Univerzita Karlova

Filozofická fakulta

Ústav politologie

Bakalářská práce

Alžběta Jurčová

Religion and anti-immigration discourses: A comparative case study of the Czech republic and Germany

Praha 2019   Vedoucí práce: PhDr. Ondřej Slačálek, Ph.D

Prohlášení:

Prohlašuji, že jsem bakalářskou práci vypracovala samostatně, že jsem řádně citovala všechny použité prameny a literaturu a že práce nebyla využita v rámci jiného vysokoškolského studia či získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.

V Praze, dne 11. 7. 2019

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Jméno a příjmení

Poděkování

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Tímto bych chtěla poděkovat všem, kteří mi byli rádci při psaní této práce a to především panu doktoru Ondřeji Slačálkovi za jeho akademické vedení a připomínky, které práci bez pochyb vylepšily.

Abstrakt (česky):

Tato Bakalářská práce pojednává o roli náboženství ve veřejné sféře. Ve formě komparativní případové studie, práce bude analyzovat vztah mezi rolí náboženství (především různé formy křestanství) v politické kultuře české republiky a Německa a intenzitou různých forem Islamofobie ve veřejné debatě v obou zemích. Teoretická část vychází z Roger Brubakerova conceptu Christianismu a Jürgen Habermase pojetí náboženství ve veřejné sféře. V obou zemích autorka bude analyzovat debatu spojenou s kritikou vůči karikaturám Charlie Hebdo, které se rozpoutala po útocích na tento satiristický magazín v Paříží roce 2015. Bude tak postupovat analýzou několika vybraných německých a českých médií. V obou zemích, se práce bude soustředit na analýzu how určité odkazy na náboženství a určité argumentační stereotypy, které byly použity ve veřejné debatě a mohly potenciálně ovlivnit muslimský immigrační diskurz.

Abstract (in English):

This thesis deals with role of religion within public sphere, in both theoretical and practical terms. In form of a comparative case study, it will analyze the relationship between the role of religion (especially various forms of Christianity) in the political culture of the Czech Republic and Germany, and in the intensity and form of Islamophobia in public debate in the two countries. The theoretical framework will have as its basis Roger Brubaker´s concept of Christianism and Jürgen Habermas's idea of religion within public sphere. In both countries the author will analyse debate evolved around criticism of Charlie Hebdo's cartoons, emerged in the public discourse after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris in 2015, by analysing different media German and Czech outlets. In both countries she will analyse how references to religion and certain argumentative patterns have been used in the public debate and possibly how they influenced Muslim immigration discourse.

Klíčová slova (česky):

komparativní případová studie, kritická diskurzivní analýza, náboženství, imigrace, diskurz, sekularismus, Islám

Key words (in English):

comparative case study, critical discourse analysis, religion, immigration, discourse, secularism, Islam

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Introduction

In this thesis, I would like to explore the complex position of religion in our contemporary society and how it become a part of an discourse on muslim immigration. Religion is an increasingly important issue among the subjects the social sciences deal with, mainly due to its controversial position and power to influence social and political realms of our societies. This thesis's assumption is that the religious reasoning is hold rather a hostage within the public's anti-muslim and anti-immigration sentiment. And, therefore, this thesis research question asks: To what extent religion influences Muslim immigration discourse. Religious argumentation is increasingly used by right-wing populists as a political resource to manipulate with general standpoints of the public. By proceeding from theoretical framework of first part of this thesis – Habermas's notion on language and his idea of religion in secular modernity and Rogers Brubaker concept of *Christianism* and *civilizationism* – I will further trace the naturalization of religious-secular arguments within the mainstream public debate and to what extent they are present in muslim immigration discourse.

In order to answer my research question, I will evolve my analysis around the debate which took place after the Charlie Hebdo's attack in January 2015. The discourse on the debate, I believe, serves well as possible indicator of how the two socities approach muslim immigration via religious prisma. Further, I choose Germany and Czech republic, for their assumable very distinct positions concerning religion and immigration. I will be applying some of the analytical tools of Critical Discourse Analysis. The conclusion sumps up the findings and relates them firmly to the theoretical concepts discussed in first part of this thesis.

1.1 Jürgen Habermas's Language Philosophy

In this chapter I would like to introduce a key elements of Jurgen Habermas's notion of communication, together with basics of Critical Discourse Analysis. In the Habermas's famous publication *The Theory of Communicative Action*[1]*,* published in for the first time in Germany in 1981, Habermas has developed a mature philosophical positions, which later will be reviewed and even tested by many other scholars in attempt to determine if his social theory is actually capable of working in practice.[2] Needless to say, his concepts are one of the most complex and sophisticated to emerge in post-war period. He has broken a ceiling of classical Marxism and become one of the most prominent neo-Marxist thinkers and one of the leading figures of the so called Frankfurt School – a Marxist study group, eventually formed into The Institute for Social Research in 1923.[3]

For Habermas, the anticapitalistic critique as articulated by the Frankfurt school is an immanent part of rationalization of society. Critical theory – as the revision of Marxism – is stripping of the Marxism its economical determinism and historicism. The theory, as perceived by Habermas, has foremost the unifying potential for other social theories, because it does question the existing forms of scientific practice and redefying the society relationship to the ideals of Enlightenment. And it

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[1] Habermas, "The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I. & II.

[2] Alexander, 'Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems'.

[3] Eric Bronner, Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction.

does investigate the way in which alienation and reification impacted upon individuals in modern society. Critical theory's quest, therefore, lies in liberation of society from oppressive institutional arrangements. Its practitioners are concerned by the role of ideology and exploitation mechanism embedded within Western civilization. To achieve these theoretical and methodological ends, Habermas steps outside Marxism and attempts to create a new theoretical tradition. As he is confronting the modern society in the *Theory of Communicative Action*[4], he develops two-level critical social theory – a theory of normative rationality. He sought to confront the philosophical problems by questioning the free-floating subjectivity of resistance and insisted upon grounding critical rationality into a language. He did so by relying on language – or communicative action – in order to ground self-reflection and universality.[5] Yet, the topics he engages with are diverse, covering a wide range of philosophical and sociological issues and loaded with universally ethical claims on society.

Habermas is rightly regarded as one of the most appraised philosophers of the twentieth century, especially for the diligence he works with. And also, for the impressive account of the most prominent thinkers he deals with and employs their ideas into his writings, starting with Max Weber, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, G.W.F. Hegel or Talcott Parsons. In fact, Max Weber is a pivotal figure for the theory of communicative action, as well for critical theory. But of course, there is a reasonable skepticism towards Habermas work. Many scholars did introduce concepts disproving some of Habermas's most echoed ideas and some did so in very convincing way as Axel Honneth argued against his concept of public sphere or Chantal Mouffe's take on the theory of communicative action. For example, Chantal Mouffe argues that Habermas's concept of reasoning between citizens, the *ideal speech situation* is too hard to achieve and almost impossible to practice – mainly due to its inherently *ideal* character[6]. An objective raised by many other scholars. In similar manner, others argue that Habermas appears very ambitious at its cognitive demands on citizens. As well, he is criticized for his rejection of cultural theory, as he dismissed cultural traditions as irrelevant.[7] However, that would be a topic for another thesis itself. It seems appropriate, therefore, in thesis such as this one, to concentrate attention on his only most principal thoughts, relevant to my framework.

1.1.2 Habermas and Critical Discourse Theory

Growing up under Nazism, Habermas's concern with the manipulation of discourse lead him to his life-long interest in rational communication. The critical theory is supposed to serve as a general theory of society capable of critical self-reflections and by the desire for liberation.[8] There is an

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[4] Habermas, "The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I. & II.

[5] Alexander, 'Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems'.

[6] 'Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?'

[7] Alexander, 'Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems'.

[8] Eric Bronner, Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction.

emancipatory element, which takes the form of reflective relationship to the self within the power relationships that are in fact characteristic to social and political arrangements and are formed by language. Thus, ideologically motivated resistance is tightly linked to our cognitive practices and therefore can be systematically foster. And for Habermas, to construct a communicative system linked to social interactions is the center to his language philosophies.

The reflective character is immanent to the theory of communicative action and rests on the idea that the social actors are able to recognize the intersubjective validity of claims and its justification, it is the *"reflective form"* of communicative action. In Habermas's discourse theory, the discourses are functioning as means to clarify contentious validity claims. The key idea is, that within a one certain discourse the result of discussion is a claim valid for all the participants of the discourse. There are two decisive conditions concerning the participants: (1) nobody can be excluded from the discourse, and (2) everyone has the equal chance to contributing. Within the discourse, the general premise is to aim on *ideal speech situation* and eventually arrive at consensus. There is the contractionary character of Habermas's discursive theory, on one hand he insists on critical and emancipatory dimension of communicative action, but on the other hand articulates a highly inclusive and mediating purpose of the action. Discourses do not participate on creating a social norms, but they are used in the process of legitimization of the existing norms. The process of how and by whom are used can be traced by the critical discourse analysis – an increasingly used tool of applied linguistic – and a practice inspired by various discursive theories.[9] Naturally, distinct theoretical schools engaged in different ways with critical discourse analysis. The perspectives on the CDA[10] differ in epistemological anchorage of these schools. However, certain elements of CDA prevails, notably the analysis's critical dynamics.

