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**EU Soft Power in the Eastern Partnership
countries: The Case of Ukraine**

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Abstract

The thesis studies the EU as a soft power actor, seeking to analyse the way it is favouring soft power tools in its foreign policy, establishing the relations with the neighbouring countries and guaranteeing security across its borders. The research is aiming to prove that the soft power is a relevant approach and an effective foreign policy tool for the EU to persuade Eastern Partnership countries for closer cooperation. The topic is relevant for the EU security, prosperity and its role as a global political actor. The thesis makes a contribution to the debate, providing with the characterization of the theoretical concept of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, description of the use of soft power by the EU, its sources and limits and the argumentation for the effectiveness and relevance of ‘soft power’ approach having studied how soft power sources are being applied. The thesis represents a qualitative research structured to investigate primarily the theoretical framework and further apply it onto the policy on regional level (Eastern Partnership states) and then more specifically on country level (Ukraine). The rendered research grants with the possibility to consider the EU soft power to be an effective tool and forceful guarantor of trust gaining and motivation source for Eastern neighbours for partnership building and integration with the EU.

Abstrakt

Diplomová práce zkoumá EU jako aktéra v oblasti měkké moci a snaží se analyzovat způsob, jakým upřednostňuje nástroje měkké moci ve své zahraniční politice, navazuje vztahy se sousedními zeměmi a zajišťuje bezpečnost jejích hranic. Cílem výzkumu je dokázat, že měkká síla je relevantním přístupem a účinným nástrojem zahraniční politiky EU, aby přesvědčila země Východního partnerství o užší spolupráci. Toto téma je důležité pro bezpečnost EU, prosperitu a její úlohu globálního politického aktéra. Práce přispívá k diskusi, poskytuje charakterizování teoretického konceptu „měkké“ a „tvrdé“ moci, popis využití měkké síly ze strany EU, její zdroje a limity a argumentaci pro efektivitu a relevanci. přístupu „soft power“, který zkoumal, jak se používají zdroje měkkého výkonu. Diplomová práce představuje kvalitativní výzkum strukturovaný tak, aby zkoumal především teoretický rámec a dále jej aplikoval na politiku na regionální úrovni (státy Východního partnerství) a následně konkrétněji na úrovni zemí (Ukrajina). Poskytnuté granty na výzkum s možností považovat měkkou sílu EU za účinný nástroj a silný ručitel získávání důvěry a motivačního zdroje pro východní sousedy pro budování partnerství a integraci s EU.

Klíčová slova

Soft Power, Východní partnerství, Evropská Unie, Rusko, regionální integrace, budování partnerství, Association Agreement

Keywords

Soft Power, Eastern Partnership, The EU, Russia, regional integration, partnership building, Association Agreement

Range of thesis: 89 pages, i.e. 213 039 symbols

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 10.05.2019

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The objectives of the research are to investigate and analyze the effectiveness of the Soft Power mechanisms, picturing the EU as a soft power actor, to describe the influence of the policies applied through the EaP as sources of its soft power, to study limits of the EU's leverage, to explore the motivations of integrational choice among the EaP countries, applying the findings to prove the effectiveness of the EU soft power.

Základní charakteristika tématu (10 řádek):

The work is aimed to analyse the way that the EU is favouring soft power tools in its foreign policy establishing the relations with the neighbouring countries through and guaranteeing security across its borders. The question of the political determination of Eastern Partnership countries is of high importance for the EU, due to their strategic geopolitical location. The innovative element is the investigation of the soft power policies realized by the EU and its impact on its objectives, providing with the perception of the image of the EU exercised. The thesis intends to show how the EaP countries are making their integrational choices, considering sources and limits of EU soft power. Particular interest for the researcher is to prove that the EU's soft power is a relevant approach for gaining partnership building with states of Eastern Dimension.

Institute of International Studies**Master thesis proposal****Předpokládaná struktura práce (10 řádek):**

INTRODUCTION

1. SOFT POWER: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Concept of Soft Power, its sources and limits, Soft Power Soft Power of the European Union

2. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AS THE EU SOFT POWER INSTRUMENT

The European Neighbourhood Policy, The Eastern Partnership: genesis and soft power dimension, Russia Factor and the limits of the EU soft power, EaP countries and the integration dynamics

3. THE EU SOFT POWER AS A TOOL TO FOSTER EU-UKRAINE INTEGRATION
EU-Ukraine relations: getting Ukraine closer to the EU, Sources and limits of EU soft power in Ukraine, 2014: Ukraine and its geopolitical orientation, The costs of European choice for Ukraine, From 2014 to 2019: Ukraine and the EU

CONCLUSION

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4. Sociological group "Rating". *Socio-Political Moods of Ukrainians IRI Poll. 30.01.2019*, p. 77, available at: https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2019.1.30_ukraine_poll.pdf, accessed on 16 April 2019

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Association Agreement
AP	Action Plans
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CISFTA	Free Trade Area between the CIS countries
CORELAP	Conference of Regional and Local Authorities
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DPR	Donetsk People’s Republic
EAEU or EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPNK	European Partnership for the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
EU	The European Union
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
LPR	Luhansk People’s Republic
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
USA	The United States of America

USSR	The Soviet Union
WTO	World Trade Organization
YES	Yalta European Strategy

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays the ways that a government is using to influence other actors on the political world arena has shifted from old fashioned military coercion to persuasion, values expanding, opinion making, and partnership building. The European Union (EU) as one of the leading global political powers is applying 'soft power' of latent influence in its foreign policy. 'Hard power', the policy of coercion, based on the use of military forces is no longer in use in Europe and is perceived as the loss of economic resources and reputation, reinforced by the fact that Europe has been staggered by numerous wars over its history, and has created the EU as a peace project, without any military force. 'Soft power' is a policy of high potential, a way of using intangible assets to achieve the desired goals in foreign policy in a non-violent way¹. The EU draws on the 'soft power' principles creating its effective image and reputation, motivating other political actors for voluntary cooperation. These principles formed the basis of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The thesis is seeking to analyse the way that the EU is favouring soft power tools in its foreign policy, establishing the relations with the neighbouring countries and guaranteeing security across its borders. The EU prioritized partnership building as the main foreign policy

¹Opt.cit.: NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004

tool within the framework of the ENP² in general and in particular in its Eastern Dimension, after the launch of Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009, preconditioned by the 2004 enlargement when the borders of the EU expanded to the East.

The **relevance** of the current topic is linked to the European security, prosperity and the role of EU as a global actor. That is of the highest interest for the EU to guarantee stability and security across its borders and the Eastern Dimension countries are the important strategic territory and the target of partnership building to work on, since they represent a shared zone of influence and colliding interests between the EU and Russia.

The thesis makes a contribution to the research of the topic providing with the characterization of the theoretical concept of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, description of the use of soft power by the EU, its sources and limits and the argumentation for the effectiveness and relevance of ‘soft power’ approach in the realization of the ENP goals³.

The **main goal** of the research is to answer the research question and prove the hypothesis. The **research question** of the thesis is whether the EU soft power is a relevant approach and an effective foreign policy tool to persuade Eastern Partnership countries for integration with the EU to guarantee stability of its borders? Respectively, the **hypothesis** of the author of the thesis is that the EU soft power is a relevant approach and forceful guarantor of trust gaining and motivation source for Eastern neighbours for partnership building and integration with the EU.

Given the fact that the thesis is a qualitative research, majorly being the analysis of the instruments of the EU foreign policy and the soft power elements contributed into partnership engagement with EaP countries, the **measurement** is not easy to be defined inasmuch as the topic is a point for a debate and cannot be evaluated quantitatively. Subsequently, the main

²Opt.cit.: TULMETS, Elsa. *Is a Soft Method of Coordination Best Adapted to the Context of EU's Neighbourhood?* Workshop: The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation? European University Institute. 1-2 December 2006. pp.2-3.

³Opt. cit.: WALLACE, William. *Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25*. Notre Europe Policy Papers, #4, June 2003.

determinant factor for the measurement of the effectiveness of the policy, even though not the exclusive one, is the act of signing the Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU by the EaP countries; along with the commitment to cooperation, preconditioned by the EU having a constant bilateral dialogue with the targeted states, providing support, building partnership and thus turning these countries onto the way of democratization, political and economic harmonization with the EU.

With regard to the *timing* of the current research, it is framed within the period from the launch of Eastern Partnership in 2009 till nowadays. Justification for this timing is provided by the relevance aiming to prove the hypothesis of the research. Thus, the starting point is linked to the launch of EaP, explained by the fact that since that point the EU has offered a framework for the countries of Eastern dimension for integration with the EU - AA and DCFTA; the end point in the time framing is the act of signing of AA by each country of EaP and giving the fact that not all the EP states yet signed the AA and compromised with the integration with the EU, the end point has not been reached for some of the states and EaP in general, additionally it seems to be relevant to mention the post AA signing dynamics for the states that upon the measurement of the current research proved to be successfully guided by EU soft power and signed the AA, hence the end point is formulated as being till nowadays.

As per formulation of the research question and the hypothesis, the *subject* of the research is the EU soft power, and the *object* of the thesis, hence are the EaP countries, their integrational choice and commitment to the cooperation with the EU.

In order to achieve the main goal of the thesis several *objectives* were accomplished: (1) to determine the concept of soft power, its sources and limits; (2) to picture EU as a soft power actor, providing with basic elements of soft power in EU foreign policies; (3) to investigate the involvement of soft power mechanisms in ENP, on regional level; (4) to describe the development and relevance of Eastern Partnership for EU stability; (5) to examine the soft power within the policies applied through the EaP; (6) to draw the way soft power tools engages for cooperation

through opinion shaping and partnership, guaranteeing stability in the region; (7) to point out the factors influencing on the EU's leverage in EaP, limits of EU soft power; (8) to explore the motivations of integrational choice among the EaP countries; (9) to analyze the effectiveness of the EU soft power in partnership engagement with Ukraine as a Case Study, on country level; (10) to give conclusions, performing the analysis of the research in order to answer the research question and evaluate the fact of proving the hypothesis of the thesis.

As regards the *methodology*, the thesis is a case study, thus it is based fundamentally on using qualitative research methods, including content analysis of textual materials, descriptive observation, documentary analysis, interpretation of theoretical notions and comparison with the real-life picture of state's behaviour. As a matter of fact, the reason for choosing qualitative methods is determined by the main goal and the research question of the thesis: to show whether the soft power tools are effective or not, being in these terms, a question measured by qualitative dimension. The dominant method subsists as empirical analysis, alternatively put, an evidence-based interpretation with respect to the study of relations between states, historical background of events, analysis of the development of political behaviours. Overwhelmingly, qualitative research method contributes into proving the hypothesis of the current research, seeking to interpret meaning of data that helps to understand targeted phenomena of relevance of soft power tools. Qualitative research, designed to reveal the meaning, produces descriptive data and creates an in-depth understanding of the attitudes, interactions and events, comprising the comprehension of credibility of soft power tools applied by the EU in its foreign policy towards EaP countries, in order to persuade them for cooperation and further integration.

Accordingly, the main part of the thesis is based on the shift from descriptive to analytical regime. In a nutshell, the current research is seeking to represent a pyramid in terms of methodological structure, starting with describing the general elements of soft power in EU foreign policies⁴, through applying those onto regional level picturing the soft power tools

⁴Opt. cit.: EU TUOMIOJA, Erkki. The role of Soft Power in EU Common Foreign Policy. International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy. Berlin, 2009.

relevance in Eastern Dimension, ending with narrowing to country level, monitoring soft power effectiveness on the example of Ukraine. Hence, the first chapter provides with the theoretical framework, describing the ‘soft power’ concept and further applying the theory onto the EU foreign policy analysing the EU as a soft power actor. Correspondingly, the second chapter of the thesis, dedicated to the Eastern Partnership, starts similarly with the descriptive part and evaluates into the analysis of the soft power dimension of the EaP⁵ and factors influencing it. Thereupon, the last part of the thesis is a case study, performing a practical way of examining theories and analysis of the above studied, basing on applying the soft power notion and proving the hypothesis of the thesis on the example of a country. The relevance of choosing Ukraine as the subject of case study is due to the fact that it appears as the brightest example of the country, neighbouring the EU, maintaining long-lasting dialogue and receiving numerous EU support, simultaneously situated in the zone of colliding interests and high influence of the EU’s ‘soft’ and Russian ‘hard’ powers⁶. The analysis of the Ukrainian society driven by the European ‘soft’ influence, making its choice in favour for cooperation with the EU and signing the AA and DCFTA with the EU, is contributing into the answering of the research question and justification of the hypothesis of the thesis.

Respectively, the methodology of the thesis determines the *literature and sources* used for the research. The bibliography of the thesis counts with 63 primary sources among which majorly appear documents of European Union, such as Fact Sheets of European External Action Service (EEAS), Declarations of The Council of the European Union, Reports on the implementation of the EU policies (ENP, EaP), Action Plans of the EEAS, Flagship Initiatives, Association Agendas, EEAS statements on Relations with EaP states, EU Neighbours portal materials, European Commission document on Deliverables, Documents from EaP Summits, Joint Communications of European Commission and High Representative of the EEAS,

⁵Opt. cit: PISKORSKA, Beata. The Eastern Partnership – a challenge for the EU’s Soft Power in International Relations. On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, Issue no. 26/2018, p. 78-94.

⁶Opt. cit: ADOMEIT, Hannes. *Russia ENP Competitor*. In: *The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges*, Erwan Lannon (ed.), Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012, pp.381-410, op. cit. pp. 390 – 391.

European Parliament Fact Sheets, Discussion papers, texts of the Association Agreements; at the same time were used several sources from government portals of Sweden, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, as well as materials of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU. Likewise, among primary sources are found several speeches and press releases, and tables with numeric results of public poll on support of pro-European vector in Ukraine. Thus, primary sources hereby provide with the basis for the descriptive parts of the second and third chapters, providing the research with portraying the Neighbourhood Policy of the EU and Eastern Partnership dimension, its historical overview, content and aims, generally, and the policies applied onto the countries of the EaP particularly.

In regard to secondary sources, the thesis comprises 63 of them, including books, academic, scientific and newspaper articles, web pages of news agencies. For the theoretical part of the thesis the most significant works are academic books of Joseph Nye giving the basis for theoretical framework. Providing with the concept of ‘soft power’⁷ and comparing it to ‘hard power’, Nye argues that commanding and threatening is not an exclusive way of influence, one can get desired outcomes “by affecting behaviour”⁸ of the others. Nye defines soft power as indirect way of influence, which gives the opportunity to evaluate upon the concept and argue that in world politics a country might achieve desired outcomes through exerting influence on others making them feel admiration for its values, aspiration for its prosperity and wish to follow its example⁹. Thus, it provided the current research with the basic idea upon which the EU foreign policy was further examined. Likewise the works of Nye contributed into analysis of the EU as a soft power, specifically to analyse it upon its sources; according to Nye there are three primary resources of soft power of a country: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies

⁷Opt cit. NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

⁸NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.2.

⁹Ibid, p. 5.

(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)¹⁰. The above definition served as a basis for researching the sources of power the EU is applying in its foreign policy. Analogically, the work of Olga G. Leonova committed into exploring the sources of soft power. As per Leonova soft power is the sum of external and internal factors of the government, providing recourses upon which a state can draw its soft power and create an “affective image”¹¹ on the global arena. Leonova provides with the extended classification of sources of soft power that is used in the thesis to analyse the policies of the EU towards eastern partners in order to answer the research question. Similarly, Leonova gives a characterization of limits of soft power, diving them into “civilization barriers” and “civilization filters”¹².

Among other works served for rendering theoretical part of the research appears the article of Gallarotti, who evolves the lack of theoretical background of soft power concept¹³. He emphasizes the factors that make soft power a better and more universal way of influence, being globalization, the importance of interdependence in nowadays world and the rising cost of the use of military power¹⁴, adding arguments into proving the demand for prioritizing soft power targeting partnership building and democratization of neighbour states through the ENP. Ian Manners work on normative power Europe was analysed in the thesis, since it is adding to the development of the concept of soft power Europe. Manners suggested the notion of the European Union as a normative power which he explains as ideological influence over other actors and the ability to shape opinions and conceptions of what is ‘normative’¹⁵¹⁶. Kristian L. Nielsen added to

¹⁰Ibid. p.11.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²LEONOVA G., Olga. *Soft Power as a State's Foreign Policy Resource*. Almanac: Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Volgograd: Uchitel Publishing House, 2014, op. cit. p.102.

¹³GALLAROTTI, Giulio M. Soft power: what it is, why it's important, and the conditions for its effective use. *Journal of Political Power*, 4:1, 25-47. April 2011. p. 25.

¹⁴Ibid. op. cit. pp. 37-38.

¹⁵MANNERS, Ian. Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU. The European Union between International and World Society. Conference, Panel 1D, Madison, Wisconsin, USA. May 2001

¹⁶MANNERS, Ian. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *JCMS*, Vol. 40, number 2, pp. 235 – 258.

the argument of capability of effective image creation by the EU stating that the fact of unification of European countries into a peaceful project per se advocates for its attractiveness¹⁷. Additionally, Nielsen's article contributes to the debate giving a critic realistic vision that the values expansion is due to the motivation to guarantee prosperity and security.

