hard or soft power is that it exploits the internal pressure inside the target state, the power comes from inside. It uses the internal pressure to aggravate internal disagreements and force its own interests. To distinguish the sharp power, we need to look at the internal character of the rising influence.

Sharp power is through covert operations and subversion, interfering in internal affairs with false information, and affecting elections and public opinion through deception. But focusing only on information warfare, hacker attacks, or media propaganda can lead to overly narrow definitions. These are specific tools for exerting sharp power, but they do not capture the basic underlying strategy that differentiate it from smart power’s value diplomacy efforts. A more analytically approach is needed towards the internal factors that differentiate the intentions and instrumentality when targeting specific country. The discussion on sharp power and value diplomacy needs to be framed by a focus on political context.

That is why in my thesis I’m focusing on Chinese influence operations. Generally, there is a lack of funding and interest of sustained academic study of China’s sharp power in East Asia and Oceania. Most of the focus is on United States of America and European Union, but countries with longer history of interference, coercion and influence operations from China like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or New Zealand serve as a better example where we can study Chinese behaviour. That is the reason why I chose them for my research. I picked “sharp power” as my sole independent variable and several dependent variables in order to find out what factors influence the use of Chinese “sharp power”.

---

<sup>14</sup> David Shambaugh. “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect.” *Foreign Affairs*, June 16, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-softpower-push>. 4 September 2019.

Specifically, after some consideration I chosen history, culture, economic dependence, geographic importance and local Chinese population as my dependent variables.

First my dependent variable is history. To understand why I chosen it, we need to look at the tributary system of ancient and medieval China. The "tribute system" is often associated with a "Confucian world order", under which neighbouring states complied and participated in the "tribute system" to secure guarantees of peace, investiture, and trading opportunities. Kingdoms like Korea, Japan or Ryukyu acknowledged China position as superior power and China would on the other hand bestow investiture to confirm their status as a part of the Sinocentric system. Chinese rulers perceive the foreign envoys bearing tribute as a "token of conformity to the Chinese world order". Membership in the tributary system was a prerequisite for any economic exchange with China. The relationship between Japan and China ended in 1549 when Japan, chose to end its recognition of China's regional hegemony and cancel any further tribute missions thus Japan relinquished its trade relationship with China. Unlike Joseon dynasty in Korea, which pay tribute to China until 1882, when China-Korea Treaty called Joseon-Qing Communication and Commerce Rules, was signed and gave China even more control in Korea. Island of Taiwan was part of China since 1683 when Qing defeated Dutch colonist on the island, until the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Every country in my case study has different historical link to China, it will be interesting to see how the tight connection between China and Taiwan influence Chinese influence operation. If today's China still see South Korea as kind of a tributary state or use that image in their pressure campaign. How the historic rivalry with Japan influence today views on the islands dispute. And what strategy China uses in country without any common history like New Zealand.

My next variable is culture. Throughout the history of Northeast Asia Chinese culture was dominating force. Both Korea and Japan adopted Traditional Chinese characters, then later in 1446 Korean king Sejong the Great created Hangul, Korean alphabetical system that Korea uses to this day, while Japan is still using Chinese Characters known as Kanji with their other two alphabetical system Hiragana and Katakana. Chinese writers and philosophers were also very influential in the region. Especially Confucius, whose teachings formed universal moral values in society not only in China, but whole of East Asia. Where we can see differences is religion. While



historically every country in the region practiced Mahayana Buddhism, today situation is different. Only country with majority of Buddhist population is Taiwan, China is officially atheist country with only “small” groups of people practicing religion, majority of South Koreans are non-religious and quarter are Christians and Japanese people practicing folk Shintoism. Both Japan and South Korea has same cultural background as China, that could give China advantage during influence operations, because it better understands their mentality. On the other New Zealand has western style of thinking and that could be more difficult, since its completely different that the Confucius style of morality and social hierarchy.

Economic dependence on China gives Chinese government power for economic coercion of their trading partners. While right now the trade war between China and USA gets the most attention, raising of tariffs is common tactic in East Asia during international disputes. In just last 5 years we saw raising of tariffs and limiting export against rules of WTO between China and South Korea, China and Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. China is largest trading partner to all countries in the region, even to Australia and New Zealand. That gives large amount of power to Chinese government when pressuring foreign government to bend to the Chinese will. Japan is the only country from my case studies that doesn't have free trade agreement with China, it will be interesting to see if this have impact.

Second to last variable is geographic importance. In this variable I will factor both strategic position for China and in the case of New Zealand a larger distance form Chinese shore. Also, important factor is that both South Korea and Japan are housing U.S. military in their territory. I'll look if the continued deployment of U.S. military equipment in South Korea had any effect on Chinese operations, China probably saw that as an increased military threat and could double down pressure on Korean government. Same with U.S. military base on Okinawa island, that works as a stronghold against Chinese expansion in East China Sea.

Last variable in my thesis are local ethnic Chinese people. Although the choosing of the self-identity roughly corresponds to the natural difference of the ethnic groups, for many Chinese people it is ultimately determined by the origin of blood. For Chinese government every person who has Chinese blood anywhere in the world is member of

PRC. They totally ignore the subjective choice that is determined by the other considerations like democracy and the protection of the human rights. In Chinese eyes members of the Han-folk and Hanized folks that lives abroad even for many generations are so-called 华人 (huaren) that belongs to the 中华民族 (zhonghua minzu). This concept is not only used heavily in relation with Taiwan to create a sense of unity, but also in Australia, New Zealand, USA etc. to try to persuade ethnic Chinese people to cooperate with PRC.

Because every country in my case study is fully developed country with economy integrated into the world system, I didn't choose any variable about GDP, Human Development Index or loans from World Bank and IMF. Therefore, I'm not going to test the hypothesis that developed and still developing countries will react differently or that countries with low GDP are more prone to economic pressure than countries with higher GDP. Also, because every country in my comparison is a functional liberal democratic country with high freedom of press, I am not looking on state systems and World Press Freedom Index. Sharp power is the most sinister in Western style liberal democracies, that is my reasoning for omitting some countries in the region where we can also see Chinese influence operation and economic coercion, but are not fully functional democracies like a Cambodia or Myanmar.

### **1.3 Empirical data and analytical technique**

Key sources of data for my own research are Annual Reports to Congress involving People's Republic of China, Hearings on China Economic and Security review by Congress, European Parliament materials on China, reports by think-tanks organizations mainly based in U.S., South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, University publications about Chinese sharp power, for example The Hoover Institute at Stanford University or Institute of Development Studies at Brighton University. As a starting point for my comparison, I'm using several amazing works done on each country. On Japan, Ankit Panda's Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, on South Korea, Sukhee Han's Resetting the South Korea-China Relationship: The THAAD Controversies and Their Aftermath and Kim Tae-hwan's China's Sharp Power and South Korea's Peace Initiative, on Taiwan, Russell Hsiao's China's Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners in Europe and the Asia Pacific, and on New Zealand, Anna-Marie Brady's

Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping. Some excellent work was done on sharp power theory by Gilbert Rozman's Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect? and John Fitzgerald's Just a Dash? China's Sharp Power and Australia's Value Diplomacy. In my research I found many amazing essays, papers and articles written on the individual cases of Chinese influence operations, list of all of them you can find at the end of my thesis. Specifically, I would like to highlight the amazing work done by the good people at The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, The Economist, Foreign Affairs, Nikkei Asian Review, South China Morning Post, Financial Times, New York Times, The Washington Post and Reuters.

Conceptually, it's better to understand sharp power in the context of specific countries and conflicts, rather than as a unilateral strategy as soft power is usually portrayed. The sharp power strategies and tools of different countries in different environments with different targets will be different, depending on their political goals and needs. Picking one actor who is projecting sharp power like China and choosing different cases of sharp power usage, we can better understand what sharp power is, the context of sharp power, what are the tools of sharp power and how they are used, in which situations sharp power is fruitful.

Case study research is suitable when the proposed research addresses a contemporary phenomenon and the research is largely exploratory and addresses the "how" and "why" questions. External validation, in terms of the limited generalizability of the findings can be established through the replication logic of the multiple case study design. Case studies, in contrary to surveys and experiments rely on analytical rather than statistical generalization. The selection of multiple case studies therefore needs to follow this replication logic. Literal replication entitles choosing cases that have similar settings and are expected to achieve similar results.

That is why I'll use qualitative multiple case study with literal replication and nomothetic approach. I have chosen multiple case study because the multiple cases are used to understand the similarities and differences between the cases and therefore can provide the literature with important influences from its differences and similarities. I'm using positive cases, because finding similarities between them will give me better insight into this problem, negative case could happen from myriad of reasons and would be too

wide for my research. Thus, my comparative method is method of agreement. Other benefits are that the evidence generated from a multiple case study is strong and reliable. It also allows a wider discovering of theoretical evolution and research questions. I carefully chose critical cases in each chapter, they permit logical generalization to other cases because if it is true to these cases, it's likely to be true to all other cases.

A brief review of the study background, research questions and main research objectives justified the application of the multiple case methodology. The number of cases was determined by the literal replication logic of the case inquiry.

It's difficult to say how to measure the use of sharp power, because sharp power is corrupt, coercive and covert. We can uncover only portion of all the tools China is using to conduct its influence operations. It's similar story with the effects of sharp power. Most of the Chinese goals are long term objectives that are leading to the national rejuvenation in 2049. We can measure success of sharp power only on the short-term goals. For example, in the South Korean case short-term goal of Chinese sharp power was to help win the THAAD dispute, which we can measure, but the long-term goal is to weaken U.S. alliance in East Asia. In case of such long-term goals, change of narrative of each national government is best way to measure success or failure of Chinese influence operations.

## 2. China's Sharp Power

If we understand geopolitics as "representation of space", then the Indo-Pacific region can be understood as an emerging geopolitical hotspot, in which the major powers are not only fighting for control, but also fighting over the discourse on values and the world view. Discussions of national vision and strategy are increasingly used as a soft power tool for foreign policy to persuade international audiences, including state and non-state actors. In this special geopolitical competition of values and thoughts, sharp power is gradually increasing in importance. In the geopolitics and discourse game in the Indo-Pacific, China is at the centre stage.

But it is difficult to distinguish sharp power from soft power based solely on the assets used, because both use similar assets. The difference between the two can only be revealed by studying how to deploy these assets in the real world. In actual use, the sharp power usage is usually mixed with the soft power and the hard power.

Attempts by the People's Republic of China abroad to guide or purchase or coerce political influence are common. China's foreign influence activities are part of a global strategy that uses almost the same, long-term and effective methods that it adapts to the current goal. The way China conducts its influence operations can be described as a "political warfare". Political warfare can be distinguished from public diplomacy. In short, public diplomacy is international political propaganda conducted in a transparent manner through conventional media channels and public participation. Political warfare differs from public diplomacy in its goals and intentions. Although public diplomacy attempts to influence the opinions of the general audience, political warfare involves the systematic manipulation of each other's strategies, national defence policies, and broader international norms.<sup>15</sup>

We can see difference in how Russia and China are using their sharp power capabilities. Russian sharp power offensive focus on weakening the credibility of the target country's political and economic institutions, exacerbating internal tensions and local community discord, while China's sharp power pay more attention to proving that the CCP

---

<sup>15</sup> Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao. *Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics*. Project 2049 Institute, 2013.

has undisputed monopoly on political power and to control discussion about sensitive issues abroad.

## **2.1 The role of the CCP in Chinese foreign policy**

The People's Republic of China is a one-party country. Since its establishment in 1949, it has relied on non-traditional means for diplomatic and economic relations. The United Front Department, the Central Propaganda Department, the International Liaison Department, the All-China Federation of Overseas Chinese, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and other Chinese Communist organizations all play important roles in China's foreign relations. These institutions complement and expand the work of the Chinese state and state-owned enterprises. Sometimes even private companies can steer China's foreign relations. The key concept of China's foreign policy connecting party, government organizations and SOEs is the "United Front".

The United Front is a core component of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) domestic and foreign policy toolkit. This involves integrating party organizations under the rule of the Communist Party into a comprehensive strategy, designed to control, indoctrinate and mobilize non-CCP masses (both domestic and foreign) in a service to the CCP's policy objectives. United Front activities include cooperation with outstanding figures in groups and society, information management and publicity and it is often a means of facilitating espionage. United Front officials and their agents strive to develop relationships with Chinese people at home and abroad to influence, subvert and to promote the interests of the CCP globally. The system that implements this political war strategy has traditionally consisted of multiple party, military, and state organizations, but in recent years, with the establishment of a United Front leadership group led by the CPC Central Committee, the system has undergone centralization. Several State Council departments responsible for overseas Chinese, religious and minority affairs were reorganized under the recently established United Front Work Department (UFW) of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Zhou Xin. "It's the mysterious department behind China's growing influence across the globe. And it's getting bigger." South China Morning Post, March 21, 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138196/its-mysterious-department-behind-chinas-growing>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

The Chinese government efforts to influence overseas Chinese helped expand China's global influence and expand its economic agenda. Deng Xiaoping talked about the "unique opportunity" provided by overseas Chinese to China, saying that by using their help, China can get rid of international isolation and improve its international political status.<sup>17</sup> The "turning them to become China's propaganda base" has become an important task for the United Front. The United Front policy is to prevent Chinese expatriates from supporting Chinese dissidents and Falun Gong, to reduce the impact of Taiwan's democratic model, and to use the patriotic sentiment to help them support China's economic development.

Staff of the United Front often work as members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the diplomatic cover. In this role, they guide the United Front activities outside China, cooperate with politicians and other important figures, Chinese community associations and student associations, and sponsor Chinese language media and cultural activities. The leaders of various overseas Chinese associations in each country are regularly invited to China to introduce them to current government policies.<sup>18</sup>

Overseas Chinese community leaders are encouraged to consider their participation as a form of service to the Chinese motherland and their community. Their cooperation with China will be a "win-win" situation, in which case, they and their communities will benefit while China realizes its agenda.<sup>19</sup> The goal of successful overseas work is to actively engage the community and even hope for spontaneous engagement in activities that can enhance China's foreign policy agenda.

The Chinese government is also increasing persuasion efforts against the non-Chinese public. The Chinese government relies on the help of foreign politicians known as "Friends of China" like Henry Kissinger in the United States to repair China's relations with the United States and other Western democracies. China has made large investments

---

<sup>17</sup> Zhang Bin. "邓小平“独特机遇论”在新时期中国侨务发展战略中的继承与发扬。” Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, 2014. <http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjyt/177/2449.shtml>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

<sup>18</sup> *Intelligence Services, part 1: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics*. Stratfor Global Intelligence, March 2010, 12.

<sup>19</sup> James Jiann Hua To. *Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese*. Leiden: BRILL, 2014. p. 29.

to expand its foreign influence activities in the media sector. The purpose is for the world to hear and understand China's views on global affairs.<sup>20</sup> CCTV has established a global, multi-platform, multi-lingual China Global Television Network (CGTN). And China Radio International and Xinhua News Agency have expanded their global reach.

Since 2007, the Chinese government has formally embraced Joseph Nye's soft power theory as a justification and a reason for the expansion and revision of CCP's overseas Chinese control, foreign management and soft power offensive. Since the Hu Jintao era, China has invested in soft power activities to enhance the country's overall national strength. The Chinese government believes that the outside world's view of contemporary China is distorted and negative.<sup>21</sup>

But Joseph Nye is critical of China's interpretation of his theory. According to Nye, China does not understand the meaning of soft power.<sup>22</sup> In instruments measuring soft power China is weak: attractive culture, political values and foreign policy. The focus of Nye is on the role of civil society to enhance a country's soft power. However, based on the United Front, China has used party-state institutions and their affiliated institutions to develop soft power, and therefore has adopted a completely different approach to enhance soft power.

From the perspective of rising, revisionist power, it is easy to understand their interpretation and appeal of Nye's theory. Nye wrote in his 1990 book "Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power" that the continued erosion of the Westphalia system has increased the importance of economic interdependence and non-state actors in the global affairs, and the development of new information and communication technologies have all reduced the effectiveness of traditional "hard power" sources.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Anne-Marie Brady. "China's Foreign Propaganda Machine." Johns Hopkins University Press, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 26, Number 4, October 2015. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/595922>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

<sup>21</sup> Hu Jintao. "Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress." Xinhua News Agency, October 25, 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

<sup>22</sup> Joseph Nye. "What China and Russia don't get about Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2013. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-getabout-soft-power/>. Accessed 4 September 2019.

<sup>23</sup> Joseph Nye. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1990, 160-166.



The CCP has also been determined to change the security environment it faces for a long time, but unable to do so, due to the lack of hard power resources, compare to United States. But since the early 1990s, double-digit economic growth has made China a global economic power. The Chinese government wants to use their economic “miracle” as a main soft power weapon. However, CCP is unwilling to let civil society on their own to develop the soft power and is instead using government institutions and their affiliated institutions to develop soft power, which now transformed into sharp power.

Since the collapse of Soviet Union, the lessons of Gorbachev’s “failure” in China were spread to their citizens. They condemned Moscow’s ideological neglect for the disaster and warned that its’s possible it might happen in China as well. Following the 1990s, the intrusiveness of Chinese influence operations has changed, from a limited scale it has become more active and when Xi Jinping took over in 2012, the degree of interference has skyrocketed and we can start talking about the sharp power. This evolution reflects a broader definition of security, covering anything that might weaken the Communist Party’s ability to hold power at home and abroad. It is characterized by reorganizing United Front activities, establishing key points of conversation to enhance awareness, and mobilizing supporters at all levels to communicate these points directly and indirectly.

## **2.2 China’s current political influence agenda and methods**

After 40 years of remarkable rise, China has now clearly demonstrated its desire to lead the world by re-elevating itself to what the leaders believe is the "historically correct position." To expand its geopolitical influence and fulfil its aspirations, Beijing has innovated, using various power combinations to rewrite trade, diplomacy, and security provisions in its own way, challenging the free international order. However, Chinese leaders are aware of the deficiency of their soft power and have emphasized the need to increase soft power and public diplomacy in the past decade. President Hu Jintao emphasized that Chinese culture is "the undefeated driving force of the Chinese nation" and therefore defined Chinese culture as "part of national soft power".<sup>24</sup> Since the first

---

<sup>24</sup> Hu Jintao. “Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress”. Xinhua News Agency, October 25, 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

mention of soft power in 2007, Beijing's soft power efforts under Xi Jinping have been accelerated and show some distinctive features.