The critical discursive analysis – as rather normative approach – is used mainly for its assumable ability to reveal power-relations within society. It does so by analyzing public discourses – a manifestation of social consciousness. CDA sees *language as social practice* and what more, considers the *context of language use* to be crucial. That means, that it does track the relationship between a discursive event and the situations, institutions and social structures. As Fairclough puts it *"the analysis of texts is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique"*[11]. There is an obvious link between practice such as CDA and other critical theories, as mentioned above, the critical dynamics determine the results. The fundamental criterion is that most of every *discourse* proposition remain implicit, thus must be inferred from the explicit propositions. It is the constructivist view, that the world is built out of our subjective experiences and understanding of reality. So, it is desirable to expose some of the interpretations and one's intention. Critical theories, in general, seek to create awareness in agents of their own interests, but as well eradicate a kind of delusion and evoke emancipation. And finally improve the communication. The practitioners of the discipline are tracing the latent type of everyday beliefs – a vital part of ruling ideology. The premise

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[9] Stahl, 'Whose Discourse? A Comparison of the Foucauldian and Habermasian Concepts of Discourse in Critical IS Research'.

[10] Critical discourse analysis will be abbreviated as CDA.

[11] Wodak and Meyer, Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.

is that established hegemonic identity narratives, controlling the access to public discourses. They do so foremost by analyzing linguistic manifestations, as they investigate the relation between social power and language. To sum up, Habermas puts it as following: *"language is also a medium of domination and social force"*[12].

Nevertheless, many researchers criticize the CDA's for its supposed biases. Especially when it comes to its critical standpoint. In general terms, CDA attempts to reveal the power structures within the society. On what grounds, one can decide about who is the perpetrator and who is a victim within the power-relation structures and presumably give warrants? It is expected, therefore, that one must theoretically justify its critique. For instance, van Dijk - a very profound scholar within the CDA movement — stated this in one of his works that: *"the anti-racist point of view [...] of this book need[s] no further justification"*[13]. It is the daring feature of the approach, that it states explicitly its progressive character. Hence, one of the key characteristics of CDA is that its normative and evaluative. And that the analysis itself is issue-oriented, aimed on problem-solving and has an ambition to give warrants and recommendations. Those universal ethical claims are based on various critical theories and hence using a various set of tools across different disciplines of social sciences.

The interdisciplinary is characteristic for the approach and is implemented in many ways. For instance, one of the research strategies of CDA a discursive-historical approach *(*DHA[14]*)* – besides its inherently linguistic character – focus on social cognition, that is how social structures determine the nature of a discourse. The discourse – according to discursive-historical approach definition – represents a *structured form of knowledge.* Discourses, therefore, are socially constituted, related to macro-topic and context-dependent. The approach focuses on exploring the internal or discourse-internal structures and unreaveling concrete discoursive strategies. I consider this approach fit to answer this thesis's research question. I will do so by analyzing and deconstructing an argumentative patterns and text contextuality. In general, the analytical process needs to be as transparent as possible. The lack of transparency is often viewed as considerable weakness of DHA.[15]What is important to clarify is that one must distinguish between discourse and text – text is naturally part of a discourse, but broader context is always needed. The interdiscursivity/intertextuality is usually analyzed, as it does determine the linkage between discourses and texts.[16] For instance, if certain features of debate were taken out of their original context and inserted into another, and during the process gained on new meaning. Ruth Wodak puts it as following: *"DHA considers intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts, genres*[17] *and discourses, as well as extra-linguistic social/sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution, and situational frames.*

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[12] De Linguística aplicada a la Comunicación, 'Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines'.

[13] Dijk, Racism and the Press, 1991.

[14] Discursive-Historical Approach will be abbreviated as DHA.

[15] Žagar, 'Topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis'

[16] Wodak, The Politics of Fear.

[17] genres may be defined as a socially ratifies way of using language in relation to distinct type of social activity

While focusing on all these relationships, we explore how discourses, genres and texts change in relation to sociopolitical change." [18] This approach was first developed in order to trace the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotyped image in press reporting during the Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim in 1986.[19]

Characteristic strategy of DHA derives from theory of argumentation and theory of *topos*. In general, *topos* can be defined *"as reservoirs of generalised key ideas from which specific statements or arguments can be generated".*[20]Ruth Wodak goes further by defying topos as conclusion rules which connect arguments with conclusions. Such as this each *topoi* can be traced within discourse and hence being useful in discovering stereotypes and patterns in argumentation. Further, these argumentation patterns might help us to understand a principal features of concrete public debates, as well unmask inter-relations between topics and arguments. Nevertheless, it could become difficult to trace and define individual *topos* along a way. Hence, Ruth Wodak offers a list of typical content-related argument schemes. Starting with (1) Usefulness, advantage, (2) Uselessness, disadvantage, (3) Definition, name-interpretation (4), Danger and threat, (5) Humanitarianism, (6) Justice, (7) Responsibility, (8) Burdening, weighting, (9) Finances, (10) Reality, (11) Numbers, (12) Law and right, (13) History, (14) Culture, and (15) Abuse.[21]Those topics can help us better structuralized reconstructing process of topoi.

In conclusion, I will engage only with basic tools of critical discourse analysis and with reconstructing *topos* within analyzed material according to Wodak's schema. However, there is obviously a vast range of possibilities and approaches of CDA in offer. Critical discourse analysis, I believe, is progressive and reflexive method and entails promising prospectives for further research.

1.1.1 The Theory of Communicative Action

The theory of communicative action serves as foundation to discursive-historical approach, also the theory is critical if one can understand Habermas's idea of religion within public sphere. The communicative action is a self-learning process within the matrix of social relations aiming on setting boundaries of rationalization within a society. Habermas develops the theory of communicative action, in order to use it as extension of his empirical analysis of immanent rationality. There are three premises deriving from the concept (1) that all action assumes communication; (2) that communication assumes some extra strategic understanding between the actors; (3) and that this understanding usually makes an inherent claim to rational justification.[22] Language, therefore, is understood as a vital source of rationality and sociality. The basic assumption

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[18] Wodak and Meyer, Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.

[19] Baker et al., 'A Useful Methodological Synergy?'

[20] Žagar, 'Topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis'

[21] Wodak and Meyer, Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.

[22] Alexander, 'Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems'.

of Habermas is that there are two types of argument, which one is more reasonable than the other. He sets those boundaries of what it appears to be a reasonable argument for creating a publicly govern mode of argumentation. The multi-dimensional dialog is than representing a vital part of conciliatory process within pluralistic and liberal society.

Naturally, this comes with assumable communicative capabilities. Language – as social action – has a universal core and there is a general communicative competence we submit to. As we are constantly making claims, though very often implicit, which are expressing certain feelings, intentions or values and are in its preposition valid as well reasonable. The principal question Habermas tackles is, whether we can set a general system of communication where we reach mutual understanding and eventually an agreement. Habermas insists that communication always involves understanding and that understanding points to rationality. A general and systematic communicative pattern serving as a template for social and ethical relationships, setting boundaries and creating norms – the *ideal speech act* situation, that is where everyone understand the common mode of rationality and it is self-motivated towards rational agreement. To put it differently, if action is oriented to understanding, it is motivated by the desire to create a consensual relation between the actor and his environment.

Yet, Habermas does not forget to shed a light on some of the obvious issues accompanying social interactions – what he is pleased to call a *strategic action* – that is an action not directed toward agreement with others and that uses agreement only for purpose of achieving one's own goals. He, therefore, constructs an ideal-typical dichotomy of *instrumental* versus *communicative action*. The division between the two lies in their orientation on subject – either the actors are oriented by strategic considerations, or by understanding.[23] Strategic action aims on influencing the others, hence the agent has a rational instrumental motive behind her or his actions, this type can also take a form of *constative or assertive speech acts*, actions such as conversating and arguing, where the motive is rather emotionally oriented. Thus, the action is purposive itself. He further works with another types of actions: the *norm-regulated action,* when the agent is not only oriented on his or her motive, but the action is regulated by a world of norms and values, which appears to be relevant to the agent. And a *dramaturgical action,* where the agent is not only concerned about pursuing the audience, but also about the authenticity of the performance. According to Habermas, the *norm-regulated*, *dramaturgical* and *constative action* are representing a three distinct validity claims: truthfulness, rightness and truth.[24] The communicative action encompasses all these claims. Therefore, that makes the language at its use rational. Rational, he claims, is the quality that makes action defendable against criticism and as well is an integral part of a structure of action oriented towards an agreement. And, therefore, rationality is a part of everyday communication. [25]

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[23] Alexander, 'Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems'.

[24] De Linguística aplicada a la Comunicación, 'Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines'.

[25] Habermas, "The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I. & II.

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that, the critical role of language is being more and more visible. We have seen how certain societal topics gaining on a new meaning by being reduced to symbolism and their semantics being shifted. The struggle over meaning is the new power struggle and thus searching for a communicative system appears to be a pressing philosophical question. What we can see at Habermas is his conviction that all social actions are inherently rational and such as this needs to be perceived. The quest is, therefore, to set a boudaries within the reason is to be used, meaning that rationalization can be and should be fostered, if we are suppose to arrive to consensus. There is the paradox of secularized society, seeing religious reasoning as irational, yet arguably using religion as an argumentative resource within debates especially the ones politicaly sensitive. I perceive, the attack on Charlie Hebdo satiristic magazine in 2015 in Paris as fitting example of a debate where symbolic played out as decisive. What more, the Charlie Hebdo's cartoons ignited debate on position of religion within a public sphere. And there is a strong indication of Charlie Hebdo discourse being chained with Muslim and immigration discourses in 2015. By proceeding with Critical Discourse Analysis, I will trace within the debate to what extent religious reasoning is present in those discourses.