The articles of William Wallace, Elsa Tulmets, Erwan Lannon and Peter Van Elsuwege served for rendering the analytical part of the second chapter, providing with an opportunity to investigate the involvement of soft power mechanisms in EU neighbourhood policy and in its Eastern dimension. Wallace indicated that in the context of Neighbourhood policy "the choice of the EU is whether to export security and stability to these new neighbours, or risk importing instability from them"¹⁸. Klatt M. advocated for the role of Poland as the motivation factor for the EU to pay special attention to EaP countries and to prioritize the democratization of eastern neighbours¹⁹. Meanwhile B. Piskorska emphasized the EU's soft power to be realized in EaP through various programs and activities, political cooperation and economic, liberalization of a visa regime, promotion of the European culture as well as the support for development of civil society in Eastern Europe"²⁰. The articles of Adomeit, A. Paul, Vilsauskas R. and Alisauskas R. et al. Provided with the basis to picture the main challenges and limits for soft power relevance in EaP, analysing the role of Russia as ENP competitor.

Proportionately, the third chapter relies on academic articles contributing into examining and proving the effectiveness of the EU soft power in partnership building with Ukraine. The

¹⁷Ibid. op.cit. p.729.

¹⁸WALLACE, William. *Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25*. Notre Europe Policy Papers, #4, June 2003, p. 4.

¹⁹KLATT Malgorzata. *Poland and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles*. Journal of Contemporary Research. Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 1-16

²⁰PISKORSKA, Beata. *The Eastern Partnership – a challenge for the EU's Soft Power in International Relations*. On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, Issue no. 26/2018, p. 78-94. p.8.

works of Riabchuk²¹, P. Goble²², Shumylo-Tapiola²³ evaluate on factors limiting the EU leverage in Ukraine, including internal (ambiguity of the position between member states) and external ones (mainly Russia factor). Wolczuk K. referred to the situation occurred by the 2014 as for Ukraine to be put in front of the decision between two regional integration proposals²⁴ (cooperation with the EU or membership in Eurasian Union). Developing the idea the thesis relied on 5 articles of Ukrainian social scientists, Frolov²⁵, Shilov²⁶, Pashina N.P.²⁷, Shubravskaya and Prokopenko²⁸, Skriba²⁹, contributing into the more detailed study of what the Ukrainian society was experiencing, facing the integrational choice and factors influenced on it, which contributed into the analysis of the way the EU soft power exerting its influence onto the mindset of the society to support the EU orientated vector in foreign policy of Ukraine.

Having considered above the goals and objectives of the research, they determine the **structure** of the thesis. Presented work consists of introduction, three chapters and conclusion (with list of contents and bibliography as a must). The first chapter: “*Soft Power: Theoretical Framework of the EU Foreign Policy*” performs an outline of the theoretical approach, divided into two parts, it draws on the concept of soft power, the differences of soft and hard power and the usage of soft power in the EU foreign policy. The second chapter is dedicated to the study of

21[□]RIABCHUK, Mykola. *The European Neighbourhood Policy and Beyond: Facilitating the Free Movement of People within the Framework of EU-Ukraine. Post-Revolutionary Relations*, 2010, pp.10

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27[□]PASHINA, N.P. *Crisis of Political Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Foreign Policy Aspect*. Luhansk: Academic Journal “Scientific Vedomosti”, 2014, No. 8 (179), Edition 30, pp. 167 – 172.

28[□]SHUBRAVSKAYA E.V., PROKOPENKO E.A. *Ukraine’s Integration Perspectives: Advantages and Risks for the Agrarian Sector*. Kiev: Academic Journal “The Economy of Ukraine”, 2014, No. 1 (618), pp. 63 – 73.

29[□]SKRIBA, Andrei. *Challenges of Eurasian integration after the Ukrainian Crisis*. Academic Journal “Vestnik of international organizations”, 2014, No. 3, pp. 96 – 111.

Eastern Partnership as the EU soft power policy, thus, following primarily description of the genesis and development of the EaP, then it analyzes the EaP through the prism of soft power, featuring at the same time limits of soft power in the region and the role of Russia challenging the EU in the East. In pursuit, the second chapter finishes with characterization of EaP countries and their choice of regional integration. The third chapter represents a case study, the practical aim of which is to show the relevance and effectiveness of the EU soft power applied on Ukraine. Subsequently, it depicts Ukrainian steps towards building closer partnership with the EU, explains the factors influencing on Ukraine and describes the decision making in favor for the integration with the EU through signing the AA. The work finishes with drawing conclusions on the impact and contribution of the EU soft power in partnership building in Eastern Europe.

1. SOFT POWER: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 The concept of Soft Power, its sources and limits

Each actor on the world political arena is seeking for gaining and maximizing its power. Consequently, comes the question what is “power”? Joseph Nye, one of the most important American political scientists of the modern times, contributed to the research and evaluation of the concept of power. As drafted by J. Nye in his book “Soft Power the means to success in the world politics” Oxford dictionary provides the definition of “power”: firstly the term appears as the ability or capacity to do something or act in a particular way; secondly it is defined as the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behaviour of others or the course of events to get the outcomes one wants”³⁰. Hence, having this very ability to influence and to get the desired

³⁰ NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.1,2.

outcomes has ever been of the highest interest for any state; and longing for power induced people to search for its sources.

Nye categorized power according to the three main ways of influence, among them are: “to coerce with threats, to induce with payments and to attract and co-opt”³¹. Historically, the way of influencing others has been done through coercion – “the action or practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats”³², recognized as “hard power”. It could be defined in practice as the use of political and economic means of coercion to influence the behaviour and interests of the other party, which has a smaller military and political force³³.

Hard power concept has ever been the main way of influence on global arena from the realist perspective. Realists based on ideas that the capability of exerting influence directly depends on material and military strength. John Mearsheimer, one of the significant scholars of contemporary realist school defined that “potential power <of a state> is based on the size of its population and the level of its wealth”³⁴ being the two main basic elements of military force. At the same time the “state's actual power is embedded mainly in its army and the air and naval forces that directly support it”³⁵. Similarly, in the work of Kenneth N. Waltz American neorealist one can find the idea that “in international politics force serves not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one”³⁶.

Joseph Nye further formalized that the hard power is the ability to use "carrot and stick"³⁷: to "stick" Nye intends threats of military intervention, economic sanctions, coercive diplomacy; for "carrot" intends incentives such as offers of alliance, military protection promises or

³¹ Ibid.

³² Oxford English Dictionary. *Coercion*. Oxford University Press, 2019.

³³ NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp. 2-4

³⁴ MEARSHEIMER, John J. *The tragedy of great politics*. New York: Norton & Company, 2001, p.23.

³⁵ Ibid. p.23.

³⁶ WALTZ, Kenneth N. *Theory of international politics*. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 113.

³⁷ NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp. p.5

reduction of trade barriers. According to Ernest Wilson hard power is the ability to force an individual to act in a different way from how it would act if he were free to choose³⁸. And it is possible to measure the hard power of a nation through quantitative indices, such as the population, the military state capacity and the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Nye argues that commanding and threatening is not an exclusive way of influence, one can get desired outcomes “by affecting behaviour”³⁹ of the others. Thus, the object of influence would be persuaded to do what the other wanted as he would feel that he shares the beliefs and find the goals of the subject of power legitimate⁴⁰. This is, as Nye stated, as indirect way to influence or as he calls is “the second face of power”. Putting it into practice, it would mean that in world politics a country might get favourable influence on others making them feel admiration for its values, aspiration for its prosperity and wish to follow its example⁴¹. In this context arises the term of ‘Soft Power’ as an indirect realisation of power of a state resting “on the ability to shape the preferences of others”⁴².

Joseph Nye is the founder of the concept of soft power, which he opposed to the concept of hard power, he first brought up the term in 1990 in his book “Bound to Lead: The changing Nature of American Power” where he knocked off the concept with the following: “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants”⁴³. Apparently, the concept is not completely clear. Soft power, as Nye highlighted, is something more than just

38 WILSON, Ernest J. *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power – Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008, Vol.616 p. 115.

39 NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.2.

40 Ibid. p. 2.

41 Ibid, p. 5.

42 NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. p. 5.

43 NYE, Joseph. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

a persuasion, but also the ability to attract, so it can be called an attractive power and its “resources are the assets that produce such attraction”⁴⁴.

Sources of Soft Power

As Joseph Nye draws soft power is a power of attraction and thus the resources of soft power are the means that can create the attraction⁴⁵ and persuade cooperation. Nye further determines that there are three primary resources of soft power of a country: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)⁴⁶. Majorly the resources for the power of persuasion and attractiveness of a state are the intangible factors and values it is exerted by a state and the persuasion mechanism, shaping preferences of the others works when other states are turned to share the same values.

Evaluation on the concepts of Nye, Olga G. Leonova in the article “Soft Power as a State’s Foreign Policy Resource” expands the classification of the resources of soft power. She suggests that if we would look at it widely - soft power is the sum of external and internal factors of the government⁴⁷. If we try to analyse the possible external factors, we could propose several, such as: (1) foreign policy and reputation in foreign affairs; (2) the status of the country in geopolitics and global hierarchy; (3) the civilization status (all countries have its national country, but not all of them are coming from a civilization); (4) political and economic model of the development; (5) strategy of the development of the country and its ability to realize the strategy on practice; (6) the informational and media resources of the country, its communicational mobility. Between internal or also called socio-cultural factors could be determined following ones: (1) ideology; (2) the style, standards and quality of life; (3) values (including the national idea); (4) the

⁴⁴ NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.6.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p.11.

⁴⁷ LEONOVA G., Olga. *Soft Power as a State’s Foreign Policy Resource*. Almanac: Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Volgograd: Uchitel Publishing House, 2014, p.100.

mentality; (5) the culture of the country (art, literature, cinema, drama, pop culture); (6) the creative potential of a country, ability to introduce new inventions and technologies.⁴⁸

As follows, all of the mentioned factors can provide recourses upon which a state can draw its soft power and create an “affective image”⁴⁹ on the global arena. Leonova explained a double view on the image of a country: the image that a state creates is a component of soft power as well as soft power can be seen as a tool to build the image⁵⁰. Extending the understanding of the concept, Leonova reveals the understanding of soft power as an impact created by influence⁵¹. This influence is implemented basing on the sources of soft power: the intangible assets of a state that produce an effect on other states; the power exerted and sourced by attractiveness is realized un a peaceful way with no political, economic or social loss, what makes soft power an attractive and beneficial way of influence.

Efficient use of soft power resources nurtures persuasion and conviction in the object of power of sharing same beliefs, values, ethics and ideas in one or more areas, creating the effect of support and share that spills over to more / all areas. Such as economic cooperation between states can create an effect of synchronizing their positions in foreign policy.

Among the tools of soft power one can distinguish mass media and political speeches and articles, information flows translated and accessible for foreign countries, foreign policy vector and political behaviour of the government, marketing capacity of a state, its popularity, touristic attraction, sport and cultural achievements, contribution to world’s science, countries language and its popularity, system of education and the prestige of universities, educational exchanges the representatives of the nation living abroad (the information spread by expatriates), cultural, political and economic dialogues with other states⁵².

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 LEONOVA G., Olga. *Soft Power as a State’s Foreign Policy Resource*. Almanac: Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Volgograd: Uchitel Publishing House, 2014, op. cit. p. 101.

Hence on the grounds of examination of its resources, soft power gives an opportunity even to smaller countries, that have no or very limited military force, to influence in an indirect way on the international affairs. Therefore, any country no matter big or small it is, no matter of its geographical position and military resources can use soft power to reach its goals on the international field. This means that one can come to a conclusion that soft power is more universal and flexible instrument of foreign policy⁵³.

Limits of Soft Power

Soft power as any source of influence has its limits. Joseph Nye while talking about the limits of soft power, mentions that for soft power mechanisms to work successfully several factors should be taken into account, such as conditions under which the attractiveness is supposed to shape behaviours. As Nye argues “all power depends on context”⁵⁴, hence he specifies that popular culture of a state has more possibility to attract other states and perform persuasion and expansion of values in a context when these actors have at least to some extent similarities between their culture. For instance, it occurs to be quite unlikely that some particular values shared by Western states and democracies would be equally met with enthusiasm in the East, Asia or Arabic world. As an example we can think of the role of woman and gender relationship: while it is completely normal for western states that a man and a woman would share to costs of a dinner, in Russia for example, it would be offensive for a woman if the man would not pay the bill; the same as it may seem shocking for democratic societies that in some states in middle east a woman is not sitting at the table together with man. So, in this context gender equality might not be popular in the countries where traditions and mentality in this aspect are different. The same would happen if one would try to expand the values of sexual revolution in Islamic states where people stick to family values⁵⁵. Thus, the limitation of soft

⁵³ Ibid., op. cit. p.100.

⁵⁴ NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.16.

⁵⁵ LEONOVA G., Olga. *Soft Power as a State's Foreign Policy Resource*. Almanac: Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Volgograd: Uchitel Publishing House, 2014, op. cit. p.102.

power would primarily lie in the scope of socio-cultural life of a nation state and its traditions. Based on this, Leonova comes up with the definition of two limiting factors of soft power, those are: “civilization barriers” and “civilization filters”⁵⁶.

Civilization barriers are explained to be the mechanisms that deny certain social, cultural, political or economic realities, some culture specific elements that do not bind and could not be understood by a given country. These ‘barriers’ appeal to the scope of national mindset and consciousness of a country, so that when a value of state- subject of soft power results to be inappropriate for the object of persuasion, civilization barriers would reject and suspend the acquisition of those values⁵⁷.

Another factor to limit soft power are civilization filters, that could be explained as processes of conversion or modification. ‘Filters’ do not reject exported phenomena but try to adapt it. The context applied here is when a nation state object of soft power may not fully share the principles of exported values but would still not refuse it in full; this is when the mechanisms of civilization filters adopt the values transforming them to be more suitable for a given state⁵⁸. Nye concludes that in the context of modern world politics, transforming its vector towards the successful use of intangible power sources, the main limitation it encounters is the fact that unfortunately many states in the world are not yet advanced democracies, using soft power in their foreign policy⁵⁹.

Despite of the limits of soft power described above that appear to explain themselves not in a negative way for the concept itself, without withdrawing the might of soft power, many sceptics still heavily criticize the concept, arguing that when it comes to soft power, governments are not in full control of mechanisms of influence.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid. op. cit. p.102.

⁵⁸ Ibid. op. cit. p.102.

⁵⁹ NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, op. cit. p.30.

Critical debate on Soft Power

François-Bernard Huyghe, French political scientist in his article “Soft power and its limits” debates that soft power is difficult to be distinguished from public diplomacy, having the same goals and the same ideology⁶⁰. Soft power as a tool to influence and expand one’s values occurs to have an effect on those actors who already find themselves to some extent keen to share the given ideology. Huyghe argues that Nye’s idea of successful use of soft power by the United States of America (USA) is based on “syncretic notion”⁶¹, meaning that the attractiveness of the American way of life and the American dream is desired per se and should be appealing for the rest of the world. Further elaboration on the topic, Huyghe questions if soft power is thus a “descriptive or prescriptive notion”⁶² and he answers this question, stating that on the one hand it is descriptive when it comes to the justification of America being a brand creating state that is the world leading opinion maker. At the same time the soft power concept, as he argues, can be adopted by other actors as a mechanism or a program to copy for gaining success in world politics by value expansion. In this scenario the advantage of soft power is highlighted by the author as the way to exert power with minimum cost.

In the article “Soft power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use” Giulio M. Gallarotti evolves the lack of theoretical background of soft power concept⁶³. He emphasizes the factors that make soft power a better and more universal way of influence. Among those factors are globalization and the importance of interdependence in nowadays world; the rising cost of using military power, including nuclear power, that proved its disutility conditioned by the processes of democratization in the world politics⁶⁴. Additionally, as Gallarotti argues nowadays society, preconditioned by social and political changes and the

⁶⁰ HUYGHE, Francois Bernard. Soft power and its limits. 24/10/2017, p.1.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., p.2.

⁶³ GALLAROTTI, Giulio M. Soft power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use. *Journal of Political Power*, 4:1, 25-47. April 2011. p. 25.

⁶⁴ Ibid. op. cit. pp. 37-38.

development of trade relations, favors economic ties and economic goals of states rather than world domination through aggression and militarization. Together with that, modern state relations are bound by numerous international organizations and coexist in terms of cooperation and partnership⁶⁵. Gallarotti subsequently formulates four “prescriptions for instituting strategies of soft power”⁶⁶: he remarks that theories of power should be up to date, meaning that political scientists have to adjust the theories of the concept of power with the contemporary view on it and the situation on the political arena. The consequences of use of strategies for amplifying and reinforcing power should be taken into account by political elites and decision makers as a must. He adds that policymakers “must think in terms of net rather than nominal power”⁶⁷ and lastly politicians should focus on results and consequences more than on tools and resources⁶⁸. In a nutshell, Gallarotti, although admitting that soft power lacks some theoretical background, states that it is a powerful mechanism of influence in international relations.