The focus of soft power has shifted from the concept of mitigating the "China threat" in the West and neighbouring countries to support of the China's development model, and the theories and values that support China's governance. Soft power not only represents a country's national identity in its language, history, and culture, but also the ideas and values that a country strives for in the international community. These ideas and values are usually structured as a discourse and "strategic narrative".<sup>25</sup> China's strategic narrative, especially in the era of Xi Jinping, seemed to consist of two elements: the vision of the "Chinese Dream" and traditional Chinese values that focused on Confucianism.<sup>26</sup>

Chinese rule is supposedly to be proven correct by the traditional concept of "mandate of heaven". It's in the fate of the world to be ruled over by the Chinese emperor and everything else revolves around the emperor's rule. From there, China spreads harmony through its culture, language and values. The CCP wants to replicate such a China-centred empire that values order above freedom, morality above law, and elite governance above democracy and human rights.<sup>27</sup>

The constitutional democratic norms have been heavily criticized because they undermine the will of the people reflected in leadership. Any call for universal values or human rights is considered an attack on the leadership's pursuit of national interests. The view that political leadership should be subjected to civil society is offensive. It's viewed as nothing more than a tool for the opposition to mobilize its supporters. These supporters that directly communicate social will without intermediaries are called "Western" and "Anti-Chinese." Similarly, freedom of press is considered to be just a smoke screen of ideological indoctrination by the West, listening only to official state press is viewed as beneficial to social progress. The laissez-faire capitalism has also been condemned, for

---

<sup>25</sup> Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

<sup>26</sup> Jin Kai. "The Chinese Communist Party's Confucian Revival." *The Diplomat*, September 30, 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-chinese-communist-partys-confucian-revival/>. Accessed 9 February 2020.

<sup>27</sup> William A. Callahan, *Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or A New Hegemony?* *International Studies Review*, No. 10, 2008, p. 753.

disrupting the Chinese economic system and social order, and for interfering with the leadership's pursuit of public interests.<sup>28</sup>

The criticism of “Western values” like democracy and human right is also heading towards domestic audience. China tries to weaken the legitimacy of a liberal democratic government as a means of internally strengthening their own illiberal government system. China is trying to repel foreign influence by defining themselves as under siege by the hostile world of “Western liberalism”, which poses “the greatest threat” to CCP. The new Anti-Espionage Law from 2014 defines activities that threaten national security in addition to espionage as “fabrication or distortion of facts, publishing or disseminating text or information that endangers national security”.<sup>29</sup>

Xi Jinping is advocating for the Chinese model of governance based on state-led development and one-party decision making to be seen as an alternative to liberalism proposed by the Western countries. He hopes that the "socialist system with Chinese characteristics" would become a new option for developing countries that seek economic development and independence at the same time. The increasingly authoritarian rule at home, especially the significant concentration of power in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping, has extended outward to the international community and manifested itself in the sharp power. Xi Jinping de facto has removed the boundary between domestic and foreign policy. The China's governance model is the centre of its foreign policy formulation and implementation. Now, that China is now exporting its political values and norms, sensitive issues abroad are a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the Chinese Communist Party and China, and they need be resolved at any cost at home and abroad. Security issues extended to areas of thought and ideas, what people think may be dangerous to Chinese existence.

Xi Jinping has worked harder than any of his predecessor to expand China's ability to shape foreign public opinion to influence the decision-making process of foreign governments. The CCP wants to change the world in which it operates as a pre-emptive

---

<sup>28</sup> “How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China's Current Political Climate?” ChinaFile, November 8, 2013. <https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

<sup>29</sup> Peter Mattis. *An American Lens on China's Interference and Influence-Building Abroad*. The Asan Forum 6, no. 3, 2018.

action. To shape the understanding of foreign elites on China and its political system. This not only reflects the increasing confidence of Chinese government in China's international influence, but also the strategy of Xi Jinping to maintain and increase China's strength by promoting economic growth and strengthening information control. Like Mao Zedong, Xi Jinping emphasize the importance of information control. In a modern environment, this means not only China's public domain, but also how the international media and the international academic community comment on China and issues related to China. Therefore, we continue to see China's censorship system gradually enter these fields abroad.

China's influence operations can be summarized as "shaping the discussion, controlling the Chinese diaspora and targeting the political core". Because China's sharp power strategy is more comprehensive and complex than Russian, it systematically promotes Chinese view in universities, business communities, overseas Chinese communities, media, entertainment, politics and government. CCP tries to find common interests and establish a dependency relationship with mainstream partners. The use of public propaganda, quasi-concealed China controlled media and covert activities to shape discourse, language, perception and behaviour is very coherent and consistent. It involves the process of gradually eroding existing local political structures, and gradually establishing new structures centred around the CCP.

### **2.3 China's strategic objectives**

Today we can see the solidification of ambitious China's regional policies in East Asia. This policy abandons the past restraint of seeking regional hegemony and influence. During Xi Jinping speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, he emphasized the plan to realize China's "great revival", thus making China an undoubted hegemon in the East Asia to 2050.<sup>30</sup> We are witnessing this competition in terms of institutional influence, balance of military power, and how the Asian regional security system adapts to China's undeniably large regional influence.

---

<sup>30</sup> Tay Hwee Peng. "19th Party Congress: 7 key themes from President Xi Jinping's work report." The Strait Times, October 26, 2017. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/19th-party-congress-7-key-themes-from-president-xi-jinpings-work-report>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

The U.S. alliance in Northeast Asia has long represented a significant advantage against the United States opponents in the region. During the Cold War it was the Soviet Union, today it's the competition between China and the United States. China's only regional ally in East Asia is North Korea, a very unreliable partner, and a black sheep of the global community. In contrast, the alliance between the United States, South Korea and Japan remains sound and is the cornerstone of maintaining American hegemony in East Asia, as well as free, liberal and democratic order. China's concerns about US relations with Japan and South Korea are driven by strategic and economic factors. Weakening the U.S. alliance relationships is an important goal if China is to have a greater impact on the order in East Asia in the future.

In order for China to achieve regional hegemony by 2050, it must find a way to severely weaken the benefits that Washington enjoys in its alliance with Seoul and Tokyo today. China is starting to work on weakening the alliances and security partnerships of the United States, which limits their sphere of influence in East Asia. For China, the US military forces and a large number of lands, air and navy military assets near their border are a security risk. In particular, Chinese policy makers worry that these forward-looking US assets will play an important role in future conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Although global attention is focused on China's construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait is still the main battle plan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). The 2015 China's military strategy guide emphasizes the Taiwan issue. "The Taiwan issue is related to China's reunification and long-term development. Reunification is an inevitable trend in the process of national rejuvenation."<sup>31</sup>

China's policies are also driven by economic and institutional issues. China now calls for the establishment of a new Asia-Pacific security architecture, which is different from the rule-based order that the United States has long advocated. This impulse is best reflected in a white paper issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 2017,

---

<sup>31</sup> "China's Military Strategy (full text)." The Information Office of the State Council, May 27, 2015. [http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2015/05/27/content\\_281475115610833.htm](http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm). Accessed 21 May 2020.

which emphasizes Beijing's ambitions in regional leadership.<sup>32</sup> In particular, the white paper says that China will seek to promote common development, establish partnerships, strengthen the political foundation and create solid economic foundations for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. China will work toward improving the existing regional multilateral mechanism, strengthen the framework for supporting peace and stability, formulate rules, and improve the institutional guarantee for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, China will properly resolve differences and disputes and maintain a good environment for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>33</sup>

Each of these goals will implicitly and clearly push back the United States in the region and complicate maintaining the alliance and expand partnerships. China plans to consolidate its position as the main Asian hegemon by 2049. In order to achieve this goal, the American alliances in the Asia-Pacific region must be contained or completely broken. Question is how much will Chinese government follows these goals. As we could see in 2016 in the Beijing rejection of the ruling by The Hague tribunal in the South China Sea dispute between China and Philippines,<sup>34</sup> China doesn't always work for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

---

<sup>32</sup> Ankit Panda. "The Future of the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture, as Seen by China." *The Diplomat*, January 17, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-future-of-the-asia-pacific-security-architecture-as-seen-by-china/>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

<sup>33</sup> "China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, January 11, 2017. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1429771.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml). Accessed 15 February 2020.

<sup>34</sup> Tom Phillips. "Beijing rejects tribunal's ruling in South China Sea case." *The Guardian*, July 12, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

### 3. Japan

While talking about Chinese influence operations, scholars generally focus on the influence exerted by Chinese embassies, by network of Confucius Institutes, by executives in Chinese state-owned enterprises and private businesses etc. But in Japanese case several factors constrain CPC ability to influence democratic politics, which led China to develop different strategy.

#### 3.1 History

The unresolved historical issues have complicated relationships in Northeast Asia since the end of Second World War. Anti-Japanese remarks about wartime behaviour of Japanese soldiers in China and Korea are still numerous. These issues came to the forefront in 2015 when the region celebrated the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II in 1945, when South-Korean president Park Geun-hye attended the celebration in Beijing. These historical issues continue to affect public opinion in particular. Although China is far away from democracy, there is evidence that Chinese policymakers are influenced by the Chinese public's attitude towards Japan and are still sensitive to the views of nationalists seeking harsher relationship with Japan.<sup>35</sup>

In Okinawa, an important exception to China's general coercive measures against Japan can be found. The Ryukyu Kingdom (1429-1879) was a tributary state of both Ming and Qing dynasty in China ruled by the Ryukyuan monarchy, even after the Japanese invasion of Okinawa that took place in 1609, the Tokugawa shogunate still allowed the Ryukyu Kingdom to be ruled as a "dual subordination" to Japan and China, where Ryukyuan tributary relations were maintained with both the Japanese shogunate and the Chinese emperor. Okinawa officially became part of Japan in 1879.

For some people in China, this history is enough to render illegitimate the Japanese rule. China is arguing that a tributary relationship at some point in history is basis for a sovereignty claim. Japan suspects that the United Front of the Chinese Communist Party

---

<sup>35</sup> Jessica Chen Weiss. *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

and other party-linked groups supports the Ryukyu independence movement.<sup>36</sup> A report released by the Japan Public Security Intelligence Agency in December 2016 stated that "Universities and think tanks in China, has promoted academic exchanges and deeper relations with Japanese groups advocating for the Okinawa independence movement and they visited Okinawa."<sup>37</sup> The majority of Chinese political elite rather supports Okinawa independence than sovereignty.<sup>38</sup> China's support for these groups is thus aimed not only at promoting Ryukyu separatism, but also at strengthening local voices of opposition against the United States.

Although Chinese government itself has not asserted a claim to Okinawa, it also doesn't stop such claims to appear in newspapers or think-tanks. Editorials and articles appearing in official and unofficial, party-linked Chinese media have supported the views of the Okinawa separatists. The voices pressing the Okinawa issue are always in some way affiliated with the Chinese government. Although the Chinese government has not formally challenged Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa Prefecture, scholars associated with the party have written articles since 2012 that question the historical basis of Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. In response, the Japanese government has filed a formal diplomatic protest against China.<sup>39</sup>

Chinese activities aimed at challenging Japan's ownership of the Senkaku Islands, as well as Chinese scholars and military officials contesting Okinawa's status as part of Japan are increasing concerns about China's long-term intentions in the region. China will continue its espionage and agitation activities in Okinawa with the purpose of monitoring

---

<sup>36</sup> Isabel Reynolds. "Japan Sees Chinese Groups Backing Okinawa Independence Activists." Bloomberg, December 26, 2016. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-26/japan-sees-chinese-groups-backing-okinawa-independence-activists>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

<sup>37</sup> Public Security Intelligence Agency. *Annual report 2016*. Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations, 2017.

<sup>38</sup> Kathrin Hille and Mure Dickie. "Chinese nationalists eye Okinawa." Financial Times, July 23, 2012. <https://www.ft.com/content/9692e93a-d3b5-11e1-b554-00144feabdc0>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

<sup>39</sup> Julian Ryall. "Japan Angered by China's Claim to All of Okinawa." Deutsche Welle, October 5, 2013. <http://www.dw.com/en/japan-angered-by-chinas-claim-to-all-of-okinawa/a-16803117>. Accessed 15 February 2020.



the status of the US and Japanese forces and trying to complicate the US-Japan alliance by intensifying dissatisfaction with the US military at the island.<sup>40</sup>

### 3.2 Culture

The nature of Japan's democratic politics and political and financial laws has led Japan to resist attempts of financial influence from abroad. Japan's political campaign finance law prohibits foreign companies and individuals from donating to political parties and individual candidates.<sup>41</sup>

Chinese influence in today Japan comes from another source, analysts have pointed out that individuals and entities connected to the Chinese government have a lasting influence within the Japanese government. For a long time now, certain decision-making departments in Japan's foreign and economic policy has been ruled by so-called “Chinese School” bureaucrats who specialize in China, speak fluent Mandarin, and spend time of their life studying or working in China.<sup>42</sup> These bureaucrats are generally considered to be favourable to establishing strong relations between Japan and China. In contrast the so-called “Westernists” of the Japanese bureaucrats are in favour a strong US-Japan alliance and a fundamentally pro-Western Japan foreign policy. Since the beginning of the new century, China is losing influence in this domain. Due to changes in the nature of bureaucracy under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the influence of Chinese School in Japanese bureaucracy is believed to declined significantly.<sup>43</sup>

Today, the Chinese Communist Party is using state-run media as a means to actively strengthen position of certain Japanese politicians and bureaucrats that it believes are beneficial to its own interests. Although many of them target domestic audience in China, some appear to target public in South Korea and Japan. An example that can best illustrate this positive reinforcement is case from 2014, when former governor of Tokyo

---

<sup>40</sup> Travis J. Tritten and Chiyomi Sumida. “Protests on Okinawa Aren’t Always What They Appear to Be.” Stars and Stripes, May 23, 2013. <http://www.stripes.com/news/protests-on-okinawa-aren-t-always-what-they-appear-to-be-1.222240>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

<sup>41</sup> “Japan.” International IDEA Political Campaign Finance Database. <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/155/55>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

<sup>42</sup> Yew Meng Lai. *Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation*. London: Routledge, 2013. p. 95.

<sup>43</sup> Peng Lam. *Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power*. London: Routledge, 2006. p. 44–45.

Yoichi Masuzoe, visited China for a three-day trip on the invitation of the Beijing Municipal Government.<sup>44</sup> This visit happened after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands, when the relations between the two countries have come to a deadlock. Masuzoe's visit has been positively reported by the Chinese official media, and he even was praised by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who called Masuzoe one of Japan's most "insightful people" that want to develop China-Japan friendship.

Chinese position on Okinawa faces another problem, the enthusiasm for independence among Okinawa people is very low. Although many are dissatisfied with the Japanese government's policies and the presence of the U.S. military, separatist sentiment is not thriving. In public poll from 2017, 82 % of Okinawa citizens were glad that Okinawa is a part of Japan.<sup>45</sup> Also when looking at China's policy of suppressing the pro-independence movement of Tibetans, Mongolians and Uighurs. It's also very hypocritical of China to support the self-determination of the Okinawa people but continue to deny it to its own minorities in China.

### **3.3 Economic dependence**

Outside of Okinawa, the Chinese has not conducted any influence operations over Japanese politics or try to influence politicians on nation-level with a possible exception of Chinese ban on rare earth minerals exports to Japan in 2010. When the Japanese authorities arrested a Chinese fishing vessel captain, Chinese officials raised the issue of the captain arrested with the Japanese government. China retaliated with unofficial sanctions, banning the export of rare earth metals minerals to Japan's high-tech industry manufacturing process.<sup>46</sup> Chinese customs officials have been accused of stopping shipments of various rare earth materials to Japan. However, Chinese officials deny that such an embargo has occurred. An analysis of Japanese port data from the Japanese Ministry of Finance from this so-called embargo period shows that there was a slight general drop in Japanese

---

<sup>44</sup> Shannon Tiezzi. "Tokyo Governor Yoichi Masuzoe Visits Beijing." *The Diplomat*, April 26, 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/tokyo-governor-yoichi-masuzoe-visits-beijing/>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

<sup>45</sup> "日本に復帰してよかった？ 沖縄 82%が肯定、若い世代ほど高く 県民意識調査。" *Okinawa Times*, May 15, 2017. <https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/97097>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

<sup>46</sup> Keith Bradsher. "Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan." *The New York Times*, September 22, 2010. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

imports of Chinese rare earths minerals following the incident<sup>47</sup> and Chinese exports were still being delayed by preshipment checks on the Chinese side.<sup>48</sup>

Why Chinese attempt at economic coercion failed in Japan, but succeed elsewhere can be explain by the unique situation of Japanese politics. Mainly, this can be easily explained by the continued dominance of the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, whom always considered China to be a strategic competitor and a threat to manage. The Japanese Communist Party isn't a strong partner to Chinese Communist Party and historically didn't maintained a strong relationship, despite criticizing the U.S.-Japan alliance at home. This is mainly because the JCP supports Japan's territorial claims in the East China Sea. Despite the party rise in the 90's and some success in local-level elections, today the party is just a marginal figure in national Japanese politics.

### **3.4 Geographical importance**

There are the large quantities of maritime territorial disputes between China and Japan, especially in the East China Sea. The two countries not only dispute the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands which are now under the jurisdiction of Japan, but also have conflict area in outlining the demarcation of their exclusive economic zones. At the same time, as China seeks strategic international air and sea passages across the East China Sea Ryukyu chain, it is increasingly important for the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy to conduct expeditionary military operations in the Western Pacific. The main area of interest in East China Sea is the Miyako Strait located between Okinawa and Senkaku islands, where an official spokesperson for the Chinese government warned that Japan must get "accustomed to" regular movement of military vessels and aircrafts in this area.<sup>49</sup> In recent years, Japan has also increased its participation in the South China Sea. In 2015, the

---

<sup>47</sup> Amy King and Shiro Armstrong. "Did China Really Ban Rare Earth Metals Exports to Japan?" East Asia Forum, August 18, 2013. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/18/did-china-really-ban-rare-earth-metals-exports-to-japan/>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

<sup>48</sup> Yuko Inoue. "China lifts rare earth export ban to Japan." Reuters, September 29, 2010. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-export-idUSTRE68S0BT20100929>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

<sup>49</sup> Ankit Panda. "Chinese Defense Ministry to Japan: 'Get Used To' PLAAF Operations Through the Miyako Strait." The Diplomat, July 17, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/chinese-defense-ministry-to-japan-get-used-to-plaaf-operations-through-the-miyako-strait>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force conducted the first bilateral exercises with the US Navy in these waters, which provoked Chinese anger.<sup>50</sup>

Chinese interest over the strategically important archipelago stems from the fact that it's China's only obstacle towards the open Pacific Ocean and Okinawa is seen as the biggest obstacle in the Ryukyu island chain to the expansion of Chinese naval power in the Pacific. Beijing is concerned about the U.S. forces capabilities in Okinawa and their force projection. Japanese media reported that Chinese investors have purchased properties near the U.S. bases on Okinawa.<sup>51</sup> China also probably retains presence of intelligence officials and instigators to gather intelligence on U.S. military presence on the island and undermine the U.S. - Japan alliance by participating in anti-U.S. activities. Pro-China activities in Okinawa may further separate the prefecture from mainland Japan and strengthen China's position in other territorial disputes, such as over the Senkaku Islands. Such a win in Okinawa would make clear to Tokyo the cost of continuing to deny Chinese claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku.