1.2 Rogers Brubaker and Jürgen Habermas's contribution to the debate on role of religion in modern society

To conduct a substantial analysis of religion would be far beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, if I mean to tackle a contemporary religious discourse it is necessary to engage with theoretical concepts discussing the societal role of religion in contemporary Europe, drawing upon its identitarian capacity. Recent developments in European politics have led to a renewed interest in religion as significant domain of cultural difference. Many argue that religious language is fast becoming a key instrument used for political ends in nowadays European societies. So as previous studies have reported that religion prompt negative attitudes towards immigration.[26] In the past two decades, several researchers have sought to determine the role of European secularism regarding increasing anti-Islam sentiment. However, a major problem is that research on the subject has been mostly restricted to shortcomings caused by liquidity of concept such as religion, modernity or nationhood. The generalizability and its normative nature of much published research on this issue is problematic. This thesis seeks to remedy these limitations by analyzing the literature of several authors, who have been able to draw on a systematic research into the topic. The following parts of this chapter will discuss the discourse on religion within the European secular paradigm.

1.2.1 Jürgen Habermas's notes on post-secular society and idea of religion within public sphere

Jürgen Habermas's stance on religion developed over years, as at the beginning still under the influence of Frankfurt School, he was outright critical on religion. For instance, in *"Theory of*

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[26] Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche, 'Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration Sentiment'.

Communicative Action"[27] he described religion as an *alienating reality* and *control tool*. Yet, since the beginning of the twenty-first century he recognized the positive social role of religion. In *"Between Religion and Naturalism"*[28] and generally in his later work, he insists that religious reasoning has enriching semantic potential. Concerning the public sphere, Habermas's specific focus lies in co-existence of religious and secular citizens within a public sphere, whilst he calls for a dialogue between them.[29] As was pointed out in first chapter of this thesis, the author's undeniable contributions to my theoretical framework is his thoughts on prevailing conflicts over interpretations and public will-formation within contemporary European Society. And like he correctly noted: *"The particular demand for interpretation arises because we cannot disregard the world-disclosive character of language, even when we use it descriptively"*.[30]

According to Habermas, it is the discourse where we exchange reasons, as well it is the process of public opinion and public will-formation which can reproduce collective identity among citizens.[31] Furthermore, his observations serve as convincing alternative to concepts of the unilateral and relativistic understanding of culture, like the *clash of civilizations* or radical multiculturalism.[32] In those concepts, different cultures are perceived as *"…semantically closed universes, each of which keeps the lid on its own standards of rationality and truth claims."* Where *"…each culture is supposed to exist for itself as a semantically sealed whole, cut off from dialogues with other cultures. With the exception of unsteady compromises, submission or conversion are the only alternatives for terminating conflicts between such cultures."*[33] What follows is an account of arguments made by Habermas, showing religion as main cultural resource in comprehending the modern polity and dialog between secular and religious citizens as necessary to moderate social relations in liberal state. Overall, Habermas's idea of democracy stands out as exemplary defense of use of public reason.

Moreover, regarding Habermas's idea of religion within the public sphere it is appropriate to examine his concept of "post-secular society". Habermas uses the term "post-secular society" in order to specify his distinct position on "secularized-desecularized society" dichotomy. He characterizes post-secular society by referring to three phenomena: (1) the effects of globalization on western societies; (2) the role of religious organization within the public debates on topics, which are for the secular public controversial enough, that it cannot handle in consensual fashion; (3) the effects of the immigration from third world countries. Firstly, Habermas means that global religiously tinted conflicts are forcing their way into international stage and in particular into

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[27] Habermas, 'Theory of Communicative Action'.

[28] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[29] Bohman and Rehg, 'Jürgen Habermas'.

[30] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[31] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[32] Ungureanu and Monti, 'Habermas on Religion and Democracy'.

[33] Habermas, 'A "Post-Secular" Society – What Does That Mean?' presented by author at the Istanbul Seminars organized by Reset Dialogues on Civilizations in Istanbul from June 2nd to the 6th 2008

European public discourses. Secondly, that Churches are increasingly more assuming their role in constructing the public opinion on pressing moral issues within a society. Finally, the effects of immigration on western societies is undoubtedly religious.[34]To sum up, we might define a post-secularized society as one where religion maintains a public relevance.

Nevertheless, some critics argue that if the term refers to transition where societies moved beyond secularization, then it appears as empirically naive. As Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argued in their book *"Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide"*[35], that empirical evidence suggests that with modernization comes hand in hand decline of religious belief and participation, which speaks strongly against the post-secular theory. Though, that does not go necessary against Habermas's argument. He asserts post-secular society as one, where religious communities are integrated into public discourse.[36] In fact, his conception of postsecularism is to a greater extent a criticism of rigid secularism, which rejects religion as historically outdated and ineligible to function in public life and of cultural relativism, producing cultural prejudices.

Consequently, inclusive character of Habermas's idea of religion in public sphere links to his thoughts on democracy and liberal state. For example, in his words, *"the liberal state must not transform the necessary institutional separation between religion and politics into an unreasonable mental and psychological burden for its religious citizens."*[37] Habermas assumes the role of the liberal state as mediator of social relations. His concerns derive from ideological polarization and problem of intersubjectivity of public discussion. The resignation on reciprocity and mutual indifference is result of liberal state expecting the same political reasoning from all of its citizens and distributes unequally cognitive burdening.

Therefore, Habermas explores how to naturalize norm-governed mode of thought and he does so by proposing the *use of public reason,* i.e. common mode of deliberation use for issues of public concern. The liberal state has duty towards secular and religious citizens to ensure, that matters of the state are express in a language that is equally accessible to all citizens. In fact, it is the principle of separation of church and state, that the religious citizens will not be excluded from democratic procedures. He sees the public sphere as self-regulating space of deliberation where public opinions and will are formed.[38] Still, is the use of public reason able to function in practice? In a sense of deliberative democracy model, Habermas accentuate active citizenship and civic solidarity. He further argues, the democratic order is sustained by a legally unenforceable form of solidarity among citizens, further their civic interactions within a democratic system must also be founded on conviction.[39] According to this premise, citizens are willing to not only participate on social order,

[34] Makariev, The Role of Religions in the Public-Sphere.

[35] Inglehart, Norris, 'Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide'.

[36] Habermas, 'A "Post-Secular" Society – What Does That Mean?' presented by author at the Istanbul Seminars organized by Reset Dialogues on Civilizations in Istanbul from June 2nd to the 6th 2008

[37] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[38] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[39] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

but as well listen to each other with mutual respect and what more learn from each other. And that is the complementary learning process, a process of mutual rational reciprocity of justifications. The end of this process within the public sphere is a generally reasonable consensus on societal issues of importance. Habermas disputes that the religious claims would not be rational at its basis, in fact as long secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and reasons are the relict of the past they cannot equally engage in deliberative practice. Naturally, religious communities need to adopt to secular environment too.[40] To put it differently, religious citizens have to hermeneutically self-reflect. Though, as Habermas concludes the political power needs to exercise on nonreligious basis. In ideal state, the post-metaphysical reason remains agnostic, as far is there a willingness to learn from religious traditions.

1.2.2 Rogers Brubaker's concept of Christianism

After having discuss Habermas's take on religion in post-secular societies the following part of this chapter will examine Rogers Brubaker's concept of Christianism, as another critical contribution to the debate. In Brubaker's distinctive paper *"Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective"*[41] he suggests that the preoccupation with Islam has given rise to an identitarian Christianism and that religious sentiment became increasingly part of national populism developed in the last decades. National populists in Northern and Western Europe are embracing the judo-Christian or Christian tradition as cultural roots of Europe and more importantly, putting it into an antagonistic relationship with the Arabic world as opposing culture. Although the increasing references to Christianity does not represent a substantive Christianity, national populists embrace Christianity as culture, where the matter of belonging prevails over religious practice. Based on this premise, Brubaker notes that Christianity is not anymore received as religion, but rather as civilization identity. Thus, the anti-Islam sentiment is not driven mainly by nationalism, but rather by what Brubaker calls *civilizationism*. *Civilizationalism* ascribes to an idea of an immediate threat from Islam, results into mobilization, and might justify conceivable political violence.

As Brubaker argued during a lecture held in Belgrade in 2016[42], the populistic notion of threat from Islam is a part of a wider schema of what he calls constructing the extreme other-hood. In other words, it is characteristic for national populism to polarize oppositions and create a constructed cleavage between "us" and "them". As it reveals crucial, unvirtuous religious language plays a pivotal role in constructing the anti-Islam discourse. Therefore, religion poses as a set of resources, which are symbolic, discursive as well organizational. Within the schema, one cannot dismiss a language. Another specified way of national populism is secularist and liberal rhetoric, which aims mainly on describing Islam as culturally backward. The embrace of liberal values such as freedom of

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[40] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[41] Brubaker, 'Between Nationalism and Civilizationism'.

[42] 'Rogers Brubaker - Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence - YouTube'.

speech, gender equality, LGBT rights is played out as discursive strategy of national populists to gain acceptance of mainstream society for their anti-Islam populist standpoints. Overall, Christianity remains to be privileged as a culture, while national populists, "for a sake of secularism and liberalism", aim on diminishing Islam within the public sphere.[43]

Even tough, the arguments Brubaker makes are convincing as they are inherently logical, the paper might have deal with some of its implicit as well explicit assumptions more fairly. This is evident in the case of the Pim Fortuyn moment, which serves as Brubaker's example of Dutch nationalist populism. It is only author's assumption that this moment of Dutch politics makes representative selection. The author does not provide us with explanation on case selection, what more it appears that the author fell into a scientific trap by choosing the case only according to the strategy confirming the study's hypothesis. Thus, this might result in inaccurate observations.[44] The Pim Fortuyn moment might serve well for illustrative and explanatory purposes, however I would be cautious about making general causal claims about whole society as Brubaker states: *"Christianity is embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity understood in antithetical opposition to Islam. Secularism is embraced as a way of minimizing the visibility of Islam in the public sphere."[45]*, followed by: *"Dutch culture was characterized not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms, as distinctively modern, progressive, and liberal, and is threatened by a backwards, regressive, and illiberal Islam."[46]*

An arguable weakness is that the paper appears to be over ambitious in its claims. Both claims fall short on describing the causal mechanism behind this change in consciousness. As the explanation does not specifying by which means and by whom the Christianity suddenly was not embraced not as a religion bus as a civilizational identity. Neither it is clear if the claims refer to a new phenomenon or prevailing tendency reshaping into different form. Nor is the subject of these sentences stated. The state, church and the civic society is merging into one unit, where the direction of interactions remain unspecified. A major drawback of not specifying the different social systems is that it inevitably leads to overgeneralization and therefore decreases the external validity of the arguments. To conclude, the findings might have been far persuasive if the author had adopted better research design or choose to be less ambitious in drawing on conclusions.