Likewise, Nye advocates in defence of the relevance of soft power in world politics, emphasizing that soft power is a crucial tool on global arena to promote democratization, human rights and opening of markets⁶⁹. Soft power occurs to be the only effective influence having a potential to contribute to the pursue of democratization of the world, considering that it seems impossible to coerce a state to be democratic, in contrast with attracting to shift to democracy. Taking into account the limits of soft power and the fact that its effectiveness may be circumscribed by the context in which applied, does not mean it is less powerful. As Nye debates military power and coercion neither have been always effective in transforming world in a prosper democratic environment⁷⁰.

65 Ibid. op. cit. pp. 38-39.

66 Ibid. p. 39

67 Ibid. p. 40

68 Ibid. p. 41.

69 Op. cit: NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

70 Op. cit. NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

1.2 The soft power of the European Union

Joseph Nye throughout his publications on soft power urged and promoted the idea of the USA being the world leader in successful implementation of soft power in its foreign policy⁷¹. Although the USA is not the exclusive actor on the world political arena to execute intangible assets in order to exert its influence. The European Union is the key actor on global arena to adopt and implement the basis of soft power. It could be argued that the EU mastered its power of attractiveness.

The current thesis research would further focus on EU as a soft power in more details, basing on the analysis of how the EU implements the resources of soft power categorized by Nye. Although prior to look at the concept more precisely, it occurs important to mention the development of thoughts of EU and its power implementation patterns and the scientific overview of the concept on the topic. Erkki Tumioja, a Finnish politician, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, supported the idea of EU being soft power, mainly upholding to the EU enlargement policy as the brightest example of effective soft power tools application. He emphasized the prospective of membership as a powerful instrument of motivation for countries to adopt EU values within the framework of Copenhagen Criteria⁷².

Within the discourse of soft power, it is not possible not to mention normative power Europe concept. Ian Manners in his work called “Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU” is seeking to prove his major innovative claim of the EU’s role on the international arena as being normative power rather than military or civilian ones. In his article Manners argues with other political scientists about the role of the EU he opposes the military power Europe and looks into widening Francois Duchene’s theory of Europe being a ‘civilian power’, likewise Karen Smith, who basing on the concept of unification of the member states

⁷¹Op. cit Ibid.

⁷²TUOMIOJA, Erkki. The role of Soft Power in EU Common Foreign Policy. International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy. Berlin, 2009.

sought to prove the relevance of Europe as a civilian power. Manners suggested the notion of the European Union as a normative power which he explains as ideological influence over other actors and the ability to shape opinions and conceptions of what is ‘normative’⁷³⁷⁴. Anna Michalski similarly advocated for the normative power Europe, supporting the idea that Europe has the ability to shape what is ‘normative’ outside its borders, however her approach is less optimistic, since normative power is to be considered as power with the limitation to its effective application⁷⁵. On the contrary, a bunch of political scientists from the realistic and neorealist school of thought (Hyde-Price, Nicholas Smith, Kenneth Waltz) wrote various papers where they disagree with ‘normative’ or ‘ethical’ power of Europe, looking at the EU from realistic perspective, they argued that its actions in its foreign politics are majorly caused by its own interests and there has to be seen a little of an ethical or “normative-focused”⁷⁶ actor EU, rather than EU – rational player^{77,78,79}.

The development of the concept brought the notion of ‘smart power’, first mentioned by Joseph Nye in 2011 in his book “Future of power” where he remarked that hard and soft power can co-influence and co-exist and the balance of the assets of hard and soft power creates ‘smart power’⁸⁰. Gallarotti supported the idea, claiming that ‘smart power’ is to generate more

73[□]MANNERS, Ian. Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU. The European Union between International and World Society. Conference, Panel 1D, Madison, Wisconsin, USA. May 2001

74[□]MANNERS, Ian. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS, Vol. 40, number 2, pp. 235 – 258.

75[□]MICHALSKI, Anna. The EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion. The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. Edited by Jan Melissen. Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. pp.124-144

76[□]SMITH, Nicholas R. *A theoretical framework for the analysis of EU – Russian interaction in Ukraine: a neoclassical realist-inspired approach*. From EU-Russian Relations and the Ukraine Crisis. Chapter 1, pp.11-31. 2016. p.20

77[□]SMITH, Nicholas R. The EU under a realist scope: Employing a neoclassical realistic framework for the analysis of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement offer to Ukraine. International Relations. 2016 Vol. 30 (I).pp. 29-48.

78[□]HYDE-PRICE, Adrian. *‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique*. Journal of European Public Policy, 13:2, pp. 217-234

79[□]WALTZ, Kenneth N. *Theory of international politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1979.

80[□]NYE, Joseph. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs. 2011.

effectiveness rather than soft or hard power apart. He further named “theoretical development and historical application of the idea of smart power” as “cosmopolitan power”⁸¹. Oli Rehn, EU commissioner for Enlargement, made a speech on Europe’s smart power promoting the concept as the answer for search of tactics for stronger global actorness of the EU⁸². According to Dr. Mai’a K. Davis Cross the “smart power” concept is yet deficient in academic research, coming up in oral rhetoric speeches, meetings, conferences (she provides the example of a Brussels-based think tank, which held a conference at the European Parliament in 2009 to discuss EU smart power) and between the works of several political scientists. The use of soft power skills together with military forces of member states, where soft power is still understood as the main strength of the EU and added value of military resources should occur specifically targeted contributes into rise of smart power⁸³. Davis Cross highlights the strong belief in a high potential of the theory the same as Amal Varghese⁸⁴, proponent of the idea that behind the ‘smart power’ lies the future of the development of scientific thought of the EU’s role.

Considering the EU as primarily a ‘soft power’ the current research would thus justify whether it correlates to the theory and how the EU implements soft power. Resting on the study of Joseph Nye, who determined the resources of soft power to be divided under three categories, as mentioned above: culture, political values and foreign policies⁸⁵.

With ‘culture’ as a resource could be understood series of elements and values that characterize a society. The more these values are universal, more policies to export them to the

81[□]GALLAROTTI, Giulio M. Soft power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use. *Journal of Political Power*, 4:1, 25-47. April 2011. p.25, 42-43.

82[□]REHN, Olli. Europe's smart power in its region and the world. Speech at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, 1 May 2008 at 5 p.m.

83[□]DAVIS CROSS, Mai’a K. *Europe as a Smart Power: The Impact of the European External Action Service*. Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. August 2011.

84[□]VARGHESE, Amal. The EU been described as a civilian power, normative power and soft power. How would you characterize the EU’s power potential? 2011.

85[□]Opt.cit: NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

rest of the world will have chances of success, the greater the consensus for the initiatives taken by the nations who support them.

The European art, literature, music, design, fashion and cuisine is getting the world's interest during ages. A lot of European countries have their strong cultural attractiveness, for example: the most important and the most spoken languages of the world are coming from Europe, Europe is a continent with rich history, the home of major significant works of art, music and literature. The critics might comment that there is no such a thing as the culture of the EU, since only member states have cultural identity⁸⁶, however all member states individually have contributed to the growth of the soft power based on cultural resources of the EU as a whole. EU foreign policy goals relying on cultural resources can be transmitted through cultural programs, conferences, exhibitions, guest performances, trade, personal contacts, mass media, travelling, school and university exchanges.

Europe is also attractive in a political way. The countries of Europe, members of the EU definitely do a lot to gain the world respect, but the biggest factor that makes Europe the leading soft power is the notion of the 'union'. As Kristian L. Nielsen argues, the fact of unification of European countries into a peaceful project per se advocates for its attractiveness⁸⁷. The idea of the EU, where there is no possibility of war between its member states, that were fighting each other during centuries and the aim of the Union to create a zone of economic growth (Single Market), common space for European with common border policy (Schengen zone) for peace and prosperity, gives it positive image across the whole world⁸⁸. It is a fact that France, Sweden, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain have more live expectancy index

⁸⁶NIELSEN L Kristian. *EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap*. Journal of Contemporary European Research. Vol 9, Issue 5, 2013. pp. 723-739. p.729

⁸⁷Ibid. op.cit. p.729.

⁸⁸NIELSEN L Kristian. *EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap*. Journal of Contemporary European Research. Vol 9, Issue 5, 2013. op. cit. p.729

than the USA⁸⁹, Germany and Great Britain are the most popular destinations for asylum seekers, almost all European countries send a big part of its GDP to help the developing countries, promoting democratization on the example of its own prosperity.

The political values interpreted and promoted by the EU are reflected in its foreign policies and in its behaviour in international bodies, aiming to impact the behaviour of other states. Through its foreign policies the EU is urging its normative goals or ‘milieu goals’ as noted by Nielsen⁹⁰ with the reference to Hyde-Price, who in his article “‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique” affirmed that states, driven by the aim of creation stability across its borders pursue ‘milieu goals’⁹¹, those being goals and values of a nation or a state to guarantee its prosperity and security, propagandized to the outside world, a concept brought by Arnold Wolfers⁹².

As far as declared on the page of the European Commission, the EU upholds to its interests articulated as its goals: “to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens; offer freedom, security and justice; sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive market economy with full employment and social progress, and environmental protection; combat social exclusion and discrimination; promote scientific and technological progress; enhance economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity”⁹³ and values: “Human dignity, Freedom, Democracy, Equality, Rule of law, Human rights”⁹⁴.

89 GONZALES, Selena; SAWYER Bradley. *How does U.S. life expectancy compare to other countries?* Peterson-Kaiser Health System Tracker. May 2017, <https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-life-expectancy-compare-countries/#item-u-s-lowest-life-expectancy-birth-among-comparable-countries>

90 NIELSEN, L Kristian. *EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap*. Journal of Contemporary European Research. Vol 9, Issue 5, 2013. pp. 723-739. p.729

91 HYDE-PRICE, Adrian. *‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique*. Journal of European Public Policy, 13:2, pp. 217-234. p.222.

92 WOLFERS, Arnold. *Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1962, pp. 73-75.

93 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *Overall goals of the EU*.

94 Ibid.

Amid various definitions, EU foreign and security policy goals are pictured on the web page of the Commission, as follows: to “preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote international cooperation, develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”⁹⁵. Consequently, in order to effectuate its rhetoric, the EU institutions, precisely the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the EU are working together to ensure the realization of the goals through EU policies and programs. The major external policies are the enlargement policy, aid and humanitarian assistance, trade, climate, environment and energy, and neighbourhood policy⁹⁶. Current research would further focus on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and will seek to apply the concept of EU soft power discussed in the theoretical chapter in order to prove the hypothesis of the thesis of the relevance of soft power in EU’s foreign policy. Guided by the fact that the essential pillar of the EU’s strategy is security across its border lines and peace keeping, current research would use as a basis ENP in general, focusing on Eastern Partnership in concrete.

95 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *Foreign & Security Policy*.

96 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *Foreign Affairs*.

2. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AS THE EU SOFT POWER INSTRUMENT

2.1 *The European Neighbourhood Policy*

European Neighbourhood Policy that was established in 2004 preconditioned by the fifth and the largest enlargement of the Union (2004) when ten new countries became member states of the EU, expanding its borders. At the time of the eastern enlargement debate in Europe, the idea to elaborate a specialized policy was coming initially from United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland and Germany (with a special role of Poland in the debate) in favour for the Eastern dimension with further France, Italy and Spain advocated for the necessity of partnership framework with Mediterranean region⁹⁷. Consequently, under the framework of the ENP are carried out the relationships with 16 neighbouring countries in the south (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia) and in the east (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), excluding Russia, being a partner in Cross-Border Cooperation activities under the ENP, but not a member as such⁹⁸.

The establishment of the ENP was stipulated by the objective of strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of the EU, its new member states and nearest neighbourhood in the context of enlarged borders⁹⁹. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the ENP was handed into a new institution body European External Action Service (EEAS) established to govern foreign policy of the EU, facilitating the coherence of foreign policies of member states and diplomatic discourse of the EU. In 2011 the policy experienced redevelopment related to the rise of democratic aspiration during the ‘Arab Spring’, when the European Commission launched “A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy”¹⁰⁰. The reviewed strategy was offering

97[□]TULMETS, Elsa. *Is a Soft Method of Coordination Best Adapted to the Context of EU’s Neighbourhood?* Workshop: The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation? European University Institute. 1-2 December 2006. pp.2-3.

98[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *European Neighbourhood Policy*.

99[□]Ibid.

100[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy*. IP/11/643. Brussels 25 May 2011.

“new types of support for more sections of society and <introducing> more incentives to pursue reform”¹⁰¹, seeking “to strengthen individual and regional relationships between the EU” and its neighbours “through a ‘more funds for more reform’ approach”¹⁰². With the developments and new challenges taking place around the neighbourhood (rise of Islamic State (ISIL), aggressive Russian foreign policy) in 2015 upon the request of Member States and the proposal of President Juncker the European Commission and the HR for Foreign Affairs issued a Joint Communication with the Review of the ENP¹⁰³. The document formulated revised principles of the policy, its scope and outlined the instruments and how should they be used and the way the “new ENP <would> play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development”¹⁰⁴. Under the altered framework the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) the main financial instrument to implement the ENP was triggered off with 2014-2020 budget of €15.4 billion, meant for funding programs for the 16 ENP partner countries. ENP bases on 3 joint priorities for cooperation: economic development for stabilization, security dimension, migration and mobility¹⁰⁵. ENI funding, in order to meet the goals of cooperation priorities, is used in various programs on the regional level (regional programs, Neighbourhood-wide and Cross Border Cooperation) and on the country level (bilateral cooperation between the EU and each of the Neighbour partner country)¹⁰⁶. The cooperation agenda for bilateral actions is outlined in ENP Action Plans (AP), mutually agreed with each partner country¹⁰⁷. The milestone point of bilateral relations between the EU and the partner states is the signing of Association Agreement (AA), a

101[□] Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy*. IP/11/643. Brussels 25 May 2011, page 2.

102[□] Ibid. page 1

103[□] European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions. Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Brussels, 18.11.2015. JOIN (2015) 50 final.

104[□] Ibid

105[□] Ibid.

106[□] Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *European Neighbourhood Policy*.

107[□] Ibid.

legal framework for the cooperation, which offers “most favoured Nation treatment” and “privileged relationship”¹⁰⁸ being the basis for further cooperation and closer partnership and integration. Typically the signing of AA implement as well agreements on economic integration in order to reduce trade barriers - Free Trade Areas (FTA) or establishing of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) (case of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine).

European Neighbourhood Policy one of the essential parts of foreign policy of the EU can be argued to be a soft power policy, forasmuch as the pillars of the cooperation is the promotion of the EU of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights with the asset of monetary aid and the prospective of possible enlargement (the most effective tool of influence) to the Neighbour partner states in exchange for cooperation and integration with EU values. William Wallace indicated that in the context of Neighbourhood policy “the choice of the EU is whether to export security and stability to these new neighbours, or risk importing instability from them”¹⁰⁹ and this particular export of stability is understood to be feasible through the use of soft power assets, in other words, by exporting norms of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law. In the context of soft power implication within the ENP the current thesis would further concentrate on the Eastern regional level of the ENP, considering the fact that the Eastern dimension was the driving factor of the ENP as such.

2.2 The Eastern Partnership: genesis and soft power dimension

The Eastern Partnership completes the project of the European Neighbourhood Policy, emerged particularly due to the EU’s enlargement to the east. Poland was the proponent of creation of a specific framework for cooperation with Eastern Neighbours starting from first enouncing the idea during its pre accession negotiations in 1998 when its Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek (in office 1997 - 2000) “called for the creation of an “Eastern

¹⁰⁸Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *Association Agreements*, 11/05/2011.

¹⁰⁹WALLACE, William. *Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25*. Notre Europe Policy Papers, #4, June 2003, p. 4.

Dimension” of EU’s external relations”¹¹⁰ when he highlighted: “Poland’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, (...) will enhance the EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours, contributing to the development of open and partner-like relations with countries remaining outside the enlarged Union.”¹¹¹ This was followed by 2003 issue of a non-paper on the “Eastern Dimension” and speeches of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland W. Cimoszewicz (in office 2001 - 2005) empowering the discourse. Poland having close ties primarily with Ukraine was concerned about possible uprising of dividing lines in the east, particularly in the scope of trade, peoples and goods movement between countries¹¹².

However, cooperation with the eastern states is not only the aftermath of Polish security concerns, but also a product of its national identity. As Klatt defined in his article “Poland and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles”: with the collapse of communism and EU membership Poland has found itself as a medium actor between East and West. The perception of a return to Europe consists not only of the idea of joining the EU, but also re-establishing the European identity of Central Europe. Thus, the democratization of Poland’s neighbours has been the priority of its foreign policy vector¹¹³. Further noted by Klatt, Poland was driven by a belief that its own experience in transformation the face of the county from communist oppressed to democratic state with market economy can give it power to help other eastern states to turn onto the path of democracy. In this context Klatt notices that Poland finds itself to be a soft power actor who delivers EU norms of rule-based international order to the east, as it comes up from

110[□]TULMETS, Elsa. *Is a Soft Method of Coordination Best Adapted to the Context of EU’s Neighbourhood?* Workshop: The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation? European University Institute. 1-2 December 2006. p.4.