Thomas U. Berger, an associate professor of international relations at Boston University, pointed out that “China’s strongest case might be based on the Cairo Declaration of 1943, in which the allied powers promised that territory taken by Japan would be returned. Since the Cairo Declaration committed the Allies to reversing Japan’s history of aggression, Okinawa could be included.”<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Anders Corr. *Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018.

<sup>51</sup> Kuchikomi. “Okinawa’s Off-Base Housing May Suffer Infestation of Chinese Bugs.” Japan Today, March 8, 2013. <http://www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/okinawas-off-base-housing-may-suffer-infestation-of-chinese-bugs>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

<sup>52</sup> Jane Perlez. “*Calls Grow in China to Press Claim for Okinawa.*” The New York Times, June 13, 2013. <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia/sentiment-builds-in-china-to-press-claim-for-okinawa.html>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

### 3.5 Overseas Chinese community

Unlike North Korean diaspora “Chongryon”<sup>53</sup>, which has strong ties to Pyongyang, the Chinese community in Japan doesn’t have any connection to Chinese communist party. In 2018, approximately three quarters of a million PRC citizens lived in Japan<sup>54</sup>, less than one per cent of total Japanese population. Not enough to be interesting for sharp power. Japan doesn’t allow dual citizenship, and every year, a large number of Chinese people acquire Japanese nationality, so they disappear from official statistics. Since Japanese nationality does not record race, once a person is naturalized, they are Japanese, so the Chinese-Japanese category doesn’t exist.

---

<sup>53</sup> Yaechan Lee. “Japan’s North Korean Diaspora.” *The Diplomat*, January 05, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japans-north-korean-diaspora/>. Accessed 19 May 2020.

<sup>54</sup> Ministry of Justice. “平成30年6月末現在における在留外国人数について。” [http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04\\_00076.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00076.html). Accessed 19 May 2020.

## 4. South Korea

In 2016, after North Korea's 4<sup>th</sup> nuclear test and Chinese silence on this matter (Xi Jinping refused to pick up Park Geun-hye phone calls for six months), South Korea allowed the United States to deploy THAAD missile defence systems on its soil. In early 2017, within a few weeks after Park Geun-hye impeachment and before the deployment began, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with a delegation of South Korean congressman from the opposition Democratic Party, which was led by Moon Jae-in.<sup>55</sup> Wang emphasized that China believes that the THAAD system poses a threat to China's "strategic security and interests." The Democratic Party later raise the possibility of China's economic retaliation during the debate about the THAAD deployment in the South Korean National Assembly.<sup>56</sup> The deployment began in May 2017, just days before the inauguration of the new president Moon Jae-in. In September, after the sixth nuclear test by North Korea, all six THAAD batteries including transmitters, missile launchers, auxiliary equipment and an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar has been deployed in Seongju, about 200 kilometres southeast of Seoul, South Korea.

The Chinese government immediately regarded South Korea's decision to allow the deployment of missile defence systems as a high-level threat. Contrary to South Korean claims of need to defend itself against North Korea's further provocation, Beijing's official statement views THAAD as a regional security issue and a threat against China. Therefore, for China, the only way to resolve bilateral disputes and restore their relationship is the withdrawal of THAAD from South Korea.<sup>57</sup>

South Korean leaders were dissatisfied with three aspects of China's position. First, despite Xi Jinping's promise at the Victory Day summit in Beijing, that in case of North Korea further provocations, it would cooperate with South Korea, China remained silent

---

<sup>55</sup> "Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets with Delegation of National Assembly Members of the Minjoo Party of the ROK." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, January 4, 2017. [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1428662.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1428662.shtml). Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>56</sup> "Minjoo Party Split over THAAD Deployment." Yonhap News Agency, July 12, 2016. <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/07/12/0200000000AEN20160712008651315.html>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>57</sup> Foreign Ministry of People's Republic of China. "外交部声明 Foreign Ministry Statement." July 8, 2016. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170514221019/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1378537.shtml>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

after Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test. Secondly, it was this silence that has persuaded South Korea to install THAAD. The decision has been postponed in the previous years.<sup>58</sup> Third, Seoul considers China's anger to be dishonest and an attempt to limit Seoul's sovereign right to defend itself.<sup>59</sup>

The current political and diplomatic situation in South Korea is complicated by Seoul's dual dependence, with security dependence on the United States and economic dependence on China intertwined. This double dependence makes South Korea vulnerable to competition from major powers, especially China's strong offensive. By paying particular attention to Beijing's strategic actions in the context of the deployment of THAAD by the United States to South Korea, we can examine how China tackled a security issue that was deemed to be in conflict with the "national core interests" by usage of Sharp power.

#### 4.1 History

The emergence and development of the Korean War has plunged South Korea into the newly formed geopolitical confrontation in the region. Since the end of the Korean War, it has relied on its alliance with the United States for their national security. In addition to this security dependence on the United States, South Korea's economic dependence on China is increasing, thanks to its export-driven economy and the rapid rise of China.

Since the normalization in 1992, China and South Korea have quickly developed good bilateral relationship in scope. The key to this successful development is mutual economic cooperation and friendly people-to-people relationships. Although South Korea's growing economic dependence on the Chinese market has attracted attention in Seoul, for the past 25 years, the growing economic and cultural cooperation between South Korea and China and the growing economic interdependence have been the main reason for maintaining friendly cooperation.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Sukhee Han. *South Korea's Tough Stance towards the North: Why It Has to Continue*. New Asia, issue 18, no. 2, 2011. p. 31.

<sup>59</sup> Jae Cheol Kim. *ROK-China Relations at 25*. Current Issues and Policies, September 2017.

<sup>60</sup> Hyundai Economic Research Institute (HERI). *한국경제의 중국의존도 현황과 시사점 Review of Korea's Dependence on Chinese Economy and Its Implications*. Weekly Review, 2014. p. 14.

At the beginning of their national leadership in 2013, Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping were looking forward to improve their bilateral relations with the "strategic partnership" declaration. This included launching various cooperation programs like numerous high-level dialogues, a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and South Korea joining China led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This development led President Xi to proclaim that thanks to these measures and their personal support "the Korea-China relationship has become the best-ever national relationship in history".<sup>61</sup> In particular, a very symbolic and important gesture was Park participation in the Chinese commemorative event of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in September 2015, which reflected the improvement of the partnership between Seoul and Beijing.

Increasingly close Korean-Chinese relations even have reached international recognition and acceptance by United States, because Washington understood Park Geun-hye's friendly policy towards China as a bases for the establishment of a positive relationship between South Korea and China, rather than a policy twist towards U.S. security.<sup>62</sup>

## 4.2 Culture

There always has been a disparity in South Korea - China relationship. Despite the unprecedentedly high degree of bilateral economic interdependence, South Korea and China had very limited development in political and security cooperation. Although China and South Korea have had unprecedented friendly relations for 25 years and given the South Korea's growing dependence on China in economic and North Korean affairs and Chinese effort to maintain close relations to limit Seoul's further efforts to strengthen the US-ROK alliance. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) dispute and subsequent sanctions imposed by China on South Korea have brought relations between the two countries into an unprecedented deadlock.

---

<sup>61</sup> Shannon Tiezzi. "South Korea's President and China's Military Parade: Park's Talk with Xi Focused on North Korea, But Historical Issues Played a Major Role as Well." *The Diplomat*, September 3, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-koreas-president-and-chinasmilitary-parade/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>62</sup> Ellen Kim and Victor Cha. *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea's Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States*. *Asia Policy*, 21, 2016. p. 101.



The key issue in the future of relations between the two countries is mutual distrust between the two countries. China views South Korean decision to deploy THAAD as a betrayal of its support, while South Korea opposes China's coercive actions. Therefore, the relationship between South Korea and China after THAAD is likely to reflect South Korea's efforts to reduce its dependence on China's economy and manage its development in a more balanced manner.

For most Chinese, the decision to deploy THAAD represents a betrayal from South Korea, and accordingly strengthens Washington's overall efforts to contain China. The feeling of a stab in the back by South Korea is due to China's strong view that by accepting the THAAD system, the friendly Seoul has joined a growing anti-Chinese security network in Asia led by the United States. Beijing still regards Seoul as a kind of partner. Despite being an ally of the United States, it is seen as a more independent than Japan and with a very similar and cautious view of Japan's defence modernization. From a Chinese perspective, Seoul is therefore more concerned with its hostilities with North Korea, while appreciating the importance of growing economic and cultural connections. However, with the THAAD decision, South Korea is clearly seen as moving away from Beijing and accepting the containment efforts of the United States and Japan.

Since the THAAD deployment announcement in 2016, South Koreans have been divided on the issue of deployment. In the South Korean public discourse, a binary approach has been clearly adopted, marking those who support THAAD as "pro-American", and opponents as "pro-Chinese".<sup>63</sup> China tried to use the divergent views within South Korea to its own advantage. China's goal was to strengthen the division in South Korea, which would lead to the termination of the THAAD deployment and would create a division between South Korea and the United States.

Due to Park Geun-hye's impeachment, domestic divisions intensified, and the THAAD issue was politicized at the beginning of the presidential election. China tried to seize this opportunity. Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong met with South

---

<sup>63</sup> Kim Jiyeon, John J. Lee and Kang Chungku. *Changing Tides: THAAD and Shifting Korean Public Opinion toward the United States and China*. Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2017.

Korean parliament members from the opposition party and urged them to overthrow the deployment decision.<sup>64</sup> They have been heavily criticized for selling out national interests.

Beijing has systematically incited Chinese nationalism as a means of strengthening social cohesion when it put pressure on South Korea. The Chinese media reported a lot on the THAAD issue, which aggravated the deterioration of public opinion on South Korea, which in turn led to a boycott of Korean products. All these measures mutually reinforced each other, the unofficial sanctions and sequential the media's negative and aggressive coverage shaped the Chinese public opinion, which then lead to more sanctions and media's coverage. According to reports, even Chinese schoolchildren participated in a boycott of Korean goods and shouted with the teacher: "Lotte, leave China! Boycott Korean goods! Protest THAAD! Love China!"<sup>65</sup>

### **4.3 Economic coercion**

China has imposed unofficial sanctions on Korean companies operating in mainland China and restricted Chinese tourism to South Korea, which has caused a major economic blow to South Korea. China is South Korea's largest trading partner, and Seoul has a trade surplus with China as one of the few Asian countries to do so. In 2016, South Korea exported 137 billion US dollars in goods to China, and imported 90.3 billion US dollars in return.<sup>66</sup> By the end of 2017, due to Chinese sanctions, South Korea may have lost 15.6 billion US dollars in revenue due to loss of economic activity.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup> "South Korea to Antagonize China with THAAD," Global Times, January 7, 2017. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1027538.shtml>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>65</sup> Kenneth Tan. "Chinese Primary School Students Are Being Brainwashed into Boycotting South Korean Snacks." Shanghaiist, March 13, 2017. [http://shanghaiist.com/2017/03/13/chinese\\_children\\_boycott\\_lotte/](http://shanghaiist.com/2017/03/13/chinese_children_boycott_lotte/). Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>66</sup> "What Did China Export to South Korea in 2016?" The Atlas of Economic Complexity by HarvardCID. <http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/?country=43&partner=121&product=undefined&productClass=HS&startYear=undefined&target=Partner&year=2016>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>67</sup> David Volodzko. "China Wins Its War against THAAD without Firing a Shot." South China Morning Post, November 18, 2017. <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

South Korean media reported that after the THAAD decision, China adopted a series of coercive measures, including:

- Suspending and cancelling all Korean pop music concerts in China<sup>68</sup>
- Banning broadcasting of Korean TV shows in China
- Not issuing a license for newly released Korean video games<sup>69</sup>
- Prohibiting the sale of Korean household appliances
- Prohibiting the sale of Korean cosmetics products<sup>70</sup>
- Banning of charter flights from South Korea to China, and vice versa<sup>71</sup>
- China National Tourism Administration formally ordered Chinese travel agencies to stop all tour groups and cruise ships to South Korea<sup>72</sup>

These actions had a serious impact. The tourism industry especially has been hit the hardest by China's punitive measures. Tourists from China account for nearly half of tourists to South Korea. Their consumption in South Korea is higher than other tourist groups on average. In addition, due to other retaliatory actions, South Korea's exports of food products<sup>73</sup> and automobiles<sup>74</sup> to China have also dropped significantly.

The Lotte Group, which had an important retail business in China, has become a symbolic target for Chinese economic retaliation. The Chinese decided to take revenge against Lotte, especially because the Lotte Group allowed one of its golf courses to be transform into THAAD site in exchange for military-owned land. The Chinese authorities conducted a punitive investigation into the Lotte retail operations in many cities in China.

---

<sup>68</sup> Song Jung-a. "Seoul Missile Move Sparks Fears for Pop Culture Exports to China." *Financial Times*, August 8, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/2fea068e-5d48-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>69</sup> Echo Huang and Josh Horwitz. "Online Videogames Are the Latest Casualty of China's War against Korean Businesses." *Quartz*, March 8, 2017. <https://qz.com/928459/online-video-games-are-the-latest-casualty-of-chinas-retaliation-against-korean-businesses-for-thethaad-antimissile-defense-system/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>70</sup> Park Hyong-ki. "China Ups THAAD Retaliation against Korean Products." *Korea Times*, January 20, 2017. [https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2017/01/488\\_222465.html](https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2017/01/488_222465.html). Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>71</sup> Emily Rauhala. "China's anger over U.S. antimissile system poses challenge to Trump." *Washington Post*, March 8, 2017. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/china-warns-of-consequences-over-deployment-of-us-anti-missile-system/2017/03/07/dd5ca494-0319-11e7-a391-651727e77fc0\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-warns-of-consequences-over-deployment-of-us-anti-missile-system/2017/03/07/dd5ca494-0319-11e7-a391-651727e77fc0_story.html). Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Yonhap. "South Korea's Food Exports to China Slide in March over THAAD Row." April 4, 2017. <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20170404004600320>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>74</sup> Song Jung-a. "South Korean Carmakers Feel Impact of China Anti-THAAD Sentiment." *Financial Times*, April 4, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/ab64d6f0-18fe-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

In May 2017, Lotte Mart reported that 74 of its 99 stores were forced to close after the "fire inspection", while 13 stores were temporarily closed after facing protests. Nearly 90% of Lotte Mart's large supermarkets in China ceased operations. After more than a year of retaliation from the Chinese authorities, Lotte Mart, which suffered a loss of nearly 2 billion US dollars in revenue, decided to close its 11-year-old business and quit China.<sup>75</sup>

Eventually, China's coercion over THAAD dispute ended in November 2017, when South Korea and China issued a statement announcing that they had reached an understanding. South Korea has publicly provided three guarantees to China: it will not accept any other THAAD deployment from U.S.; it will not participate in the U.S. missile defence network; and it will not participate in the trilateral alliance with United States and Japan.<sup>76</sup> The South Korean government emphasized that every guarantee is consistent with South Korea's long-term policy, that increasing defences and precision-strike capabilities will only aggravate the arms race rather than quench it.<sup>77</sup>

Basically, South Korea has agreed to distance itself from the US-led strategy of China's containment in the region. The agreement has raised severe concerns in the South Korean opposition party, the Conservatives have said it is insulting, humiliating, unobtrusive diplomacy that undermines Korean security and sovereignty.<sup>78</sup> But by the ruling Progressives it was seen as the driving force of peace. The key to solve the problem of divided Korean peninsula is to maintain the balance between Washington and Beijing and to continue to strive for neutrality and peaceful diplomacy.<sup>79</sup> In assessing the alliance with the United States, President Moon has committed himself to stepping up diplomatic efforts with China to resolve the North Korean problem peacefully through dialogue.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> Min-hee Jung. "Lotte Faces 500 Billion Won Losses in China over THAAD Retaliation." *Business Korea*, May 8, 2017. <http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=18007>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>76</sup> Byong-su Park. "South Korea's "Three No's" Announcement Key to Restoring Relations with China." *Hankyoreh*, [http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/817213.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817213.html). Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>77</sup> Jeffrey Lewis. "KN-11 and THAAD." *ArmsControlWonk*, August 28, 2016. <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201857/kn-11-and-thaad/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>78</sup> David Josef Volodzko. "China wins its war against South Korea's US THAAD missile shield – without firing a shot." *South China Morning Post*, November 17, 2017. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>79</sup> Kristian McGuire. "China-South Korea Relations: A Delicate Détente." *The Diplomat*, February 27, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/china-south-korea-relations-a-delicate-detente/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

During the first official visit to Beijing of Moon Jae-in in order to hold a summit meeting with Xi Jinping, President Moon guaranteed a "new starting point" for relations between South Korea and China.<sup>81</sup> However, despite official commitments and efforts to improve bilateral contacts, South Korea-China relations have not been significantly improved. Still fewer Chinese people visit South Korea.<sup>82</sup> Since being forced to close, major Korean companies embedded in China (for example, Lotte) have never resumed full operations. In some cases, they have completely withdrawn from the Chinese market.<sup>83</sup> The Korean entertainment industry is working hard to regain China's market share.<sup>84</sup> However, even if China relaxes economic sanctions and provides opportunities to restore bilateral relations, South Korea-China relations may not be fully restored in the foreseeable future.

The resolution to the THAAD deadlock underscores China's ability to use economic coercion to extract commitments from U.S. allies that would damage their relations with the United States. Chinese economic retaliation for South Korea's implementation of THAAD shows that China intends to exploit South Korea's economic dependence to achieve its own goals.<sup>85</sup> The THAAD controversy has led many South Korean exporters to develop more diverse export destinations. Most Koreans have lost confidence in the Chinese market and hope to seek new forms of economic cooperation with China. South Korea is now working to reduce its dependence on China. Seoul is looking for other global partners to strengthen economic relations. So far, South Korea is mainly exploring opportunities in Southeast Asia and the European Union.