Yet, these are several reasons why Rogers Brubaker is greatly compelling author. These are, for example, those: Brubaker successfully grasped in his paper several traditionally omitted components of religious discourse. Over the past decade most research describing the role of religion has emphasized religion only as ex-post justification, yet possible to explain in non-religious terms. As Brubaker correctly pointed out, many neglect the distinctiveness of religiously informed political

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[43] Brubaker, 'Between Nationalism and Civilizationism'.

[44] Gerring, 'Case study research principles and practices'.

[45] Brubaker, 'Between Nationalism and Civilizationism'.

[46] Brubaker, 'Between Nationalism and Civilizationism'.

conflicts and categorize them under political violence or politicized ethnicity in general.[47] Traditionally, ethnicity and nationalism are characterized as basic sources and forms of cultural and political identity and potentials of conflict. However, in paper on *"Religion and nationalism: four approaches"*[48] Brubaker argues, that we might treat religion and nationalism, together with ethnicity and language, as analogous phenomena. As they all represent channels of informal social relations, which generate and carry social categorization. Thus, all those domains of cultural differences entail distinctive potentials for political conflict. Further he carries on with three more ways how to analyze interconnection between religion and nationalism: (1) to hypothesize religion as part of nationalism, (2) to assume that religion serves as explanation to different cases of nationalism and (3) to consider nationalism as distinctive form of religion.[49] Though, this thesis will not explore the interconnection between religion and nationalism in Rogers Brubaker terms, it seems relevant to address author's theoretical contribution to my framework, as I assume that religion, not at its substantive form, plays a crucial role within the national populistic schema.

1.2.3 Discussion

It can be seen from the above analysis that, more research is required to determine procedures, which allow to certain social groups to deliberately use discursive strategies to exploit the public discussion and pursue their own interpretations for political gains. The perpetrators aim on demonstrating and strengthening the paradigm of cultural dominance of Europe. And pluralist society offers a fertile ground to those who understood the modern power struggle, which is the struggle over meaning and opinion formation. In this perspective, religious diversity poses as great challenge to contemporary pluralistic societies which are still undergoing a transformation, in the words of Habermas, into postcolonial immigrant societies.[50] In this manner, therefore, Brubaker's research extends our knowledge of religion as one of the domains of cultural differences and its implications for the political accommodation of cultural heterogeneity. As well, Rogers Brubaker work rightly grasped the multi-dimensional resurgence of religion in post-secular societies and its potentials for future.

Habermas did comment on the "resurgence of religion" as well and so by introducing three overlapping phenomena suggesting it: (1) the missionary expansion; (2) a fundamentalist radicalization; (3) and the political instrumentalization of the potential for violence innate in many of the world religions. Similarly as Brubaker, he points out that *"Often smoldering conflicts that are profane in origin are first ignited once coded in religious terms."*[51] Thus one could argue that both authors realize, in Brubaker words, the potentials of religious legitimations as forms of meaning-

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[47] 'Rogers Brubaker - Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence - YouTube'.

[48] Brubaker, 'Religion and Nationalism'.

[49] Brubaker, 'Religion and Nationalism'.

[50] Habermas, 'Notes on Post-Secular Society'.

[51] Habermas, 'A "Post-Secular" Society – What Does That Mean?' presented by author at the Istanbul Seminars organized by Reset Dialogues on Civilizations in Istanbul from June 2nd to the 6th 2008

making.[52] Though, Habermas links the religious legitimations rather with the need of reciprocal provision of reason between religious citizens, who grounds their political opinions on their religious convictions, and secular citizens who orient their political positions along secular reason. And even though, he clearly releases the potentials for violence entailed in religious justifications, he emphasizes mutual respect and necessity of integration religious reasons into public sphere. Further, this reciprocity among citizens is what he believes set a liberal polity integrated by a constitution apart from a community segmented along the divisions between competing worldviews.[53] Arguably, Brubaker does not see religious language primarily as part of mediation between secular and non-secular citizens. Whilst Brubaker argues that religious pluralism can flourish in the private realm without generating conflicts in the public sphere and that is more or less self-reproducing and that public life can be a-religious[54], Habermas asserts religious communities as capable to articulate moral sensitivities and access public debate from another perspective, which can prove to be enriching for secular citizens. Actually, the premise is that public and private spheres complement each other.[55] Simply put, it is desirable that religion plays a role within a public sphere.

Altogether, I believe that the most significant difference between the two lies in their epistemological understanding of religion. Whereas Brubaker categorizes religion as one of nodes of ethnical identity, domain of difference[56] – exclusively existing in practice and reducible to private life, Habermas, in contrary, does not define religion only in secular or philosophical terms, but engage with religion also in theological manner. His meddling with theology, arguably based on philosophical reading of Kant and Hegel and origin of reason, resulted into respectful though idealistic version of religion's role in society. He hypothesized on moral capacities of religion and most importantly on Judeo-Christian understanding of ethics. It is the concept of morality, which creating the connection between secular and religious reason. Consequently, many criticized Habermas for developing less critical stance on religion and thus abandoning his earlier post-Marxist critique of religion as articulated in his *Theory of Communicative Action*.[57] Without speculating on possible reasons behind the shift, Habermas's theological turn imposes a question on how far the philosophy and social sciences can or cannot accommodate commitments to theism in the practice of science.

To conclude, the theoretical background introduced in this part of this thesis leads me to my hypothesis on the strengthening effects of religious argumentation on Muslim immigration discourse. Both author's account on religion in modernity is impressive as it hypothesizes on two distinct capacities of religion. On one hand, there is a Brubaker's thesis on religion serving as an ideological

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[52] 'Rogers Brubaker - Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence - YouTube'.

[53] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[54] Brubaker, 'Language, Religion and the Politics of Difference'.

[55] Habermas, 'Between Naturalism and Religion'.

[56] Brubaker, 'Language, Religion and the Politics of Difference'.

[57] Portier, 'Religion and Democracy in the Thought of Jürgen Habermas'.

tool. He describes how secular argumentation is strengthening the anti-Islam and anti-immigration discourses. On the other hand, Habermas emphasizes the need of public mediation between religious and secular citizens, and the potentials of religious reasoning for the secular society, if it accept sreligious citizens as equal. Thus, it appears that the breaking-point turns around secular reason, whereas non-religious actors using the religious argumentation in purposive way – derived on secular reasoning – in order to strengthen the anti-immigration sentiment towards Muslim. This intersection appears to be a sufficient theoretical background for further testing my hypothesis. For this purpose, I choose a debate evolved around Charlie Hebdo's attack in Paris in 2015. I believe, that this case serves well to my theoretical background and it could possibly answer my research question: To what extent religion influences Muslim immigration discourse. Interestingly, the debate is not internal to either of the two compared countries – Czech Republic and Germany. In this perspective, I argue that the comparison between the two countries, which did not experience the discursive event directly and thus are not traumatized, has even greater potential to uncover a certain naturalized arguments within the overall discourse on this topic. Since, the debate itself it is not that emotionally loaded one as the one in France.[58]

1.3 Historical-discursive context: Charlie Hebdo attacks and the "European values" debate

On the 7th of January 2015 two gunmen entered the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris, a satirical magazine, killing 12 people. The two men, Cherif Kouachi and Said Kouachi were brothers and French citizens born to Algerian parents. They both claimed their affiliation to Al-Qaeda's branch in Yemen, as the organization itself also later confirmed. The attack was carried as religious one, whereas the reason was the magazine's satirist cartoons, which often displayed religious symbols and thematic in a very provocative and to some disrespectful manner. More concretely, as the police learned the Kouachis had targeted the magazine for its depictions of the Prophet Mohammed. The attackers were eventually killed in a shootout with police. I do not see a reason to further analyze the attack itself as it is not center to my analysis. Thus, I will rather focus on the aftermath of the attack and its narratives. Naturally, the attack caused a great distress within the French society. The shock over the killings quickly spread across the continent as well globally. The social media, and foremost Twitter reacted immediately upon the attack and later played a crucial role in constructing the discourse. The attack was widely interpreted as an attack on freedom of expression and freedom of the press, many world leaders condemned the attack as an assault on liberty. The Europeans in particular, often described the horrific events as an attack on our *(European)* civilization. For example, the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy ascribed the attack to: *"a war declared on civilization".*[59] Finally, Twitter played out crucial role in constructing the public debate. Soon after the attack the reactions clustered into several hashtags. Several of them were used massively and #JeSuisCharlie[60] became worldwide symbol of the events. At the time of the attack, the hashtag

[58] Goodwin et al., 'Psychological Distress and Prejudice Following Terror Attacks in France'.

[59] Le Figaro, 'Charlie Hebdo', [the author's own translation].

[60] 'I am Charlie', [the author's own translation].

expressed sympathy towards the victims and endorsement of freedom of speech, respectively freedom of the press. Shortly after that emerged hashtag #JeNeSuisPasCharlie[61] opposing to the first hashtag, and debate about defamation of religious symbols and boarders of humor gradually developed.