111[□]Geremek, B. (1998). Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on the Opening of Poland’s Negotiations on Membership of the European Union, Brussels, 31 March. In: KLATT Malgorzata. *Poland and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles*. Journal of Contemporary Research. Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 1-16, p.6.

112[□]CASIER, Tom. *European Neighbourhood Policy and the Paradoxes of Enlargement*. Administration and Public Management Review, The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, No. 7, 2006, p. 103

113[□]KLATT Malgorzata. *Poland and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles*. Journal of Contemporary Research. Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 1-16, p.3.

the words of Radoslaw Sikorski, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, quoted in Klatt's article: "Protecting human rights as well as the rule of law and democracy have become a Polish passion"¹¹⁴.

Major proposals outlined by Poland included creation of a policy targeting the establishment of the cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (similarly to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started with Barcelona Process in 1995 and Northern Dimension initiated on the request of Finland in 1997). Along with the Polish in non-paper on "Eastern Dimension", that urged the policy to be based on three main pillars: the community, the governmental (of member states, including bilateral agreements to be developed within a multilateral framework); and non-governmental¹¹⁵. And ultimately the proposals appealed for the possibility for the Eastern Neighbours (meaning primarily Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) to be granted the perspective of joining the EU once they would fulfil the accession criteria¹¹⁶.

Therefore, Polish proposal for creation of Eastern Dimension in ENP contributed to the EU's foreign policy, re-established the role of Poland on the EU arena. With Polish political elite defining Poland being a middle-man between the West and the East, and as Klatt concludes analysing Polish decision makers discourse, Poland's self-identification is characterized as "a promoter of EU's norms, translator of the EU's law"¹¹⁷, proponent of democratization on the east and facilitator of EU's vision of cooperation with the east on the basis of a normative approach and soft power application in bilateral and multilateral relations¹¹⁸.

114 Ibid.

115 TULMETS, Elsa. *Is a Soft Method of Coordination Best Adapted to the Context of EU's Neighbourhood?* Workshop: The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation? European University Institute. 1-2 December 2006. p.4.

116 KLATT Malgorzata. *Poland and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles*. Journal of Contemporary Research. Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 1-16, p.3.

117 Ibid, p.6.

118 Ibid. p.6

Eastern Partnership was finally inaugurated in May 2009 during the first Eastern Partnership summit in Prague, Czech Republic. After Polish proposals moving around for about a decade, it was further supported by Sweden (In June 2008 Polish-Swedish Proposal on Eastern Partnership was handed to the EU¹¹⁹) and the inauguration was favourably preconditioned by Swedish presidency of the EU Council¹²⁰. The main goal Eastern Partnership (EaP) is to bring the 6 targeted states closer to the EU, deepening the political and economic integration¹²¹.

The cooperation is realized on bilateral and multilateral levels. Multilateral track contributes to a region-building process in Eastern Neighbourhood. Within its framework, the European Commission organized the multilateral interaction of four thematic platforms, each focusing on a key areas of cooperation: “(1) democracy, good governance and stability; (2) economic integration and convergence with EU policies; (3) energy security; (4) and contacts between people”¹²². In order to give more visibility and focus to the four thematic platforms, the multilateral framework of the Partnership provided the flagship initiatives, among those are: (1) the border management programme; (2) the instrument for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs); (3) the development of regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources; (4) diversification of energy supplies; (5) prevention, preparedness and response to natural disasters and man-made disasters and the initiative of environmental governance¹²³.

Bilateral cooperation is based on the AAs and DCFTAs, each AA consists of four sections: political dialogue and security and foreign policy issues; justice and human rights; economic cooperation and free trade area under DCFTA part, the agenda of which includes

119[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site: *Polish-Swedish Proposal on the Eastern Partnership*. EU Neighbours Library. 2008.

120[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site: Report on the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

121[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *Eastern Partnership*.

122[□] Council of the European Union. *Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit. Prague, 7 May 2009*. Brussels, 7 May 2009. 8435/09 (Presse 78), p.9.

123[□]European Commission. *Eastern Partnership Summit to strengthen EU links with Eastern Europe and South Caucasus*. IP/09/700. Brussels, 6 May 2009, p.3.

improved opened trade with free accessibility to goods and services in stable legal environment¹²⁴. Another significant incentive offered by the bilateral track is visa dialogue and “Visa facilitation and readmission agreements”, allowing and promoting greater mobility of citizens with a prospective for visa-free regime for certain EaP partners¹²⁵.

The major channel of communication of the EaP is the organization of summits, which are held every two years starting from 2009, the launch of the EaP and provide political guidance for further development of the EaP (2009 – Prague, 2011 – Warsaw, 2013 – Vilnius, 2015 – Riga, 2017 – Brussels). The summits are held on the level of heads of states or governments of the partner countries and the President of the European Council representing the EU, with the participation of the President of the European Commission. In addition to that meetings of ministers of foreign affairs are taking place on the annual basis¹²⁶. The social structure of the EaP is further completed by Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (inter-parliamentary forum of EaP)¹²⁷, Civil Society Forum (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum), CORLEAP (Conference of Regional And Local Authorities)¹²⁸ and Business Forum.

With regard to the allocation of funding, the EaP is benefiting from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), set to be the main financial instrument with the agenda for the period 2014-2020. In the paper “Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2020” issued by EEAS together with the Commission the main objectives of the ENI in EaP are pictured to be: (1) support the political association process; (2) contribute to economic integration and sector cooperation; (3) enhance civil society’s role as a vector for reform¹²⁹. In

¹²⁴Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Council. *Eastern Partnership*.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Council. *Eastern Partnership*.

¹²⁷Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly.

¹²⁸European Union Committee of the Regions, *Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP)*

¹²⁹Opt.cit.: From the official web site: EEAS, European Commission. *Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020*. 2014.

order to meet those objectives EaP is set to implement various projects under the guidance of Association Agendas, Partnership Priorities and EaP 20 Deliverables for 2020 framework¹³⁰. The factsheet on the state of the programme shows that the deliverables are divided into five sections: cross cutting deliverables (strategic communication, gender balance, engagement with civil society), stronger economy (economic development and market opportunities), stronger governance (strengthening institutions and good governance), stronger connectivity (connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change), stronger society (mobility and people-to-people contacts)¹³¹.

Reading through 20 Deliverables for 2020 factsheet, can be noted the results of delivering the support in 5 main areas shows by 2018: in economic scope an increase in trade (since 2016: by 15% with Armenia, 17% with Azerbaijan, 19% with Belarus, 6% with Georgia, 20% with Republic of Moldova, and 24% with Ukraine); loans to SMEs are granted in local currencies (<50%); consensus achieved on perspective for a roaming agreement for the region by 2020; on the political level an important progress in anti-corruption programs was achieved with setting up electronic asset declaration systems (in Armenia, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine); civil service laws improving for a more depoliticised civil service (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine); in transport sector was finalised TEN-T Investment Action Plan (to develop 5,500 kilometres of roads and railways across the region by 2020 and an additional 4,600 kilometres by 2030); energy cooperation celebrates the inauguration of the Azerbaijan – Georgia section of the Southern Gas Corridor to strengthen common energy security; in the area of contribution to stronger society the EaP has achieved since 2014, more than 30,000 young people to have taken part in exchanges, mobility and volunteering through Erasmus+ programme, the first Eastern Partnership European School was launched in Tbilisi in 2018, and the EU4Youth programme, with over 20 million euros of

¹³⁰Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *Eastern Partnership. 20 Deliverables for 2020: State of play in 2018*.

¹³¹Ibid.

funding, contributes to employability, leadership development and entrepreneurship of young people across EaP (Erasmus+, Fellowships)¹³², finally, all partner countries have been granted the full access to Horizon 2020, the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme with 80 billion euros of funding¹³³ to encourage and support scientific research¹³⁴.

Looking at the achievements of EaP in partner countries, the increased EaP citizens' positive perception of the EU occurs comprehensible and merited, as stated in the factsheet: "trust in the EU is higher than ever, with 61% of citizens considering the EU as the most trustworthy foreign institution"¹³⁵.

Having described the programme of the EaP, its aims, objectives and policy implementations the current research sees it feasible and relevant to analyse the above described through the prism of soft power. EaP represents an explicit example of soft power use by the EU on regional level, which is asserted by several incentives. In the first place the nature of the European Union as such, having no military assets, thus no hard power in use. The general rhetoric around EaP, being a tool to promote European values, democratization and rule of law between the Eastern Neighbours, in order to bring them closer to the EU, to secure its borders, having developed market economies and stable democratic states in its neighbourhood.

In respect to J. Nye's definition of soft power mentioned above as "the ability to shape the preferences of others",¹³⁶ the EU replicates the notion, exerting its attractive and co-opting potential to get the desired outcomes in Eastern Neighbourhood. Analysing EaP as a soft power policy B. Piskorska, Polish political scientist, declares that the EU's soft power is realized in EaP through various programs and activities. Among those, as she affirms, are the promotion of

¹³²Opt.cit.: From the official web site of EU Neighbours, Cooperation of the EU with its Eastern Partners. *EU4Youth*. Project description, 2017

¹³³Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *What is Horizon 2020?*

¹³⁴Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Commission. *Eastern Partnership. 20 Deliverables for 2020: State of play in 2018*.

¹³⁵Opt.cit.: From the official web site of European Commission. *Eastern Partnership. 20 Deliverables for 2020: State of play in 2018*.

¹³⁶NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.5

“European political, economic, cultural, and civilization standards (so-called power of examples), political cooperation (association agreements), economic cooperation (deep free trade areas), liberalization of a visa regime (plans of actions for visa liberalization), promotion of the European culture and development of civil society, as well as mediation and presenting a unified front in conflicts in Eastern Europe”¹³⁷

Thus, the Eastern Partnership policy and its programme described above, including the flagship initiatives, 20 Deliverables for 2020 (with the variety of activities under its agenda), the humanitarian aid and civil missions represent the instruments of soft power of the EU. Through EaP activities the EU is seeking to reach the goal of Europeanisation of eastern neighbours. The current research considers that the main purpose of the EU in the region is to gain EaP countries to integrate with the EU. The measurement of its achievement is the decision of the partner countries to sign the AA with the EU. In order for having a potential to examine the relevance and effectiveness of soft power influence, it is essential to look at the factors influencing it and challenges it faces, which to a certain degree impede, or at the least detain the achievement of its goals. The major external factor in this aspect is Russia and its activity in the region.

2.3 Russia factor and the limits of the EU soft power

With regards to the limits of soft power relevance in the countries of EaP, respectively Russia and its aspiration for dominance is the major factor to consider. Since 1994 the relationship between the EU and Russia were based on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (initially valid for 10 years, renewed each year afterwards, and currently frozen following the crisis over Ukraine)¹³⁸. PCA was providing with the legal basis of bilateral cooperation setting up common goals. With the initiation of ENP the EU’s intention was to build beneficial relationship with Russia within the framework of Neighbourhood policy (when in late 2002 the

¹³⁷PISKORSKA, Beata. The Eastern Partnership – a challenge for the EU’s Soft Power in International Relations. On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, Issue no. 26/2018, p. 78-94. p.8.

¹³⁸GARCÉS DE LOS FAYOS, Fernando. *Russia*. 10/2018. European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2019.

initiative of ‘New Neighbours’ focusing on Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus was broadened into ‘Wider Europe’ including Russia and South Mediterranean)¹³⁹. However, this was followed by Russia denying its participation in the ENP, driven by its self-determination as a super power or a “second power pole on the European continent”¹⁴⁰. Being a part of the ENP from Russian perspective meant to acknowledge the need in European support in regulating its economic and political situation; and to be tangled up in need to reconstruct its institutions according to the European model, going against its aspirations. Hannes Adomeit in “Russia ENP Competitor” described three main sources of conflicts between Russia and the EU: (1) Russia is a false democracy (2) Russia “has explicitly rejected the concept of “integration” with European institutions” (3) Russia has strong political interest in the former Soviet Union area¹⁴¹. Post-Soviet space is representing the zone where Russia aspires for dominance, and the active presence of the EU in the region causes Russia to feel loss of influence, thus, the EU in the eyes of Russian politics is acting against its interests. This can be noted in the discourse of Russian political authorities: Vladimir Putin referred to the EaP as to “an alternative to NATO's (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) expansion to the east”¹⁴², and Sergei Lavrov accused the EU of attempting to carve out a new "sphere of influence"¹⁴³ in Russia's backyard, perceiving its project (building southern energy corridor bypassing Russia and connecting the Ukrainian and Moldovan energy infrastructure to EU standards¹⁴⁴) as a direct threat to its economic interests. As

139 EMERSON, Michael. Readings in European Neighbourhood Policy. Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy. 2005, p.77.

140 KRAMER, Stephanie. The revision of the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy and the instability on its Eastern border. International Association For Political Science Students. 2017.

141 ADOMEIT, Hannes. *Russia ENP Competitor*. In: *The European Neighbourhood Policy's Challenges*, Erwan Lannon (ed.), Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012, pp.381-410, op. cit. pp. 390 – 391.

142 PARK, Jeanne. *The European Union's Eastern Partnership*, Council on Foreign Relations, March 14, 2014.

143 Ibid

144 LANNON Erwan, VAN ELSUWEGE Peter. *Eastern Partnership. Prospects of a New Regional Dimension within the European Neighbourhood Policy*. In: *The European Neighbourhood Policy's Challenges*, Erwan Lannon (ed.), Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012, op. cit. pp. 312 – 313.

of this belief, the EU has been always proving with justification of its actions; as observed in a EEAS Factsheet “Myths about the Eastern Partnership - Factsheet” :

“MYTH 2: The Eastern Partnership initiative was designed by the EU to provoke Russia.

FALSE: The Eastern Partnership initiative is not against any country; it is a mutually beneficial and constructive platform for countries in the region to build a closer relationship with the EU, if they so choose. The EU does not demand that any of its partners need to make a choice between the EU or any other countries. We stand for good neighbourly relations. The Eastern Partnership respects the individual aspirations and ambition of each partner country”¹⁴⁵.

Notwithstanding, Moscow authorities concentrated on deepening of integration in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States established on 8 December 1991) in the aftermath of ENP development and EaP launch particularly.

Russia is trying to strengthen its leverage: followed by 2000 Eurasian Economic Community, in 2009 was introduced an agreement on creation of a Free Trade Area between the CIS countries (CISFTA) and in 2011 the FTA was signed by 8 leading CIS countries. Hereupon Russia started to work on elaboration of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU), with further signing a number of treaties that made the EEU to come into force in 2015. This was an offer of integration project, including the initiatives to establish single market and the customs union between the countries of Eurasia for gaining economic benefits (offering its member states a Single Market of 183.8 million people and a combined GDP of around \$1.9 trillion, 3.2% of the World GDP)¹⁴⁶. As per the official web page, among the main pillars of the EAEU are the “*raise of the competitiveness of and cooperation between the national economies, and to promote stable development in order to raise the living standards of the nations of the Member-States*”,

¹⁴⁵Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. Myths about the Eastern Partnership – Factsheet. Brussels. 20/11/2017.

¹⁴⁶Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Eurasian Economic Union.

provision of basic freedoms of goods, services, capital and labour. The EAEU “is an international organization for regional economic integration. It has international legal personality and is established by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union; it pursues coordinated, harmonized and single policy in the sectors determined by the Treaty and international agreements within the Union”¹⁴⁷. Russia has been intensively highlighting its position for strengthening the Eurasian Union: union with a common external tariff on all goods entering the market and unified methods of valuing imported goods¹⁴⁸. Additionally, there were ideas of creating an area with the coordination in the area of energy, industry, agriculture and transport¹⁴⁹ and even introduction of the single currency¹⁵⁰.

Created the EAEU as an alternative integrational proposal, Russia echoed the EU in terms of its form (FTA, basic freedoms, idea of single currency, integration in policies), purposed to attract countries of the post-Soviet space for cooperation, however unlike the EU’s model of integration building through the use of soft power of attractiveness, the Russian delivery of integration proposal is rather controversial.

Following the EU, Russia attempted to apply ‘soft power’ methods of influence in order to reinforce its relationship with post-soviet states. It appealed to the shared historical and cultural heritage; offered integration within the Eurasian Economic Union establishing single economic space, promoting its great potential and big perspectives to grow; and attracted with cheap gas and simplified and thus more favourable procedure of accession, with no request for

147 Ibid.

148 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Eurasian Economic Commission. *Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures*, p.15, 2013.

149 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Eurasian Economic Commission. *Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures*, 2015.

150 KOSOLAPOVA E. *Eurasian Union’s Common Currency: New Perspectives or New Challenges*. European Dialogue, 03.04.2015.

any additional commitments (in contrast with the EU, that in exchange for cooperation sets expectations of reforms, costly for eastern partners)¹⁵¹.