---

<sup>81</sup> Jane Perlez. "South Korea's Leader, Meeting Xi Jinping, Seeks 'New Start' With China." *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/world/asia/china-south-korea-xi-jinping.html>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>82</sup> Kentaro Iwamoto. "Chinese tourists return to South Korea as relations warm." *NIKKEI Asian Review*, July 24, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Chinese-tourists-return-to-South-Korea-as-relations-warm>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>83</sup> "South Korea's Lotte Group to Sell Some China Stores after Missile Row." *The Straits Times*, April 26, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-lotte-group-to-sell-some-china-stores-after-missile-row>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>84</sup> Lauren Teixeira. "K-Pop's Big China Problem." *Foreign Policy*, July 30, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/30/k-pops-big-china-problem/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

<sup>85</sup> Ankit Panda. "All's Well THAAD Ends Well? What the China-South Korea Détente Means." *The Diplomat*, November 1, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/all-s-well-thaad-ends-well-what-the-china-south-korea-detente-means/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

The case of THAAD dispute and the China's way of exerting pressure shows us few noteworthy items. First, China views the THAAD deployment as a violation of its core interests and as a retaliation, has imposed unofficial economic sanctions. South Korea was vulnerable to such sanction due to its economic dependence on China. However, the economic retaliation was selective and targeted only South Korean companies and sectors that are especially dependent on the Chinese consumers like tourism or are active on Chinese market like Lotte group. The Chinese government has not targeted industries that are interdependent such as semiconductors, which would also cause suffering for the Chinese industry. CCP use of informal economic punishment to hit its political rivals is an effective strategy, because its use is difficult to prove. In the THAAD case, the Chinese authorities also denied any official measures against Korean products.

#### **4.4 Geographical importance**

It is clear that although these were informal sanctions against South Korea, they were coordinated at the highest Chinese government level. The reason Beijing responded so strongly to the deployment of this missile defence system is because Chinese observers claim that the deployment of THAAD marks the expansion of the US Allied ballistic missile defence system in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>86</sup> According to China's analysis of system capabilities, Chinese military planners were worried that forward deployment of the X-band will weaken the country strategic nuclear deterrence.<sup>87</sup> China maintains a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and it can retaliate against the United States after its first nuclear attack. China believes that the deployment of US missile-related assets in Northeast Asia may pose a threat to the limited deterrent force.

---

<sup>86</sup> Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova. *China's Response to U.S.–South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications*. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission: Staff Research Report, July 26, 2017, p. 1–16.

<sup>87</sup> Li Bin. "The Security Dilemma and THAAD Deployment in the ROK." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/08/03/security-dilemma-and-thaad-deployment-in-rok-pub-64279>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Chinese main points in the opposition of the THAAD deployment are as follows:

- THAAD is useless against a North Korean attack, because it only targets missiles from high altitudes and Pyongyang will not use long-distance ballistic missiles to attack its neighbour.<sup>88</sup>
- The long range of the X-band radar system can be used to conduct surveillance on the Chinese military and enhance Washington's ability to distinguish between warheads and decoys on Chinese ballistic missiles.<sup>89</sup>
- The U.S. is deploying THAAD in South Korea in order to increase their global anti-missile defence system and the U.S. continues to intentionally damage Asian stability. THAAD deployment is another step in the global U.S. defence network intended to undermine Chinese security and contain China.<sup>90</sup>
- Even the South Korean public oppose THAAD.<sup>91</sup> The South Korean government has taken the role of a U.S. "lackey", by approving its deployment.
- South Korean government lacks a sense of reality and should understand how it benefits from China, both economically and in a handling of North Korea.<sup>92</sup>
- China oppose any military presence of outside powers in Northeast Asia, therefore in response China will have to take actions to incur unbearable cost to South Korea.<sup>93</sup>

However, the system can only intercept projectiles in the "terminal" phase. Unless China considers launching ballistic missiles to South Korea, THAAD will not interfere. Secondly, the range estimate of the AN/TPY-2 radar has been from "hundreds of kilometres" to 3,000 kilometres. Even the most generous estimate does not allow the device to perform any useful surveillance on China's most active and sensitive missile test

---

<sup>88</sup> Fan Gaoyue. "ROK: the Biggest Loser of THAAD." *China-US Focus*, August 9, 2016. <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/rok-the-biggest-loser-of-thaad>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>89</sup> Zhang Han. "吴日强: 韩国部署萨德导弹可能引发连锁反应." US China Press, July 18, 2016. <http://www.uschinapress.com/2016/0718/1071874.shtml>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>90</sup> Yang Xiyu. "因为“萨德”, 中国应如何“报复”韩国." *Global Times*, August 1, 2016. <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-08/9246419.html>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>91</sup> In November 2016, 46.3% approved while 45.7% disapproved of THAAD. See Kim Jiyeon, John J. Lee and Kang Chungku. *Changing Tides: THAAD and Shifting Korean Public Opinion toward the United States and China*. Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2017.

<sup>92</sup> Zhong Sheng. "美韩不要在半岛问题上失去现实感." *People's Daily*, October 1, 2016. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/pinglun/n1/2016/1001/c78779-28754634.html>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>93</sup> Zhong Sheng. "US, ROK will pay price if persisting in THAAD deployment." *People's Daily*, October 8, 2016. <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1008/c90000-9123945.html>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

range in Gobi Desert.<sup>94</sup> But Beijing has reasonable concerns about the radar disrupting the US-China strategic nuclear stability. Since the third<sup>95</sup> AN / TPY-2 radar raised near the Korean Peninsula, China's nuclear secondary strike capability has been greatly reduced. Due to its location, this radar has a unique advantage that can distinguish real warheads and decoys by seeing their backs, thereby reducing the certainty that Chinese existing arsenal is sufficient to penetrate U.S. anti-ballistic missile system.<sup>96</sup>

In addition, to alleviate Chinese concerns, US officials tried to assure Beijing that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea will be independent and will not establish a network within the US theatre missile defence system or the Homeland Missile Defence System.<sup>97</sup> In early 2016, the Obama administration even invited China to participate in THAAD's technical briefing to help ease technical concerns, but China declined the invitation.<sup>98</sup> Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted that THAAD was "certainly not a simple technology issue" for China.<sup>99</sup>

The conflict revealed that both countries have a common misunderstanding of their developing relations.<sup>100</sup> South Korea and China developed their relationship with each other with quite different strategic motivations. South Korea expected that the close relationship between South Korea and China will cause a strategic shift, weaken the relationship between China and North Korea and eventually lead to peace on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, China hoped that their relationship thanks to bilateral

---

<sup>94</sup> Ankit Panda. "THAAD and China's Nuclear Second-Strike Capability." *The Diplomat*, March 8, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/thaad-and-chinas-nuclear-second-strike-capability/>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>95</sup> The U.S. already had two AN/TPY-2 installations in Japan, in Kyoto and Aomori prefecture.

<sup>96</sup> Li Bin. "The Security Dilemma and THAAD Deployment in the ROK." *Kyunghyang Daily*, August 03, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/08/03/security-dilemma-and-thaad-deployment-in-rok-pub-64279>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>97</sup> Kyong-ae Choi. "U.S. to Conduct Interception Test against Musudan-Type Missiles next Year: MDA Chief." *Yonhap News Agency*, August 11, 2016, [http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents\\_en.jsp?cid=AEN20160811008051315](http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20160811008051315). Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>98</sup> "US Offers to Brief China on over Deployment of THAAD Missile System in South Korea." *South China Morning Post*, March 30, 2016. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1931667/us-offers-brief-china-over-deployment-thaad-missile>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>99</sup> Andrea Shalal. "U.S. hopes for talks with China about possible THAAD move to South Korea." *Reuters*, March 22, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-missiledefense-china-idUSKCN0WO2P2>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>100</sup> Ellen Kim. *Common Misconceptions about the China–South Korea Relationship*. *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* 1, no. 1, 2014. p. 135–140.



economic, cultural and diplomatic interaction will become closer and closer, so that South Korea will enter Chinese sphere of influence, thereby weakening the US-ROK alliance.<sup>101</sup>

However, after Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test, Beijing's cold reaction showed to the now disillusioned Seoul that its expanded relations with China did not extend to China's policy shift towards North Korea. Beijing was frustrated by the subsequent deployment of THAAD on South Korean territory, and concluded that its charm offensive against Seoul failed to undermine the US-ROK alliance. Beijing imposed its unofficial economic sanctions, for Seoul then made sense to seek greater security cooperation with the United States, which could defend themselves against North Korea and in the long-term provide strategic security safeguard against China.<sup>102</sup>

When President Trump mentioned at the press conference after the US-DPRK summit held in Singapore that the US and South Korea suspended the US-ROK joint military exercise, Chinese government recognized the growing possibility of U.S.-South Korea alliance disbandment. Therefore, the Chinese authorities have increased the diplomatic pressure on the Korean government to withdraw THAAD.<sup>103</sup>

The North Korean factor participates in the complex calculations made by South Korean government when is assessing its dependence on China. Since China has always been the main source of economic assistance and diplomatic protection to North Korea, without Beijing's assistance and protection, Pyongyang cannot guarantee the survival of its regime. South Korea knows this and because North Korean affairs are the top priority of the South Korean government, the core goal of South Korea was to obtain indirect influence over North Korea by maintaining close ties with China. But this method is no longer sustainable. After THAAD, South Korea is reducing its dependence on China on the North Korean issue, advocating for establishment of more independent and balanced

---

<sup>101</sup> Jae Ho Chung and Jiyeon Kim. *Is South Korea in China's Orbit? Assessing Seoul's Perceptions and Policies*. *Asia Policy* 21, 2016. p. 123.

<sup>102</sup> Shannon Tiezzi. "North Korea Nuclear Test Reveals the Limits of China-South Korea Cooperation." *The Diplomat*, January 14, 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/north-koreanuclear-test-reveals-the-limits-of-china-south-korea-cooperation/>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>103</sup> Ministry of Defense of PRC. "国防部例行记者会文字实录 News Conference Record of Chinese Ministry of Defense." June 2018, [http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2018-06/28/content\\_4818001\\_6.html](http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2018-06/28/content_4818001_6.html). Accessed 7 March 2020.

model. Indeed, since the beginning of 2018, a series of bilateral summits including North and South Korea, North Korea and China, and the United States and North Korea have changed the relationship between South and North Korea. This change has opened up new avenues for cooperation and conflict resolution, but the results and reliability of this new relationship are still not clear.

Although the decision was made jointly by South Korea and the United States, China's retaliation only targeted South Korea. China believes that South Korea is the weakest point in the US-Japan-Korea security alliance, and hope that it can drive a wedge between South Korea and U.S. by creating a problem that will cause anti-American protests. If South Korea would withdraw its decision to deploy the THAAD system, it would shake the foundation of the alliance and ultimately weaken South Korea's military role in the US-led containment efforts against China.<sup>104</sup>

The THAAD controversy revealed the difference between Beijing's rhetorical values and their behavior. When leaders in Beijing feel threat to their "core interests", like in the case of THAAD, they no longer try to use soft power, that Beijing tries to develop. Beijing often speaks of "the principles of friendship, sincerity, reciprocity, and tolerance" in its relations with neighboring countries, and emphasizes "community with a common destiny." Although China describes itself as another great power with lofty intentions, in case of THAAD deployment and South Korea, China has not met its own standards. It used sharp power, from economic leverage to political and public pressure, to try to influence South Korea's policy choices.

#### **4.5 Overseas Chinese community**

Similar to Japan, South Korea also doesn't have sizable Chinese community. It's hard to estimate how many Chinese lives in South Korea, because majority of immigrants from People's Republic of China are ethnic Koreans, so called "Joseonjok",<sup>105</sup> who historically lived in China, but after the opening up of the PRC and normalization of relations between the two countries emigrated back to their homeland.

---

<sup>104</sup> Mark Tokola. "Why Is China So Upset about THAAD?" Korean Economic Institute. <http://keia.org/why-china-soupset-about-thaad>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

<sup>105</sup> David Lee. "Victimised for being Chinese: the hard lives of South Korea's Joseon-jok community." South China Morning Post, May 10, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/3009651/hard-lives-south-koreas-chinese-joseon-jok-community-who-face>. Accessed 20 May 2020.

## 5. Taiwan

Considering the history of Chinese civil war and the strategic importance of the Taiwan issue to the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan remains the top priority of China. Goal of the relationship with Taiwan has changed from subverting the remnants of the Kuomintang's rule over the island to conquer and rule over Taiwan.

Beijing is using the hybrid warfare like Russia,<sup>106</sup> that operate in the grey zone, to exert influence and pressure on Taiwan's internal and external forces. This Russian-style information operations are appearing only in Taiwan. This type of conflict uses multiple means of power and influence, especially non-military means, in pursuit of national interests. These non-military tools include, but are not limited to: propaganda and false information propaganda, proxies, economic coercion, secret behind the scene measures and political influence.<sup>107</sup> And with the rise of China, this overwhelming influence will only become more and more coercive.

Media control is important tool. Propaganda and false information are most effectively communicated through mass media and are main means of disseminating the China's narrative, which limits opposing views and supports the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Ultimate goal of China's false information campaign in Taiwan is to create chaos, weaken trust in democratic institutions and leadership, intensify differences between political parties, civil society, and among Chinese dissidents. All these goals lead to destroyed morale and damaged people's immunity to Beijing's unified propaganda.<sup>108</sup>

### 5.1 History

From 1949 to 1979, the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China fought fiercely for international diplomatic recognition as the legal representative of "China" in the international community. The two sides have engaged in several small conflicts, and two times have almost fallen into full-scale conflict. People's

---

<sup>106</sup> Christopher S. Chivvis. *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare"*. RAND Corporation, 2017.

<sup>107</sup> Douglas Cantwell. *Hybrid Warfare: Aggression and Coercion in the Gray Zone*. ASIL insights, vol. 21, issue 14.

<sup>108</sup> Michael Cole. "China Intensifies Disinformation Campaign Against Taiwan." Taiwan Sentinel, January 19, 2017. <https://sentinel.tw/china-disinformation-tw/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Republic of China replaced the Republic of China in United Nations in 1971, when United Nations recognized Beijing as China's sole legal representative in the United Nations, the goal of Beijing relations towards Taiwan has evolved to incorporate Taiwan under the "One Country, Two Systems". This formula was then also applied to Hong Kong and Macau. Since Deng Xiaoping first proposed this plan in 1979, it has been the blueprint of the CCP's cross-strait policy ever since.<sup>109</sup>

In 1989, facing the Tiananmen massacre and demise of its ideological compatriots, the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping proposed his strategy of "hide our capabilities and bide our time." (韬光养晦) Feeling that these events weakened the political legitimacy of communist rule, the leadership turned to nationalism to strengthen its legitimacy at home and abroad. As part of this propaganda, it became the goal to cultivate overseas Chinese communities and mobilize them to support Chinese goals. This strategy has been used as the guiding principle of its foreign policy for two decades, including Taiwan.

At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 2017, China no longer hides its strength or gains time. General Secretary Xi Jinping promised that the CCP will achieve "a great revival of the Chinese nation." By 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, China will be restored to its due status as a great power.<sup>110</sup> Xi Jinping's declaration puts China's ultimate goal of reunifying Taiwan into the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". Taiwan's reunification is the prerequisite for the great rejuvenation by 2049, "a China that remains divided cannot be a great China".<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>109</sup> "A policy of "one country, two systems" on Taiwan." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/ziliao\\_665539/3602\\_665543/3604\\_665547/t18027.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18027.shtml). Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>110</sup> Rush Doshi. "Xi Jinping just made it clear where China's foreign policy is headed." The Washington Post, October 25, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/xi-jinping-just-made-it-clear-where-chinas-foreign-policy-is-headed/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>111</sup> Richard C. Bush. "What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress, Brookings." October 19, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

## 5.2 Culture

The most famous and successful united front movement is alliance between Chinese Communist Party and Kuomintang. The Kuomintang and CCP formally united twice to resist the common enemy before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, first to get rid of imperialist and warlords in China, second time to resist Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War. After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party shifted the focus of its United Front to subvert the Kuomintang government's control of Taiwan. When Taiwan began to democratize in the 1980s, the focus of the United Front began to shift to subvert Taiwan's democratic system.

In 2015, the Communist Party of China issued important regulations on the work of the United Front of the Communist Party of China. This document is the first official regulation issued to regulate the work of the United Front of Communist Party of China. More importantly, it seeks to standardize, unify and establish procedures to standardize the work of the United Front.<sup>112</sup> Article 30 of the Regulations emphasizes that the main task of the United Front for Taiwan is: "Following the central government's guiding principles for Taiwan, adhering to the one-China principle, and opposing the separatist activities of Taiwanese independence while uniting Taiwanese compatriots. Deepening of economic, cultural and social connection for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and accomplishing the great cause of the reunification of the motherland in the process of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". In addition, Article 31 mentioned promoting global anti-independence and reunification activities, while Article 32 sought the support of democratic political parties and non-partisan parties to guide relevant United Front groups such as China Overseas Friendship Association.<sup>113</sup>

The work of United Front directly or indirectly affects Taiwan's domestic policies and social issues. Taiwan is a free democratic society where sympathetic groups of the United Front are allowed to legally register as non-governmental organizations and have

---

<sup>112</sup> Jenn-Shing Liou. *Seriously Facing the Promulgation of CPC United Front Guidelines*. Prospect & Exploration, vol. 13, issue 11, 2015. p. 36-41.

<sup>113</sup> "中国共产党统一战线工作条例." CPC News, September 27, 2015. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0923/c64107-27622040.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

influence in civil society. The United Front may also be directly involved in activities that at least economically support Taiwan's smaller political parties.<sup>114</sup>

When the first government of the DPP won the second term in 2004 elections, the CCP increased its work on the United Front against Taiwan. In March 2005, the delegation of the Kuomintang Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kung visited China for the first time since 1949. Subsequently, in April a 70-member delegation led by KMT Chairman Lien Chan went to Nanjing, the legal capital of the Republic of China, to initiate an eight-day "Peace Tour of Taiwan Strait".<sup>115</sup> The two parties established the first KMT-CCP Forum (國共論壇), which has been held annually since 2006 and issued a joint statement. A communique against Taiwan's independence and promoting Taiwan's eventual reunification with China.<sup>116</sup>

When the Kuomintang regained power in Taiwan in 2008, the CCP's activities became more institutionalized. For example, the annual cross-strait dialogue began in 2010, called the "Zhongshan, Huangpu Cross-Strait Friendship Forum" (中山黃埔兩岸情論壇). It is composed of the Central Revolutionary Committee of the People's Republic of China and the Huangpu Military Academy Alumni Association<sup>117</sup>. The CCP's work focused not only on the political but also on the business elites in Taiwan. The Straits Forum (海峽論壇) also began in 2009, attracting a large number of people to the event on both sides of the Strait to promote cross-strait dialogue. According to reports, more than 10,000 participants from Taiwan participated in the last Strait Forum held in 2019 in Xiamen.<sup>118</sup> The Cross-Strait Entrepreneurs Summit (兩岸企業家峰會) is another high-level, non-governmental exchange platform focused on business. These efforts ultimately

---

<sup>114</sup> Chris Horton. "Taiwan Suspects Pro-China Party of Passing Information to Beijing." *The New York Times*, December 20, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/asia/taiwan-china-new-party.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>115</sup> Edward Cody. "Nationalists Return to Chinese Mainland." *The Washington Post*, April 27, 2005. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042600406.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>116</sup> Russell Hsiao. *Taiwan's Role in the Global Non-Proliferation Architecture*. Global Taiwan Brief, 2016 vol. 1, issue 8.