In Czech Republic it was Roman Catholic priest, philosopher, and theologian Tomáš Halík, who stood up against the Charlie Hebdo´s cartoons as highly offensive to religious community, though of course did condemn the attack itself. One of his main opponent in this debate Erik Tabery, an editor in chief of weekly political magazine Respekt, insisted that the right of free expression is unquestionable and such as this needs to be preserved for any cost.[62] Later on, another Respekt's journalist Jan Macháček, than went on arguing that the fact the Charlie Hebdo's journalists were picturing Mohammed in a humorous ways, possibly offensive to Muslims, had its reason and that was defending our culture and civilization which is under a threat. This came as surprise, since Respekt is profiling as rather liberal magazine and habitually does not lean to this type of argumentation. In contrast, Tomáš Halík argued that the freedom of expression should not exist without any constrains. He called for freedom of expression to be submitted to certain ethical norms, while saying that next to freedom belongs responsibility. Yet, in the article published at Lidové noviny,[63] he does ascribe values such as tolerance to each other and kindness as a part of culture he wants to live in – not specifically naming it as European, though.

I believe, that the debate continues to evolve along these two perspectives. Meanwhile, some insist that certain values and freedoms are exclusively natural only to European *secularized* civilization and what more needs to be preserve in front of the *others* – typically members of Muslim community. Halík and others refer rather to culture which is immanent to our society we live in, and of which also Muslims, Jews and other believers are part of. To sum up, more articles articulating similar positions emerged and one could argue that the debate on freedom of expression within the Czech wider public transformed into one on European *civilizationism* and public role of religion. Czech politicians expressed their concerns over the attack in a way indicating this. For instance, Daniel Herman (KDU-CSL), now the former minister of culture said, *"It is an attack not only on freedom of speech, but also on the principles of democracy and Euro-Atlantic identity"*. Other members of government followed in the same direction: *"I hope that the insane terrorist attack in Paris will not result in us giving up our democratic values and freedoms,"* stated in that time the State Secretary for European Affairs Tomáš Prouza on Twitter at the very day of the attack. Or as said by Petr Fiala, chairman of the opposition party (ODS), *"It is an attack on Western civilization, on our values, on us,"*.[64]

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[61] 'I am not Charlie', [the author's own translation].

[62] DVTV, 'Je správné být Charlie?'

[63] Lidové noviny, 'Halík: Já nejsem Charlie. Ke svobodě patří zodpovědnosť'.

[64] ČTK, 'Barbarský a šílený čin. Čeští politici tvrdě odsoudili útok ve Francii', [the author's own translation].

The debate which emerged in Germany was significantly different to the one in Czech Republic. Germany – as country used to immigration and home to large Muslim population – did not adopt such a defensive rhetoric. For example, Heiko Maas (SPD[65]) – a distinctive figure in German politics – serving as Minister of Justice in 2015 warned against blaming Islam for the attack and further criticized the right-wing populist of using the topic for political gains.[66] A statement, which is hardly imaginable coming from a Minister of Justice or other high-profile political function in Czech political climate. However, also in Germany several anti-Islam demonstrations took place within the year of 2015. Most famously, the ones which took place in Dresden right after the attack in January 2015 and were organized by Pegida.[67] They did, however, sparked a mass anti-protests later, as well they were publicly condemned by many German public figures. The open letter, written as reaction to rising xenophobia, was for example signed besides other by the former Social Democrat chancellor Helmut Schmidt.[68] The country's leader, a chancellor Angela Merkel, pledged in her statement right after the attack a fight against extremism of any kind. Though, she expressed concerned over Islamist extremism and at the same time challenged Islamic scholars to explain why so often violence is executed in the name of their faith. And thus showing doubts about nature of Islam in the world and in Europe.[69]Overall, the German society become rather worried about their own Muslim community, than about external threats.

Hypothetically, the debate appears more variant and multi-dimension than the one within Czech public discourse. Perhaps, because of German's accommodation of multiculturalism or due to the different political culture, certainly more concrete research would needed to be conducted in order to answer the question. Still, a debate similar to one evolved around Tomáš Halík emerged as well in Germany. In magazines as Spiegel or Die Welt articles calling for discussion on blasphemy and humorous depicting of religious symbols. [70] The debate, which took place, though was first concerned about Germans own right to humor, since religion in Germany enjoys legal protection from blasphemy and international reaction on the Charlie Hebdo's cartoons.[71]

Along the debate on freedom of expression, the right-wing populists mobilized themselves and re-introduce the debate concerning Islam in France and in Europe. For instance, the former president Hollande invited two days after the attack on January 9th a right-wing populist Marine Le Pen to the presidential palace. In that time, Marine Le Pen still was frankly to say a political outsider.[72] And even tough Marine Le Pen is clearly an extremist in her rhetoric towards foreigners, immigrants and

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[65] SPD is the abbreviation for Social Democratic Party of Germany

[66] Welle, 'Charlie Hebdo Attack "an Attack on Islam"'.

[67] BBC, 'Dresden Protest against Pegida'.

[68] The Guardian, 'German Leaders Condemn Xenophobia after Pegida Protests'.

[69] The Locals, 'Germany will fight Islamist extremists'.

[70] Welt, 'Charlie Hebdo'.

[71] Spiegel, 'Anschlag Auf "Charlie Hebdo"'.

[72] Spiegel, 'Assaulting Democracy'.

especially Muslims, in the wake of the events her popularity significantly increased.[73] In reaction to renewed anxieties about Islam within the French society, another hashtag emerged. Hashtag #JeSuisAhmed[74] was aimed on emphasizing the difference between Islam and terrorism. Also, the hashtag was directly connected to the event, where one of the victims was named Ahmed – Muslim policeman guarding the Charlie Hebdo´s office. The hashtag was not necessary in opposition to the #JeSuisCharlie hashtag though, in fact in 76,5% of cases the both hashtags were used together.[75]Indicating, that deeper analysis is in order, to reveal the reasons behind using these two hashtags. This brings us towards a debate on immigration and anti-Islam moods in society.

Most would agree, that the debate connected to Charlie Hebdo's attack as mainly framed as a debate concerned by freedom of speech and freedom of the press, of course in the end the victims were journalists. There is a few researches who disagree, though, while emphasizing the need for more concrete research of the public debate.[76] And further claiming, that the debate on freedom of speech was, in fact, a debate on *European identity* evolved around *European values*. Obviously, freedom of speech is a universal human right value and it is either cherished or oppressed. Considering the features of the debate, it became clear that the word *European* is in public discourse closely allocated with freedom of speech and freedom of press. Many articles, often highly normative and emotionally loaded, published right after the attack, were discussing preservation of *European values* in a face of threat from Islam to our civilization. In the light of the islamic terrorism, certain groups of society began to feel threatened by Muslims, as well by their own fellow-citizens Muslims and Jews, which resulted into an upsurge of attacks on Muslim and Jewish communities.[77] It is, therefore, obvious that there are statements, narratives and discourses which revived within the Charlie's Hebdo debate the 'self/other' dichotomy, and emerged as dividing practices within the discourse.[78]

Moreover, the anti-immigration sentiment yielded in Europe during the 2015. Arguably, the effects of the immigration crisis together with terrorist attacks in France have caused the increase of anti-immigration sentiments among the public across the western parts of Europe.[79] The perception of societal threat from immigration is often emphasized as a determinant of attituted towards immigration.[80] There are several main determinants which triggers the public towards negative attituted towards immigrants, such as security and collective or individual economic factors. For

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[73] 'Marine Le Pen's Front National Makes Political Gains after Paris Attacks | World News | The Guardian'.

[74] 'I am Ahmed', [the author's own translation].

[75] An, Kwak, and Mejova, 'Are You Charlie or Ahmed? Cultural Pluralism in Charlie Hebdo Response on Twitter'.

[76] Giglietto And Lee, 'To Be Or Not To Be Charlie: Twitter Hashtags As A Discourse And Counter-Discourse In The Aftermath Of The 2015 Charlie Hebdo Shooting In France'.

[77] 'New French Report Shows Rise in Attacks on Muslims, Sustained Targeting of Jews'.

[78] Giglietto And Lee, 'To Be Or Not To Be Charlie: Twitter Hashtags As A Discourse And Counter-Discourse In The Aftermath Of The 2015 Charlie Hebdo Shooting In France'.

[79] Dennison and Geddes, 'A Rising Tide?'

[80] Solheim, 'Are We All Charlie? Tolerance and Immigration Attitudes after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks'.

example, as Sniderman et al. show in their analysis on attituted towards immigrant minorities in Western Europe, that in the wake of cultural threat of immigration even liberal groups of society are more likely to be in favor of more restrictive immigrational policies. The assumable economical threat does not have, in terms of mobilization, the same impact on society.[81]As we have seen, certain religious symbols in the past invoked an anti-immigrational sentiments within the society. Most notably, several discussions within the public on Islam visibility in the public space lead France in 2011 to ban the full-face Islamic veil in public places.[82]

However, to look closer on the relationship between religion and negative attitudes towards immigrants, the academic debate splits along two possible resolutions. Some argue that religion induces anti-immigrant sentiment, while others that religion has the capacity to fuels feelings of solidarity and compassion among citizens towards immigrants. As Bloom et al. argue, the oppose findings are due to the differences in the measurement of religiosity.[83] The religious belief and behavior have both distinct effect on the public's perception on immigration. If we see religion as social identity, the question which needs to be ask than is *to what extent* people derive their social identity from religion. The studies suggest that triggering one's group identification results in heightened tendency to become protective of the group's culture. Thus, it is expected, that the more someone feels as their religious group's symbolic resources are in threat, the anti-immigration sentiment is to increase.[84]This, in fact, suggesting a possible hypothesis that if Charlie Hebdo's cartoons were reduced to foremost symbolic resource, it could be part of an explanation of upsurge of anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments in 2015.