Yet, the Russian soft power approach is opposed by the notion of fear of its hard power that it shows, when it notices a lack of allegiance from its partners. This fear mainly concerns the energy sphere and the prices for oil and gas, since all Eastern Partnership countries (excepting Azerbaijan) depend on Russian resources and sensitive to the change in prices for oil and gas. Reflectively happened with Ukraine when the prices for gas rose up by almost 80 per cent¹⁵², following the event of the signing by Ukraine government the political part of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014¹⁵³. Similarly, Russian Federation harden on its border control: from 1 January 2015 for the citizens of the countries of the CIS who are not the member states of the EAEU the entry to the Russia has become possible exclusively in case of having foreign passport (however without a visa)¹⁵⁴. Finally, nothing more proves Russia's ability to use hard power than its actions in regard to destabilizing the countries, creating geopolitical conflicts within them (South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia; Transnistria in Moldova; Artsakh, known by its official name between 1991 and 2017 as Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; annexation of Crimea and Donbass in Ukraine).

With the Eurasian Union, Russia constrained the EaP states to decide between partnership agreement with the EU (AA) and EAEU membership. Among the eastern partner participant countries Armenia and Belarus have decided to join the Eurasian Economic Union under Russian coercive pressure (its hard power).

2.4 EaP countries and integration dynamics

151[□]VILSAUSKAS, R., ALISAUSKAS, R. et al. *Eurasian Union: a Challenge for the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries*. Public Institution Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Vilnius, 2012. p.11.

152[□]BURMISTROVA S., ZINETS N. *Russia raises gas prices for Ukraine by 80 per cent*. Moscow/Kiev: 4 Apr 2014.

153[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. *Ukraine-EU Relations*.

154[□]Opt.cit.: From the official web site - The immigration law of Russian Federation.

The relationship between the EU and *Armenia* is legally based on a “Comprehensive and enhanced partnership agreement” that the EU achieved to sign with Armenia in 2017¹⁵⁵ within the bounds of the last Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels, in the afterglow of failing of the AA in 2014, when Armenia denied to sign the agreement, with Serzh Sargsyan Armenian President (in office 2008 - 2018) publicly stating that he wanted to join a trade and political union with Russia in preference to the integration with the EU¹⁵⁶. From 2015 Armenia became a full member of the Eurasian Economic Union, strengthening its ties with Russia. Elsewhere, the Yerevan government would risk losing the financial support of Russia, being Armenian’s main investment partner since late 1990s. Armenian economy indicates strong dependence on the flow of capital from Russia, controlling the most strategic state enterprises¹⁵⁷. Armenia is hosting big Russian military units on its territory and Russia has always been Armenia’s main security guarantor in its frozen conflict with Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh¹⁵⁸.

The Russian Federation has been Armenia’s main investment partner

The Russian Federation has been Armenia’s main investment partner

The Russian Federation has been Armenia’s main investment partner

Belarus has always been the closest partner of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), basing its close cooperation as the partners of the Union State from 1999 (based on the signing of the Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus, 8 December 1999¹⁵⁹) and later on partners within the Eurasian Economic Union since 2015.

155 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *Fact sheet on EU-Armenia relations*. Bruxelles, 19/06/2018.

156 RETTMAN A. *Armenia to join Russia trade bloc, surprises EU*, Brussels: EU Observer, 3 Sep 2013.

157 KACZMAREK-KHUBNAIA, Julia. *Foreign Investment in Armenia*. Journal of Geography, Politics and Society. 2017, 7(4), pp.46-52.

158 KACZMAREK-KHUBNAIA, Julia. *Foreign Investment in Armenia*. Journal of Geography, Politics and Society. 2017, 7(4), pp.46-52.

159 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Information Analysis Portal of the Union State, text of the Treaty.

Regarding the cooperation with EU, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1995 but the ratification process was frozen¹⁶⁰. EU technical assistance programs were stopped, the only functioning part of the EP remained the one-direction help activities, such as humanitarian aid, regional programs, and support for civil society, assistance is realized through country Action Programmes funded through the ENI. The three priority sectors were social inclusion, the environment, and local/regional economic development. The European Union exposes major concerns over the issues with freedoms (of speech and media and assembly), death penalty abolition and labour standards, human rights and democratization¹⁶¹.

Notwithstanding its raise in nationalism and self-orientated politics in its shift away from Russia during 2014 – 2017¹⁶², following Ukrainian crisis, Belarus remains closest ally of Putin's government Overall, Belarus has Russian military presence on its territory, it cooperates in joint military activities¹⁶³, and more importantly is in heavy economic dependence from Russia (export to Russia equal 44% of total Belarus export, while import from Russia is of 56%¹⁶⁴), which in sum constitute the understanding of Russian leverage.

Azerbaijan position in regards to the integration choice has been characterized as quite self-orientated without making any obvious choice of closer partnership building neither with EU, nor with Russia. In 2013 the EU was committed to sign the AA before the summit of the EaP, however the negotiations were frozen by Azerbaijan. The country's geopolitical situation, conflict with Armenia, pressure from Russia (promising to provide help with the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh problem in return for Azerbaijan's EEU membership), fear of neighbouring Iran, which can try to export the Islamic state model, have put Azerbaijan into a difficult

¹⁶⁰Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *Fact Sheet EU – Belarus Relations*. Delegation of the EU to Belarus, Brussels, Feb 2016

¹⁶¹Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *Fact Sheet EU – Belarus Relations*. Delegation of the EU to Belarus, Brussels, Feb 2017

¹⁶²KOZLOVSKY, Sergey. *The Strange Death of Russia's Closest Alliance*. Global Voices. 2017.

¹⁶³Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus. *Cooperation with Russian Armed Forces*.

¹⁶⁴Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the The Observatory of Economic Complexity: OEC. *Belarus*.

situation in terms of its foreign policy¹⁶⁵. The EU has started negotiations on the new comprehensive agreement on 7 February 2017 to substitute the existing PCA (in force since 1999) and provide with a framework for mutually beneficial relationship (following the 2015 review of ENP)¹⁶⁶.

Azerbaijan and the EU have strong partnership in energy sector, with the EU being the biggest customer of Azerbaijani oil (receiving the supply of 5% of the total EU's demand), and Azerbaijan bringing Caspian gas supplies through the Southern Gas Corridor. The EU is Azerbaijan's biggest trading partner (60.7% and 31.8% share in total exports and imports) and financial aid provider (through the ENI with current agenda in priority sectors for the period 2014-2020 being (1) regional and rural development, (2) justice sector reform, (3) education and skills development)¹⁶⁷. At the same time the EU provides assistance with Nagorno-Karabakh geopolitical conflict through a special designed programme: European Partnership for the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK). The EU is actively standing for the importance of defence of human rights and freedom of expression. The new PCA is supposed to push forward a certain degree of integration of Azerbaijan's law system and trade with the EU¹⁶⁸.

From the beginning of the 2000s *Moldova* started to be involved a geopolitical problem in Transnistria region (strongly Russia supported area), following the events of 2003 when the Moldova's president Vladimir Voronin (in office 2001- 2009) abandoned a pro-Russian political course, rejected the plan of giving a wide autonomy to the separatist entity of Transnistria, disapproved the continued Russia's military presence in the eastern part of the country and set the course towards European integration¹⁶⁹. The EU issued a Strategy Paper and an Action Plan

¹⁶⁵ PAUL Amanda. *The Eastern Partnership, the Russia – Ukraine War, and the Impact on the South Caucasus*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers, 6 Feb 2015, p.7.

¹⁶⁶ Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. EU-Azerbaijan relations. Bruxelles, 2017.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ ADOMEIT, Hannes. *Russia ENP Competitor*, 2012, op. cit. pp. 400 – 401.

in 2004 (adopted formally in February 2005). Moldova became a part of ENP and EaP consequently, participating in and benefitting from many regional EaP programmes. Since 2010 Moldova started to collaborate with the EU in the field of energy sector, signing the Energy Community Treaty. In 2014 the EU and Moldova relations reached its peak with the AA and DCFTA, parallelly the visa liberalization dialogue gave results and since April 2014 Moldovan citizens with a biometric passport can travel to the Schengen area without a visa¹⁷⁰. Moldova and EU are active economic partners with the increase in bilateral trade by 18% during 2017. The new EU multiannual programming 2017-2020 (Single Support Framework) sets up a framework for support to Moldova, focusing on four priority areas: (1) economic development; (2) governance; (3) connectivity; (4) contacts between people, including, as well, support to civil society, strategic communication, and capacity development/institution building¹⁷¹. Since the signing of the AA Moldova is under the processes of integration its political system and legislation with EU standards. The Republic of Moldova is actively working on gaining the possibility to get the EU membership, mainly blocked by the problem in Transnistria, where Russia is acting undermining the integrity of Moldova, hampering the country on its way to deeper integration with the EU.

Alongside with Moldova, *Georgia* is a country that has chosen the integration with the EU rather than joining the EAEU. Over the years Georgia's foreign policy vector was characterized by its Euro-Atlantic integration, favouring the integration with West as the guarantor for its security and prosperity. Russia has always played on exacerbating the geopolitical conflict between Georgia on one side and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other, supporting separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the biggest military conflict in the region in 2008 – the Russo-Georgian War, during which Russia sent military force to fight against Georgia. The war ended in Russian, South Ossetian, and Abkhaz military victory,

¹⁷⁰Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. EU-Moldova relations, Factsheet. Bruxelles, 2018.

¹⁷¹Ibid.

and as a result Russia proclaimed the official recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The aggressive politics against Georgia and its territorial integrity is noted to be the Russian response to Georgia's active Euro-Atlantic political vector¹⁷².

The EU and Georgia have close partnership relations, laying on the legal basis of the AA signed in 2014. The EU is firmly committed to support Georgia in economic development, job creation and developing market opportunities, strengthening institutions and good governance, connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change, and mobility and people-to-people contacts¹⁷³. Since March 2017 Georgia's citizens were granted with visa free travel to the Schengen countries (for short stay). Within the framework of the DCFTA, the EU is the main trading partner for Georgia (over 30% of its trade), similarly the EU is the main financial aid provider, supporting Georgia with over €100 million annually¹⁷⁴. Receiving significant support from the EU, Georgia favours the integration with the EU as a way for building democratic and prosperous statehood.

Ukraine, another country to sign the AA, found itself being a big battleground of the clash of pro-Russian interests and the advocators for integration with the EU. The country's had a difficult way shifting towards its integrational choice. Hence, Ukraine serves the focus of attention for the case study in following chapter of the research.

To summarise, the current part of the thesis research targeted to analyse the EU as an actor using the tools of soft power in its foreign policy. After analysing gradually its actions in ENP in general and then in EaP at regional level, the research narrowed to country level looking in brief at the relations with Eastern partner countries. As noted, the biggest obstacle for EU is Russia exposing its influence, using coercive methods and aggressive politics. Among the six countries partners within the EaP, Armenia and Belarus, two states that are heavily dependent

172 PAUL Amanda. *The Eastern Partnership, the Russia – Ukraine War, and the Impact on the South Caucasus*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers, 6 Feb 2015, op. cit. p.5.

173 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. EU-Georgia relations, factsheet. Bruxelles, 2017.

174 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EU Neighbours. *Georgia*.

economically on Russian investment have decided to join the Eurasian Union, under Russian pressure. One state – Azerbaijan, abstained from signing integrational treaties, keeping beneficial relationship with the EU. And the rest three countries (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine), with the support of the EU encouraging for reforms, receiving monetary aid, and guided by the attractiveness of sustainable and prosperous political and economic atmosphere in the union, made the decision to restructure and reform their government apparatus. Consequently, the soft power mechanisms prove themselves to be a relevant vehicle for partnership building on regional level. In order to prove the hypothesis of the thesis the research would apply the analysis of soft power relevance in the case study on the country level.

3. THE EU SOFT POWER AS A TOOL TO FOSTER EU-UKRAINE INTEGRATION

Introduction

The following part of the research presents a Case Study, based on the investigation of the EU-Ukraine relations with the aim of proving the hypothesis of the thesis applying the soft power theory onto country level, specifically – Ukraine. The *objective of the case study* is to prove, that the EU using the sources of soft power is successful in persuasion of Ukraine for deeper cooperation and integration. In order to meet the objective Case study would provide with (1) an overview of the relations between the EU and Ukraine; (2) determine the soft power resources the EU has been using towards Ukraine; (3) define limits of soft power in integration engagement with Ukraine (indigenous – countries of EU 28 different position on Ukraine and exogenous - Russia); (4) analyse the public opinion and political orientation atmosphere in Ukraine in 2014 right before signing the AA; (5) look at the results and consequences of Ukraine's integrational choice; (6) conclude the aftermath of the AA signing and elaborate on the perspectives for Ukraine.

With regard to methodology of the Case Study, qualitative methods prevail, similarly to previous chapters and the thesis in whole. The dominant method subsists as empirical analysis, alternatively put, an evidence-based interpretation with respect to the study of relations between states and historical background of events. Conjointly, the last part of research uses the study and evaluation of documents (namely Factsheets, Association agreement, official statements of political actors or bodies) and further analysis and interpretation of articles on the topic (particularly to investigate the public orientation regarding the integrational choice of Ukraine) concluding with drawing inference from the examined means of applied methods.

The relevance of choosing Ukraine as the subject of case study constitutes by multiple justifications. In the first place comes the geography and geopolitics of the country, Ukraine is second largest state in European terms after Russia with the population over 44 million people, which makes it a potential trade power and an important market. The country is rich in fertile

plains (black soil considered to be the best for food production and animal husbandry) and in natural resources, is known for its mining industry and for being a major producer and exporter of coal and steel. Moreover, Ukraine has a coastline with access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The country as well is a manufacturer of ballistic missiles, large transport planes and launch pads for space carriers and possesses 15 operative nuclear power reactors, that can easily be converted to produce nuclear weapons, making Ukraine a major player in the field of weapons systems¹⁷⁵. Foremost significant are the frontier lines the country maintains, bordering with 3 post-soviet states, being Russia, Belarus and Moldova, and with 4 countries of the EU (more than any other EaP state): Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, which constitutes a remarkable potential in its foreign politics. Extensive border with Russia, implicates its strategic significance for western countries, especially US, who aims to discourage Russia from expanding its influence westwards. Conjointly, the location between Russia and the EU converts Ukraine in the dominant vendor of Russian oil and gas. Another reason is that Ukraine was initially the motive for the EaP policy in general (before it was launched Poland advocated for specialized policy and insisted on it due to its close ties with Ukraine). And last but not least, Ukraine appears to be an interesting object for case study specifically because it represents a state where the integrational choice was a product of the society division between the attractiveness of soft power Europe and fear of hard power Russia, turning it into the state where in the end the decision to build the deeper integration with Europe (to sign the AA as a result) caused a hot-tempered discussion and became a reason of the social cleavage, bringing ‘painful’ consequences for the country including civil war in Donbass and loss of Crimea occupied by Russian Federation.

Ukraine having a very important geopolitical location, huge industrial capacity, bordering with EU countries and Russia is a significantly strategic territory, and its future would have

¹⁷⁵ADUSEI, Aikins Lord. The Strategic Importance of Ukraine and Why Both Russia and U.S. Want Her as an Ally. February 2014. Modern Ghana.

influenced and defined the future of political relations between EU and Russia, influencing on other global actors as well. Current case study seeks to describe the integration possibilities that appeared for Ukraine over the last years, advantages and disadvantages for its foreign policy development, the expectations that Ukraine had and how they guided its choice.

3.1 EU-Ukraine relations: getting Ukraine closer to the EU

Over the last two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the EU were working together to design a course for increased political and economic cooperation.¹⁷⁶ According to the official web page of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU, the relations started with the official recognition of the independence of Ukraine by the EU in 1991. Two years later, Ukraine for the first time declared its intention to develop the relations with the EU, based on the principles of integration: on the 2nd of July 1993 the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted the decision “On the Key Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine”, in which Ukraine pointed its aspirations of integration:

«the priority of Ukrainian foreign policy is Ukrainian membership in the European Communities, as long as it does not harm its national interests. In order to maintain stable relations with the EU, Ukraine shall conclude an Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the implementation of which shall become the first step towards its association and, later, full membership in this organization»¹⁷⁷

The first legal basis for the cooperation was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1994 (and came into force in 1998), which boosted the cooperation between two parties on wide range of political, economic, trade, and humanitarian issues. During that time EU and Ukraine held two summits: in Kiev in 1997 and in Vienna 1998, which ensured the

¹⁷⁶APPEL H. *The Long-Term Prospects for Ukraine's Accession to the European Union*. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 330, August 2014, p.1.