<sup>117</sup> This association composes of retired, older generals of "Taiwanese Army", who are easier to be bribed. See Zhang Xiaojing. "第九屆"中山黃埔兩岸情"論壇在滬舉行, 中国台湾网." July 18, 2019. [http://big5.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201907/t20190718\\_12184839.htm](http://big5.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201907/t20190718_12184839.htm). Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>118</sup> Mu Xuequan. "More than 10,000 people from Taiwan to attend Straits Forum." *Xinhua News Agency*, June 15, 2019. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/15/c\\_138144358.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/15/c_138144358.htm). Accessed 22 March 2020.

led to the summit meeting between the Kuomintang Chairman Ma Ying-jeou and the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015.

The turning point for China-Taiwan relationship was the student-led Sunflower Movement held in spring 2014, which not only shaken the political status of the ruling Kuomintang at the time, but also triggered a reflection on Beijing's actions. To make this turning point more prominent, after the student protests, the DPP swept the Kuomintang in the local election. Subsequently, Zhang Zhijun, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, postponed his visit to Taiwan and decided to rearrange his trip on Taiwan in order to be in contact with more people from the grassroots organizations of Taiwan.

The teacher-student exchanges have been a common feature of the United Front activities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but the sunflower movement made Chinese leaders realize how Taiwanese youth identify themselves is the biggest problem facing the “reunification”. In 2016 another shock for the China-Taiwan relations happened, the DPP won the presidential and legislative elections. When the new government came to power, China immediately stopped high-level contacts with the new government and strengthened its activities against Taiwan. Beijing found that the high-level exchanges under the leadership of Ma Ying-jeou with the Taiwanese government and enterprises did not win the hearts of the people of Taiwan.

As a result, activities of the Chinese government had changed from a “passive” policy to a more “active” policy, and has gradually expanded that policy in order to attract more Taiwanese youth to study, work and open businesses in China.<sup>119</sup> China has established cross-strait youth employment and business bases, and granted special privileges to Taiwanese holders of travel permit when traveling in mainland China. Also allowed Taiwanese researchers to apply for Chinese funded academic funds and issued a housing bonds for young Taiwanese.<sup>120</sup> To attract entrepreneurs’ Chinese agencies are

---

<sup>119</sup> Simon Denyer. “Taiwan battles a brain drain as China aims to woo young talent.” The Washington Post, April 15, 2018. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html). Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>120</sup> Jess Macy Yu. “China tries to charm tech-savvy Taiwanese youth as political ties fray.” Reuters, February 7, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-youth/china-tries-to-charm-tech-savvy-taiwanese-youth-as-political-ties-fray-idUSKBN1FR0LB>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

offering tax breaks, fast-track permits to set up offices and subsidies for start-ups.<sup>121</sup> The CCP also has shifted the focus of its United Front strategy to target SMEs, low middle-income people, people in the poorer central and southern regions, and youth, while isolating counties and cities managed by the DPP.

The United Front is now widely targeting groups that includes grassroots villages, youth, students, Chinese spouses, indigenous peoples, pro-Chinese political parties and groups, religious organizations, distant relatives, fishermen's associations, and retired generals.<sup>122</sup> The United Front organizations invite grassroots village heads from Taiwan to travel to mainland China and establish relationships by creating "villages of the same name". The effort also includes providing more incentives for Taiwanese high school graduates to study in Chinese universities. At present time, there are about 330,000 wives holding Chinese passports in Taiwan, many of which are closely related to pro-unification groups. There are also about 400,000 indigenous people in Taiwan that Beijing would like to distribute goods, money and invite them to travel to China.

Beijing is also conducting a lot of temple exchanges to enhance the cultural and religious ties between the two sides. Relatives of the same surname also often communicate with each other with a purpose of forming a "family on both sides of the strait".<sup>123</sup> Also, Beijing is using a pseudo-academic conference to rewrite historical events to emphasize the Kuomintang-Communist's unity. Today, the anniversary of major historical events in Chinese history is commonly used for this purpose.<sup>124</sup>

Beijing can also weaken military morale and willingness to fight through activities aimed at retired senior officers. Watching senior ex-military officers participate in China's grand events and say anti-nationalist words often quoted in the media will have a negative

---

<sup>121</sup> Ralph Jennings. China Offers Special Breaks to Attract Taiwanese Startups, But Only 1% Find Success. Forbes, March 26, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2019/03/26/china-offers-special-breaks-to-attract-taiwanese-startups-but-only-1-find-success/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>122</sup> Lu Xiufang. "中共矮化台灣，又黑勢力入侵，一中架構下的憲法害人不淺." Yahoo News, September 11, 2018. <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/匯流筆陣-中共矮化台灣-又黑勢力入侵-一中架構下的憲法害人不淺-070245704.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

<sup>123</sup> Russell Hsiao. *Political Warfare Alert: Fifth "Linking Fates" Cultural Festival of Cross-Strait Generals*. Global Taiwan Brief, vol. 2, issue 2.

<sup>124</sup> Richard C. Bush. "Facing Mainland China: Taiwan's Future Challenges." Brookings, April 10, 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/facing-mainland-china-taiwans-future-challenges/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.



psychological impact on soldiers in active service. Perhaps most disturbing is the impact of the United Front's work on enhancing the ability of the Ministry of National Security to recruit spies in Taiwan.

### **5.3 Economic coercion**

The United Front uses its influence over Taiwanese companies to demand political concessions, whether it is forcing major businessmen to issue a statement in support of Beijing's policies, condemning Taipei, or encouraging businessmen to vote for pro-Beijing political parties and candidates in Taiwanese election. These measures use coercive and hidden methods to influence the integrity of the media, freedom of speech, academic freedom and fairness of political process. Another problem is the relationship between United Front and organized crime in Taiwan, as the former head of Triad, Chang An-le, established the China United Promotion Party.<sup>125</sup>

### **5.4 Geographical importance**

Since Tsai Ing-wen was elected as President in January 2016, China has increased its diplomatic offensive against Taiwan in the international and diplomatic fields. Taiwan now has only 15 diplomatic allies in the world, compared to 23 when Tsai was elected. The continued bleeding of diplomatic allies may lead to a decline in public confidence and morale in Taiwan. China also uses its strong economic power to require multinational companies to abide by their political interpretation of Taiwan's legal status, thereby affecting people's understanding of Taiwan and its relationship with China.<sup>126</sup>

Beijing also uses international organizations that can influence, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as its political targets in cross-strait relations. The exclusion of Taiwan from international institutions is to prove that Taiwan is the sole jurisdiction of China. This approach may be aimed at shaping a

---

<sup>125</sup> Edward White. "Alarm in Taiwan over triad ties to pro-China groups." *Financial Times*, October 12, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/b09de5d0-aa76-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

<sup>126</sup> Russell Hsiao. "Cross-Strait Aviation and Beijing's Hybrid Warfare." *Taiwan Insight*, 21 February 2018. <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/02/21/the-politics-of-cross-strait-aviation-and-beijings-hybrid-warfare/>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

normative understanding of Taiwan's status, and its long-term impact may be a change to the "status quo".<sup>127</sup>

Beijing's use of United Front activities aims to intensify tensions within Taiwan's society, thereby worsening polarization and national cohesion, thereby weakening Taiwan's relationship with its main security partner, the United States. The spread of propaganda and false information, deliberately confuses the meaning and interpretation of the U.S. policy toward Taiwan. A suitable example is the continuous blurring of the line between China's "One China Principle" and the United States "One China Policy", suggesting that the policies of Beijing and Washington on the management of Taiwan are the same. This propaganda has heightened American fear of Taiwan society abandoning the alliance. The Chinese propaganda tries to make China a natural partner of Taiwan for cultural and ethnic reasons, not the United States, even though the two countries share common democratic and human rights values.

The United Front is using a strategy evolving around whole society, which needs a response also from the whole society. One of the challenges is to encourage cross-strait exchanges to minimize misunderstandings, but on the other hand to protect people from secret and coercive activities that undermine the structure of a democratic society.

Taiwan's recently drafted legislation and regulations, such as the National Security Law, to impose stricter penalties on espionage activities and more restrictions on active duty and retired senior military officers,<sup>128</sup> are in a long-term necessary precaution. But they should have been done long ago, and they are still not enough.

Although the United Front is generally regarded to the context of the Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party relationship, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the importance of the United Front in 2014, calling

---

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> George Liao. "Amendment bill allowing National Security Act to cover online spies passed in Taiwan's legislature." Taiwan News, June 19, 2019. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3727612>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

it one of the "magic weapons" (法宝) of the CCP.<sup>129</sup> Taiwan is still the main goal of the United Front work, because reunification is still one of the core issues of the Chinese Communist Party. But, with the rise of China, the United Front area of interests expands and the working goals have also increased. The United Front work abroad of buying or coercing political influence is now also affecting countries such as New Zealand. Therefore, Taiwan and New Zealand should cooperate in their fight against Chinese influence operations done by the United Front.

## 5.5 Overseas Chinese community

When we talk about overseas Chinese people, the general consensus is that means people of Han ethnicity. But in Taiwan, many regular Taiwanese people are Han ethnicity as well. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to talk about "overseas Chinese" in Taiwan. The term "Zhongguoren (中國人)" could be interpreted as "Chinese national", but older Taiwanese generation still regards themselves as "中國人" and other term such as "Huaren (華人)" and "Zhonghua minzu (中華民族)" can be differently interpreted. The length of my thesis is not allowing me to talk extensively about Taiwanese identity, there are several papers that were written just about this topic. Also, no data is available on how many PRC citizens lives in Taiwan, because technically they are not crossing international border when entering "Republic of China", their passports are not stamped by Taiwan immigration officers.

---

<sup>129</sup> James Kynge, Lucy Hornby, Jamil Anderlini. "Inside China's secret 'magic weapon' for worldwide influence." Financial Times, October 26, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

## 6. New Zealand

The relationship between New Zealand and China is interesting because the Chinese government regards New Zealand as a model for its relationship with other democratic countries in Europe and America. In 2013, the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand described the relationship between the two countries as "a model to other Western countries."<sup>130</sup> After Premier Li Keqiang visited New Zealand in 2017, a Chinese government gave a positive evaluation of the intimacy of New Zealand-China relations, comparing it to Albania in the early 1960s.

China's political influence in New Zealand has become saturated, and because of its interaction with China and its natural assets, it may be experiencing more political influence than most countries. Most of China's influence activities in New Zealand are not illegal. Instead, they are a matter of etiquette and national security, unless they lead to treason, bribery or other forms of corruption.

### 6.1 History

New Zealand has always been committed to becoming the first Western country to sign up for China's new foreign economic policy. Whether it's China's joining the WTO, a Free Trade Agreement with China, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), and the recent "Belt and Road" Initiative.

When in the mid-1980s New Zealand lost access to the British market, New Zealand's government saw China as a solution. Today, New Zealand's trade with the Asia-Pacific region accounts for 44 %, while China is New Zealand's largest overall trading partner.<sup>131</sup> New Zealand signed the "Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership Agreement" with China in 2003 and the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement" with China in 2014. New Zealand is currently expanding its relationship with China beyond trade, including finance, telecommunications, forestry, food safety and security, education,

---

<sup>130</sup> “新西兰华人议员杨健：“做好每一件事，机会就来找你”，中工网。” August 29, 2013.

<http://character.worker.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>131</sup> “Where did New Zealand export to in 2017?” The Atlas of Economic Complexity by HarvardCID, <https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore?country=166&product=undefined&year=2017&productClass=HS&target=Partner&partner=undefined&startYear=undefined>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

science and technology, tourism, climate change and Antarctic cooperation, as well as military cooperation.<sup>132</sup> In 2013, Jonathan Coleman, New Zealand's defence minister, admitted that New Zealand is currently "walking road between the United States and China".<sup>133</sup>

Following the model over the years, the New Zealand government soon signed on China's new policy the "Belt and Road" initiative and New Zealand's "Belt and Road" Council was established in 2012.<sup>134</sup> New Zealand was the first Western country to establish an institution to promote the "Belt and Road" initiative. In March 2017, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative, during a visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. New Zealand is the first Western country to sign such an agreement. During his visit, Li Keqiang also launched "New Zealand Belt and Road Initiative Foundation" and "New Zealand Belt and Road Initiative Think-tank".<sup>135</sup>

Since Li Keqiang's visit, the New Zealand Belt and Road Foundation has promoted the "Belt and Road" to closed-door audiences across the country.<sup>136</sup> They also established contacts with China's "Belt and Road" lead agency and the Chinese Ministry of strategic resources.<sup>137</sup> New Zealand media published many pro-Belt and Road articles.

## 6.2 Culture

In just a few years, New Zealand's mass media in Chinese language has lost their independence and has become China's official information output channel.<sup>138</sup> Most of the

---

<sup>132</sup> John Key. "Joint Statement between New Zealand and the People's Republic of China on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership." <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-between-new-zealand-and-people%E2%80%99s-republic-china-establishment-comprehensive>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>133</sup> Audrey Young. "Coleman on 'rebalancing' visit to China." NZ Herald, November 28, 2013. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11163835](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11163835). Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>134</sup> New Zealand China Council. "About the Council." <https://nzchinacouncil.org.nz/about-the-council/>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>135</sup> New Zealand China Council. *BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE A Strategic Pathway*. 2018.

<sup>136</sup> Tian Shaohui. "China deepens ties with B&R countries with fruitful achievements, promising prospects, Xinhua." April 26, 2017. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/26/c\\_136237559.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/26/c_136237559.htm). Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>137</sup> China Daily. "Road starts here - New Zealand to catch the 'Belt and Road' train." March 28, 2017. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/28/content\\_28711006.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/28/content_28711006.htm). Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>138</sup> Phoebe H. Li. *A Virtual Chinatown: The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

local Chinese language media platforms in New Zealand have signed a content cooperation agreement with Xinhua News Agency, a Chinese government owned news agency, to obtain news about China and participated in the annual media training conference held in China. Some media also hired senior staff closely related to CPC. Thanks to the “integrating” process of overseas Chinese media with domestic Chinese media, as instructed by Xi Jinping in one of his speeches “to tell China’s story well”, New Zealand Chinese media organizations are now repeating official propaganda of the Communist Party of China.<sup>139</sup> The phrase "tell China's story" is a key phrase used to symbolize the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda messages during the Xi Jinping era. In practice, telling China’s story well looks a lot like serving the ideological aims of the state.<sup>140</sup>

In 2017, the State Council of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office held a meeting in Auckland to discuss the integration of overseas Chinese media with domestic Chinese media. The main guest of the event was the Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department, with representatives of Chinese New Zealand media and the most influential people of Chinese community group attending.<sup>141</sup> The “update” meetings are one of the main ways for the CPC to convey instructions to the Chinese language media in New Zealand, in order to avoid any physical evidence.<sup>142</sup>

In 2014, Xinhua News Agency established an extensive cooperation agreement with New Zealand's leading Chinese multi-platform website Skykiwi. Since then, the website has become a two-way communication channel between Chinese government and New Zealand. In addition to publishing the news content of Xinhua News Agency on the website, Skykiwi also organized their own pro-China content. Some popular Chinese programs, such as the dating program "If You Are the One" (非诚勿扰), included New Zealand specials, which were then broadcast on Chinese TV stations.

---

<sup>139</sup> “China is spending billions on its foreign-language media.” *The Economist*, June 14, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/china/2018/06/14/china-is-spending-billions-on-its-foreign-language-media>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>140</sup> Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin. “Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign.” *The Guardian*, December 7, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>141</sup> Skykiwi. “牛清报总领事赴天维网调研 寄语继续传播正能量。” September 9, 2014. <http://politics.skykiwi.com/consulate/2014-09-15/185823.shtml>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>142</sup> Anne-Marie Brady. *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. p. 19.

Since the economic reforms in the early 1990s, China has implemented media supervision, where media companies can be owned by a different entity than just the state, but they cannot ever cross the party line and are always between the party and the bottom line.<sup>143</sup> This way the CPC still retains overall political control of the media. This same approach we can see now in other countries, including New Zealand, where Overseas Chinese media has basically repeated the same pattern.

Like in many other countries, China has made tremendous efforts to change the way New Zealand mainstream media reports on China. Just like in many other countries, Chinese diplomats exert considerable pressure on New Zealand scholars, journalists, politicians and other thought leaders who are critical of issues related to China. The Chinese Embassy has invited some New Zealand journalists to visit China for reporting trips. But when China pays the bill, it raises questions about the independence and credibility of the journalists. New Zealand government officials have also been sent to China to participate in short-term courses funded by the Chinese government, where the curriculum is determined by China.

### **6.3 Economic coercion**

The CPC has long time ago developed a policy of party-to-party relations, but this policy has been greatly expanded to a bigger extent during the Xi Jinping administration, and the government is determined to improve China's international image and legitimacy. Former politicians who still have connections to the respective government are valuable commodities. China's diplomatic work has always been aimed at giving foreigners the opportunity to gain political power in exchange for support of China's foreign policy agenda.<sup>144</sup> But the focus now is on using foreign political leaders to develop both economic and political relations. The mission of the United Front officials and their agents is to develop relations with foreigners and overseas Chinese to influence, subvert, and coerce

---

<sup>143</sup> Amie Tsang, "Caijing Journalist's Shaming Signals China's Growing Control Over News Media." September 6, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/business/media/caijing-journalists-shaming-signals-chinas-growing-control-over-news-media.html>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>144</sup> Anne-Marie Brady. *Making the Foreign Serve China*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 150.

their government policies when necessary, in order to promote the interests of the CPC on global scale.<sup>145</sup>

For example, New Zealand's former Prime Minister John Key, who now represents Comcast's business projects in China on behalf of the US media and entertainment company. In July 2017, Key met with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, mayor of Beijing and head of the Chinese Ministry of Tourism.<sup>146</sup> In September 2017, many eyebrows were raised about the price and the buyer of Key property in Parnell. The property was sold to an undisclosed Chinese buyer at a price of 20 million New Zealand dollars, much higher than the market price in the region and tax free. John Key refused to answer any questions about the transaction.<sup>147</sup>

The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) is responsible for sister city relations. Xi Jinping's strategy of more economic cooperation with local governments has now revitalized the CPAFFC and its local counterparts like the New Zealand-China Friendship Association (NZCFS). Many wealthy Chinese businessmen with close ties to the Chinese government, are donating millions of Yuan to the NZCFS.<sup>148</sup> These donations are now linked to the New Zealand Government's Winston Churchill Trust. Only NZCFS members can apply for Winston Churchill Trust Fund projects in China.<sup>149</sup> The association also used these two donations to fund art exhibitions, book publications and other non-critical activities to promote China in New Zealand.