Furthermore, it is also broadly accepted opinion, as several studies have shown, that terrorism fuels negative attitudes towards out-groups and in particular towards immigrants.[85] However, several studies have also shown that the reactions are different in particular countries. For instance, while studying the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo's attack the perception of immigration in France did change however differently than in other countries. In another study conducted by Øyvind Bugge Solheim, that the French society did not feel threaten in terms of culture, but it did lean afterwards towards more restrictive immigration policies.[86] Moreover, Nathan Walter in his study interestingly points out that as the Charlie Hebdo attack's in U.S. were framed as *"French 9/11"*, the event was further used in the public debate as example of Islam's responsibility for the attack and in general for terrorism and this particular framing, which should later result in gaining the public support for

[81] Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 'Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers'.

[82] BBC,'The Islamic Veil across Europe'.

[83] Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche, 'Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration'.

[84] Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche, 'Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration'.

[85] Solheim, 'Are We All Charlie? Tolerance and Immigration Attitudes after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks'.

[86] Solheim, 'Are We All Charlie? Tolerance and Immigration Attitudes after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks'.

deploying anti-immigration policies.[87] To put it differently, it appears that the difference how terrorism effects the society on matter of immigration, depends heavily on the context and features of distinct national debates. The question, therefore, relevant for this thesis is if the anti-immigrational discourse can be connected to the one on the Charlie Hebdo's attack. Besides the academic debate concerning this question, this particular period, as already mentioned, gave rise to numerous hate crimes against Muslims, with French law enforcement agencies recording 128 such acts between January 7 and 20, 2015, while compared to 133 incidents in the whole year 2014.[88] The Pegida movement staged repeatedly anti-Islam and anti-immigration protests in the wake of the terrorist attacks. In Czech republic, an Islamophobic movement *"We do not want Islam in Czech Republic"* gained on new relevance in that time and became representation of an anti-immigration and anti-Islam standpoints within Czech society.[89] Other examples can be found suggesting that the Charlie Hebdo's attack is intercorrelated with the anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiments induced in 2015.

Analytical part

2.1 Methodology

This chapter discusses the applied methodology in this thesis. The central question in this thesis asks to what extent religion influences discourse on Muslim immigration. Therefore, this thesis's resolution is to analyze the usage of religious argumentation in the articles connected to the chosen discursive event[90] and what effect, hypothetically, it might have on Muslim immigration discourses in both countries. For this purpose, I would like to engage also with critical discourse analysis – as introduced in the section 1.1 of this thesis.

Furthermore, I choose to compare Czech Republic and Germany, as countries which appears to have a very different public opinion on immigration, so as the societies have a very distinct relation to religiosity. According to statistics from the year 2015, the 76.4% of Czechs are casting themselves as unaffiliated to any religion, 23.3 % are affiliated to Christianity.[91] In contrast, 68.7% of Germans describes themselves as Christians.[92] Additionally, the public's opinion on immigration appears to be

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[87] Walter, 'Je Suis Charlie? The Framing of In-Group Transgression and the Attribution of Responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo Attack'.

[88] Cohu, Maisonneuve, and Testé, 'The "Charlie-Hebdo" Effect'.

[89] Slačálek, O., Svobodová, E., 'The Czech Islamophobic movement beyond populism.'

[90] The attack on the office of Charlie Hebdo magazine.

[91] 'Religions in Czech Republic | PEW-GRF'.

[92] 'Religion in Germany | GRF'.

greatly different in both countries. For example, considering the statistics from June 2015, in Czech Republic over 70% of was against accepting refugees and immigrants from Syria and North Africa.[93] In Germany, a country experienced with immigration, the public opinion is more concerned with economic impact of immigration. In 2015, the 58 % of population had neither positive nor negative attitude towards immigration. With 21% arguing that the prosperity could be under threat due to the immigration.[94] It can be, therefore, assume that this difference will be present within the media's debate on Charlie Hebdo's attacks.

To answer my question, I gathered forty (40) articles from German and Czech public debate reflecting on the Charlie Hebdo attacks. To be more concrete, in Czech Republic I focus on specific debate evolved around most prominent Czech Catholic intellectual Tomáš Halík. As he famously stated right after the attack *"I am not Charlie"*, reacting on the worldwide spread of several hashtags connected to the attack, it sparked off a particularly religious debate within the Czech discourse on Charlie Hebdo. As I have shortly introduced the debate earlier, interviews were conducted, public debates took place and many other people confronted Halík through media in reaction to his publicly stated opinion. In Germany, I have searched for people within a German media debate who similarly as Halík declared *"I am not Charlie"*. Though, I did not find a person such comparable with Tomáš Halík, a debate concerning Charlie Hebdo's cartoons and blasphemy took place there as well. For instance, the decision of the executive editor of the New York Times Dean Baquet not to publish Charlie Hebdo's cartoons due to their offensive character was a highly discussed matter among the biggest German media outlets.[95] Hence it revealed as reasonable, in both countries, to searched for articles according to keywords. Primarily by searching for *"I am not Charlie"* and the word *"blasphemy"* in Germany, while in Czech Republic I have searched for the articles discussing Tomáš Halík thus *"Halík"* was a keyword.

I chose articles only from the day of the attack (January 7, 2015) till end of the month (January 31, 2015). I did decide only to analyze articles and consider other discursive genres such as interviews in radio, television and online stream in my analysis only to an extent of complementary information. I will focus on identifying discoursive strategies and so by reconstructing topoi in gathered data. And proceed according to the Ruth Wodak's content-related argument schemes. The articles are taken from two (2) media outlets in Czech republic and two (2) media outlets in Germany. Concretely, Lidové noviny and Respekt in Czech republic. As these two medias were directly engaged with the debate on Tomáš Halík criticism of cartoonists and they did follow systematicaly the debate. In contrast, Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung published comparably to other German big outlets the most articles tracing the debate on blasphemy and public role of religion. Considering those nuances, I believe, that the choice will make a representative sample of discussed debate.

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[93] 'Postoj České Veřejnosti k Přijímání Imigrantů a Uprchlíků Červen 2015 - Centrum pro Výzkum Veřejného Mínění'.

[94] Talo, T. 'Public Attitudes to Immigration in Germany in the Aftermath of the Migration Crisis'.

[95] Wemple, 'New York Times Top Editor Dean Baquet Shows Strains of Charlie Hebdo Controversy'.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

In this chapter, I will present my analysis of chosen articles from Czech outlets Lidové Noviny, Respekt and German outlets Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung. In the following part of this chapter, I will describe thematical features of the analysis. The following in-depth analysis will discuss the reconstructing process of *topoi*. I will conclude with disscusion on Charlie Hebdo and religion discourses in both countries.

2.2.1 Czech Republic

To begin with, I will proceed by identifying and reconstruction of topoi in articles of each media outlets and connecting them together. In Respekt, as I have shortly introduced the debate in chapter on historical-discursive context, several journalists including the editor-in-chief Erik Tabery gradually opposed to Tomáš Halík. Their arguments against Tomáš Halík were more or less consistent and thus one could say that Respekt in that time had adopted certain opinion within the debate. In contract, Lidové noviny was the outlet originally publishing Halík's response and systematically followed the debate, as they later published opinions and articles various authors – discussing the matter from different angles. In most of the analyzed articles, provocative cartoons of Charlie Hebdo, were justified by means of the *topos of danger and threat* through presenting Islam as threat to freedom of expression. And further, the *topos of culture* was heavily deployed, as the overall discussion was evolved around European civilization and its values and principles. Several repeating nodes of argumentation was possible to identify. For instance, an argument frequently re-introduced to the debate can be synthesized into this representative example:

"The fact that the cartoonists were making fun of Mohammed had a clear cause, clear rational reasons based on the defense of the values of our culture and civilization."[96] **[Jan Macháček, 13. 1. 2015, Respekt]**

The same author continues and strengthens his hypothesis by making a strong assumptions as seen below:

"These threats, intimidation and attacks on freedom of speech were the only and main reason why Charlie Hebdo's intellectuals were making fun of Prophet Muhammad and even appointed him the editor-in-chief for certain time. If the cartoonist would not be threatened by the followers of Muhammad, the cartoonist would not care about their prophet."[97] **[Jan Macháček, 13. 1. 2015, Respekt]**

I have chosen this example, because it well expressed the overall argument repeating in most of the analyzed articles, as will become evident later. This argument made to oppose Tomáš Halík is inherently constructed around topos of danger and threat, and justifying the cartoons's possibly offensive character. In fact, this argument should also prevent any discussion of the cartoon's content and what it might cause to Muslims. Actually, any articulation of Muslim's needs is absent in all the

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[96] 'Halík Se Mýlí. Karikatury Nebyly Jen Tak • RESPEKT'. [the author's own translation]

[97] 'Halík Se Mýlí. Karikatury Nebyly Jen Tak • RESPEKT'. [the author's own translation]

articles. That derives from presumption, that European civilization which is incarnated into the victims of the attack is under a threat – to many under a Islam threat. By incarnated I mean, that the assassinated cartoonists were reduced to symbols – a symbols of our civilization. This type of symbolicism can be ascribe to topoi of compassion – in Ruth Wodak's scheme it would be topoi of humanitarism. This topoi is constructed around invoking compassion and sympathy not only with a victims, but first with their cause, which does not have to be carried by the victims themselves, but can be constructed by others. Let us remember, the example from Jan Macháček's text, where he makes an assumption, that if the cartoonist would not feel threaded by the followes of Muhammad, they would not depicting Prophet. This topoi is employed on several occassions, as describe in following part.