¹⁷⁷Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. *Ukraine-EU Relations*.

active cooperation within the PCA in 7 major areas: energy, trade and investments, justice and home affairs, adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU, environment protection, transport, border cooperation, cooperation in areas of science, technology and space.¹⁷⁸ Consequently, on the second summit Ukraine-EU relations were defined as a “strategic and unique partnership” and Ukraine firstly announced its desire to gain future membership in the EU.¹⁷⁹ The PCA allowed the EU to establish a regular bilateral dialogue with Ukraine, promote its values and give assistance to Ukraine to develop in terms of shifting to market economy, introducing trade regulations, based on the principles of World Trade Organization (WTO), adaptation to the legislation standards with the European norms and last, but not the least, political change on the way to build a democratic state.¹⁸⁰

The following significant step in the relations between the EU and Ukraine was marked by the inclusion in the ENP from 2004. It coincided with internal changes in Ukraine, videlicet the shift to democracy in Ukraine, followed by the Orange Revolution, when Viktor Yushchenko took the presidency in the country. By that time, Ukrainian population was strongly constrained by the previous non-democratic, pro-Russian government of Leonid Kuchma, which failed to sustain the country’s economic situation. With the Orange Revolution, seeking for fair democratic elections, the people of Ukraine elected Viktor Yushchenko, who strengthened in his campaign the vector on WTO and NATO membership and deeper cooperation with the EU.¹⁸¹ That period deemed to be characterized as favourable and promising for EU-Ukraine relations. In 2008 the EU-Ukraine PCA was about to expire, and the same year Ukraine became a member of WTO¹⁸²; these two factors urged the discussion for further framework of cooperation during

178^{Opt.cit.}: From the official web site of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. *Ukraine-EU Relations*.

179^{EU-Ukraine Summits: 16 Years of Wheel-Spinning}, The Ukrainian Week, 28 Feb 2013.

180^{Opt.cit.}: From the official web site of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. *Ukraine-EU Relations*.

181^{KUBICEK, Paul}. *Problems of post-post-communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution*. Democratization, Vol. 16, No. 2, April 2009.

182^{Opt.cit.}: From the official web site of the WTO. *WTO welcomes Ukraine as a new member*, Press Release, Press/511 Accessions, World Trade Organization, 5 February 2008.

the 12th EU-Ukraine summit in Paris, 2008, when the negotiations on the AA and DCFTA have taken its start. In 2009 EU-Ukraine Association Agenda was adopted by the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council¹⁸³. The text of the Agenda claims that the Orange Revolution “created an opportunity for the EU and Ukraine to move beyond cooperation towards gradual economic integration and deepening political association.”¹⁸⁴

The same year the EU launched Eastern Partnership, within which Ukraine implicitly became the priority country. EP provided the impetus for deeper cooperation and fuelled the EU in expanding its values and supporting Ukraine, being the main tool and mechanism for achieving goals in the relationship with Ukraine. Back then the cooperation between the two parties was developing constructively, giving the impression that the relations would come to a new deeper level rapidly and effectively.

However, further developments in the internal politics of Ukraine deteriorated the successful vector. In 2010 Viktor Yanukovich became the president of Ukraine. Under the Yanukovich presidency an evident digression of democracy took place in the country. After political trial of Y. Tymoshenko (his rival during the presidential elections and the democratic candidate) the EU “was sending a signal that there was no incompatibility between growing authoritarianism and Ukraine’s Association Agreement and DCFTA”.¹⁸⁵ In July 2010 the Ukrainian government under Yanukovich dropped the goal of seeking NATO membership. “Yanukovich has been intensively pressured by Russia to drop his support for European integration and join the CIS Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in exchange for ‘discounted’ gas”.¹⁸⁶ However Ukraine for that moment was already the member of WTO, which has put the country into the situation in which it had to face a choice of a trade

183 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *EU-Ukraine Association Agenda.*, 2009.

184 Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *EU-Ukraine Association Agenda.*, 2009.

185 KUZIO, Taras. *Ukraine’s relations with the West since the Orange Revolution.* European Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2012, p.408.

186 Ibid. p. 407-408.

union, whether that be the CIS Customs Union or the DCFTA with the EU. Yanukovich has supported the DCFTA over the CIS Customs Union while at the same time his presidency was undermining ‘European values’ at home that are incompatible with Ukraine’s integration into Europe”.¹⁸⁷ The foreign policy of Yanukovich was characterized by having a double vector. He supported the DCFTA with the EU for obtaining trade and economic benefit for the country, but he intended to avoid following the political requirements of the AA, stating at the 2010 YES (Yalta European Strategy) summit that Ukraine “will choose the speed, form and methods of integration that conform to its national interests”¹⁸⁸. As a result, in 2013 just before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November) the Ukrainian government declared that the work on preparation for signing the AA had been suspended, driven by the opinion that “for Ukraine, signing the Association Agreement would have marked a decisive step away from the centuries-long orientation toward Russia and the east”¹⁸⁹. Yanukovich suspended the AA, pursuing a loan bailout from Russia, and thus deepening its ties with it.

As a response for the suspension of the AA in November 2013 a series of protests and demonstrations started gathering thousands of people, protecting pro-European aspirations of Ukrainians, demanding the government to sign the AA with the EU, which further got the name of “Euromaidan”¹⁹⁰. The main arena was the Independence square in Kiev, while several demonstrations happened in other cities as well, mainly in the West. Euromaidan got a military response from the central government, using arms against the demonstrators, which consequently evolved into a violent bloody conflict developed into the event referred as ‘2014 Ukrainian revolution’. The revolution gained to remove Viktor Yanukovich and his government from their post, electing the new government with the president – Petro Poroshenko, who supported the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ KUZIO, Taras. *Ukraine’s relations with the West since the Orange Revolution*. European Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2012, p.408.

¹⁸⁹ DIUK, Nadia. *Euromaidan: Ukraine’s self-organizing revolution*, World Affairs, 176.6, 2014.

¹⁹⁰ Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. *Ukraine-EU Relations*.

European vector for Ukraine. After the victory of the Revolution, the Ukrainian Parliament “adopted the Resolution "On confirmation of Ukraine's course towards integration into the European Union and priority measures in this direction" confirming irreversibility of Ukraine's European integration, which aims joining the European Union.”¹⁹¹ The political chapters of the EU-Ukraine AA were signed on 21 March 2014 at the EU Summit, and the economic part was signed on 27 June 2014¹⁹². The AA replacing the PCA was a new legal basis and framework for EU-Ukraine relations. “The AA provides for a shared commitment to a close and lasting relationship based on common values, in particular full respect for democratic principles, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹⁹³ On the 1 January 2016 parts of DCFTA were implemented aiming to boost “bilateral trade in goods and services between the EU and Ukraine by progressively cutting tariffs and by aligning Ukraine's rules with the EU's in selected industrial sectors and for agricultural products.”¹⁹⁴ Meanwhile the AA signed in 2014 it remained awaiting the ratification to be completed (hampered by 2016 Netherlands to suspend ratification and hold a referendum), until September 1, 2017 when it was ratified by all EU Member states and Ukraine and entered into force. The same year achievement was gained in visa liberalization dialogue and visa free regime, allowing Ukrainians with a biometric passport to visit the Schengen Area for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period. The continuation of partnership is characterized by further approximation of Ukraine to the EU with cohesion of its political and economic system, aspiration for perspective of candidate for membership status, support from the EU, continuous dialogue and annual summits.

3.2 Sources and limits of EU soft power in Ukraine

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EEAS. *A look at the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement*. 27 April 2015.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Opt.cit.: European Commission materials: *Trade, Ukraine*, last update: 07 April 2016.

As per the aim of current research to illustrate the relevance of soft power in partnership engagement, the current research would further apply soft power resources and limits on country level for better understanding the ways that the EU projects influence on other states building allies and shapes mentalities, expanding its values. Alluding to Nye's categorization three primary resources considered to be culture, political values and foreign policies. The main and most significant source of soft power exercised over Ukraine is the EU's actions over the object state in the context of foreign policy, which in this particular case is characterized mainly by active support to Ukraine in various fields and establishing dialogue since the very beginning of the appearance of Ukraine on political arena as an independent state following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The EU proactively called for a dialogue and created a treaty to bound the relationship with the introduction of the PCA in early 90s and starting from 1997 the EU-Ukraine summit has been taken place with the examination of paths for economic cooperation and sustainable development of Ukraine. The EU advocated for Ukraine's accession to the WTO, and further on, conditioned by eastern enlargement the proactive position of EU and its interest in advancing of Ukraine were boosted and ended up in formation of ENP and later on, involvement of EaP to grant broad range of new opportunities and relevant instruments to invest in Ukraine's progress as a market economy and democratic state. The EU looking for promotion of stronger governance in Ukraine, has acted in several programmes such as public administration programme to reorganise and democratise policy making, an anti-corruption programme, a decentralisation programme to improve the governing of the local political authorities and a programme for developing the private sector¹⁹⁵.

The attractiveness of the EU is highlighted in terms of support for Ukrainian economy, with the EU to have been adopting monetary help packages and bailouts and Ukrainian businesses receiving preferential access to the EU market providing support to the Ukrainian economic growth, which thereafter was strengthened with the DCFTA and customs free trade.

¹⁹⁵Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the EU Neighbours, Cooperation of the EU with its Eastern Partners. *Facts and Figures about EU – Ukraine Relations*.

The political model of behaviour that EU has exercised over Ukraine, characterized by support and encouragement for development, creating the perception of help, thus results in strengthening the attractiveness of the EU as a political and economic partner, and the model to follow for Ukraine. The soft power of the EU in the path of its image creation is enforced as well by its reputation in foreign affairs and geopolitics as a peacebuilding and aid providing actor; and its status in global hierarchy, political and economic development, defining it as a prosperous democracy with high standards and quality of life.

Another meaningful source of soft power of the EU in attractiveness creation for Ukraine and shaping the opinion of Ukrainians towards the pro-European vector is the support for society and socio – cultural principles. Ukraine is one of the largest beneficiaries between the EU neighbours of support for civil society, including contributions in improvements in social sector, investments in research, financing and development of programs for students and education staff. Thereby, the EU has been creating space for social development, to boost the creative potential of Ukrainians, and to encourage the ability to introduce new inventions and technologies.

One more direction in EU policies towards Ukraine is stronger connectivity with support provided in transport agenda and visa liberalization dialogue to foster Ukraine transport system and deepen the social movement, which contributes in stimulation of people contacts, spreading EU's ideology and mentality, promoting its lifestyle, culture and values.

In terms of actors as soft power sources, it is worth mentioning the EEAS as an institutional actor, being a main body to cover the foreign policy of the EU in general and the relationship with Ukraine in particular, conducting the programmes towards Ukraine through the EaP and guarantying the effective communication through its mission to Ukraine. At the same time notable role as a EU member state actor, carrying out in practice soft power influence, has played Poland, being the closest tie between Ukraine and the EU. Poland as a country with which Ukraine maintained close communication has played a 'positive example effect' over Ukraine as an eastern European state and a close neighbour and partner becoming a member of

the EU and developing its institutions and economy towards European level. Additionally, Poland further played major role in influencing Ukraine and persuading towards partnership with the EU, when followed by its strong initiative the EU has elaborated the EaP policy for deeper cooperation and granting support to Eastern neighbours in general and Ukraine in particular.

Consequently, the proactive position of the EU in its policies towards Ukraine, based on soft power resources, marked by comprehensive support with significant investments to strike for development of Ukraine and its convergence with EU standards, aimed to contribute the creation of the effective image of the EU and persuade Ukraine for deeper cooperation and partnership building.

However, soft power of EU over partnership building with Ukraine faced with factors that significantly constrained its relevance and vastly hampered its success. Effectively, Ukraine is the country where the struggle between the leverage of soft power European attractiveness and the its limiting factors (specifically Russian factor) have converted the country into a battlefield of interests and opinions. The limits of soft power influence can be divided into endogenous and exogenous ones. The endogenous factors are defined by the lack of cohesion among the member states of the EU and their position over Ukraine. Thus, by April 2016 the AA between the EU and Ukraine had been ratified by Ukraine and all the EU member states, except the Netherlands, where the entry into force of the ratification was suspended due to the start of the referendum procedure. The referendum held on 6th April 2016 showed that over 61% of the voter rejected the ratification of the AA, therefore Netherlands put the ratification on hold for the negotiations¹⁹⁶ which ended up by its approval to ratification after roughly a year. The other internal factor deteriorating the successfulness of EU-Ukraine partnership building is what Riabchuk called to be a “blind West European Russocentrism”¹⁹⁷ referring to pragmatic policy of Germany, Italy

196[□] VAN DER LOO, Guillaume. *The Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Legal options for navigating a tricky and awkward situation*, CEPS, 8 April 2016.

197[□] RIABCHUK, Mykola. *The European Neighbourhood Policy and Beyond: Facilitating the Free Movement of People within the Framework of EU-Ukraine. Post-Revolutionary Relations*, 2010, pp.10.

and France, having its closer relations with Russia and thus being infirm and suspensive over Ukraine. Similarly, Shumylo-Tapiola referred to European ambiguity, categorizing the EU member states into “idealistic activists” and “pragmatic conservatives”¹⁹⁸; with the idealists to be central and eastern European states supported by northern EU members, advocating for closer cooperation with Ukraine up to membership perspective; and conservatives to be represented by older western European states hesitant upon their interest in unconditioned and fast engagement with Ukraine.

Nonetheless the greatest challenge and the main exogeneous factor to limit the EU relevance is Russia, that has been opposing the European soft power with what P. Goble referred to as neo-imperialistic model of behaviour in foreign politics, relying on hard power, including military and economic pressure¹⁹⁹. At the same time Hannes Adomeit, theologizing Russian assertive position, determined the importance of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy for Russia, due to close historical and cultural ties between the two states. Ukraine’s importance is marked by having strategic location between the EU and Russia, economic potential, pipelines bringing Russian gas to Europe, and military importance with the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet located in Sevastopol, Crimea.²⁰⁰ The objectives of Russia appear to be clear in this context: to prevent western, EU and NATO orientation of Ukraine, which Russia perceives as anti-Russian vector and a sign of hostility. Kuzio explained Russian aspirations, arguing that if Russia would gain to close the perspective and desire of EU and NATO membership for Ukraine, it would achieve “its objective of ensuring Ukraine’s only integration option is within the CIS. Moscow received one of two major strategic objectives in Ukraine when the ‘Kharkiv Accords’ extended the 1997 Sevastopol treaty as a base for the Black Sea Fleet until 2042-47. Russia’s second strategic objective is to gain control over Ukraine’s gas pipelines through a

198 SHUMYLO-TAPIOLA, Olga. Why Does Ukraine Matter to the EU? Carnegie Europe, April 16, 2013.

199 GOBLE, Paul. Putin’s Neo-Imperialism: Russia’s Shift to Hard Power. Real Clear Defense. June 14, 2017.

200 ADOMEIT, Hannes. *Russia ENP Competitor*, 2012, op.cit. p. 397.

consortium that would be controlled by Moscow.”²⁰¹ As far as its sources of influence, Moscow has been using economic pressure, military-political threats, as well as pressure in energy sector, used for political purposes, with the rise of prices for gas following pro-European political behaviour of Ukraine. Additionally, the fact that Ukraine has ever been home to a big Russian diaspora, especially the Eastern regions and Crimea, provided with source of influence, conditioning the population, highly persuaded to support Russia, to pursue for pro-Russian political vector.

Similarly, K. Wolczuk was referring to the situation occurred by the 2014 as for Ukraine to be put in front of the decision between two regional integration: the AA with Europe and the EEU with Russia. Russia was willing to do anything possible to undermine the implementation of the AA and Ukraine’s European integration in three ways. First, Russia has relied on its hard power, and is ready to use a far wider range of tools than the EU, including punitive measures such as economic or military threat, even if that would mean breaking domestic and international law. Second, Russia has used the weaknesses in the EU strategy and highlighted the significant costs for Ukrainian economy to restructure itself in accordance with the European standards. Russian government tried to call for a fear in front of the economic reform, calling the DCFTA ‘suicidal’ for Ukrainian economy. Third, Russia takes into consideration and plays on the vulnerabilities, being the dependence on Russian resources, the danger to lose Russia as an important trading partner, and to be excluded from all Eurasian market, and regional split of the society and the support for Russia in the Eastern Ukraine. As a result, Russia increases the costs of the European priorities in the Ukrainian foreign policy, putting Ukrainian society in front of the disruptive choice²⁰².

3.3 2014: Ukraine and its geopolitical orientation

²⁰¹ KUZIO, Taras. *Ukraine’s relations with the West since the Orange Revolution*. European Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2012, op.cit. p.410.

²⁰² WOLCZUK, Katarzyna. *Ukraine and the EU: turning the Association Agreement into a success story*. European Policy Center, 23 April 2014, p.3-4.

This part of the Case Study will describe more precisely what the Ukrainian society was experiencing once the two different integrational choices appeared in front of the state; which factors influenced on the favouring one or another choice.

The relevance for looking onto the public opinion in order to prove the hypothesis of the thesis is conditioned by the nature of soft power itself to be the tool of influence through making others to want and think the same way (as per Nye). Hence, soft power is understood to shape opinions of the society in order to get desired outcome in terms of political orientation of the state. Thus, further analysis helps to prove soft power relevance looking onto Ukrainian's perception of the EU, exercising soft power, and the willingness of it to make the Ukrainian society to actor as a driving factor of Euromaidan movement, pro-European political orientation of Ukraine and further partnership building.