Chinese investors linked to political interests can conceal their foreign identity by buying a New Zealand company to acquire a local identity and then using it to invest in

---

<sup>145</sup> Ibid. 23.

<sup>146</sup> New Zealand China Council. "China's Premier Li Keqiang meets with former New Zealand PM John Key in Beijing." July 25, 2017. <https://nzchinacouncil.org.nz/2017/07/chinas-premier-li-keqiang-meets-with-former-new-zealand-pm-john-key-in-beijing/>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>147</sup> Ricardo Simich, Kirsty Wynn. "Sir John Key sells off Parnell mansion for \$20m." NZ Herald, September 9, 2017. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=3&objectid=11919697](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11919697). Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>148</sup> New Zealand China Friendship Association. "Our Patrons." <http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/our-patrons/>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>149</sup> "New Zealand Winston Churchill Fellowships Awarded 1966 – 2018." <https://www.communitymatters.govt.nz/assets/Winston-Churchill-Memorial-Trust-Fellowship-PDFs/WCMT-Fellowships-Awarded-1966-2017.pdf>. Accessed 7 April 2020.



other companies as a local rather than foreign investor. This is useful for influence activities, and it may lead of potentially acquiring strategic information and technology that would otherwise be unobtainable. For example, in 2014, New Zealand company Pacific Aerospace signed a partnership with BAIC Group to sell small commercial aircrafts to the Chinese market. However, in 2017, New Zealand charged Pacific Aerospace with illegal exports to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through its Chinese partner.<sup>150</sup> Another example is with now infamous Huawei, in 2017, Huawei Technologies signed a partnership with Victoria University of Wellington and Lincoln University. Huawei has pledged to spend 300 million US dollars to establish cloud data centres and innovation laboratories in Christchurch and Wellington, and is building data capacity that exceeds the needs of its projects.<sup>151</sup> Huawei is now building a 5G network in New Zealand thanks to NZ Telecom who dismissed security concerns about Huawei.<sup>152</sup>

## 6.4 Geographical importance

There are many reasons why China is interested in New Zealand. New Zealand’s government is responsible for the defence and foreign affairs of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau in the South Pacific, which may mean four votes for China in international organizations. New Zealand is a claimant country in Antarctica and one of the closest points of visit there. China has a long-term strategic agenda in Antarctica, which will require cooperation from established Antarctic countries such as New Zealand.<sup>153</sup> China is seeking to acquire foreign arable land to improve its food safety and New Zealand has plenty of cheap arable land and a sparse population.<sup>154</sup> Because Cook Islands, Niue and

---

<sup>150</sup> Edward White. “New Zealand aircraft maker guilty of breaching N Korea sanctions.” *Financial Times*, October 22, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/adbd5c54-b261-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>151</sup> Tom Westbrook. “China's Huawei to spend \$300 million in New Zealand expansion.” *Reuters*, March 21, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-huawei-tech-idUSKBN16S2NZ>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>152</sup> Fumi Matsumoto. “Huawei back in New Zealand's 5G plans despite security concerns.” *Nikkei Asian Review*, November 20, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown/Huawei-back-in-New-Zealand-s-5G-plans-despite-security-concerns>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>153</sup> Anne-Marie Brady. *China as a Polar Great Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

<sup>154</sup> Claire Trevett, Li Yuanchao. “Why China wants Kiwi land, *NZ Herald*.” October 25, 2017. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11534966](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11534966). Accessed 7 April 2020.

Tokelau are known tax havens and money laundering countries. In 2016, New Zealand was described as the "heart" of global money laundering.<sup>155</sup>

New Zealand is also a member of the UKUSA intelligence agreement, so-called "Five-Eyes". Separating New Zealand from this military bloc, its traditional partners, or at least get New Zealand to stop monitoring China for the Five Eyes would be a major help for China to achieve its strategic goal of becoming a global power. New Zealand and China have closer economic, political, and military ties, and Beijing sees it as a model for Australia, small island nations in the South Pacific, and other Western countries. Because of all of these aspects China is in interest of New Zealand.

The current National Party government follows two main principles on China. First is the "no accidents" policy that means for the New Zealand government and its officials or anyone associated with government to avoid any activities or say anything that could potentially offend the Chinese government. Second is long-term emphasis on "establishing correct political relations", this means establishing a close relationship with the local and national leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and affiliated actors in New Zealand.<sup>156</sup>

This cautious attitude towards the relationship between New Zealand and China is why New Zealand is reluctant to join the United States and Australia to criticize China's construction of military bases in the South China Sea. Although New Zealand has the fourth largest maritime territory in the world and relies on respecting international maritime norms to protect its rights, the New Zealand National Government is still reluctant to comment on this issue.

## **6.5 Overseas Chinese community**

Currently, out of the 4.5 million New Zealanders, about 200,000 Chinese live in New Zealand. The Chinese Consulate closely monitors all Chinese community activities, especially in Auckland. They achieved this goal through close contact with core pro-

---

<sup>155</sup> Gyles Beckford, Patrick O'Meara, Jane Patterson. "NZ at heart of Panama money-go-round, Radio New Zealand, May 9, 2016. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/panama-papers/303356/nz-at-heart-of-panama-money-go-round>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

<sup>156</sup> Australia-China Relations Institute. *New Zealand's China Policy: Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership*. Wellington: University of Wellington, 2015.

Beijing Chinese community groups, as well as supervision of other Chinese community groups, ethnic Chinese politicians, Chinese language media and schools in New Zealand. In addition, during the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese embassy supports the establishment of a new organization that report back to the United Front agency in China.

The organization with closest relationship to the Chinese authorities in New Zealand is the Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New Zealand (PRCANZ), which was established in 2000.<sup>157</sup> It directly belongs to the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee. The organization has launched a series of activities in support of China's foreign policy goals, including collective voting and fundraising for ethnical Chinese political candidates who agreed to support their agenda. When senior Chinese leaders visited New Zealand, anti-protest groups were organized by United Front organizations such as PRCANZ to counter pro-Falun gong, pro-Tibet, or other groups that criticized China.<sup>158</sup> In 2014, PRCANZ hosted a meeting organized by more than 30 leaders of the New Zealand United Front to condemn Hong Kong's democratic protest.<sup>159</sup> From the perspective of the participants, the connection with the Chinese embassy can bring prestige and business opportunities.

The current person in charge of PRCANZ is Steven Wai Cheung Wong. He has held senior leadership positions in many other United Front organizations in New Zealand and China. He is the chairman of the United Chinese Association, the chairman of the New Zealand Chinese History and Culture Association, the vice chairman of the New Zealand's Chinese Chamber of Commerce, a member of the Guangdong Overseas Exchange Association, and an honorary chairman of the Overseas Association of Shandong Province. He is a member of the China Peaceful Reunification Committee and an advisor to the Beijing Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee.

---

<sup>157</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in New Zealand. "Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New Zealand Established." October 27, 2003. <http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t39207.htm>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>158</sup> James Jiann Hua To. *Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese*. Leiden: Brill, 2014. p. 35.

<sup>159</sup> Consulate-General of The People's Republic of China In Auckland. "新西兰华侨华人反对“占中”违法行为." October 7, 2014. <http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/lsqz/lingshiqianzheng/t1198220.htm>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Like in many other countries in the world, every university campus in New Zealand now has a Chinese Students and Scholars Association, which is one of the main means used by the Chinese authorities to guide Chinese students and scholars while they study abroad. The New Zealand organization was established in 2012 to connect all Chinese student in New Zealand. The New Zealand Chinese Students and Scholars Association is "under the correct guidance" of the People's Republic of China.<sup>160</sup>

An important policy of Xi Jinping's era is to encourage the diaspora to be more active in the host country's politics. The number of ethnical Chinese candidates is growing in local and national elections held in New Zealand.<sup>161</sup> Chinese government see these political leaders to be easier to pressure by Chinese diplomats to comply with and work for the Chinese government's policies. But reflecting the diversity of Chinese communities in New Zealand, many ethnical Chinese are unwilling to work for Chinese representatives. Not everyone is Han, and not all are from People's Republic of China.

The ethnic Chinese member of the Parliament, National's Yang Jian, has very close relationship with the United Front organization of the New Zealand and the Chinese embassies. Yang Jian is a former lecturer in political studies at the University of Auckland. Thanks to his community activities and academic status, when he joined Parliament, Yang Jian was already active in the Chinese community in New Zealand.<sup>162</sup> But before coming to New Zealand in 1999, Yang Jian worked in the Chinese military intelligence department for fifteen years and had taught English at an elite spy school, the Luoyang Foreign Languages Institute. Yang Jian has hidden his 15-year long career as an officer in People's Liberation Army on his National Party Online Resume. Nor it had appeared on his profile at the University of Auckland.<sup>163</sup> But when he was distributing his resume to the Chinese

---

<sup>160</sup> Zhu Feng. "新西兰奥克兰中国学联举行第一届干部选举大会, 中新网." March 30, 2013. <http://www.chinanews.com/lxsh/2012/03-30/3787099.shtml>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>161</sup> "Dr X is in the house! Asian newcomers to local body elections." Radio New Zealand, September 19, 2016. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/voices/audio/201816606/dr-x-is-in-the-house!-asian-newcomers-to-local-body-elections>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>162</sup> Jamil Anderlini. "China-born New Zealand MP probed by spy agency." Financial Times, September 13 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/64991ca6-9796-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>163</sup> Tom Phillips. "China-born New Zealand MP denies being a spy." The Guardian, September 13, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/13/china-born-new-zealand-mp-yang-jian-denies-being-a-spy>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

officials in preparation for his official 2012 visit to China, he did not forget to mention this information.<sup>164</sup>

Yang Jian accompanied New Zealand Prime Minister John Key and his successor Bill English on their visits to China, and met with senior Chinese leaders during their visit to New Zealand. This role gave him the opportunity to read New Zealand's China policy briefs and positions. Normally, people with Yang's foreign military intelligence background would not get New Zealand's security clearance. But elected members of parliament do not need to apply for security clearance. Yang has been investigated by New Zealand Security Intelligence Service in the past few years.<sup>165</sup> Last year, he organized a trip to China for party leader Simon Bridges without the involvement of officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. During this trip, Bridges met with high-ranking Communist Party figures including the head of Chinese Secret Police.<sup>166</sup>

The Xi Jinping government encourages more overseas Chinese to participate in politics, and an important means of participating in politics is through political donations. Since 2007, the New Zealand Electoral Commission has prepared an annual report covering monetary contributions to political parties and candidates. However, this inspection does not include "charitable" fundraising, such as dinners and auctions.<sup>167</sup> According to various reports, 83% of the political contributions received came from anonymous donors in 2018.<sup>168</sup>

---

<sup>164</sup> "National MP taught English to Chinese spies." NZ Herald, September 13, 2017. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11921843](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11921843). Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>165</sup> Laura Walters. "Jian Yang in China for CCP military parade." Newsroom, October 5, 2019. <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/10/02/838837/jian-yang-in-china-for-chinese-communist-party-celebrations>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>166</sup> Harrison Christian. "National MP Jian Yang organised Simon Bridges' controversial China trip, emails show." Stuff, January 05, 2020. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/118419927/national-mp-jian-yang-organised-simon-bridges-controversial-china-trip-emails-show>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>167</sup> New Zealand Electoral Commission. "Party donations and loans by year." <https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/political-parties-in-new-zealand/party-donations-and-loans-by-year/>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

<sup>168</sup> Liam Hehir. "A step by step guide for compulsory anonymity in political donations." The Spinoff, March 3, 2020. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/03-03-2020/a-step-by-step-guide-for-compulsory-anonymity-in-political-donations/>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

## 7. Comparison

We can see from the cases above, that CCP is using different strategy for each country. In every case, there are one or two variables that prove my initial assumption that China specializes sharp power on individual bases. China is good at finding weak points and focusing sharp power on those areas that are most likely to yield success.

First, the history aspect. In the case of Japan, China has troubles overcoming animosity between the two caused by their troubled past. But CCP found some common language with the Ryukyu islands. Okinawa, the main island, hosts U.S. military base, therefore they are a valuable target. Chinese influence operations focus on common history, Ryukyu kingdom was a Chinese tributary state until Japanese takeover. Chinese sharp power is targeting the independence movement, strengthening their ties with China. CCP promotes an image of China as an alternative to Japanese rule. It's worth to mention that Korean kingdom was also a tributary state in the past, but that is something, China is not emphasizing (in contrast to Donald Trump<sup>169</sup>). China and Korea have good diplomatic relationship, unlike China and Japan, and such narrative would be quite provocative. And Chinese government found, in the case of South Korea, other means of projecting sharp power to be more effective. In case of Taiwan, history just creates a resentment in Taiwanese public and is not effective. But there are some cases where the historical United Front between KMT and CCP, is used for elite capture of KMT senior officials. In case of New Zealand, the two countries share a common history for only a short time, but in that time New Zealand profiled itself as a China supporter in international space and NZ politicians find some need to be always the first of Western countries to engage China. CCP is aware of such behaviour and masterful uses it when launching new endeavours like AIIB or BRI to attract other Western countries, pointing on New Zealand as a trend setter to eliminated any doubts.

Second, the cultural aspect. Japanese and Chinese cultures were close in the past, the mandarin model of governance was a model for Japan. Still in the 80's and 90's "Chinese style" bureaucrats were prevalent in Japan. But today, "Western style" of

---

<sup>169</sup> Michelle Ye. "Trump claims 'Korea actually used to be a part of China'." South China Morning Post, April 20, 2017. <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2089161/trump-claims-korea-actually-used-be-part-china-does-claim-stack>. Accessed 19 May 2020.

governance became dominant, most bureaucrats went to universities in USA or Europe. Therefore, China is unable to find some friendly souls in Tokyo, even Japanese Communist party have anti-Chinese views, so this aspect is not possible for sharp power usage. South Korean case is as complicated as their relationship with China. These two countries had a friendly relationship, South Korea was most popular destination for Chinese tourist, K-pop and K-dramas were one of the most watched programs on Chinese TV. But China was willing to sacrifice such a good relationship over the THAAD issue. In Japan, two THAAD system are already installed, but they did not award so much attention from China. Reason for this seems to be the close relationship between China and South Korea. For unknown reason, CCP bet on economic coercion for sharp power use, thus severely damaging their image. In the Taiwanese case, Chinese approach is exactly opposite. Chinese influence operations are targeting Taiwanese of all ages, backgrounds, economic power and education. China is using vast number of different strategies to attract every Taiwanese with one goal only, peaceful “reunification” in the future. To hinder the growing independence movements and create ties across the strait, Chinese government wager on sharp power in cultural sense. In New Zealand, Chinese sharp power is also very active in the culture sphere. United Front organizations are trying to create better image of China in NZ media. CCP hopes that if New Zealanders will have a better feeling about China, than they will accept Chinese rising influence in the international area, maybe even Chinese style of governance.

Third, economic coercion. Japan was the one of the first country to experience economic coercion from China. But the 2010 case of export ban of rare earth minerals didn't prove to be effective. In the following incidents around Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, China did not use such tools anymore. In case of South Korea, since the early 1990's China and South Korea developed close economic and cultural ties. These ties then became main target of Chinese sharp power. The close relationship between the two countries allowed China to use targeted economic sanctions very effectively. Korean companies lost access to Chinese market, Chinese costumers boycotted Korean products and Korean tourism industry suffered as well. This led new Korean government to make big concessions towards China, where Seoul commit to discuss with Beijing any further endeavours with the U.S. alliance. This can be seen as a biggest Chinese sharp power victory so far. And it seems like Beijing wish to repeat it with Taiwan. The United Front is working hard to

developed economic ties with Taiwanese businesses. When the time comes, China could then use similar strategy as with South Korea. But Taiwanese government is well aware of such weakness and is trying to combat stronger economic dependence of China by concluding trade agreements with their neighbours (New Southbound Policy).<sup>170</sup> In New Zealand case, Chinese economic coercion takes another form. In New Zealand, United Front is targeting individuals with bribes, investments and special funds. This is unlike the broad economic coercion in South Korean case. But the end result is similar, New Zealand's politicians are playing ball with China.

There is similarity in the geographical importance of all countries. Ryukyu island chain in Japan and Taiwanese islands in East China Sea are blocking Chinese access to Pacific Ocean, while New Zealand own several islands in Pacific Ocean that could be very useful for Chinese military. Broader access to vast Pacific is one of the main goals of PLA, thus is not a surprise that Chinese sharp power is focusing on this area. Another important factor turned out to be the U.S. alliance, designed to contain China. In South Korea, Okinawa and New Zealand, China is trying to erode the U.S. partnership. This can be contributed to the superpower competition between U.S. and China.

Lastly, overseas Chinese communities. Both in Japan and South Korea, there is not massive Chinese diaspora. Both countries have homogeneous population, therefore China cannot exploit the multiculturalism like it does in the Western countries. Taiwan is special case, as an overseas Chinese we can count only people who emigrated from People's Republic of China, but most of them emigrated thanks to marriage with a Taiwanese person. Case of New Zealand is a perfect example of how China is exploiting Western multiculturalism. United Front created many organizations in New Zealand to serve as a front of Chinese influence operations in the Chinese community. The most influential members of the community were then recruited or bribed to spread Chinese propaganda. Chinese students organized protests at university campuses against "anti-China" events. And many ethnic Chinese people entered politics thanks to their connections with Chinese government, the case of Yang Jian should be a cautionary tale.

---

<sup>170</sup> Humphrey Hawksley. "Taiwan's New Southbound Policy is decreasing its reliance on China." *Nikkei Asia Review*, October 4, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Taiwan-s-New-Southbound-Policy-is-decreasing-its-reliance-on-China>. Accessed 19 May 2020.