It appears that authors commonly confused freedom with solidarity: who refuses to publish the cartoons of the Prophet is said to reject solidarity with the victims of terror, or it will deprive itself of its own freedom. The emphasizes on solidarity with the victims and empathy were present in most of the articles. And could be reconstructed again as *topos of humanitarism*, since the argumentation derived from the feeling and merely responsibility to be solidary with the victims of the attack. In fact, most of the articles appear to overwhelmingly aim on inducing emotionally, as they are making ethical claims towards readers. As manifested most evidently here: *"If someone finds themselves at risk for only a publication of a cartoon, if jihadists shoot the editorial office solely for this, solidarity with the victims is a matter of moral attitude, even of self-preservation."*[98] **[Jiří Přibáň, 26. 1. 2015, Lidové noviny]**

Presentation of Charlie Hebdo's cartoons was almost exclusively reduced to symbolic. They were interpreted exclusively as expression of liberal freedoms, inherent to European civilization. This suggest an another implication, that several author's stated that is not necessary to agree with the cartoons, but it is necessary to be solidar with what the cartoons represent – a cause. There, once again, is not coherent where the limits of this represenation are set. Authors speaking about all sort of freedoms, European values – a very vague term, condemnation of terrorism and violence, as well that the cartoons are symbols of secularization and rejection of Islam. It is possible, therefore, to assume, that several of these are bounds together – all being a part of European civilization and culture. Example can be see below:

We must be ready to clearly formulate the values of our civilization and stand up for them. Like hundreds of thousands of people with the words "Je suis Charlie".[99] **[Vladimír Chlouba, 17. 1. 2015, Lidové noviny]**

and as very clearly presented here:

"To present yourself publicly as "Je suis Charlie" is symbolic identification with victims of unacceptable violence."[100] **[Martin Zvěřina, 18. 1. 2015, Lidové noviny]**

Furthermore, the articles discussed preservation and protection of European civilization and culture, referred to European civilization as "our" and in opposition to other's culture, typically not named. Islam is present in articles rather latently. The articles are not coherent in what they perceive as

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[98] 'Jiří Přibáň. Arbitr Demagogie | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[99] 'Vladimír Chlouba: Postavme Se Za Své Hodnoty | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[100] 'Martin Zvěřina. Proč má mít monopol na vkus zrovna Halík? | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

threat, if religion in general, Islam or radicalism. At some point, also Tomáš Halík's articulation of the matter is presented as dangerous to our society and his opinions compared to the ones of fascist right. For instance, most notably in Michael žantovský article, where he puts it as following: *"(...) but decided to leave generously to "readers' intelligence" to recognize the difference between his "kind" and "responsible" attitudes and the views of the "fascinating right" and "Stalinists of the Halo newspaper".*"[101]

Another feature of the debate could be ascribed to *topoi of burdening*. Several authors blamed Europeans to not standing sufficiently against attacks on Jews, which followed right after the attack on Charlie Hebdo's office in Paris. This opinion emerged within the discourse, after part of society appeared to banalize the attack on Kosher store in Paris, as something merely expected, considering Israel's politics and its impact on Middle East region. For example, as Bohumil Doležal argue: *"(...) In the shadow of the tragedy in Charlie Hebdo's office, the attack on the Parisian Kosher store was neglected. Perhaps it is because the attack on the cartoonists is clearly readable: you have printed this, we kill you for that, the terrorists say. But the second attack seems to me to be "readable" too: we are killing you because you are Jews, nothing specific, what you would "be guilty of" against us.*[102] A fewer flowers were put in front of the Kosher store, as well the survivers did not gained such media attention in aftermath as the satirical magazine. In the following months, the Europeans lack of response on an increasing number of hatred motivated attacks on Jews across Western Europe invoked a feeling of omission, which resulted in Jewish emmigration fron Western Europe.[103]

However, danger of terrorism is presumption of all analyzed articles, named explicitly and also implicitly. However, none of the articles is discussing terrorism as problem of collective violence or radicalization. Overall, they all argue that restrictions on freedom – materialized in fanaticism – induces in violence such as this and that one cannot restrict freedom of expression in sake of religious tolerance. In respect to this, religion is, in fact, on many occassions relativized and believers are presented rather in negative terms as people potentially dangerous to people embracing freedom of expression. In one article author argues, that *"Charlie refuses to take religion cults seriously"*. That, in fact, *"Charlie is one of the last platforms, where religion does bear the privilege of being taken seriously."*[104] As it reveals, religion and Faith is designated into dichotomic relation to freedom of expression. And possibly to other liberal values. This argumentation, as apparent from the analyzed content, is founded on Europe's culture and values, though often not specified in the articles. But, in respect to the article's presentation of religiosity – secularism and certain heritage of Enlightment appear to be one of the key and latent parts to European culture. Those following examples show this:

"Unlike Tomáš Halík, I think we are in a fight with the Islamic world. Only that fight is different. Radical Islamists are trying to terrorize us with their terror. And Western secular culture would also like to turn Muslims into their faith."[105] **[Dan Drápal, 26. 1. 2015, Lidové noviny]**

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[101] 'Michael Žantovský: V Charlieho Kůži | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[102] 'Bohumil Doležal: Naše hodnoty | Neviditelný pes | Lidovky.cz'. [the author's own translation]

[103] Goldberg, 'Is It Time for the Jews to Leave Europe?'

[104] 'Jiří Kozelka: Lepší Než Víra Je Pochybnost | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[105] 'Dan Drápal: Žertovat Lze o Lecčem. Jen Jestli to Stojí Za to | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

"Wasn't the upsurge of public outrage at the same time a silent sigh over how the revolutionary ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity are increasingly evaporating from our globalized permanently-in-pressure society?"[106] **[Jiří Přibáň, 25. 1. 2015, Lidové noviny]**

Displaying Europe as civilization under threat was also constructed around *topos of history*. In analyzed articles, the historical examples are serving as justification of provocative cartoons and blasphemy. Notably in Respekt's article, the matter was compared to censorship deployed by Nazi Germans in 1930ies. Furthermore, other examples of censorships and struggle for freedom of expression through history follows. In all articles, the designation of threat is problematic. In many cases, it is not clear whether religion, terrorism, state or radical Muslims are threating Europe, though the threat itself is emphasized on several occassions. But the actors themselves, who puts Europe under a threat are not named. As visible in the part of article published in Lidové noviny below:

"Solidarity with the at-risk is a great thing, which only a person who once has been or is permanently in the role of at-risk is fully appreciated. It is especially great because nobody knows exactly will be under the threat."[107] **[Zdeněk Petráček, 13. 1. 2015, Lidové noviny]**

That leads us to conclusion, that the construction of threat is still rather done in abstract terms. What more, it appears that the enemy is Tomáš Halík and his response, interpreted as capitulation in front of violence induced by Faith. For instance, in article of Jiří Kozelka this argumentation is evident. The author recalls some of examples where violence took place in the name of Faith. Suggesting, that even though for some religion might have a cognitive potential, still the religion is first problematic for others.[108]Overall, most of articles published to the topic in Lidové noviny criticized Tomáš Halík as highbrow from reality detached priest, arrogant and lacking on empathy. And there was some who reacted upon the criticism as for example Petr Pithart, an influencial figure within Czech public discourse. Also, many articles mentioned also Pope Francis's response to the attacks, omitting the differences in both declarations and interpreting them as identical within the discourse. Which is, in fact, bizzare if we are to compare both declarations. While Pope Francis argued that *"Curse my mother, expect a punch"*[109] thus saying that the assassins were being provoked and cartoonist were wrong in insulting someone's Faith. Tomáš Halík did not say, that the attack would be induce by blasphemy, he though critized the widespread print of Charlie Hebdo's cartoons after the attack and making out of them a symbol of our culture.

To conclude, Charlie Hebdo's Prophets cartoons were *defined* as freedom of speech itself and *"an integral part of Western culture"*[110]. And characterized as attack on our civilization – defined as Western society. In the end, the Charlie Hebdo editor-in-chief Gérard Biard said as well, that the cartoons are symbol of freedom of expression democracy and secularization. The presentation of European culture is overwhelmingly positive. Europe, as authors describe, is home to liberal

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[106] 'Jiří Přibáň: Islamistický Teror a Jiné Hrozby | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[107] 'PETRÁČEK'. V masce Charlieho | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[108] 'Jiří Kozelka: Lepší Než Víra Je Pochybnost | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[109] 'Pope "punch" on Papal Plane'.

[110] 'Vladimír Chlouba: Postavme Se Za Své Hodnoty | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

freedoms and deserve to be preserve. In many of the analyzed articles, Europe was also portrayed as exceptional and European culture as threated due to the demographics. One article, for example, paraphrased Europe as *"ecosystem"*[111], therefore an environmental in danger and need to be preserve. In contract, Muslim community is presented as possibly threating to our civilization. Presentation of Charlie Hebdo's cartoons was almost exclusively reduced to symbolic, as well the assassinated cartoonists themselves. *Topoi of compassion* was present through most of the articles, as to induce compassion with a cause was the traditional claim on reader. Moreover, *topoi of danger* was employed also into different level of the same argument. The possibility that cartoons such as this would be restricted, in the sake of Tomáš Halík's argument, was connected to threat of restriction on freedoms by state. In fact, examples mentioned assumed that is that already happening. Politicians were also on several occasions describe as being trapped in their own political correctness and generally acting against people. Jiří Kozelka writes in his article in Lidové noviny: ***"Politicians** do not have much [courage], even now, after tragic assassinations, they reassuringly assert that we are only fighting against terrorists: there is no civilization conflict. I think it is, and at least one reason for it is quite serious: the culture that Muslims are trying to introduce to us is totally defies women's rights. This is a fundamental and compelling reason to refuse the Muslim culture in its present form."*[112]Altogether, most of the articles are reduced to subjective criticism towards Tomáš Halík's publicly stated opinions on Charlie Hebdo's attack, than that it would dealt with position of religion within public sphere. In the example above, Muslim culture is mentioned, however it is never explained why the Muslim culture is problematic or incompatible, nor is never addressed the Czech Muslim community. The Muslims serve within the texts as passive actors, hence their point of view is excluded from the debate. They are not taken as participants within the debate, only as an external threatening force – or as accentuate by some – as a group which needs to be tolerated. Nevertheless, Islam as religion and part of European socities is not discussed. That lead us to example, that religion is latent part of the debate, even to a great extent, but perceived first in negative terms and in opposition to liberal values. The debate shows that we are unable to discuss religion at its substantial form and omitting its role which it still holds to large group of Europeans.