Current section will look at five articles, written by the Ukrainian social scientists in 2014, describing the overall attitude of the society to the integrational perspectives from the time of Yanukovych presidency, when the society had to make the decision of integration, until the signing of the political part of the AA with the EU.

Vladimir Frolov, Ukrainian social scientist, in his article "The Problem of Ukrainian Participation in the Integration Processes of Europe and Eurasian Region" argued that the Ukrainian behaviour, was characterized by unpredictability, caused by the geopolitical location of the country, being between the two powers. The author comments about the importance of Ukraine for Eurasian Union, due to the borders, specifying that if the Ukraine was going by the European way it would have caused a threat for Russian foreign policy and interests, decreasing geopolitical influence of Russia, ready to 'punish' Ukraine. The importance of the Ukraine for the EU is described in terms of economy: Ukraine is the exporter of electric energy and a country with a big potential in the agricultural sphere and industry. Thus, for the EU the integration of Ukraine with Europe would have brought lower prices for electric energy. However, the choice of western scenario would have a negative impact for Ukraine in term of prices of Russian gas.

Frolov argued that debate on the choice of integration was complexified by the social split in opinion, conditioned by geopolitical ambiguity between pro-European Western part of the state and Eastern regions favouring to keep the country being Russian ally²⁰³.

N.P. Pashina, the professor of the Lugansk National Agrarian University, in her article named “Crisis of Political Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Foreign Policy Aspect” is bringing up a concern of lack of unity in social opinion towards the orientation of the choice in Ukrainian foreign policy. The reasons, according to the author, are ethno-cultural, religious and language differences between the regions, political stereotypes, contradictory politics of the state and uncertainty of foreign policy of the ruling elite. The main problem is the choice between Eurasian Union and the cooperation with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan on the one hand, and NATO and the EU on the other. Pashina argues that according to the public survey, realized by the Center Razumkova in 2013, the majority of population supported the integration with the EU. Among the strongest motivations in favor for the integration with the EU are the economic reasons and social perspectives and changes that the population expected. Motives for integration into the Eurasian Union are the economic advantages, meaning cheap energy resources and relative stability, but at the same time there are risks of Russian domination and general lack of prospects of this union. The article admits one of the most important problems for the self-determination of the Ukrainian population to be the lack of information about both the EU and the Eurasian Union. Consequently, the country ended up being in the situation when for an ordinary Ukrainian citizen, who has never visited countries of the EU or Eurasian Customs Union, any integration seemed not more than an abstraction, and the informative content to be filled depending on the political orientation of the region and the degree at which mass media had been influenced by. Another factor, according to the article, impacting the population inability to choose what union to support had been the lack of coherence within the Ukrainian

203FROLOV, Vladimir. *The Problem of Ukrainian Participation in the Integration Processes of Europe and Eurasian Region*. Academic Journal “Politics in Focus”, 2014’01, pp. 165 – 169.

government: the ruling elite, that for that moment was headed by Viktor Yanukovych, sometimes was seen as undetermined and hesitatory trying to “sit on two chairs”, taking advantages from European help and development and cheap Russian gas prices at the same time. The majority of population, had been expressing the opinion that firstly the government should have solved inner problems and then could have made a decision on foreign policy and then it could follow the decision in realizing one of the integration processes. Pashina emphasizes that the problem of formation of unified political identity in Ukraine has been one of the most challenging and vital objectives for the Ukrainian government at that moment²⁰⁴.

Ukrainian economic scientists from the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, E.V. Shubravska, E.A. Prokopenko, in the article “Ukraine’s Integration Perspectives: Advantages and Risks for the Agrarian Sector” were emphasizing that the cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in agrarian sector seemed to have promising perspectives. The signing of AA and the establishment of the DCFTA would have brought certain advantages for Ukraine, such as harmonization of national standards which would raise the competitiveness of Ukrainian production, moreover, Ukrainian manufacturers would have benefited from access to the European innovative technologies, which could have caused modernization of Ukrainian agricultural production. However, Ukraine realized possible threats that the integration with the EU could have brought for the agriculture. Firstly, the process of harmonization of standards would have been painful and long for Ukraine and until it would have been finished it could have caused the increase of the competitive European import within Ukraine, meanwhile the export to the EU would be strictly limited because of its incompatibility with the European standards. Besides of it, another fear described, was the raise of the amount of low-quality products coming from Europe, due to the reason of not being sold on the European markets, but having the access to Ukrainian consumers. The authors of the

²⁰⁴PASHINA, N.P. *Crisis of Political Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Foreign Policy Aspect*. Luhansk: Academic Journal “Scientific Vedomosti”, 2014, No. 8 (179), Edition 30, pp. 167 – 172.

article also mentioned the possible raise of prices of agricultural production in Ukraine and the decrease of income of Ukrainian agricultural producers, conditioned by the appearance of imported European products, competitive in price and quality and more attractive for consumers. Furthermore, the European orientation of the agricultural market could have led to the loss of the access to the Russian and Eurasian markets. E.V. Shubravskaya, E.A. Prokopenko came to a conclusion that there were certain advantages and disadvantages for agricultural sector in any of the integration ways Ukraine would have chosen and the most significant strategy to develop should have been broadening of non-integrative possibilities of the development of foreign trade of agricultural production within the framework of WTO; and following the strategic aims of agrarian sector within the integration processes²⁰⁵.

In the next article studied for the current part of the research: “Challenges of Eurasian integration after the Ukrainian Crisis”, political scientist A. Skriba is advocating for the European attractiveness for Ukraine. The EU, according to the author, is successful in realizing its soft power, being perceived as civilized, stable and politically attractive, being truly democratic with less centralization of power, where the interest of every country is taken into consideration. The current article confirms the above studied in current thesis, arguing that in the case of Ukraine, the major influence was provided by its European neighbours – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, showing its successfulness following the accession to the EU and the advantages they obtained from the accession. Moreover, the soft power influence intensified from the beginning of 2000s with the launch of ENP and specifically EP from 2009. There has taken place the deepening of cooperation in different areas, such as education, culture, ecology, energy, politics, economy, transport, etc. Extremely successful, according to the author, was the role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and foundations promoting European values, standards, and the EU as such.

²⁰⁵ SHUBRAVSKAYA E.V., PROKOPENKO E.A. *Ukraine's Integration Perspectives: Advantages and Risks for the Agrarian Sector*. Kiev: Academic Journal “The Economy of Ukraine”, 2014, No. 1 (618), pp. 63 – 73.

A. Skriba evaluated that conditioned by successfulness of European soft power in engaging Ukrainian population to favour euro integration, certain expectations were born for Ukrainians. First, it is about the idea of “europeaness” itself, which meant economic and cultural integration. Ukraine found itself in aspiration to reach the European development in democratization, freedoms and civilization, as well as in obtaining advantages on the economic level. Integration with the EU was promising the establishment of Free Trade Area and the liberalization of all trade barriers with the EU. Ukraine was expecting to receive European capital investments and new technologies. The last but not the least were described the expectations regarding political and humanitarian spheres of life. In this context Ukraine expected to reach the coherence of the foreign policy and security (in accordance with signed political part of the AA), and liberalization of visa regime for Ukrainian citizens. Motivated by European expectations Ukraine however ‘opened its eyes’ to the disadvantages of the Association Agreement and its European choice. Firstly, signing the AA Ukraine would have had to obey to the norms and rules of the EU, the regulations in creation of which Ukraine has never participated and had no influence, the European norms were perceived to be far from the ones that the state used to have and the transition seemed to be very painful for Ukraine, which was hardly ever prepared for it, meant the possibility of creation of a crisis in the country. Secondly, the implementation of European standards and regulations would inevitably mean the worsening of the relations with Russia and not exclusively in the economic terms, but also in political and humanitarian spheres. And lastly the European project was seen as undetermined in terms of the future perspectives for Ukraine. The EU was not declining the possibility of accession of the associated partners sometime in future, but the AA was never the accession instrument and the current agreement does not foresee any regulations regarding this point.

Having described sources and limits of soft power of the EU in engaging Ukraine for integration the author of the article concluded that Ukraine found itself being put in a situation of a so-called “dilemma of integrations” (between the integration with the EU and Eurasian

Customs Union). The economy driven factor in the dilemma was conditioned by the clash between the European help and expectations and dependency from Russian resources. In terms of the politics the dilemma was between painful reforms necessary to adjust to European norms and the threat of Russian control and pressure. Significant factor was the social cleavage, meaning the split of the public opinion and the impossibility to unify regional fracture in choice of the integration way²⁰⁶.

In the article “To the Question on Geopolitical Orientation of Modern Ukraine” by V.N. Shilov, the situation of Ukraine by the year 2014, was characterized by intermediacy, uncertainty of its future despite the fact that after Euromaidan and the revolution the country’s government was oriented towards the integration with the EU and signed the political part of the Association Agreement. Ukraine was founding itself in between European aspirations and dependency from Russia. Shilov is drawing on the Ukrainian expectations, emphasizing particularly its wish to distance itself from the Russian influence, from the Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian Economic Union, meaning getting rid of the unpleasant past characterized by high dependence in soviet space. The integration with Europe in this context is seen as a guarantee of a progressive and prosperous future, since the development of the west is attractive for Ukraine. Moreover, the integration with Eurasian Union was perceived as a threat leading to economical dependency from Russia spilling over to a total political one, at the same time the democratic image of the EU makes sure that Ukraine has no fear to become depended form Brussels.

Another expectation about building closer ties with the EU, according to the article, is the protection and conservation of Ukrainian culture, ethnicity and language. Any deep cooperation with Russia and integration with the union where the leading part belongs to Russia was threatening with the displacement of Ukrainian language and culture by Russian ones. In case of

²⁰⁶ SKRIBA, Andrei. *Challenges of Eurasian integration after the Ukrainian Crisis*. Academic Journal “Vestnik of international organizations”, 2014, No. 3, pp. 96 – 111.

Eurasian integration Ukraine could have risked becoming a second Russia in terms of culture, because in the conditions of a union and opened relations the Ukrainian world will not be able to stand the concurrence with the Russian pressure. The contrast picture was perceived to happen on the European path, in the context of which the dominant language in the is English, being far from becoming a language of day-to-day communication in Ukraine, which was excluding threat of displacement of Ukrainian culture, highlighted by Language Policy of the EU, guided by the objection of preservation of nation languages. Thus, the European direction for future of Ukraine was seen as marked by the stimulation of national dignity, being favourable.

Coincidentally the article of V.N. Shilov is focusing on the difficulty of integrational choice for Ukraine in 2014, with ex-president V.Yushchenko claiming the Eurasian Economic Union to be a proposition to recognize colonial status, and an invitation to slavery, ad interim with sighing of the AA the state was recognizing the necessity of following European decisions without any clear perspective of membership. As a consequence derived from the context of necessity of choice making the country fell into a social split, driven by the majority of population of the South-Eastern Ukraine (Russian speaking population) belief in stability of cooperation with Russia, meanwhile Western population was concerned with the preservation of the language and culture; living by means of the industrial East, significantly influenced by neighbouring European countries, thus wishing western future for Ukraine. Consequently, Shilov concludes that European states (especially neighbouring countries, like Poland) and the EU as a whole served as an example to follow in terms of the economy, development and high standards of life, and not only for Ukraine, but also for Russia. The “European” is a brand, perceived to be equal to higher life quality and while Russia could long for mutually beneficial cooperation with the EU as maximum, Ukrainian ruling elite and the majority of population have been choosing for a

strong pro-European vector and with a desire to share European values and integrate with the EU to reach prosperity and well-being for Ukraine²⁰⁷.

To conclude, the current part of the case study, drawing upon the articles of Ukrainian political scientists over the situation in the country and describing Ukrainian mindset by 2014 (when the AA was signed) contributed to prove the hypothesis of the research, showing in further details how the integrational decision in the minds of Ukrainians had been made, which factors influenced on the society to choose pro-European policy and to oppose the government decision to suspend signing the AA, which guided the people to make the Euromaidan and revolution happen and to change the internal government of the country for reaching the democratization and European future for Ukraine.

In the interim the analysis of these articles drawing on the Ukrainian decision making, additionally shows the clash between the Russian hard and the European soft powers in their race for turning Ukraine each onto its side, engaging for deeper cooperation. The tools that Russia is using to enforce Ukraine to stay its ally are majorly characterized being military and economic threats, including the possibility of colonization of culture and total political control. Contrastingly the EU is using soft power, promoting its values of freedom, respect for human rights, equality, rule of law and democracy²⁰⁸, proposing its support for Ukrainian economy and culture, and wants to see Ukraine as a democratic prosperous state.

To sum up, Ukraine, regardless Russian threats and fear of losing Eurasian market and access to Russian energy, chooses the Eurointegration and strongly believes that the future of the country is in the cooperation with the EU, democratization, market economy and restructuring the state after the decades of influence of Russian authoritarian way of governance and imperial

207^{SHILOV, V.N. *To the Question on Geopolitical Orientation of Modern Ukraine*. Belgorod: Academic Journal "Scientific Vedomosti", 2014, No. 1 (172), Edition 29, pp. 184 – 191.}

208^{Opt.cit.:} From the official web site of the European Union. *The EU in brief*.

politics. Ukrainian choice contributes to prove that soft power is a relevant tool for the EU in engaging its neighbouring states for cooperation and partnership.

3.4 The costs of European choice for Ukraine

The fears of Ukraine to be ‘punished’ by Russia for ‘anti-Russian’ integration, as Moscow perceived it, justified. Following the Euromaidan and the revolution in Ukraine, in the Eastern and Southern regions, the population: largely represented by the Russian diaspora, Russophones, that supported Yanukovich government and the idea of building closer ties with Russia; did not approve the revolution and started to protest. According to claims of Ukrainian media the rebellion movement was initially organized by members of Russian Army and secret services.²⁰⁹ Anti-Maidan pro-Russian demonstrations took place in various regions in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk oblast, Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, as well as in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa. Initially the Russian government denied its direct military involvement, even though evidence indicates that Russia from the very beginning supported separatists in Donbas “by allowing volunteers and weapons to cross the border from Russia, and in providing weapons, recruitment, training, and safe haven to separatists.”²¹⁰ Crimea experienced as well a direct Russian military invasion, and control of the peninsula was taken by Russia from that moment until now. In March 2014 under the influence of Russia, Crimean authorities held a referendum and declared independence from Ukraine and its accession into the Russian Federation, the illegal event internationally disputed, got the name of Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation²¹¹. The separatist movements had taken a particular big scale in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the demonstrations converted into violent conflict, raised into

²⁰⁹ROBINSON, Paul. *Russia’s role in the war in Donbass, and the threat to European security*. European Politics and society, 15 March 2016, p.6.

²¹⁰KATCHANOVSKI, Ivan. *The Separatist War in Donbas: A violent Break-up of Ukraine?*. European Politics and society, 2016, p.8.

²¹¹MARPLES David R. *Russia’s perception of Ukraine: Euromaidan and historical conflicts*, European Politics and society, 2016.

the War in Donbas, which took its start in April 2014 and is representing a still ongoing geopolitical conflict²¹². The history of the conflict in Donbas counts with the attempts, encouraged by Russia, to create an independent Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR), to incorporate these regions as members of Russian Federation, and to create a state of Novorossiia (New Russia) from these two regions²¹³; in fact the civil war in Donbas, with Russian military intervention has led, in any case to the de facto independence of the DPR and the LPR.²¹⁴ Regional political orientation and the big Russian diaspora in Donbas became strong factors for the support of separatism in Ukraine and according to various political studies the long-running conflict in Donbas would remain frozen for the foreseeable future²¹⁵.

Therefore, drawing upon the costs of choice for cooperation with the EU for Ukraine, being the loss of Crimea the fact of being dragged into civil war in Donbas, the political behaviour of Russia can be analysed in terms of its coercive reaction onto integrational choice of Ukraine. Followed by the rejection of Ukraine for the Russian integration proposal, Moscow's objection became obstruction of political integration of Ukraine with the EU, perceived endangering its security. Having no legal instrument to impede the signing of the AA, Russia contributed into the separatist war in Donbas, whereby creating a geopolitical conflict in Ukraine, breaking-up its territorial integrity. As a result, Russia created its protectorate in Donbas region, spreading its influence and blocking Ukrainian unity, which is, in fact, similar to the other Russian protectorates, serving the same objectives in other countries of the EP: Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; and such geopolitical conflicts are one of the most significant obstacles to develop

212 KATCHANOVSKI, Ivan, 2016, op.cit. p. 2-4.

213 Ibid., p.4.

214 KATCHANOVSKI, Ivan. *The Separatist War in Donbas: A violent Break-up of Ukraine?*. European Politics and society, 2016, op.cit. p.15.

215 GRICIUS, Gabriella. *The Future of the War in Ukraine*. Global Security Review. Feb 20, 2019.

political cohesion with the EU and apply in future for a status of a candidate to be an EU member.