## 8. Conclusion

In 21<sup>st</sup> century, we can observe a wave of democracy relapsing around the world in places like Venezuela, Turkey and even to some extent the United States during the Trump administration. But unlike the events in the past, these don't start violently due to a crisis or external pressure, but rather, driven by the fierce political competition and continuous attacks of democratic institutions, internal erosion gradually takes place.<sup>171</sup> Given this trend, the sharp power ability to mislead and sow alternative narratives are especially daunting.

Xi Jinping has become very active in the cultural confrontation and has surpassed any efforts made by his predecessor, greatly enhancing Chinese image. His predecessor, Hu Jintao mainly maintained Deng Xiaoping's "low-key" approach, demonstrating his determination to fight for a "harmonious world". Xi Jinping, on the contrary, demonized the value diplomacy of Western powers while declaring that the "Chinese Dream" is the road to national rejuvenation against the liberal international order.

China focuses on long-term goals and include wide range of participants. China's influence operations tend to be subtle and methodical, with a long timeframe, and focus on steadily developing relationships that can be exploited later to achieve clear strategic goals. Unlike well-known forms of public diplomacy, influence operations occur in secret, for corrupt or coercive measures. Influence operations happened before, during the Cold War era, but the tools to realize them have expanded exponentially in the last decade, and China have used them in unprecedented ways. The bulk of momentum for sharp power comes from the work of the United Front, which is not limited to one specialized organization. United Front has a far-reaching agenda in a variety of activities for their agents, officials from all walks of life, and a wide range of sympathetic personnel.

In order to fight against the Chinese influence operations, political leaders need to cooperate with other democratic governments and invite civil society to participate in the fight against the Chinese sharp power. As we can see in the case of Okinawa, the U.S. alliance has become main target of Chinese sharp power. As China strives for regional

---

<sup>171</sup> Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. *How Democracies Die*. New York: Crown Publishing, 2018.

hegemony, the U.S. alliance has become a shield against China's revisionism in the region. All members need to stay alert to the Chinese government's attempts to influence the discourse of the alliance. So far, people of Okinawa don't seem to be influenced by Chinese sharp power.

In case of South Korea, we observe that in cases of economic coercion, China tends to adopt informal sanctions, which are violating the World Trade Organization standards. But, when South Korea turned to the WTO for sanctions related to THAAD, China denied any sanction and South Korea didn't had any success. The economic importance of the Chinese market to other economies is an important contributor to China's influence and coercive power. In the THAAD dispute, China won, South Korean government made significant concessions that weaken the U.S. alliance in the region. Therefore, all democratic countries should promote economic integration and interdependence between each other to help reduce the extent to which these countries rely on Chinese market.

A whole-society approach of the sharp power by the United Front involving all aspects of society, can be seen in Taiwan. In Taiwan's case, we see tactics, technology, tools, techniques and procedures used by Chinese influence operations targeting whole society in order to disseminate their propaganda to change the minds of Taiwanese people that would eventually lead to peaceful "reunification". Democratic governments should be aware of Chinese secretive meddling in the domestic affairs and focus more on protecting democratic system, instead of promoting regime change in authoritarian countries. Taiwanese government is well conscious of Chinese sharp power, Chinese threat is on everyone's mind, which is why China wasn't successful in Taiwan.

New Zealand is a case of traditional multicultural Western country with sizeable Chinese community. Therefore, New Zealand has a chance of becoming a model relationship between a Western countries and China. But so far, New Zealand is more an example of Chinese interference in the highest levels of politics. New Zealand's government needs to face the challenges of Chinese sharp power and investigate the extent and impact of Chinese influence activities on its democratic institutions. New Zealand should find a way to better manage its economic and political relations with China.

In the end, the score of successful Chinese sharp power in my cases is a draw of 2:2. Given that China's goals are more long-term, I should repeat this study in year 2049, when China should reach the national rejuvenation. We can only expect that Chinese sharp power will become even stronger in the future and whole democratic world should be combating China's influence operations.

## Summary

Today's Chinese foreign policy transformed under the leadership of president Xi Jinping. In this new era, China's role on the global stage is to promote its own ideas, norms and approaches to governance that are favourable to China. But China is not using traditional soft power. This has created need for a fresh new way of thinking about China and the term "Sharp Power" was created. Sharp power is an approach to international affairs that involves efforts at censorship and the use of manipulation to lower the integrity of independent institutions. Influence operations occur in secret, for corrupt or coercive measures. Sharp power has the effect of limiting free expression and distorting the political environment. The bulk of momentum for sharp power comes from the work of the United Front, which is not limited to one specialized organization.

In my thesis I focus on areas where sharp power is mostly used, analyse the usage of sharp power and determine how factors like history, culture, economic coercion, geographical significance and size of overseas Chinese community affect Chinese influence operations strategy. In my assumption, China differentiate the specific conditions of individual countries and exerts its sharp power accordingly. At the end, I measure how China was successful in their short-term and long-term goals.

In Okinawa, the U.S. alliance has become main target of Chinese sharp power. So far, people of Okinawa don't seem to be influenced by Chinese sharp power. In case of South Korea, we observe that the economic importance of the Chinese market is an important contributor to China's influence and coercive power. In the THAAD dispute, China won, South Korean government made significant concessions that weaken the U.S. alliance in the region. In Taiwan's case, we see tactics, technology, tools, techniques and procedures used by Chinese influence operations targeting whole society in order to disseminate their propaganda to change the minds of Taiwanese people that would eventually lead to peaceful "reunification". Taiwanese government is well conscious of Chinese sharp power, Chinese threat is on everyone's mind, which is why China wasn't successful in Taiwan. New Zealand is an example of Chinese interference in the highest levels of politics. New Zealand's government face a challenge of Chinese sharp power and needs to investigate the extent and impact of Chinese influence activities on its democratic institutions.

## List of References

Ankit Panda. *Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*. Washington D.C., 2018.

Public Security Intelligence Agency. *Annual report 2016*. Tokyo: PSIA, 2017.

Sukhee Han. *Resetting the South Korea–China Relationship: The THAAD Controversies and Their Aftermath*. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. 31, no. 4. December 2019.

Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova. *China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and its Implications*. Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017.

Michael D. Swaine. *Chinese Views on South Korea's Deployment of THAAD*. *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 52. Winter 2017.

Kim Tae-hwan. *China's Sharp Power and South Korea's Peace Initiative*. *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies*, vol. 30. 2019.

John Fitzgerald. *Just a Dash? China's Sharp Power and Australia's Value Diplomacy*. *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies*, vol. 30. 2019.

Gilbert Rozman. *Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?* *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies*, vol. 30. 2019.

Russell Hsiao. *Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*. Washington D.C., 2018.

Jonas Parello-Plesner and Belinda Li. *The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations: How the U.S. and Other Democracies Should Respond*. Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2018.

Anne-Marie Brady. *Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping*. Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 2018.

Graeme Read. *Sharp Power, Youth Power, And The New Politics In Taiwan*. Canberra: ANU Press, 2019.

June Teufel Dreyer. *Roundtable on Sharp Power, Soft Power, and the Challenge of Democracy*. *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, vol. 25, no. 2. October 2018.

Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson. *Power in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Canberra: ANU Press, 2019.

Neil Renwick. *China as a Development Actor in Southeast Asia*. Brighton : Institute of Development Studies, 2016.

Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar. *Dual-Track Neighbourhood Policy: Solidifying China's Leadership in Asia*. Warsaw: PISM, 2015.

David Shambaugh. China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order. *International Security*. 2005. Vol. 29, no. 3p. 64–99.

Martina Bassan, Antoine Bondaz, François Godement, Marc Julienne and Agatha Kratz. *CHINA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY*. London: Asia Centre/The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2014.

Joshua Kurlantzick. *China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

Tony Tai-Ting Liu and Tsai Tung-Chieh. Swords into ploughshares? China's Soft Power strategy in Southeast Asia and its challenges. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*. 2014. Vol. 57, p. 28–48.

Robert Ayson. *The Economics-Security Nexus Under Trump and Xi: Policy Implications for Asia-Pacific Countries*. Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2017. *Hearing on China's Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners in Europe and The Asia Pacific*. Washington D.C.: United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018.

Anke Berndzen. The “Asia-Pacific Dream”: Is China Using Economic Integration Initiatives as Ideological Weapons? – On The Link Between Free Trade Agreements, Soft Power and “Universal Values.” *Journal of China and International Relations*. 2017. Vol. 5, no. 1p. 1–34.

Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. *From 'Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power': Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World*. Washington D.C. : National Endowment for Democracy, 2017.

Cédric Alviani. *China's Pursuit of a New World Media Order*. Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2019.

*Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019*. Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019.

Christopher Walker. *China's Foreign Influence and Sharp Power Strategy to Shape and Influence Democratic Institutions*. Washington D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy, 2019.

The Hoover Institution. *Chinese Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance*. California: Stanford University, 2018.

Min Ye. *China–South Korea Relations in the New Era: Challenges and Opportunities*. Washington D.C.: Lexington Books, 2017.

James Paradise. *Sanction Effectiveness in the China-South Korea THAAD Dispute*. Washington D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

Phoebe Li, *A Virtual Chinatown: The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

H. R. McMaster, Michael Pillsbury, Kishore Mahbubani, Huiyao Wang. *China and the West: The Munk Debates*. Toronto: House of Anansi Press Incorporated, 2019.

Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

John A. Agnew. *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Jozef Batora. *Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada*. Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy 97, The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2005.

Jan Melissen. *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Gyorgy Szondi. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Difference*. Clingendael Institute 2008.

Peter Van Ham. *The Rise of the Brand State - The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation*. Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001.

Gyorgy Szondi. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Difference*. Clingendael Institute 2008.

Hillary Clinton. *Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development*. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010.

Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. *From 'Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power': Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World*. National Endowment for Democracy, 2017.

Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig. *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence*. National Endowment for Democracy, 2017.

Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao. *Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics*. Project 2049 Institute, 2013.

*Intelligence Services, part 1: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics*. Stratfor Global Intelligence, March 2010.

James Jiann Hua To. *Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese*. Leiden: BRILL, 2014.

Joseph Nye. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

William A. Callahan, *Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or A New Hegemony?* International Studies Review, No. 10, 2008.

Peter Mattis. *An American Lens on China's Interference and Influence-Building Abroad*. The Asan Forum 6, no. 3, 2018.

Feng Zhongping, Huang Ping. *China's strategic partnership diplomacy: engaging with a changing world*. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, June 2014.

Nadège Rolland. *China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017.

Jessica Chen Weiss. *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Public Security Intelligence Agency. *Annual report 2016*. Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations, 2017.



Yew Meng Lai. *Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan 's Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Peng Lam. *Japan 's Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Anders Corr. *Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018.

Sukhee Han. *South Korea 's Tough Stance towards the North: Why It Has to Continue*. *New Asia*, issue 18, no. 2, 2011.

Jae Cheol Kim. *ROK–China Relations at 25. Current Issues and Policies*, September 2017.

Hyundai Economic Research Institute (HERI). *한국경제의중국의존도현황과시사점 Review of Korea 's Dependence on Chinese Economy and Its Implications*. *Weekly Review*, 2014.

Ellen Kim and Victor Cha. *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea 's Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States*. *Asia Policy*, 21, 2016.

Kim Jiyeon, John J. Lee and Kang Chungku. *Changing Tides: THAAD and Shifting Korean Public Opinion toward the United States and China*. Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2017.

Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova. *China 's Response to U.S.–South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications*. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission: Staff Research Report, July 26, 2017.

Kim Jiyeon, John J. Lee and Kang Chungku. *Changing Tides: THAAD and Shifting Korean Public Opinion toward the United States and China*. Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2017.

Ellen Kim. *Common Misconceptions about the China–South Korea Relationship*. *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* 1, no. 1, 2014

Jae Ho Chung and Jiyeon Kim. *Is South Korea in China 's Orbit? Assessing Seoul 's Perceptions and Policies*. *Asia Policy* 21, 2016. p. 123.

Christopher S. Chivvis. *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare"*. RAND Corporation, 2017.

Douglas Cantwell. *Hybrid Warfare: Aggression and Coercion in the Gray Zone*. ASIL insights, vol. 21, issue 14.

Jenn-Shing Liou. *Seriously Facing the Promulgation of CPC United Front Guidelines*. Prospect & Exploration, vol. 13, issue 11, 2015.

Russell Hsiao. *Taiwan's Role in the Global Non-Proliferation Architecture*. Global Taiwan Brief, 2016 vol. 1, issue 8.

Russell Hsiao. *Political Warfare Alert: Fifth "Linking Fates" Cultural Festival of Cross-Strait Generals*. Global Taiwan Brief, vol. 2, issue 2.

New Zealand China Council. *BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE A Strategic Pathway*. 2018.

Phoebe H. Li. *A Virtual Chinatown: The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Anne-Marie Brady. *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.

Anne-Marie Brady. *Making the Foreign Serve China*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Anne-Marie Brady. *China as a Polar Great Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Australia-China Relations Institute. *New Zealand's China Policy: Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership*. Wellington: University of Wellington, 2015.

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. *How Democracies Die*. New York: Crown Publishing, 2018.

### **Online references:**

George Gao. "Why Is China So ... Uncool?" Foreign Policy, March 8, 2017. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/why-is-china-so-uncool-soft-power-beijing-censorship-generation-gap/>. Accessed 10 December 2019.

Joseph Nye Jr., "How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence." Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>. Accessed 4 September 2019

David Shambaugh. "China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect." *Foreign Affairs*, June 16, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-softpower-push>. Accessed 4 September 2019.

Zhou Xin. "It's the mysterious department behind China's growing influence across the globe. And it's getting bigger." *South China Morning Post*, March 21, 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138196/its-mysterious-department-behind-chinas-growing>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

Zhang Bin. "邓小平“独特机遇论”在新时期中国侨务发展战略中的继承与发扬." Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, 2014. <http://qwgzjy.gqb.gov.cn/yjyt/177/2449.shtml>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

Anne-Marie Brady. "China's Foreign Propaganda Machine." Johns Hopkins University Press, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 26, Number 4, October 2015. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/595922>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

Hu Jintao. "Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress." Xinhua News Agency, October 25, 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

Joseph Nye. "What China and Russia don't get about Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2013. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-getabout-soft-power/>. Accessed 4 September 2019.

Hu Jintao. "Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress". Xinhua News Agency, October 25, 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

Jin Kai. "The Chinese Communist Party's Confucian Revival." *The Diplomat*, September 30, 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-chinese-communist-partys-confucian-revival/>. Accessed 9 February 2020.

"How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China's Current Political Climate?" *ChinaFile*, November 8, 2013. <https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

"Xi urges all Chinese to contribute to national rejuvenation." *ChinaNews*, February 17, 2017. [http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-02/17/content\\_40309410.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-02/17/content_40309410.htm). Accessed 9 February 2020.

Chris Buckley. "Tycoon's Claims Reverberate in China Despite Censorship and Thin Evidence." *The New York Times*, June 27, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/asia/guo-wengui-china-corruption-xi-jinping.html>. Accessed 9 February 2020.

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. "CPC's united front and international relations." October 23, 2017. <http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1566519/1566519.htm>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

Simon Denyer. "Xi Jinping at China congress calls on party to tighten its grip on the country." *The Washington Post*, October 18, 2017.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/confidence-control-paranoia-mark-xi-jinpings-speech-at-china-party-congress/2017/10/18/6e618694-b373-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/confidence-control-paranoia-mark-xi-jinpings-speech-at-china-party-congress/2017/10/18/6e618694-b373-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html). Accessed 21 May 2020.

"Xi Jinping has more clout than Donald Trump. The world should be wary." *The Economist*, October 14, 2017. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/14/xi-jinping-has-more-clout-than-donald-trump-the-world-should-be-wary>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

CCTV. "牢记职责使命 创新构建现代传播体系——新闻舆论战线贯彻落实习近平总书记 2·19 讲话一周年." February 19, 2017. <http://news.cctv.com/2017/02/19/ARTINW0o9KU0T6pVPKfV6ODv170219.shtml>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

Sarah Cook. "Beijing's Global Megaphone." Freedom House, 2020. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

Jenny Lah. "The changing role of think tanks in China, Think Tanks Initiative." November 14, 2018. <http://www.thinktankinitiative.org/blog/changing-role-think-tanks-china>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin. "Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign." *The Guardian*, December 7, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

Nadège Rolland. "Mapping the footprint of Belt and Road influence operations." Sinopsis, August 8, 2019. <https://sinopsis.cz/en/rolland-bri-influence-operations/>. Accessed 21 May 2020.

Tay Hwee Peng. "19th Party Congress: 7 key themes from President Xi Jinping's work report." *The Strait Times*, October 26, 2017. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/19th-party-congress-7-key-themes-from-president-xi-jinpings-work-report>. Accessed 8 February 2020.

“China’s Military Strategy (full text).” The Information Office of the State Council, May 27, 2015.

[http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2015/05/27/content\\_281475115610833.htm](http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm). Accessed 21 May 2020.

Ankit Panda. “The Future of the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture, as Seen by China.” *The Diplomat*, January 17, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-future-of-the-asia-pacific-security-architecture-as-seen-by-china/>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

“China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, January 11, 2017.

[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1429771.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml). Accessed 15 February 2020.

Tom Phillips. “Beijing rejects tribunal's ruling in South China Sea case.” *The Guardian*, July 12, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Isabel Reynolds. “Japan Sees Chinese Groups Backing Okinawa Independence Activists.” *Bloomberg*, December 26, 2016. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-26/japan-sees-chinese-groups-backing-okinawa-independence-activists>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Kathrin Hille and Mure Dickie. “Chinese nationalists eye Okinawa.” *Financial Times*, July 23, 2012. <https://www.ft.com/content/9692e93a-d3b5-11e1-b554-00144feabdc0>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Julian Ryall. “Japan Angered by China’s Claim to All of Okinawa.” *Deutsche Welle*, October 5, 2013. <http://www.dw.com/en/japan-angered-by-chinas-claim-to-all-of-okinawa/a-16803117>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Travis J. Tritten and Chiyomi Sumida. “Protests on Okinawa Aren’t Always What They Appear to Be.” *Stars and Stripes*, May 23, 2013. <http://www.stripes.com/news/protests-on-okinawa-aren-t-always-what-they-appear-to-be-1.222240>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

“Japan.” International IDEA Political Campaign Finance Database.