2.2.2 Germany

Already on a first view, we notice that the debate in Germany was significantly different to the on in Czech Republic. For example, the articles in German Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung are considerably longer than the ones I have analyzed within the Czech debate on Charlie Hebdo. It could indicate, that the German debate engages with the topic to a greater depth. However, the debate is not construicted mainly around topoi of threat and danger. Foremost, it does evolved around *topoi of law*, as almost all of the articles are recalling the Paragraph 66 of German Criminal code, which states that: *"Who insults publicly or by means of written publication the content of other's religious or ideological confession and by doing so qualifies for a destruction of public peace, will be punished with up to 3 years in prison or with a fee."*[113] Many articles, are in fact, calling for a change concerning the law, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo's attack and searching for a boudaries of blasphemy. However, this is not limited only to a media, but also within a public

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[111] Třešňák, 'Rána Od Halíka'. [the author's own translation]

[112] 'Jiří Kozelka: Lepší Než Víra Je Pochybnost | Fórum | Lidovky.Cz'. [the author's own translation]

[113] Becker, 'Anschlag Auf "Charlie Hebdo"'. the author's own translation]

discourse. As politicians calls for either abolishing or tightening of the law. For instance, the FDP leader Christian Lindner calls to abolish it as an "unbeatable commitment to freedom of expression".[114]The German discussion on setting the boudaries of blasphemy is well expressed in this example:

In fact, and distinction must be made between personal rights and religious feelings. Taking care of the latter can be commandment of respect and tolerance.[115] **[Markus C. Schulte von Drach und Lilith Volkert, 13. 1. 2015, Süddeutsche Zeitung]**

Moreover, the articles are to a great extent less normative in comparison to Czech articles. The authors rather recalling facts and discuss the matter in less ideological terms, as in Czech Republic it is mostly an opinion articles which were written to the topic. For example, most of the articles discussing international situation concerning the Charlie Hebdo's attack and the cartoons. The internationality is another interesting factor within the debate. Most of the authors does not forget to mention mass protests, which took place after printing some of the Charlie Hebdo's cartoons, in the sake of solidarity. Inrestingly, since we focus on the debate within the same time period – the Czech outlets are not remembering any of the international events connected to the cartoons. Actually, the international perspective is very much excluded from the debate on the topic. In Germany, a great focus was dedicated to reactions in Turkey, as many Turkish live and work in Germany. In Turkey, it was said, that the cartoons could *"incite hatred"*[116]. The fear of spreading hatred is than common in several other articles and thus constructing the *topoi of danger and threat* from different perspective. And I would argue, that it is linked to *topoi of responsibility*, towards Turkish fellow-citizens. The topoi of danger and threat is present as well, although almost absent on rthetoric concerning European civilization and need to defend Europe in front of Muslims. What is latently articulated, is the need to protect European communities in front of terrorism. But what is rather in question is the position of religious communities within Germany. For instance, how teachers should approach the topic. One article discusses how among Muslims hood the criticism towards Charlie Hebdo's cartoons widespreaded and also how upsurge of xenophobia after the attack is influencing the lives of young Muslims.[117]

Also, the cartoons as much the cartoonists were reduced to symbols. But within a German debate, the satiristic magazine is explicitly connected to the right for blasphemy, not only freedom of expression. Though, the symbolicism was very similar to one in Czech Republic, as this certain symbolic was simply inherent to Charlie Hebdo discourse in Europe.

The magazine's attorney, Richard Malka, shared on Monday the statement that the spirit of "Je suis Charlie" also includes a "right for blasphemy".[118] **[13. 1. 2015, Süddeutsche Zeitung]**

Also, another tendency is present and that is the discussion on what the assessment of the phrase *"I am Charlie"* actually represents. Similarly, to Czech discourse, the articles are not coherent and concrete in what it should mean, only that the pressure on expressing the solidarity with the victims

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[114] 'Blasphemie-Gesetze in Europa - Was Spott Über Gott Darf - Politik - Süddeutsche.De'.

[115] 'Blasphemie-Gesetze in Europa - Was Spott Über Gott Darf - Politik - Süddeutsche.De'.

[116] 'Mohammed-Karikatur: Türkei Blockt Charlie-Hebdo-Titel - Medien - Süddeutsche.De'. [the author's own translation]

[117] 'Paris: Deutsche Schüler Sorgen Sich Vor Anschlägen - SPIEGEL ONLINE'. [the author's own translation]

[118] '"Charlie Hebdo": Nächste Ausgabe Mit Mohamed-Titel - Medien - Süddeutsche.De'. [the author's own translation]

is great. *"People gathering here mourn about the lost ones and the feeling to be attacked in their basic value-systems."*[119] **[Felicitas Kock, 11. 1. 2015 Süddeutsche Zeitung]**

The German need in this debate to look for limitations is very well expressed here:

"But it is worth noting that the success of the slogan "Je suis Charlie" is accompanied by both expansions and limitations. It was necessary because of its dual character as a symbol of persistence on the press freedom and as a gesture of mourning for the victims that he multiplied. The model was for "Je suis Ahmed" and "Je suis Juif". After all, even the attack on the kosher supermarket addressed to a Jewish audience was not an attack on the general city crowd."[120] **[Lothar Müller, 15. 1. 2015, Süddeutsche Zeitung]**

Furthermore, the religious citizen's feelings are in question and widely debated. That is, in fact, one of the most significant distinctions between the Czech and German debate. The debate on #JeNeSuisPasCharlie – I am not Charlie itself is than framed rather in a terms of understandable criticism. This tendency could be induced by debate evolved around Dean Baquet, editor-in-chief of the New York Times. This sub-topic of the debate is consructed as *topoi of responsibility*. Baquet refused to publish Charlie Hebdo's cartoons after the attack. Further, he claimed that this type of humor is offensive and does not belong into the New York Times. Several interviews with him are featured in the two analyzed medias and he is often mentioned in other articles. Though, considerable criticism appeard, blaming the editor-in-chief from cowardice.[121] Thus, making similar ethical claims on readers and others, in terms of solidarity with the victims and the cause, as we have seen in Czech debate. The *topoi of compassion* is again heavily deployed. As seen on this example, the victims's actions are heroized: *"In the name of freedom of speech, they risked their lives."*[122]. But, in comparison to Czech debate, the German articles often recalling Ahmed - the Muslim policeman killed during the attack as a figure, which disappears from the public discourse on Charlie Hebdo, even tough it should remember to all, that it is important to not induce hatred against Muslims.[123] The topoi of burdening, evolved around criticism towards European for ommiting the victims of the attacked Kosher store also appeared on several occassions. The argumentative pattern here, though, was almost identitacal as in Czech case.

To conclude, the debate which took place in Germany concerning the criticism towards Charlie Hebdo's symbolicsm was not that heavily burdened by systematical relativization of religion in public sphere. Perhaps, one of the reason for this is, that the criticism was not invoked by prominent religious figure as it was in Czech case. And because of large Muslims minority being part of Germany. Despite all the similarities, the two debates are significantly different to each other, showing that the national debate and certain conditions within every country are changing the character of the debate. Although, the symbolicsm which emerged around Charlie Hebdo was inherent part of the discussion and it can be assumed that it would appear also in media in different European countries.

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[119] Paris, 'Aus Angst zu Hause bleiben ist keine Option'. [the author's own translation]

[120] Müller, 'Wer bin ich?'

[121] 'Diese Art von Humor ist eine unnötige Beleidigung'. [the author's own translation]

[122] Becker, 'Anschlag Auf "Charlie Hebdo"'. the author's own translation]

[123] 'Charlie Hebdo Und #jesuisahmed: Solidarität Mit Getötetem Polizisten - SPIEGEL ONLINE'.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is necessary to evaluate if I was able to answer my research question. To what extent religion influences Muslim immigration discourse. Religious argumentation was visibly present within the analyzed debate. I engaged with basic tools of critical discourse analysis and reconstructed *topos* within analyzed material according to Wodak's schema in two countries. Theoretical background as introduced in this thesis introduced theoretical question connected to role of religion within public sphere and the potentials of communication. And indicating, which further philosophical issues we might deal with. Analysing the Czech debate, most of the articles are reduced to subjective criticism towards Tomáš Halík's publicly stated opinions on Charlie Hebdo's attack, than that it would dealt with position of religion within public sphere. I argue, that the religious rhetoric present in Czech debate could and arguably did induce anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments within wider public. Concerning Germany, I do not see this tendency there that visible, that it would be possible to declare it. Within German debate, the religious citizen's feelings are in question and position of Muslim community in German society. Thus, the religion is again present, however not in such negative way. The topic of Charlie Hebdo's attack is overall not framed in civilizational terms as it was in Czech debate. Based on analyzed content, I argue, that Czech society appears to feel in danger in front of a rather abstract threat. I believe, that the employed method – Critical Discourse Analysis – served well in order to unreveal certain tendencies and argumentation patterns within the analyzed content.

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