3.5 From 2014 to 2019: Ukraine and the EU

Notwithstanding the fact that Ukraine has been undergoing deteriorating consequences, from Russian hard power as a result of making the choice in favour of the integration with the EU, the society did not change its attitude to this decision. According to the Poll conducted by the Sociological group “Rating” on the request of The International Centre for Policy Studies Ukrainians support cooperation with the EU in contrast with membership in the Eurasian Customs Union. The Poll Agency has been performing the research several times a year through years starting from 2012, the last result available are from December 2018. Each time the research was a subject of personal interview according to a questionnaire. The audience of the survey was the population of a total 2000 Ukrainian citizens aged from 18 years and older. As per the results, the obvious growth can be detected in support for deeper cooperation with the EU in contrast with the cooperation with Russia within the framework of Eurasian Union. Throughout 2012 the supporters of the EU counted with 37% maximum (May 2012) while in favour for Russia were more than 40% of population (43% maximum in March 2012). Through 2013 the percentage was steadily growing, and the picture changed with support at minimum 40% of population for the integration with the EU, while the pro-Russian amount of population dropped, not being able to reach 40% (37% maximum). The year of 2014 conditioned by the AA signing negotiations changed the situation in favour of the EU, shortly before signing the political part of the AA 41% of Ukrainians considered that the AA and DCFTA with the EU had to be implicated as soon as possible. March of 2014 and the fact of signing of the AA conditioned the percentage of the Ukrainians and positive perception of the integration with the EU to never going lower than 50% further. The peak in support for building closer ties with the EU had been reached in September 2014, followed by the events of Russian hard power reaction

to Ukraine signing the AA with 59% of population to support pro-European foreign policy course²¹⁶. Looking at the results of the public poll from regional perspective, the results appear quite predictable within the context of existing social cleavage in the country where the majority of population in Western regions have pro-European political views, meanwhile Eastern regions are characterized by their pro-Russian position, intensified by separatist movements advocating for stronger ties with Russia. According to the last performed poll based on regional support for different integration lines 80% of total population support the integration with the EU in the West of the country, against only 2% favouring Customs Union with Russia; in the central regions 54% supporting the EU against 10% for Russia, in the South of the country 35% stand for EU direction against 27% for Russia, and finally the East shows only 26% of population feel align with the cooperation with the EU while 30% keep supporting the pro-Russian course (the resting percentage number belong to population abstaining to show any favouritism)²¹⁷. During the last years, followed the events of signing and ratification of the AA, taking into account the frozen war conflict in Donbass region and the occupied territory of Crimea, the public opinion towards cooperation with the EU, marked with the percentage of population being solid over 50%²¹⁸, being indicative of the firm and lasting support of pro-European course of development for the country amount the majority of population.

Analysing the above stated, current study suggests that the results of these public surveys are significant to show and prove the relevance of the EU's soft power in engaging the Ukrainian society to share European values and thus choosing the European future. The population of Ukraine even though oppressed by the Russian hard power actions and costs it had to pay for its integrational choice, does not seem to change the opinion onto its choice through the years following the signing of the AA. The high percentage of supporters for integration with the EU

216[□]Sociological group "Rating". *Socio-Political Moods of Ukrainians IRI Poll*. 30.01.2019, p.77.

217[□]Sociological group "Rating". *Socio-Political Moods of Ukrainians IRI Poll*. 22.08.2018, p.37.

218[□]Sociological group "Rating". *Socio-Political Moods of Ukrainians IRI Poll*. 30.01.2019, p.77.

proves that in spite of the costs of the integrational choice, meaning coercive actions of Russian Federation, Ukraine stays firm in sharing EU values and thus the belief in its own prosperity, becoming a democratic state with healthy economy and is longing for the EU membership perspective in future, being the most significant prospective and desired outcome for Ukraine. Earlier in 2014 Ukrainian president Poroshenko has set up an ambitious goal for the year 2020 to submit the application to get the status of the candidate for being the full member state of the EU.²¹⁹ During his presidency his government was keeping pro-European foreign policy vector, with one of the most significant achievements to be the establishment of the visa free movement for Ukrainian citizens. Following Poroshenko, the new elected president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky is set to keep and strengthen the EU orientated foreign policy. In his electoral campaign, Zelensky advocated for Ukrainian NATO membership and setting up goals to lead the country through necessary reforms to be able to realize a goal of submitting NATO and EU membership applications for 2024²²⁰.

Conclusion

To sum up, the Case Study conducted in current part of the research aimed to show the effectiveness of the EU soft power based on the investigation of the Ukrainian choice in favour for deeper cooperation with the EU. The case study described the historical overview of the EU-Ukraine relations, outlined sources of soft power that EU has been basing its policies towards Ukraine on, analysing limits of soft power and factors influencing on regional integrational choice in Ukraine, paying special attention to the Russia factor. This chapter classified public opinion and perceived advantages and disadvantages of pro-European foreign policy development of Ukraine, the expectations it had and how they guided its choice, leading to signing AA with the EU. Further the Case Study portrayed the consequences and costs of pro-

²¹⁹BALMFORTH Richard, ZINETS, Natalia. *Ukraine president sets 2020 as EU target date, defends peace plan*. Kiev: Reuters, 25 Sep 2014.

²²⁰Zelensky, Poroshenko, Tymoshenko and Gritsenko told how to move to NATO. *Ukrayinska Pravda*. 25.03.2019.

European vector (loosing Crimea and being rushed into War in Donbas losing its territorial integrity) and interpreted the results of public polls from 2012 till 2019 showing the firm support for cooperation with EU between Ukrainian population. Thus, the case study fulfilled its objective and proved, on the example of Ukraine, that EU's soft power is a relevant foreign policy tool to persuade a partner country for deeper cooperation, with Ukraine motivated by soft power EU on its way from Russia dependency through revolution to steady democratization, sharing the EU values and wiliness for further restructuring, making steps towards harmonisation with the EU.

CONCLUSION

The leading actors of world politics nowadays are mainstreaming the use of soft power in their foreign policy. Persuasion has become perceived more and more often to be more effective way of influence rather than coercion. The EU has chosen as its priority approach - partnership building in its nearest neighbourhood. Expanding its values and promoting democratization, healthy economy, sustainability and prosperity, the EU is persuading its neighbours to follow it, providing assistance within partnership mechanisms. After the 2004 enlargement, the borders of the EU have expanded, and it got new neighbours on the East. For applying its soft power policy of attractiveness and latent influence on its new eastern neighbours the EU launched Eastern Partnership (EaP) (within the ENP) to be a framework of political relationship. The six targeted countries of the EaP became: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The current thesis has been aimed to prove that the use of soft power tools helps to gain desired outcomes on the way for partnership building with the countries of Eastern Neighbourhood. The issue is linked to the questions of the EU security, prosperity and its role as a global political actor, thus the matter of the political determination of Eastern Neighbouring

countries is of high importance for Europe. These countries are having a very important geopolitical location, bordering with EU countries and Russia, representing a significantly strategic territory, and its future would define the future of political relations between EU and Russia, influencing on other global actors as well.

The thesis answers to the main research question of the work that the EU soft power is an effective foreign policy tool to persuade Eastern Partnership countries for integration with the EU to guarantee stability of its borders. The main goal of the research to answer the research question and prove the hypothesis has been achieved through accomplishing the objectives of the work. This way, in the first chapter the concept of soft power, its sources and limits were determined and the EU was pictured as a soft power actor, investigating the involvement of soft power mechanisms in its foreign policy. Thereafter, the second chapter starts with the study of the involvement of soft power mechanisms in Eastern Neighbourhood Policy, with further description of the development of the Eastern Partnership, examining the soft power within the policies applied through the EaP on regional level, drawing the way soft power tools engages for cooperation. Afterwards, the current study points out the factors influencing on the EU's leverage in EaP. Having considered the limits of the EU soft power in the region, including Russia factor, the thesis explores the motivations of integrational choice among the EaP countries. Subsequently the last chapter represents a case study, providing with the analysis of the effectiveness of the EU soft power in partnership engagement with Ukraine, applying the theoretical concept of use of soft power onto country level in order to prove the hypothesis of the research.

Performing the evaluation of the research and considering results of the policies applied as per the measurement criteria being signing the partnership treaties the results are favourable for the EU. Currently the EU signed the AAs with three countries (Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine) out of six targeted within the EaP; one country – Azerbaijan - did not sign the AA, but continues an effective cooperation and bilateral dialogue with the EU and did not enter to the

EEU either. In the end only two countries – Armenia and Belarus – entered to the EEU and perceived as failures for EaP for the moment, meanwhile the EU is continuing to proceed with providing assistance through EaP policies and keeping the political dialogue in order to ensure further cooperation.

Significantly, the major contribution of the thesis to the topic was provided with the in-depth interpretation of soft power methods application through the foreign policy of the EU to shape mindsets and behaviours. The thesis provides with structured view on the topic drawing the analysis upon the sources and limits of the soft power approach, considering findings and formulations of political scientists. Having categorized sources of soft power (mainly basing on works of Nye²²¹ and Leonova²²²) the research was seeking to apply the concepts in three dimensions: onto the (1) foreign policies of EU in general, describing its role as a soft²²³, smart²²⁴, normative²²⁵, civilian²²⁶ power, giving an overview of different approaches looking onto the role of the EU in world politics, which being described from different angles contributed into concluding the notion of the EU potential to create its attractiveness; (2) on regional level, through the ENP²²⁷ and EaP²²⁸, looking onto the way the EU exerts its attractive power in its neighbourhood, through the programmes elaborated as framework for the relationships with ENP and EaP countries; in this part of the thesis the research focuses on specific examples of EU

221 NYE, Joseph. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004

222[□] LEONOVA G., Olga. *Soft Power as a State's Foreign Policy Resource*. Almanac: Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Volgograd: Uchitel Publishing House, 2014

223[□] MICHALSKI, Anna. *The EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion*. The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. Edited by Jan Melissen. Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. pp.124-144.

224[□] DAVIS CROSS, Mai'a K. *Europe as a Smart Power: The Impact of the European External Action Service*. Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. September 2011.

225[□] MANNERS, Ian. *Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU*. The European Union between International and World Society. Conference, Panel 1D, Madison, Wisconsin, USA. May 2001.

226[□] VARGHESE, Amal. *The EU been described as a civilian power, normative power and soft power. How would you characterize the EU's power potential?* 2011.

227[□] European Commission. *A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy*. IP/11/643. Brussels 25 May 2011.

228[□] Opt.cit.: From the official web site of the European Council. *Eastern Partnership*.

actions, having studied the documents, action plans and fact sheets²²⁹ on relations of the EU with countries of the EaP, portraying the policies through the prism of soft power sources; (3) and finally the thesis applies the above stated findings onto a country level. Given the fact that the brightest example in order to prove the effectiveness of soft power in partnership engagement in EaP is Ukraine, it was selected for the case study in the current research. The country, indeed had become the biggest battlefield between the EU latent influence of its attractiveness onto the mindset of Ukrainian population based on the use of soft power sources, and the limits of its soft power, being majorly the Russian activity in the region. Ukraine represents a state, oppressed by the hard power of Russia²³⁰ and its domination over decades, where the EU's soft power persuasion to rebuild the country into a democratic, prosperous state has won the society support. The third chapter of the thesis adds to the debate specific findings on the perception of the EU actorness by the society in Ukraine. Thus, 5 articles of Ukrainian political scientists (Frolov²³¹, Shilov²³², Pashina N.P.²³³, Shubravskaia and Prokopenko²³⁴, Skriba²³⁵,) were analysed from the perspective of how the opinion of the population was set towards the cooperation with the EU. Respectively, the interpretation of the articles showed that the society was doubled between the understanding of benefits for further cooperation with the EU, restructuring and democratization and the idea of assumed costs, being the difficulty of change itself and the fear of Russian threats. The research shows that having considered the advantages and disadvantages of the pro-

229 European Commission, EEAS, European Council, various sources from the official web pages of the European Institutions (see: Primary sources on Bibliography)

230 GOBLE, Paul. Putin's Neo-Imperialism: Russia's Shift to Hard Power. Real Clear Defense. June 14, 2017.

231 FROLOV, Vladimir. *The Problem of Ukrainian Participation in the Integration Processes of Europe and Eurasian Region*. Academic Journal "Politics in Focus", 2014'01, pp. 165 – 169.

232 SHILOV, V.N. *To the Question on Geopolitical Orientation of Modern Ukraine*. Belgorod: Academic Journal "Scientific Vedomosti", 2014, No. 1 (172), Edition 29, pp. 184 – 191.

233 PASHINA, N.P. *Crisis of Political Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Foreign Policy Aspect*. Luhansk: Academic Journal "Scientific Vedomosti", 2014, No. 8 (179), Edition 30, pp. 167 – 172.

234 SHUBRAVSKAYA E.V., PROKOPENKO E.A. *Ukraine's Integration Perspectives: Advantages and Risks for the Agrarian Sector*. Kiev: Academic Journal "The Economy of Ukraine", 2014, No. 1 (618), pp. 63 – 73.

235 SKRIBA, Andrei. *Challenges of Eurasian integration after the Ukrainian Crisis*. Academic Journal "Vestnik of international organizations", 2014, No. 3, pp. 96 – 111.

European political course for the country the population in its majority found itself motivated by the idea of prosperity in the support for European future, which driven people for Euromaidan revolution, change of government and signing the AA with the EU. The major input of the thesis in this context is that it shows how the soft power of the EU gained to shape opinions and to exert its attractiveness achieving Ukraine to choose pro-European course. Further this argument is reinforced by the analysis of the costs for Ukraine and investigation of the public opinion towards commitment to the EU orientated foreign policy. According to the Poll conducted by the Sociological group “Rating” on the request of The International Centre for Policy Studies Ukrainians support cooperation with the EU in contrast with membership in the Eurasian Customs Union, the peak in support for building closer ties with the EU had been reached in September 2014, followed by the events of Russian hard power reaction to Ukraine signing the AA with 59% of population to support pro-European foreign policy course²³⁶. During the last years, followed the events of signing and ratification of the AA, taking into account the frozen war conflict in Donbass region and the occupied territory of Crimea, the public opinion towards cooperation with the EU, marked with the percentage of population being solid over 50%²³⁷, being indicative of the firm and lasting support of pro-European course of development for the country amount the majority of population. Thus, the findings based on the public poll²³⁸ resulted to admit that in spite of the costs Ukraine had to pay (loosing Crimea and being rushed into War in Donbas losing its territorial integrity) for its European orientation the support for the idea of building closer ties with the EU remains firm among the majority of population. Therefore, the thesis proves that the EU is successful in turning a neighbour into a partner using soft power resources, strengthened with the evidence of stability of Ukrainian choice, despite the fact that it cost the country a revolution, territorial break-up and a civil war.

236 Sociological group “Rating”. *Socio-Political Moods of Ukrainians IRI Poll*. 30.01.2019, p.77.

237 Sociological group “Rating”. *Socio-Political Moods of Ukrainians IRI Poll*. 30.01.2019, p.77.

238 Ibid.

To sum up, the thesis reached its main goal, it answers the research question and proves the hypothesis, stating that the EU soft power is a relevant approach, forceful guarantor of trust gaining and attractive image creation, and an effective foreign policy tool in order to persuade Eastern Partnership countries for integration with the EU to guarantee stability of its borders. Drawing upon achievements reached with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova the research concluded that the EU soft power is an resultative tool for partnership building in its neighbourhood; however this is a tool that needs time for gaining results, due to the nature of the sources it appeals to.

Soft power as an approach for foreign policy has ever been a topic for debate, because the assets it has in its arsenal are intangible thus cannot be easily measured. The processes involved in soft power application being shaping opinions, persuasion, creation of motivation for action are mechanisms that necessitate long-lasting implementation to provide results, since they are invisible mechanisms of influence; consequently they raise a question of credibility and relevance. Soft power is a tool that a political actor uses with long term perspective. While setting up the attitudes, putting an idea into the mindset of population of other states, the EU as an actor appealing to soft power mechanisms should from various channels keep nourishing its attractiveness through actions such as providing monetary support, social programmes, ensure people to people contacts that reinforce the propaganda of engaging image of the EU in front of targeted states. The necessary components to achieve result is time and persistence. Current research focusing on the EU actions in the east and having described the relations between the EU and the EaP countries proved the EU's ability to get the desired outcomes through the proper and smart use of soft power.

The results of the research conducted in the presented thesis are providing with an outlook for possible extensions. Primarily the research topic urges for extension to follow the development of the policy up to the point when all EaP countries would be committed and convinced for cooperation with the EU, democratisation, harmonization with EU standards and

successful signing of partnership treaties (AA and DCFTA) to be framework for closer cooperation. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus – still did not sign AA, giving a field for further investigation of what is needed more, whether it is extended timing or possibly a need for change in policies, programmes, revision of action plans and try testing different instruments of influence. Hence, the study can be continued and come up with a proposal of a reviewed action plan towards the remaining three states, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus,

Additionally, as far as the methodology and structure of the thesis contributed into proving the hypothesis, the thesis can serve as a basis for soft power policy evaluation in other EU foreign policy programs and towards other states; this same structure can be applied as well to conduct a research of other EU policy evaluation.

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