<https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/155/55>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

Shannon Tiezzi. “Tokyo Governor Yoichi Masuzoe Visits Beijing.” *The Diplomat*, April 26, 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/tokyo-governor-yoichi-masuzoe-visits-beijing/>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

“日本に復帰してよかった？ 沖縄 82%が肯定、若い世代ほど高く 県民意識調査 .” Okinawa Times, May 15, 2017. <https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/97097>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

Keith Bradsher. “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan.” The New York Times, September 22, 2010. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Amy King and Shiro Armstrong. “Did China Really Ban Rare Earth Metals Exports to Japan?” East Asia Forum, August 18, 2013. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/18/did-china-really-ban-rare-earth-metals-exports-to-japan/>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

Yuko Inoue. “China lifts rare earth export ban to Japan.” Reuters, September 29, 2010. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-export-idUSTRE68S0BT20100929>. Accessed 16 February 2020.

Ankit Panda. “Chinese Defense Ministry to Japan: ‘Get Used To’ PLAAF Operations Through the Miyako Strait.” The Diplomat, July 17, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/chinese-defense-ministry-to-japan-get-used-to-plaaf-operations-through-the-miyako-strait>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Kuchikomi. “Okinawa’s Off-Base Housing May Suffer Infestation of Chinese Bugs.” Japan Today, March 8, 2013. <http://www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/okinawas-off-base-housing-may-suffer-infestation-of-chinese-bugs>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Jane Perlez. “*Calls Grow in China to Press Claim for Okinawa.*” The New York Times, June 13, 2013. <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia/sentiment-builds-in-china-to-press-claim-for-okinawa.html>. Accessed 15 February 2020.

Yaechan Lee. “Japan’s North Korean Diaspora.” The Diplomat, January 05, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japans-north-korean-diaspora/>. Accessed 19 May 2020.

Ministry of Justice. “平成 30 年 6 月末現在における在留外国人数について.” [http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04\\_00076.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00076.html). Accessed 19 May 2020.

“Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets with Delegation of National Assembly Members of the Minjoo Party of the ROK.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, January 4, 2017. [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1428662.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1428662.shtml). Accessed 1 March 2020.

“Minjoo Party Split over THAAD Deployment.” Yonhap News Agency, July 12, 2016. <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/07/12/0200000000AEN20160712008651315.html>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China. “外交部声明 Foreign Ministry Statement.” July 8, 2016. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170514221019/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1378537.shtml>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Shannon Tiezzi. “South Korea’s President and China’s Military Parade: Park’s Talk with Xi Focused on North Korea, But Historical Issues Played a Major Role as Well.” *The Diplomat*, September 3, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-koreas-president-and-chinasmilitary-parade/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

“South Korea to Antagonize China with THAAD,” *Global Times*, January 7, 2017. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1027538.shtml>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Kenneth Tan. “Chinese Primary School Students Are Being Brainwashed into Boycotting South Korean Snacks.” *Shanghaiist*, March 13, 2017. [http://shanghaiist.com/2017/03/13/chinese\\_children\\_boycott\\_lotte/](http://shanghaiist.com/2017/03/13/chinese_children_boycott_lotte/). Accessed 1 March 2020.

“What Did China Export to South Korea in 2016?” *The Atlas of Economic Complexity* by HarvardCID. <http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/?country=43&partner=121&product=undefined&productClass=HS&startYear=undefined&target=Partner&year=2016>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

David Volodzko. “China Wins Its War against THAAD without Firing a Shot.” *South China Morning Post*, November 18, 2017. <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Song Jung-a. “Seoul Missile Move Sparks Fears for Pop Culture Exports to China.” *Financial Times*, August 8, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/2fea068e-5d48-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Echo Huang and Josh Horwitz. “Online Videogames Are the Latest Casualty of China’s War against Korean Businesses.” *Quartz*, March 8, 2017. <https://qz.com/928459/online-video-games-are-the-latest-casualty-of-chinas-retaliation-against-korean-businesses-for-thaad-antimissile-defense-system/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Park Hyong-ki. "China Ups THAAD Retaliation against Korean Products." *Korea Times*, January 20, 2017.

[https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2017/01/488\\_222465.html](https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2017/01/488_222465.html). Accessed 1 March 2020.

Emily Rauhala. "China's anger over U.S. antimissile system poses challenge to Trump." *Washington Post*, March 8, 2017. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/china-warns-of-consequences-over-deployment-of-us-anti-missile-system/2017/03/07/dd5ca494-0319-11e7-a391-651727e77fc0\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-warns-of-consequences-over-deployment-of-us-anti-missile-system/2017/03/07/dd5ca494-0319-11e7-a391-651727e77fc0_story.html). Accessed 1 March 2020.

Yonhap. "South Korea's Food Exports to China Slide in March over THAAD Row." April 4, 2017.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20170404004600320>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Song Jung-a. "South Korean Carmakers Feel Impact of China Anti-THAAD Sentiment." *Financial Times*, April 4, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/ab64d6f0-18fe-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Min-hee Jung. "Lotte Faces 500 Billion Won Losses in China over THAAD Retaliation." *Business Korea*, May 8, 2017.

<http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=18007>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Byong-su Park. "South Korea's "Three No's" Announcement Key to Restoring Relations with China." *Hankyoreh*,

[http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/817213.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817213.html). Accessed 1 March 2020.

Jeffrey Lewis. "KN-11 and THAAD." *ArmsControlWonk*, August 28, 2016.

<https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201857/kn-11-and-thaad/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

David Josef Volodzko. "China wins its war against South Korea's US THAAD missile shield – without firing a shot." *South China Morning Post*, November 17, 2017.

<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Kristian McGuire. "China-South Korea Relations: A Delicate Détente." *The Diplomat*, February 27, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/china-south-korea-relations-a-delicate-detente/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.



Jane Perlez. "South Korea's Leader, Meeting Xi Jinping, Seeks 'New Start' With China." *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/world/asia/china-south-korea-xi-jinping.html>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Kentaro Iwamoto. "Chinese tourists return to South Korea as relations warm." *NIKKEI Asian Review*, July 24, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Chinese-tourists-return-to-South-Korea-as-relations-warm>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

"South Korea's Lotte Group to Sell Some China Stores after Missile Row." *The Straits Times*, April 26, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-lotte-group-to-sell-some-china-stores-after-missile-row>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Lauren Teixeira. "K-Pop's Big China Problem." *Foreign Policy*, July 30, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/30/k-pops-big-china-problem/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Ankit Panda. "All's Well THAAD Ends Well? What the China-South Korea Détente Means." *The Diplomat*, November 1, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/all-well-thaad-ends-well-what-the-china-south-korea-detente-means/>. Accessed 1 March 2020.

Li Bin. "The Security Dilemma and THAAD Deployment in the ROK." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/08/03/security-dilemma-and-thaad-deployment-in-rok-pub-64279>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Fan Gaoyue. "ROK: the Biggest Loser of THAAD." *China-US Focus*, August 9, 2016. <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/rok-the-biggest-loser-of-thaad>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Zhang Han. "吴日强：韩国部署萨德导弹可能引发连锁反应." *US China Press*, July 18, 2016. <http://www.uschinapress.com/2016/0718/1071874.shtml>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Yang Xiyu. "因为“萨德”，中国应如何“报复”韩国." *Global Times*, August 1, 2016. <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-08/9246419.html>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Zhong Sheng. "美韩不要在半岛问题上失去现实感." *People's Daily*, October 1, 2016. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/pinglun/n1/2016/1001/c78779-28754634.html>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Zhong Sheng. "US, ROK will pay price if persisting in THAAD deployment." *People's Daily*, October 8, 2016. <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1008/c90000-9123945.html>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Ankit Panda. "THAAD and China's Nuclear Second-Strike Capability." *The Diplomat*, March 8, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/thead-and-chinas-nuclear-second-strike-capability/>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Li Bin. "The Security Dilemma and THAAD Deployment in the ROK." *Kyunghyang Daily*, August 03, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/08/03/security-dilemma-and-thead-deployment-in-rok-pub-64279>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Kyong-ae Choi. "U.S. to Conduct Interception Test against Musudan-Type Missiles next Year: MDA Chief." *Yonhap News Agency*, August 11, 2016, [http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents\\_en.jsp?cid=AEN20160811008051315](http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20160811008051315). Accessed 7 March 2020.

"US Offers to Brief China on over Deployment of THAAD Missile System in South Korea." *South China Morning Post*, March 30, 2016. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1931667/us-offers-brief-china-over-deployment-thead-missile>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Andrea Shalal. "U.S. hopes for talks with China about possible THAAD move to South Korea." *Reuters*, March 22, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-missiledefense-china-idUSKCN0WO2P2>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Shannon Tiezzi. "North Korea Nuclear Test Reveals the Limits of China–South Korea Cooperation." *The Diplomat*, January 14, 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/north-koreanuclear-test-reveals-the-limits-of-china-south-korea-cooperation/>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

Ministry of Defense of PRC. "国防部例行记者会文字实录 News Conference Record of Chinese Ministry of Defense." June 2018, [http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2018-06/28/content\\_4818001\\_6.html](http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2018-06/28/content_4818001_6.html). Accessed 7 March 2020.

Mark Tokola. "Why Is China So Upset about THAAD?" *Korean Economic Institute*. <http://keia.org/why-china-soupset-about-thead>. Accessed 7 March 2020.

David Lee. "Victimised for being Chinese: the hard lives of South Korea's Joseon-jok community." *South China Morning Post*, May 10, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/3009651/hard-lives-south-koreas-chinese-joseon-jok-community-who-face>. Accessed 20 May 2020.

Michael Cole. "China Intensifies Disinformation Campaign Against Taiwan." *Taiwan Sentinel*, January 19, 2017. <https://sentinel.tw/china-disinformation-tw/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

“A policy of "one country, two systems" on Taiwan.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.  
[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/ziliao\\_665539/3602\\_665543/3604\\_665547/t18027.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18027.shtml). Accessed 22 March 2020.

Rush Doshi. “Xi Jinping just made it clear where China's foreign policy is headed.” The Washington Post, October 25, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/xi-jinping-just-made-it-clear-where-chinas-foreign-policy-is-headed/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Richard C. Bush. “What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress, Brookings.” October 19, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

“中国共产党统一战线工作条例.” CPC News, September 27, 2015.  
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0923/c64107-27622040.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Chris Horton. “Taiwan Suspects Pro-China Party of Passing Information to Beijing.” The New York Times, December 20, 2017.  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/asia/taiwan-china-new-party.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Edward Cody. “Nationalists Return to Chinese Mainland.” The Washington Post, April 27, 2005. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042600406.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Zhang Xiaojing. “第九屆“中山黃埔兩岸情”論壇在滬舉行，中国台湾网.” July 18, 2019.  
[http://big5.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201907/t20190718\\_12184839.htm](http://big5.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201907/t20190718_12184839.htm). Accessed 22 March 2020.

Mu Xuequan. “More than 10,000 people from Taiwan to attend Straits Forum.” Xinhua News Agency, June 15, 2019. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/15/c\\_138144358.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/15/c_138144358.htm). Accessed 22 March 2020.

Simon Denyer. “Taiwan battles a brain drain as China aims to woo young talent.” The Washington Post, April 15, 2018.  
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html). Accessed 22 March 2020.

Jess Macy Yu. “China tries to charm tech-savvy Taiwanese youth as political ties fray.” Reuters, February 7, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-youth/china->

tries-to-charm-tech-savvy-taiwanese-youth-as-political-ties-fray-idUSKBN1FR0LB. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Ralph Jennings. China Offers Special Breaks to Attract Taiwanese Startups, But Only 1% Find Success. *Forbes*, March 26, 2019.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2019/03/26/china-offers-special-breaks-to-attract-taiwanese-startups-but-only-1-find-success/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Lu Xiufang. “中共矮化台灣，又黑勢力入侵，一中架構下的憲法害人不淺。” *Yahoo News*, September 11, 2018. <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/匯流筆陣-中共矮化台灣-又黑勢力入侵-一中架構下的憲法害人不淺-070245704.html>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Richard C. Bush. “Facing Mainland China: Taiwan’s Future Challenges.” *Brookings*, April 10, 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/facing-mainland-china-taiwans-future-challenges/>. Accessed 22 March 2020.

Edward White. “Alarm in Taiwan over triad ties to pro-China groups.” *Financial Times*, October 12, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/b09de5d0-aa76-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

Russell Hsiao. “Cross-Strait Aviation and Beijing’s Hybrid Warfare.” *Taiwan Insight*, 21 February 2018. <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/02/21/the-politics-of-cross-strait-aviation-and-beijings-hybrid-warfare/>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

George Liao. “Amendment bill allowing National Security Act to cover online spies passed in Taiwan’s legislature.” *Taiwan News*, June 19, 2019. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3727612>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

James Kynge, Lucy Hornby, Jamil Anderlini. “Inside China’s secret ‘magic weapon’ for worldwide influence.” *Financial Times*, October 26, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4>. Accessed 23 March 2020.

“新西兰华人议员杨健：“做好每一件事，机会就来找你”，中工网。” August 29, 2013. <http://character.worker.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

“Where did New Zealand export to in 2017?” *The Atlas of Economic Complexity* by HarvardCID, <https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore?country=166&product=undefined&year=2017&productClass=HS&target=Partner&partner=undefined&startYear=undefined>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

John Key. “Joint Statement between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.”

<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-between-new-zealand-and-people%E2%80%99s-republic-china-establishment-comprehensive>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Audrey Young. “Coleman on 'rebalancing' visit to China.” NZ Herald, November 28, 2013. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11163835](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11163835). Accessed 7 April 2020.

New Zealand China Council. “About the Council.” <https://nzchinacouncil.org.nz/about-the-council/>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Tian Shaohui. “China deepens ties with B&R countries with fruitful achievements, promising prospects, Xinhua.” April 26, 2017. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/26/c\\_136237559.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/26/c_136237559.htm). Accessed 7 April 2020.

China Daily. “Road starts here - New Zealand to catch the 'Belt and Road' train.” March 28, 2017. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/28/content\\_28711006.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/28/content_28711006.htm). Accessed 7 April 2020.

“China is spending billions on its foreign-language media.” The Economist, June 14, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/china/2018/06/14/china-is-spending-billions-on-its-foreign-language-media>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin. “Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign.” The Guardian, December 7, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Skykiwi. “牛清报总领事赴天维网调研 寄语继续传播正能量.” September 9, 2014. <http://politics.skykiwi.com/consulate/2014-09-15/185823.shtml>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Amie Tsang. “Caijing Journalist’s Shaming Signals China’s Growing Control Over News Media.” September 6, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/business/media/caijing-journalists-shaming-signals-chinas-growing-control-over-news-media.html>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

New Zealand China Council. “China’s Premier Li Keqiang meets with former New Zealand PM John Key in Beijing.” July 25, 2017. <https://nzchinacouncil.org.nz/2017/07/chinas-premier-li-keqiang-meets-with-former-new-zealand-pm-john-key-in-beijing/>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Ricardo Simich, Kirsty Wynn. "Sir John Key sells off Parnell mansion for \$20m." NZ Herald, September 9, 2017.  
[https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=3&objectid=11919697](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11919697).  
Accessed 7 April 2020.

New Zealand China Friendship Association. "Our Patrons."  
<http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/our-patrons/>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

"New Zealand Winston Churchill Fellowships Awarded 1966 – 2018."  
<https://www.communitymatters.govt.nz/assets/Winston-Churchill-Memorial-Trust-Fellowship-PDFs/WCMT-Fellowships-Awarded-1966-2017.pdf>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Edward White. "New Zealand aircraft maker guilty of breaching N Korea sanctions." Financial Times, October 22, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/adbd5c54-b261-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Tom Westbrook. "China's Huawei to spend \$300 million in New Zealand expansion." Reuters, March 21, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-huawei-tech-idUSKBN16S2NZ>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Fumi Matsumoto. "Huawei back in New Zealand's 5G plans despite security concerns." Nikkei Asian Review, November 20, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown/Huawei-back-in-New-Zealand-s-5G-plans-despite-security-concerns>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Claire Trevett, Li Yuanchao. "Why China wants Kiwi land, NZ Herald." October 25, 2017. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11534966](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11534966). Accessed 7 April 2020.

Gyles Beckford, Patrick O'Meara, Jane Patterson. "NZ at heart of Panama money-go-round, Radio New Zealand, May 9, 2016. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/panama-papers/303356/nz-at-heart-of-panama-money-go-round>. Accessed 7 April 2020.

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in New Zealand. "Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New Zealand Established." October 27, 2003.  
<http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t39207.htm>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Consulate-General of The People's Republic of China In Auckland. "新西兰华侨华人反对“占中”违法行为." October 7, 2014.  
<http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/lsqz/lingshiqianzheng/t1198220.htm>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Zhu Feng. “新西兰奥克兰中国学联举行第一届干部选举大会, 中新网.” March 30, 2013. <http://www.chinanews.com/lxsh/2012/03-30/3787099.shtml>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

“Dr X is in the house! Asian newcomers to local body elections.” Radio New Zealand, September 19, 2016.

<https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/voices/audio/201816606/dr-x-is-in-the-house!-asian-newcomers-to-local-body-elections>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Jamil Anderlini. “China-born New Zealand MP probed by spy agency.” Financial Times, September 13 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/64991ca6-9796-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Tom Phillips. “China-born New Zealand MP denies being a spy.” The Guardian, September 13, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/13/china-born-new-zealand-mp-yang-jian-denies-being-a-spy>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

“National MP taught English to Chinese spies.” NZ Herald, September 13, 2017. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11921843](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11921843). Accessed 8 April 2020.

Laura Walters. “Jian Yang in China for CCP military parade.” Newsroom, October 5, 2019. <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/10/02/838837/jian-yang-in-china-for-chinese-communist-party-celebrations>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Harrison Christian. “National MP Jian Yang organised Simon Bridges' controversial China trip, emails show.” Stuff, January 05, 2020.

<https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/118419927/national-mp-jian-yang-organised-simon-bridges-controversial-china-trip-emails-show>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

New Zealand Electoral Commission. “Party donations and loans by year.”

<https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/political-parties-in-new-zealand/party-donations-and-loans-by-year/>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Liam Hehir. “A step by step guide for compulsory anonymity in political donations.” The Spinoff, March 3, 2020. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/03-03-2020/a-step-by-step-guide-for-compulsory-anonymity-in-political-donations/>. Accessed 8 April 2020.

Michelle Ye. “Trump claims ‘Korea actually used to be a part of China’.” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2017. <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2089161/trump-claims-korea-actually-used-be-part-china-does-claim-stack>. Accessed 19 May 2020.

Humphrey Hawksley. "Taiwan's New Southbound Policy is decreasing its reliance on China." *Nikkei Asia Review*, October 4, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Taiwan-s-New-Southbound-Policy-is-decreasing-its-reliance-on-China>. Accessed 19 May 2020.